Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes
n his paper, "Iconocopy," did make an initial stab at identifying objects in the phaneron in terms of their 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns, this being done either within a distinct branch of phenomenology (as I see it} or, as De Tienne puts it it in his subtitle, "between phenomenology and semeiotic." [Note: De Tienne has not further followed this line of thinking.] JAS: In speculative grammar, what classifies something as an object is that it determines a sign to determine an interpretant, such that the object affects the sign but the sign does not affect the object. A pure index would denote its object without signifying any interpretant, and the closest that we can come to such a sign is one whose only effect is drawing attention to something else. GR: And similarly, there are no pure icons, but only signs which are *iconic*. In semeiotic (or speculative, or theoretical) grammar, sign classifications necessarily abstract much of what is intrinsically relational, while an adequate, scientific terminology for doing analyses of specific 'moments' of semiosis seems to me to be scientifically essential. Best, Gary R On Sun, Jul 2, 2023 at 7:03 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Helmut, List: > > One correction--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, the three trichotomies are *not > *for the sign, the object, and the interpretant. They are for the sign > itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), the *relation *of the sign to its > object (icon/index/symbol), and the *relation *of the sign to its > interpretant (rheme/dicent/argument). He later clarifies that they are for > the sign itself (tone/token/type), the relation of the sign to its *dynamical > *object (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its *final > *interpretant > (seme/pheme/delome). > > The sign corresponds to 1ns, the object to 2ns, and the interpretant to > 3ns in accordance with phaneroscopic analysis of their relative > complexity--one sign has two objects (dynamical and immediate) and three > interpretants (final, dynamical, and immediate). However, their relations > are in accordance with Gary Richmond's vector of determination--the two > objects (2ns) determine the one sign (1ns) to determine the three > interpretants (3ns). Likewise, the flow of time is from the accomplished > past (2ns) through the nascent present (1ns) toward the contingent future > (3ns). > > I agree that real semiosis is a *continuous *process, such that our > demarcation of *individual *signs with their objects and interpretants is > at least somewhat arbitrary. In speculative grammar, what classifies > something as an object is that it determines a sign to determine an > interpretant, such that the object affects the sign but the sign does not > affect the object. A pure index would denote its object without signifying > any interpretant, and the closest that we can come to such a sign is one > whose only effect is drawing attention to something else. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jun 30, 2023 at 2:22 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: > >> List, >> >> in physics, especially thermodynamics, we have state variables, e.g. >> temperature, and process variables, e.g. heat. I think, that this >> distinction is transferable to semiotics and the category theory. For >> example, if we look at the sign table, we have in the horizontal dimension >> the categorial distinction between sign, object, and interpretant (I know , >> that not everybody agrees here, but I think, that this is in accord with >> the Peircean categories 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.), and in the vertical dimension too >> the distinction 1,2,3, that distinguishes the sign in quali-, sin-, >> legisign, the object in icon, index, symbol, and the interpretant in rheme, >> dicent, argument. >> >> Now I think, that the horizontal disttinction is about categories applied >> to processes, and the vertical distinction is categories applied to states. >> Both is possible, and it is always goood to have in mind, when speaking of >> categories, whether they are applied to states or processes. >> >> The ten signs, that are possible, consist of dynamic elements, which have >> blended static and processural aspects, somehow. With this vagueity I am >> hoping for your interest and continuation about this topic. >> >> As most critical I see the object: I see it as a process, because a thing >> is only then an object, when it is being denoted, and an object can change. >> I know, that this view somehow confronts the concept of the dynamical >> object, but anyway, look at common speech: An object of i
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes
Jon, List, Thank you for the correction, I remember it now too. And for your hint to the distinction between classes and individual signs: An individual sign is something new, that has not existed before, so it is hard to speak of a relation in the mathematical sense, because there relations are parts of the structure. A structure is something permanent, pre-existed. Therefore, I guess it might be ok to say, that the relations exist between the variables sign, object, interpretant, forming new variables (like "legisign", "icon", "rheme", and so on), and not between the individuals the variables stand for. At least, if we are talking about the sign classes table. Otherwise, if we say, that real individual signs have relations with real objects and interpretants, these relations would be parts of the structure of a somehow all- encompassing realm of possibilities, about which it is hard or useless to talk. So, maybe (in the sign classes table) the relations are process variables, because they are not distinct, but parts. In the vertical direction, you might call the distinctions (e.g. between legisign and sinsign) relations too, which are state variables. Well, maybe. And what kind of variables are the connections between the relations` relations (such as "rhematic indexical legisign")? On one hand, real signs are continuous, on the other, these variables are distinct, each showing an irreducible triad. Perhaps you cannot easily transfer thermodynamics to semiotics. Best Regards Helmut Gesendet: Montag, 03. Juli 2023 um 01:03 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" An: "Peirce-L" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes Helmut, List: One correction--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, the three trichotomies are not for the sign, the object, and the interpretant. They are for the sign itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), the relation of the sign to its object (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its interpretant (rheme/dicent/argument). He later clarifies that they are for the sign itself (tone/token/type), the relation of the sign to its dynamical object (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its final interpretant (seme/pheme/delome). The sign corresponds to 1ns, the object to 2ns, and the interpretant to 3ns in accordance with phaneroscopic analysis of their relative complexity--one sign has two objects (dynamical and immediate) and three interpretants (final, dynamical, and immediate). However, their relations are in accordance with Gary Richmond's vector of determination--the two objects (2ns) determine the one sign (1ns) to determine the three interpretants (3ns). Likewise, the flow of time is from the accomplished past (2ns) through the nascent present (1ns) toward the contingent future (3ns). I agree that real semiosis is a continuous process, such that our demarcation of individual signs with their objects and interpretants is at least somewhat arbitrary. In speculative grammar, what classifies something as an object is that it determines a sign to determine an interpretant, such that the object affects the sign but the sign does not affect the object. A pure index would denote its object without signifying any interpretant, and the closest that we can come to such a sign is one whose only effect is drawing attention to something else. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 30, 2023 at 2:22 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: List, in physics, especially thermodynamics, we have state variables, e.g. temperature, and process variables, e.g. heat. I think, that this distinction is transferable to semiotics and the category theory. For example, if we look at the sign table, we have in the horizontal dimension the categorial distinction between sign, object, and interpretant (I know , that not everybody agrees here, but I think, that this is in accord with the Peircean categories 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.), and in the vertical dimension too the distinction 1,2,3, that distinguishes the sign in quali-, sin-, legisign, the object in icon, index, symbol, and the interpretant in rheme, dicent, argument. Now I think, that the horizontal disttinction is about categories applied to processes, and the vertical distinction is categories applied to states. Both is possible, and it is always goood to have in mind, when speaking of categories, whether they are applied to states or processes. The ten signs, that are possible, consist of dynamic elements, which have blended static and processural aspects, somehow. With this vagueity I am hoping for your interest and continuation about this topic. As most critical I see the object: I see it as a process, because a thing is only then an object, when it
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes
Helmut, List: One correction--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, the three trichotomies are *not *for the sign, the object, and the interpretant. They are for the sign itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), the *relation *of the sign to its object (icon/index/symbol), and the *relation *of the sign to its interpretant (rheme/dicent/argument). He later clarifies that they are for the sign itself (tone/token/type), the relation of the sign to its *dynamical *object (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its *final *interpretant (seme/pheme/delome). The sign corresponds to 1ns, the object to 2ns, and the interpretant to 3ns in accordance with phaneroscopic analysis of their relative complexity--one sign has two objects (dynamical and immediate) and three interpretants (final, dynamical, and immediate). However, their relations are in accordance with Gary Richmond's vector of determination--the two objects (2ns) determine the one sign (1ns) to determine the three interpretants (3ns). Likewise, the flow of time is from the accomplished past (2ns) through the nascent present (1ns) toward the contingent future (3ns). I agree that real semiosis is a *continuous *process, such that our demarcation of *individual *signs with their objects and interpretants is at least somewhat arbitrary. In speculative grammar, what classifies something as an object is that it determines a sign to determine an interpretant, such that the object affects the sign but the sign does not affect the object. A pure index would denote its object without signifying any interpretant, and the closest that we can come to such a sign is one whose only effect is drawing attention to something else. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 30, 2023 at 2:22 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: > List, > > in physics, especially thermodynamics, we have state variables, e.g. > temperature, and process variables, e.g. heat. I think, that this > distinction is transferable to semiotics and the category theory. For > example, if we look at the sign table, we have in the horizontal dimension > the categorial distinction between sign, object, and interpretant (I know , > that not everybody agrees here, but I think, that this is in accord with > the Peircean categories 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.), and in the vertical dimension too > the distinction 1,2,3, that distinguishes the sign in quali-, sin-, > legisign, the object in icon, index, symbol, and the interpretant in rheme, > dicent, argument. > > Now I think, that the horizontal disttinction is about categories applied > to processes, and the vertical distinction is categories applied to states. > Both is possible, and it is always goood to have in mind, when speaking of > categories, whether they are applied to states or processes. > > The ten signs, that are possible, consist of dynamic elements, which have > blended static and processural aspects, somehow. With this vagueity I am > hoping for your interest and continuation about this topic. > > As most critical I see the object: I see it as a process, because a thing > is only then an object, when it is being denoted, and an object can change. > I know, that this view somehow confronts the concept of the dynamical > object, but anyway, look at common speech: An object of interest has not > been an object of interest before somebody had showed interest, has it? > > Best Regards! > > Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes
Helmut and List--- It seems correct to say that the categories are correspondently represented in phenomenal representamen that are signs and that such signs in turn are clearly reflective of the categories, so that both categories and signs are likely applicable to physics, whether physics is held to be theoretical as a formal science or held to be practical as a natural science. This aspect of the topic you suggest is intriguing for me as a Peirceanite, but your message has several pairs of terms that for me might need to be more fully defined in relation to Peirceanism. These pairs include: dimension/distinction, horizontal/vertical, process/state, static/dynamic, aspect/element, thing/object. There may also be a diagonal aspect to some of Peircean semiosis that you might want to include in your probe. For now, let me find out at my end where physics itself is mainly or usually located in Peircean philosophy and science. ---Frances From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien Sent: Friday, 30 June, 2023 15:22 To: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes List, in physics, especially thermodynamics, we have state variables, e.g. temperature, and process variables, e.g. heat. I think, that this distinction is transferable to semiotics and the category theory. For example, if we look at the sign table, we have in the horizontal dimension the categorial distinction between sign, object, and interpretant (I know , that not everybody agrees here, but I think, that this is in accord with the Peircean categories 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.), and in the vertical dimension too the distinction 1,2,3, that distinguishes the sign in quali-, sin-, legisign, the object in icon, index, symbol, and the interpretant in rheme, dicent, argument. Now I think, that the horizontal disttinction is about categories applied to processes, and the vertical distinction is categories applied to states. Both is possible, and it is always goood to have in mind, when speaking of categories, whether they are applied to states or processes. The ten signs, that are possible, consist of dynamic elements, which have blended static and processural aspects, somehow. With this vagueity I am hoping for your interest and continuation about this topic. As most critical I see the object: I see it as a process, because a thing is only then an object, when it is being denoted, and an object can change. I know, that this view somehow confronts the concept of the dynamical object, but anyway, look at common speech: An object of interest has not been an object of interest before somebody had showed interest, has it? Best Regards! Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes
List, in physics, especially thermodynamics, we have state variables, e.g. temperature, and process variables, e.g. heat. I think, that this distinction is transferable to semiotics and the category theory. For example, if we look at the sign table, we have in the horizontal dimension the categorial distinction between sign, object, and interpretant (I know , that not everybody agrees here, but I think, that this is in accord with the Peircean categories 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.), and in the vertical dimension too the distinction 1,2,3, that distinguishes the sign in quali-, sin-, legisign, the object in icon, index, symbol, and the interpretant in rheme, dicent, argument. Now I think, that the horizontal disttinction is about categories applied to processes, and the vertical distinction is categories applied to states. Both is possible, and it is always goood to have in mind, when speaking of categories, whether they are applied to states or processes. The ten signs, that are possible, consist of dynamic elements, which have blended static and processural aspects, somehow. With this vagueity I am hoping for your interest and continuation about this topic. As most critical I see the object: I see it as a process, because a thing is only then an object, when it is being denoted, and an object can change. I know, that this view somehow confronts the concept of the dynamical object, but anyway, look at common speech: An object of interest has not been an object of interest before somebody had showed interest, has it? Best Regards! Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] The history of science and Kant's mistaken response to Hume
(E) ∧ BeyondInteraction(E) ∧ Knowable(E) ∧ TranscendentalReason(R) ∧ (E ∉ ExistWith(S, T)) Differentially: To express the given decision tree in a consistent logic and incorporate paraconsistent logic at the specified point, we can modify the formulation as follows: - Does Self Exist? - Yes: - Does Self exist with 'things'? - Yes: Proceed to Step 3 - No: Terminate - Does Self exist with 'things'? - Yes: Proceed to Step 3 - No: Terminate - Is the self's existence with things the definition of the self or the things with which it exists? - Yes*: Proceed to Step 4 - No**: Proceed to Step 5 - Terminal: ∀S ∃T ∃D: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧ Definition(S, T) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ S) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ T) - Yes/No***: At this point, the decision tree breaks into paraconsistent logic, allowing for the handling of contradictory options. We retain the ontological form and proceed with the following formulation: - No Godel (not true), but: - Godelresolved: ∀S ∃T ∃E ∃R: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧ Essence(E) ∧ BeyondInteraction(E) ∧ Knowable(E) ∧ TranscendentalReason(R) ∧ (E ∉ ExistWith(S, T)) In this modified formulation, the decision tree remains consistent until Step 5, where paraconsistent logic is introduced to handle contradictory options. Step 4 represents the ontological form in consistent logic, while Step 6 formalizes the ontological assertions within paraconsistent logic while retaining the ontological structure. Peirce's semeiotic is great but he is wrong to say the "ding an sich" is meaningless. I can explain Godel a hundred different ways by the necessary acceptance of it. I accomodate Godel and then explain, elsewhere, the entire premise of incompleteness within the Kantian framework and beyond it. It is a KnownIncognizable (we know such a thing, in itself, exists, but cannot represent or feel/think it as it is in itself). This is just the now easily proven truth (though the argument will take longer). My thesis advisor has access to enormous amounts of data which aren't shared here and knows the consistency is perfect (though that much of my logical formulation will alter to eliminate natural language ambiguity and various small errors which you note). Best Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce
n he also >>> argues that a computer’s “understanding” is based on inference of indexes >>> and icons rather than symbols (though he does not use such terms). >>> >>> I discuss these points at length in my forthcoming book and I will be >>> giving a talk on this at Google’s headquarters in July. >>> >>> Another benefit of Peirce’s philosophy over standard linguistics comes >>> into view when we consider what I call “Frege’s error.” As we all know >>> Peirce and Frege were developing propositional and first-order logic nearly >>> simultaneously. However, Frege’s axiom-based system proposes a crucial role >>> for the Fregean concept of compositionality in language, whereas Peirce’s >>> Existential Graphs provide an inferential, non-compositional model of >>> meaning. In my forthcoming work (and in a few talks I have given recently >>> in pro-Fregean linguistics departments (which is pretty much all >>> linguistics departments) I argue that compositionality is too weak (it >>> cannot extend beyond the sentence/proposition) and too strong (it creates >>> faux problems such as the veritable core of most formal linguistics, >>> “gap-filler” analyses, e.g. movement rules) whereas inferentialism provides >>> the best coverage. >>> >>> Peirce’s inferentialism is similar to, but much more general, than >>> Brandom’s inferentialism (also as developed by Peregrin). So Peirce, in my >>> analysis, is right at the center of current debates on the nature of human >>> language. I also make this point in my 2017 book, How Language Began (and >>> Homo erectus scholar Larry Barham and I make this point based on much more >>> archaeological evidence from Homo erectus sites: >>> https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10816-020-09480-9 >>> >>> All best, >>> >>> Dan >>> >>> On Apr 20, 2023, at 4:47 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >>> >>> Dan, if I would read all of Chomsky´s, and would not find him claiming, >>> that his genetic grammar-module is not based on logic, then I would have to >>> quote all he ever has written. The other way round would be easier. And: >>> Refutation is a strong accusation, and I think the prosecutor has the >>> burden of proof. >>> Best, Helmut >>> >>> >>> *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 19. April 2023 um 20:28 Uhr >>> *Von:* "Dan Everett" >>> *An:* "Helmut Raulien" >>> *Cc:* g...@gnusystems.ca, "Peirce-L" >>> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce >>> You’ll have to read your way through the literature. >>> >>> D >>> >>> >>> On Apr 19, 2023, at 2:27 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >>> >>> >>> Dan, List, >>> >>> First i apologize for posting unrelated in the main thread. >>> >>> I appreciate your argument and find it a great insight. Now, is this a >>> refutation of Chomsky´s theory or not? A computer program perhaps does not >>> need such a module, because it can research and develop language from >>> universal (natural) logic with Peirce´s contribution to discovering it >>> included. But maybe the evolution of the brain works differently: There is >>> no direct, analytical reference to universal logic, I would say. Evolution >>> is all about viability. But of course, viability is greater if it is in >>> accord with universal logic. It then simply works out, while when not being >>> in accord, it doesn´t. But, with a direct link to logic missing, I guess >>> for evolution it is a good idea, to install viable, well tested routines >>> for modules from time to time, which are then inherited and give >>> instructions. So maybe humans do have a grammar module, although for a >>> computer such a thing is not necessary. Instead of "module" you may call it >>> "instinct", i think, like a bird knows how to build a nest without first >>> logically pondering "What should I do to have something to lay my eggs >>> in?". So, all i wanted to object, was, that all that is not a refutation of >>> Chomsky´s work. That is, unless he explicitly should have claimed, that >>> this module/instinct is the starting source/reference of language, and does >>> itself not have a reference to logic. Which would be absurd, i think. >>> >>> Best Regards >>> Helmut >>> >>> 19. April 2023 um 19:37 Uhr >>> "Dan Everett" >>> *
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce
nu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf > > > > > I read this paper several years ago when I asked Michael to explain the > important notion of 'markedness' in linguistics for a NYC philosophy club > we are both members of, and he pointed to this paper. But I haven't > sufficient knowledge of linguistics nor Chat GPT to enter this discussion. > So, this is offered as material that those who have such knowledge might > find of interest, especially from a Peircean perspective. > http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf > > To all: this paper and many Peirce and Peirce-related papers may be found > at *Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway *https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > > > On Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 5:18 AM Dan Everett > wrote: > >> Helmut, >> >> There are only two claims here, one by Chomsky and one by Peirce.Although >> both use the term ‘instinct’ and ‘innate,’ these mean quite different >> things for both of them (there is a tendency to interpret Peirce’s (Hume’s, >> Locke’s, etc) use of “instinct” (and many other terms) anachronistically). >> >> In any case, Chomsky claims that language is not learned, in fact that it >> cannot be learned. It is “acquired” via innate structure that emerges via >> triggering via the environment. >> >> Peirce claims that all knowledge, ontogenetic or phylogenetic (but that >> is often/usually misinterpreted as well) is gained via inference over signs. >> >> What ChatGPT has done (and the Piantadosi article is crucial to seeing >> this clearly, so I assume you have read it) is to show that language >> structures AND their meanings can be learned by inference over signs. >> ChatGPT does rely on LLM (Large Language Models) and children do not, but >> work is already being done to produce the results based on more realistic >> data bases. >> >> Now if any system can learn a language via inference over signs, Chomsky >> is wrong. QED. >> >> The question that arises, however, is whether ChatGPT (or computers in >> Searle’s Chinese Room Gedanken experiment) are inferring over indexes and >> icons or also symbols (human language is differentiated from all other >> communication system via the open-ended cultural production of symbols). >> This also challenges the Turing Test, as Searle points out when he also >> argues that a computer’s “understanding” is based on inference of indexes >> and icons rather than symbols (though he does not use such terms). >> >> I discuss these points at length in my forthcoming book and I will be >> giving a talk on this at Google’s headquarters in July. >> >> Another benefit of Peirce’s philosophy over standard linguistics comes >> into view when we consider what I call “Frege’s error.” As we all know >> Peirce and Frege were developing propositional and first-order logic nearly >> simultaneously. However, Frege’s axiom-based system proposes a crucial role >> for the Fregean concept of compositionality in language, whereas Peirce’s >> Existential Graphs provide an inferential, non-compositional model of >> meaning. In my forthcoming work (and in a few talks I have given recently >> in pro-Fregean linguistics departments (which is pretty much all >> linguistics departments) I argue that compositionality is too weak (it >> cannot extend beyond the sentence/proposition) and too strong (it creates >> faux problems such as the veritable core of most formal linguistics, >> “gap-filler” analyses, e.g. movement rules) whereas inferentialism provides >> the best coverage. >> >> Peirce’s inferentialism is similar to, but much more general, than >> Brandom’s inferentialism (also as developed by Peregrin). So Peirce, in my >> analysis, is right at the center of current debates on the nature of human >> language. I also make this point in my 2017 book, How Language Began (and >> Homo erectus scholar Larry Barham and I make this point based on much more >> archaeological evidence from Homo erectus sites: >> https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10816-020-09480-9 >> >> All best, >> >> Dan >> >> On Apr 20, 2023, at 4:47 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> >> Dan, if I would read all of Chomsky´s, and would not find him claiming, >> that his genetic grammar-module is not based on logic, then I would have to >> quote all he ever has written. The other way round would be easier. And: >> Refutation is a strong accusation, and I think the prosecutor has the >> burden of proof. >> Best, Helmut >> >> >> *
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] DIALETHEISM AND THE INEFFABILITY OF GOD - GRAHAM PRIEST: The Logic and Religion Webinar
Dear Francesco, List, Google translator translates "ineffable" to german "unbeschreiblich", which means "not describable". If "not describable" is itself a description, this paradoxon lies within the term, not in anything that the term applies to, I would say. Same with "almighty": If God cannot make a rock too heavy for Him to pick up, He is not almighty, because either He cannot pick it up, or He cannot make such a rock. Just now, I am starting to guess, that this paradoxon too is one of the term, and not one of God. Before I had thought, that the solution lies in the "Son"- part of the trinity, as Jesus is not almighty. But still I think it is possible, that this way God has solved the paradoxon, though it is not His one, but the term`s, the human-made concept`s. Maybe same with "ineffable"? Jesus as a human can be described (by humans)? Best Helmut Gesendet: Mittwoch, 14. Juni 2023 um 20:49 Uhr Von: "FRANCISCO MARIANO" An: "Peirce-L" Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] DIALETHEISM AND THE INEFFABILITY OF GOD - GRAHAM PRIEST: The Logic and Religion Webinar Dear Colleague, You are invited to participate in the next session of the Logic and Religion Webinar Series which will be held on June 15, 2023, at 4pm CET with the topic: DIALETHEISM AND THE INEFFABILITY OF GOD Speaker: Graham Priest (City University of New York, USA) Chair: Agnieszka Rostalska (Ghent University, Belgium) Please check the link to register and recieve a zoom link: https://www.logicandreligion.com/webinars Abstract: Many Christian philosophers have argued that God is ineffable. Of course, in arguing for this, they talk about God. So God cannot be ineffable. Call this the self-referential trap. One way out of the trap is to accept that God is both effable and ineffable. It might be thought that such a view is incoherent. But it can be shown to make perfectly good sense using the techniques of paraconsistent logic. In this talk, I will show how. Join us 5 minutes prior to the beginning of the session! With best wishes, -- Francisco de Assis Mariano The University of Missouri-Columbia LARA Secretary _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ��� PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ��� To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ��� PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Paraconsistent Newsletter Spring-Fall 2023
Just released including an interview with Elena Ficara, and papers, books, videos, events of interest for paraconsistentists Enjoy ! Paraconsistent Newsletter Spring-Fall 2023 https://sites.google.com/view/paranews-2023-2 Jean-Yves Beziau Editor of the Paraconsistent Newsletter _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] DIALETHEISM AND THE INEFFABILITY OF GOD - GRAHAM PRIEST: The Logic and Religion Webinar
Dear Colleague, You are invited to participate in the next session of the Logic and Religion Webinar Series which will be held on June 15, 2023, at 4pm CET with the topic: DIALETHEISM AND THE INEFFABILITY OF GOD Speaker: Graham Priest<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Priest> (City University of New York, USA) Chair: Agnieszka Rostalska<https://research.flw.ugent.be/en/agnieszka.rostalska> (Ghent University, Belgium) Please check the link to register and recieve a zoom link: https://www.logicandreligion.com/webinars Abstract: Many Christian philosophers have argued that God is ineffable. Of course, in arguing for this, they talk about God. So God cannot be ineffable. Call this the self-referential trap. One way out of the trap is to accept that God is both effable and ineffable. It might be thought that such a view is incoherent. But it can be shown to make perfectly good sense using the techniques of paraconsistent logic. In this talk, I will show how. Join us 5 minutes prior to the beginning of the session! With best wishes, -- Francisco de Assis Mariano The University of Missouri-Columbia LARA Secretary _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Your claim is unpublishable (was Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)))
John, I do appreciate the advice but: 1. Embodied Existence: Individuals exist as embodied beings in a physical universe. ∃x (Individual(x) ∧ Embodied(x) ∧ InPhysicalUniverse(x)) 2. Derivation of Experience: Human understanding and feeling are derivational of physical elements via sensate experiences. ∀x (Human(x) → (∃y (PhysicalElements(y) ∧ Sensate(x, y 3. Essence and Representation: Every organism and element has an essence (in itself), which cannot be represented within the physical universe. ∀x (Organism(x) ∨ Element(x) → (∃e Essence(x) ∧ ¬RepresentedWithinPhysicalUniverse(x, e 4. Mediation and Perception: Perception involves mediation and interpretation of elemental qualities through cognitive processes. ∀x, y (Perception(x, y) → (∃z (Mediation(z) ∧ Interpretation(x, y, z) What Intend to prove is absolutely provable once I move from generalization to specificity, and back out again. Weaving between macro and micro categoricals and threading the needle for the sake of nuance. I understand you think it is unprovable, but I know it to be provable for I have proven it. The problem isn't proving it - the incognizability of the thing in itself which nonetheless may be understood to exist without any contradiction at all - but rather in framing it within the canon. This is my task. JFS: Re point #1; Two people looking at the same thing at the same time will see different views of it. That is obvious and irrelevant to the claim that anything about the object is unrecognizable.. 1. But, if obvious, and I agree, it is, then the inference should also be obvious: the thing in itself necessarily is even as you cannot cognize it. JFS: There is ZERO evidence that any aspect of any physical object can be forever unrecognizable. 2. I have logical and empirical evidence - axiomatic, and a lot of it - that such is true insofar as the thing in itself goes. It's not a claim for me any more, I have gone beyond that, which I know will sound hubristic, but that's not my intent. I have situated entire linguistic/anthropological/mathematical/physical epistemes within a frame just narrow and general enough to demonstrate precisely what I mean. It is proven. I just await the publication notes. JFS: He denied that their were any properties or aspects of any Ding an sich that could never be recognized (i,e,, detected or observed in any way). For any object x, this point can be proved by tests on objects or parts of objects that are similar to x. 3. He denies that you can cognize it. He says, explicitly, "...in half a dozen ways the Ding an sich has been proved to be nonsensical.” (CP, 5.525) Again, “The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all reference to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage.” That it can be neither indicated, nor found, is precisely where Peirce was/is wrong. That it - the thing in itself - has here been accepted but not as Peirce here has it, but instead as something else, which is also not where Peirce, differentially now, does truthfully have it, as it were: "It is perfectly true that we can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is all the universe is for us." That is the derivational (of the "essence", noumenal, called physical world of appearances, which I have lain out in logical form above). Here Peirce is correct. This is a true position. I demonstrate it consistently in my paper, in logic, in empirical framing, throughout linguistics, sociology, physics, mathematics, principles, and so on. It - to me - and I think to many, when published, is not ambiguous. Peircean Semeiotic helps me enormously but I don't carry all of Peirce any more than I carry all of Kant or all of Hume (it's not feasible or necessary). At any rate, the thesis when published will be the end of the matter (for me). It'll be debated, argued, accepted, ignored, rejected, or however it is greeted or not greeted, it will, nonetheless be the resolution of a long time spent pondering this issue. Best Jack I do appreciate all of your commentary, by the way, it has been immensely helpful. I know we won't agree on the strict Peircean, for perhaps I am wrong? I'm happy if that is true, for I live by the maxim "let truth decide" (the Peircean spirit of inquiry and fallibilism to my mind). From: John F Sowa Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2023 6:29 PM To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY ; Peirce-L Subject: [EXTERNAL] Your claim is unpublishable (was Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))) *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unles
[PEIRCE-L] Your claim is unpublishable (was Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)))
Jack,
Your latest summary is very clear. Unfortunately, there are three criticisms
that make it unacceptable for any serious publication:
According to three ways of interpreting the phrase "in itself", your claim is
(1) obvious and irrelevant, (2) complex and unprovable, (3) irrelevant to
anything Peirce wrote about Kant's claim.
Re point #1; Two people looking at the same thing at the same time will see
different views of it. That is obvious and irrelevant to the claim that
anything about the object is unrecognizable..
Re #2: There are an uncountable infinity (continuous range of perspectives and
aspects) of any object that can be detected and recognized by the open-ended
range of scientific instruments available now or in the future. There is ZERO
evidence that any aspect of any physical object can be forever unrecognizable..
Re #3: Peirce's claim was much simpler and much easier to prove than total
recognition of everything (as in #2). He denied that their were any properties
or aspects of any Ding an sich that could never be recognized (i,e,, detected
or observed in any way). For any object x, this point can be proved by tests
on objects or parts of objects that are similar to x.
There was strong evidence for point #3 when Peirce made it, and the evidence
has become stronger every year since then.
Suggestion: Please print out this note and my note note from yesterday. Then
let us know what your adviser says about them.
John
From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY"
My drawing skills are clearly fallible, but the structure is as presented (as I
analyze it).
The "object" (in itself) never is cognized as it is in itself.
Via linguistic structuralism, which here is recursive entailment, we see how
one person's O' (iterative/derivational "copy/experience/representation") of
the thing in itself as "object" exists within that person's frame of reference.
But, also, why it is not necessary (or plausible) that the thing as it is in
itself should/could be cognized as it is in its "in itself" aspect.
This is how, structurally, people come to argue about the objective validity of
any given object, which object is "common" but idiosyncratic. It is both
"shared" yet from each "cogito"
(personhood/individuality/perspective-experience), it is necessarily
derivational and thus recursive. Universal Grammar, at core, functions, (I
arrive at publication soon), in its nativist principles - poverty of stimulus,
recursion, and so on - because the thing in itself is as Kant described. Now, I
am open to all counter arguments which can situate this very basic structure,
of the below, sui generis, within a Peircean frame and thus dislodge the
Kantian "price" (of the incognizable). That would be me citing any of you as my
conclusion if it is possible to articulate. Many will be/are cited anyway
(their literature).
It is this:
H1)O(H2
H1[O'])O(H2[O']
-
")"=experience, necessarily mediated, thus "representation/frame".
-
All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually, "refracted" or
"represented" ("copied", Kant says, "represented", Peirce says, though I treat
them as calques) and thus, within cognition it doesn't only seem surplus to
requirements that the thing in itself should be cognized but that it cannot be,
as per its Kantian definition, seems, to me, to pose no problem at all. It
rather answers so many: Chomsky, Godel, Peirce, Saussure, Jakobson, Bourdieu,
Foucault, Russell, Einstein, Newton, string/quantum, and on and on.
If it is wrong, the thing in itself, then none of these make any real coherent
sense. If it is true, all of these need to make more sense than they currently
do. That is the frame which my (many theses) are engaging with. The treatment
here, however, is narrowed: Hume, Kant, Peirce, Godel, Chomsky. The latter two
merely are canonical logical/empirical support for the necessary proof of the
thing in itself as incognizable and thus a more coherent understanding of what
we call "cognition" itself.
As to where it falls, it doesn't bother me. I'm not an ideologue in this
matter. If either can be disproven, then I go where the truth goes.
Best
Jack
P.S.
I'll refrain from replying now except to thank all for their contributions in a
fruitful dialogue (but will of course read any and all responses). JFS is right
when he says we can go back and forth too much and until I publish, and situate
with nuance, which goes to peer review, anyway, it isn't strictly right of me
to allude to things that I cannot delineate here in full context. It's not
about quotations for me - it's deconstruction of the very structural process of
mediation/communication/language/physics itself and then quotation
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jon, List,
If you can merely explain to me How a representation of a thing in itself can
be except that the thing is in itself is represented and thus beyond the
representation as that thing is in itself even whilst represented (formally)
and I will concede my position immediately. This, to my mind, and research,
simply cannot be. If it can be such that you can represent a thing in itself,
as it is in itself, then I will admit scholarly defeat in this productive
argument.
For we all agree that the thing exists in itself, or that the thing in itself
exists, but differ as to whether we can represent it as it is in itself (this
is how narrowly we've managed, collectively, to bring the debate in).
That's all I ask. And if you think you've explained it already, I merely ask
you for the requisite patience to tolerate my lack of understanding and explain
it one last time.
Best
Jack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Monday, June 12, 2023 11:46 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the
Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jack, List:
JRKC: There is no Peircean Semeiotic, whatsoever - without the Kantian thing in
itself. ... It isn't possible for Peircean Semeiotic to be coherent except that
thing in itself exists beyond all possible cognition.
The pioneer of Peircean semeiotic strongly disagrees, and so do most (maybe
all) of his successors in that field. Your claims continue to reflect a
fundamental misunderstanding of it, which you are apparently unwilling to
acknowledge, let alone correct.
JRKC: All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually, "refracted"
or "represented" ("copied", Kant says) and thus, within cognition never can be
as they are in themselves for the in itself is the very derivational "source"
of the "copy/representational".
Again, a cognition of an external thing is not a copy or reproduction of that
thing, nor is it identical to that thing. It is a representation (sign) of that
thing, which is why a solid grasp of Peircean semeiotic and its peculiar
terminology is a prerequisite for engaging in productive dialogue on this
subject.
JRKC: The thing/object exists to/for people, but as individuals, we never
derive the same "copy" of the thing, even the same thing.
Again, "copy" is an inaccurate term in this context. Different people routinely
perceive the same external thing, but their percepts are different signs of
that same external thing, i.e., they are determined by the same dynamical
object.
JRKC: Right, but all they perceive, all we perceive, is necesarily
differentiated representation of the "same" object.
No, what we perceive are not representations of an external thing, we directly
perceive that external thing itself. The percept is a representation (sign)
determined by that dynamical object, and the resulting perceptual judgment is
the dynamical interpretant that the percept determines. In any actual situation
where all the perceivers have fallible habits of interpretation, which are
different, their perceptual judgments as dynamical interpretants can likewise
be different. However, in the ideal situation where all the perceivers would
have infallible habits of interpretation--e.g., an infinite community after
infinite investigation--all their perceptual judgments as dynamical
interpretants would match the final interpretant, thus representing the
external thing as it is in itself.
JRKC: Yes, but those things we cognize - physical - are necessarily independent
of that cognition. In themselves. That's the categorical error people are
making here.
On the contrary, not one participant in this discussion is making that
"categorical error"--again, no one is disputing that external things are
independent of any actual cognitions or other representations of them. The
dynamical object determines any sign that represents it, but the sign does not
affect its dynamical object in any way. Nevertheless, this does not entail that
external things cannot possibly be cognized or otherwise represented as they
really are.
JRKC: But if the object is cognizable as it is in itself, (thus not in itself
at all, in the Kantian sense), then there are no "copies" qua "representations"
which differ according to individuality (according to "different perceptual
perspectives and faculties").
No, this is false. Again, the fact that we do not actually cognize the object
as it is in itself (multiple dynamical interpretants) does not entail that we
cannot possibly cognize the object as it is in itself (one final interpretant).
Again, this is what makes logic as semeiotic a normative science--the goal of
sincere inquiry is to conform all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their
final inte
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
John, Jon, list,
I suggest that Jack should study Peirce's writings about phaneroscopy, the
normative sciences, cognition, and scientific methodology. I'm sure that the
rest of us can suggest passages in Peirce's writings he should consider.
Absolutely, John. This is a "framing" issue. It wouldn't bother me in the
slightest if my thesis explores the inability to cognize things as they are,
and then explores the problems with that position (and we have had an immense
back and forth over these very nuances). Whatever the truth is, (closest to
it), is that which must decide, now, for me, within the analytical/academic
frame.
That is why I truly welcome all suggestions. Even if I disagree, now, in the
tradition of Socratic Heurism, the disagreement is worthwhile we arrive at some
form of consensus regarding the truth of the matter. That is why I ask @Jon
Alan Schmidt<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> for materials, which I know he
knows far better than I do, regarding "interpretants" and "dynamical objects".
I need to study certain Peircean nuance for I have the Kantian nuance already.
Now, I'm with you - you are closer to intermediary here - but not against any
person, just against/for a "position" (which is the spirit of all debate
really).
That is, this - academia - can get bitter at times, and I am guilty of that,
too, but that's not the overarching theological principle (to my mind, or, I
think, to most or all people here).
Jack
____
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on
behalf of John F Sowa
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2023 5:24 AM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the
Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jon and Jack,
I believe that there is a way out of this impasse. Although I agree that
Jon's conclusion is correct, I believe that we have to state the issues of
perception, cognition, and semeiotic with more precision, In particular, it's
essential to state the issues in terms of Peirce's first three sciences: (1)
Pure mathematics, which includes mathematical logic; (2) phaneroscopy, which
receives an uninterpreted mental experience prior to any application of signs
of any kind; and (3) the normative sciences of (3a) esthetics (beauty); (3b)
ethics (goodness); and (3c) logic as semeiotic (truth).
Following are the two critical statements by Jack and Jon:
JRKC: All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually,
"refracted" or "represented" ("copied", Kant says) and thus, within cognition
never can be as they are in themselves for the in itself is the very
derivational "source" of the "copy/representational".
JAS: Again, a cognition of an external thing is not a copy or reproduction of
that thing, nor is it identical to that thing. It is a representation (sign) of
that thing, which is why a solid grasp of Peircean semeiotic and its peculiar
terminology is a prerequisite for engaging in productive dialogue on this
subject.
I agree with Jon. But it's important to distinguish the role of the first two
sciences, which precede semeiotic. Mathematics provides and open-ended supply
of structural patterns (in Peirce's terms, diagrams or even stereoscopic moving
images). The senses provide mental experience from all five senses of
external stimuli and all internal stimuli. That experience, which Peirce
called the phaneron is not a representation of anything. It just is a
primitive, completely uninterpreted experience. The first step of phaneroscopy
is to retrieve or generate new mathematical patterns or retrieve previous
(habitual) patterns that correspond (as accurately as possible in just a few
milliseconds) to the patterns in the phaneron.
Peirce called that initial pattern an uninterpreted icon. The icon is a sign
prior to any recognition. The interpretation of the icon as a token of some
type in the next stage is performed by the normative sciences. At the end of
that stage the token is recognized and evaluated as a sign of the beauty,
goodness, and truth of the object that was perceived.
Note that the phrase "in itself" never occurs in this explanation. Nobody ever
thinks about whether they have seen an object in itself. Their main concern is
whether it's a familiar (habitual) sign of something they know from previous
experience, a new instance of a familiar type, or a new type they are seeing
for the first time. The question about a "thing in itself" would never occur
to anybody except a philosopher or perhaps a scientist.
Since Peirce was both a philosopher and a scientist, we should ask how he would
explain that process of perception and interpretation. I suggest that Jack
should study Peirce's writings about phaneroscopy, the normative sciences,
cognition, and scientific methodology. I'm su
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
that case, then, if we can find out the right method of thinking and can follow it out--the right method of transforming signs--then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately carry us. In that case, that to which the representation should conform, is itself something in the nature of a representation, or sign--something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself. (CP 5.553, EP 2:380, 1906) Peirce's metaphysical alternative to throwing up our hands and resigning ourselves to Kant's incognizable thing-in-itself is recognizing that the entire universe is an immense sign--a semiosic continuum that "is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--which is precisely why it is intelligible at all. In short, everything is, in itself, of the nature of a sign, and therefore cognizable. Cheers, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
tated by concurrence of > individual experience of an objective quality which has to exist beyond the > subjective representation of it. > > JAS: > 1: The two different [humans] do not perceive two different "copies" of > object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself. > 2: However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give > them two different representations of object 1. > > Right, but all they perceive, all we perceive, is necesarily > differentiated representation of the "same" object. What difference is > there between these "two different representations" and the Kantian > "copies" in the above? > > "no one is disputing that those external things exist independently of > those perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them." > > Yes, but those things we cognize - physical - are necessarily independent > of that cognition. In themselves. That's the categorical error people are > making here. > > I mean, what is direct perception if via direct perception "different > [individual] perspectives" necessitate "[individual] representations" of > the same object? How does that differ from the thing in itself? > > Consider: > > H1)O(H2 > H1[O'])O(H2[O'] > --- > > Two perspectives, direct, but necessarily "individual" (thus mediated) of > the "object": > "-- H1)O(H2 --". > > Now, two "individual representations" of the "same" object: > H1[1O'])O(H2[2O'] > > If "two different [people] do not perceive two different "copies" of [the > object "O"], but [each] directly perceive the very same object [O] [as it > is in] itself, then, how are "two different representations" [individual] > of the "same" object, therefore necessitated? > > For if the object is in itself, you can see, *structurally *and > *logically*, why it is that Peirce's entire schema works. But if the > object is cognizable as it is in itself, (thus not in itself at all, in the > Kantian sense), then there are no "copies" qua "representations" which > differ according to individuality (according to "different perceptual > perspectives and faculties"). > > Peirce is unwilling to pay the Kantian price but insofar as I can tell his > entire schema cannot work, at all, (which it does, btw), unless you > understand the necessity of that price (and thus I understand his admission > of it, whether people agree or not, as his own understanding of Kant as > actually accurate). > > I have traced the nuance precisely, in longer form, yet to be published, > as to where Peirce goes categorically wrong. That I will be happy to share. > It is very nuanced. So nuanced as to be diaphanous. Thus, it's hardly a > sin. It's a mind-boggling topic and whilst he was trained from an early > age, and his semiotic remains the best, that training doesn't necessarily > work in your favor if you need to think outside the box. Now that he did > think outside the box is evident: but he is wrong insofar as he says you > can cognize the thing in itself. It's just not true. > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jack, All the discussion in this list has given you a huge amount of material for your thesis. I'll admit that some of the arguments did not refute the claim about an incognizable Ding an sich. JRKC: "There is no Peircean Semeiotic, whatsoever - without the Kantian thing in itself. The object as thing must be in itself beyond all possible cognition and experience." But I'll reformulate the issues in a way that is consistent with Peirce and with all the valid observations that anyone has mentioned during the debates in this thread: JFS: "Peirce's semeiotic is a theory of the ways that living organisms perceive and conceive physical things in an open-ended variety of ways. No single perception can derive all possible information about a physical thing, but there is no reason for assuming that physical things have any incognizable aspects that would forever be hidden from discovery by scientific methodology." This statement avoids putting the word "not" in front of your original statement. It just avoids making any claims about the existence or nonexistence of something that is truly unknowable. Does it really exist? Yes, but only in the imagination of Kant and his true believers. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Supplement: How can you represent the absence of representation? You can, by calling it "nothing". But that cannot be true. So it is possible to represent something that isn´t there, that is a falsity. So you cannot believe in representation. So you cannot prove anything by showing how or how not it may be represented. You can never know, whether something is a true representation, or just a presentation. I don´t believe in a presentation, that I don´t have presented myself, would Churchill say. Jack, list, I am not the one able to forgive you using the term "silicon valley idiots", because I cannot see any unjustifiedness of this term. I am happy, that you are so clearly opposed against my fear, which is caused initially by buddhism, and amplified by Hollywood blockbuster, er, -ism. I also see, that "nothing" cannot exist, i think, with this aspect, Hegel was right. I hope, that all the digital nonsensism, that is contemporarily going around, will soon "self-implode". When where I usually live will be face recognition like in China, i will paint my face before going out. Still i don´t understand, what you mean by "angle": Is this a metaphor of a lever which reqires a fixed point and, and, if actuated, does a movement that opens an angle? Then the first premiss would not be an angle, but a fixed point, is that so? Anyway, I feel the same reluctance like you do, but always am open minded towards any paranoia. Then i always need a second opinion to exclude it. One last question: What is superior, and in which aspect, to deduction? Best Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 18:54 Uhr Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)) If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Well then they would never have an intelligence comparable to humans. For life - organic - has no innate "angles" as such and no one can prove that it does (i.e., the lack of proof is because it has no angles to begin with). The concept of "angle" is received aposteriori and then, via mathematic, becomes standard. All mathematic, even that part which pretends or thinks it isn't of the angle, is of the angle. My point: there can be no equivalent to the organic (this hybrid scenario you see silicon valley idiots, forgive the term, promoting is degenerative). It's of the cyborg manifesto but without the warning against. As for the Matrix, that simulacra scenario is itself a fallacy. That fallacy, dualist, in nature, (I explicate it elsewhere), is such that it never can exist (if made, it will self-implode). But my petulant diatribe aside, "nothing would be real, all would be an illusion". "Nothing" is itself a relational concept (it cannot exist). How can you represent the absence of representation? It's not even a negative term, it's just "not true". But if we assume illusory, then the existence of the illusory is a "reality". As for proof: I only use deduction because people, in philosophy, tend to use it. I think it far too "square" in all honesty to understand the greater nuances. But then there are logical modes which are superior (and which I am learning continuously). The "if... then..." format is irritating. "If the sun exists". You're right: why "if"? Propositional logic - yes, but it's apriori. Thus to transcend propositional logic is what I am trying to do (but even the non-linear has an irritatingly linear form to it). Best Jack From: Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 5:42 PM To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; s...@bestweb.net Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)) Jack, list, A proof must resist all "If"s. Can it resist the following, quite weird "If"? There are evolution experiments with computers. Program parts with the ability to interact and to learn are implemented in a virtual, let´s say, matrix. If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Maybe not? And maybe we are such program parts? Maybe on a quantum computer? I hope not, but what if? Then nothing would be in itself, nothing would be real, all would be an illusion. Like the buddhists say, they like it that way, I don´t. But, by them, the suspicion is there. But might it be proven, if it was so, or disproven if it wasn´t? Best Helmut
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jack, list, I am not the one able to forgive you using the term "silicon valley idiots", because I cannot see any unjustifiedness of this term. I am happy, that you are so clearly opposed against my fear, which is caused initially by buddhism, and amplified by Hollywood blockbuster, er, -ism. I also see, that "nothing" cannot exist, i think, with this aspect, Hegel was right. I hope, that all the digital nonsensism, that is contemporarily going around, will soon "self-implode". When where I usually live will be face recognition like in China, i will paint my face before going out. Still i don´t understand, what you mean by "angle": Is this a metaphor of a lever which reqires a fixed point and, and, if actuated, does a movement that opens an angle? Then the first premiss would not be an angle, but a fixed point, is that so? Anyway, I feel the same reluctance like you do, but always am open minded towards any paranoia. Then i always need a second opinion to exclude it. One last question: What is superior, and in which aspect, to deduction? Best Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 18:54 Uhr Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)) If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Well then they would never have an intelligence comparable to humans. For life - organic - has no innate "angles" as such and no one can prove that it does (i.e., the lack of proof is because it has no angles to begin with). The concept of "angle" is received aposteriori and then, via mathematic, becomes standard. All mathematic, even that part which pretends or thinks it isn't of the angle, is of the angle. My point: there can be no equivalent to the organic (this hybrid scenario you see silicon valley idiots, forgive the term, promoting is degenerative). It's of the cyborg manifesto but without the warning against. As for the Matrix, that simulacra scenario is itself a fallacy. That fallacy, dualist, in nature, (I explicate it elsewhere), is such that it never can exist (if made, it will self-implode). But my petulant diatribe aside, "nothing would be real, all would be an illusion". "Nothing" is itself a relational concept (it cannot exist). How can you represent the absence of representation? It's not even a negative term, it's just "not true". But if we assume illusory, then the existence of the illusory is a "reality". As for proof: I only use deduction because people, in philosophy, tend to use it. I think it far too "square" in all honesty to understand the greater nuances. But then there are logical modes which are superior (and which I am learning continuously). The "if... then..." format is irritating. "If the sun exists". You're right: why "if"? Propositional logic - yes, but it's apriori. Thus to transcend propositional logic is what I am trying to do (but even the non-linear has an irritatingly linear form to it). Best Jack From: Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 5:42 PM To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; s...@bestweb.net Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)) Jack, list, A proof must resist all "If"s. Can it resist the following, quite weird "If"? There are evolution experiments with computers. Program parts with the ability to interact and to learn are implemented in a virtual, let´s say, matrix. If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Maybe not? And maybe we are such program parts? Maybe on a quantum computer? I hope not, but what if? Then nothing would be in itself, nothing would be real, all would be an illusion. Like the buddhists say, they like it that way, I don´t. But, by them, the suspicion is there. But might it be proven, if it was so, or disproven if it wasn´t? Best Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 16:29 Uhr Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" An: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)) There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details. John, whilst I agree in spirit, I do think it is necessary in practice. For the details are categorically fundamental here. That is, there e
[PEIRCE-L] Going beyond or beneath the words (was Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)))
take much more than one or two centuries to discover the minutest details. His three guiding principles: The First Rule of Reason, Fallibilism, and no limit to the amount of time that may be required. Most authors who comment on Peirce mention those three principles. But they don't apply them to questions about the unknown or unknowable Ding an sich. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
John Sowa and Peirce-l, The discussion about The Thing in Itself has been interesting. I think you’re right to remind some of us of the importance of biographies and the history of time when determining what Peirce and Kant “really” said about things-in-themselves. You demonstrate the value of putting this discussion of Kant and Peirce in an historical context. Thanks… Mary Libertin > On Jun 11, 2023, at 1:34 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Jack, I agree with you, especially about the bickering. > > But when I said that the details are not important, I meant the tons of > quotations. You won't discover why Kant and Peirce disagreed about the > noumenon just by reading what they wrote -- or any commentary by any scholar > of either or both. You need to read their biographies, and the history of > their time.. > > Kant was an excellent theoretician who had studied, taught, developed, and > published important theoretical work about Newtonian mechanics. But the > science of his day was limited. Benjamin Franklin had just discovered the > nature of lightening by flying a kite. Chemistry was just beginning to creep > out of alchemy. There was no concept of chemical elements. No steam > engines. The only horse power came from horses. > > But when Peirce was just 8 years old, his father taught him chemistry and > gave him exercises in analyzing mixtures to determine what chemical compounds > were present. Those exercises were and still are college-level tests. > > Furthermore, Peirce traveled the world measuring gravity -- and doing the > math to determine how to design better equipment for the purpose. He even > recommended the use of a wavelength of light as a unit of measure for the > pendulums he used. He not only recommended that -- he even designed the > equipment for doing those very precise measurements, > > That is an immense difference in the state of science in just a century. > That is a fact that you won't find by reading Peirce or Kant or any scholar > who writes commentary about their writings. > > That is why Kant was pessimistic about learning the nature of the Ding an > sich, and Peirce was optimistic that someday any currently unknown facts > would eventually be discovered. > > Peirce had great faith in the progress of science -- but he realized that it > might take much more than one or two centuries to discover the minutest > details. His three guiding principles: The First Rule of Reason, > Fallibilism, and no limit to the amount of time that may be required. > > Most authors mention those three principles. But they don't apply them to > questions about the unknown or unknowable Ding an sich. > > John > > > From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" > > There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about > the details. > > John, whilst I agree in spirit, I do think it is necessary in practice. For > the details are categorically fundamental here. > > That is, there either is an object which can be cognized as it is in itself, > or there is an object in itself which can never be cognized as it is in > itself. > > I set myself the task, then, of proving the necessary inference that the > object as it is in itself cannot be cognized (this was not something I had > intended to do, it merely came, naturally, as it were, from a series of > related, but not precisely the same, necessities [academic/personal). > > I take the canon, as it were, then, as a structure. And it - the in itself - > will either live or die by its necessity of explaining (necessarily) those > core elements of the human sciences/arts which I am empirically setting about > re-arranging. For example, poverty of stimulus, within an already extant > analysis cannot be - insofar as I can see/logically prove - except that the > thing in itself is (and that poverty of stimulus is, now, proven, to me, > here, I mean, is not in doubt [within a Peircean assonant framework, too]). > > Thus, I wish to avoid all bickering - honestly, and we are all perhaps guilty > of that from time to time - but the minor details here are major categorical > issues which explicate the very nuance which thus ignites the very realm of > inquiry we all aspire to. > > Best > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help
[PEIRCE-L] The Decision Problem for Effective Procedures - Celebration of the 120th anniversary of Alonzo Church
The Decision Problem for Effective Procedures - Celebration of the 120th anniversary of Alonzo Church Nathan Salmon (University of California at Santa Barbara), Gary Mar (State University of New York, Stony Brook), Melvin Fitting (CUNY Graduate Center) Logica Universalis Webinar 2023 - June 14, 2023 at 4pm CET (Paris-Geneva-Rome) we will have one more session of the Logica Universalis Webinar (LUW). Nathan Salmón will present his recently published paper in Logica Universalis "The Decision Problem for Effective Procedures" https://www.springer.com/journal/11787/ Salmón was a former PhD student of the famous logician and founder of computer science Alonzo Church. Church was born June 14, 1903. We will therefore commemorate his 120th anniversary with a preliminary presentation by his last PhD student Gary R.Mar. The chair of the session will be Melvin Fitting. Nathan Salmón was also a long time friend and collaborator of Saul Kripke: https://www.simplycharly.com/read/interviews/naming-names-a-deep-dive-into-saul-kripkes-philosophy-with-nathan-salmon/ At LUW we have before the main talk the presentation of an association related to the author or/and topic of the talk. The Kripke center was presented at the LUW session of August 11, 2021: https://youtu.be/piyvWZ5nOik This next LUW session June 14 will initiate a series where the preliminary talk is related to the anniversary of a famous logician. This is not indeed completely new, considering that the first session of LUW was for the celebration of the World Logic Day, January 14, 2021, the 120th anniversary of Alfred Tarski: http://www.logica-universalis.org/wld3 Everybody is welcome to attend the next LUW session June 14, register here: https://www.springer.com/journal/11787/updates/23910922 Jean-Yves Beziau Editor-in-Chief Logica Universalis President of LUA (Logica Universalis Association) http://www.logica-universalis.org/LUAD _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jack, I agree with you, especially about the bickering. But when I said that the details are not important, I meant the tons of quotations. You won't discover why Kant and Peirce disagreed about the noumenon just by reading what they wrote -- or any commentary by any scholar of either or both. You need to read their biographies, and the history of their time.. Kant was an excellent theoretician who had studied, taught, developed, and published important theoretical work about Newtonian mechanics. But the science of his day was limited. Benjamin Franklin had just discovered the nature of lightening by flying a kite. Chemistry was just beginning to creep out of alchemy. There was no concept of chemical elements. No steam engines. The only horse power came from horses. But when Peirce was just 8 years old, his father taught him chemistry and gave him exercises in analyzing mixtures to determine what chemical compounds were present. Those exercises were and still are college-level tests. Furthermore, Peirce traveled the world measuring gravity -- and doing the math to determine how to design better equipment for the purpose. He even recommended the use of a wavelength of light as a unit of measure for the pendulums he used. He not only recommended that -- he even designed the equipment for doing those very precise measurements, That is an immense difference in the state of science in just a century. That is a fact that you won't find by reading Peirce or Kant or any scholar who writes commentary about their writings. That is why Kant was pessimistic about learning the nature of the Ding an sich, and Peirce was optimistic that someday any currently unknown facts would eventually be discovered. Peirce had great faith in the progress of science -- but he realized that it might take much more than one or two centuries to discover the minutest details. His three guiding principles: The First Rule of Reason, Fallibilism, and no limit to the amount of time that may be required. Most authors mention those three principles. But they don't apply them to questions about the unknown or unknowable Ding an sich. John From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details. John, whilst I agree in spirit, I do think it is necessary in practice. For the details are categorically fundamental here. That is, there either is an object which can be cognized as it is in itself, or there is an object in itself which can never be cognized as it is in itself. I set myself the task, then, of proving the necessary inference that the object as it is in itself cannot be cognized (this was not something I had intended to do, it merely came, naturally, as it were, from a series of related, but not precisely the same, necessities [academic/personal). I take the canon, as it were, then, as a structure. And it - the in itself - will either live or die by its necessity of explaining (necessarily) those core elements of the human sciences/arts which I am empirically setting about re-arranging. For example, poverty of stimulus, within an already extant analysis cannot be - insofar as I can see/logically prove - except that the thing in itself is (and that poverty of stimulus is, now, proven, to me, here, I mean, is not in doubt [within a Peircean assonant framework, too]). Thus, I wish to avoid all bickering - honestly, and we are all perhaps guilty of that from time to time - but the minor details here are major categorical issues which explicate the very nuance which thus ignites the very realm of inquiry we all aspire to. Best Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jack, list, A proof must resist all "If"s. Can it resist the following, quite weird "If"? There are evolution experiments with computers. Program parts with the ability to interact and to learn are implemented in a virtual, let´s say, matrix. If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Maybe not? And maybe we are such program parts? Maybe on a quantum computer? I hope not, but what if? Then nothing would be in itself, nothing would be real, all would be an illusion. Like the buddhists say, they like it that way, I don´t. But, by them, the suspicion is there. But might it be proven, if it was so, or disproven if it wasn´t? Best Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 16:29 Uhr Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" An: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)) There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details. John, whilst I agree in spirit, I do think it is necessary in practice. For the details are categorically fundamental here. That is, there either is an object which can be cognized as it is in itself, or there is an object in itself which can never be cognized as it is in itself. I set myself the task, then, of proving the necessary inference that the object as it is in itself cannot be cognized (this was not something I had intended to do, it merely came, naturally, as it were, from a series of related, but not precisely the same, necessities [academic/personal). I take the canon, as it were, then, as a structure. And it - the in itself - will either live or die by its necessity of explaining (necessarily) those core elements of the human sciences/arts which I am empirically setting about re-arranging. For example, poverty of stimulus, within an already extant analysis cannot be - insofar as I can see/logically prove - except that the thing in itself is (and that poverty of stimulus is, now, proven, to me, here, I mean, is not in doubt [within a Peircean assonant framework, too]). Thus, I wish to avoid all bickering - honestly, and we are all perhaps guilty of that from time to time - but the minor details here are major categorical issues which explicate the very nuance which thus ignites the very realm of inquiry we all aspire to. Best Jack From: John F Sowa Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 6:02 AM To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY ; Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)) Jack, Jeff, Jon, John Shook, List, Peirce had a very high regard for Kant. The disagreement about the Ding-an-sich or noumenon is based on just one fundamental principle: whether there is any aspect of the universe that is inherently unknowable. Peirce was willing to admit that there were some things or some aspects of observable things that were unobservable by human senses because they were too big, too small, too far away, or unobservable by human senses. However, he had over a century more information about the possibilities of scientific methodology (or his own methodeutic and pragmaticism). He would admit (with Kant) that some aspects of things might be unobservable by the science of his day. But he would not admit that there was anything that could never be known by whatever scientific methods could be developed in the future. I believe that is all you have to say. Just leave it as an open question. Science has made enormous progress in the century after Peirce, but there are still huge amounts of unknown aspects about any living thing from a bacterium on up. There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details. John From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" Sent: 6/10/23 8:42 PM To: Peirce-L , Jon Alan Schmidt , JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)) Additionally: "There is therefore only one way possible for my intuition to precede the actuality of the object and occur as an a priori cognition, namely if it contains nothing else except the form of sensibility, which in me as subject precedes all actual impressions through which I am affected by objects." -Kant: (§9)). The above is what Peirce calls a diagrammatic icon insofar as Kant's thesis recurs, isomorphic, with respect to the below: If the representation of the thing (in itself) contains only the physical form of the thing (in itself) as "representation/copy", then we may understand precisely why it is that Peircean Semeiotic, vis-a-vis generation/determination of interpretants and obje
[PEIRCE-L] ChatGPT is flaky, unreliable, and has ZERO logical ability (was God... etc.
Dear John Shook, I had sent a note to Peirce-L about a lecture that a colleague and I had presented on May 31st. And it was extremely critical of GPT and related systems. Their only good and reliable contribution is their ability to do better machine translation than previous AI systems. They can also do some good summarizing of a specific document or a set of closely related documents.. But their ability to answer questions or do any kind of reasoning is flaky and even dangerous for anybody who takes them seriously. For a serious legal blunder, Google "Lawyers Blame ChatGPT for Tricking Them Into Citing Bogus Case Law" If you are referring to the notes I had sent about our lectures, you must not have read the slides or listened to the talks. For the slides by John Sowa, see EvaluatingGPT--JohnSowa_20230531.pdf (ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com) For the Video recording of both talks and a long Q/A discussion, see https://ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com/General/EvaluatingGPT--JohnSowa-ArunMajumdar_20230531.mp4 John Sowa From: "John Shook" Sent: 6/10/23 5:37 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Hello Peirceans from a Deweyan, Have to disagree with a recent approval of ChatGPT's "logicality _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
after here (people's understanding of it). synthetising Kant and Peirce >> and I know a lot of each, but my knowledge of the second pales in specifics >> when it comes to general terminology. >> >> best >> >> jack >> -- >> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu >> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY >> *Sent:* Saturday, June 10, 2023 9:30 PM >> *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L < >> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; s...@bestweb.net ; robert >> marty ; Edwina Taborsky < >> edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The >> Thing In Itself) >> >> John, Jon, list, >> >> We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as >> to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant). >> >> Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this: >> >> [image: User]JC: >> Premise 1: An object exists. >> Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist. >> Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object >> 1) differently due to subjectivity. >> Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the >> perceiving objects. >> Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as >> they are copies. what is the conclusion? >> ChatGPT >> >> Based on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be: >> >> Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving >> objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their >> perceptions. >> >> This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the >> distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself. >> It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or >> experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it >> exists independently of perception. >> I didn't draw a conclusion for it (the machine) this time. It got there >> by itself. Learning, obviously, but true enough. >> >> Now, whether we agree or disagree about the knowability of the thing in >> itself, we can all surely agree about the interpretant/object generative >> which is here proven, also, in Peircean semeiotic? Isn't the above the >> structural premise of much "interpretant generation" in Peirce? Here I'd >> like @Jon Alan Schmidt to weigh in (not on >> knowability of the thing in itself, as we may never agree on that - I say >> no, you say yes, in ideal, or practically, that's fair enough, best left >> out for now I think). >> >> I just remember @robert marty and @Edwina >> Taborsky (among others) telling me of such >> things (and JAS has, himself, with Gangle, Colapietro, et al) gone into the >> mechanics of this extensively. Would just wonder what people make of it >> from within the Peircean semeiotic, now, not so much as to thing in >> itself's in(cognizablility). >> >> Best >> >> Jack >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
nsofar as I can tell his entire schema cannot work, at all, (which it does, btw), unless you understand the necessity of that price (and thus I understand his admission of it, whether people agree or not, as his own understanding of Kant as actually accurate). I have traced the nuance precisely, in longer form, yet to be published, as to where Peirce goes categorically wrong. That I will be happy to share. It is very nuanced. So nuanced as to be diaphanous. Thus, it's hardly a sin. It's a mind-boggling topic and whilst he was trained from an early age, and his semiotic remains the best, that training doesn't necessarily work in your favor if you need to think outside the box. Now that he did think outside the box is evident: but he is wrong insofar as he says you can cognize the thing in itself. It's just not true. Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 11:09 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: [EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)) *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Jack, List: John Shook's assessment of your latest argumentation is spot-on. The two different perceiving objects do not perceive two different "copies" of object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself. However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give them two different representations of object 1. Nevertheless, their resulting perceptual judgments (initial cognitions) about object 1 might very well be the same, e.g., "That is a yellow chair." Again, no one is claiming that perceptions, cognitions, and other representations are identical to the external things being perceived, cognized, or otherwise represented; and no one is disputing that those external things exist independently of those perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them. The sign is not its dynamical object, nor does it affect its dynamical object. Instead, the dynamical object determines the sign to determine a dynamical interpretant (actual effect), and the degree to which the latter matches the final interpretant (ideal effect) is the normative measure of representational "success." I am honestly not sure what you mean by "the interpretant/object generative which is here proven" and "the structural premise of much 'interpretant generation' in Peirce," but I hope that this is relevant and helpful. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 3:37 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: edit: i did draw the conclusion for it, my mistake. but i think it is sound (that's not the purpose here). interpretant generation ala Peirce and dynamical objects is really what I'm after here (people's understanding of it). synthetising Kant and Peirce and I know a lot of each, but my knowledge of the second pales in specifics when it comes to general terminology. best jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 9:30 PM To: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>; Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>; s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net> mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>; robert marty mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com>>; Edwina Taborsky mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself) John, Jon, list, We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant). Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this: [cid:188a711c4a1479137d21][User]JC: Premise 1: An object exists. Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist. Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object 1) differently due to subjectivity. Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the perceiving objects. Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as they are copies. what is the conclusion? ChatGPT Based on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be: Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of
[PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jack, List: John Shook's assessment of your latest argumentation is spot-on. The two different perceiving objects do not perceive two different "copies" of object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself. However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give them two different *representations *of object 1. Nevertheless, their resulting perceptual judgments (initial cognitions) about object 1 might very well be the same, e.g., "That is a yellow chair." Again, no one is claiming that perceptions, cognitions, and other representations are *identical to* the external things being perceived, cognized, or otherwise represented; and no one is disputing that those external things exist *independently of* those perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them. The sign is not its dynamical object, nor does it affect its dynamical object. Instead, the dynamical object determines the sign to determine a dynamical interpretant (actual effect), and the degree to which the latter matches the final interpretant (ideal effect) is the normative measure of representational "success." I am honestly not sure what you mean by "the interpretant/object generative which is here proven" and "the structural premise of much 'interpretant generation' in Peirce," but I hope that this is relevant and helpful. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 3:37 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > edit: i did draw the conclusion for it, my mistake. but i think it is > sound (that's not the purpose here). > > interpretant generation ala Peirce and dynamical objects is really what > I'm after here (people's understanding of it). synthetising Kant and Peirce > and I know a lot of each, but my knowledge of the second pales in specifics > when it comes to general terminology. > > best > > jack > -- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY > *Sent:* Saturday, June 10, 2023 9:30 PM > *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L < > peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; s...@bestweb.net ; robert > marty ; Edwina Taborsky < > edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The > Thing In Itself) > > John, Jon, list, > > We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as > to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant). > > Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this: > > [image: User]JC: > Premise 1: An object exists. > Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist. > Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object > 1) differently due to subjectivity. > Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the > perceiving objects. > Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as they > are copies. what is the conclusion? > ChatGPT > > Based on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be: > > Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving objects > cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their perceptions. > > This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the > distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself. > It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or > experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it > exists independently of perception. > I didn't draw a conclusion for it (the machine) this time. It got there by > itself. Learning, obviously, but true enough. > > Now, whether we agree or disagree about the knowability of the thing in > itself, we can all surely agree about the interpretant/object generative > which is here proven, also, in Peircean semeiotic? Isn't the above the > structural premise of much "interpretant generation" in Peirce? Here I'd > like @Jon Alan Schmidt to weigh in (not on > knowability of the thing in itself, as we may never agree on that - I say > no, you say yes, in ideal, or practically, that's fair enough, best left > out for now I think). > > I just remember @robert marty and @Edwina > Taborsky (among others) telling me of such > things (and JAS has, himself, with Gangle, Colapietro, et al) gone into the > mechanics of this extensively. Would just wonder what people make of it > from within the Peircean semeiotic, now, not so much as to thing in > itself's in(cognizablility). > > Best > > Jack > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscr
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)
Hello Peirceans from a Deweyan, So impressed by recent contributions, and arguments over Peirce/Kant etal. Have to disagree with a recent approval of ChatGPT's "logicality". To recap, we were provided with this argument: +++ Premise 1: An object exists. Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist. Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object 1) differently due to subjectivity. Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the perceiving objects. Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as they are copies. ChatGPT Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their perceptions. +++ Shook's comments: This argument is actually unsound, with validity problems as well. Premise 4 is false, for typical observers of typical objects. Furthermore, this argument is invalid, since it is circular: only by tacitly accepting that Conclusion would Premise 4 then seem sensible (this matter of "copies"), much less true. Furthermore, Premise 3 is in conflict with Premise 4: if Premise 4 is accepted as true at first, the observers would not be able to verify the truth of Premise 3 (or verify premise 1 either if “an object” means “one singular object”). A valid and not unsound version of an argument would instead be this: Premise 1. An Object exists. Premise 2. Two other perceiving objects exist. Premise 3. These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (Object 1) differently. Premise 4. An object that objectively exists is (usually) perceived differently by two different perceivers at the same time. (by definition of ‘objective’) Premise 5. Two perspectives of Object 1 occur for each the perceiving objects. Premise 6. (from 4 and 5) The observers understand they are simultaneously viewing the Object, not anything else like an ontologically different “copy” (definition of "direct perception") Conclusion: Object 1 is directly perceived as existing. John Dewey in a few papers from 1904-1912 argued in this manner against dualistic and indirect theories of veridical perception. I leave others to comment on the logical limitations of ChapGPT. And we must hesitate before supposing that any AI will independently confirm the logicality of any substantive or ontological proposition. Chapbot has not confirmed any merit to representationalism. best to all, john shook On 6/10/2023 4:30 PM, JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY wrote: Premise 1: An object exists. Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist. Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object 1) differently due to subjectivity. Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the perceiving objects. Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as they are copies. what is the conclusion? ChatGPT Based on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be: Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their perceptions. This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself. It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it exists independently of perception. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)
edit: i did draw the conclusion for it, my mistake. but i think it is sound (that's not the purpose here). interpretant generation ala Peirce and dynamical objects is really what I'm after here (people's understanding of it). synthetising Kant and Peirce and I know a lot of each, but my knowledge of the second pales in specifics when it comes to general terminology. best jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 9:30 PM To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L ; s...@bestweb.net ; robert marty ; Edwina Taborsky Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself) John, Jon, list, We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant). Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this: [cid:1d946b44-0226-4409-8582-6347e726eaf1][User] JC: Premise 1: An object exists. Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist. Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object 1) differently due to subjectivity. Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the perceiving objects. Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as they are copies. what is the conclusion? ChatGPT Based on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be: Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their perceptions. This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself. It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it exists independently of perception. I didn't draw a conclusion for it (the machine) this time. It got there by itself. Learning, obviously, but true enough. Now, whether we agree or disagree about the knowability of the thing in itself, we can all surely agree about the interpretant/object generative which is here proven, also, in Peircean semeiotic? Isn't the above the structural premise of much "interpretant generation" in Peirce? Here I'd like @Jon Alan Schmidt<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> to weigh in (not on knowability of the thing in itself, as we may never agree on that - I say no, you say yes, in ideal, or practically, that's fair enough, best left out for now I think). I just remember @robert marty<mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com> and @Edwina Taborsky<mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> (among others) telling me of such things (and JAS has, himself, with Gangle, Colapietro, et al) gone into the mechanics of this extensively. Would just wonder what people make of it from within the Peircean semeiotic, now, not so much as to thing in itself's in(cognizablility). Best Jack ________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of John F Sowa Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 3:51 AM To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [PEIRCE-L] God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself) *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Jon, That's a good list of quotations by Peirce that show the development of his thoughts about God and religion. I took your list of quotations (cited below) and added the two quotations about Buddhism in his letters to LW (1908) and to WJ (1909). See the attached file CSP_God.htm.i A strong interest in Buddhism, Daoism, and other religions is definitely compatible with Christianity. See, for example, the Wikipeidia article about Thomas Merton, who was "a Trappist<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trappists> monk, writer, theologian, mystic<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_mysticism>, poet, social activist<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_activism> and scholar of comparative religion<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparative_religion>." I believe that it would be a useful project to add more quotations from all periods in Peirce's life. CP has 217 instances of "God", but most of them are part of a discussion on some issue that does no say much of anything about what Peirce believed or thought about God or religion. In any case, CP is an easy source to search and cite. It would be important to get more quotations from sources that are less accessible. Other important quotations, for example, would include his mystical vision at a time when he visited St. Thomas church in New York. And by the way, you have two slightly different copies of the quotation from R 843. One of them should be dele
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)
John, Jon, list, We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant). Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this: [cid:1d946b44-0226-4409-8582-6347e726eaf1][User] JC: Premise 1: An object exists. Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist. Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object 1) differently due to subjectivity. Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the perceiving objects. Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as they are copies. what is the conclusion? ChatGPT Based on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be: Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their perceptions. This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself. It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it exists independently of perception. I didn't draw a conclusion for it (the machine) this time. It got there by itself. Learning, obviously, but true enough. Now, whether we agree or disagree about the knowability of the thing in itself, we can all surely agree about the interpretant/object generative which is here proven, also, in Peircean semeiotic? Isn't the above the structural premise of much "interpretant generation" in Peirce? Here I'd like @Jon Alan Schmidt<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> to weigh in (not on knowability of the thing in itself, as we may never agree on that - I say no, you say yes, in ideal, or practically, that's fair enough, best left out for now I think). I just remember @robert marty<mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com> and @Edwina Taborsky<mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> (among others) telling me of such things (and JAS has, himself, with Gangle, Colapietro, et al) gone into the mechanics of this extensively. Would just wonder what people make of it from within the Peircean semeiotic, now, not so much as to thing in itself's in(cognizablility). Best Jack ________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of John F Sowa Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 3:51 AM To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [PEIRCE-L] God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself) *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Jon, That's a good list of quotations by Peirce that show the development of his thoughts about God and religion. I took your list of quotations (cited below) and added the two quotations about Buddhism in his letters to LW (1908) and to WJ (1909). See the attached file CSP_God.htm.i A strong interest in Buddhism, Daoism, and other religions is definitely compatible with Christianity. See, for example, the Wikipeidia article about Thomas Merton, who was "a Trappist<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trappists> monk, writer, theologian, mystic<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_mysticism>, poet, social activist<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_activism> and scholar of comparative religion<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparative_religion>." I believe that it would be a useful project to add more quotations from all periods in Peirce's life. CP has 217 instances of "God", but most of them are part of a discussion on some issue that does no say much of anything about what Peirce believed or thought about God or religion. In any case, CP is an easy source to search and cite. It would be important to get more quotations from sources that are less accessible. Other important quotations, for example, would include his mystical vision at a time when he visited St. Thomas church in New York. And by the way, you have two slightly different copies of the quotation from R 843. One of them should be deleted. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" As I have documented with exact quotations previously (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00208.html), by his own testimony Peirce was a theist _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)
Jon, That's a good list of quotations by Peirce that show the development of his thoughts about God and religion. I took your list of quotations (cited below) and added the two quotations about Buddhism in his letters to LW (1908) and to WJ (1909). See the attached file CSP_God.htm.i A strong interest in Buddhism, Daoism, and other religions is definitely compatible with Christianity. See, for example, the Wikipeidia article about Thomas Merton, who was "a Trappist monk, writer, theologian, mystic, poet, social activist and scholar of comparative religion." I believe that it would be a useful project to add more quotations from all periods in Peirce's life. CP has 217 instances of "God", but most of them are part of a discussion on some issue that does no say much of anything about what Peirce believed or thought about God or religion. In any case, CP is an easy source to search and cite. It would be important to get more quotations from sources that are less accessible. Other important quotations, for example, would include his mystical vision at a time when he visited St. Thomas church in New York. And by the way, you have two slightly different copies of the quotation from R 843. One of them should be deleted. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" As I have documented with exact quotations previously (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00208.html), by his own testimony Peirce was a theist Title: Peirce's Remarks About God and Religion Deism is opposed to atheism, or the denial of any God; to pantheism, which denies or ignores the personality of God; to theism, which believes not only in a God, but in his living relations with his creatures; and to Christianity, which adds a belief in a historical manifestation of God, as recorded in the Bible. (Century Dictionary entry for "deism," 1889-91) In modern philosophy the word ["immanent"] is applied to the operations of a creator conceived as in organic connection with the creation, and to such a creator himself, as opposed to a transient or transcendent creating and creator from whom the creation is conceived as separated. The doctrine of an immanent deity does not necessarily imply that the world, or the soul of the world, is God, but only that it either is or is in God. (Century Dictionary entry for "immanent," 1889-91) A difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is this. In considering personality, that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine of a personal God ... (CP 6.162, EP 1:332, 1892) I look upon creation as going on and I believe that such vague idea as we can have of the power of creation is best identified with the idea of theism. (CP 8.138n4, 1905) To Schiller's anthropomorphism I subscribe in the main. And in particular if it implies theism, I am an anthropomorphist. But the God of my theism is not finite. That won't do at all. (CP 8.262, 1905) "Do you believe this Supreme Being to have been the creator of the universe?" Not so much to have been as to be now creating the universe, concerning which see my articles in the first three volumes of The Monist ... I think we must regard Creative Activity as an inseparable attribute of God. (CP 6.505-506, c. 1906) I do not mean, then, a "soul of the World" or an intelligence is "immanent" in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds, of matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them. (R 843:11, 1908) Indeed, meaning by "God," throughout this paper will be meant, the Being whose attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, omniscience, omnipotence, infinite benignity, and a Being not immanent in the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of them without exception. (R 843:15, 1908) Indeed, meaning by "God," as throughout this paper will be meant, the Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, Omniscience, Omnipotence, Infinite Benignity, a Being not "immanent in" the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of them without exception. (R 843:19&21, 1908) But I had better add that I do not mean by God a being merely "immanent in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every content of the world of ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and the world of all minds, without any exception whatever. (R 843:26, 1908) I say the creed in church with the rest. By doing so, I only signify... my willingness to put aside, most heartily, anything that tends to separate me from my fellow Christians... I think probably Christianity was a higher development out of Buddhism, modified by Jewish belief in a living God. (L
[PEIRCE-L] God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)
Helmut, List: HR: For a theist God is the creator, for a pantheist the universe is, and for an atheist chance and natural selection (evolution) is. I think that Peirce was a pantheist or maybe panentheist, because he said, that the universe has a quasi-mind. As I have documented with exact quotations previously ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00208.html), by his own testimony Peirce was a theist, not a pantheist nor a panentheist. He professed to believe that God is the real and personal creator of the entire universe from nothing, such that the latter is neither identical to God (pantheism) nor somehow within God (panentheism). To be clear, I am not suggesting that one must likewise be a theist in order to be a Peircean with respect to other aspects of his thought, just pointing out what his own explicitly stated position on the relation between God and the universe actually was. A quasi-mind is a kind of sign, and Peirce maintained that the entire universe is a sign--"a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903). In accordance with his definition of a sign, this would require the universe to be determined by a dynamical object that is external to it, independent of it, and unaffected by it; and also to have a final interpretant that it *would *determine under ideal circumstances, namely, in the infinite future after infinite investigation by an infinite community. What might these correlates be? CSP: The starting-point of the universe, God the Creator, is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the third. (CP 1.362, EP 1:251, 1887-8) God the Creator is the dynamical object of the universe as a sign, and God completely revealed is its final interpretant. In other words, God's purpose in creating the universe is to reveal Himself more and more definitely. CSP: The hypothesis of God is a peculiar one, in that it supposes an infinitely incomprehensible object, although every hypothesis, as such, supposes its object to be truly conceived in the hypothesis. This leaves the hypothesis but one way of understanding itself; namely, as vague but as true so far as it is definite, and as continually tending to define itself more and more, and without limit. ... Thus, the hypothesis will lead to our thinking of features of each Universe as purposed; and this will stand or fall with the hypothesis. Yet a purpose essentially involves growth, and so cannot be attributed to God. Still it will, according to the hypothesis, be less false to speak so, than to represent God as purposeless. (CP 6.466, EP 2:439-440, 1908) Since the growth associated with this purpose "cannot be attributed to God," it must instead be attributed to the universe--specifically, the growth of concrete reasonableness as the *summum bonum*, what esthetics identifies as the only intrinsically admirable ideal. The corresponding ethical imperative is to engage in sincere inquiry using methods that will advance our knowledge of the universe as a sign and of God the Creator as its dynamical object, and to cultivate habits of deliberate conduct accordingly. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jun 8, 2023 at 3:51 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Jeffrey, List, > > I guess there are two ways of classification: Creation and observation. > Both make things. Creation is primary and produces the crude thing, the > universal ground of it, like a first sketch. The thing may then be further > specified (individuated) by observation. For a theist God is the creator, > for a pantheist the universe is, and for an atheist chance and natural > selection (evolution) is. I think that Peirce was a pantheist or maybe > panentheist, because he said, that the universe has a quasi-mind. In any > case, i think, that no thing is caused by itself, because it exists due to > one or more of these institutions. I think a universal is generated by the > universe. A human is generated by evolution, but evolution is controlled by > the universe (by its laws). Is an individuated thing then set free, so it > exists in itself? I wouldn´t say so, because it still is dependent on the > universe`s laws. But a human can decide what to do by him/herself. So, is > free will a thing in itself? And, in physical inanimate nature, is chance > one? Chance and free will are not things you can touch, but concepts. But > chance has existed before individuals capable of having concepts have > existed, and chance is proven by chaos theory. But it still is a concept of > the universe. So it is not in itself, but in the universe. > > I thi
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
As for the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon", Peirce's criticisms of Kant are justified. But Kant may be excused for not understanding modern scientific methodology. By the late 19th and early 20th c, Peirce recognized that the science of his day had produced results that people could trust with their lives -- cars, trains, bridges, airplanes, and electricity. That did not guarantee the absolute certainty of scientific "laws", but it meant that they deserved a high level of confidence. In conclusion, I believe that Jack could "update" Kant by identifying the noumenon with Peirce's search for scientific "laws" that have been tested to a high degree of confidence by scientific methodology. Peirce's final goal of a proof of pragmaticism was very close to Kant's goal of a proof of his noumena John, list, Yes, this is what I am doing as of now. The thesis, that is, when published will be Kant through Peirce (not linear - as of now, convinced I've proven the necessity of the thing in itself but also convinced I've understood the precise juncture where Peirce and Kant come to disagreement and it is, in truth, incredible nuanced as you would expect of each: entirely a categorical matter with respect to each's respective system). Thanks for the information, by the way (have been gathering lots from the list exchange of late). Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of John F Sowa Sent: Friday, June 9, 2023 7:06 PM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jeff, Jon, Jack, Helmut, et al., Before discussing Peirce's comments about Kant and others, I think it's important to review Peirce's background and the influences that led to his final synthesis. By the time Peirce was 8 years old, his father had taught him Greek, Latin, mathematics, and chemistry. When he was 12, he taught himself logic from Whateley's book, and when he was 16, he and his father worked their way through Kant's KdrV (or CdrV in the spelling of that time). I believe that the combined effect of those influences led him to generalize his framework in order to accommodate all the details. I also believe that his correspondence with Lady Welby, starting in 1903, led to him to produce his clearest and most general foundation. The first effect (in 1904) was to replace his abstract phenomenology with a phenomenoscopy that was more compatible with her significs. He produced his final synthesis in 1911, shortly after he had promised to send her a copy of his latest work.. . Jeff> it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz... Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant and Leibniz: "Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or less explicitly state that that which they say cannot be derived from observation, or legitimate probable inference from observation, is a universal proposition in sense (3), that is, an assertion concerning every member of a general class without exception." CP 2.370 Jeff> How do you interpret Peirce's objection to each? The context of CP 2.370 is a section about univerals that begins at 2.367. In the remainder of 2.370 and later, Peirce did not distinguish the positions of those three. He quoted Leibniz (in French) as saying "all the examples that confirm a general truth, no matter how many they are, are not sufficient to establish the universal necessity of that same truth." He then quoted a long German passage in which Kant says that its a serious mistake to conclude "whatever holds in most cases holds in all cases." In the remainder of that section and 2.371, Peirce ignored differences among Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. His main conclusion was that they agreed that evidence for universals could not come from observations. Kant said that universals came from some "Erkentniss (understanding) a priori", but he did not explain where that Erkentnis came from. Peirce added "Descartes in particular, and Leibnitz in some measure, perhaps even Kant (though it would be very illogical for him to do so) did more or less attach weight to the irresistible apparent evidence, and to some degree to the catholic acceptance, of propositions as tending to persuade us of their truth; but not as criteria of their origin.". Although those three correctly recognized that observations alone could not guarantee the truth of univeersals, none of them had an adequate answer to the question about where
[PEIRCE-L] Two lawyers use ChatBPT to prepare their case
The subject line sounds like the beginning of a joke. Unfortunately for them, it wasn't a joke. See the news item below. There will be more news about this case later today. For anyone who may be interested in ChatGPT and related systems, you can check the slides and the video of a talk by my colleague Arun Majumdar and me on May 31. For the slides by John Sowa, see EvaluatingGPT--JohnSowa_20230531.pdf (ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com) For the Video recording of both talks and a long Q/A discussion, see https://ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com/General/EvaluatingGPT--JohnSowa-ArunMajumdar_20230531.mp4 John ___ New York lawyers blame ChatGPT for tricking them into citing ‘bogus legal research Excerpts: Attorneys Steven A. Schwartz and Peter LoDuca are facing possible punishment over a filing in a lawsuit against an airline that included references to past court cases that Schwartz thought were real, but were actually invented by the artificial intelligence-powered chatbot. Schwartz explained that he used the groundbreaking program as he hunted for legal precedents supporting a client's case against the Colombian airline Avianca for an injury incurred on a 2019 flight. The chatbot, which has fascinated the world with its production of essay-like answers to prompts from users, suggested several cases involving aviation mishaps that Schwartz hadn't been able to find through usual methods used at his law firm. The problem was, several of those cases weren't real or involved airlines that didn’t exist. Schwartz told Judge P. Kevin Castel he was “operating under a misconception ... that this website was obtaining these cases from some source I did not have access to.” He said he “failed miserably” at doing follow-up research to ensure the citations were correct. “I did not comprehend that ChatGPT could fabricate cases,” Schwartz said. The judge confronted Schwartz with one legal case invented by the computer program. It was initially described as a wrongful death case brought by a woman against an airline only to morph into a legal claim about a man who missed a flight to New York and was forced to incur additional expenses. “Can we agree that's legal gibberish?” Castel asked. The judge said he'll rule on sanctions at a later date. Source: https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/national-international/new-york-lawyers-blame-chatgpt-for-tricking-them-into-citing-bogus-legal-research/3248139/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
been tested to a high degree of confidence by scientific methodology. Peirce's final goal of a proof of pragmaticism was very close to Kant's goal of a proof of his noumena. I believe that Peirce, who had a century more experience with science, came closer than Kant. But I would give Kant partial credit. Maybe an A- or at least a B+. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
In summary, Kant's claim is true for most of the things we encounter in our daily lives. Our descriptions cover only the parts we can detect with our senses and any scientific instruments at our disposal. As science progresses, people keep inventing more precise instruments. But there is still a huge amount that is unknowable in nearly every object we encounter. John, I tend to agree with you regarding Kant and Peirce. That Kant's claim is true (I would say categorically). I have been reading Kant through Peirce and Peirce through Kant, as is proper at the moment and have already had a few eureka moments regarding what is the nature of the ambiguity - incredibly nuanced as JAS and some private correspondence has alluded to - between the two. This I wish to keep for my thesis/article as and when it moves to publication (soon, I expect), but it has been a fruitful interchange with many here already. Will have reply to JAS, hopefully, within a few days which most here should find of interest. Best Jack From: John F Sowa Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 6:16 AM To: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jon, Jack, et al., As I wrote in my previous note (excerpt copied below), both Kant and Peirce presented positions that neither one had fully proved. Although I prefer Peirce's position, I must admit that his proof in CP 5.525 is flawed, and your version does not correct the flaw. JAS> By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) The flaw in this paragraph is in the phrase "after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate". Question: What words are being considered? Do we consider all the words that have been defined in the current state of Engllish (or some other languages)? If Peirce meant 1905, that would rule out the huge number of new concepts of quantum mechanics and other innovations in the physics of the 20th and later centuries. It's quite certain that no words could be found in 1905 that could adequately explain the life of a snail. In fact, nobody has proposed a precise definition of the word 'life' today. Physicians cannot reliably detect the precise moment when a patient dies. And quantum mechanics makes many issues impossible to detect or measure precisely. There is a huge amount that is unknown. In summary, Kant's claim is true for most of the things we encounter in our daily lives. Our descriptions cover only the parts we can detect with our senses and any scientific instruments at our disposal. As science progresses, people keep inventing more precise instruments. But there is still a huge amount that is unknowable in nearly every object we encounter. John Excerpt from: "John F Sowa" Sent: 6/7/23 1:24 AM The quotation below summarizes Peirce's theory of science in the first paragraph, where the final opinion is a goal that might never be reached. One way to explain the difference between Kant and Peirce is that (1) they both understood the difficulty of analyzing every detail of the full complexity of the things we experience. (2) Kant was a pessimist who did not believe that anybody could ever really understand all those details. (3) Peirce was an optimist who believed that any question about the things we experience could eventually be answered if given enough scientists enough time to study the question and test it with all possible experiments. As a pessimist, Kant was correct in saying that the overwhelming majority of the details of the things we perceive are unknowable by us, But as an optimist, Peirce was correct in claiming that scientific methodology, as pursued by an untold number of scientists, could ultimately discover any of those details that may be needed to answer any questions we might ask. . "There is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given... This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought, in general, but of all that is arbitrary and ind
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Atkins monograph
Jeffrey, John, Peirce-list, You can read 35 pages of Peirce on Inference right now. Click on the icon of the book that is to the right from the book’s title and the source of the excerpt: books.google.com. I gave this link before, and someone may have read it. It is interesting, as you will see. Although the book does not refer to “things in themselves,” as noted already, it puts the terms “deduction, induction, and abduction” in a new light. Mary > Peirce on Inference > books.google.com > > > <https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false>Peirce > on Inference > <https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false> > books.google.com > <https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false> > > <https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false> > Best, > On Jun 8, 2023, at 4:40 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > Hi John, > > The Atkins monograph is not yet available from OUP. > > https://global.oup.com/academic/product/peirce-on-inference-9780197689066?cc=us=en; > > It is scheduled to ship in July. I'd be interested in discussing the work > when it does appear in print. Let me know if you are interested. > > --Jeff > From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on > behalf of Mary Libertin > Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 11:19 AM > To: John F Sowa > Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt > ; jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie > > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - > Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > John and Peirce-List, > > Here is the link to an excerpt from the book Peirce on Inference: Validity, > Strength, and the Community of Inquirers by Richard Kenneth Atkins. > > > Peirce on Inference > books.google.com > > > <https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false>Peirce > on Inference > <https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false> > books.google.com > <https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false> > > <https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false> > > Best, > Mary > >> On Jun 8, 2023, at 12:01 PM, John F Sowa wrote: >> >> Mary, >> >> Thanks for citing that book. >> >> Note to all: If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro >> or con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any >> excerpt or summary that might clarify these issues. >> >> After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to >> refute Kant's claims are getting stronger. Just consider the case of >> identical twins. When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are >> two distinct individuals. But the differences between them are minor >> aspects of their appearance. Are there any considerations other than >> surface observations that could distinguish them as two distinct "things in >> themselves"? >> >> For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles >> of beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for >> tiny discrepancies from their intended specifications. >> >> John >> >> >> From: "Mary Libertin" >> Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM >> >> John, Peirce-list >> >> For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this >> discussion. >> >> Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By >> Richard Kenneth Atkins >> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] 2nd Call for Papers: 4th World Congress on Logic and Religion (4th WoCoLoR)
Please circulate widely. Apologies for multiple emails. -- 2nd CALL FOR PAPERS -- 4th World Congress on Logic and Religion (4th WoCoLoR) Sinaia, Romania September 3-8, 2023 - Deadline: June 17, 2023 - Submission of abstract: http://4wocolor.pl/#submission - Notification of acceptance: June 25, 2023 - Website: http://4wocolor.pl/ -- ABOUT THE WoCoLoR: The WoCoLoR (World Congress on Logic and Religion) is a series of events organized by LARA (Logic And Religion Association) (https://www.logicandreligion.com/lara). Previous keynote speakers include: Saul Kripke (Schock Prize), Laurent Lafforgue (Fields Medal), Michal Heller (Templeton Prize), Dov Gabbay, Jan Wolenski and Piergiorgio Odifreddi. The first edition was in João Pessoa (Brazil) in 2015, the second in Warsaw (Poland) in 2017, and the third in Varanasi (India) in 2022. -- KEYNOTE SPEAKERS OF THE 4rd WoCoLoR: - Richard Swinburne (University of Oxford, UK) - Eleonore Stump (Saint Louis University, USA) - Mircea Dumitru (University of Bucharest, Romania) - Anne-Françoise Schmid (Mines Paris-Tech, France) - Franziska Kohlt (University of Leeds, UK, and University of Southern California, USA) - Douglas L. Berger (Leiden University, The Netherlands) - Kordula Świętorzecka (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland) - Matthias Kossler (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany) - Miray Yazgan (Bahcesehir Cyprus University, Turkey) - Antonios Kalogerakis (Orthodox Academy of Crete, Greece) -- SUBMISSION: We invite scholars (philosophers, logicians, mathematicians, theologians and others) to submit a one page abstract.The topics of the papers should deal with the relationships between logic and religion. Talks will be presented either in the general session or in one of the following workshops: - Religious Symbolism and Symbolic Logic - Logic of Reconciliation - Applying Mathematics to Theology - Concepts of God: Consistency, Inconsistency and Paraconsistency Issues - Argumentation in World Religious Traditions, including Legal Traditions - Religion, Logic and AI - Religious Discourse and Argumentation - Mythos and Logos: Schopenhauer and the relationship of philosophy and religion Abstracts must have a maximum of 3000 characters and be written in English. They must be submitted by June 15, 2023, through the workshop site (http://4wocolor.pl/#submission). Notification of acceptance will be released on June 25, 2023. At least one author of each accepted paper must register for the congress. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] 2nd Call for Papers: Workshop on CONCEPTS OF GOD: CONSISTENCY, INCONSISTENCY AND PARACONSISTENCY ISSUES
Please circulate widely. Apologies for multiple emails. -- CALL FOR PAPERS -- Workshop on CONCEPTS OF GOD: CONSISTENCY, INCONSISTENCY AND PARACONSISTENCY ISSUES 4th World Congress on Logic and Religion (4th WoCoLoR) Sinaia, Romania September 3-8, 2023 - Extended Deadline: June 17, 2023 - Submission of abstract: http://4wocolor.pl/#submission (or ricard...@ufcg.edu.br<mailto:ricard...@ufcg.edu.br>) - Notification of acceptance: June 25, 2023 -- SUBMISSION: The Workshop on CONCEPTS OF GOD: CONSISTENCY, INCONSISTENCY AND PARACONSISTENCY ISSUES will take place at Sinaia, Romania, in September, 2023, as part of the 4th World Congress on Logic and Religion (4th WoCoLoR): https://www.logicandreligion.com/4th-world-congress http://4wocolor.pl/ We invite submissions of contributed papers on general topics related to the theme including, but not restricted to: - Individual and joint (in)consistency of divine attributes - The role of consistency in the debate on the rationality of theistic belief - Paraconsistent approaches to the concept of God - Paradoxical accounts of God (and their solutions) in world religious traditions (e.g. the doctrine of Trinity in Cristianity, bhedabheda accounts in Indian religious traditions and God's essence and attributes in Islam) Abstracts must have a maximum of 3000 characters and be written in English. They must be submitted by June 17, 2023, through the workshop site (http://4wocolor.pl/#submission) or the e-mail ricard...@ufcg.edu.br<mailto:ricard...@ufcg.edu.br>. Notification of acceptance will be released on June 25, 2023. At least one author of each accepted paper must register for the congress. -- KEYNOTE SPEAKER: Richard Swinburne (University of Oxford, UK) -- PUBLICATIONS: Accepted abstracts will be published in the congress proceedings, which will be available during the congress. Accepted abstracts will be published in the congress proceedings, which will be available during the congress. After the conference authors will be invited to submit complete papers, which will be peer-reviewed and published in a special issue of Logica Universalis https://www.springer.com/journal/11787 Peer-reviewed papers of previous WoCoLoRs appeared as special issues of Logica Universalis (Springer), Sophia (Springer) and the Journal of Applied Logics (College Publications): https://www.logicandreligion.com/publications -- CHAIRS: Ricardo Sousa Silvestre (Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil), Alan Herbert (Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, UK) and Abbas Ahsan (University of Birmingham, UK) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jeffrey, List, I guess there are two ways of classification: Creation and observation. Both make things. Creation is primary and produces the crude thing, the universal ground of it, like a first sketch. The thing may then be further specified (individuated) by observation. For a theist God is the creator, for a pantheist the universe is, and for an atheist chance and natural selection (evolution) is. I think that Peirce was a pantheist or maybe panentheist, because he said, that the universe has a quasi-mind. In any case, i think, that no thing is caused by itself, because it exists due to one or more of these institutions. I think a universal is generated by the universe. A human is generated by evolution, but evolution is controlled by the universe (by its laws). Is an individuated thing then set free, so it exists in itself? I wouldn´t say so, because it still is dependent on the universe`s laws. But a human can decide what to do by him/herself. So, is free will a thing in itself? And, in physical inanimate nature, is chance one? Chance and free will are not things you can touch, but concepts. But chance has existed before individuals capable of having concepts have existed, and chance is proven by chaos theory. But it still is a concept of the universe. So it is not in itself, but in the universe. I think, to decide, whether you may speak of a thing in itself, it may be helpful to test, if the itself-aspect of a thing can be prescinded, discriminated, or dissociated from a thing, and if the product of one of these Peircean processes then is a part of reality, and therefore a thing too. I can´t do that (too abstract for me). Perhaps one of you can do that? Best Regards, Helmut Gesendet: Donnerstag, 08. Juni 2023 um 20:30 Uhr Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" An: Kein Empfänger Cc: "Peirce-L" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Hello John, Mary, all, I'd be happy to compare notes on Peirce's, Kant's, Leibniz's arguments and remarks about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself." As I've suggested earlier, it is helpful to read Kant's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Leibniz. Similarly, it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz. Given John's notes about individuating individuals who are biological twins, he appears to be interested in the logical and semantic character of Leibniz's two principles: (1) the identity of individuals that are indiscernible and (2) the indiscernibility of individuals that are identical. In order to sort out the points of agreement and disagreement between Peirce, Kant and Leibniz on the application of those principles to actual things, it will be helpful to consider the differences in their respective accounts of how signs can be used to refer to individual objects as existing and as having qualities and real relations to other objects. That is, I think we can make progress on sorting out their disagreements by looking at their respective accounts of representation of actual individual's, the abstract qualities they may possess, and the real general laws that govern such individuals. A fundamental disagreement is over the types of signs that are essential for cognition. Leibniz claims there is one fundamental type of sign, which is that of a general conception. The sensations that are part of our perceptual observations of actual objects are just confused general conceptions. Kant maintains that there are two basic types of signs, individual representations as perceptual "intuitions" of things as being at a place in time and space, and general conceptions. Peirce, of course, maintains that signs can be classified triadically based on their own character, that of the object and that of the interpretant—and the requisite relations between those three. The result is a richer theory of signs and relations than either Leibniz or Kant provide. We need to interpret Peirce's responses to Kant's, or to Leibniz's claims about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself" in light of these differences in their accounts of signs and semiotic relations. Then, we need to consider different kinds of "things" that we might try to individuate, such as a rock, a human person or God. Contrast the attempts of these philosophers to clarify the grounds for individuating such various things as individuals, as compared to the grounds for understanding something—such as a law of causality--to be a real universal that governs actual individual objects. Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant and Leibniz: Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly or by legitimate probable inference. …
[PEIRCE-L] Atkins monograph
Hi John, The Atkins monograph is not yet available from OUP. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/peirce-on-inference-9780197689066?cc=us=en; It is scheduled to ship in July. I'd be interested in discussing the work when it does appear in print. Let me know if you are interested. --Jeff From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Mary Libertin Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 11:19 AM To: John F Sowa Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). John and Peirce-List, Here is the link to an excerpt from the book Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers by Richard Kenneth Atkins. <https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false> Peirce on Inference<https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false> books.google.com<https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false> [content.jpeg]<https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false> Best, Mary On Jun 8, 2023, at 12:01 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Mary, Thanks for citing that book. Note to all: If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro or con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any excerpt or summary that might clarify these issues. After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to refute Kant's claims are getting stronger. Just consider the case of identical twins. When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are two distinct individuals. But the differences between them are minor aspects of their appearance. Are there any considerations other than surface observations that could distinguish them as two distinct "things in themselves"? For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles of beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for tiny discrepancies from their intended specifications. John From: "Mary Libertin" Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM John, Peirce-list For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this discussion. * * Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By Richard Kenneth Atkins _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Mary, Jeff, List: The new volume by Atkins is surely another valuable contribution from him to Peirce scholarship, but searching it on Google Books turns up zero instances of "thing in itself," "things in themselves," or "*Ding an sich*." It apparently does not even discuss collateral experience/observation, which would be the most relevant Peirce-specific terminology. Again, the first premiss in CP 5.525 is that that every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found. This is the basic principle of logic that we can *only *identify and distinguish an individual external thing using an *index *(2ns), not a verbal description (3ns) of its qualities (1ns)--e.g., a line of identity in the Beta part of Existential Graphs, or a variable in the now-standard first-order predicate calculus. Any interpreter of a sign referring to that thing (dynamical object) must *already *be acquainted with it from collateral experience/observation. CSP: [E]very correlate of an existential relation is a single object which may be indefinite, or may be distributed; that is, may be chosen from a class by the interpreter of the assertion of which the relation or relationship is the predicate, or may be designated by a proper name, but in itself, though in some guise or under some mask, it can always be perceived, yet never can it be unmistakably identified by any sign whatever, without collateral observation. Far less can it be defined. It is *existent*, in that its being does not consist in any *qualities*, but in its effects--in its actually acting and being acted on, so long as this action and suffering endures. Those who experience its effects perceive and know it in that action; and just that constitutes its very being. It is not in perceiving its qualities that they know it, but in hefting its insistency then and there, which Duns called its *haecceitas *... (CP 6.318, 1907) Biological twins are neither identical (strictly speaking) nor indiscernible, no matter how closely they resemble each other in appearance. At a minimum, they occupy different locations in space. Unless they are sons of George Foreman, we can distinguish them by using their proper names, which Peirce classified as rhematic indexical legisigns; or if we happen to be with them in the same room, then we can do so simply by pointing at them. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jun 8, 2023 at 1:30 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> wrote: > Hello John, Mary, all, > > I'd be happy to compare notes on Peirce's, Kant's, Leibniz's arguments and > remarks about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself." As I've suggested > earlier, it is helpful to read Kant's claims in light of his attempt to > respond to Leibniz. Similarly, it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in > light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz. > > Given John's notes about individuating individuals who are biological > twins, he appears to be interested in the logical and semantic character of > Leibniz's two principles: (1) the identity of individuals that are > indiscernible and (2) the indiscernibility of individuals that are > identical. > > In order to sort out the points of agreement and disagreement between > Peirce, Kant and Leibniz on the application of those principles to actual > things, it will be helpful to consider the differences in their respective > accounts of how signs can be used to refer to individual objects as > existing and as having qualities and real relations to other objects. That > is, I think we can make progress on sorting out their disagreements by > looking at their respective accounts of representation of actual > individual's, the abstract qualities they may possess, and the real general > laws that govern such individuals. > > A fundamental disagreement is over the types of signs that are essential > for cognition. Leibniz claims there is one fundamental type of sign, which > is that of a general conception. The sensations that are part of our > perceptual observations of actual objects are just confused general > conceptions. Kant maintains that there are two basic types of signs, > individual representations as perceptual "intuitions" of things as being at > a place in time and space, and general conceptions. Peirce, of course, > maintains that signs can be classified triadically based on their own > character, that of the object and that of the interpretant—and the > requisite relations between those three. The result is a richer theory of > signs and relations than either Leibniz or Kant provide. > > We need to interpret Peirce's responses to Kant's, or to Leibniz's claims >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Hello John, Mary, all, I'd be happy to compare notes on Peirce's, Kant's, Leibniz's arguments and remarks about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself." As I've suggested earlier, it is helpful to read Kant's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Leibniz. Similarly, it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz. Given John's notes about individuating individuals who are biological twins, he appears to be interested in the logical and semantic character of Leibniz's two principles: (1) the identity of individuals that are indiscernible and (2) the indiscernibility of individuals that are identical. In order to sort out the points of agreement and disagreement between Peirce, Kant and Leibniz on the application of those principles to actual things, it will be helpful to consider the differences in their respective accounts of how signs can be used to refer to individual objects as existing and as having qualities and real relations to other objects. That is, I think we can make progress on sorting out their disagreements by looking at their respective accounts of representation of actual individual's, the abstract qualities they may possess, and the real general laws that govern such individuals. A fundamental disagreement is over the types of signs that are essential for cognition. Leibniz claims there is one fundamental type of sign, which is that of a general conception. The sensations that are part of our perceptual observations of actual objects are just confused general conceptions. Kant maintains that there are two basic types of signs, individual representations as perceptual "intuitions" of things as being at a place in time and space, and general conceptions. Peirce, of course, maintains that signs can be classified triadically based on their own character, that of the object and that of the interpretant—and the requisite relations between those three. The result is a richer theory of signs and relations than either Leibniz or Kant provide. We need to interpret Peirce's responses to Kant's, or to Leibniz's claims about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself" in light of these differences in their accounts of signs and semiotic relations. Then, we need to consider different kinds of "things" that we might try to individuate, such as a rock, a human person or God. Contrast the attempts of these philosophers to clarify the grounds for individuating such various things as individuals, as compared to the grounds for understanding something—such as a law of causality--to be a real universal that governs actual individual objects. Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant and Leibniz: Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or less explicitly state that that which they say cannot be derived from observation, or legitimate probable inference from observation, is a universal proposition in sense (3), that is, an assertion concerning every member of a general class without exception. CP 2.370 How do you interpret Peirce's objection to each? --Jeff ____ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of John F Sowa Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 9:01 AM To: Mary Libertin Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Mary, Thanks for citing that book. Note to all: If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro or con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any excerpt or summary that might clarify these issues. After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to refute Kant's claims are getting stronger. Just consider the case of identical twins. When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are two distinct individuals. But the differences between them are minor aspects of their appearance. Are there any considerations other than surface observations that could distinguish them as two distinct "things in themselves"? For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles of beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for tiny discrepancies from their intended specifications. John From: "Mary Libertin" Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM John, Peirce-list For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this discussion. * * Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By Richard Kenneth Atkins _ _ _ _ _
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
John and Peirce-List, Here is the link to an excerpt from the book Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers by Richard Kenneth Atkins. https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCEAAAQBAJ=0=frontcover=PP1=en=newbks_fb#v=onepage=false Best, Mary > On Jun 8, 2023, at 12:01 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Mary, > > Thanks for citing that book. > > Note to all: If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro > or con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any > excerpt or summary that might clarify these issues. > > After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to > refute Kant's claims are getting stronger. Just consider the case of > identical twins. When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are > two distinct individuals. But the differences between them are minor aspects > of their appearance. Are there any considerations other than surface > observations that could distinguish them as two distinct "things in > themselves"? > > For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles > of beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for > tiny discrepancies from their intended specifications. > > John > > > From: "Mary Libertin" > Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM > > John, Peirce-list > > For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this > discussion. > > Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By > Richard Kenneth Atkins > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Mary, Thanks for citing that book. Note to all: If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro or con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any excerpt or summary that might clarify these issues. After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to refute Kant's claims are getting stronger. Just consider the case of identical twins. When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are two distinct individuals. But the differences between them are minor aspects of their appearance. Are there any considerations other than surface observations that could distinguish them as two distinct "things in themselves"? For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles of beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for tiny discrepancies from their intended specifications. John From: "Mary Libertin" Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM John, Peirce-list For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this discussion. - - Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By Richard Kenneth Atkins _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
John, Peirce-list For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this discussion. Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By Richard Kenneth Atkins > On Jun 8, 2023, at 1:16 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Jon, Jack, et al., > > As I wrote in my previous note (excerpt copied below), both Kant and Peirce > presented positions that neither one had fully proved. Although I prefer > Peirce's position, I must admit that his proof in CP 5.525 is flawed, and > your version does not correct the flaw. > > JAS> By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an > sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. > CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after > all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a > subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise > indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The > Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no > proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of > it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless > surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) > The flaw in this paragraph is in the phrase "after all that words can convey > has been thrown into the predicate". > > Question: What words are being considered? Do we consider all the words > that have been defined in the current state of Engllish (or some other > languages)? If Peirce meant 1905, that would rule out the huge number of new > concepts of quantum mechanics and other innovations in the physics of the > 20th and later centuries. It's quite certain that no words could be found > in 1905 that could adequately explain the life of a snail. > > In fact, nobody has proposed a precise definition of the word 'life' today. > Physicians cannot reliably detect the precise moment when a patient dies. > And quantum mechanics makes many issues impossible to detect or measure > precisely. There is a huge amount that is unknown. > > In summary, Kant's claim is true for most of the things we encounter in our > daily lives. Our descriptions cover only the parts we can detect with our > senses and any scientific instruments at our disposal. As science > progresses, people keep inventing more precise instruments. But there is > still a huge amount that is unknowable in nearly every object we encounter. > > John > > > Excerpt from: "John F Sowa" > Sent: 6/7/23 1:24 AM > > The quotation below summarizes Peirce's theory of science in the first > paragraph, where the final opinion is a goal that might never be reached. > One way to explain the difference between Kant and Peirce is that (1) they > both understood the difficulty of analyzing every detail of the full > complexity of the things we experience. (2) Kant was a pessimist who did not > believe that anybody could ever really understand all those details. (3) > Peirce was an optimist who believed that any question about the things we > experience could eventually be answered if given enough scientists enough > time to study the question and test it with all possible experiments. > > As a pessimist, Kant was correct in saying that the overwhelming majority of > the details of the things we perceive are unknowable by us, But as an > optimist, Peirce was correct in claiming that scientific methodology, as > pursued by an untold number of scientists, could ultimately discover any of > those details that may be needed to answer any questions we might ask. > . > "There is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in > the long run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already > reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given... This final > opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought, in general, but of all > that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, > or I or any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought > to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else... > > This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself, - > a thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's conception of it. > Yet it would by no means forbid, but rather encourage us, to regard the > appearances of sense as only signs of the realities. Only, the realities > which they represent, would not be the unknowable cause of sensation, but > noumena or intelligible conceptions which are the last products of the mental > action which is set in motion by sensation
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, Jack, et al., As I wrote in my previous note (excerpt copied below), both Kant and Peirce presented positions that neither one had fully proved. Although I prefer Peirce's position, I must admit that his proof in CP 5.525 is flawed, and your version does not correct the flaw. JAS> By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) The flaw in this paragraph is in the phrase "after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate". Question: What words are being considered? Do we consider all the words that have been defined in the current state of Engllish (or some other languages)? If Peirce meant 1905, that would rule out the huge number of new concepts of quantum mechanics and other innovations in the physics of the 20th and later centuries. It's quite certain that no words could be found in 1905 that could adequately explain the life of a snail. In fact, nobody has proposed a precise definition of the word 'life' today. Physicians cannot reliably detect the precise moment when a patient dies. And quantum mechanics makes many issues impossible to detect or measure precisely. There is a huge amount that is unknown. In summary, Kant's claim is true for most of the things we encounter in our daily lives. Our descriptions cover only the parts we can detect with our senses and any scientific instruments at our disposal. As science progresses, people keep inventing more precise instruments. But there is still a huge amount that is unknowable in nearly every object we encounter. John Excerpt from: "John F Sowa" Sent: 6/7/23 1:24 AM The quotation below summarizes Peirce's theory of science in the first paragraph, where the final opinion is a goal that might never be reached. One way to explain the difference between Kant and Peirce is that (1) they both understood the difficulty of analyzing every detail of the full complexity of the things we experience. (2) Kant was a pessimist who did not believe that anybody could ever really understand all those details. (3) Peirce was an optimist who believed that any question about the things we experience could eventually be answered if given enough scientists enough time to study the question and test it with all possible experiments. As a pessimist, Kant was correct in saying that the overwhelming majority of the details of the things we perceive are unknowable by us, But as an optimist, Peirce was correct in claiming that scientific methodology, as pursued by an untold number of scientists, could ultimately discover any of those details that may be needed to answer any questions we might ask. . "There is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given... This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought, in general, but of all that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, or I or any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else... This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself, - a thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's conception of it. Yet it would by no means forbid, but rather encourage us, to regard the appearances of sense as only signs of the realities. Only, the realities which they represent, would not be the unknowable cause of sensation, but noumena or intelligible conceptions which are the last products of the mental action which is set in motion by sensation". [CP 8.12-13, emphasis Peirce's] _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: I appreciate the latest attempt at simplification, but it is still not a deductively valid argumentation. In fact, its conclusion is an incorrect *definition*. JRKC: 13. Elemental qualities, in the absence of human (or, all organic) experience, must exist in themselves. 14. This is what Kant calls the “thing in itself”. On the contrary, this is *not *what Kant calls the "thing in itself." #13 is not controversial at all, as long as we are using "exist" in the logical sense of belonging to a universe of discourse; from the metaphysical standpoint, qualities have their *being *in themselves (1ns), but they do not *exist *except as embodied in things (2ns). Moreover, we agree that cognition (and representation in general) is always *mediation *such that things with their embodied qualities can and do exist without ever *actually *being cognized; again, the *real *is that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks *about it*, and the *external *is that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks *about anything*. We further agree that no cognition or other sign of an external thing is *identical *to that thing. In short, no one is disputing that external things *exist *independently of mediation or human cognitive processes, but at issue is whether external things and/or some of their embodied qualities are *incognizable*, i.e., impossible to *represent *by means of mediation (semiosis) including human cognitive processes. You still have not provided a series of premisses from which *that *conclusion follows necessarily, like I did by reformulating and formalizing Peirce's straightforward proof that the *Ding an sich* is nonsensical (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2023-06/msg00016.html). Instead, you seem to be *assuming *that whatever is *independent *of any representation of it is *incapable *of being represented at all, thus begging the question. JRKC: I just want to add, with respect to that draft, that it cannot be a "dynamical object" for the thing in itself is posited in absentia of all organic experience. Therefore, whilst Peircean semeiotic remains vital, to me, and I use it in the relata (though only proto as of now), it is not accurate to say that the Semeiotic can account for the thing in itself except to help infer its necessary existence, which it does. These remarks reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of Peircean semeiotic. Strictly speaking, it is true that nothing *serves *as a dynamical object unless/until it *actually *determines a sign (such as a cognition) to represent it. Nevertheless, whatever logically exists, in *any *of the three Universes of Experience (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908), is *capable* of being represented and thus a *potential *dynamical object for a sign. Again, the problematic concept here is not so much the thing-in-itself as the *incognizable *thing-in-itself, the claim that something can exist yet be *impossible *to cognize/represent. For both Kant and Peirce, metaphysics depends on logic for principles, not the other way around. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jun 6, 2023 at 7:18 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > > Jon, list, > > I present a very brief draft, once more - albeit much neater than perhaps > it has been before - which demonstrates the necessary inference of the > thing in itself which cannot, in any respect, be cognized. I know not how > to make it more simple than this (though I am trying - and facing the > problem, in micro-form, perhaps, that Kant had with his Prolegomena). That > is, the more complicated version no one can understand (Critique) but > surely this simple version everyone must understand. The premises follow > each other, I have checked them dozens of ways, differentially, and the > primary points - semantic - are all sound. > > Whether one accepts this as proof or not is not up to me, as I, too, used > to think the thing in itself was utter nonsense. But, in all honesty, I > cannot see how it is now other than necessary given the logical situation > (minus Peirce, for the moment, whom I bring back in at a later date - > comments from yourself, Helmut, some private correspondence, and J Sowa > have been very helpful in allowing me to understand the primary > objections). If they are not met here, within this draft, it is only > because I am literally cutting paper upon the chopping board and going > through hundreds of thousands of words to try and find the best means of > articulation. > > Best > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce
[PEIRCE-L] Symbolic Logic and Religious Symbolism, Sinaia, Sept 3-8, 2023 - CfP - Extended Deadline June 15
Workshop organized by Jean-Yves Beziau and Caroline Pires Ting Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Logica Universalis Association (Geneva, Switzerland) Part of the 4th World Congress on Logic and Religion, Sinaia, Sept 3-8, 2023 CALL FOR PAPERS On the one hand symbolism is important in most religions, on the other hand modern logic is often characterized as symbolic. This workshop, part of WoCoLoR4, explores the relation between these two symbolic approaches. Suggested topics include - but are not limited to - the following: > Boole's symbolic mathematical notation in logic and abstract religious notions > Zoroastrianism's dualism, Pythagoras's table of opposites, Trinity Christian triangle, Islamic geometrical objects and the theory of oppositions > Yin/Yang and the notion of complementary contradiction > the symbolism of the cross, crucifixion, negation and abnegation > Venn symbolic logic, Venn diagrams and their application for understanding religious phenomena > the universal quantifier and catholicism as a religion for all > is the existential quantifier really symbolizing existence? > Cabala symbolism and logic in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland by Charles Dodgson, aka Lewis Carroll, deacon in the Church of England and symbolic logician > logical "interpretation" of Gödel's proof of the existence of God in symbolic logic Submit a one page abstract by June 15 Religious Symbolism and Symbolic Logic, Sinaia, Sept 3-8, 2023 https://sites.google.com/view/symbol-relog _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack and Jon, I believe that the two of you are talking past one another. I also suspect that a major reason for the disagreement is that Kant and Peirce had very different criteria for what it means to know something. By knowing, Kant meant absolutely total knowledge of something, not just its appearances at the surface. But Peirce was first and foremost a scientist, who understood that scientific knowledge is acquired by years or even centuries of collaborative research by an untold number of scientists. The following quotation summarizes Peirce's theory of science in the first paragraph, where the final opinion is a goal that might never be reached. One way to explain the difference between Kant and Peirce is that (1) they both understood the difficulty of analyzing every detail of the full complexity of the things we experience. (2) Kant was a pessimist who did not believe that anybody could ever really understand all those details. (3) Peirce was an optimist who believed that any question about the things we experience could eventually be answered if given enough scientists enough time to study the question and test it with all possible experiments. As a pessimist, Kant was correct in saying that the overwhelming majority of the details of the things we perceive are unknowable by us, But as an optimist, Peirce was correct in claiming that scientific methodology, as pursued by an untold number of scientists, could ultimately discover any of those details that may be needed to answer any questions we might ask. . "There is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given... This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought, in general, but of all that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, or I or any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else... This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself, - a thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's conception of it. Yet it would by no means forbid, but rather encourage us, to regard the appearances of sense as only signs of the realities. Only, the realities which they represent, would not be the unknowable cause of sensation, but noumena or intelligible conceptions which are the last products of the mental action which is set in motion by sensation". [CP 8.12-13, emphasis Peirce's] John From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" I just want to add, with respect to that draft, that it cannot be a "dynamical object" for the thing in itself is posited in absentia of all organic experience. Therefore, whilst Peircean semeiotic remains vital, to me, and I use it in the relata (though only proto as of now), it is not accurate to say that the Semeiotic can account for the thing in itself except to help infer its necessary existence, which it does. Jack -------- From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Jack, List: Your persistent claim is that the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is a necessary inference, i.e., a deductive conclusion. The problem is that it almost certainly follows only from premisses (still not fully spelled out) that Peirce and I would dispute. Moreover, we cannot infer the existence of anything strictly by deduction; as Peirce says, "It is to ideal states of things alone--or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality--that deduction applies" (CP 2.778, 1902). In fact, our inference that Socrates existed is not deductive at all, it is abductive/retroductive--a very plausible explanation of extensive evidence. The problem with taking this approach to the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is that it does not actually explain anything. CSP: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
I just want to add, with respect to that draft, that it cannot be a "dynamical object" for the thing in itself is posited in absentia of all organic experience. Therefore, whilst Peircean semeiotic remains vital, to me, and I use it in the relata (though only proto as of now), it is not accurate to say that the Semeiotic can account for the thing in itself except to help infer its necessary existence, which it does. Jack ____ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Monday, June 5, 2023 10:31 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Your persistent claim is that the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is a necessary inference, i.e., a deductive conclusion. The problem is that it almost certainly follows only from premisses (still not fully spelled out) that Peirce and I would dispute. Moreover, we cannot infer the existence of anything strictly by deduction; as Peirce says, "It is to ideal states of things alone--or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality--that deduction applies" (CP 2.778, 1902). In fact, our inference that Socrates existed is not deductive at all, it is abductive/retroductive--a very plausible explanation of extensive evidence. The problem with taking this approach to the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is that it does not actually explain anything. CSP: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must therefore be guided by the rule of hope, and consequently we must reject every philosophy or general conception of the universe, which could ever lead to the conclusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to the explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing whatever. (CP 1.405, EP 1:, 1887-8) Again, for Peirce, asserting that it is impossible to cognize/represent/know something as it is in itself is straightforwardly blocking the way of inquiry. Moreover, a person as an existent is not a predicate, but a subject--that to which propositions can attribute predicates. Likewise, if the thing-in-itself were to exist, then it would be a subject to which propositions could attribute predicates; but as Peirce observes, "no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). In other words, there is no logical justification for asserting the existence of something to which we cannot determinately attribute any predicates whatsoever. As for the "unknown known" or "known unknown" ... CSP: A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls up. So that we cannot even talk about anything but a knowable object. The unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk can be nothing but an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy. The nominalists in giving their adherence to that doctrine which is really held by all philosophers of all stripes, namely, that experience is all we know, understand experience in their nominalistic sense as the mere first impressions of sense. These "first impressions of sense" are hypothetical creations of nominalistic metaphysics: I for one deny their existence. But anyway even if they exist, it is not in them that experience consists. By experience must be understood the entire mental product. (CP 6.492, c. 1896) Peirce clarifies later, "But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in order those observations which lie open to every man every day and hour, experience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538, 1899). Cheers, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist P
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, list, I present a very brief draft, once more - albeit much neater than perhaps it has been before - which demonstrates the necessary inference of the thing in itself which cannot, in any respect, be cognized. I know not how to make it more simple than this (though I am trying - and facing the problem, in micro-form, perhaps, that Kant had with his Prolegomena). That is, the more complicated version no one can understand (Critique) but surely this simple version everyone must understand. The premises follow each other, I have checked them dozens of ways, differentially, and the primary points - semantic - are all sound. Whether one accepts this as proof or not is not up to me, as I, too, used to think the thing in itself was utter nonsense. But, in all honesty, I cannot see how it is now other than necessary given the logical situation (minus Peirce, for the moment, whom I bring back in at a later date - comments from yourself, Helmut, some private correspondence, and J Sowa have been very helpful in allowing me to understand the primary objections). If they are not met here, within this draft, it is only because I am literally cutting paper upon the chopping board and going through hundreds of thousands of words to try and find the best means of articulation. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Monday, June 5, 2023 10:31 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Your persistent claim is that the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is a necessary inference, i.e., a deductive conclusion. The problem is that it almost certainly follows only from premisses (still not fully spelled out) that Peirce and I would dispute. Moreover, we cannot infer the existence of anything strictly by deduction; as Peirce says, "It is to ideal states of things alone--or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality--that deduction applies" (CP 2.778, 1902). In fact, our inference that Socrates existed is not deductive at all, it is abductive/retroductive--a very plausible explanation of extensive evidence. The problem with taking this approach to the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is that it does not actually explain anything. CSP: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must therefore be guided by the rule of hope, and consequently we must reject every philosophy or general conception of the universe, which could ever lead to the conclusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to the explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing whatever. (CP 1.405, EP 1:, 1887-8) Again, for Peirce, asserting that it is impossible to cognize/represent/know something as it is in itself is straightforwardly blocking the way of inquiry. Moreover, a person as an existent is not a predicate, but a subject--that to which propositions can attribute predicates. Likewise, if the thing-in-itself were to exist, then it would be a subject to which propositions could attribute predicates; but as Peirce observes, "no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). In other words, there is no logical justification for asserting the existence of something to which we cannot determinately attribute any predicates whatsoever. As for the "unknown known" or "known unknown" ... CSP: A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls up. So that we cannot even talk about anything but a knowable object. The unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk can be nothing but an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy. The nominalists in giving their adherence to that doctrine which is really
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
ut merely my analytical attempt, foolhardy, as it must be, to > imagine it. > > That is, I know that Socrates existed. I do not know what he looked like > but I might imagine such a man. I do not pretend my imagining of Socrates > is what Socrates, the actual man, appeared in physical characteristic. But > that I have an imagining of such a man, and know it to be incorrect, and > also know that such a man existed, to which some "truthful" quality > pertained, this is no contradiction at all. Thus, I infer that Socrates > existed whilst also inferring that my representation of Socrates, in image, > is not what Socrates, the man, actually looked like. More accurately, then: > > People operate upon this structural basis quite frequently. I'm sure I > have read of this very means in Peirce. And yet, I cannot point you > precisely to it, as it were, which is, diagrammatically, a micro-variety of > the same phenomena. > > However, consider this: I hear of a person - predicate 1 - and something > they've done/something qualitatively associated with them - predicate 2. I > do not know the first predicate at all - the person - but am very familiar > with the second predicate - the quality which is "something" they've done > or is "something associated with them". Now, let's pretend the second > predicate is "died/death". > > Thus, I may justly infer a conclusion, which is both inductive and > deductive and have it stand entirely valid despite absolutely no knowledge > of the first predicate. Insofar as "naturally occurring propositions" go, > then, limited/no exposure to the first predicate beyond formal > acquaintance, that it represents "a person", but quite a lot of exposure > with/to the second predicate, which here is the quality of "death/died" is > such, sui generis, that *my inference corresponds to UnknownKnown* > wherein my *attempts to imagine the Unknown, are entirely fallible* > > And such is a logical truism: that the unknown may exist, and frequently > does, (ordinally here), as in the above scenario where I have never met the > first person, but I may still imagine that person via whatever images, as > result of Collateral Experience, are present to my mind as means of > furnishing. Yet, such images, I know, simultaneously, are not, at all, what > that person, *the unknown-but-really-extant "predicate",* actually > is/looks-like. > > It is Schopenhauer who posits the Known Unknown within the Kantian context > of the thing in itself. He deviates, I have to recall here as it is ten > years since I have read Schopenhauer, from my understanding of Kant, but > that UnknownKnown, or KnownUnknown, is something, which, experientially, > you find in Peirce (as Peirce explaining things as they are in > representational terms - within his schema: is it abduction? the term is > not important to me here, but what it refers to, as it were, is a rather > true phenomena). > > At any rate, to infer that the thing in itself necessarily exists but that > all cognitions of it are not it, beyond the mere fact that it exists, is > not as contradictory as it may seem. > > Best > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).
rms, semeiotic or otherwise, it is best to restrict theses to the simplest terms possible. Quality/Element/Subject. To a physicist, perhaps all three are elements? That the "quality" of the "element" (salt) is "poison" to a snail, is the formal - semiotic - classifcation of the relation in its simplest possible form. That the Q of the E(s) is not poison to any other organism (or need not be) is the point. Thus, the essence of salt, as it is in itself, is proven (regardless of formal structure but via formal structure - as with Godel). Thus Q of E(S) = V(P-H[S]) but not [X]. To humans, always V(-X) (in itself, there, but not possible to represent). All mathematics/lexicals/sciences/logics produce a value within a formal relata (relational schema) which value is never the thing in itself (but we know the thing in itself necessarily is and is pre-form). That is as scientific as Semeiotic may ever be. But only if it understands the X restriction which enables its liftoff - the fallibilism upon which science is based and which Peirce always embraced - thus there should be no reticience in disregarding large chunks of Peircean terminology as that is what Peirce aimed for (semeiotic as science). Quality of Element(Snail) = Value(Poison-to-Human[-of-Snail]). That is the semeiotic "standing for" schema simplified. I.e, Salt-Snail-Poison = Value(Poison-to-Human[-of-Snail]. However, P-H[S] is necessarily not Poison to a Snail which in semiotic/formal terms is more like P(S[Sa]). The first has a human intermediary - we cannot pretend that this doesn't "count" (formal logic and mathematics will tell you that it does). Thus, what salt - as poison - is to a snail, in absentia of human understanding, cannot be the "same" thing (Reality or otherwise) as it is to a snail minus the human predicate. And this is only in logical terms - which occludes the fact that no animal understands such things via logic (of this lexical, received, variety, other than the human). We have no idea - no matter what anyone says - of how a snail perceives salt. We assume it is the same - or similar - as in "fire is hot" (Kantian objectivity 1.0) but similar, mutual threshold of understanding, is not the "same" (it cannot be, even from the biological point of view - it mightbe similar, but never the same, for the divergences among humans themselves tell us this with zero ambiguity: savoury for some, poisonous for others). Nor is it relativity, it is just true. Every single mathematical system ever derived partakes of precisely the same schema. Bar none. Formal relationships - genres if you like - which justify certain functions/operations within a given "habitus" (area of operational protocol - entirely habitual insofar as the numericals/etc go). And all such are discursivities - which is why logic goes ahead of mathematics in every schema you've ever seen (epistemological). This is why Russell derives a paradox and Godel derives incompleteness -- the terms are arbitrary discursivities (functional, yes, but not innate or universal in any sense -- consubstantiality may be universal, but no given terms used "with substance" to "map substance" is necessarily divine/universal). V(X), however, is universal in every sense but we cannot represent its existence in formal terms without missing the point. For example, V(X) explains Peirce's entire schema and continua (the result...) but Peirce's schema, in itself (not noumenal), cannot do the same thing. Q(uality) of E(lement) = derivation of V(alue) but never the thing in itself: (X). A representation - VALUE - of the thing which is never the thing in itself (X). Now, this can be formalized a million different ways but it never breaks. It's the simplest - insofar as I know - means of explaining formal logic relative to semiotic and the limitations/possibilities therein as it pertains to the noumenal proof. I know - as it goes - that for this to be a "proof" in the academic sense, I'd have to go further (but I just know it is proven and have been rather lazy of late - not very well). Happy to let others go at it - whether to falsify or prove. Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, Just with respect to "inference": I just wish to say, in advance of what I think will be a slow creep, on my part, toward a methodological break down of an already confirmed thesis (as it stands to me, but necessary for its confirmation is not understood by others or accepted) that my use of inference/infer is correct. I infer it, the thing in itself exists, but as it is in itself, as to its qualities re cognition, I cannot cognize it even as I do. My imagination of it is not what it is, but merely my analytical attempt, foolhardy, as it must be, to imagine it. That is, I know that Socrates existed. I do not know what he looked like but I might imagine such a man. I do not pretend my imagining of Socrates is what Socrates, the actual man, appeared in physical characteristic. But that I have an imagining of such a man, and know it to be incorrect, and also know that such a man existed, to which some "truthful" quality pertained, this is no contradiction at all. Thus, I infer that Socrates existed whilst also inferring that my representation of Socrates, in image, is not what Socrates, the man, actually looked like. More accurately, then: People operate upon this structural basis quite frequently. I'm sure I have read of this very means in Peirce. And yet, I cannot point you precisely to it, as it were, which is, diagrammatically, a micro-variety of the same phenomena. However, consider this: I hear of a person - predicate 1 - and something they've done/something qualitatively associated with them - predicate 2. I do not know the first predicate at all - the person - but am very familiar with the second predicate - the quality which is "something" they've done or is "something associated with them". Now, let's pretend the second predicate is "died/death". Thus, I may justly infer a conclusion, which is both inductive and deductive and have it stand entirely valid despite absolutely no knowledge of the first predicate. Insofar as "naturally occurring propositions" go, then, limited/no exposure to the first predicate beyond formal acquaintance, that it represents "a person", but quite a lot of exposure with/to the second predicate, which here is the quality of "death/died" is such, sui generis, that my inference corresponds to UnknownKnown wherein my attempts to imagine the Unknown, are entirely fallible And such is a logical truism: that the unknown may exist, and frequently does, (ordinally here), as in the above scenario where I have never met the first person, but I may still imagine that person via whatever images, as result of Collateral Experience, are present to my mind as means of furnishing. Yet, such images, I know, simultaneously, are not, at all, what that person, the unknown-but-really-extant "predicate", actually is/looks-like. It is Schopenhauer who posits the Known Unknown within the Kantian context of the thing in itself. He deviates, I have to recall here as it is ten years since I have read Schopenhauer, from my understanding of Kant, but that UnknownKnown, or KnownUnknown, is something, which, experientially, you find in Peirce (as Peirce explaining things as they are in representational terms - within his schema: is it abduction? the term is not important to me here, but what it refers to, as it were, is a rather true phenomena). At any rate, to infer that the thing in itself necessarily exists but that all cognitions of it are not it, beyond the mere fact that it exists, is not as contradictory as it may seem. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 8:57 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate your honesty, but since you are now rejecting basic principles of logic (my #1 and #4), there is nothing more for us to discuss. Again, Peirce affirms them (as well as my #2), so there is also no possibility of reconciling your position with his. You simply think that he was wrong, while I (and many others) think that he was right. I will just note that an inference (conclusion of an argument) is never an indication (index), it is always a symbol; and anything that we infer is thereby something that we cognize. In other words, as I have said twice before, even if your alleged "proof" demonstrates that the thing-in-itself must be inferred, it still must be capable of being represented, and thus cognizable after all. Cheers, Jon On Sun, Jun 4, 2023 at 2:45 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the discussion further. Hi Jon, li
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, Helmut, List, No doubt, Jon, the burden of proof rests with me here because I am asserting that I have proved the necessary inference of the thing in itself and also assert that it cannot be cognized (as per Kant). I don't find myself rejecting basic principles of logic, at all, to be honest, but perhaps you find me rejecting basic principles of Peircean logic? For I read that Peircean extract differently and in a manner entirely logical, just one we do not agree with. But you have, to your credit, outlined precisely why you think the thing in itself can be represented whereas I say, and must now prove, within the Peircean idiom, so to speak, precisely why this is not true. Thus, I think it a premature statement, on your behalf, here, to say that I am "blocking" the road of "inquiry" when I am spending a hot Monday afternoon rather heuristically reading through eclectic Peircean material and responding to Peircean scholars about the very nature of the Peircean schema. Indeed, I believe we advance inquiry precisely by doing what we are now doing. Thanks. Now I think, that representation or meaning is an "Ought"- thing: Some sign ought to mean something. If it is symbolical, it ought due to a convention, if it is iconical, it ought due to resemblance, if it is indexical, it ought due to it giving a hint. I think that's entirely accurate, Helmut. I am, too, more concerned with the general outline, (of how Peirce derives his categories and general categorical framework), than with specifics because to approach the Kantian/Hume (now Peirce, too) debate, you must go to the generalities in logic before, insofar as I can tell, rushing to the specificities of any given writer's system. I find myself engaged with Peirce's "lists" as of now, that is, the means by which he came to deduce his categories. The Deduction of Categories in Peirce's "New List" Author(s): Fred Michael Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society , Summer, 1980, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 1980), pp. 179-211 Published by: Indiana University Press https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319892 I recommend the above. Perhaps (or, rather, likely, given the audience) familiar to many of you already. I am concerned with the most general as of now, the burden of proof being upon me. For though I am convinced it is logically proven already, that we are debating it means I have not proved it sufficiently, it isn't accurate, or I have not sufficiently made myself understood. Thus, it falls back upon me, rather than other people, to sufficiently prove my thesis: that the thing in itself must necessarily be inferred and, necessarily, cannot be cognized (part of my thesis, at any rate). That's fine, I think, as my interest is philosophy/logic with particular interest in Semeiotic/Peirce, and I find myself discussing all of these things with the requisite audience. I would only stress this: argumentation over something such as this can never limit inquiry. We are necessarily advancing it by removing ambiguity regardless of whose position wins out. That is, if JAS be correct (his position within the debate-parameters), then truth, via consensus, over time, wins and such can never be a bad thing. The same if my thesis is found to be accurate. I find this debate very helpful, that is, for the parameters - what is required of me as it were and thus what is found lacking by others within my position - have been suitably set. That is already a dividend reaped for honest inquiry. This is a nuanced issue, if you ask me, and will take time to consider. I have been formulating series/natural language descriptions for nearly a year now. It's not a rush to the finish line for me. Thus, Jon, your position, for example. Suppose it is actually accurate and I instead walk away with that proof? Well, I have nonetheless explored Peirce/Kant/Hume - metaphysics and semeiotic - exhaustively. There is no such thing as "failed thesis", an old advisor once told me, if you can advance the area of research within which said thesis is published. Less about winning, I suppose, and more about advancing the truth by hook or crook but honestly. Best wishes, Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 8:57 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate your honesty, but since you are now rejecting basic principles of logic (my #1 and #4), there is nothing more for us to discuss. Again, Peirce affirms them (as well as my #2), so there is also no possibility of reconciling your position with his. You simply think that he was wrong, while I (and many others) think that he was right. I will just note that an inference (conclusion of an argu
Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists
izing that concrete reasonableness is itself a manifestation of continuity as "a special kind of generality, or conformity to one idea" (CP 7.535n6, 1908). CSP: Such is the place of logic among the sciences; and such is its utility. Yet the reader will find that the aggregate value of all such applications will not compare with the treasure of the pure theory itself. For when he has surveyed the whole subject, he will see that the theory of logic, in so far as we attain to it, is the vision and the attainment of that Reasonableness for the sake of which the Heavens and the Earth have been created. (CP 2.122, 1902) The resulting ethical imperative is for each of us to exercise self-control over our future actions by deliberately cultivating habits of conduct accordingly. CSP: This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason. I do not see how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the admirable than the development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to us" to do so. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903) I recently came across the following in an unpublished manuscript where Peirce aligns elliptical philosophy (no starting/stopping point) with epicureanism, parabolic philosophy (same starting/stopping point) with pessimism, and his own hyperbolic philosophy (different starting/stopping points) with meliorism. CSP: [Meliorists] think that throughout the universe as a whole, the good has a decided tendency to prevail. If you ask what they mean by the good, they will tell you they mean the ultimate end of the universe. Accordingly, when they say the good tends to prevail, they mean there is a general tendency throughout the universe toward some describable condition of things. These thinkers consequently prescribe for us what they consider as an infallible recipe for being happy, if one only has the strength of mind to take the medicine, namely, to bring your desires into conformity with the general course of nature. ... Since the maxim of happiness is to recognize and accept the truth, they declare that contempt for the ego and love for the community of soul is the truest and happiest sentiment. (R 953, no date) This might be the closest that Peirce ever comes to endorsing a version of natural law theory, especially in conjunction with my suggestion that the complete revelation of God is the overall final interpretant of the entire universe as a sign, i.e., the "describable condition of things" toward which "there is a general tendency throughout the universe." Accordingly, "to bring your desires into conformity with the general course of nature" would then amount to bringing your desires into conformity with the revealed character of God Himself, along with your actions and beliefs. Regarding leadership, I think that it makes a lot of sense to frame it as drawing followers toward a designated goal as a final cause (3ns), instead of the all-too-common approach of pushing them toward it as an efficient cause (2ns). This allows appropriate flexibility in the means that they can employ to reach the specified end, as opposed to dictating every step along the way. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmi _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, Helmut, List: Deciding from the outset that no sign can ever represent its object as it is in itself is blocking the way of inquiry, not to mention begging the question. Given that stance on Jack's part, again, there is nothing more for us to discuss. The supposed "is-ought distinction" is not relevant here. Every sign means something because that is part of the very definition of a sign--it has an *immediate *(possible) interpretant, such that it is capable of producing *dynamical *(actual) interpretants. Logic as semeiotic is a *normative *science in the sense that it prescribes how we *ought* to reason, *if *our goal in doing so is to adopt only true beliefs, i.e., to conform our dynamical interpretants of any given sign to its *final *(ideal) interpretant. A thing in itself (*dynamical *object) is as it is regardless of how anyone *actually *represents it (*immediate *object), but it is precisely how an infinite community *would *represent it after infinite inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jun 4, 2023 at 11:19 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Jack, Jon, List, > > Both Hume´s law, and the "natural fallacy"- theory say, that you cannot > conclude from "Is" to "Ought". I think, that is because the two are > categorically different approaches. So I guess, that it neither is possible > to conclude the other way, from "Ought" to "Is". Now I think, that > representation or meaning is an "Ought"- thing: Some sign ought to mean > something. If it is symbolical, it ought due to a convention, if it is > iconical, it ought due to resemblance, if it is indexical, it ought due to > it giving a hint. The only critical variety (a variety in which it is > possible to conclude from ought to is, resp. when "Ought" turns into "Is"), > I see, is indexical with complete induction, when the hints fill the space > of possibility in a way, that there is no more space for counter-hints. But > this case is not only unlikely, I think, but also contradicts Goedel. The > range of the space of possibility is necessarily unknown, otherwise it > could not be called "possibility". So I guess, that you cannot conclude > from an ought-matter such as representation to an is-matter, like the > essential being of a thing. > > Best, Helmut > *Gesendet:* Sonntag, 04. Juni 2023 um 09:50 Uhr > *Von:* "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" > *An:* "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > the question is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the > object as it is in itself. > > Just to add: along with what has to now be a deductively clear > argumentation of the premisses, by me, this is where we are likely to > disagree. The sign, cannot, in principle, or practice, represent the object > as it is in itself. But I note your post in general and there are many good > pointers there insofar as we might bring this debate forward and reach > consensus one way or the other. > > Thanks. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: I appreciate your honesty, but since you are now rejecting basic principles of logic (my #1 and #4), there is nothing more for us to discuss. Again, Peirce affirms them (as well as my #2), so there is also no possibility of reconciling your position with his. You simply think that he was wrong, while I (and many others) think that he was right. I will just note that an inference (conclusion of an argument) is never an indication (index), it is always a symbol; and anything that we infer is thereby something that we cognize. In other words, as I have said twice before, even if your alleged "proof" demonstrates that the thing-in-itself must be inferred, it still must be capable of being represented, and thus cognizable after all. Cheers, Jon On Sun, Jun 4, 2023 at 2:45 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two > specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the > discussion further. > > Hi Jon, list, > > I think this is fair. It comes down to whether I can, or cannot, answer > these two questions. I agree with that. > > I would say, provisionally, that premises 1 and 2, 4 and thus 5 are all > wrong. That the thing in itself can be indicated but its indication comes > by inference (for, as you know, it cannot possibly be cognized). > > But it requires a better treatment from me which I've began drafting (not > overly long as in the last essay-post and more conventional). > > Thanks again. > > Jack > > -- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > Any argumentation that has a "gap" *cannot *be deductively valid. The > whole point is to *show *that the conclusion follows necessarily from the > premisses by spelling them *all *out, especially the ones that are likely > to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in > itself" entails that nothing has been *demonstrated *yet. *Which > premiss(es) are you omitting?* > > By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the *Ding an > sich* is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. > > CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after > all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains > a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or > otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be > prescribed. The *Ding an sich*, however, can neither be indicated nor > found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or > false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be > thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) > > > In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, > we can reformulate it as follows. > > 1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or > found (all S is I or F). > 2. The *Ding an sich* can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F). > 3. Therefore, the *Ding an sich* cannot be the subject of a meaningful > proposition (no D is S). > > > We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it. > > 4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E > is S). > > 5. Therefore, the *Ding an sich* does not exist (no D is E). > > > Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). *Which > premiss(es) are you denying?* > > Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the > *non-existence* of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing > misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it > violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction > to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the > full context. > > CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up > in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of > things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the > universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think > Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe > which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to > be trusted only so far as it sustains critical investigation. Of course I > cannot say in short compass exactly what I mean. (SS 140-141,
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, Jon, List, Both Hume´s law, and the "natural fallacy"- theory say, that you cannot conclude from "Is" to "Ought". I think, that is because the two are categorically different approaches. So I guess, that it neither is possible to conclude the other way, from "Ought" to "Is". Now I think, that representation or meaning is an "Ought"- thing: Some sign ought to mean something. If it is symbolical, it ought due to a convention, if it is iconical, it ought due to resemblance, if it is indexical, it ought due to it giving a hint. The only critical variety (a variety in which it is possible to conclude from ought to is, resp. when "Ought" turns into "Is"), I see, is indexical with complete induction, when the hints fill the space of possibility in a way, that there is no more space for counter-hints. But this case is not only unlikely, I think, but also contradicts Goedel. The range of the space of possibility is necessarily unknown, otherwise it could not be called "possibility". So I guess, that you cannot conclude from an ought-matter such as representation to an is-matter, like the essential being of a thing. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 04. Juni 2023 um 09:50 Uhr Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" An: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). the question is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the object as it is in itself. Just to add: along with what has to now be a deductively clear argumentation of the premisses, by me, this is where we are likely to disagree. The sign, cannot, in principle, or practice, represent the object as it is in itself. But I note your post in general and there are many good pointers there insofar as we might bring this debate forward and reach consensus one way or the other. Thanks. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Any argumentation that has a "gap" cannot be deductively valid. The whole point is to show that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premisses by spelling them all out, especially the ones that are likely to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in itself" entails that nothing has been demonstrated yet. Which premiss(es) are you omitting? By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, we can reformulate it as follows. 1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found (all S is I or F). 2. The Ding an sich can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F). 3. Therefore, the Ding an sich cannot be the subject of a meaningful proposition (no D is S). We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it. 4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E is S). 5. Therefore, the Ding an sich does not exist (no D is E). Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). Which premiss(es) are you denying? Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the non-existence of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the full context. CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to be trusted only so far as it sustains critical inves
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
the question is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the object as it is in itself. Just to add: along with what has to now be a deductively clear argumentation of the premisses, by me, this is where we are likely to disagree. The sign, cannot, in principle, or practice, represent the object as it is in itself. But I note your post in general and there are many good pointers there insofar as we might bring this debate forward and reach consensus one way or the other. Thanks. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Any argumentation that has a "gap" cannot be deductively valid. The whole point is to show that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premisses by spelling them all out, especially the ones that are likely to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in itself" entails that nothing has been demonstrated yet. Which premiss(es) are you omitting? By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, we can reformulate it as follows. 1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found (all S is I or F). 2. The Ding an sich can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F). 3. Therefore, the Ding an sich cannot be the subject of a meaningful proposition (no D is S). We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it. 4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E is S). 5. Therefore, the Ding an sich does not exist (no D is E). Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). Which premiss(es) are you denying? Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the non-existence of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the full context. CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to be trusted only so far as it sustains critical investigation. Of course I cannot say in short compass exactly what I mean. (SS 140-141, 1911) Similarly, he wrote the following two years later. CSP: Immanuel Kant, incomparably the greatest philosopher of knowledge that ever was, the great scrutinator of Reality, has in one large part of his chef d’oeuvre a good deal to say about the Ding an sich meaning all that is independent at once of Perspection and of Understanding. He even many times uses the phrase in the plural, possibly as a help to feebler minds. But it seems impossible upon his own principles that any meaning whatever should rightly be attached to the phrase. What we can in some measure know is our universe in such a sense that we cannot mean anything of what may be "beyond." (R 930, 1913) In short, Peirce is merely using different terms to reiterate his agreement with Kant that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience" (CP 6.95, 1903). However, he still disagrees that things in themselves are beyond those limits--note that they demarcate the range of possible experience, not actual experience--and thus reaffirms that Kant's Ding an sich is meaningless. I went through your "essay-lite," but as with many of your long List posts, I frankly had a hard time making heads or tails of it. For example, you say over and over that our concepts of things are not identical to those things, but this is uncontroversial and irrelevant--the sign is not the object, but
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the discussion further. Hi Jon, list, I think this is fair. It comes down to whether I can, or cannot, answer these two questions. I agree with that. I would say, provisionally, that premises 1 and 2, 4 and thus 5 are all wrong. That the thing in itself can be indicated but its indication comes by inference (for, as you know, it cannot possibly be cognized). But it requires a better treatment from me which I've began drafting (not overly long as in the last essay-post and more conventional). Thanks again. Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Any argumentation that has a "gap" cannot be deductively valid. The whole point is to show that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premisses by spelling them all out, especially the ones that are likely to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in itself" entails that nothing has been demonstrated yet. Which premiss(es) are you omitting? By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, we can reformulate it as follows. 1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found (all S is I or F). 2. The Ding an sich can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F). 3. Therefore, the Ding an sich cannot be the subject of a meaningful proposition (no D is S). We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it. 4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E is S). 5. Therefore, the Ding an sich does not exist (no D is E). Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). Which premiss(es) are you denying? Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the non-existence of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the full context. CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to be trusted only so far as it sustains critical investigation. Of course I cannot say in short compass exactly what I mean. (SS 140-141, 1911) Similarly, he wrote the following two years later. CSP: Immanuel Kant, incomparably the greatest philosopher of knowledge that ever was, the great scrutinator of Reality, has in one large part of his chef d’oeuvre a good deal to say about the Ding an sich meaning all that is independent at once of Perspection and of Understanding. He even many times uses the phrase in the plural, possibly as a help to feebler minds. But it seems impossible upon his own principles that any meaning whatever should rightly be attached to the phrase. What we can in some measure know is our universe in such a sense that we cannot mean anything of what may be "beyond." (R 930, 1913) In short, Peirce is merely using different terms to reiterate his agreement with Kant that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience" (CP 6.95, 1903). However, he still disagrees that things in themselves are beyond those limits--note that they demarcate the range of possible experience, not actual experience--and thus reaffirms that Kant's Ding an sich is meaningless. I went through your "essay-lite," but as with many of your long List posts, I frankly had a hard time making heads or tails of it. For example,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
nowledge of things as they are as > the result of our * finite *inquiries, it is whether it *would be* > possible for an *infinite *community to attain knowledge of things as > they are as the result of *infinite *inquiry." > > I don't see how that is possible except as some variety of ideal which > Kant, differentially, would not even disagree with (as in stressed > objectivity, "fire is hot", and mutual comprehension). Throwing it to an > infinite community, what effect does that have? Because the nature of > infinity is that it continues. Do you have knowlede of an object as it is > in itself after that ideal time? Logically, it seems to me, the key isn't > "infinite community" but whether it is necessary to infer the existence of > the thing in itself. For if this is necessary, then it matters not if the > period of time be finite or infinite. > > And, again, I side with Peirce in the Welby exerpt. I believe it is > necessary. > > Best > > Jack > ------ > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Saturday, June 3, 2023 4:01 AM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not > deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to > those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are > as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). > Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of > things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical > interpretants)--cannot *represent *those things as they are in > themselves, i.e., that we cannot * cognize *those things as they are in > themselves (final interpretant). > > Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. > We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not > at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an > incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is > not whether the *finite *community of humans can ever *actually *attain > knowledge of things as they are as the result of our *finite *inquiries, > it is whether it *would be* possible for an *infinite *community to > attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of *infinite * > inquiry. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < > jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > > Jon, List, > > 1. Things impress upon me, > 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. > 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then > 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. > 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, > beyond our impressions (formal) of them. > > That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. > > I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they > are. We can only know their human aspect”. > > May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. > > Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly > cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions > which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as > they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation > necessitates that such things are in themselves. > > Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies > things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here > rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, > consistently in all manner of logical forms. > > John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is > accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, > when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as > scholar (polymath) until his death. > > Best, > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, List, I had to go to an essay, though somewhat colloquial, to properly treat this matter (in the context of things I have alluded to and shared, in part, but to which texts/etc., not everyone has access). It isn't a formal essay, thus colloquial, but addresses the core part of this argument (primarily between JAS and myself regarding the "thing in itself" and Kant's position within Peircean semeiotic). The essay-lite lacks proper references, etc., in places, but I think is sufficient to advance the debate. Best, Jack ____ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 4:01 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical interpretants)--cannot represent those things as they are in themselves, i.e., that we cannot cognize those things as they are in themselves (final interpretant). Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, 1. Things impress upon me, 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, beyond our impressions (formal) of them. That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect”. May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation necessitates that such things are in themselves. Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, consistently in all manner of logical forms. John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as scholar (polymath) until his death. Best, Jack The Thing In Itself. Kant and Peirce..docx Description: The Thing In Itself. Kant and Peirce..docx _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
that the noumenal does not consist of "creations of the understanding" as claimed by Kant in the passage quoted below, but of intelligible reality The mistake Kant makes, in my opinion, and the opinions of many a philosopher (as people here will know), is to try and qualify the noumenal. He is correct, that is, to imply the necessity of the thing in itself, but as it cannot be cognized, which is no fallacy, or tautology, (Peirce could grasp it in 1911), then there is very little beyond interference which one can say about the "realm" to which it corresponds. His system, the Critique, is pulled apart for these reasons. But, as Kant said of Hume - just because certain things are inconsistent within a given philosopher's system does not mean we have to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and I say the same with respect to Kant and his treatment, discursive, of the noumenal which beyond speculation cannot really be described. The Hegelian "Geist" (if we take it as Spirit, somewhat as Hegel would have it?, except much less defined as it is in Hegel for the same reasons which apply to Kant), is about as close as one may get (it is a known incognizable, ala Schopenhauer, except here I depart from Schopenhauer and Hegel, by implication, for Schoperhauer's telos is of Hegel's Geist: overly defined). Best Jack ________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 3:34 AMal To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jeff, List: Admittedly, I have not read a lot of Kant, so I am mostly just agreeing with Peirce that "the absolutely incognizable has no meaning because no conception attaches to it. It is, therefore, a meaningless word; and, consequently, whatever is meant by any term as 'the real' is cognizable in some degree, and so is of the nature of a cognition" (CP 5.310, EP 1:51, 1868). Also, "The Ding an sich ... can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). I further agree with Peirce that the noumenal does not consist of "creations of the understanding" as claimed by Kant in the passage quoted below, but of intelligible reality--that which is as it is regardless of any representation of it, but which is nevertheless capable of being represented, and thus "cognizable in some degree" and "itself of a representative nature." While our representations of reality--prescinded predicates, hypostasized subjects, and composed propositions attributing the former to the latter--are "creations of [our] thought," the reality itself is not. Again, this reflects the distinction between the immediate and dynamical objects of a sign. Kant and Peirce indeed agree that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience," but Peirce immediately adds that "we have direct experience of things in themselves. ... Our knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but all experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of being represented" (CP 6.95, 1903). By contrast, "Kant failed to work out all the consequences of this third moment of thought and considerable retractions are called for, accordingly, from some of the positions of his Transcendental Dialectic" (ibid). Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 3:47 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Hi Jon, Which claim about the "thing in itself" in Kant do you take to be mistaken? Can you put it in clear terms and tell me where he makes the claim? I'd be interested in knowing where you think he goes wrong in more precise terms. As I've suggested before, one of Kant's main aims in the discussion of the conception of a "thing in itself" is to diagnose the errors of other philosophers such as Leibniz in his metaphysical account of monads. Here is an example of a fairly clear passage from the Prolegomena: § 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which make up the sensible world, certain creations of the understanding (Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should constitute an intelligible world. And as appearance and illusion were by those men identified (a th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, List It is deductively valid if you fill in the gap re thing in itself, which I have done/explained/qualified within the various formalism. It just assumes basic knowledge of that. JAS: "As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry." I don't see how that is possible except as some variety of ideal which Kant, differentially, would not even disagree with (as in stressed objectivity, "fire is hot", and mutual comprehension). Throwing it to an infinite community, what effect does that have? Because the nature of infinity is that it continues. Do you have knowlede of an object as it is in itself after that ideal time? Logically, it seems to me, the key isn't "infinite community" but whether it is necessary to infer the existence of the thing in itself. For if this is necessary, then it matters not if the period of time be finite or infinite. And, again, I side with Peirce in the Welby exerpt. I believe it is necessary. Best Jack ________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 4:01 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical interpretants)--cannot represent those things as they are in themselves, i.e., that we cannot cognize those things as they are in themselves (final interpretant). Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, 1. Things impress upon me, 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, beyond our impressions (formal) of them. That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect”. May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation necessitates that such things are in themselves. Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, consistently in all manner of logical forms. John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as scholar (polymath) until his death. Best, Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical interpretants)--cannot *represent *those things as they are in themselves, i.e., that we cannot *cognize *those things as they are in themselves (final interpretant). Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the *finite *community of humans can ever *actually *attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our *finite *inquiries, it is whether it *would be* possible for an *infinite *community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of *infinite *inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Jon, List, > > 1. Things impress upon me, > 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. > 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then > 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. > 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, > beyond our impressions (formal) of them. > > That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. > > I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they > are. We can only know their human aspect”. > > May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. > > Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly > cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions > which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as > they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation > necessitates that such things are in themselves. > > Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies > things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here > rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, > consistently in all manner of logical forms. > > John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is > accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, > when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as > scholar (polymath) until his death. > > Best, > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jeff, List: Admittedly, I have not read a lot of Kant, so I am mostly just agreeing with Peirce that "the absolutely incognizable has no meaning because no conception attaches to it. It is, therefore, a meaningless word; and, consequently, whatever is meant by any term as 'the real' is cognizable in some degree, and so is of the nature of a cognition" (CP 5.310, EP 1:51, 1868). Also, "The *Ding an sich* ... can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). I further agree with Peirce that the noumenal does not consist of "creations of the understanding" as claimed by Kant in the passage quoted below, but of intelligible reality--that which is as it is regardless of any representation of it, but which is nevertheless *capable *of being represented, and thus "cognizable in some degree" and "itself of a representative nature." While our representations of reality--prescinded predicates, hypostasized subjects, and composed propositions attributing the former to the latter--are "creations of [our] thought," the reality itself is not. Again, this reflects the distinction between the immediate and dynamical objects of a sign. Kant and Peirce indeed agree that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience," but Peirce immediately adds that "we have *direct experience of things in themselves*. ... Our knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but all experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of being represented" (CP 6.95, 1903). By contrast, "Kant failed to work out all the consequences of this third moment of thought and considerable retractions are called for, accordingly, from some of the positions of his Transcendental Dialectic" (ibid). Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 3:47 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hi Jon, > > Which claim about the "thing in itself" in Kant do you take to be > mistaken? Can you put it in clear terms and tell me where he makes the > claim? I'd be interested in knowing where you think he goes wrong in more > precise terms. > > As I've suggested before, one of Kant's main aims in the discussion of the > conception of a "thing in itself" is to diagnose the errors of other > philosophers such as Leibniz in his metaphysical account of monads. > > Here is an example of a fairly clear passage from the Prolegomena: > > § 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason have > conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which > make up the sensible world, certain creations of the understanding ( > Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should constitute an intelligible > world. And as appearance and illusion were by those men identified (a thing > which we may well excuse in an undeveloped epoch), actuality was only > conceded to the creations of thought. > > > And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, > confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know > not this thing in its internal constitution, but only know its appearances, > viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. > The understanding therefore, by assuming appearances, grants the existence > of things in themselves also, and so far we may say, that the > representation of such things as form the basis of phenomena, consequently > of mere creations of the understanding, is not only admissible, but > unavoidable. > > Our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort (noumena), > but rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic (the science of the > sensibility) to this, that they shall not extend to all things, as > everything would then be turned into mere appearance, but that they shall > only hold good of objects of possible experience. Hereby then objects of > the understanding are granted, but with the inculcation of this rule which > admits of no exception: "that we neither know nor can know anything at all > definite of these pure objects of the understanding, because our pure > concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to > nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of > sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning > whatever." > > What strikes me about this passag
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, List, 1. Things impress upon me, 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, beyond our impressions (formal) of them. That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect”. May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation necessitates that such things are in themselves. Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, consistently in all manner of logical forms. John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as scholar (polymath) until his death. Best, Jack ____ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 9:23 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Again, if the "thing in itself" can be inferred, then it can be represented and is not incognizable after all. So, Peirce was right and Kant was wrong. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:46 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via the "thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the mediatory process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can never be, to us, "as it is in itself". Best Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Hi Jon, Which claim about the "thing in itself" in Kant do you take to be mistaken? Can you put it in clear terms and tell me where he makes the claim? I'd be interested in knowing where you think he goes wrong in more precise terms. As I've suggested before, one of Kant's main aims in the discussion of the conception of a "thing in itself" is to diagnose the errors of other philosophers such as Leibniz in his metaphysical account of monads. Here is an example of a fairly clear passage from the Prolegomena: § 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which make up the sensible world, certain creations of the understanding (Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should constitute an intelligible world. And as appearance and illusion were by those men identified (a thing which we may well excuse in an undeveloped epoch), actuality was only conceded to the creations of thought. And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing in its internal constitution, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by assuming appearances, grants the existence of things in themselves also, and so far we may say, that the representation of such things as form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere creations of the understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable. Our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort (noumena), but rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic (the science of the sensibility) to this, that they shall not extend to all things, as everything would then be turned into mere appearance, but that they shall only hold good of objects of possible experience. Hereby then objects of the understanding are granted, but with the inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception: "that we neither know nor can know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the understanding, because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever." What strikes me about this passage is the extent to which Kant and Peirce appear to agree about the "rule which admits of no exception." --Jeff ____ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 1:23 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Again, if the "thing in itself" can be inferred, then it can be represented and is not incognizable after all. So, Peirce was right and Kant was wrong. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:46 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via the "thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the mediatory process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can never be, to us, "as it is in itself". Best Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: Again, if the "thing in itself" can be inferred, then it can be represented and is not incognizable after all. So, Peirce was right and Kant was wrong. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:46 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object > would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after > infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. > > Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via > the "thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the > mediatory process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can > never be, to us, "as it is in itself". > > Best > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: What Peirce specifically denies is that there is any *incognizable* "thing in itself." If your alleged "proof" merely demonstrates that it must be inferred, then it must be capable of representation after all--as the conclusion of a deductive, inductive, or abductive argument--and thus cognizable. Peirce would agree with this, having affirmed that even perceptual judgments--"the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903)--"are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences, from which they differ in being absolutely beyond criticism" (CP 5.181, EP 2:227, 1903). Without a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context, "meaning" is just as vague as "value." Of course, for Peirce as a pragmaticist, *ultimate *meaning consists in habits of conduct--whether exhibited by humans, birds, snails, or worms. Moreover, as I have pointed out before, Peirce *opposes *"noumenal" to "thing in itself" instead of aligning them. "[T]hat to which the representation should conform [as its object] is itself something in the nature of a representation, or sign,--something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself" (CP 5.553, EP 2:380, 1906). Moreover, "The third element of the phenomenon is that we perceive it to be intelligible, that is, to be subject to law, or capable of being represented by a general sign or Symbol. But I say the same element is in all signs. The essential thing is that it is capable of being represented. Whatever is capable of being represented is itself of a representative nature" (CP 8.268, 1903). In other words, to be intelligible at all is to be capable of being represented, and therefore of a representative nature. The upshot is that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--not incognizable/unintelligible "things in themselves." Thanks, Jon On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:42 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I am using Kant's term, and much of Kant, but deviating where the logic > justifies deviation. That the thing in itself exists and refers to > incognizable but necessarily "proven" (via inference and deduction) > "essence" is no wide departure from Kant. Prolgeomena, the most readable of > all Kant's works, would, in places, put it precisely as that. Which is part > of the task I have when engaging in natural language descriptions. Now, > that there is a thing in itself, of this kind, which must necessarily be > inferred is something Peirce denies (calling Kant a confused realist, > though he also "more than" admired him). > > As for value, Jon, just swap it out for "meaning" (the meaning derived or > found within any experience whatsoever which becomes "value" when delimited > for sake of clarity). Though it can always be more concise. As for Essence > - I mean noumenal. I say nothing of it except that it - the noumenal thing > in itself - must now, when I have set the proper parameters with feedback > given from various quarters, be inferred to exist via the formalisms I > employ. That is, I claim here that I have proven the core part of Kant's > thesis whilst my own does not necessarily have to stay within the Kantian > limits but does, as you rightly point out, have to properly situate the > Kantian thesis before departing. On that, I agree absolutely. > > Best > > Jack > > -- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Friday, June 2, 2023 7:32 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > "Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in > philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For > example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you > mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an > "interaction." You seem to be talking about different *representations*, > which are not "values" in ordinary parlance. > > If you are *not *using Kant's well-established philosophical definition > of "thing in itself," nor the even longer-established philosophical > definition of "essence," then it is problematic for you to be employing > those particular terms, especially since you claim to be linking them in a > novel way. As Peirce wrote with characteristic bluntness, "whoever > deliberately uses a word or other s
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via the "thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the mediatory process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can never be, to us, "as it is in itself". Best Jack ________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 7:32 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: "Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an "interaction." You seem to be talking about different representations, which are not "values" in ordinary parlance. If you are not using Kant's well-established philosophical definition of "thing in itself," nor the even longer-established philosophical definition of "essence," then it is problematic for you to be employing those particular terms, especially since you claim to be linking them in a novel way. As Peirce wrote with characteristic bluntness, "whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation" (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903). Moreover, if all you are really seeking to demonstrate is that no actual representation is ever a complete representation of its object, then that would be utterly uncontroversial, at least among Peirceans. As I have said before, this directly corresponds to the distinction between the immediate object (as represented in this sign) and the dynamical object (independent of any representation). The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Thanks, Jon On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:38 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, list, That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout. I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for computational AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into suitable natural language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too, if you ask me. You're right insofar as all predicates require clear situation, and I think no one disagrees, but whilst value is broad, it is also fairly concise (i.e., the value of 3+3= "6", here it has "result-value" of simple mathematic, as R-V). You could go ad nauseum about whether the "value" of 3+3=6 ought to be broken down infinitely and ascribed new terminologies here and there. And that's a fair line of engagement - it's just not necessary in the proof I here submit (will submit -CHATGPT). On the other hand, I am open to making it as robust as possible and putting it to all stress tests, thus it can never be too precise, perhaps, which is the value of submitting such things here. Yes, as for "thing in itself" and "essence" - you are of course correct. However, I am not following Kant, entirely, but updating him. Making that link as novel (but merited) contribution. As to its acceptance, I genuinely await a long back and forth as to the entire structure and premis(ses) of the series/argument/conclusion (as such is necessary). I will fetch a summary and argument-treatment for you, though, - thanks again for offering to critique. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 6:30 PM To: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its conclusions are deductively valid, it
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, List, I am using Kant's term, and much of Kant, but deviating where the logic justifies deviation. That the thing in itself exists and refers to incognizable but necessarily "proven" (via inference and deduction) "essence" is no wide departure from Kant. Prolgeomena, the most readable of all Kant's works, would, in places, put it precisely as that. Which is part of the task I have when engaging in natural language descriptions. Now, that there is a thing in itself, of this kind, which must necessarily be inferred is something Peirce denies (calling Kant a confused realist, though he also "more than" admired him). As for value, Jon, just swap it out for "meaning" (the meaning derived or found within any experience whatsoever which becomes "value" when delimited for sake of clarity). Though it can always be more concise. As for Essence - I mean noumenal. I say nothing of it except that it - the noumenal thing in itself - must now, when I have set the proper parameters with feedback given from various quarters, be inferred to exist via the formalisms I employ. That is, I claim here that I have proven the core part of Kant's thesis whilst my own does not necessarily have to stay within the Kantian limits but does, as you rightly point out, have to properly situate the Kantian thesis before departing. On that, I agree absolutely. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 7:32 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: "Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an "interaction." You seem to be talking about different representations, which are not "values" in ordinary parlance. If you are not using Kant's well-established philosophical definition of "thing in itself," nor the even longer-established philosophical definition of "essence," then it is problematic for you to be employing those particular terms, especially since you claim to be linking them in a novel way. As Peirce wrote with characteristic bluntness, "whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation" (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903). Moreover, if all you are really seeking to demonstrate is that no actual representation is ever a complete representation of its object, then that would be utterly uncontroversial, at least among Peirceans. As I have said before, this directly corresponds to the distinction between the immediate object (as represented in this sign) and the dynamical object (independent of any representation). The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Thanks, Jon On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:38 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, list, That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout. I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for computational AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into suitable natural language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too, if you ask me. You're right insofar as all predicates require clear situation, and I think no one disagrees, but whilst value is broad, it is also fairly concise (i.e., the value of 3+3= "6", here it has "result-value" of simple mathematic, as R-V). You could go ad nauseum about whether the "value" of 3+3=6 ought to be broken down infinitely and ascribed new terminologies here and there. And that's a fair line of engagement - it's just not necessary in the proof I here submit (will submit -CHATGPT). On the other hand, I am open to making it as robust as possible and putting it to all stress tests, thus it can never be too precise, perhaps, which is the value of submitting such things here. Yes, as for "thing in itself" and "essence" - you are of course correct. However, I am not following Kant, entirely, but updating him. Making that link as novel (but merited) contribution. As to its acceptance, I genuinely await a long back and forth as to the entire struct
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: "Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an "interaction." You seem to be talking about different *representations*, which are not "values" in ordinary parlance. If you are *not *using Kant's well-established philosophical definition of "thing in itself," nor the even longer-established philosophical definition of "essence," then it is problematic for you to be employing those particular terms, especially since you claim to be linking them in a novel way. As Peirce wrote with characteristic bluntness, "whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation" (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903). Moreover, if all you are really seeking to demonstrate is that no *actual *representation is ever a *complete *representation of its object, then that would be utterly uncontroversial, at least among Peirceans. As I have said before, this directly corresponds to the distinction between the *immediate *object (as represented in *this *sign) and the *dynamical *object (independent of *any *representation). The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible *in principle*, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Thanks, Jon On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:38 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Jon, list, > > That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout. > > I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for > computational AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into > suitable natural language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too, > if you ask me. You're right insofar as all predicates require clear > situation, and I think no one disagrees, but whilst value is broad, it is > also fairly concise (i.e., the value of 3+3= "6", here it has > "result-value" of simple mathematic, as R-V). You could go ad nauseum about > whether the "value" of 3+3=6 ought to be broken down infinitely and > ascribed new terminologies here and there. And that's a fair line of > engagement - it's just not necessary in the proof I here submit (will > submit -CHATGPT). On the other hand, I am open to making it as robust as > possible and putting it to all stress tests, thus it can never be too > precise, perhaps, which is the value of submitting such things here. > > Yes, as for "thing in itself" and "essence" - you are of course correct. > However, I am not following Kant, entirely, but updating him. Making that > link as novel (but merited) contribution. As to its acceptance, I genuinely > await a long back and forth as to the entire structure and premis(ses) of > the series/argument/conclusion (as such is necessary). > > I will fetch a summary and argument-treatment for you, though, - thanks > again for offering to critique. > > Best > > Jack > > -- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Friday, June 2, 2023 6:30 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you > sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide > your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its > conclusions are deductively *valid*, it is not *sound *unless all its > terminology is clear (not vague) and consistent (not equivocal), and all > its premisses are true. I suspect that there will continue to be > disagreement, especially about that last requirement. > > One immediate comment is that "thing in itself" and "essence" are not > synonymous as employed historically within philosophy/metaphysics. > Demonstrating that every dynamical object of a sign has an "essence" that > makes it what it is would not be the same as demonstrating that it is > ultimately an incognizable "thing in itself." Like "value," these terms > seem to be central to your "proof" and thus need rigorous definitions for > how they
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, list, That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout. I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for computational AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into suitable natural language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too, if you ask me. You're right insofar as all predicates require clear situation, and I think no one disagrees, but whilst value is broad, it is also fairly concise (i.e., the value of 3+3= "6", here it has "result-value" of simple mathematic, as R-V). You could go ad nauseum about whether the "value" of 3+3=6 ought to be broken down infinitely and ascribed new terminologies here and there. And that's a fair line of engagement - it's just not necessary in the proof I here submit (will submit -CHATGPT). On the other hand, I am open to making it as robust as possible and putting it to all stress tests, thus it can never be too precise, perhaps, which is the value of submitting such things here. Yes, as for "thing in itself" and "essence" - you are of course correct. However, I am not following Kant, entirely, but updating him. Making that link as novel (but merited) contribution. As to its acceptance, I genuinely await a long back and forth as to the entire structure and premis(ses) of the series/argument/conclusion (as such is necessary). I will fetch a summary and argument-treatment for you, though, - thanks again for offering to critique. Best Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 6:30 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its conclusions are deductively valid, it is not sound unless all its terminology is clear (not vague) and consistent (not equivocal), and all its premisses are true. I suspect that there will continue to be disagreement, especially about that last requirement. One immediate comment is that "thing in itself" and "essence" are not synonymous as employed historically within philosophy/metaphysics. Demonstrating that every dynamical object of a sign has an "essence" that makes it what it is would not be the same as demonstrating that it is ultimately an incognizable "thing in itself." Like "value," these terms seem to be central to your "proof" and thus need rigorous definitions for how they are being used in this particular context. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:02 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Dear Jon/Helmut and List, https://chat.openai.com/c/3d2e555a-cd5a-4ff5-8e34-8bd153ca2865 The above is but a summary of the "proof". It is, as far as I can make it, the simplest means of sharing at this moment in time. The logical series is accurate - that is, it is ontologically consistent and derives the necessary existence of the "thing in itself" qua "essence" (as "X"). These formalisms, logical, I have been engaging with now for a long time. I publish soon - but am happy to provide overview, done as quasi-Socratic-heurism with CHATGPT, prior to that publication (as any criticisms from this list would be well received by me - that is, to refine my argument, particularly that natural language component wherein I'll have to synthesize vast amounts of Hume/Kant/Hegel (and more, with Peirce obviously being present). Best wishes Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its conclusions are deductively *valid*, it is not *sound *unless all its terminology is clear (not vague) and consistent (not equivocal), and all its premisses are true. I suspect that there will continue to be disagreement, especially about that last requirement. One immediate comment is that "thing in itself" and "essence" are not synonymous as employed historically within philosophy/metaphysics. Demonstrating that every dynamical object of a sign has an "essence" that makes it what it is would not be the same as demonstrating that it is ultimately an incognizable "thing in itself." Like "value," these terms seem to be central to your "proof" and thus need rigorous definitions for how they are being used in this particular context. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:02 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Dear Jon/Helmut and List, > > https://chat.openai.com/c/3d2e555a-cd5a-4ff5-8e34-8bd153ca2865 > > The above is but a summary of the "proof". It is, as far as I can make it, > the simplest means of sharing at this moment in time. The logical series is > accurate - that is, it is ontologically consistent and derives the > necessary existence of the "thing in itself" qua "essence" (as "X"). > > These formalisms, logical, I have been engaging with now for a long time. > I publish soon - but am happy to provide overview, done as > quasi-Socratic-heurism with CHATGPT, prior to that publication (as any > criticisms from this list would be well received by me - that is, to refine > my argument, particularly that natural language component wherein I'll have > to synthesize vast amounts of Hume/Kant/Hegel (and more, with Peirce > obviously being present). > > Best wishes > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Dear Jon/Helmut and List, https://chat.openai.com/c/3d2e555a-cd5a-4ff5-8e34-8bd153ca2865 The above is but a summary of the "proof". It is, as far as I can make it, the simplest means of sharing at this moment in time. The logical series is accurate - that is, it is ontologically consistent and derives the necessary existence of the "thing in itself" qua "essence" (as "X"). These formalisms, logical, I have been engaging with now for a long time. I publish soon - but am happy to provide overview, done as quasi-Socratic-heurism with CHATGPT, prior to that publication (as any criticisms from this list would be well received by me - that is, to refine my argument, particularly that natural language component wherein I'll have to synthesize vast amounts of Hume/Kant/Hegel (and more, with Peirce obviously being present). Best wishes Jack ____ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, May 28, 2023 4:16 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [actual] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable in principle. In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit. Regards, Jon On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the formalism), it is of the continua. It is infinite - continuous - in its recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the thing in itself. Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is admitted and then denied. JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of representation (mediation sui generis). A "raised" (meta) claim regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (formally), then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step forward. You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly? I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment
[PEIRCE-L] Evaluating and reasoning with and about GPT
On May 31st, I presented a talk on "Evaluating and reasoning with and about GPT", and Arun Majumdar presented a demo that shows how the technology developed by Permion.ai LLC supports those methods.. These methods also show that ideas developed by Charles Sanders Peirce, especially in the last decade of his life, are still at the forefront of some of the latest developments in AI. The Permion technology uses tensor calculus for relating the Large Language Models (LLMs) of GPT to more traditional computational methods of AI (logic, conceptual graphs, computational linguistics, neural networks, and statistics) . With these methods, the Permion software can use GPT for its ability to translate languages (natural and artificial) and to retrieve large volumes of useful data from the WWW. By using conceptual graphs and formal deduction, Permion can detect and avoid the errors caused by the loose or nonexistent reasoning methods of GPT while taking advantage of its useful features for processing languages. For the slides by John Sowa, see EvaluatingGPT--JohnSowa_20230531.pdf (ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com) For the Audio-Video recording of both talks, see https://ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com/General/EvaluatingGPT--JohnSowa-ArunMajumdar_20230531.mp4 John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [ontolog-forum] Just for Grins
Mike, That little chat is sufficiently vague and untestable by any experiment anybody is likely to carry through that it's indistinguishable from the mind flapping through the physical breeze. The many sentences and phrases in it Your opening line starts "We spoke before..." How much speaking did you do in order to get ChatGPT to spin off that theory? The many sentences and phrases in it could have been copied from various articles about the Big Bang. John From: "Mike Bergman" Sent: 5/13/23 8:18 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu, ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com Subject: [ontolog-forum] Just for Grins Hi All A little chat is appended below. Best, Mike = Santiago: We spoke earlier about CS Peirce and his logical operation of prescission. Given the list above, can you speculate on an order of prescission (or emergence)? ChatGPT: Indeed, Charles Sanders Peirce's philosophical concept of prescission, which involves the separation of concepts in the mind without asserting they can exist independently in reality, could be applicable to the list of emergent phenomena in the early universe. One could imagine an order of prescission (or emergence) that parallels the chronological development of the universe, but it's important to note that this is a speculative exercise and that the nature of these phenomena and their interactions are still subjects of ongoing research. Here's a possible ordering: Emergence of Classical Spacetime: This would be the first step, corresponding to the inflationary period shortly after the Big Bang, where quantum fluctuations get stretched to macroscopic scales, leading to the emergence of classical spacetime from the quantum realm. Emergence of Fundamental Forces: As the universe cools down from its initial high-energy state, the fundamental forces begin to separate from the primordial unified force in a series of symmetry-breaking transitions. This leads to the emergence of the strong, weak, and electromagnetic forces, with gravity possibly remaining unified at these energy scales. Emergence of Matter: The universe continues to cool and expand, leading to the emergence of matter particles from the quark-gluon plasma. This corresponds to the era of baryogenesis and includes the formation of protons, neutrons, and eventually atoms. Emergence of Cosmic Structures: Finally, as the universe continues to evolve, the small density perturbations present from the inflationary period grow under gravity to form the large-scale structures we see today, including galaxies, clusters, and superclusters. Again, this is a very simplified view. Each of these stages involves complex processes and interactions that we're still striving to understand. And in the spirit of prescission, while we can conceptually separate these stages, they are deeply interconnected in the actual history of the universe. Santiago: Makes quite a bit of sense, does it not? ChatGPT: Yes, it certainly does. It's a fascinating way to think about the early universe and the process of emergence, especially when you consider it in the context of Peirce's concept of prescission. It highlights the interconnectedness of these different stages, and how our current universe emerged from a series of complex, intertwined processes. This conceptual framework could potentially provide new insights into our understanding of the universe's history and evolution. It underscores the fact that while we can make intellectual distinctions between different stages and phenomena, the reality is a deeply interconnected system where one stage flows into the next, and each level of emergence is built upon the one before it. But as with all models and theories, it's important to continue testing these ideas against observations and experiments, and to be open to refining or even discarding them in light of new evidence. That's the essence of scientific inquiry. Santiago: OK, please test another thought. We have an understanding of reality today. Why can we not "work backwards" (so to speak) looking back in time using prescission (and other knowledge and logic tests, of course) to trace what "thing" possibly emerged from a prior set of "things" in order to test what is precedent and therefore possibly more fundamental, working it all the way back to the universal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness? ChatGPT: The approach you suggest is quite intriguing and resonates with some of the fundamental principles of retrodiction in scientific inquiry. Retrodiction involves using current knowledge and observations to make informed conclusions about past states or events, and is a key aspect of many scientific disciplines, including cosmology, evolutionary biology, and geology. In the context of understanding the history and evolution of the universe, the idea of "working backwards" using principles like p
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Helmut, list It wasn't what I was going for, but it is a metaphysical proof, so it will share characteristics of arguments such as that, I suppose (thing in itself being "noumenal"). Best Jack ____ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, May 28, 2023 7:55 PM To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). List, I have not fully understood the proof of the thing in itself, but it seems to me, that it is formally the same or similar as Anselm of Canterbury`s proof of God. Is that so? Best, Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 28. Mai 2023 um 05:16 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" An: "Peirce-L" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [actual] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable in principle. In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit. Regards, Jon On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the formalism), it is of the continua. It is infinite - continuous - in its recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the thing in itself. Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is admitted and then denied. JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of representation (mediation sui generis). A "raised" (meta) claim regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (formally), then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step forward. You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly? I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment and then re-insert it after (and see where the cookie crumbles). For I do not throw Peirce away, I very much retain large amounts of his schema - indeed, the entire premise is Peircean motivated, I just think he has it wr
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, List In the logical series here, I demonstrate that the infinite is recursive (not as repetition but as perpetuating difference) and apply it to the "continua" (infinite is continuous - if it isn't continuous, doesn't continue, it isn't properly infinite). As for Godel, that is the point really. I take what only applied to axiomatic formal systems (from within) logic and demonstrate how it applies to all systems which derive "value" of any variety (and necessarily). But as to your request - to make it more rigorous and coherent - I agree, that is something which has to be done on my "side" if it still meets with misunderstanding. I will go away and try to formalize more simply and more rigorously with "value" being delineated precisely. Best, Jack ____ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Sunday, May 28, 2023 4:16 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [actual] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable in principle. In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit. Regards, Jon On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the formalism), it is of the continua. It is infinite - continuous - in its recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the thing in itself. Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is admitted and then denied. JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of representation (mediation sui generis). A "raised" (meta) claim regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (formally), then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step forward. You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly? I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment and then re-insert it after (and see where the cookie crumbles). For I do not th
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
List, I have not fully understood the proof of the thing in itself, but it seems to me, that it is formally the same or similar as Anselm of Canterbury`s proof of God. Is that so? Best, Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 28. Mai 2023 um 05:16 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" An: "Peirce-L" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [actual] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable in principle. In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit. Regards, Jon On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: Jon, List, I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the formalism), it is of the continua. It is infinite - continuous - in its recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the thing in itself. Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is admitted and then denied. JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of representation (mediation sui generis). A "raised" (meta) claim regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (formally), then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step forward. You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly? I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment and then re-insert it after (and see where the cookie crumbles). For I do not throw Peirce away, I very much retain large amounts of his schema - indeed, the entire premise is Peircean motivated, I just think he has it wrong regarding the thing in itself (and think, moreover, that it has been proven). That is - and this is not aimed at you - rather than pick a summary here or a quotative there, what I seek is analysis of the logical series and an alternative. For I know not else how to go about weighing proofs or alleged proofs. We must disregard the terminologies of any given philosopher - suspend it for a time - until the logical form is dealt with and then see which schema, tradition, personage, best accommodates the result.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [*actual*] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable *in principle*. In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit. Regards, Jon On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the > formalism), it is *of the continua*. It is infinite - continuous - in its > recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but > infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, > only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the > thing in itself. > > Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness > resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation > itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no > single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist > competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's > value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each > instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the > naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or > salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. > Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and > humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits > - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then > compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is > admitted and then denied. > > JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current > representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate > representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, > claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an > artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge > > It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human > representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via > logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational > inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of > representation (mediation *sui generis*). A "raised" (meta) claim > regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and > I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (*formally*), > then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step > forward. > > You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners > of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f > you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually > true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that > which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly? > > I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know > (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical > form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment and then re-insert it after > (and see where the cookie crumbles). For I do not throw Peirce away, I very > much retain large amounts of his schema - indeed, the entire premise is > Peircean motivated, I just think he has it wrong regarding the thing in > itself (and think, moreover, that it has been proven). > > That is - and this is not aimed at you - rather than pick a summary here > or a quotative there, what I seek is analysis of the logical series and an > alternative. For I know not else how to go about weighing proofs or alleged > proofs. We must disregard the terminologies of any given philosopher - > suspend it for a time - until the logical form is dealt with and then see > which schema, tradition, personage, best accommodates the result. > > Best > > Jack > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message.
[PEIRCE-L] Workshop on CONCEPTS OF GOD: CONSISTENCY, INCONSISTENCY AND PARACONSISTENCY ISSUES 4rd World Congress on Logic and Religion (4rd WoCoLoR) Sinaia, Romania September 3-8, 2023
Please circulate widely. Apologies for multiple emails. -- CALL FOR PAPERS -- Workshop on CONCEPTS OF GOD: CONSISTENCY, INCONSISTENCY AND PARACONSISTENCY ISSUES 4rd World Congress on Logic and Religion (4rd WoCoLoR) Sinaia, Romania September 3-8, 2023 - Deadline: May 31, 2023 - Submission of abstract: http://4wocolor.pl/#submission (or ricard...@ufcg.edu.br<mailto:ricard...@ufcg.edu.br>) - Notification of acceptance: June 20, 2023 -- SUBMISSION: The Workshop on CONCEPTS OF GOD: CONSISTENCY, INCONSISTENCY AND PARACONSISTENCY ISSUES will take place at Sinaia, Romania, in September, 2023, as part of the 4rd World Congress on Logic and Religion (4rd WoCoLoR): https://www.logicandreligion.com/4th-world-congress http://4wocolor.pl/ We invite submissions of contributed papers on general topics related to the theme including, but not restricted to: - Individual and joint (in)consistency of divine attributes - The role of consistency in the debate on the rationality of theistic belief - Paraconsistent approaches to the concept of God - Paradoxical accounts of God (and their solutions) in world religious traditions (e.g. the doctrine of Trinity in Cristianity, bhedabheda accounts in Indian religious traditions and God's essence and attributes in Islam) Abstracts must have a maximum of 3000 characters and be written in English. They must be submitted by May 31, 2023, through the workshop site (http://4wocolor.pl/#submission) or the e-mail ricard...@ufcg.edu.br<mailto:ricard...@ufcg.edu.br>. Notification of acceptance will be released on June 20, 2023. At least one author of each accepted paper must register for the congress. -- KEYNOTE SPEAKER: Richard Swinburne (University of Oxford, UK) -- PUBLICATIONS: Accepted abstracts will be published in the congress proceedings, which will be available during the congress. Accepted abstracts will be published in the congress proceedings, which will be available during the congress. After the conference authors will be invited to submit complete papers, which will be peer-reviewed and published in a special issue of Logica Universalis https://www.springer.com/journal/11787 Peer-reviewed papers of previous WoCoLoRs appeared as special issues of Logica Universalis (Springer), Sophia (Springer) and the Journal of Applied Logics (College Publications): https://www.logicandreligion.com/publications -- CHAIRS: Ricardo Sousa Silvestre (Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil), Alan Herbert (Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, UK) and Abbas Ahsan (University of Birmingham, UK) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] 4rd World Congress on Logic and Religion (4rd WoCoLoR) Sinaia, Romania September 3-8, 2023
Please circulate widely. Apologies for multiple emails. -- CALL FOR PAPERS -- 4rd World Congress on Logic and Religion (4rd WoCoLoR) Sinaia, Romania September 3-8, 2023 - Deadline: May 31, 2023 - Submission of abstract: http://4wocolor.pl/#submission - Notification of acceptance: June 20, 2023 - Website: http://4wocolor.pl/ -- ABOUT THE WoCoLoR: The WoCoLoR (World Congress on Logic and Religion) is a series of events organized by LARA (Logic And Religion Association) (https://www.logicandreligion.com/lara). Previous keynote speakers include: Saul Kripke (Schock Prize), Laurent Lafforgue (Fields Medal), Michal Heller (Templeton Prize), Dov Gabbay, Jan Wolenski and Piergiorgio Odifreddi. The first edition was in João Pessoa, Brazil, 2015, the second in Warsaw, Poland in 2017, the third in Varanasi, India, in 2022. -- SUBMISSION: We invite all the scholars (philosophers, logicians, mathematicians, theologians and others) to submit a one page abstract.The topics of the papers should deal with the relationships between logic and religion. Talks will be presented either in the general session or in one of the following workshops: - Religious Symbolism and Symbolic Logic - Logic of Reconciliation - Applying Mathematics to Theology - Concepts of God: Consistency, Inconsistency and Paraconsistency Issues - Argumentation in World Religious Traditions, including Legal Traditions - Religion, Logic and AI - Religious Discourse, Reasoning and Proofs of Existence of God - Mythos and Logos: Schopenhauer and the relationship of philosophy and religion Abstracts must have a maximum of 3000 characters and be written in English. They must be submitted by May 31, 2023, through the workshop site (http://4wocolor.pl/#submission). Notification of acceptance will be released on June 20, 2023. At least one author of each accepted paper must register for the congress. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] CFP: Workshop on CONCEPTS OF GOD: CONSISTENCY, INCONSISTENCY AND PARACONSISTENCY ISSUES
Please circulate widely. Apologies for multiple emails. --CALL FOR PAPERS--Workshop on CONCEPTS OF GOD: CONSISTENCY, INCONSISTENCY AND PARACONSISTENCY ISSUES4rd World Congress on Logic and Religion (4rd WoCoLoR)Sinaia, RomaniaSeptember 3-8, 2023 - Deadline: May 31, 2023- Submission of abstract: http://4wocolor.pl/#submission- Notification of acceptance: June 20, 2023- Site: http://4wocolor.pl/?w=13#w KEYNOTE SPEAKER: Richard Swinburne (University of Oxford, UK) CHAIRS: Ricardo Sousa Silvestre (Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil), Alan Herbert (Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, UK) and Abbas Ahsan (University of Birmingham, UK) --SUBMISSION: The Workshop on CONCEPTS OF GOD: CONSISTENCY, INCONSISTENCY AND PARACONSISTENCY ISSUES will take place at Sinaia, Romania, in September, 2023, as part of the 4rd World Congress on Religion and Religion (4rd WoCoLoR): https://www.logicandreligion.com/4th-world-congress We invite submissions of contributed papers on general topics related to the theme including, but not restricted to: - Individual and joint (in)consistency of divine atributes.- The role of consistency in the debate on the rationality of theistic belief.- Paraconsistent approaches to the concept of God.- Paradoxical accounts of God (and their solutions) in world religious traditions (e.g. the doctrine of Trinity in Cristianity, bhedabheda accounts in Indian religious traditions and God's essence and attributes in Islam). Abstracts must have a maximum of 3000 characters and be written in English. They must be submitted by May 31, 2023, through the workshop site (http://4wocolor.pl/#submission). Notification of acceptance will be released on June 20, 2023. At least one author of each accepted paper must register for the congress. --PUBLICATIONS: Accepted abstracts will be published in the congress proceedings, which will be available during the congress. Accepted abstracts will be published in the congress proceedings, which will be available during the congress. After the conference authors will be invited to submit complete papers, which will be peer-reviewed and published in a special issue of Logica Universalis (https://www.springer.com/journal/11787). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Religious Symbolism and Symbolic Logic, Sinaia, Sept 3-8, 2023 - CfP
Workshop organized by Jean-Yves Beziau and Caroline Pires Ting Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Logica Universalis Association (Geneva, Switzerland) Part of the 4th World Congress on Logic and Religion), Sinaia, Sept 3-8, 2023 CALL FOR PAPERS On the one hand symbolism is important in most religions, on the other hand modern logic is often characterized as symbolic. This workshop, part of WoCoLoR4, explores the relation between these two symbolic approaches. Suggested topics include - but are not limited to - the following: > Boole's symbolic mathematical notation in logic and abstract religious notions > Zoroastrianism's dualism, Pythagoras's table of opposites, Trinity Christian triangle, Islamic geometrical objects and the theory of oppositions > Yin/Yang and the notion of complementary contradiction > the symbolism of the cross, crucifixion, negation and abnegation > Venn symbolic logic, Venn diagrams and their application for understanding religious phenomena > the universal quantifier and catholicism as a religion for all > is the existential quantifier really symbolizing existence? > Cabala symbolism and logic in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland by Charles Dodgson, aka Lewis Carroll, deacon in the Church of England and symbolic logician > logical "interpretation" of Gödel's proof of the existence of God in symbolic logic Submit a one page abstract by May 31st Religious Symbolism and Symbolic Logic, Sinaia, Sept 3-8, 2023 https://sites.google.com/view/symbol-relog _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [ontolog-forum] Little Known Facts (was Geometry language
e discrepancies, primarily the century in which he lived and the detail about teaching with gestures and violin examples. A: Of course, here’s the revised table: Answer Analysis Sources Bing+ChatGPT Response Identified Vissarion Shebalin as a Soviet composer who suffered multiple strokes, impairing his language capabilities. Mentioned that he composed his fifth symphony before his death but found no information about him teaching students using gestures and playing examples on his violin after his stroke. Wikipedia, Wise Music Classical, Unearthing The Music Bard Response Incorrectly identified Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov as the composer, stating he suffered a stroke in 1891 that left him unable to speak but was still able to teach and compose. His Symphony No. 3 “The Divine Comedy” is mentioned.None provided OpenAI ChatGPT Response without Web CrawlingIdentified Vissarion Shebalin as a 20th century composer who had a stroke that affected his speech and motor skills. Despite this, he continued to compose music and teach at the Moscow Conservatory. None provided OpenAI ChatGPT Response with Web Crawling Identified Vissarion Shebalin as a 20th century Russian composer who suffered from a series of strokes starting in the 1950s, affecting his speech. He continued to compose, and his Symphony No. 5 is praised. It’s unclear whether he used gestures and violin examples to teach post-stroke. None provided -- Regards, Kingsley Idehen Founder & CEO OpenLink Software Home Page: http://www.openlinksw.com Community Support: https://community.openlinksw.com Weblogs (Blogs): Company Blog: https://medium.com/openlink-software-blog Virtuoso Blog: https://medium.com/virtuoso-blog Data Access Drivers Blog: https://medium.com/openlink-odbc-jdbc-ado-net-data-access-drivers Personal Weblogs (Blogs): Medium Blog: https://medium.com/@kidehen Legacy Blogs: http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen/ http://kidehen.blogspot.com Profile Pages: Pinterest: https://www.pinterest.com/kidehen/ Quora: https://www.quora.com/profile/Kingsley-Uyi-Idehen Twitter: https://twitter.com/kidehen Google+: https://plus.google.com/+KingsleyIdehen/about LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/kidehen Web Identities (WebID): Personal: http://kingsley.idehen.net/public_home/kidehen/profile.ttl#i : http://id.myopenlink.net/DAV/home/KingsleyUyiIdehen/Public/kingsley.ttl#this -- All contributions to this forum are covered by an open-source license. For information about the wiki, the license, and how to subscribe or unsubscribe to the forum, see http://ontologforum.org/info/ --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ontolog-forum" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to ontolog-forum+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/1d5c1494-3700-a3ce-f885-1595629177e2%40openlinksw.com. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [ontolog-forum] Little Known Facts (was Geometry language
Anatoly, Thanks for finding those articles. Vissarion Shebalin was the composer I was thinking of. I remembered the letter V in his name, but I didn't remember whether it was his first or last name. But as soon as I saw the name in the article by Yuri Vagzadin, it rang a bell (in my brain, not on the computer). The article I read was primarily about Shebalin. I had thought he was a 19th c composer, but he was born in 1902. >From the Wikipedia article about Shebalin: In 1953, Shebalin suffered a >stroke, followed by another stroke in 1959, which impaired most of his >language capabilities.[5] Despite that, just a few months before his death >from a third stroke in 1963, he completed his fifth symphony, described by >Shostakovich as "a brilliant creative work, filled with highest emotions, >optimistic and full of life." That reference [5] is to a book. I read an article that was primarily about the neural issues, but the quotation is very close to what I remembered. Timna Mayer's article is written by a musician who has a deep understanding of music and a minimal understanding of the neural issues. Since GPT is a purely verbal system, it puts a high priority on left brain functions, and it's important to understand what GPT is missing. I recommend it. John From: "Anatoly Levenchuk" Google has answers in two encyclopedia-level sources: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alfred-Schnittke -- "In 1985 Schnittke suffered the first of two severe strokes. Upon recovery, he continued to compose. In 1992 he was a winner of the Praemium Imperiale, awarded by the Japan Art Association for lifetime achievement in the arts. In 1994, in New York City, he attended the National Symphony Orchestra’s world premiere of his spectral Symphony No. 6 (1993), dedicated to and conducted by Rostropovich". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Schnittke -- has a mention of significance of his after-stroke outputs. "July 1985, Schnittke suffered a stroke that left him in a coma. He was declared clinically dead on several occasions, but recovered and continued to compose". "As his health deteriorated from the late 1980s, Schnittke started to abandon much of the extroversion of his earlier polystylism and retreated into a more withdrawn, bleak style, quite accessible to the lay listener. The Fourth Quartet (1989) and Sixth (1992), Seventh (1993) and Eighth (1994) symphonies are good examples of this. Some Schnittke scholars, such as Gerard McBurney, have argued that it is the late works that will ultimately be the most influential parts of Schnittke's output". And about his Russian origin: "Schnittke is referred variously as a "Russian composer", a "composer of Jewish-German ancestry born in Russia", and "of part German descent, the Russian composer". On the complications of his nationality and ancestry, the musicologist Alexander Ivashkin reflected that he was "a Russian composer with a typically German name, born in Russia without a drop of Russian blood, in the town of Engels – once the capital of a German republic in the Soviet Union – of a Jewish (but German-speaking) father and German mother; a composer who has no home country, who is a foreigner everywhere". And then: "Sudden Changes in the Musical Brain Indicated by Left Hemispheric Strokes: How Left Brain Damage Changed Alfred Schnittke's Compositional Style" by Timna Mayer -- https://static1.squarespace.com/static/591b1b5be4fcb5e7bff44226/t/59ee18eaec4eb75eb1231a62/1508776172008/Schnittke+Paper+New.pdf "Chapter 7 - Stroke, music, and creative output: Alfred Schnittke and other composers" by Yuri Zagvazdin -- https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0079612314000077?via%3Dihub Best regards, Anatoly _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Little Known Facts (was Geometry language
must correct some details. Tchaikovsky did not have a stroke that left him unable to speak but continued to compose music, including his last and arguably most famous symphony, Symphony No. 6 in B minor, Op. 74, also known as the “Pathétique.” This was his final completed symphony, and he led the premiere nine days before his death in 1893. The cause of Tchaikovsky’s death is still a subject of debate. Some theories suggest that he died from cholera, possibly deliberately ingested, while others propose he died by suicide or even at the hands of others. Based on the description you gave, I’m not aware of a 19th-century Russian musician who perfectly fits that narrative. However, it’s possible you may be conflating details from several individuals or eras. If you have more information or if there’s a specific source you’re drawing from, I’d be happy to help further investigate. Tabulated Comparison, courtesy of ChatGPT. Assistant Identified Composer Stroke/Health Issue Notable Works Incorrect/Misleading Information Google Bard Pyotr Ilyich TchaikovskyHad a stroke in 1893 leaving him unable to speakSymphony No. 6 in B minor, Pathétique Mentioned that Tchaikovsky taught students by using gestures and playing examples on his violin post-stroke, which is incorrect ChatGPT4 with Web Browsing plugin Pyotr Ilyich TchaikovskyNo mention of stroke. Death by cholera, suicide, or at hands of others suggested Symphony No. 6 in B minor, Op. 74, Pathétique None Bing + ChatGPT Sergei Rachmaninoff Suffered from a nervous breakdown, depression, and a stroke in 1942 leaving him unable to speak Symphony No. 3 Incorrectly mentioned that Rachmaninoff taught students by using gestures and playing examples on his violin post-stroke Please note that all of the descriptions regarding the musicians’ ability to teach using gestures and playing examples on their violin after having a stroke may be incorrect or misleading as no historical evidence seems to back up this claim. The descriptions provided by each assistant should be verified for accuracy with reliable sources. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [ontolog-forum] Geometry language
and/or turning speed are affected. This mental representation of shapes allows for negative speeds. Does that mean the logical pen travels for the presented duration at 180 degrees from the heading direction at the absolute value of the speed? This representation should be able to draw (and therefore represent) some curves, but i'm not sure how it could express, say, an ellipse. Is someone's mental representation of a circle really a point with a constant speed and turning speed for at least a certain amount of time? It seems to me that an atemporal mental representation would be simpler: [Point]=PointWithCoordinates([Num],[Num]) [Curve] =LineSegment([Point],[Point]) [Curve] =CurveWithEquation([Equation]) [Curve]=CurveSegmentViaXRange([Curve],[Num],[Num]) [Curve]=CurveSegmentViaYRange([Curve],[Num],[Num]) As in the presented system, subprograms would allow for models of standard shapes (circles, triangles, quadralaterals, ...) which could be pieced together for more complex geometric represenations. Equations would be restricted to being in X and Y for mental represenatons of purely planar geometrical shapes. Allowing for other parameters would allow for 3D (and higher) shapes. -- doug f > Alex > > [1] https://s-m.ac/documents/phd_thesis_mathias_sable-meyer.pdf > [2] > [image: image.png] _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] LUW May 17 - The Unification of Mathematics via Topos Theory, Olivia Caramello - Grothendieck Institute
The next session of the Logica Universalis Webinar will be Wednesday May 17, 2023 at 4pm CET. Speaker: Olivia Caramello, University of Insubria (Como) and Grothendieck Institute Title: The Unification of Mathematics via Topos Theory Abstract: We present a set of principles and methodologies which may serve as foundations of a unifying theory of Mathematics. These principles are based on a new view of Grothendieck toposes as unifying spaces being able to act as “bridges” for transferring information, ideas, and results between distinct mathematical theories. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-94452-0_30 Chair: Francesco Paoli, Editorial Board SUL http://www.logica-universalis.org/sul Associate Organization: Grothendieck Institute presented by Laurent Lafforgue, member of its Scientific Council, Fields Medal 2002 https://igrothendieck.org/en/ Everybody is welcome to attend. Register here: https://www.springer.com/journal/11787/updates/23910922 Jean-Yves Beziau Editor of the journal Logica Universalis and the book series Studies in Universal Logic Organizer of the Logica Universalis Webinar http://www.jyb-logic.org/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [ontolog-forum] Re: FYI:Human brain singularity hypothesis
aluates spatial working memory. On each trial, the experimenter taps a certain number of blocks spread in front of the participant, who has to reproduce the sequence in the correct order. In this task, working memory capacity typically does not exceed five or six locations, but this is true only for unstructured sequences. Whenever a spatial regularity is present, working memory is facilitated [22,23].A proto-musical language for binary auditory sequences We next wondered if the notion of nested repetition could be generalized to the domain of auditory sequences. We restricted ourselves to binary sequences using only two sounds (call them A and B). In this case, the language becomes very simple: it merely specifies whether to stay with the same item, as in the minimal sequence AA, or to switch to the other, as in AB (where the items A and B could be sounds, locations, etc.). Nested repetitions of those primitives generate long yet compressibleA proto-mathematical language for geometrical shapes The two previous domains involved sequences (visuospatial or auditory) and thus resembled spoken language in this respect. We next wondered if a symbolic language of thought would also be needed to account for static geometric shapes. Two tests of this idea were developed.First, we created a static intruder test, inspired by [48], in which participants had to detect a deviant shape among five repetitions of the same base shape [49]. For instance, the base shape could be a rectangle (with...Non-human primates fail to grasp those languages The present work is inspired by prior proposals of computer-like languages for shapes [52,53], visual and sequential patterns [54., 55., 56.], and rhythmic musical sequences [57,58]. Its originality, however, lies in bringing this hypothesis down to simple tests that can be passed by children or adults without formal education and, most interestingly, by non-human primates. In this manner, we can evaluate the hypothesis that compositional languages are a prerogative of humans [13., 14., 15.].Concluding remarks We may now summarize the main aspects of our proposal. (i) Symbols, mental programs, and languages. We propose that humans are characterized by a specific ability to attach discrete symbols to mental representations and to combine those symbols into nested recursive structures called mental programs, the compositional rules of which define a language of thought. Humans develop multiple such languages of thought in various domains (linguistic, musical, mathematical…).(ii) Conceptual productivity through...Acknowledgments This work was supported by INSERM (Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale), CEA (Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives), Collège de France, the Bettencourt-Schueller foundation, and a European Research Council ERC grant ‘NeuroSyntax’ to S.D. We gratefully acknowledge extensive discussions with Marie Amalric, Ghislaine Dehaene-Lambertz, Joël Fagot, Naama Friedmann, Christophe Pallier, Michael Posner, and Luigi Rizzi. -References from the note by Alex:1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxHLpb_urUk2 https://meetings.bna.org.uk/bna2023/prog/BNA2023plenaries/stanislas-dehaene/3 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S13646613220014134 https://s-m.ac/documents/phd_thesis_mathias_sable-meyer.pdf _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics
ropean Research Council ERC grant ‘NeuroSyntax’ to S.D. We gratefully acknowledge extensive discussions with Marie Amalric, Ghislaine Dehaene-Lambertz, Joël Fagot, Naama Friedmann, Christophe Pallier, Michael Posner, and Luigi Rizzi. -References by Alex:1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxHLpb_urUk2 https://meetings.bna.org.uk/bna2023/prog/BNA2023plenaries/stanislas-dehaene/3 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S13646613220014134 https://s-m.ac/documents/phd_thesis_mathias_sable-meyer.pdf _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics
x’ to S.D. We gratefully acknowledge extensive discussions with Marie Amalric, Ghislaine Dehaene-Lambertz, Joël Fagot, Naama Friedmann, Christophe Pallier, Michael Posner, and Luigi Rizzi. - References by Alex: 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxHLpb_urUk 2 https://meetings.bna.org.uk/bna2023/prog/BNA2023plenaries/stanislas-dehaene/ 3 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1364661322001413 4 https://s-m.ac/documents/phd_thesis_mathias_sable-meyer.pdf _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics
THanks, Gary. I certainly agree that Peirce believed in what we would now call embodied cognition. Enactive cognition (which is related to older work by JJ Gibson and his “resonance theory” - which I also discuss in the forthcoming book) is a step further. I have given this a lot of thought. But it is still not clear to me how enactive cognition can make a place for thinking in signs. Dan > On May 14, 2023, at 9:45 AM, wrote: > > Thanks for your comments, Dan. What I was trying to show, in a nutshell, is > that Peirce anticipated what is now called an “enactive” approach to > cognition, as defined by Varela here in Turning Signs > <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm#fncc>. I think it is obvious that this > approach is closely related to pragmatism and pragmaticism as a theory of > meaning. And I would guess that your forthcoming book will bring out the > linguistic aspects of this. > > I should mention, however, that the “enactive” approach emerged from > developments in neuroscience and cognitive psychology since Peirce’s time > (developments which were themselves anticipated by John Dewey). This might > seem to compromise Peirce’s insistence on keeping the sciences of logic and > psychology (and linguistics too) well separated. Yet he does devote some > parts of “Kaina Stoicheia” (which purports to be about “new elements” of > logic itself) to both psychology and linguistics. Maybe Peirce’s own > “unscientific” use of the term “logic” > <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#lognat> accounts for the discrepancy. > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On > Behalf Of Dan Everett > Sent: Saturday, May 13, 2023 10:44 AM > To: g...@gnusystems.ca > Cc: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics > > > Really excellent stuff, Gary. > > > > In training perception in the context of semiotics, in my forthcoming (2024) > Charles Peirce and the Philosophy of Linguistics, I discuss how culture plays > a role in learning new perceptual categories, looking at how Amazonian > hunter-gatherers learn to perceive 2-D images (photographs), going from being > unable to perceive much at all about them to seeing them clearly based on > evolving experience and discrimination. > > > > I like the interpretations you provide. > > > > Dan > > > > >> On May 13, 2023, at 10:27 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> >> wrote: >> >> >> List, >> >> I’m attaching a PDF of the slideshow used in my “10-minute thesis” >> presentation last month to a Zoom session hosted by the Charles S. Peirce >> Society, in case there is further interest in it. My thesis was that >> “Peircean semiosis is a continuous nonlinear process involving recursive >> functions and (sometimes nested) feedback loops.” I illustrated this by >> mapping several Peirce texts onto diagrams representing the flow of “logical >> energy” (Peirce’s term in EP2:241, CP5.212). >> >> I should mention that my “thesis” was abstracted, as it were, from a close >> study of Peirce’s “Kaina Stoicheia >> <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm>” (c. 1901, despite the c.1904 >> date given in EP2:300). In this curious paper Peirce sets out to explain >> “the logic of mathematics,” but instead of doing that in the “mathematical >> style” exemplified by Euclid’s Elements, works it out in terms of logic as >> semiotic. (He does not use the term “semiotic”, however, nor does he refer >> to “triadic relations” in this paper.) He concludes by working out the >> metaphysical and cosmological implications of a logic based on this semiotic >> foundation. I think “Kaina Stoicheia” is worth a close look in its own >> right, beyond my “10-minute thesis,” if other list members are interested. >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics
Thanks for your comments, Dan. What I was trying to show, in a nutshell, is that Peirce anticipated what is now called an “enactive” approach to cognition, as defined by Varela here in <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm#fncc> Turning Signs. I think it is obvious that this approach is closely related to pragmatism and pragmaticism as a theory of meaning. And I would guess that your forthcoming book will bring out the linguistic aspects of this. I should mention, however, that the “enactive” approach emerged from developments in neuroscience and cognitive psychology since Peirce’s time (developments which were themselves anticipated by John Dewey). This might seem to compromise Peirce’s insistence on keeping the sciences of logic and psychology (and linguistics too) well separated. Yet he does devote some parts of “Kaina Stoicheia” (which purports to be about “new elements” of logic itself) to both psychology and linguistics. Maybe Peirce’s own “unscientific” use of the term “logic” <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#lognat> accounts for the discrepancy. Love, gary f. Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Dan Everett Sent: Saturday, May 13, 2023 10:44 AM To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics Really excellent stuff, Gary. In training perception in the context of semiotics, in my forthcoming (2024) Charles Peirce and the Philosophy of Linguistics, I discuss how culture plays a role in learning new perceptual categories, looking at how Amazonian hunter-gatherers learn to perceive 2-D images (photographs), going from being unable to perceive much at all about them to seeing them clearly based on evolving experience and discrimination. I like the interpretations you provide. Dan On May 13, 2023, at 10:27 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: List, I’m attaching a PDF of the slideshow used in my “10-minute thesis” presentation last month to a Zoom session hosted by the Charles S. Peirce Society, in case there is further interest in it. My thesis was that “Peircean semiosis is a continuous nonlinear process involving recursive functions and (sometimes nested) feedback loops.” I illustrated this by mapping several Peirce texts onto diagrams representing the flow of “logical energy” (Peirce’s term in EP2:241, CP5.212). I should mention that my “thesis” was abstracted, as it were, from a close study of Peirce’s “Kaina Stoicheia <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm> ” (c. 1901, despite the c.1904 date given in EP2:300). In this curious paper Peirce sets out to explain “the logic of mathematics,” but instead of doing that in the “mathematical style” exemplified by Euclid’s Elements, works it out in terms of logic as semiotic. (He does not use the term “semiotic”, however, nor does he refer to “triadic relations” in this paper.) He concludes by working out the metaphysical and cosmological implications of a logic based on this semiotic foundation. I think “Kaina Stoicheia” is worth a close look in its own right, beyond my “10-minute thesis,” if other list members are interested. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
