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• • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Patrick Pelletier
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Roy T. Fielding
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Poul-Henning Kamp
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Martin Thomson
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting David Morris
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Karl Dubost
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting 陈智昌
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Randy Bush
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Yoav Nir
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting George Michaelson
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Yoav Nir
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Randy Bush
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Nicolas Mailhot
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Karl Dubost
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Nicolas Mailhot
  • Re: [perpass] HTTP user-agent fingerprinting Scott Brim
  • Re: [perpass] What problems does perpass need to solve? Dickson, Brian
• Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Peter Gutmann
• Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Marsh Ray
• [perpass] PRISM-Proof Criteria Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] PRISM-Proof Criteria SM
• [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Theodore Ts'o
  • [perpass] FW: proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] FW: proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Paul Wouters
  • Re: [perpass] FW: proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] FW: proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] FW: proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol George Michaelson
  • Re: [perpass] FW: proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] FW: proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] FW: proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Jon Callas
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Leif Johansson
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol karl m
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Leif Johansson
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Leif Johansson
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Oliver Gasser
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Randy Bush
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Randy Bush
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Warren Kumari
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Warren Kumari
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Yoav Nir
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol manning bill
  • Re: [perpass] proposed enhancement to TLS strong authentication protocol Warren Kumari
• [perpass] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Nick Mathewson
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Russ Housley
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Nick Mathewson
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Paul Wouters
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Alfredo Pironti
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Eric Rescorla
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Nick Mathewson
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Adam Langley
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Ryan Hurst
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Xiaoyong Wu
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Martin Rex
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Nick Mathewson
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Martin Rex
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Let's remove gmt_unix_time from TLS Stephen Farrell
• [perpass] Creating confidence in endpoints with protocols. Ross Snider
  • Re: [perpass] Creating confidence in endpoints with protocols. Stephen Farrell
• [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Marc Blanchet
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Mark Townsley
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Paul Kyzivat
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Yoav Nir
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] Bruce Schneier - A different approach? Dan Wing
• [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Peter Saint-Andre
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Scott Brim
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Dean Willis
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Scott Brim
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Spencer Dawkins at IETF
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver manning bill
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Scott Brim
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Dave Crocker
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Scott Brim
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver David Lloyd-Jones
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Eggert, Lars
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Ben Laurie
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Brian Trammell
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Brian Trammell
  • [perpass] plenary vs BOF: (was Re: BoFing in Vancouver) Dave Crocker
  • Re: [perpass] plenary vs BOF: (was Re: BoFing in Vancouver) Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] plenary vs BOF: (was Re: BoFing in Vancouver) Leif Johansson
  • Re: [perpass] plenary vs BOF: (was Re: BoFing in Vancouver) Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] plenary vs BOF: (was Re: BoFing in Vancouver) Dean Willis
  • Re: [perpass] plenary vs BOF: (was Re: BoFing in Vancouver) joel jaeggli
  • Re: [perpass] plenary vs BOF: (was Re: BoFing in Vancouver) Jacob Appelbaum
  • Re: [perpass] BoFing in Vancouver Dave Crocker
• Re: [perpass] [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt Patrick Pelletier
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt Yoav Nir
  • Re: [perpass] [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
• [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Linus Nordberg
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Dean Willis
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Brian Rosen
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Marc Petit-Huguenin
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Marc Petit-Huguenin
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Brian Rosen
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Scott Brim
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Brian Rosen
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Dean Willis
  • [perpass] Mumble project .... Re: Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] . Re: Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Olle E. Johansson
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring SM
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Olle E. Johansson
  • Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring Hadriel Kaplan
• Re: [perpass] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt Patrick Pelletier
• [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world Yaron Sheffer
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world Yaron Sheffer
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world James Cloos
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world Yaron Sheffer
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world Karl Malbrain
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world Yaron Sheffer
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world Carl Wallace
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world Paul Wouters
  • Re: [perpass] Why Yaron can't encrypt: S/MIME in the real world James Cloos
• [perpass] encrypted PPP Nick Thomas
  • Re: [perpass] encrypted PPP Paul Wouters
  • Re: [perpass] encrypted PPP Dean Willis
  • Re: [perpass] encrypted PPP Nick Thomas
• Re: [perpass] Howdy! Dean Willis
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Rene Struik
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Moriarty, Kathleen
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Stephen Kent
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Hannes Tschofenig
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Theodore Ts'o
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Jacob Appelbaum
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Dean Willis
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Randy Bush
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Phil Karn
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Dean Willis
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Dean Willis
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Dean Willis
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! SM
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Jacob Appelbaum
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Norbert Bollow
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! SM
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Stephen Kent
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Dean Willis
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] Howdy! Dean Willis
• Re: [perpass] TLS/SSL Perfect Forward Secrecy and Key Rotation Patrick Pelletier
• [perpass] stronger crypto requirements Lucy Lynch
  • Re: [perpass] stronger crypto requirements Randy Bush
  • Re: [perpass] stronger crypto requirements Lucy Lynch
  • Re: [perpass] stronger crypto requirements Yoav Nir
  • Re: [perpass] stronger crypto requirements Stephane Bortzmeyer
  • Re: [perpass] stronger crypto requirements Yoav Nir
• Re: [perpass] On the perfect passive adversary Brian Trammell
  • Re: [perpass] On the perfect passive adversary Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [perpass] On the perfect passive adversary Brian Trammell
  • Re: [perpass] On the perfect passive adversary Stephen Farrell
• [perpass] (Possibly Dumb) EMail Security Idea Russ White
  • Re: [perpass] (Possibly Dumb) EMail Security Idea Brian Trammell
  • Re: [perpass] (Possibly Dumb) EMail Security Idea Russ White
  • Re: [perpass] (Possibly Dumb) EMail Security Idea Patrick Pelletier
  • Re: [perpass] (Possibly Dumb) EMail Security Idea Randy Bush

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