Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:07, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote: You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). This is in the eight step. I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the point. I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing numbers. I mean exactly what you mean by existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x), with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false independently of me or of any consideration. But that doesn't mean the same thing at all. Assuming comp, this is necessarily enough. Formalists can accept such truths, they just don't think that truths about what exists mathematically use a literal sense of truth. What is a 'literal' sense of truth? Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why does it organize into living being if it is propertyless? I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal amount of computer science. If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational numbers such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not. Who knows? How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD? It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the shape ExP(x) with P decidable). I don;t see what that has to do with information. Which information? The Shannon like information comes from the arithmetical truth, and the meaning-consciousness information comes from the fixed point of machine self-observability. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:12, Flammarion wrote: On 21 Sep, 08:58, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Sep 2009, at 02:49, Brent Meeker wrote: So does being pure thought mean without a reference, i.e. a fiction? As in Sherlock Holmes is a pure thought? Consider the Many world theory of Everett, or the many histories of comp. Does it make sense to say that Sherlock Holmes exists in such structure? The problem is that a fiction like Sherlock Holmes is not well defined. It is a bit like unicorns. I would not compare such essentially fictional construction with a mathematical object, like a computation or like a number, which admits forms of realism. I would not compare them in rigour or clarity. I would compare them in ontology. ? You talk here like if you knew that primary matter exists. You told me that you can doubt that primary matter exists. I don't understand. Also, I have no clue how primary matter and matter (as object of study by physicists) are related. Is primary matter made of parts? I think Plotinus did already understand that Aristotelian primary matter cannot belong to 'being', and has to be retrieved from a 'bastard calculus based on what God cannot determine. (This fits very well in the comp frame: cf even God or any conception of 'truth') cannot determine the first person indeterminacy). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:32, m.a. wrote: - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2009 10:36 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote: *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators worked, the spokesman replied, Very well, thank you.* :) Actually the Heisenberg compensators, if they compensate really the Heisenberg uncertainties, would make such machine impossible: you just cannot compensate the Heisenberg uncertainties, unless those compensators send the classical bits needed to effectuate a quantum teleportation, and this would explain, retrospectively, why in star strek those devices always (?) annihilate the original... and why Star Strek did not exploit the self-duplication and I thought more devoted Trekkies than I would have pointed out by now that Star Trek did indeed exploit self-duplication. There were several episodes in which transmission problems produced two Kirks or two Spocks. Nice. I miss them! There were other episodes in which people going through the transporter were changed in subtle, overt or sinister ways.m.a. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:47, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Well little problem in gmail sorry. So I do it again /o\ Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can relate physically running a program on a computer, and running it on an abaccus, with a pen and a sheet of paper, in my mind. The only relation is the abstract computation. 1. The notion of immaterial computation needs defense since all known computers are material Physicisist cannot yet define computation (except in a sense immaterial quantum computations). it is a notion dicovered by mathematicians. I am no more sure what you mean by computation, now. How does your primary matter implements computations? Bruno 2. Level 0 as part of materialism makes a difference because it makes different predictions about what I will probably* observe. 3. Contrived BIV scenarios do not affect what I will probably* observe. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 23 Sep, 06:59, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:15, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: There is no problem attaching consc to PM. What do you mean by this? since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would be a property. That's kind of funny you denying any existence to mathematical existence and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a propertyless thing. *A* propertyless thing is fine. But there is a contradiciton in multiple proeprtiless things Why? By the Identity of indescernibles, there can only be one thing that has the empty set as the set of its properties. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles And what's the relevance of this? Actually PM is even more non sensical if it is the lack of property which makes possible to attach qualia to it. Why would that piece of matter get the qualia seeing red, and that other piece of matter having the qualia seeing blue? Why would they get different physical properties? Answer: starting conditions+physical laws. Property dualism would require psychophysical laws as per Chalmers. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 23 Sep, 07:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:07, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote: You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). This is in the eight step. I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the point. I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing numbers. I mean exactly what you mean by existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x), with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false independently of me or of any consideration. But that doesn't mean the same thing at all. Assuming comp, this is necessarily enough. Formalists can accept such truths, they just don't think that truths about what exists mathematically use a literal sense of truth. What is a 'literal' sense of truth Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why does it organize into living being if it is propertyless? It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as an accident. I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal amount of computer science. If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational numbers such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not. Who knows? How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD? It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the shape ExP(x) with P decidable). I don;t see what that has to do with information. Which information? The Shannon like information comes from the arithmetical truth, and the meaning-consciousness information comes from the fixed point of machine self-observability. The idea that mathematical theorems have shanning information is contradicted by the idea that mathematical theorems are logically necessarty tautologies. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them. Such a theory would of course escape the vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment inherent in MR. Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio, Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. Well, I've read Damasio, Jaynes and Dennett, all at some length, and whilst each offers fascinating insight from his own perspective, I don't think that any of them could be said to offer a physical causal theory of first-person experience in the sense we are discussing here. Does Metzinger go any further? I've got quite a lot on my reading list so I've been resisting the temptation to add him to it for the moment - should I succumb? Knowing the physical function of a species sensors and the evolutionary history of it's environment you could infer what it is conscious of. True, but this is to give a third-person behavioural account, not a first-person experiential one. I'm right in assuming that you don't intend to offer a third-person account as an eliminativist dismissal of first-person experience - yes? I didn't think that was your position, but you've made this kind of comment so frequently recently that I'm starting to wonder. David David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go. You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't you say so? And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM? Would you respond to this please? I find them both quite contestable If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument. e.g. http://philpapers.org/rec/KLEDIS Klein's criticism of Maudlin is concerned with constraining what might be considered a valid computational realisation. Were this accepted as reasonable, he could attack that particular reductio by disputing the adequacy of the realisation. This is however a separate question to the lack of any consistent justification of the association of homogeneous experiential states to heterogeneous physical ones, which does not depend on any particular reductio argument. Klein does not set out to address this issue, but tips his hand by remarking that I remain neutral between identifying the disposition with the first-order property or treating it as a second-order property that is realized in each case by some first-order property. The problem with CTM as a physical theory is that it violates normal standards of physical explanation. The very notion of computation is based not on a consistent self-selection of a specific physically-defined class of events, but rather on an external interpretation of a functionally-defined class. This is not problematic in the third-person sense, but if a first-person experiential state is to be considered equivalent merely to what we could say about something, then it is not a physical state in any normally understood sense. What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them. Such a theory would of course escape the vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment inherent in MR. Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio, Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. Knowing the physical function of a species sensors and the evolutionary history of it's environment you could infer what it is conscious of. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
in TOS: the enemy within On stardate 1672.1, in 2266, a strange ore had altered the function of the transporter, causing one of the most bizarre transporter accidents on record, in which Captain James T. Kirk was split into two separate entities. No mention of where the extra matter came from. in TNG:second chances In 2361, on Nervala IV, the USS Potemkin was conducting an evacuation of the science outpost on the planet. Lieutenant William T. Riker was part of the away team at the time. in VOY tuvix Lysosomal enzymes of an alien orchid were the cause of another accident in that same year. Tuvok, Neelix and the orchid were temporarily merged into one being during transport. Tuvix, as he named himself (or themselves), was a complete mixture of the talents of both crewmembers. After discovering how to separate the two patterns and retrieve both Tuvok and Neelix, Tuvix protested that such a procedure would be equivalent to murdering him, but the procedure was undertaken anyway, and Tuvok and Neelix were restored in TNGrascals Coming back from a botanic expedition on planet Marlonia where Keiko O'Brien found a specimen of Draebidium calimus, the Fermi shuttle piloted by Ro Laren, Captain Jean-Luc Picard, Keiko and Guinan falls victim of an energy anomaly. The emergency transport back is difficult, and the USS Enterprise-D crew is shocked by the return of a twelve year old Captain, bartender, botanist and Bajoran Ensign instead of their adult selves. These are all I had the time to remember, retrieve and post from work.The descriptive text come from Memory Alpha Ronald An unusual distortion field meant the Potemkin had difficulty beaming up Riker. A second confinement beam was initiated to overcome these difficulties, with the intent of reintegrating the two beams in the transporter buffer. This was unnecessary as only one beam was successful at transporting Riker, the modulation of the distortion caused the second beam to be reflected back down to the surface, materializing two Rikers, one on the ship, and one on the planet's surface. Unlike the two Kirks created in 2266, both Rikers were functionally identical to the original man. On Sep 23, 4:39 am, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 23 Sep, 07:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:07, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote: You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). This is in the eight step. I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the point. I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing numbers. I mean exactly what you mean by existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x), with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false independently of me or of any consideration. But that doesn't mean the same thing at all. Assuming comp, this is necessarily enough. Formalists can accept such truths, they just don't think that truths about what exists mathematically use a literal sense of truth. What is a 'literal' sense of truth Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why does it organize into living being if it is propertyless? It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as an accident. I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal amount of computer science. If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational numbers such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not. Who knows? How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD? It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the shape ExP(x) with P decidable). I don;t see what that has to do with information. Which information? The
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then the abduction is only to be expected. I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does not need premises of its own but negates the premises of its counterargumetns. Not that I accept it AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively. It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM, rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is accepted. In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified, its consequences would of course be expected to match observation. Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least one case. He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. That is not possible unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. The entities so posited are of course trivially immaterial. You might as well say that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be unmathematical. I thought you had denied that you were seeking some ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be deployed in a particular research programme. In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either explanatory scheme. Who's been doing that? This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of Platonism to justify the UDA He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing. Either you're demanding that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't. On the evidence of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you. He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism. AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to abandoning CTM. It is motivated by the desire to pursue a computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM. In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes said as much). In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference. The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme. Well then, surely we can agree. One finds grounds for preferring a theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work. Comp is open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem that MGA is a declaration of irrefutable certainty? No. But is has assumptions of its own. If so, it shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the coherency of CTM+PM into doubt. Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument. Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism. Yes of course, that is not controversial in this discussion. Frankly, most people faced with the alternative of abandoning CTM or PM would probably choose the former option. However, Bruno has a point when he observes that this could be mere Aristotelian prejudice. The waste bin of thought is stuffed with intuitively obvious ideas that turned out to be the opposite of the truth. I make no claim to knowing which of these alternatives, if either, is correct. We are discussing only which conjunctions of claims may be consistent, and which theoretical commitments make any difference worth bothering about. David On 22 Sep, 14:37, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: But surely what is 'literally'
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
How you can remember all those technical details is astonishing, but thanks for the confirmation and the trip down memory lane. marty a. - Original Message - From: ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:10 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology in TOS: the enemy within On stardate 1672.1, in 2266, a strange ore had altered the function of the transporter, causing one of the most bizarre transporter accidents on record, in which Captain James T. Kirk was split into two separate entities. No mention of where the extra matter came from. in TNG:second chances In 2361, on Nervala IV, the USS Potemkin was conducting an evacuation of the science outpost on the planet. Lieutenant William T. Riker was part of the away team at the time. in VOY tuvix Lysosomal enzymes of an alien orchid were the cause of another accident in that same year. Tuvok, Neelix and the orchid were temporarily merged into one being during transport. Tuvix, as he named himself (or themselves), was a complete mixture of the talents of both crewmembers. After discovering how to separate the two patterns and retrieve both Tuvok and Neelix, Tuvix protested that such a procedure would be equivalent to murdering him, but the procedure was undertaken anyway, and Tuvok and Neelix were restored in TNGrascals Coming back from a botanic expedition on planet Marlonia where Keiko O'Brien found a specimen of Draebidium calimus, the Fermi shuttle piloted by Ro Laren, Captain Jean-Luc Picard, Keiko and Guinan falls victim of an energy anomaly. The emergency transport back is difficult, and the USS Enterprise-D crew is shocked by the return of a twelve year old Captain, bartender, botanist and Bajoran Ensign instead of their adult selves. These are all I had the time to remember, retrieve and post from work.The descriptive text come from Memory Alpha Ronald An unusual distortion field meant the Potemkin had difficulty beaming up Riker. A second confinement beam was initiated to overcome these difficulties, with the intent of reintegrating the two beams in the transporter buffer. This was unnecessary as only one beam was successful at transporting Riker, the modulation of the distortion caused the second beam to be reflected back down to the surface, materializing two Rikers, one on the ship, and one on the planet's surface. Unlike the two Kirks created in 2266, both Rikers were functionally identical to the original man. On Sep 23, 4:39 am, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 23 Sep, 07:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:07, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote: You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). This is in the eight step. I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the point. I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing numbers. I mean exactly what you mean by existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x), with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false independently of me or of any consideration. But that doesn't mean the same thing at all. Assuming comp, this is necessarily enough. Formalists can accept such truths, they just don't think that truths about what exists mathematically use a literal sense of truth. What is a 'literal' sense of truth Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why does it organize into living being if it is propertyless? It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as an accident. I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal amount of computer science. If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational numbers such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not. Who knows? How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD? It is program without input which
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 23 Sep 2009, at 10:39, Flammarion wrote: Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why does it organize into living being if it is propertyless? It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as an accident. Then it needs the essential property of being able to have accidental property. Also you attach qualia to it, or you said that qualia can be attached to it. But if CTM is correct, such qualia can be attached accidentally, so it does need some essential properties. How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD? It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the shape ExP(x) with P decidable). I don;t see what that has to do with information. Which information? The Shannon like information comes from the arithmetical truth, and the meaning-consciousness information comes from the fixed point of machine self-observability. The idea that mathematical theorems have shanning information is contradicted by the idea that mathematical theorems are logically necessarty tautologies. Then you cannot be physicalist either, because everything can be derived from Schrodinger equation + initial condition (or vaccuum). Cf your own: Why would they get different physical properties? Answer: starting conditions+physical laws. But mathematical theorems are not necessary tautologies, in general. By Godel completeness theorem, all you can say is that they are true in all models of the (first order logical) theories. But even this is not relevant, given that the information are relative from the view of the observer (the 3-observer in the UD, which emulates all theories). This is explains explicitly in AUDA. Even for ideally correct machine there is a notion of contingency, which is provided by the notion of consistency (unprovable by the theory), so that such machine develop according to different histories. Information is provided then by self-analysis after self- multiplication, like discovering I am in Moscow after the WM- duplication. All this dodges my question: do you agree that once you say yes to the doctor, your many '3-you' appear, in the third person sense, in the execution of the UD? Once you say yes to the digital surgeon, you know that your physical state will be truncated and encoded through a number (the digital backup, the teletransport information, ...). The UD will generate all the computations generating that state. For example, it will generate the quantum state of the Milky Way, and emulates its wave equation, and thus all relative states of all its subsystems. That emulation will generate your actual computational states, and the 3-you will be generated. All the 3-you will behave as if they were you, and talk about primary matter and so one. Before the MGA, I can understand you may consider them as immaterial zombie. The MGA shows that if you survive qua computatio then each of those 3- you will have a 1-you (actually captured by the non formalizable-by- you notion of Bp Dp p). To be sure the emulation of the galaxy will not be among the winning computations, but that is not the point here. The only way out would be to postulate a notion of primary matter, and to attach consciousness to it in a way which cannot be Turing emulated. But then you cannot say yes to the doctor qua computatio. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being used in this thread? (e.g. CTM, PM, UD etc.) - Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then the abduction is only to be expected. I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does not need premises of its own but negates the premises of its counterargumetns. Not that I accept it AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively. It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM, rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is accepted. In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified, its consequences would of course be expected to match observation. Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least one case. He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. That is not possible unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. The entities so posited are of course trivially immaterial. You might as well say that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be unmathematical. I thought you had denied that you were seeking some ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be deployed in a particular research programme. In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either explanatory scheme. Who's been doing that? This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of Platonism to justify the UDA He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing. Either you're demanding that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't. On the evidence of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you. He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism. AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to abandoning CTM. It is motivated by the desire to pursue a computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM. In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes said as much). In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference. The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme. Well then, surely we can agree. One finds grounds for preferring a theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work. Comp is open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem that MGA is a declaration of irrefutable certainty? No. But is has assumptions of its own. If so, it shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the coherency of CTM+PM into doubt. Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument. Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism. Yes of course, that is not controversial in this discussion. Frankly, most people faced with the alternative of abandoning CTM or PM would probably choose the former option. However, Bruno has a point when he observes that this could be mere Aristotelian prejudice. The waste bin of thought is stuffed with intuitively obvious ideas that turned out to be the opposite of the truth. I make no claim to knowing which of these
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
2009/9/23 m.a. marty...@bellsouth.net: CTM = Computational Theory of Mind CT = Church Thesis PM = Primitive Matter (A)UDA = (Arithmetical) Universal Dovetailer Argument AR = Arithmetical Realism MR = Multiple Realisability WR = White Rabbit MGA = Movie Graph Argument Olympia = Tim Maudlin's anti-CTM reductio argument RITSIAR = Real In The Sense I Am Real ITEODYNAM? = Is That Enough Or Do You Need Any More? David Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being used in this thread? (e.g. CTM, PM, UD etc.) - Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then the abduction is only to be expected. I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does not need premises of its own but negates the premises of its counterargumetns. Not that I accept it AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively. It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM, rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is accepted. In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified, its consequences would of course be expected to match observation. Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least one case. He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. That is not possible unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. The entities so posited are of course trivially immaterial. You might as well say that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be unmathematical. I thought you had denied that you were seeking some ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be deployed in a particular research programme. In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either explanatory scheme. Who's been doing that? This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of Platonism to justify the UDA He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing. Either you're demanding that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't. On the evidence of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you. He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism. AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to abandoning CTM. It is motivated by the desire to pursue a computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM. In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes said as much). In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference. The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme. Well then, surely we can agree. One finds grounds for preferring a theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work. Comp is open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem that MGA is a declaration of irrefutable certainty? No. But is has assumptions of its own. If so, it shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the coherency of CTM+PM into doubt. Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument. Maudlin of course is *not*
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
CTM = Computational theory of mind PM = Primary matter UD = Universal Dovetailer UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument AUDA = Arithmetical Dovetailer Argument Quentin 2009/9/23 m.a. marty...@bellsouth.net *Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being used in this thread? (e.g. CTM, PM, UD etc.)* ** ** ** - Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then the abduction is only to be expected. I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does not need premises of its own but negates the premises of its counterargumetns. Not that I accept it AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively. It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM, rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is accepted. In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified, its consequences would of course be expected to match observation. Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least one case. He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. That is not possible unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. The entities so posited are of course trivially immaterial. You might as well say that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be unmathematical. I thought you had denied that you were seeking some ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be deployed in a particular research programme. In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either explanatory scheme. Who's been doing that? This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of Platonism to justify the UDA He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing. Either you're demanding that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't. On the evidence of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you. He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism. AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to abandoning CTM. It is motivated by the desire to pursue a computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM. In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes said as much). In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference. The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme. Well then, surely we can agree. One finds grounds for preferring a theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work. Comp is open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem that MGA is a declaration of irrefutable certainty? No. But is has assumptions of its own. If so, it shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the coherency of CTM+PM into doubt. Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument. Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism. Yes of course, that is not controversial in this discussion. Frankly, most people faced with the alternative of abandoning CTM or PM
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On Sep 22, 7:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head. Good point. However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking them seriously. I would recommend the following piece, particularly the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface): http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf Hoffman's 'conscious realism', I have recently discovered, is a systematic effort to work out the consequences implicit in some of the intuitions I've been attempting to share recently, with such underwhelming results. When I examine the effort he's put into this, it's not hard to see how he is able to be coherent and empirical where I am merely vague and suggestive (even to myself). Nonetheless there is a kinship of basic intuition. A commentary on this which attempts to align it with Husserlian phenomenology is: http://www.urop.uci.edu/journal/journal06/03_matthews.pdf I suspect that all of the above bears much kinship with at least aspects of comp. I'd be interested in Bruno's reaction. David Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any real world, you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD, and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense). And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything epistemological. Then, what you call primary matter is explained by the appearances of some irreductible invariant in universal 'dreams'. The real question is why is it so symmetrical, is information preserved, is the empirical world coherent with the comp physics, etc. Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head. Brent Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it follows from comp)? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 23 Sep 2009, at 16:36, m.a. wrote: Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being used in this thread? (e.g. CTM, PM, UD etc.) CTM = computational theory of mind Comp = computationalism = a weak and preciser version of CTM (mainly yes doctor + Church's thesis (also referred as Church-Turing thesis, Post law, Gödel's miracle, etc..). It is Church thesis which makes possible to get a precise mathematical definition of the ideas of computability, computation and all computations. CT is used for Church thesis (btw). CT requires the belief that if a natural number has some verifiable property then we can find it soon or later, (a version of arithmetical realism). PM = Primary Matter (in Aristotle sense? or in Peter Jones, alias 1Z, alias Flammarion sense?). UD is the Universal Dovetailer. It is a program (and a program belongs to the collection of finite objects that you can identify by a number by using some computable bijection) which generates all programs, in all possible programming languages, and generates, little pieces by little pieces, all executions of those programs, with all possible arguments, in all possible environment, some being initial segments of the real, or of the complex, or octonions, etc.). The mandelbrot set can be seen as a nice approximation (at least) of a compact form of a universal dovetailing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xmt3_5AJvQgfeature=channel_page UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument (in 8 steps to fix the things, from the Sane04 paper) including MGA as step 8. MGA = the movie graph argument. MGA is UDA-8, and is independent of UDA1-7, and is a direct argument for showing that comp makes primitive matter 'spurious', or physicalism 'wrong' (to be short). Comp forces the couple consciousness/realities to emerge from elementary arithmetic. IMO, David correctly (re)defines Peter Jones theory, at least the one he is defending the plausibility here, as CTM+PM. I argue that CTM+PM is epistemologically extravaguant. IMO, Peter Jones, non correctly, (re)define comp as CTM + Platonism. When reasoning on computations, or just when defining them, we have to accept a minimal amount of realism on the properties of numbers (much less so that most scientists, arguably a little more than some philosophers). Such a mimimal Platonism is already in Church thesis, and I prefer to name it by arithmetical realism. I think that only ultrafinitist does not believe in it. IMO = in my opinion. AFAICS isas far as I can see ... I think :) I don't see other acronyms. Usually, when I introduce a new acronym, I redefine it, at each first occurrences in the first posts. But it is a good idea to ask, especially for those which are idiosyncratic with respect to a thread. Bruno - Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then the abduction is only to be expected. I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does not need premises of its own but negates the premises of its counterargumetns. Not that I accept it AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively. It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM, rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is accepted. In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified, its consequences would of course be expected to match observation. Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least one case. He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. That is not possible unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. The entities so posited are of course trivially immaterial. You might as well say that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be unmathematical. I thought you had denied that you were seeking some ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be deployed in a particular research programme. In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 23 Sep, 13:12, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least one case. He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. That is not possible unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. Isn't that what I have been saying. The entities so posited are of course trivially immaterial. You might as well say that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be unmathematical. It does, so why not? I thought you had denied that you were seeking some ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be deployed in a particular research programme. I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking X exists as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth of a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori self-evidence. In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either explanatory scheme. Who's been doing that? This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of Platonism to justify the UDA He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing. Either you're demanding that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't. On the evidence of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you. He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism. He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he is positing Platonism at all. And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not an abductive argument. AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to abandoning CTM. It is motivated by the desire to pursue a computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM. In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes said as much). I think Bruno has zero interest in AI, he is trying to argue towards Plotnistic mysticism. CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point since the MGA and Olympia arguments are contestable. In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference. The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme. Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption. Other peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark. You are putting forward a better argument on his behalf than he is. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
David Nyman wrote: On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them. Such a theory would of course escape the vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment inherent in MR. Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio, Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. Well, I've read Damasio, Jaynes and Dennett, all at some length, and whilst each offers fascinating insight from his own perspective, I don't think that any of them could be said to offer a physical causal theory of first-person experience in the sense we are discussing here. Does Metzinger go any further? I've got quite a lot on my reading list so I've been resisting the temptation to add him to it for the moment - should I succumb? Knowing the physical function of a species sensors and the evolutionary history of it's environment you could infer what it is conscious of. True, but this is to give a third-person behavioural account, not a first-person experiential one. I'm right in assuming that you don't intend to offer a third-person account as an eliminativist dismissal of first-person experience - yes? I didn't think that was your position, but you've made this kind of comment so frequently recently that I'm starting to wonder. I don't have a position on such an unsettled question. But I think what you are asking is incoherent - a first-person account physical account of experience. Can you give an example what such an account might look like? Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
Again thanks, Hopefully, these notes plus David Nyman's will allow me to orient myself--at least roughly--in the sturm und drang of debate.m.a. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 11:52 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology On 23 Sep 2009, at 16:36, m.a. wrote: Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being used in this thread? (e.g. CTM, PM, UD etc.) CTM = computational theory of mind Comp = computationalism = a weak and preciser version of CTM (mainly yes doctor + Church's thesis (also referred as Church-Turing thesis, Post law, Gödel's miracle, etc..). It is Church thesis which makes possible to get a precise mathematical definition of the ideas of computability, computation and all computations. CT is used for Church thesis (btw). CT requires the belief that if a natural number has some verifiable property then we can find it soon or later, (a version of arithmetical realism). PM = Primary Matter (in Aristotle sense? or in Peter Jones, alias 1Z, alias Flammarion sense?). UD is the Universal Dovetailer. It is a program (and a program belongs to the collection of finite objects that you can identify by a number by using some computable bijection) which generates all programs, in all possible programming languages, and generates, little pieces by little pieces, all executions of those programs, with all possible arguments, in all possible environment, some being initial segments of the real, or of the complex, or octonions, etc.). The mandelbrot set can be seen as a nice approximation (at least) of a compact form of a universal dovetailing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xmt3_5AJvQgfeature=channel_page UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument (in 8 steps to fix the things, from the Sane04 paper) including MGA as step 8. MGA = the movie graph argument. MGA is UDA-8, and is independent of UDA1-7, and is a direct argument for showing that comp makes primitive matter 'spurious', or physicalism 'wrong' (to be short). Comp forces the couple consciousness/realities to emerge from elementary arithmetic. IMO, David correctly (re)defines Peter Jones theory, at least the one he is defending the plausibility here, as CTM+PM. I argue that CTM+PM is epistemologically extravaguant. IMO, Peter Jones, non correctly, (re)define comp as CTM + Platonism. When reasoning on computations, or just when defining them, we have to accept a minimal amount of realism on the properties of numbers (much less so that most scientists, arguably a little more than some philosophers). Such a mimimal Platonism is already in Church thesis, and I prefer to name it by arithmetical realism. I think that only ultrafinitist does not believe in it. IMO = in my opinion. AFAICS isas far as I can see ... I think :) I don't see other acronyms. Usually, when I introduce a new acronym, I redefine it, at each first occurrences in the first posts. But it is a good idea to ask, especially for those which are idiosyncratic with respect to a thread. Bruno - Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then the abduction is only to be expected. I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does not need premises of its own but negates the premises of its counterargumetns. Not that I accept it AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively. It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM, rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is accepted. In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified, its consequences would of course be expected to match observation. Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least one case. He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. That is not possible unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. The entities so posited are of course trivially immaterial. You might as well say that arguing from the opposite position requires that
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
David, Thanks so much. I have a feeling there are others so if and when I run across them, I'll add them to your list and ask again. Best, marty a. - Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 10:48 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology 2009/9/23 m.a. marty...@bellsouth.net: CTM = Computational Theory of Mind CT = Church Thesis PM = Primitive Matter (A)UDA = (Arithmetical) Universal Dovetailer Argument AR = Arithmetical Realism MR = Multiple Realisability WR = White Rabbit MGA = Movie Graph Argument Olympia = Tim Maudlin's anti-CTM reductio argument RITSIAR = Real In The Sense I Am Real ITEODYNAM? = Is That Enough Or Do You Need Any More? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 23 Sep, 15:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Sep 2009, at 10:39, Flammarion wrote: Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why does it organize into living being if it is propertyless? It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as an accident. Then it needs the essential property of being able to have accidental property. That's more of a purely logical 'Cambidge' property. Also you attach qualia to it, or you said that qualia can be attached to it. But if CTM is correct, such qualia can be attached accidentally, so it does need some essential properties. I don't follow How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD? It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the shape ExP(x) with P decidable). I don;t see what that has to do with information. Which information? The Shannon like information comes from the arithmetical truth, and the meaning-consciousness information comes from the fixed point of machine self-observability. The idea that mathematical theorems have shanning information is contradicted by the idea that mathematical theorems are logically necessarty tautologies. Then you cannot be physicalist either, because everything can be derived from Schrodinger equation + initial condition (or vaccuum). No, the SE is not logically necessary. Cf your own: Why would they get different physical properties? Answer: starting conditions+physical laws. But mathematical theorems are not necessary tautologies, in general. By Godel completeness theorem, all you can say is that they are true in all models of the (first order logical) theories. Have you an exampel fo a theorem which is provably true, and which is not derived analytcially from axioms? But even this is not relevant, given that the information are relative from the view of the observer (the 3-observer in the UD, which emulates all theories). You are appealing to your theory to justify your theory. This is explains explicitly in AUDA. Even for ideally correct machine there is a notion of contingency, which is provided by the notion of consistency (unprovable by the theory), so that such machine develop according to different histories. Information is provided then by self-analysis after self- multiplication, like discovering I am in Moscow after the WM- duplication. subjective indeterminacy is no more than subjective information. I find myself in the world where Hitler lost WWII, but I just *am* that version of Peter. SO it boils down to the tatutology that Hitler-lost-WWII Peter is in the Hitler-lost-WWII world, Hitler-won-WWII Peter is in the Hitler-won-WWII world, etc. All this dodges my question: do you agree that once you say yes to the doctor, your many '3-you' appear, in the third person sense, in the execution of the UD? I have answers that a million times. Since I don't agree that there is either a material or an immaterial UD, i do not believe I am running on a UD Once you say yes to the digital surgeon, you know that your physical state will be truncated and encoded through a number (the digital backup, the teletransport information, ...). AFIAC it is always encoded in some physical form. The UD will generate all the computations generating that state. A non-existent UD generates nothing. For example, it will generate the quantum state of the Milky Way, and emulates its wave equation, and thus all relative states of all its subsystems. That emulation will generate your actual computational states, and the 3-you will be generated. All the 3-you will behave as if they were you, and talk about primary matter and so one. None of that follows without the actual existence of an immaterial UD. Equally, you will continue to believe in dreamign machines even if every existing thign is material and Platonism is completely false. Before the MGA, I can understand you may consider them as immaterial zombie. The problem is not that the UD only generates zombies. The problem is that it does not exist. The MGA shows that if you survive qua computatio then each of those 3- you will have a 1-you (actually captured by the non formalizable-by- you notion of Bp Dp p). To be sure the emulation of the galaxy will not be among the winning computations, but that is not the point here. The only way out would be to postulate a notion of primary matter, and to attach consciousness to it in a way which cannot be Turing emulated. That is false. All I have to do is reject the immaterial UD. (In particular I can accept PM and Turing Emulation so long as I reject Platonism and the immaterial UD). But then you cannot say yes to the doctor qua computatio.
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 23 Sep, 16:10, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On Sep 22, 7:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head. Good point. However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking them seriously. I would recommend the following piece, particularly the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface): http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf That is just rehashed idealism with all the standard problems. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 23 Sep, 02:06, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go. You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't you say so? And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM? Would you respond to this please? I don't think CTM solves the HP. I don't think CTM contradicts physcialism. I find them both quite contestable If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument. e.g. http://philpapers.org/rec/KLEDIS Klein's criticism of Maudlin is concerned with constraining what might be considered a valid computational realisation. Were this accepted as reasonable, he could attack that particular reductio by disputing the adequacy of the realisation. This is however a separate question to the lack of any consistent justification of the association of homogeneous experiential states to heterogeneous physical ones, which does not depend on any particular reductio argument. Klein does not set out to address this issue, but tips his hand by remarking that I remain neutral between identifying the disposition with the first-order property or treating it as a second-order property that is realized in each case by some first-order property. The problem with CTM as a physical theory is that it violates normal standards of physical explanation. Alternatively, that is what is just so handy about it The very notion of computation is based not on a consistent self-selection of a specific physically-defined class of events, but rather on an external interpretation of a functionally-defined class. Says who? The in-the-eye-of the observer notion of computation is contentious. The addition of side-constraints, such as counterfactuals, to the defintiion of computation is motivated precisely to avoid dryign paint implementing any possible computation. And the Maudlin argument exploits that to show that computation is narrowed down so much that no physical system can compute a mind. And then the Klein argument widens the definition of computation out again ...the moral of the story being that you can't have your argument that computing is in the eye of the beholder AND your your firm faith in the MGA/olympia style of argument. They work from different assumptions. This is not problematic in the third-person sense, but if a first-person experiential state is to be considered equivalent merely to what we could say about something, then it is not a physical state in any normally understood sense. What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them. Such a theory would of course escape the vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment inherent in MR. The point at issue is not whether there is only one way to realise a computation, or to get from A to B. The point is that in the case of the journey, the transition from physical irrelevance to relevance is at the point where the physical result emerges as identical - i.e. as the same journey form A to B. In the case of the computation, no such physical identity of result ever emerges; Instead there is functional identity and functional relevance... Sure, and that makes CTM a functional theory, supervening on functional relata, and appealing to a purely functional association with consciousness. In what remaining sense that makes any difference can CTM claim to be a materialist theory? It doesn;t need anything non-physical, as I have said several times. To say that nonetheless it must be materially instantiated is no answer; it is merely begging the question. It doesn;t require anything non-physical either. all you have is a collection of heterogeneous physical processes, each merely *formally* identical to a given computation. It is a further - and physically entirely ad hoc - assumption that this heterogeneity of physical states is homogeneous with a single experiential state. It is not entirely ad hoc because not every physical system implements every computation. The fact that not every physical system implements every computation doesn't reduce the ad-hoccery in the slightest, because the whole notion of implementation is immaterial from the outset. There's nothing physically fundamental about a computationally-defined 'realisation' - it is merely an externally-imposed interpretation of a physical state of affairs that is perfectly capable of causing whatever lies within its powers without such aid. The only interesting question from a
Re: Dreaming On
On 23 Sep, 03:20, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: David Nyman wrote: inherent in MR. Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio, Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. Knowing the physical function of a species sensors and the evolutionary history of it's environment you could infer what it is conscious of. It doesn't address the HP of coruse. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 23 Sep, 08:00, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:47, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Well little problem in gmail sorry. So I do it again /o\ Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can relate physically running a program on a computer, and running it on an abaccus, with a pen and a sheet of paper, in my mind. The only relation is the abstract computation. 1. The notion of immaterial computation needs defense since all known computers are material Physicisist cannot yet define computation (except in a sense immaterial quantum computations). I have absolutely no idea why you would say that. Physicists tend to have computers on their desks and tend to regard them as physical. it is a notion dicovered by mathematicians. matehmaticians can discover numebrs, but they still need matterial things to writh them with, I am no more sure what you mean by computation, now. How does your primary matter implements computations? Same way it implements being a chair. By beign the bearer of properties that implement it. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't you say so? And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM? Would you respond to this please? I don't think CTM solves the HP. I don't think CTM contradicts physcialism. If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular computational types. In that case we need no longer debate the association of physical and conscious states qua computatio. I have no quarrel with the third-person notion of computational realisation per se, and consequently I have no further arguments to offer. David So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go. You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't you say so? And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM? Would you respond to this please? I don't think CTM solves the HP. I don't think CTM contradicts physcialism. I find them both quite contestable If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument. e.g. http://philpapers.org/rec/KLEDIS Klein's criticism of Maudlin is concerned with constraining what might be considered a valid computational realisation. Were this accepted as reasonable, he could attack that particular reductio by disputing the adequacy of the realisation. This is however a separate question to the lack of any consistent justification of the association of homogeneous experiential states to heterogeneous physical ones, which does not depend on any particular reductio argument. Klein does not set out to address this issue, but tips his hand by remarking that I remain neutral between identifying the disposition with the first-order property or treating it as a second-order property that is realized in each case by some first-order property. The problem with CTM as a physical theory is that it violates normal standards of physical explanation. Alternatively, that is what is just so handy about it The very notion of computation is based not on a consistent self-selection of a specific physically-defined class of events, but rather on an external interpretation of a functionally-defined class. Says who? The in-the-eye-of the observer notion of computation is contentious. The addition of side-constraints, such as counterfactuals, to the defintiion of computation is motivated precisely to avoid dryign paint implementing any possible computation. And the Maudlin argument exploits that to show that computation is narrowed down so much that no physical system can compute a mind. And then the Klein argument widens the definition of computation out again ...the moral of the story being that you can't have your argument that computing is in the eye of the beholder AND your your firm faith in the MGA/olympia style of argument. They work from different assumptions. This is not problematic in the third-person sense, but if a first-person experiential state is to be considered equivalent merely to what we could say about something, then it is not a physical state in any normally understood sense. What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them. Such a theory would of course escape the vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment inherent in MR. The point at issue is not whether there is only one way to realise a computation, or to get from A to B. The point is that in the case of the journey, the transition from physical irrelevance to relevance is at the point where the physical result emerges as identical - i.e. as the same journey form A to B. In the case of the computation, no such physical identity of result ever emerges; Instead there is functional identity and functional relevance... Sure, and that makes CTM a functional theory, supervening on functional relata, and appealing to a purely functional association with consciousness. In what remaining sense that makes any difference can CTM claim to be a materialist theory? It doesn;t need anything non-physical, as I have said several times. To say that nonetheless it must be materially instantiated is no answer; it is merely begging the question. It doesn;t require anything non-physical either. all you have is a collection of heterogeneous physical processes, each merely *formally* identical to a given
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: True, but this is to give a third-person behavioural account, not a first-person experiential one. I'm right in assuming that you don't intend to offer a third-person account as an eliminativist dismissal of first-person experience - yes? I didn't think that was your position, but you've made this kind of comment so frequently recently that I'm starting to wonder. I don't have a position on such an unsettled question. Perhaps you misunderstand me. Do you mean to suggest that the denial of first-person experience, as a 'solution' to the mind-body problem, is an unsettled question? Or that you are willing to entertain such a denial? But I think what you are asking is incoherent - a first-person account physical account of experience. Can you give an example what such an account might look like? I wasn't asking for that. I was extrapolating, for the purposes of this particular discussion, from the line of argument that assumes the primacy of matter and physical causation. On this basis, I would expect a physical theory of consciousness to take the form of a consistent mapping from a low-level physical account to a high-level experiential account, exactly as is the case with physical reductions of life, weather, or other higher-order physical phenomena (as you yourself have suggested to me more than once). This is not to say that I'm in any way convinced that first-person experience can be explained satisfactorily in this manner, but it's what a physical account should look like if consciousness is deemed to supervene on physical states in any standardly justified sense. David David Nyman wrote: On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them. Such a theory would of course escape the vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment inherent in MR. Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio, Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. Well, I've read Damasio, Jaynes and Dennett, all at some length, and whilst each offers fascinating insight from his own perspective, I don't think that any of them could be said to offer a physical causal theory of first-person experience in the sense we are discussing here. Does Metzinger go any further? I've got quite a lot on my reading list so I've been resisting the temptation to add him to it for the moment - should I succumb? Knowing the physical function of a species sensors and the evolutionary history of it's environment you could infer what it is conscious of. True, but this is to give a third-person behavioural account, not a first-person experiential one. I'm right in assuming that you don't intend to offer a third-person account as an eliminativist dismissal of first-person experience - yes? I didn't think that was your position, but you've made this kind of comment so frequently recently that I'm starting to wonder. I don't have a position on such an unsettled question. But I think what you are asking is incoherent - a first-person account physical account of experience. Can you give an example what such an account might look like? Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head. Good point. However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking them seriously. I would recommend the following piece, particularly the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface): http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf That is just rehashed idealism with all the standard problems. The point is that Brent's comment - like Johnson's 'refutation' of Berkeley - is ineffectual as a dismissal of Bruno's theoretical position. Hoffman gives a neat account of how this might go. As to the problems, you pays your money.. David On 23 Sep, 16:10, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On Sep 22, 7:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head. Good point. However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking them seriously. I would recommend the following piece, particularly the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface): http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf That is just rehashed idealism with all the standard problems. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I thought you had denied that you were seeking some ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be deployed in a particular research programme. I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking X exists as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth of a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori self-evidence. AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a priori truth. The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the consequence of a reasoned argument. The alternative is that CTM is false on the posit of PM. Neither alternative forces anyone to adopt either PM or AR as a metaphysical posit a priori; it is a question of the consistency of two simultaneous posits. And of course we are agreed that the justification of any posit whatsoever is its explanatory power. He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he is positing Platonism at all. And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not an abductive argument. But what extra explanatory value is Platonism supposed to have? If it were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism add to this? Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP, which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who don't). In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference. The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme. Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption. Surely that's not so. He argues that the reversal of material and mathematical primacy is a necessary posit for computational supervenience - i.e. AR. And he claims that the predictions of the theory are empirically refutable, which means that its ultimate justification is to be sought abductively. Other peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark. Do they in fact? You are putting forward a better argument on his behalf than he is. TVM (ta very much) David On 23 Sep, 13:12, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least one case. He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. That is not possible unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. Isn't that what I have been saying. The entities so posited are of course trivially immaterial. You might as well say that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be unmathematical. It does, so why not? I thought you had denied that you were seeking some ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be deployed in a particular research programme. I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking X exists as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth of a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori self-evidence. In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either explanatory scheme. Who's been doing that? This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of Platonism to justify the UDA He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. Peter, this is becoming utterly
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On Sep 22, 1:10 pm, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86 computer than on an ARM based one ? There's a difference between being independent of any specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations. Computational supervenience is not equivalent to no instantiation. Its realisation is derived from AR - i.e. the posit that all phenomena are consequential on a specific subset of mathematics and computational theory. It is motivated by the inadequacy of physical supervenience as a basis for the computational theory of mind. Its explanatory worth as a theory is to be judged abductively and empirically. Platonism is not proved by multiple realisability. AFAICS nobody is trying to prove Platonism but you. Could you either state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop your insistence on it? David On 22 Sep, 12:59, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation. Such existence is blatant Platonism. No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86 computer than on an ARM based one ? There's a difference between being independent of any specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations. Platonism is not proved by multiple realisability. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head. Good point. However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking them seriously. I would recommend the following piece, particularly the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface): http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf That is just rehashed idealism with all the standard problems. The point is that Brent's comment - like Johnson's 'refutation' of Berkeley - is ineffectual as a dismissal of Bruno's theoretical position. Hoffman gives a neat account of how this might go. As to the problems, you pays your money.. David Of course Johnson's refutation didn't change any idealist minds, but he pointed to the use of operational definitions as the basis of science which ultimately had a lot more influence than Berkeley. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
