Re: About wisdom
Knowledge is knowing the answer to a troll's question. Wisdom is not posting it. Brent On 10/23/2013 11:14 PM, chris peck wrote: I thought knowledge was knowing that tomatoes are fruit, and wisdom was knowing not to put them in a fruit salad. -- From: sw...@post.harvard.edu Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 15:12:57 -0700 Subject: About wisdom To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Wisdom is the art of coming up with believable excuses for one's ignorance. Discuss. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3614/6772 - Release Date: 10/22/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: About wisdom
Stephen Lin, Are you on some kind of methamphetamine binge where you think it is totally cool for you to post vaguely sensible (but mostly nonsensical) thoughts that drive through your drug addled brain? Dude, we've all been there, we've got the t-shirts and postcards, and we are ready for something more... mature. At first, I thought you might have been on to something, but now I know you are useless. Please, stop cluttering up this board with your inanities. there are many other places on the internet where you can dump your mental garbage. Cheers, Dan Oh, and by the way, this pretty much eliminates that stupid thesis you have that we are all Neo from the matrix... I ain't neo, but I wish for fuck that you would just go away, idiot. That proves that there is at least one other person in the universe besides you who basically hates your guts... On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 6:12:57 PM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote: Wisdom is the art of coming up with believable excuses for one's ignorance. Discuss. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my journey?
I think you need to lay off whatever drugs you are doing, find faith in some kind of higher power, and stop posting in a place on the internet made for serious thinkers and not lame ass dilletantes such as yourself. You do know you can comment on Youtube videos, don't you? On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:00:52 PM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote: -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: I have a very good question but I don't know how to ask it...
Put down your crack pipe and seek help On Tuesday, October 22, 2013 11:23:39 AM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote: Without coaching anyway assume an answer. Trust me, it really is on-optic; it has something to do with a supercomputer. Annywy, here does: Give that I am Neo, is it possible for me to bot attended and not addending the wedding of Tim Lee and Jess Han without actually doing it, such that Tim Lee becomes reborn as Wakka? It''s actually a good question, but if you have no idea what it means, Try not to embarrass yourself by thinking you know. It has to with the fact that I think we converge the same person in the end which becomse our own beginning. Unfortunatley, sometimes we lose track of where we started or where you're spposed to do... Thanks, Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
2013/10/24 Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com ** ** ** ** *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto: everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:45 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...* *** ** ** ** ** On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote: *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [ mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com everything-list@googlegroups.com ] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...* *** On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote: I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is that definitive -* *** granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive? It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside fundamental particles! On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space is better compared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35. So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent with Fermi* *** gamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different in energy* *** arrived from across the universe at the same time whereas granularity would delay one measurably. Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS. However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is most likely a model construct, rather than actually being something physical out there. It is something Allen Francom bangs on about too, which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with his Brownian Quantum Universe models. Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, but quantum granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described by some continuum aI0 + bI1 (a and b complex). The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classic granularity of space time with the scale this granularity would need to be under being pushed far below the Planck scale. The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but the physical (and the theological) should reasonably have continuous observable (even if those are only the frequency operators, and that *only* the probabilities reflect the continuum. Needless to say those are open problems). I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule out granularity. Hard questions, but with comp, some continuum seems to play a role in physics (which should be a first person plural universal machines view).** ** Bruno If reality arises from scale invariant equations perhaps there is no need for a pixelated foundation to act as the smallest addressable chunks and as the canvas upon which reality is drawn or projected as it were. Perhaps reality really arises at it is observed ** ** ... from our points of view. That might even include backtracking, so that the physical reality develops and bactrack when some inconsistency is met. Open problem with comp, but evidences exists, and it might be that physical reality is ever growing. have you understand that if the brain works like a digital machine, the physical realitu emerges from some statistics on all computations (which exist in arithmetic)? ** ** Interesting point! It seems you are suggesting that causality – to use an Americanism colloquialism (at least amongst auto-mechanics) – may be a little “loosey goosey”, in other words it fits well enough in order to be fully functional, as far as the macro observer is concerned, but that within the realm of the very small (also along the time axis) causality becomes less rigorous and these – what would they be called?... reality paradox reconciliation algorithms perhaps -- re-write and “fix” transient paradoxes, loose ends etc. in order to produce, at least on the observer’s macro scale, the smooth perception of rock solid causality. And that as long as on the macro scale of the observer, causality continues to operate smoothly (in so far as they are concerned at least) then causality can be said to be operative…. Even if it needs to get fixed up on the fly as reality manifests becoming observed reality, as long as at the functional level its Laws stand then it would seem to all still work out. This also fits with the mind-bending quantum scale universe
Re: Dialetheism
Craig, As sympathetic as I am to all of your various multisense realism projects and the different conclusions they are intended to imply, I must warn you: If you're going to try to prove black is white, beware the Zebra crossings...(and if you don't get it, read Douglas Adams and the ultimate disproof of God) Peace On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 11:54:45 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 6:13:33 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 24 October 2013 04:39, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called true contradictions, or dialetheia. Doublethink as defined in 1984 is almost exactly this. Not exactly. Trivialism is more that indiscriminate sense of 'anything can be true or not true'. Diathelethism is about recognizing that there are limitations in the way that language can meaningfully represent the full richness of nature. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my journey?
Why is it that people who have faith in some kind of higher power never seem to have a sense of humor? On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 8:43 AM, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.com wrote: I think you need to lay off whatever drugs you are doing, find faith in some kind of higher power, and stop posting in a place on the internet made for serious thinkers and not lame ass dilletantes such as yourself. You do know you can comment on Youtube videos, don't you? On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:00:52 PM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote: -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my journey?
2013/10/24 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com Why is it that people who have faith in some kind of higher power I don't have faith in some kind of higher power, but still I don't see spamming non-sense as sense of humor. Quentin never seem to have a sense of humor? On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 8:43 AM, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.com wrote: I think you need to lay off whatever drugs you are doing, find faith in some kind of higher power, and stop posting in a place on the internet made for serious thinkers and not lame ass dilletantes such as yourself. You do know you can comment on Youtube videos, don't you? On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:00:52 PM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote: -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my journey?
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/24 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com Why is it that people who have faith in some kind of higher power I don't have faith in some kind of higher power, but still I don't see spamming non-sense as sense of humor. No problem! Telmo. Quentin never seem to have a sense of humor? On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 8:43 AM, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.com wrote: I think you need to lay off whatever drugs you are doing, find faith in some kind of higher power, and stop posting in a place on the internet made for serious thinkers and not lame ass dilletantes such as yourself. You do know you can comment on Youtube videos, don't you? On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:00:52 PM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote: -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
How does one obtain an infinity of computations in a universe of limited bits of information. For example our universe is thought to be limited to 10^120 bits, the so-called Lloyd Limit. On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 2:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/24 Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com ** ** ** ** *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto: everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:45 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... ** ** ** ** On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote: *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [ mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.comeverything-list@googlegroups.com ] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote: I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is that definitive - granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive? It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside fundamental particles! On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space is better compared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35. So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent with Fermi gamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different in energy arrived from across the universe at the same time whereas granularity would delay one measurably. Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS. However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is most likely a model construct, rather than actually being something physical out there. It is something Allen Francom bangs on about too, which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with his Brownian Quantum Universe models. Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, but quantum granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described by some continuum aI0 + bI1 (a and b complex). The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classic granularity of space time with the scale this granularity would need to be under being pushed far below the Planck scale. The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but the physical (and the theological) should reasonably have continuous observable (even if those are only the frequency operators, and that *only* the probabilities reflect the continuum. Needless to say those are open problems). I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule out granularity. Hard questions, but with comp, some continuum seems to play a role in physics (which should be a first person plural universal machines view). Bruno If reality arises from scale invariant equations perhaps there is no need for a pixelated foundation to act as the smallest addressable chunks and as the canvas upon which reality is drawn or projected as it were. Perhaps reality really arises at it is observed ** ** ... from our points of view. That might even include backtracking, so that the physical reality develops and bactrack when some inconsistency is met. Open problem with comp, but evidences exists, and it might be that physical reality is ever growing. have you understand that if the brain works like a digital machine, the physical realitu emerges from some statistics on all computations (which exist in arithmetic)? ** ** Interesting point! It seems you are suggesting that causality – to use an Americanism colloquialism (at least amongst auto-mechanics) – may be a little “loosey goosey”, in other words it fits well enough in order to be fully functional, as far as the macro observer is concerned, but that within the realm of the very small (also along the time axis) causality becomes less rigorous and these – what would they be called?... reality paradox reconciliation algorithms perhaps -- re-write and “fix” transient paradoxes, loose ends etc. in order to produce, at least on the observer’s macro scale, the smooth perception of rock solid causality. And that as long as on the macro scale of the observer, causality continues to operate smoothly (in so far as they are concerned at least) then causality can be said to be
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
Quentin, Perhaps that assumption of unlimited bits for computation is unwarranted in a finite universe. In my paper I circumvent that limitation by assuming that the metaverse is the computational source of matter. http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194 Richard On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 8:20 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Computationalism doesn't assume the universe (or any universe) at the start, just only arithmetical realism, it is not limited in any fashion, universe/matter is an emergent phenomena not a primary ontological substance. 2013/10/24 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com How does one obtain an infinity of computations in a universe of limited bits of information. For example our universe is thought to be limited to 10^120 bits, the so-called Lloyd Limit. On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 2:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: 2013/10/24 Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com ** ** ** ** *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto: everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:45 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... ** ** ** ** On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote: *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [ mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.comeverything-list@googlegroups.com ] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote: I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is that definitive - granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive? It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside** ** fundamental particles! On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:*** * The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space is better compared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35. So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent with Fermi gamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different in energy arrived from across the universe at the same time whereas granularity would delay one measurably. Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS. However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is most likely a model construct, rather than actually being something physical out there. It is something Allen Francom bangs on about too, which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with his Brownian Quantum Universe models. Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, but quantum granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described by some continuum aI0 + bI1 (a and b complex). The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classic granularity of space time with the scale this granularity would need to be under being pushed far below the Planck scale. The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but the physical (and the theological) should reasonably have continuous observable (even if those are only the frequency operators, and that *only* the probabilities reflect the continuum. Needless to say those are open problems). I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule out granularity. Hard questions, but with comp, some continuum seems to play a role in physics (which should be a first person plural universal machines view). Bruno If reality arises from scale invariant equations perhaps there is no need for a pixelated foundation to act as the smallest addressable chunks and as the canvas upon which reality is drawn or projected as it were. Perhaps reality really arises at it is observed ** ** ... from our points of view. That might even include backtracking, so that the physical reality develops and bactrack when some inconsistency is met. Open problem with comp, but evidences exists, and it might be that physical reality is ever growing. have you understand that if the brain works like a digital machine, the physical realitu emerges from some statistics on all computations (which exist in arithmetic)? ** ** Interesting point! It seems you are suggesting that causality – to use an Americanism colloquialism (at least amongst auto-mechanics) – may be a little “loosey goosey”, in other words it fits well enough in order to be
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
Comp does not assume universe at the start... also the fact if the universe is finite or not is not settle. But anyway fact of physical laws have to be recovered from comp alone. Quentin 2013/10/24 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Quentin, Perhaps that assumption of unlimited bits for computation is unwarranted in a finite universe. In my paper I circumvent that limitation by assuming that the metaverse is the computational source of matter. http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194 Richard On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 8:20 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: Computationalism doesn't assume the universe (or any universe) at the start, just only arithmetical realism, it is not limited in any fashion, universe/matter is an emergent phenomena not a primary ontological substance. 2013/10/24 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com How does one obtain an infinity of computations in a universe of limited bits of information. For example our universe is thought to be limited to 10^120 bits, the so-called Lloyd Limit. On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 2:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: 2013/10/24 Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com ** ** ** ** *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto: everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:45 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... ** ** ** ** On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote: *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [ mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.comeverything-list@googlegroups.com ] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote: I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is that definitive - granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive? It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside* *** fundamental particles! On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:** ** The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space is better compared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35. So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent with Fermi gamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different in energy arrived from across the universe at the same time whereas granularity would delay one measurably. Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS. However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is most likely a model construct, rather than actually being something physical out there. It is something Allen Francom bangs on about too, which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with his Brownian Quantum Universe models. Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, but quantum granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described by some continuum aI0 + bI1 (a and b complex). The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classic granularity of space time with the scale this granularity would need to be under being pushed far below the Planck scale. The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but the physical (and the theological) should reasonably have continuous observable (even if those are only the frequency operators, and that *only* the probabilities reflect the continuum. Needless to say those are open problems). I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule out granularity. Hard questions, but with comp, some continuum seems to play a role in physics (which should be a first person plural universal machines view). Bruno If reality arises from scale invariant equations perhaps there is no need for a pixelated foundation to act as the smallest addressable chunks and as the canvas upon which reality is drawn or projected as it were. Perhaps reality really arises at it is observed ** ** ... from our points of view. That might even include backtracking, so that the physical reality develops and bactrack when some inconsistency is met. Open problem with comp, but evidences exists, and it might be that physical reality is ever growing. have you understand that if the brain works like a digital machine, the physical realitu emerges from some statistics on all computations (which exist in
Re: Dialetheism
On Thursday, October 24, 2013 2:58:16 AM UTC-4, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Craig, As sympathetic as I am to all of your various multisense realism projects and the different conclusions they are intended to imply, I must warn you: If you're going to try to prove black is white, beware the Zebra crossings...(and if you don't get it, read Douglas Adams and the ultimate disproof of God) It's not that black is white, it's that black and white are both the same thing in one sense (monochrome contrast), similar things in another sense (one of the group of things we call colors), and opposite things (black = absence of white). The important part is the multiplicity of senses and the relation of that multiplicity to symmetry and opposition. Thanks, Craig Peace On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 11:54:45 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 6:13:33 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 24 October 2013 04:39, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called true contradictions, or dialetheia. Doublethink as defined in 1984 is almost exactly this. Not exactly. Trivialism is more that indiscriminate sense of 'anything can be true or not true'. Diathelethism is about recognizing that there are limitations in the way that language can meaningfully represent the full richness of nature. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 23 Oct 2013, at 19:57, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 12:00 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Note, John, that you just go from P(W) = P(M) = 0, to the post you sent before (and that I commented), to P(W) = P(M) = 1. That's because it depends entirely about what the hell P(W) and P(M) mean! Just putting it into a semi mathematical format will not by itself make the idea clearer, or smarter. You do seem confused. At least John Clark can express John Clark's ideas about identity without using pronouns, it just takes a little longer and sounds a little awkward, Bruno Marchal can not because without the indeterminacy that pronouns can produce in the English Language the illogic inherent in Bruno Marchal's ideas would have nowhere to hide. The fact that Bruno Marchal refuses to stop using pronouns meas that Bruno Marchal does not know how to count people in a thought experiment involving duplicating chambers, and yet Bruno Marchal continues to say things like In the third person point of view on the first person points of view. But the question bears on the first person point of view exclusively and confusion between the third person view on the first person views, and the first person points of view themselves. To answer the question asked, you have to put yourself in the shoes of each copy, If there were already a way to directly feel the sense of self that another person has your proof would be unnecessary. The indeterminacy comes from that fact. The W-Clark and the M-Clark cannot feel what the other feel, and each can understand that H-Clark was wrong with P(M) = 1 P(W) = 1. They both feel alive, and so that the H-Clark was wrong with P(M) = P(W) = 0. They both know better, and eventually most sequence-of-X and M-Clark get the notion of first person indeterminacy. or at least read their personal diaries That will not increase precision unless you give a name (and NOT a pronoun!) to the guy who wrote the diary, if its Mr. The Guy Who Is Experiencing Helsinki On October 21 2013 then the probability he will experience Washington is zero. Ridiculous, because in that case would implies you die in a duplication or teletransportation experiences. We have already agree that the W-guy and the M-guy are the same H-guy, but living a later time. If the guy's name is Mr. The Guy Who Will Experience Washington On October 22 2013 then the probability he will experience Washington is 1. And I don't want to hear any more of this first person third person stuff until you make it clear what a person is and how many there are in a world with people duplicating machines in it. You ask irrelevant question. With the definition of first and third person that I provide, it is just a childplay to see that no person at all can predict the outcome *they* (any of them) will feel personally (or just will describe in *their* diary. The reasoning is pure third person reasoning, and concerned all persons involved. Let me ask you questions, one at a time. Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? (with the same protocol than in step 3, that is: annihilation of the original (H- GUY), and reconstitution done in W and M). Bruno And I agree with Quentin Anciaux that It is human to make mistakes but It is of the devil to continue making them, but I don't agree with the pompous way he said it. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dialetheism
On 23 Oct 2013, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip My problem is that you need to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark. Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math instead? With comp, when you test the flavor of coffee, you do, actually, test the flavor of some math. But you test it from the inside of math, and so it looks different from the math we learn at school. That it looks different is explainable by any Löbian machine, and can be understood intuitively with some training in the comp thought experiment. The difference are accounted by the intensional nuance of Gödel's provability. Bruno Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon
On 23 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote: I will be reading this as soon as I get the time, I mean the emergent phenomenon...but thought in the meantime you guys might be interested :-) https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/d5d3dc850933 I may have comments once I've had a chance to read it! Very interesting, and quite close the way time, and space have to appear from a universal number points of view, in case the normal measure does not contain too much white rabbits, which needs to be verify. Now, I thought, perhaps naively, that after Einstein and Gödel, no one serious still believed in a real time. Here I allude to Gödel's work in General Relativity. I recommend the reading of the book of Palle Yourgreau, which made me realize that perhaps not so much scientist have understood the vanishing of time, in physics. But the link you provided is not just on the disparition (and phenomenological emergence) of time, but on an elegant way to recover it in a first person plural ways, and a way to test this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dialetheism
Here's the deal...how about I go to the Garden of Eden and everyone else keep exploring until we finish. Ill never know the difference.. NOT EDEN PRIME though. And don't think about Red or 42 this time. Thanks,s Stephen On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:50 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote: I have the perfect James Joyce! On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:49 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.eduwrote: This is better: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#label/everything-list/141e79c24d12e062http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=634170 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:31 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Always take the weather with you. I feel a spam filter coming on. On 24 October 2013 12:29, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote: Whereever you go, there you are! On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:17 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: If anyone is still in doubt that Mr Lin is trolling, try googling Tomorrow this will be harder but today this is the easiest thing in the world. Bill Murray? Andie MacDowell? Yes I said yes I will Yes. (including the quote marks). As you will see, the most sensible response to this is Oh, cr*p - another guru. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: AUDA and pronouns
On 23 Oct 2013, at 22:57, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 03:02:55PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2013, at 22:50, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 03:09:03PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Oct 2013, at 23:03, Russell Standish wrote: In fact p- []p characterizes sigma_1 completeness (by a result by Albert Visser), and that is why to get the proba on the UD*, we use the intensional nuance []p t (= proba) starting from G extended with the axiom p- []p (limiting the proposition to the UD). proba? Sorry - I was actually asking what you meant by the word proba. OK. Sorry. It was an abbreviation for probability. []p t doesn't seem like a probability. It is a probability 1. von Neumann once argued, if you have a good quantum logic (which means automatically a good axiomatic for the probability 1 (the box in a modal axiomatic) and the ~probability = 0, (the diamond in the modal approach), all the other probabilities should be derivable from it. Assuming three dimension, and the Hilbert space structure for the quantum state, Gleason theorem get the probabilities from the logic. I thought some years that I could derive a Temperley Lieb algebra of projection operators in the logic Z1*, but the math get too much complex for me. That would have provided the 3 dimensions (by relation between Temperley-Lieb Algebra and 3D knots), and the Hilbert Space structure, and in that case, the rest is done by Gleason theorem. Did you mean certainty? In our context certainty might be a bit fuzzy. But I am not against calling a probability one a certainty, in case it is an ideal relative certainty, based on the assumption of comp for example, the correct choice of the substitution level, the perfect ability of the doctor/teleportation-machine, all the default hypotheses. IIRC, one of your hypostases was interpreted as probability=1 (ie certain) events. The key is more that []p is not a probability. And that we get an abstract probability (a modal logic of probability or credibility) when we add the consistency (semantically = the existence of at least one accessible reality) condition. So yes, []p t is an arithmetical predicate which behaves like a probability one. Also, is []p t == []p p ? Yes. Those are definition made in G (and thus in arithmetic), which is a normal modal logic. t implies the existence of an accessible world (by Kripke semantics). []p implies p is true in all accessible world. So there will a world, and p is true in it, so we have p when we have []p t . And, of course the reverse is more easy. if we have p, we have an accessible world (the one with p true in that world), and t is true there too, as t is true in all world. Careful! the new logic obtained (with the new box defined by []p t), we lost the necessitation rule, and in that logic, there is no more a Kripke semantics. But we have still a notion of worlds- neighborhoods, which fit better the apparition of topologies, continuua, ... and thus with the UDA way to derive physics. Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: AUDA and pronouns
On 23 Oct 2013, at 23:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/23/2013 5:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Oct 2013, at 19:01, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/22/2013 5:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Oct 2013, at 20:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/20/2013 11:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 08:09:59PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
Consistency is []p ~[]~p. I was saying []p ~p, ie
mistaken belief.
ISTM that Bruno equivocates and [] sometimes means believes
and sometimes provable.
And I'm doing the same. It's not such an issue - a
mathematician will
only believe something if e can prove it.
But provable(p)==p and believes(p)=/=p, so why equivocate on
them?
Both provable('p') - p, and believe('p') - p, when we limit
ourself to correct machine.
(And incidentally mathematicians believe stuff they can't prove
all the time - that's how they choose things to try to prove).
Then it is a conjecture. They don't believe rationally in
conjecture, when they are correct.
They believe it in the real operational sense of believe, they
will bet their whole professional lives on it. How long did it
take Andrew Wiles to prove Fermat's last theorem? Since one can
never know that one is a correct machine it seems to me a
muddling of things to equivocate on provable and believes.
On the contrary. It provides a recursive definition of the beliefs,
by a rational agent accepting enough truth to understand how a
computer work.
We can define the beliefs by presenting PA axioms in that way
Classical logic is believed,
'0 ≠ s(x)' is believed,
's(x) = s(y) - x = y' is believed,
'x+0 = x' is believed,
'x+s(y) = s(x+y)' is believed,
'x*0=0' is believed,
'x*s(y)=(x*y)+x' is believed,
and the rule: if A - B is believed and A is believed, then (soon
or later) B is believed.
But the point of Seth Lloyd's paper was that later can effectively
be never and since given any time horizon, t, almost all B will not
be believed earlier than t.
But Seth Loyd assumes some physical universe. In the arithmetic
context from which we start (and have to start by UDA, at some
recursive equivalence) soon or later means once. It never means
never.
So really you call it believe, but you use it as provable.
You miss the point. The incompleteness forces the provability logic to
behave like a believability logic.
After Gödel, provable (which was for many the best case of knowledge)
becomes only 'believable'.
That's why I agree with Popper, that science = only belief, because
the big difference between a belief and a knowledge, is that the first
is corrigible and the second is incorrigible.
(Popper and Deutsch uses non-standard vocabulary here, but I agree
with them).
Then the theory will apply to any recursively enumerable extensions
of those beliefs, provided they don't get arithmetically unsound.
The believer can be shown to be Löbian once he has also the beliefs
in the induction axioms.
Not really. You have add another axiom that the believer is correct.
Why would I need to do that? It is not a new axiom, it is that I limit
the interview to correct machines. (Everett does the same, it is
natural. If you predict that a comet will appear in the sky, you will
not be refuted by a paper explaining that when astronomers are
sufficiently drunk, they miss to see it. You don't have to assume that
the observer is not drunk, sane of mind, etc. (At the level of the
scientific paper, in real life you know that a talk after dinner, at
some conference, will count for nothing, as people are full, and
sleepy!).
He doesn't believe any false propositions - which means it is an
idealization that doesn't apply to anyone.
To derive physics, that is enough. Theoretical approach starts from
the simpler assumptions, and change them, or improves them only if
needed.
If not, you would have rejected Newton's at once, as he consider the
sun being a point, when recovering Keepler laws from his gravitation
theory.
The interesting happening, I think, is that by G* proving []f,
somehow, the laws of physics and the whole machine's theology have to
take into account the consistency of incorrectness, at some basic
fundamental level. The idealization makes justice itself of your
remark, somehow.
Bruno
Brent
Bruno
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Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon
From SR and GR, photons are static in time. So I do not understand how differences in photon time can emerge. On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote: I will be reading this as soon as I get the time, I mean the emergent phenomenon...but thought in the meantime you guys might be interested :-) https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/d5d3dc850933 I may have comments once I've had a chance to read it! Very interesting, and quite close the way time, and space have to appear from a universal number points of view, in case the normal measure does not contain too much white rabbits, which needs to be verify. Now, I thought, perhaps naively, that after Einstein and Gödel, no one serious still believed in a real time. Here I allude to Gödel's work in General Relativity. I recommend the reading of the book of Palle Yourgreau, which made me realize that perhaps not so much scientist have understood the vanishing of time, in physics. But the link you provided is not just on the disparition (and phenomenological emergence) of time, but on an elegant way to recover it in a first person plural ways, and a way to test this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
The recent observation of a galaxy 30 billion light years away, just 700 million years after the Big Bang, suggests that the universe is finite. On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 8:57 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Comp does not assume universe at the start... also the fact if the universe is finite or not is not settle. But anyway fact of physical laws have to be recovered from comp alone. Quentin 2013/10/24 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Quentin, Perhaps that assumption of unlimited bits for computation is unwarranted in a finite universe. In my paper I circumvent that limitation by assuming that the metaverse is the computational source of matter. http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194 Richard On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 8:20 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: Computationalism doesn't assume the universe (or any universe) at the start, just only arithmetical realism, it is not limited in any fashion, universe/matter is an emergent phenomena not a primary ontological substance. 2013/10/24 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com How does one obtain an infinity of computations in a universe of limited bits of information. For example our universe is thought to be limited to 10^120 bits, the so-called Lloyd Limit. On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 2:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: 2013/10/24 Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com ** ** ** ** *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto: everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:45 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... ** ** ** ** On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote: *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [ mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.comeverything-list@googlegroups.com ] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote: I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is that definitive - granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive? It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside fundamental particles! On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:* *** The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space is better compared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35. So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent with Fermi gamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different in energy arrived from across the universe at the same time whereas granularity would delay one measurably. Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS. However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is most likely a model construct, rather than actually being something physical out there. It is something Allen Francom bangs on about too, which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with his Brownian Quantum Universe models. Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, but quantum granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described by some continuum aI0 + bI1 (a and b complex). The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classic granularity of space time with the scale this granularity would need to be under being pushed far below the Planck scale. The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but the physical (and the theological) should reasonably have continuous observable (even if those are only the frequency operators, and that *only* the probabilities reflect the continuum. Needless to say those are open problems). I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule out granularity. Hard questions, but with comp, some continuum seems to play a role in physics (which should be a first person plural universal machines view). Bruno If reality arises from scale invariant equations perhaps there is no need for a pixelated foundation to act as the smallest addressable chunks and as the canvas upon which reality is drawn or projected as it were. Perhaps reality really arises at it is observed ** ** ... from our points of view. That might even include backtracking, so that the physical reality develops and bactrack when some inconsistency is met. Open problem with comp, but
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
I think you can't see a galaxy who would be 30 billions light years away, while the hubble spĥere radius is only 15 billions light year, centered on earth... Also what would settle the finitude of the universe because a full fledged galaxy was found not long after the bigbang ? As of now, I've never read anything that settle if the universe is finite or not... we're not talking about the hubble volume, but the universe here... Anyway, that doesn't change the fact that computationalism does not assume universe at the start and as such you can't use such assumption. Quentin 2013/10/24 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com The recent observation of a galaxy 30 billion light years away, just 700 million years after the Big Bang, suggests that the universe is finite. On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 8:57 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: Comp does not assume universe at the start... also the fact if the universe is finite or not is not settle. But anyway fact of physical laws have to be recovered from comp alone. Quentin 2013/10/24 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Quentin, Perhaps that assumption of unlimited bits for computation is unwarranted in a finite universe. In my paper I circumvent that limitation by assuming that the metaverse is the computational source of matter. http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194 Richard On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 8:20 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: Computationalism doesn't assume the universe (or any universe) at the start, just only arithmetical realism, it is not limited in any fashion, universe/matter is an emergent phenomena not a primary ontological substance. 2013/10/24 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com How does one obtain an infinity of computations in a universe of limited bits of information. For example our universe is thought to be limited to 10^120 bits, the so-called Lloyd Limit. On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 2:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: 2013/10/24 Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com ** ** ** ** *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto: everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:45 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... ** ** ** ** On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote: *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [ mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.comeverything-list@googlegroups.com ] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote: I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is that definitive - granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive? It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside fundamental particles! On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space is better compared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35. So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent with Fermi gamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different in energy arrived from across the universe at the same time whereas granularity would delay one measurably. Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS. However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is most likely a model construct, rather than actually being something physical out there. It is something Allen Francom bangs on about too, which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with his Brownian Quantum Universe models. Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, but quantum granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described by some continuum aI0 + bI1 (a and b complex). The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classic granularity of space time with the scale this granularity would need to be under being pushed far below the Planck scale. The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but the physical (and the theological) should reasonably have continuous observable (even if those are only the frequency operators, and that *only* the probabilities reflect the continuum. Needless to say those are open problems). I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule out granularity. Hard questions,
Douglas Hofstadter Article
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how *we* play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” I was just reading this too. I agree. This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? I think the intended meaning is closer to: airplanes don't fly by flapping their wings, why should computers be intelligent by thinking?. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dialetheism
On Thursday, October 24, 2013 10:16:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Oct 2013, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip My problem is that you need to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark. Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math instead? With comp, when you test the flavor of coffee, you do, actually, test the flavor of some math. That's what I am saying. It would have to be the case under comp. My point though is that it is absurd. Tasting something gives us no mathematical understanding. The understanding that flavor does provide is the opposite of math. It is immediate (although develops briefly through time as well), it is irreducible to anything other than flavor, and it does not consist of 'stepped reckoning' of any kind, it is an aesthetic gestalt. But you test it from the inside of math, and so it looks different from the math we learn at school. That it looks different is explainable by any Löbian machine, Taste doesn't look like anything though, and it cannot ever look like anything. If it did, then it would be vision. If it could be vision, then it would be profoundly redundant to have both senses of the same data...(assuming that Santa Claus has brought the possibility of senses to begin with.) and can be understood intuitively with some training in the comp thought experiment. The difference are accounted by the intensional nuance of Gödel's provability. I don't think it is. It seems clear to me that any mechanical accounting of sense implicitly takes sense for granted from the start. There is no functional difference between sight, smell, feeling, hearing, etc. There is no intensional nuance that ties to the possibility of any one of them - only a grey box where something like virtual proof could theoretically live. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On Thursday, October 24, 2013 12:43:49 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” I was just reading this too. I agree. This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? I think the intended meaning is closer to: airplanes don't fly by flapping their wings, why should computers be intelligent by thinking?. It depends whether you want 'thinking' to imply awareness or not. I think the point is that we should not assume that computation is in any way 'thinking' (or intelligence for that matter). I think that 'thinking' is not passive enough to describe computation. It is to say that a net is 'fishing'. Computation is many nets within nets, devoid of intention or perspective. It does the opposite of thinking, it is a method for petrifying the measurable residue or reflection of thought. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript:. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dialetheism
On 24 Oct 2013, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2013 9:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Oct 2013, at 17:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called true contradictions, or dialetheia. Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis about truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic, often based on pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has various consequences, depending on the theory into which it is introduced. For example, in traditional systems of logic (e.g., classical logic and intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes true if a contradiction is true; this means that such systems become trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom. Other logical systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as paraconsistent logics. Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs from Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological) deflationism regarding the truth predicate. Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self- contradictory statements in classical logic and naïve set theory, respectively. Contradictions are problematic in these theories because they cause the theories to explode—if a contradiction is true, then every proposition is true. The classical way to solve this problem is to ban contradictory statements, to revise the axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory statements do not appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this problem by accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any resulting contradiction is a theorem. It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the possibility of dialetheism metaphysically. No problem with that. Like Everett restore 3p-determinacy, comp restore also non-dialetheism, metaphysically, but does not (and cannot) disallow it it in some machine's mind. G* says it; D(Bp B~p), or ([]p []~p). read: it is consistent that p is believed and that ~p is believed, by the Löbian machine. The machine cannot know that, note. Sure. That's because logic assumes that if p=q then q can be substituted for p. Hence if you believe the morning star is a goddess and the evening star is a planet, you may believe a contradiction - but not if you know it. That is a bit unclear to me. Substitution of equivalent if always dangerous in modal contexts. The reason is perhaps more prosaic, which is that a machine who believe in its inconsistency believes in some infinite (non-standard) number(s), she agrees that 0 is not Gödel number of a proof of f, nor are 1, 2, 3, ... , but yet she believes in some number representing a proof of f. Humans have a big non monotonical logic layers, making them able to say I was wrong, and able to revise previews opinions. Evolution might exploit truth and relative lies too. That leads to complex questions. Correcteness is when you forget all the lies, and nothing more. If you survive that, you get Löbian by necessity, and your physics will not change, normally (with comp). No doubt that human actual theologies are more complex than the theology of the correct universal machine, platonist, and believing not in much more than the universal base (number, or combinator, or ...). But PA, ZF, are only sort of Escherichia Coli of the person. They get personhood by the intensional nuances of the provability predicate. Detrivializing their physics and theology (the simplest one as it might be, but it is already quite rich). Look how much information we already get in the UDA, where a person is defined by just the accessible memory (the diary entangled though their accompaniment in the annihilations and reconstitutions). In the arithmetical version, a person is defined by a universal number with enough introspection and induction ability. PA and ZF are well known typical example. And incompleteness allows to define a notion of knowledge associate to them, and a notion of observation. We all have a Löbian part, as believer in PA's axioms, for example. I think that that part is already conscious when we assume consciousness is invariant for the genuine universal digital substitution. The universal machine defines a canonical universal person, and the Löbian one, which knows, in some weaker sense that the Theaetetus' one, that they are
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
On 24 Oct 2013, at 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/24 Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:45 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... Keep in mind the difference between 1) the computationalist hypothesis in philosophy of mind, and 2) the hypothesis that the universe is the product of some program. 2) implies 1) but 1) implies the negation of 2)(this can be explained with the thought experiment like in the UDA). In particular 2) implies the negation of 2), and so is self- contradictory. Bruno You lost me here… why does 1) negate 2)? Because 1 implies matter is the result of an infinity of computations below the substitution level (there is an infinity of computations going through your current state). 2 implies matter is the result of one specific computation. 2 implies 1, 1 implies ~2 = 2 = ~2. OK? No more question? I have to go, might add comments later. Bruno Quentin Is it because 1) requires some external observable that is not a part of itself As seems suggested by saying 2) implies the negation of 2) Which would be the hall of mirrors of the observing entity requiring an external observable in order to even know it exists. Unless something could be perfectly self-referential, which I sense you doubt. perhaps just the sound of me flailing around J Chris http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
We solved the problem evil, sort of...
Instead of spending all our efforts correcting each other's faults, we should just all agree to spend a little bit of effort coming up with really good excuses for each other. It accomplishes the same thing in the end, and it's much much easier. ** -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
About creating a singlarity
Creating a singularity is not the hard part: the hard part is making sure you only create one. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
About the Panopticon again (sorry I lost the e-mail)
Who watches the watchers? is a good question, but a better question is Given a definition of watching and watchers, what is the least cardinality of watchers required such that all watching is watched by at least one watcher? The answer might be a lot smaller than you think it is... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
The last truth that ever matters:
Him: God has shown me all truth, but your love is beauty beyond comprehension. Her: God has shown me all beauty, but your love is truth beyond imagination. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
Craig and Telmo: Is anticipation involved at all? Deep Blue anticipated hundreds of steps in advance (and evaluated a potential outcome before accepting, or rejecting). What else is in thinking involved? I would like to know, because I have no idea. John Mikes On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 1:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Thursday, October 24, 2013 12:43:49 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/**magazine/archive/2013/11/the-** man-who-would-teach-machines-**to-think/309529/http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” I was just reading this too. I agree. This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? I think the intended meaning is closer to: airplanes don't fly by flapping their wings, why should computers be intelligent by thinking?. It depends whether you want 'thinking' to imply awareness or not. I think the point is that we should not assume that computation is in any way 'thinking' (or intelligence for that matter). I think that 'thinking' is not passive enough to describe computation. It is to say that a net is 'fishing'. Computation is many nets within nets, devoid of intention or perspective. It does the opposite of thinking, it is a method for petrifying the measurable residue or reflection of thought. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-listhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_outhttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On Thursday, October 24, 2013 3:08:26 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote: Craig and Telmo: Is anticipation involved at all? Deep Blue anticipated hundreds of steps in advance (and evaluated a potential outcome before accepting, or rejecting). What else is in thinking involved? I would like to know, because I have no idea. John Mikes It's hard to talk about the particulars of pseudo-sentience, since all of our language is geared toward the assumption of sentience. We haven't had time to develop terms to discern between map and territory when the territory is a trompe l'oeil illusion. When we think, we are rehearsing or pretending to some extent. It is an act of imagination that is anticipatory. The etymology of anticipate traces back to a sense of taking into possession beforehand,. Did Deep Blue take anything into possession, or did it merely exhaust its ritual of mindless reductions - compressing a fourth dimensional object of game permutations into a one dimensional path which matches its mindless criteria? What a computer does would be thinking if it could care what it was thinking about, but since it is built from the outside in, it is incapable of caring about the games that we designed it to play. It isn't playing a game at all, it is filtering one abstract pattern against another without reference to 'before' or 'after'. It's not anticipating from its point of view, it's just rendering a set of positions which satisfy a rule. I think that what complicates the story is that the power of human thought is in it's distance from the feelings and sensations that it has evolved from. Think of the evolution of the human experience as an artistic movement, which has oscillated between realism, impressionism, cubism, and now finally abstract minimalism. Without the whole history of art behind it, the stark forms of minimalism seem simple and mechanical...and they are, in the absence of an appreciation of the whole story of art. Thinking is an art that acts like a science. Computation is a science which we can use to frame art. The danger is that we have overlooked what has led up to thinking and now mistake the frame for the canvas. Thanks, Craig On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 1:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Thursday, October 24, 2013 12:43:49 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/**magazine/archive/2013/11/the-** man-who-would-teach-machines-**to-think/309529/http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” I was just reading this too. I agree. This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? I think the intended meaning is closer to: airplanes don't fly by flapping their wings, why should computers be intelligent by thinking?. It depends whether you want 'thinking' to imply awareness or not. I think the point is that we should not assume that computation is in any way 'thinking' (or intelligence for that matter). I think that 'thinking' is not passive enough to describe computation. It is to say that a net is
Re: For John Clark
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That will not increase precision unless you give a name (and NOT a pronoun!) to the guy who wrote the diary, if its Mr. The Guy Who Is Experiencing Helsinki On October 21 2013 then the probability he will experience Washington is zero. Ridiculous, because in that case would implies [you] die in a duplication or teletransportation experiences. ^^^ Who would die? YOU would die. If you put a gun to Bruno Marchal's head Bruno Marchal could still not coherently explain Bruno Marchal's ideas about indeterminacy without using pronouns, the most indeterminate part of the English language and made even more so by duplicating chambers. Do you think that [you] die in a self-duplication experience? ^^^ We've been through this, it depends on who the hell you is. Is you the guy who remembers being John Clark yesterday, or the guy who is seeing Helsinki right now, or the guy that will see Washington tomorrow, or the guy that will see Moscow tomorrow? Bad ideas always sound better if they are imprecisely expressed, and there is no better way to do that than using lots of personal pronouns in a world that has people duplicating chambers in it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
Hi John, On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 9:08 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Craig and Telmo: Is anticipation involved at all? Deep Blue anticipated hundreds of steps in advance (and evaluated a potential outcome before accepting, or rejecting). Sure. This issue though is that Deep Blue does this by brute force. It computes billions of possible scenarios to arrive at a decision. It's clear that human beings don't do that. They are more intelligent in the sense that they can play competitively while only considering a small fraction of the scenarios. How do we do this? There is almost no real AI research nowadays because people gave up on answering this question. It's related to many other interesting questions: how do we read and understand the meaning of a text? Google is like something with the intelligence of an ant (probably still way less) but vast amounts of computational power. Again, this is brute-forcing the problem and it doesn't come close to the level of understanding that a smart 9 year old can have when reading. On the linguistic side, Chomsky is also outspoken against the statistical dumb approaches. What else is in thinking involved? I would like to know, because I have no idea. Hofstadter's ideas are very deep and I don't claim to fully understand them. I do think that is concept of strange loop is important. Every time there's something we can't define (intelligence, life, consciousness), strange loops seems to be involved. Strange loops feedback across abstraction layers. Goals-feelings-cognition-Goals. Environment-DNA-Organism-Environment and so on -- in a very informal way, please pay no attention to the lack of rigour here. I think this is compatible with comp and several thing that Bruno alludes to. The insight also seems to come from similar sources -- notably Gödel's theorems. On the engineering of AI side, I believe we are still in the middle ages when it comes to computation environments and languages. One of my intuitions is that languages that facilitate the creation of self-modifying computer code are an important step. Telmo. John Mikes On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 1:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, October 24, 2013 12:43:49 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” I was just reading this too. I agree. This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? I think the intended meaning is closer to: airplanes don't fly by flapping their wings, why should computers be intelligent by thinking?. It depends whether you want 'thinking' to imply awareness or not. I think the point is that we should not assume that computation is in any way 'thinking' (or intelligence for that matter). I think that 'thinking' is not passive enough to describe computation. It is to say that a net is 'fishing'. Computation is many nets within nets, devoid of intention or perspective. It does the opposite of thinking, it is a method for petrifying the measurable residue or reflection of thought. -- You received this message because you are subscribed
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
I think what Deep Blue does is similar to what *parts *of the brain do, and it probably does *that* better (some human computers seem to use this facility in a more direct way than most of us can). However obviously something is missing - possibly the system that integrates all these little engines into a whole. (Or possibly not...) On 25 October 2013 08:55, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: Hi John, On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 9:08 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Craig and Telmo: Is anticipation involved at all? Deep Blue anticipated hundreds of steps in advance (and evaluated a potential outcome before accepting, or rejecting). Sure. This issue though is that Deep Blue does this by brute force. It computes billions of possible scenarios to arrive at a decision. It's clear that human beings don't do that. They are more intelligent in the sense that they can play competitively while only considering a small fraction of the scenarios. How do we do this? There is almost no real AI research nowadays because people gave up on answering this question. It's related to many other interesting questions: how do we read and understand the meaning of a text? Google is like something with the intelligence of an ant (probably still way less) but vast amounts of computational power. Again, this is brute-forcing the problem and it doesn't come close to the level of understanding that a smart 9 year old can have when reading. On the linguistic side, Chomsky is also outspoken against the statistical dumb approaches. What else is in thinking involved? I would like to know, because I have no idea. Hofstadter's ideas are very deep and I don't claim to fully understand them. I do think that is concept of strange loop is important. Every time there's something we can't define (intelligence, life, consciousness), strange loops seems to be involved. Strange loops feedback across abstraction layers. Goals-feelings-cognition-Goals. Environment-DNA-Organism-Environment and so on -- in a very informal way, please pay no attention to the lack of rigour here. I think this is compatible with comp and several thing that Bruno alludes to. The insight also seems to come from similar sources -- notably Gödel's theorems. On the engineering of AI side, I believe we are still in the middle ages when it comes to computation environments and languages. One of my intuitions is that languages that facilitate the creation of self-modifying computer code are an important step. Telmo. John Mikes On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 1:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, October 24, 2013 12:43:49 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” I was just reading this too. I agree. This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? I think the intended meaning is closer to: airplanes don't fly by flapping their wings, why should computers be intelligent by thinking?. It depends whether you want
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/24 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That will not increase precision unless you give a name (and NOT a pronoun!) to the guy who wrote the diary, if its Mr. The Guy Who Is Experiencing Helsinki On October 21 2013 then the probability he will experience Washington is zero. Ridiculous, because in that case would implies [you] die in a duplication or teletransportation experiences. ^^^ Who would die? YOU would die. If you put a gun to Bruno Marchal's head Bruno Marchal could still not coherently explain Bruno Marchal's ideas about indeterminacy without using pronouns, the most indeterminate part of the English language and made even more so by duplicating chambers. Do you think that [you] die in a self-duplication experience? ^^^ We've been through this, it depends on who the hell you is. Is you the guy who remembers being John Clark yesterday, or the guy who is seeing Helsinki right now, or the guy that will see Washington tomorrow, or the guy that will see Moscow tomorrow? Bad ideas always sound better if they are imprecisely expressed, and there is no better way to do that than using lots of personal pronouns in a world that has people duplicating chambers in it. John K Clark Be consistent, reject MWI, or ask *the same question* about the probability of *you* (who is you ? pinocchio maybe ?) measuring spin up while measuring the spin of an electron... thing is, there you don't ask these dumb questions, only in nanoscopically tiny tiny fractions of the multiverse will you ever stop playing that dumb. Your agenda is not to try to comprehend something, it is just to bash someone with no reason except misplaced pride. Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my journey?
I'm just glad that no one's called me a lame ass dilletante yet. Maybe I'm doing something right after all! Still while we're on the subject of koans, wisdom etc... Stephen Lin seems like a 60 watt desk lamp that keeps blinking on and off in a room full of 1000 watt uplighters... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 7:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, October 24, 2013 12:43:49 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” I was just reading this too. I agree. This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? I think the intended meaning is closer to: airplanes don't fly by flapping their wings, why should computers be intelligent by thinking?. It depends whether you want 'thinking' to imply awareness or not. Ok. I don't think we can know that in any case. I think the point is that we should not assume that computation is in any way 'thinking' (or intelligence for that matter). I think that 'thinking' is not passive enough to describe computation. It is to say that a net is 'fishing'. Computation is many nets within nets, devoid of intention or perspective. It does the opposite of thinking, it is a method for petrifying the measurable residue or reflection of thought. Ok but let's take a human grand master playing chess. You don't think a computer can play like him? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon
This actually seems rather similar to the picture of the universe Barrington Bayley came up with in Collision with Chronos, in my opinion. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collision_Course_%28Bayley_novel%29 http://www.oivas.com/bjb/bsr2.html On 25 October 2013 05:02, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: From SR and GR, photons are static in time. So I do not understand how differences in photon time can emerge. On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote: I will be reading this as soon as I get the time, I mean the emergent phenomenon...but thought in the meantime you guys might be interested :-) https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/d5d3dc850933 I may have comments once I've had a chance to read it! Very interesting, and quite close the way time, and space have to appear from a universal number points of view, in case the normal measure does not contain too much white rabbits, which needs to be verify. Now, I thought, perhaps naively, that after Einstein and Gödel, no one serious still believed in a real time. Here I allude to Gödel's work in General Relativity. I recommend the reading of the book of Palle Yourgreau, which made me realize that perhaps not so much scientist have understood the vanishing of time, in physics. But the link you provided is not just on the disparition (and phenomenological emergence) of time, but on an elegant way to recover it in a first person plural ways, and a way to test this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
The galaxy is probably 30 bn light years away NOW (leaving aside exactly what now means cosmologically) but we see its image from when it was 13 bn light years away. In the intervening 13bn years it has moved another 17bn light years (universal expansion not being limited to c). Or so I'm reliably informed... On 25 October 2013 06:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Oct 2013, at 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/24 Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com ** ** ** ** *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto: everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal *Sent:* Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:45 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... ** ** ** Keep in mind the difference between 1) the computationalist hypothesis in philosophy of mind, and 2) the hypothesis that the universe is the product of some program. ** ** 2) implies 1) ** ** but ** ** 1) implies the negation of 2)(this can be explained with the thought experiment like in the UDA). ** ** In particular 2) implies the negation of 2), and so is self-contradictory. ** ** Bruno ** ** You lost me here… why does 1) negate 2)? Because 1 implies matter is the result of an infinity of computations below the substitution level (there is an infinity of computations going through your current state). 2 implies matter is the result of one specific computation. 2 implies 1, 1 implies ~2 = 2 = ~2. OK? No more question? I have to go, might add comments later. Bruno Quentin Is it because 1) requires some external observable that is not a part of itself As seems suggested by saying 2) implies the negation of 2) Which would be the hall of mirrors of the observing entity requiring an external observable in order to even know it exists. Unless something could be perfectly self-referential, which I sense you doubt. ** ** perhaps just the sound of me flailing around J Chris ** ** http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ ** ** ** ** ** ** -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 11:29 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 7:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, October 24, 2013 12:43:49 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” I was just reading this too. I agree. This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? I think the intended meaning is closer to: airplanes don't fly by flapping their wings, why should computers be intelligent by thinking?. It depends whether you want 'thinking' to imply awareness or not. Ok. I don't think we can know that in any case. I think the point is that we should not assume that computation is in any way 'thinking' (or intelligence for that matter). I think that 'thinking' is not passive enough to describe computation. It is to say that a net is 'fishing'. Computation is many nets within nets, devoid of intention or perspective. It does the opposite of thinking, it is a method for petrifying the measurable residue or reflection of thought. Ok but let's take a human grand master playing chess. You don't think a computer can play like him? This relates to what you said earlier which I agree with: *They are more intelligent in the sense that they can play competitively while only considering a small fraction of the scenarios. How do we do this? There is almost no real AI research nowadays because people gave up on answering this question. * The answer lies somewhere in building branch histories and databases that are for now only partial. The computer cannot beat humans without databases for openings, middle, and endgame. I believe this is what freaked out Kasparov in the questionable game and what gives his suspicion of human intervention in the code, which IBM never ruled out or proved negatively between games, some substance. Kasparov lost because IBM eventually accrued enough understanding of Kasparov's database (dozens of years of notes and logs that make up his holy grail secret) to not let it fall for Kasparov's gambit. Kasparov's and any GM's algorithm for beating chess engines often runs along the lines of: Keep position closed via Botvinnik type openings and middlegame so the computer will have to contend with billions of possible move continuations instead of a few dozen million. Then implement precise, but highly complex, long term strategy that offers both positional and material gambit for twenty or so moves which is designed to flip at exactly the point of the computer's computational horizon, and the computer loses. This doesn't work today, because human GMs have fed the databases with every line/variation up their sleeves (from hundreds of years of recorded games) and consequently we feed the software with every refutation. Once a refutation is implemented, it's our loss in terms of raw summing value, because we are forced into unexplored territory and can't compute those positions optimally anymore (no more strategy, just local computational tactics; computer
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
I want a computer that can play poker. And Bridge. And Go. On 25 October 2013 12:11, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.comwrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 11:29 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 7:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, October 24, 2013 12:43:49 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” I was just reading this too. I agree. This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? I think the intended meaning is closer to: airplanes don't fly by flapping their wings, why should computers be intelligent by thinking?. It depends whether you want 'thinking' to imply awareness or not. Ok. I don't think we can know that in any case. I think the point is that we should not assume that computation is in any way 'thinking' (or intelligence for that matter). I think that 'thinking' is not passive enough to describe computation. It is to say that a net is 'fishing'. Computation is many nets within nets, devoid of intention or perspective. It does the opposite of thinking, it is a method for petrifying the measurable residue or reflection of thought. Ok but let's take a human grand master playing chess. You don't think a computer can play like him? This relates to what you said earlier which I agree with: *They are more intelligent in the sense that they can play competitively while only considering a small fraction of the scenarios. How do we do this? There is almost no real AI research nowadays because people gave up on answering this question. * The answer lies somewhere in building branch histories and databases that are for now only partial. The computer cannot beat humans without databases for openings, middle, and endgame. I believe this is what freaked out Kasparov in the questionable game and what gives his suspicion of human intervention in the code, which IBM never ruled out or proved negatively between games, some substance. Kasparov lost because IBM eventually accrued enough understanding of Kasparov's database (dozens of years of notes and logs that make up his holy grail secret) to not let it fall for Kasparov's gambit. Kasparov's and any GM's algorithm for beating chess engines often runs along the lines of: Keep position closed via Botvinnik type openings and middlegame so the computer will have to contend with billions of possible move continuations instead of a few dozen million. Then implement precise, but highly complex, long term strategy that offers both positional and material gambit for twenty or so moves which is designed to flip at exactly the point of the computer's computational horizon, and the computer loses. This doesn't work today, because human GMs have fed the databases with every line/variation up their sleeves (from hundreds of years of recorded games) and consequently we feed the software with every refutation. Once a refutation is implemented, it's our loss in terms
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On 25 October 2013 03:39, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? You could say that human chess players just take in visual data, process it in a series of biological relays, then send electrical signals to muscles that move the pieces around. This is what an alien scientist would observe. That's not thinking! That's not understanding! -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On 25 October 2013 12:16, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: You could say that human chess players just take in visual data, process it in a series of biological relays, then send electrical signals to muscles that move the pieces around. This is what an alien scientist would observe. That's not thinking! That's not understanding! I like the use of just ! (I'm sure a Chinese room the size of the galaxy could replicate their behaviour...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
In the 13 B year period that the light took to get here the universe itself has expanded stretching out spacetime spreading things out like dots on the surface of an inflating balloon. Hence the 30 B figure - that factors in the red shift computed values to arrive at that current distance. Light leaving those galaxies right now, if they still exist that is, would take 30 B years to finally get to earth which will have been long since gone by then. From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Thursday, October 24, 2013 3:58 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... The galaxy is probably 30 bn light years away NOW (leaving aside exactly what now means cosmologically) but we see its image from when it was 13 bn light years away. In the intervening 13bn years it has moved another 17bn light years (universal expansion not being limited to c). Or so I'm reliably informed... On 25 October 2013 06:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Oct 2013, at 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/24 Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:45 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids... Keep in mind the difference between 1) the computationalist hypothesis in philosophy of mind, and 2) the hypothesis that the universe is the product of some program. 2) implies 1) but 1) implies the negation of 2)(this can be explained with the thought experiment like in the UDA). In particular 2) implies the negation of 2), and so is self-contradictory. Bruno You lost me here. why does 1) negate 2)? Because 1 implies matter is the result of an infinity of computations below the substitution level (there is an infinity of computations going through your current state). 2 implies matter is the result of one specific computation. 2 implies 1, 1 implies ~2 = 2 = ~2. OK? No more question? I have to go, might add comments later. Bruno Quentin Is it because 1) requires some external observable that is not a part of itself As seems suggested by saying 2) implies the negation of 2) Which would be the hall of mirrors of the observing entity requiring an external observable in order to even know it exists. Unless something could be perfectly self-referential, which I sense you doubt. perhaps just the sound of me flailing around J Chris http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email
Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon
On 25 October 2013 05:02, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: From SR and GR, photons are static in time. So I do not understand how differences in photon time can emerge. In the experimental setup they are passed through polarising filters, so the time-evolution of the system involves changes to their states of polarisation. [image: Inline images 1] -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon
Then the schrodinger cat in the box is a little block multiverse with both supperposed possible states until we open it and become entangled. 2013/10/25, LizR lizj...@gmail.com: On 25 October 2013 05:02, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: From SR and GR, photons are static in time. So I do not understand how differences in photon time can emerge. In the experimental setup they are passed through polarising filters, so the time-evolution of the system involves changes to their states of polarisation. [image: Inline images 1] -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon
Assuming a perfect decoherence free box, I think you're right. On 25 October 2013 13:20, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Then the schrodinger cat in the box is a little block multiverse with both supperposed possible states until we open it and become entangled. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On Thursday, October 24, 2013 7:16:55 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 25 October 2013 03:39, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-machines-to-think/309529/ The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think ...Take Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer that bested the chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue won by brute force. For each legal move it could make at a given point in the game, it would consider its opponent’s responses, its own responses to those responses, and so on for six or more steps down the line. With a fast evaluation function, it would calculate a score for each possible position, and then make the move that led to the best score. What allowed Deep Blue to beat the world’s best humans was raw computational power. It could evaluate up to 330 million positions a second, while Kasparov could evaluate only a few dozen before having to make a decision. Hofstadter wanted to ask: Why conquer a task if there’s no insight to be had from the victory? “Okay,” he says, “Deep Blue plays very good chess—so what? Does that tell you something about how we play chess? No. Does it tell you about how Kasparov envisions, understands a chessboard?” A brand of AI that didn’t try to answer such questions—however impressive it might have been—was, in Hofstadter’s mind, a diversion. He distanced himself from the field almost as soon as he became a part of it. “To me, as a fledgling AI person,” he says, “it was self-evident that I did not want to get involved in that trickery. It was obvious: I don’t want to be involved in passing off some fancy program’s behavior for intelligence when I know that it has nothing to do with intelligence. And I don’t know why more people aren’t that way...” This is precisely my argument against John Clark's position. Another quote I will be stealing: Airplanes don’t flap their wings; why should computers think? You could say that human chess players just take in visual data, process it in a series of biological relays, then send electrical signals to muscles that move the pieces around. This is what an alien scientist would observe. That's not thinking! That's not understanding! Right, but since we understand that such an alien observation would be in error, we must give our own experience the benefit of the doubt. The computer does not deserve any such benefit of the doubt, since there is no question that it has been assembled intentionally from controllable parts. When we see a ventriloquist with a dummy, we do not entertain seriously that we could be mistaken about which one is really the ventriloquist, or whether they are equivalent to each other. Looking at natural presences, like atoms or galaxies, the scope of their persistence is well beyond any human relation so they do deserve the benefit of the doubt. We have no reason to believe that they were assembled by anything other than themselves. The fact that we are made of atoms and atoms are made from stars is another point in their favor, whereas no living organism that we have encountered is made of inorganic atoms, or of pure mathematics, or can survive by consuming only inorganic atoms or mathematics. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On 25 October 2013 14:31, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Looking at natural presences, like atoms or galaxies, the scope of their persistence is well beyond any human relation so they do deserve the benefit of the doubt. We have no reason to believe that they were assembled by anything other than themselves. The fact that we are made of atoms and atoms are made from stars is another point in their favor, whereas no living organism that we have encountered is made of inorganic atoms, or of pure mathematics, or can survive by consuming only inorganic atoms or mathematics. What are inorganic atoms? Or rather (since I suspect all atoms are inorganic), what are organic atoms? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Douglas Hofstadter Article
yep. organity is emergent. Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2013 14:46:54 +1300 Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 25 October 2013 14:31, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Looking at natural presences, like atoms or galaxies, the scope of their persistence is well beyond any human relation so they do deserve the benefit of the doubt. We have no reason to believe that they were assembled by anything other than themselves. The fact that we are made of atoms and atoms are made from stars is another point in their favor, whereas no living organism that we have encountered is made of inorganic atoms, or of pure mathematics, or can survive by consuming only inorganic atoms or mathematics. What are inorganic atoms? Or rather (since I suspect all atoms are inorganic), what are organic atoms? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On 25 October 2013 12:31, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You could say that human chess players just take in visual data, process it in a series of biological relays, then send electrical signals to muscles that move the pieces around. This is what an alien scientist would observe. That's not thinking! That's not understanding! Right, but since we understand that such an alien observation would be in error, we must give our own experience the benefit of the doubt. The alien might be completely confident in his judgement, having a brain made of exotic matter. He would argue that however complex its behaviour, a being made of ordinary matter that evolved naturally could not possibly have an understanding of what it is doing. The computer does not deserve any such benefit of the doubt, since there is no question that it has been assembled intentionally from controllable parts. When we see a ventriloquist with a dummy, we do not entertain seriously that we could be mistaken about which one is really the ventriloquist, or whether they are equivalent to each other. But if the dummy is autonomous and apparently just as smart as the ventriloquist many of us would reconsider. Looking at natural presences, like atoms or galaxies, the scope of their persistence is well beyond any human relation so they do deserve the benefit of the doubt. We have no reason to believe that they were assembled by anything other than themselves. The fact that we are made of atoms and atoms are made from stars is another point in their favor, whereas no living organism that we have encountered is made of inorganic atoms, or of pure mathematics, or can survive by consuming only inorganic atoms or mathematics. There is no logical reason why something that is inorganic or did not arise spontaneously or eats inoragnic matter cannot be conscious. It's just something you have made up. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Douglas Hofstadter Article
The alien might be completely confident in his judgement, having a brain made of exotic matter. He would argue that however complex its behaviour, a being made of ordinary matter that evolved naturally could not possibly have an understanding of what it is doing. Aliens don't matter. They can be wrong about us being thoughtless and we can be right that computers are thoughtless. There seem to be two points of view here: 1) Whether a machine is thinking is determined by the goals it achieves (beating people at chess, translating bulgarian) 2) Whether a machine is thinking is determined by how it trys to achieve a goal. How does it cognate? I find myself rooting for the second point of view. A machine wouldn't need to beat kasperov to convince me it was thinking, but it would have to make mistakes and successes in the same way that I would against kasperov. In developmental psychology there is the question of how children learn grammar. I forget the details; but some bunch of geeks at a brainy university had developed a neural net system that given enough input and training began to apply grammatical rules correctly. What was really interesting though was that despite arriving at a similar competence to a young child, the journey there was very different. The system outperformed children (on average) and crucially didn't make the same kind of mistakes that are ubiquitous as children learn grammar. The ubiquity is important because it shows that in children the same inherent system is at play; the absence of mistakes between computer and child is important because it shows that theses systems are different. At this juncture then it becomes moot whether the computer is learning or thinking about grammar. It is a matter of philosophical taste. It certainly isn't learning or thinking as we learnt or thought when learning grammar. The way we cognate is the only example we have of cognition that we know is genuine. Do AI systems do that? The answer is obviously : No they don't. Are computers brainy in the way we are? No they are not. You can broaden the definition of thought and braininess to encompass it if you like, but that is just philosophical bias. They do not do what we do. Regards From: stath...@gmail.com Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2013 13:11:47 +1100 Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 25 October 2013 12:31, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You could say that human chess players just take in visual data, process it in a series of biological relays, then send electrical signals to muscles that move the pieces around. This is what an alien scientist would observe. That's not thinking! That's not understanding! Right, but since we understand that such an alien observation would be in error, we must give our own experience the benefit of the doubt. The alien might be completely confident in his judgement, having a brain made of exotic matter. He would argue that however complex its behaviour, a being made of ordinary matter that evolved naturally could not possibly have an understanding of what it is doing. The computer does not deserve any such benefit of the doubt, since there is no question that it has been assembled intentionally from controllable parts. When we see a ventriloquist with a dummy, we do not entertain seriously that we could be mistaken about which one is really the ventriloquist, or whether they are equivalent to each other. But if the dummy is autonomous and apparently just as smart as the ventriloquist many of us would reconsider. Looking at natural presences, like atoms or galaxies, the scope of their persistence is well beyond any human relation so they do deserve the benefit of the doubt. We have no reason to believe that they were assembled by anything other than themselves. The fact that we are made of atoms and atoms are made from stars is another point in their favor, whereas no living organism that we have encountered is made of inorganic atoms, or of pure mathematics, or can survive by consuming only inorganic atoms or mathematics. There is no logical reason why something that is inorganic or did not arise spontaneously or eats inoragnic matter cannot be conscious. It's just something you have made up. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On 10/24/2013 8:09 PM, chris peck wrote: At this juncture then it becomes moot whether the computer is learning or thinking about grammar. It is a matter of philosophical taste. It certainly isn't learning or thinking as we learnt or thought when learning grammar. The way we cognate is the only example we have of cognition that we know is genuine. Unfortunately we don't even have that example, because we don't know how we think. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Douglas Hofstadter Article
Unfortunately we don't even have that example, because we don't know how we think. We know that a certain set of mistakes are ubiquitous when learning grammer. (overgeneralising for example). Cats. dogs. hamsters. ... Sheeps. deers. etc. And we know the computer system didn't make these mistakes. Thats all we need to know to say that the two systems are not the same. All we need to know to say the computer was not doing what children do. Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 20:35:05 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article On 10/24/2013 8:09 PM, chris peck wrote: At this juncture then it becomes moot whether the computer is learning or thinking about grammar. It is a matter of philosophical taste. It certainly isn't learning or thinking as we learnt or thought when learning grammar. The way we cognate is the only example we have of cognition that we know is genuine. Unfortunately we don't even have that example, because we don't know how we think. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
On 10/24/2013 8:41 PM, chris peck wrote: / Unfortunately we don't even have that example, because we don't know how we think./ We know that a certain set of mistakes are ubiquitous when learning grammer. (overgeneralising for example). Cats. dogs. hamsters. ... Sheeps. deers. etc. And we know the computer system didn't make these mistakes. Whether a computer made those mistakes would obviously depend on it's software and one could obviously write software that would over generalize and in fact neural network classifiers often over generalize. But you're back to judging internal processes by external behavior. Brent Thats all we need to know to say that the two systems are not the same. All we need to know to say the computer was not doing what children do. -- Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 20:35:05 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article On 10/24/2013 8:09 PM, chris peck wrote: At this juncture then it becomes moot whether the computer is learning or thinking about grammar. It is a matter of philosophical taste. It certainly isn't learning or thinking as we learnt or thought when learning grammar. The way we cognate is the only example we have of cognition that we know is genuine. Unfortunately we don't even have that example, because we don't know how we think. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Douglas Hofstadter Article
But you're back to judging internal processes by external behavior. I have nothing against doing that. Its exactly what I in fact did. Where there are no behavioral differences from which we can identify internal differences, we would not know whether they were cognitively different or the same. Maybe they are, maybe they are not. And that certainly leads to the problem of other minds, say between children learning grammar. But where we can do that, say between this grammar system and children or Deep Blue and Kasperov, it follows that they are definitely not cognitively similar regardless of how they perform because we can discern internal differences from external behavior. We can only say Deep Blue is thinking if we broaden the definition of thinking. Well, I can show that Im gorgeous if I broaden the definition of gorgeous. We don't learn anything about thought by changing its definition. Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 20:52:39 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article On 10/24/2013 8:41 PM, chris peck wrote: Unfortunately we don't even have that example, because we don't know how we think. We know that a certain set of mistakes are ubiquitous when learning grammer. (overgeneralising for example). Cats. dogs. hamsters. ... Sheeps. deers. etc. And we know the computer system didn't make these mistakes. Whether a computer made those mistakes would obviously depend on it's software and one could obviously write software that would over generalize and in fact neural network classifiers often over generalize. But you're back to judging internal processes by external behavior. Brent Thats all we need to know to say that the two systems are not the same. All we need to know to say the computer was not doing what children do. Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 20:35:05 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article On 10/24/2013 8:09 PM, chris peck wrote: At this juncture then it becomes moot whether the computer is learning or thinking about grammar. It is a matter of philosophical taste. It certainly isn't learning or thinking as we learnt or thought when learning grammar. The way we cognate is the only example we have of cognition that we know is genuine. Unfortunately we don't even have that example, because we don't know how we think. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
