Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 13, 1:52 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. Make your mind up. You said 'see a square' not 'squareness'. Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. Yes, fine, no problem of course, so why discuss this example? It shows that experiences had by persons are not necessarily incommunicable. Thus, whatever the pronblem is with qualia, it is not about personhood per se. I specifically said '1-person experience', and in the case of 'see a square' (your choice) let's try the hard one - i.e. communicate the experience of seeing a particular square, not the concept of squareness. So, for example, you can say 'look at that square', I look at it, I see the square, I instantiate it, I have an analogous 1-person experience. OK? Come to think of it, even in your example of squareness, I have to instantiate *something*, otherwise your explanation won't register with me. Are you sure? mathematicians can comunicate higher-dimensional spaces that they cannot visualise. And this something is *my* private something, as it happens *derived* from your communication - it isn't literally what you 'had in mind', because this is private to *you*. You are playing on two senses of the same. It may be an exact duplicate, rather than the very same individual, but if it is an *exact* duplicate,there is no incommunicability or ineffability. Frankly, I think if you quibble about this, you must have some other notion of 1-person in mind. But will we ever know? David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. Your 1-person experience per se is incommunicable,That's just my point. It's not the fact that is is an experience, or that it is had by a person that makes something inexpressible. and consequently you have no direct evidence of (although you may be jusified in your beliefs concerning) what others have instantiated as a result of your communication.Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of external objects. There a re phenomenal feels attached to emotions, sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable external objects. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own. Your 1-person experience per se is incommunicable, and consequently you have no direct evidence of (although you may be jusified in your beliefs concerning) what others have instantiated as a result of your communication. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of external objects. There a re phenomenal feels attached to emotions, sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable external objects. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own. I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. Your 1-person experience per se is incommunicable, That's just my point. It's not the fact that is is an experience, or that it is had by a person that makes something inexpressible. and consequently you have no direct evidence of (although you may be jusified in your beliefs concerning) what others have instantiated as a result of your communication. Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of external objects. There a re phenomenal feels attached to emotions, sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable external objects. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 13, 1:52 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. Make your mind up. You said 'see a square' not 'squareness'. Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. Yes, fine, no problem of course, so why discuss this example? I specifically said '1-person experience', and in the case of 'see a square' (your choice) let's try the hard one - i.e. communicate the experience of seeing a particular square, not the concept of squareness. So, for example, you can say 'look at that square', I look at it, I see the square, I instantiate it, I have an analogous 1-person experience. OK? Come to think of it, even in your example of squareness, I have to instantiate *something*, otherwise your explanation won't register with me. And this something is *my* private something, as it happens *derived* from your communication - it isn't literally what you 'had in mind', because this is private to *you*. Frankly, I think if you quibble about this, you must have some other notion of 1-person in mind. But will we ever know? David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. Your 1-person experience per se is incommunicable,That's just my point. It's not the fact that is is an experience, or that it is had by a person that makes something inexpressible. and consequently you have no direct evidence of (although you may be jusified in your beliefs concerning) what others have instantiated as a result of your communication.Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of external objects. There a re phenomenal feels attached to emotions, sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable external objects. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to explain even just the physical laws (not to talk on consciousness). because if your UD doesn't exist in Platonia, ... but the UD exists in Platonia. The ontological status of the UD is the same as the ontological status of the number 5. Peano Arithmetic can prove the existence of the UD. it doesn't exist in the material world either, so it doesn't exist at all, and therefore cannot replace anything that does exist. Actually an instantiation of the UD exists in the material world too (as far as the material world exists of course). The UD is just a prgram. You can see its code here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/ 4%20GEN%20%20DU.pdf http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Le 11-oct.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit : David Nyman wrote: But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'. David Yes. That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. Yes. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Le 10-oct.-06, à 22:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Bruno: you wrote: ...I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, ... Why not 1+1+1+1+1+1+1? Because it is equal to six. you had a notion somewhere in your mathemaitcally instructed mind that you have to stop at exactly the 5th addition, because there is a quantity (???) in the number '5' that made you stop there. Exactly. It is part of the definition of 5. Now quantity is also expressed by numbers, lots of them in applying 'rules', so don't we see here a circularity? Yes. I am not explaining the mystery of numbers. I just say that if comp is true then mind and matter have to be explained from the mystery of numbers. Sometimes I explain that the natural numbers are a good starting point in the sense that we cannot recover them without assuming then. Somehow comp can justify why the natural numbers have to be mysterious. It looks as if the 'numbers' represent quantities? how about algebra? Well, the existence of a turing universal diophantine polynomial makes me realize that the fourth hypostases(*) is closer to a theory of elementary particles than I was hoping for. It has the form of a complex algebra. Apparently the first string theory (the bosonic one, which is not super) is most probably a subtheory of the comp physics. This could help to extract the quantum physics more rapidly than by an exhaustive interview of the lobian machine. This gives only quanta, though, and the interview remains necessary for having the (non sharable) qualia as well. What key made you stop at the fifth '1'? (I wrote in a similar sense a post to Colin, an hour ago). You ended your reply with: My Platonism is the explicit or implicit standard platonism of most working mathematicians. Q: is there a way to reach an agreement between the working mathematicians and the rest of the world (common sense people)? I believe there is such a common agreement as far as they talk on numbers. Only sophisticated philosophers, or mathematicians during the week-end, like to doubt on that (but stop such doubt in front of they insurance taxes, etc.). I would be already glad if working mathematicians (week) were able to agree with themselves during the wee-end Bruno (*) Fourth hypostases = Plotinus intelligible matter = logic of certain observation in self-duplicating experiment = logic of Bp Dp (which does split through the G* minus G difference). The two 4th hypostases have no Kripke multiverses, but more sophisticated topological one. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to explain even just the physical laws (not to talk on consciousness). Primary matter was never *supposed* to explain either of those things. That is a straw-man version of materialism. because if your UD doesn't exist in Platonia, ... but the UD exists in Platonia. The ontological status of the UD is the same as the ontological status of the number 5. Whatever that is. A purely mathematical argument can tell us they have the same ontological status; it cannot tell us what that status is. The question of what a mathematical existence-claim means ontologically requires a philosophical argument. Peano Arithmetic can prove the existence of the UD. The mathematical existence. Pure maths cannot prove anything ontologically. it doesn't exist in the material world either, so it doesn't exist at all, and therefore cannot replace anything that does exist. Actually an instantiation of the UD exists in the material world too (as far as the material world exists of course). The UD is just a prgram. You can see its code here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/ 4%20GEN%20%20DU.pdf But it requires infinite time to run. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to explain even just the physical laws (not to talk on consciousness). Primary matter was never *supposed* to explain either of those things. That is a straw-man version of materialism. because if your UD doesn't exist in Platonia, ... but the UD exists in Platonia. The ontological status of the UD is the same as the ontological status of the number 5. Whatever that is. A purely mathematical argument can tell us they have the same ontological status; it cannot tell us what that status is. The question of what a mathematical existence-claim means ontologically requires a philosophical argument. Peano Arithmetic can prove the existence of the UD. The mathematical existence. Pure maths cannot prove anything ontologically. it doesn't exist in the material world either, so it doesn't exist at all, and therefore cannot replace anything that does exist. Actually an instantiation of the UD exists in the material world too (as far as the material world exists of course). The UD is just a prgram. You can see its code here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/ 4%20GEN%20%20DU.pdf But it requires infinite time to run. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Bruno Marchal wrote: That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. Yes. We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Bruno Marchal wrote: That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. Yes. We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Then a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all computations - but it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different physical systems. And it is possible by inspection of these systems to determine whether they calculate pi. But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? 'Calculating pi' in the final analysis can be satisfied by the system in question externalising its results (e.g. printing out the value of pi). But it isn't so simple to test a system that is claimed to be conscious. Be that as it may, would you be content with the conclusion that the 'properties' of materialism claimed to be jointly relevant to both computationalism and consciousness are purely relational? In this case, we needn't argue further. But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'.I would think that identifying the relata would be relevant to explaining a relation. But I agree that computation is mostly a matter of relations. What matter adds is that it allows the computation to be instantied. To dismiss it from the explanation seems like dismissing hydrogen and oxygen from an explanation of water. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to. David The fact that conscious experience is intrinsically privately presented/delivered can be regarded as key evidence in any proposition as to its physics. Any real solution must, by definition, explain why that is so. Indeed if you imagine a world where consciousness is mundane they would expect it to be so. If this possibility exists what it means is that the attitude to scientific evidence has to change to suit the real world of scientific evidence... especially if consciousness in the form of observation by a scientist is to be demanded as the source of evidence on pain of being declared unscientific (which is what we currently do - unless you can eyeball it you're not being scientific). The subtlety with 'objective scientific evidence' is that ultimately it is delivered into the private experiences of indiividual scientists. Only agreement as to what is evidenced makes it 'objective'. So the privacy of the experience individuals is and always will be an intrinsic and unavoidable part of the whole process. If this is the case then there's a way around it - because in saying the last sentence I have been implicitly assuming that a human is doing the observing and therefore accepting tacitly all the limitations of that circumstance. Relax that constraint and what do you get? Either another biological life form is supplying evidence or a non-biological life-form is giving evidence of consciousness somehow. A non-biological life-form offers the only really flexible and fully controllable and ethical option. How can this do the job, you ask? Isn't this a circular arument? You have to know you;ve built a conscious life form in oder that you get evidence to prove its consciousness? Not really... what it does is open up new options. In another world where ethics are different you'd experiment by grafting scientist's heads together so they could verify each other's experiences in some way. Plenty of scientists! Why not?! ... erm...welll...not really gonna fly is it? So the viable alternative is 'grafting' putative artifiacts together in 'cancellation bridges' of one form or another and configure them in such a way as to report unambiguously the presence or absense of the results of the physics of experience doing its stuff. Merge 4 artificial scientists and get them to compare/contrast... and report In other words we _humans_ relinquish the act of role of observation but continue to be scientists. Then we can do it. We have to let go of a seriously long term darling in order that we (humans and artifacts) collectively have 'proof'. It's just that humans don't get to experience all the evidence. This, I believe is the cultural angst we have to endure in order that a science of consciousness happen. Bitter medicine. We can eather sit around and bitch about not solving it or we can take the medicine, solve the problem, but not get all the thrills of the observation involved. When I become a Dr that is the bitter pill I'll be prescribing for science. cheers colin hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to. David The fact that conscious experience is intrinsically privately presented/delivered can be regarded as key evidence in any proposition as to its physics. Any real solution must, by definition, explain why that is so. Indeed if you imagine a world where consciousness is mundane they would expect it to be so. If this possibility exists what it means is that the attitude to scientific evidence has to change to suit the real world of scientific evidence... especially if consciousness in the form of observation by a scientist is to be demanded as the source of evidence on pain of being declared unscientific (which is what we currently do - unless you can eyeball it you're not being scientific). The subtlety with 'objective scientific evidence' is that ultimately it is delivered into the private experiences of indiividual scientists. Only agreement as to what is evidenced makes it 'objective'. So the privacy of the experience individuals is and always will be an intrinsic and unavoidable part of the whole process. If this is the case then there's a way around it - because in saying the last sentence I have been implicitly assuming that a human is doing the observing and therefore accepting tacitly all the limitations of that circumstance. Relax that constraint and what do you get? Either another biological life form is supplying evidence or a non-biological life-form is giving evidence of consciousness somehow. Why a life form? Why not an instrument or a robot? A non-biological life-form offers the only really flexible and fully controllable and ethical option. How can this do the job, you ask? Isn't this a circular arument? You have to know you;ve built a conscious life form in oder that you get evidence to prove its consciousness? Not really... what it does is open up new options. In another world where ethics are different you'd experiment by grafting scientist's heads together so they could verify each other's experiences in some way. Plenty of scientists! Why not?! ... erm...welll...not really gonna fly is it? Don't we graft scientists heads together now by speech, papers, symposia,... So the viable alternative is 'grafting' putative artifiacts together in 'cancellation bridges' Huh?? of one form or another and configure them in such a way as to report unambiguously the presence or absense of the results of the physics of experience doing its stuff. Merge 4 artificial scientists and get them to compare/contrast... and report So, for example, if we build a lot of different Mars rovers and they go to Mars and they report back similar things we'll have evidence that they are conscious? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
snip unless you can eyeball it you're not being scientific). The subtlety with 'objective scientific evidence' is that ultimately it is delivered into the private experiences of indiividual scientists. Only agreement as to what is evidenced makes it 'objective'. So the privacy of the experience individuals is and always will be an intrinsic and unavoidable part of the whole process. If this is the case then there's a way around it - because in saying the last sentence I have been implicitly assuming that a human is doing the observing and therefore accepting tacitly all the limitations of that circumstance. Relax that constraint and what do you get? Either another biological life form is supplying evidence or a non-biological life-form is giving evidence of consciousness somehow. Why a life form? Why not an instrument or a robot? Call it what you want. AGI (artificial general intelligence) or artificial scientist, George... its more like 'life' than any other artifact in that it has experiences. That's all. A non-biological life-form offers the only really flexible and fully controllable and ethical option. How can this do the job, you ask? Isn't this a circular arument? You have to know you;ve built a conscious life form in oder that you get evidence to prove its consciousness? Not really... what it does is open up new options. In another world where ethics are different you'd experiment by grafting scientist's heads together so they could verify each other's experiences in some way. Plenty of scientists! Why not?! ... erm...welll...not really gonna fly is it? Don't we graft scientists heads together now by speech, papers, symposia,... So the viable alternative is 'grafting' putative artifiacts together in 'cancellation bridges' Huh?? There's an academic here who has a similar critical style. It sort of says I don't get it, so you must be wrong :-) A very common method in electrical measurement is the formation of a 'bridge' structure in multiples of 4 measurement elements. At the moment of relevance the 'control' and the 'probe' match each other. They are intimately interrelated physically - for example a strain gauge. I am working on a similar technique, only for phenomenal consciousness and all on one chip and all physically interrelated electromagnetically. The same sort of outcomes are possible - I think - I can get a) the same behaviour with and without phenomenality and also behaviour that can only have arisen because phenomenality exists. I can compare two phenomenal quale, but I can't experience either. It's better than nothing - a start. of one form or another and configure them in such a way as to report unambiguously the presence or absense of the results of the physics of experience doing its stuff. Merge 4 artificial scientists and get them to compare/contrast... and report So, for example, if we build a lot of different Mars rovers and they go to Mars and they report back similar things we'll have evidence that they are conscious? I think you misunderstand... see the above yes there is a statistical element to the experiment (numbers of chips, numbers of 'scientists'/chip) but this is not the mechanism doing the reporting - the mechanism is the physics on the individual 'merged scientist' chips. BTW the 'science' being done by these 'scientists' is the sort of science that could be done by a paramecium - :-) very very simple but science it is. It's just that several scientists get to experience the one single experience and conversely each individual scientist can experience any other scientist's experience. Mix and match. One way or another there's a protocol towards and acceptable 'truth' in there. === Note: The existence of successful science is proven by the existence of technology that used the science outcomes. Science cannot have occurred without the existence/reality of phenomenal consciousness. Hence the existence of consciousness is already objectively/scientifically proven. All that is really missing is specific mechanism and then a detailed ontology of experiences related to the objectively observed physics. Then we'll be cooking. In the end, tho - the chips will be implantable (say in the occipital) I think - so the human isn't entirely cut out of the loop in the long term. In fact with any luck they'll be able to repair the experientially-impaired. Also there are visualisation options in a technological solution - where the artifact's experiences can be directly converted to human-viewable visualisation. The artifact could then also look at it's own internal life and tune it to show the human what effects are happening.There's a bunch of ways through this. I can't wait to play with it... anyone got $100 million? Call me. :-) Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to. So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of external objects. There a re phenomenal feels attached to emotions, sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable external objects. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP is incompatible with is eliminative materialism, also sometimes known as physicalism. That's hardly surprising. EM says consciousness doesn't exist, computationalism says it does. Just about everything contradicts EM. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in the storage (call it [I]) is not an integer, but a symbolic representation of property of five_ness as mapped from platonia to reality. What we are doing is (very very metaphorically) shining a light (of an infinity of possible numbers) on the object 5 in platonia and letting the reflected light inhabit [I]. We behave as if 5 was in there, but it's not. I think you are reifying number, or, put in another way, you put much more in platonia than I am using in both the UDA and the AUDA (the arithmetical UDA alias the interview of the lobian machine). Some people makes confusion here. All I say is that a reasoner is platonist if he believes, about *arithmetical* propositions, in the principle of excluded middle. Equivalently he believes that if you execute a program P, then either the program stop or the program does not stop. I don't believe at all that the number 5 is somewhere there in any sense you would give to where or there. I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, and that for any natural number N either N is a multiple of 5 or it is not. So platonism is just in opposition to ultra-intuitionnism. We know since Godel that about numbers and arithmetic, intuitionnism is just a terminological variant of platonism (where a platonist says (A or ~A), an intuitionnist will say ~~(A or ~A), etc. My Platonism is the explicit or implicit standard platonism of most working mathematicians. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims that whatever 'physical properties' happen to be picked out by the 'right sort of computation' must be the ones that are responsible for consciousness? But this is just dogma masquerading as explanation. But remember that I have a narrowish view of what is a computer. And remember that consciousness is not held to be any old computation. Yes, but are you saying that *any old instantiation*, provided it implements to your satisfaction the 'right sort of computation', must by that token be conscious, whatever 'physical properties' it employs? If you are, then AFAICS you're either claiming that *any old physical properties* that implement the computation are fact doing the work of creating consciousness, or that *none* are. Either option is effectively abandoning materialism as the explanation for why the computation is deemed to cause consciousness. If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems. In this case, you retain your appeal to materialism as causally relevant, but mere 'computational equivalence', in the implementation-independent mathematical sense, ceases to predict which physical systems will be conscious, and which not. David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Whatever properties are picked out by a computation will be relevant to it as a computation. Yes, of course. But how are these properties supposed to simultaneously produce a state of consciousness stably linked to the 'computation' when this self-same computation could have been instantiated in arbitrarily many physically distinct ways?Why not? A ordinary numerical computation can be instantiated in arbitrarily many physical ways, and still produce the same result. The computations would be equivalent, but you appear to be claiming that however they are implemented, arbitrarily many distinct physical properties somehow become equally 'relevant' to generating the same state of consciousness.I still don't see why you think this is a problem. If different physical states always produced different mental states, there would be no mental commonalities between people, since all brains are physcially different. Mutiple realisability is a feature, not a bug! There is no requirement that the same connscious state is implemented by the same physical state, so the multiple reliasability of computations is not a problem So you say, but just *what* physical properties are supposed to be relevant and *how* do they contrive always to manifest equivalently within totally different implementations of a computation?How do they for a non-conscious computation? That is no a mystery, it is computer engineering. Is this just supposed to be a mystery?The mystery is which computations are conscious. My point is that under materialism, 'computation' is just a metaphor and what is directly relevant is the activity of the physical substrate in producing the results that we interpret in this way.Under physicalism, *all* the activity is relevant. Under computationalism, a subset is. What's critical to computational equivalence is not the internal states of the physical substrate, but the consistency of the externalised results thus produced.That's a broad definition of equivalence. Running the same algorithm -- rather than producing the same results -- is generally more relevant. But with consciousness, it's precisely the internal states that are relevant.Yes. And here your reasoning appears to become circular - a particular set of physical properties can be construed as 'externalising' a particular set of computational results at a given point in time (fair enough) so, whatever these properties happen to be, they're must also be 'relevant' in generating a specific internal conscious state - and so must any arbitrary alternative set of properties that externalise the same computational results. Only because you say so, AFAICS.It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! It's not an argument that computationalism is actually true, nor meant to be. By making the rationale for supervention of consciousness on physical activity completely arbitrary in this wayIt's not completely arbitrary. I don't subsribe to the idea that every physical system implements every computation. I
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Le 10-oct.-06, à 03:52, Russell Standish a écrit : On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP is incompatible with is eliminative materialism, also sometimes known as physicalism. Comp has indeed be shown to be incompatible with physicalism (the doctrine that physics is the fundamental science). But physicalism is not necessarily eliminativist. Most physicalist believes in consciousness, even if they believe that consciousness emerges from the behavior of some putative matter. Eliminative materialist does not believe in consciousness or first person at all. Some says this explicitly, others are unclear or just incoherent. Comp is not incompatible with the existence of primary or primitive matter, but the UDA shows that comp has to be incompatible with any relation between that matter and the *appearance* of matter or of physical laws; making matter and material universe(s) as useless as invisible horse pulling cars. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims that whatever 'physical properties' happen to be picked out by the 'right sort of computation' must be the ones that are responsible for consciousness? But this is just dogma masquerading as explanation. Saying X-ists claim Y is not dogma. Saying Y, because i say so is dogma. But remember that I have a narrowish view of what is a computer. And remember that consciousness is not held to be any old computation. Yes, but are you saying that *any old instantiation*, provided it implements to your satisfaction the 'right sort of computation', must by that token be conscious, whatever 'physical properties' it employs? I am saying that computationalists say that. If you are, then AFAICS you're either claiming that *any old physical properties* that implement the computation are fact doing the work of creating consciousness, or that *none* are. Either option is effectively abandoning materialism as the explanation for why the computation is deemed to cause consciousness. It isn't abandoning materialism as the claim that matter exists. It *is* claiming that computation is a kind of shorthand for the sets of relevant physical properties. So what? Maybe all our current physics is an approximate, high-level rendition of something more fundamental. It's just a claim about what the right level of decription is. Most neuroscientists don't think you have t go down to the quantum level, even if they don't think the computational level is the right level of description. (It is also abandoning token-token identity theory. Are you getting that confused with materialism?) If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems. I have no idea how you come to that conclusion. In this case, you retain your appeal to materialism as causally relevant, but mere 'computational equivalence', in the implementation-independent mathematical sense, ceases to predict which physical systems will be conscious, and which not. No it doesn't. Any system that implements computation C will be conscious, According To Computationalism. The other factors aren't relevant. ATC. David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 03:52, Russell Standish a écrit : On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP is incompatible with is eliminative materialism, also sometimes known as physicalism. Comp has indeed be shown to be incompatible with physicalism (the doctrine that physics is the fundamental science). I don't know who you think has shown this. Maudlins argument relies on the Activity Thesis, which is an independent claim from physics is the fundamental science. Your argument shows that phyics emerges from maths (given the existence of an immaterial UD), making matter redundant; but it is equally the case that maths emerges from physics (given the existence of matter), making Platonia redundant. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in the storage (call it [I]) is not an integer, but a symbolic representation of property of five_ness as mapped from platonia to reality. What we are doing is (very very metaphorically) shining a light (of an infinity of possible numbers) on the object 5 in platonia and letting the reflected light inhabit [I]. We behave as if 5 was in there, but it's not. I think you are reifying number, or, put in another way, you put much more in platonia than I am using in both the UDA and the AUDA (the arithmetical UDA alias the interview of the lobian machine). Some people makes confusion here. All I say is that a reasoner is platonist if he believes, about *arithmetical* propositions, in the principle of excluded middle. Equivalently he believes that if you execute a program P, then either the program stop or the program does not stop. I don't believe at all that the number 5 is somewhere there in any sense you would give to where or there. I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, and that for any natural number N either N is a multiple of 5 or it is not. So platonism is just in opposition to ultra-intuitionnism. We know since Godel that about numbers and arithmetic, intuitionnism is just a terminological variant of platonism (where a platonist says (A or ~A), an intuitionnist will say ~~(A or ~A), etc. My Platonism is the explicit or implicit standard platonism of most working mathematicians. If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, because if your UD doesn't exist in Platonia, it doesn't exist in the material world either, so it doesn't exist at all, and therefore cannot replace anything that does exist. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems. I have no idea how you come to that conclusion. I don't see how you can *avoid* this conclusion, unless you've landed on some unexcluded middle position that I fail to grasp. If computationalists claim the same set of properties as are picked out by *any* instantiation of a computation are also responsible for a stable state of consciousness, then they simply aren't being serious about the 'physical' aspect of these 'properties'. Any relationship whatever between the properties that support computation, and those putatively reponsible for any 1-person state of the machine, is *irrelevant* to the causal explanation of the computation (i.e. such a state could vary wildly with the instantiation, but this would have no effect whatsover on the computation *qua computation*). However, it's precisely what *must* be relevant if the internal state is to be determined by those selfsame properties. To claim that the *same* 1-person state is generated by wildly variable sets of properties, is precisely to say that such 'properties' - i.e. whatever material aspects they are supposed to pick out - are in effect *irrelevant* to the state. This appears to be flatly contradictory, unless in effect the 'properties' so picked out are not in any meaningful sense 'physical' - i.e. they are purely relational. In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata, and has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your sticking point, I think). David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims that whatever 'physical properties' happen to be picked out by the 'right sort of computation' must be the ones that are responsible for consciousness? But this is just dogma masquerading as explanation.Saying X-ists claim Y is not dogma. Saying Y, because i say so is dogma. But remember that I have a narrowish view of what is a computer. And remember that consciousness is not held to be any old computation. Yes, but are you saying that *any old instantiation*, provided it implements to your satisfaction the 'right sort of computation', must by that token be conscious, whatever 'physical properties' it employs?I am saying that computationalists say that. If you are, then AFAICS you're either claiming that *any old physical properties* that implement the computation are fact doing the work of creating consciousness, or that *none* are. Either option is effectively abandoning materialism as the explanation for why the computation is deemed to cause consciousness.It isn't abandoning materialism as the claim that matter exists. It *is* claiming that computation is a kind of shorthand for the sets of relevant physical properties. So what? Maybe all our current physics is an approximate, high-level rendition of something more fundamental. It's just a claim about what the right level of decription is. Most neuroscientists don't think you have t go down to the quantum level, even if they don't think the computational level is the right level of description. (It is also abandoning token-token identity theory. Are you getting that confused with materialism?) If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems.I have no idea how you come to that conclusion. In this case, you retain your appeal to materialism as causally relevant, but mere 'computational equivalence', in the implementation-independent mathematical sense, ceases to predict which physical systems will be conscious, and which not.No it doesn't. Any system that implements computation C will be conscious, According To Computationalism. The other factors aren't relevant. ATC. David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems. I have no idea how you come to that conclusion. I don't see how you can *avoid* this conclusion, unless you've landed on some unexcluded middle position that I fail to grasp. If computationalists claim the same set of properties as are picked out by *any* instantiation of a computation are also responsible for a stable state of consciousness, then they simply aren't being serious about the 'physical' aspect of these 'properties'. Any relationship whatever between the properties that support computation, and those putatively reponsible for any 1-person state of the machine, is *irrelevant* to the causal explanation of the computation (i.e. such a state could vary wildly with the instantiation, but this would have no effect whatsover on the computation *qua computation*). However, it's precisely what *must* be relevant if the internal state is to be determined by those selfsame properties. To claim that the *same* 1-person state is generated by wildly variable sets of properties, is precisely to say that such 'properties' - i.e. whatever material aspects they are supposed to pick out - are in effect *irrelevant* to the state. This appears to be flatly contradictory, unless in effect the 'properties' so picked out are not in any meaningful sense 'physical' - i.e. they are purely relational. In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata, and has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your sticking point, I think). David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims that whatever 'physical properties' happen to be picked out by the 'right sort of computation' must be the ones that are responsible for consciousness? But this is just dogma masquerading as explanation.Saying X-ists claim Y is not dogma. Saying Y, because i say so is dogma. But remember that I have a narrowish view of what is a computer. And remember that consciousness is not held to be any old computation. Yes, but are you saying that *any old instantiation*, provided it implements to your satisfaction the 'right sort of computation', must by that token be conscious, whatever 'physical properties' it employs?I am saying that computationalists say that. If you are, then AFAICS you're either claiming that *any old physical properties* that implement the computation are fact doing the work of creating consciousness, or that *none* are. Either option is effectively abandoning materialism as the explanation for why the computation is deemed to cause consciousness.It isn't abandoning materialism as the claim that matter exists. It *is* claiming that computation is a kind of shorthand for the sets of relevant physical properties. So what? Maybe all our current physics is an approximate, high-level rendition of something more fundamental. It's just a claim about what the right level of decription is. Most neuroscientists don't think you have t go down to the quantum level, even if they don't think the computational level is the right level of description. (It is also abandoning token-token identity theory. Are you getting that confused with materialism?) If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems.I have no idea how you come to that conclusion. In this case, you retain your appeal to materialism as causally relevant, but mere 'computational equivalence', in the implementation-independent mathematical sense, ceases to predict which physical systems will be conscious, and which not.No it doesn't. Any system that implements computation C will be conscious, According To Computationalism. The other factors aren't relevant. ATC. David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems. I have no idea how you come to that conclusion. I don't see how you can *avoid* this conclusion, unless you've landed on some unexcluded middle position that I fail to grasp. If computationalists claim the same set of properties as are picked out by *any* instantiation of a computation are also responsible for a stable state of consciousness, then they simply aren't being serious about the 'physical' aspect of these 'properties'. Any relationship whatever between the properties that support computation, and those putatively reponsible for any 1-person state of the machine, The claim of computationalism is that the relationship between the properties that support (a particular kind of) computation , and those putatively reponsible for any 1-person state of the machine, are identical. ie, physical systems are conscious because of their cpmputional properties, and only indirectly because of the physical properties that support he computation. is *irrelevant* to the causal explanation of the computation (i.e. such a state could vary wildly with the instantiation, but this would have no effect whatsover on the computation *qua computation*). Some causation is required for computation, and *some* properties are required for causation. So far, everything is compatible with materialism (ie the claim that material things are the only things). However, it's precisely what *must* be relevant if the internal state is to be determined by those selfsame properties. If the computation that produces consciousness is computation C, then computation C will not be produced by any set of properties, so in that sense the properties are relevant. Is that the problem? Or do you think that different sets of properties must produce different conscious states? That is not an implication of the supervenience of consciousness on the physical. Supervenience only requires that the same mental state is always associated with the same physical one. Of course the same physical state will produce the same computational state... To claim that the *same* 1-person state is generated by wildly variable sets of properties, is precisely to say that such 'properties' - i.e. whatever material aspects they are supposed to pick out - are in effect *irrelevant* to the state. What is relevant is relations between the properties, ATC. That is the properties are neither irrelevant nor relevant in the way suggested by token-token identity (which is what you seem to be assuming). This appears to be flatly contradictory, unless in effect the 'properties' so picked out are not in any meaningful sense 'physical' - i.e. they are purely relational. I am not clear why you would call that meaningless. That is still miles form Bruno-style non-physicalism, in which neither matter nor space nor time nor any physical property at all is needed. But I am not arguing that computationalism is compatible with physicalism I am arguing that computationalism is compatible with materialsim -- matter exists. In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata, That's a feature, not a bug. and has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your sticking point, I think). That would be a redundancy argument,. not an incompatibility (contradiction) argument. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems. I have no idea how you come to that conclusion. I don't see how you can *avoid* this conclusion, unless you've landed on some unexcluded middle position that I fail to grasp. If computationalists claim the same set of properties as are picked out by *any* instantiation of a computation are also responsible for a stable state of consciousness, then they simply aren't being serious about the 'physical' aspect of these 'properties'. Any relationship whatever between the properties that support computation, and those putatively reponsible for any 1-person state of the machine, The claim of computationalism is that the relationship between the properties that support (a particular kind of) computation , and those putatively reponsible for any 1-person state of the machine, are identical. ie, physical systems are conscious because of their cpmputional properties, and only indirectly because of the physical properties that support he computation. is *irrelevant* to the causal explanation of the computation (i.e. such a state could vary wildly with the instantiation, but this would have no effect whatsover on the computation *qua computation*). Some causation is required for computation, and *some* properties are required for causation. So far, everything is compatible with materialism (ie the claim that material things are the only things). However, it's precisely what *must* be relevant if the internal state is to be determined by those selfsame properties. If the computation that produces consciousness is computation C, then computation C will not be produced by any set of properties, so in that sense the properties are relevant. Is that the problem? Or do you think that different sets of properties must produce different conscious states? That is not an implication of the supervenience of consciousness on the physical. Supervenience only requires that the same mental state is always associated with the same physical one. Of course the same physical state will produce the same computational state... To claim that the *same* 1-person state is generated by wildly variable sets of properties, is precisely to say that such 'properties' - i.e. whatever material aspects they are supposed to pick out - are in effect *irrelevant* to the state. What is relevant is relations between the properties, ATC. That is the properties are neither irrelevant nor relevant in the way suggested by token-token identity (which is what you seem to be assuming). This appears to be flatly contradictory, unless in effect the 'properties' so picked out are not in any meaningful sense 'physical' - i.e. they are purely relational. I am not clear why you would call that meaningless. That is still miles form Bruno-style non-physicalism, in which neither matter nor space nor time nor any physical property at all is needed. But I am not arguing that computationalism is compatible with physicalism I am arguing that computationalism is compatible with materialsim -- matter exists. In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata, That's a feature, not a bug. and has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your sticking point, I think). That would be a redundancy argument,. not an incompatibility (contradiction) argument. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Colin: I could not have expressed my similar doubts anyhow close to such full clarity, did not even try. About the conceptual (numerically expressed) essence of 5 : recalling some words of Bruno, it may be that it should be expressed by lots and lots of rules-including number expressions, as anything else. And, of course, A the included 'numbers' to express 5 should have similarly long and convoluted num-b-erical expressions as well. And so on. Does this make sense? (Not to me). John M - Original Message - From: Colin Geoffrey Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 5:56 PM Subject: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;) LZ: Colin Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. This deficit of mine includes having trouble with ALL numbers. :-) For the life of me I cannot imagine what an 'object' is that has quintessential property of 'five' about it. Sitting in platonia somewhere is this object. Somewhere else in platonia sit the objects 'red' and 'sad' and 'big'. Here on the list we talk of integers and given them a label I and then speak of operations on I. We tend to think of I as 'being' an an integer.. ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in the storage (call it [I]) is not an integer, but a symbolic representation of property of five_ness as mapped from platonia to reality. What we are doing is (very very metaphorically) shining a light (of an infinity of possible numbers) on the object 5 in platonia and letting the reflected light inhabit [I]. We behave as if 5 was in there, but it's not. All the rules of integers act as-if 5 was there. At that moment the storage pointed to by I contains a symbolic rearrangment of matter such as binary 1001 implemented as the temporary state (an arrangement of charge in space) of logic gates. We logically interpret this artrangement of charge in space as having the effect of five_ness, which is property of we assign at the moment we use it (such as one more than 4). To me the actual numbers (things) don't exist at all. All I can really see here in reality is logical relations that behave as-if the platonic entities existed. This all may seem obvious to the rest of you. That's my problem! But to me here watching the industrial scale manipulations of symbols going on, I wonder why it is we think we are saying anything at all about reality - the computation that literally _is_ reality - which, again, I see as a pile of logical relations that sometimes lets the platonic light shine on them in useful ways - say in ways that enable a mathematical generalisation called an empirical law. As to what the non-ideal numbers are Well there aren't any. Not really. At least I can't conceive them. However the logical operations I see around us have the structure of numbers correponding to a rather odd plethora of bases. Quantity is implicit in any natural aggregation resulting from logical operations. One number might be: human.cell.molecule.atom.nucleus.proton.quark.fuzzy1.fuzzy2...fuzzyN (fred.dandruffskincell.omega3.carbon.nucleus.3rd_proton.UP_quark1_string.loo p_2.etc1.etc2.) If you work in base atom arithmetic you have and arithmetic where atoms associate with a remainder, say a unit in another base called .photon This is called chemistry. The human (and all the space that expresses it) is one single number consisting of 'digits' that are all the cells(and interstitial molecules) collected together according to affinities of fuzzyN, which acts in the above 'number' like the integer I does to the set of integers expressed in binary I mentioned above. There's no nice neat rows. No neat remainderless arithmetic. But it's all created with logical operators on an assumed elemental 'fuzzyN' (see above) primitive. '.fuzzyN' can be treated as an underlying structural primitive 'pseudo-object' as a fundamental 'thing'. But .fuzzyN can be just another logical relation between deeper primitives. There is no depth limit to it. As to computation - I have already described what we do here in maths and computation - all the same, really - all manipulating 'as-if' labeled entities. At the instant we lose sight of the logical/relational nature of what we are doing then we can delude ourselves that the symbols denote real 'objects' such as those in platonia and - especially - if you happen to 'be' a collection of these logical operations the rest of the logical operations going on around you look very lumpy and thingy indeed! It looks even more compellingly so
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims that whatever 'physical properties' happen to be picked out by the 'right sort of computation' must be the ones that are responsible for consciousness? But this is just dogma masquerading as explanation. It's not dogma if it's just offered as a possibility; a possibility that refutes the claim that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. But remember that I have a narrowish view of what is a computer. And remember that consciousness is not held to be any old computation. Yes, but are you saying that *any old instantiation*, provided it implements to your satisfaction the 'right sort of computation', must by that token be conscious, whatever 'physical properties' it employs? If you are, then AFAICS you're either claiming that *any old physical properties* that implement the computation are fact doing the work of creating consciousness, or that *none* are. Either option is effectively abandoning materialism as the explanation for why the computation is deemed to cause consciousness. If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems. In this case, you retain your appeal to materialism as causally relevant, but mere 'computational equivalence', in the implementation-independent mathematical sense, ceases to predict which physical systems will be conscious, and which not. Just replace be conscious and consciousness with be a calculation of pi. Then a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all computations - but it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different physical systems. And it is possible by inspection of these systems to determine whether they calculate pi. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Bruno: you wrote: ...I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, ... Why not 1+1+1+1+1+1+1? you had a notion somewhere in your mathemaitcally instructed mind that you have to stop at exactly the 5th addition, because there is a quantity (???) in the number '5' that made you stop there. Now quantity is also expressed by numbers, lots of them in applying 'rules', so don't we see here a circularity? It looks as if the 'numbers' represent quantities? how about algebra? What key made you stop at the fifth '1'? (I wrote in a similar sense a post to Colin, an hour ago). You ended your reply with: My Platonism is the explicit or implicit standard platonism of most working mathematicians. Q: is there a way to reach an agreement between the working mathematicians and the rest of the world (common sense people)? John - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:06 AM Subject: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;) Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in the storage (call it [I]) is not an integer, but a symbolic representation of property of five_ness as mapped from platonia to reality. What we are doing is (very very metaphorically) shining a light (of an infinity of possible numbers) on the object 5 in platonia and letting the reflected light inhabit [I]. We behave as if 5 was in there, but it's not. I think you are reifying number, or, put in another way, you put much more in platonia than I am using in both the UDA and the AUDA (the arithmetical UDA alias the interview of the lobian machine). Some people makes confusion here. All I say is that a reasoner is platonist if he believes, about *arithmetical* propositions, in the principle of excluded middle. Equivalently he believes that if you execute a program P, then either the program stop or the program does not stop. I don't believe at all that the number 5 is somewhere there in any sense you would give to where or there. I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, and that for any natural number N either N is a multiple of 5 or it is not. So platonism is just in opposition to ultra-intuitionnism. We know since Godel that about numbers and arithmetic, intuitionnism is just a terminological variant of platonism (where a platonist says (A or ~A), an intuitionnist will say ~~(A or ~A), etc. My Platonism is the explicit or implicit standard platonism of most working mathematicians. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.407 / Virus Database: 268.13.1/466 - Release Date: 10/07/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Hi, Le mardi 10 octobre 2006 22:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Bruno: you wrote: ...I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, ... Why not 1+1+1+1+1+1+1? you had a notion somewhere in your mathemaitcally instructed mind that you have to stop at exactly the 5th addition, because there is a quantity (???) in the number '5' that made you stop there. Now quantity is also expressed by numbers, lots of them in applying 'rules', so don't we see here a circularity? The successor axiom and the definition of addition make you stop there. If you choose other axioms and/or operations definitions and/or another language to express it, it has of course another meaning ;) It looks as if the 'numbers' represent quantities? how about algebra? What key made you stop at the fifth '1'? (I wrote in a similar sense a post to Colin, an hour ago). You ended your reply with: My Platonism is the explicit or implicit standard platonism of most working mathematicians. Q: is there a way to reach an agreement between the working mathematicians and the rest of the world (common sense people)? John - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:06 AM Subject: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;) Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in the storage (call it [I]) is not an integer, but a symbolic representation of property of five_ness as mapped from platonia to reality. What we are doing is (very very metaphorically) shining a light (of an infinity of possible numbers) on the object 5 in platonia and letting the reflected light inhabit [I]. We behave as if 5 was in there, but it's not. I think you are reifying number, or, put in another way, you put much more in platonia than I am using in both the UDA and the AUDA (the arithmetical UDA alias the interview of the lobian machine). Some people makes confusion here. All I say is that a reasoner is platonist if he believes, about *arithmetical* propositions, in the principle of excluded middle. Equivalently he believes that if you execute a program P, then either the program stop or the program does not stop. I don't believe at all that the number 5 is somewhere there in any sense you would give to where or there. I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, and that for any natural number N either N is a multiple of 5 or it is not. So platonism is just in opposition to ultra-intuitionnism. We know since Godel that about numbers and arithmetic, intuitionnism is just a terminological variant of platonism (where a platonist says (A or ~A), an intuitionnist will say ~~(A or ~A), etc. My Platonism is the explicit or implicit standard platonism of most working mathematicians. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.407 / Virus Database: 268.13.1/466 - Release Date: 10/07/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 10, 8:31 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata,That's a feature, not a bug. and has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your sticking point, I think). That would be a redundancy argument,. not an incompatibility (contradiction) argument. OK - in the interests of getting somewhere, can we settle for that? i.e. The 'properties' we have been debating are purely relational (whatever that turns out to entail)? David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems. I have no idea how you come to that conclusion. I don't see how you can *avoid* this conclusion, unless you've landed on some unexcluded middle position that I fail to grasp. If computationalists claim the same set of properties as are picked out by *any* instantiation of a computation are also responsible for a stable state of consciousness, then they simply aren't being serious about the 'physical' aspect of these 'properties'. Any relationship whatever between the properties that support computation, and those putatively reponsible for any 1-person state of the machine,The claim of computationalism is that the relationship between the properties that support (a particular kind of) computation , and those putatively reponsible for any 1-person state of the machine, are identical. ie, physical systems are conscious because of their cpmputional properties, and only indirectly because of the physical properties that support he computation. is *irrelevant* to the causal explanation of the computation (i.e. such a state could vary wildly with the instantiation, but this would have no effect whatsover on the computation *qua computation*).Some causation is required for computation, and *some* properties are required for causation. So far, everything is compatible with materialism (ie the claim that material things are the only things). However, it's precisely what *must* be relevant if the internal state is to be determined by those selfsame properties.If the computation that produces consciousness is computation C, then computation C will not be produced by any set of properties, so in that sense the properties are relevant. Is that the problem? Or do you think that different sets of properties must produce different conscious states? That is not an implication of the supervenience of consciousness on the physical. Supervenience only requires that the same mental state is always associated with the same physical one. Of course the same physical state will produce the same computational state... To claim that the *same* 1-person state is generated by wildly variable sets of properties, is precisely to say that such 'properties' - i.e. whatever material aspects they are supposed to pick out - are in effect *irrelevant* to the state.What is relevant is relations between the properties, ATC. That is the properties are neither irrelevant nor relevant in the way suggested by token-token identity (which is what you seem to be assuming). This appears to be flatly contradictory, unless in effect the 'properties' so picked out are not in any meaningful sense 'physical' - i.e. they are purely relational.I am not clear why you would call that meaningless. That is still miles form Bruno-style non-physicalism, in which neither matter nor space nor time nor any physical property at all is needed. But I am not arguing that computationalism is compatible with physicalism I am arguing that computationalism is compatible with materialsim -- matter exists. In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata,That's a feature, not a bug. and has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your sticking point, I think).That would be a redundancy argument,. not an incompatibility (contradiction) argument. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Then a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all computations - but it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different physical systems. And it is possible by inspection of these systems to determine whether they calculate pi. But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious. 'Calculating pi' in the final analysis can be satisfied by the system in question externalising its results (e.g. printing out the value of pi). But it isn't so simple to test a system that is claimed to be conscious. Be that as it may, would you be content with the conclusion that the 'properties' of materialism claimed to be jointly relevant to both computationalism and consciousness are purely relational? In this case, we needn't argue further. But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims that whatever 'physical properties' happen to be picked out by the 'right sort of computation' must be the ones that are responsible for consciousness? But this is just dogma masquerading as explanation.It's not dogma if it's just offered as a possibility; a possibility that refutes the claim that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. But remember that I have a narrowish view of what is a computer. And remember that consciousness is not held to be any old computation. Yes, but are you saying that *any old instantiation*, provided it implements to your satisfaction the 'right sort of computation', must by that token be conscious, whatever 'physical properties' it employs? If you are, then AFAICS you're either claiming that *any old physical properties* that implement the computation are fact doing the work of creating consciousness, or that *none* are. Either option is effectively abandoning materialism as the explanation for why the computation is deemed to cause consciousness. If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical systems. In this case, you retain your appeal to materialism as causally relevant, but mere 'computational equivalence', in the implementation-independent mathematical sense, ceases to predict which physical systems will be conscious, and which not.Just replace be conscious and consciousness with be a calculation of pi. Then a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all computations - but it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different physical systems. And it is possible by inspection of these systems to determine whether they calculate pi. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Ah yes - I was confusing my 'isms. Eliminative materialism is an extreme type of physicalism, but physicalism is broader. What I meant was what you just stated - COMP is incompatible with physicalism, but not with materialism. As I understand it, physicalism denies any form of downward causation, but materialism allows for the possibility. (I'm tending to use Chalmers' classification here). The Strong Anthropic Principle is strictly denied with physicalism, as the SAP is effectively a form of downward causation. Actually, I suspect that physicalism is incompatible with the MWI - hmm need to think about that more... On Tue, Oct 10, 2006 at 02:18:15PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 03:52, Russell Standish a écrit : On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP is incompatible with is eliminative materialism, also sometimes known as physicalism. Comp has indeed be shown to be incompatible with physicalism (the doctrine that physics is the fundamental science). But physicalism is not necessarily eliminativist. Most physicalist believes in consciousness, even if they believe that consciousness emerges from the behavior of some putative matter. Eliminative materialist does not believe in consciousness or first person at all. Some says this explicitly, others are unclear or just incoherent. Comp is not incompatible with the existence of primary or primitive matter, but the UDA shows that comp has to be incompatible with any relation between that matter and the *appearance* of matter or of physical laws; making matter and material universe(s) as useless as invisible horse pulling cars. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'. David That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Then a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all computations - but it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different physical systems. And it is possible by inspection of these systems to determine whether they calculate pi. But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious. Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? 'Calculating pi' in the final analysis can be satisfied by the system in question externalising its results (e.g. printing out the value of pi). But it isn't so simple to test a system that is claimed to be conscious. Be that as it may, would you be content with the conclusion that the 'properties' of materialism claimed to be jointly relevant to both computationalism and consciousness are purely relational? In this case, we needn't argue further. But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'. I would think that identifying the relata would be relevant to explaining a relation. But I agree that computation is mostly a matter of relations. What matter adds is that it allows the computation to be instantied. To dismiss it from the explanation seems like dismissing hydrogen and oxygen from an explanation of water. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
-Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Brent Meeker Skickat: den 11 oktober 2006 06:12 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;) David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Then a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all computations - but it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different physical systems. And it is possible by inspection of these systems to determine whether they calculate pi. But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious. Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? 'Calculating pi' in the final analysis can be satisfied by the system in question externalising its results (e.g. printing out the value of pi). But it isn't so simple to test a system that is claimed to be conscious. Be that as it may, would you be content with the conclusion that the 'properties' of materialism claimed to be jointly relevant to both computationalism and consciousness are purely relational? In this case, we needn't argue further. But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'. I would think that identifying the relata would be relevant to explaining a relation. But I agree that computation is mostly a matter of relations. What matter adds is that it allows the computation to be instantied. To dismiss it from the explanation seems like dismissing hydrogen and oxygen from an explanation of water. Brent Meeker A passage in Gary L. Drescher's book GOOD AND REAL. Demystifying pradoxes from physics to ethics. comes to mind. On page 324 he compares what he calls the spark of existence with the dualist' spark of awareness. And he continues: Both putative sparks face the same problem: even if they were real, we could not know of them, could not percieve them - because any such perception would constitute a miraclulous violation of the definitive physics equations that already specify all our thoughts and perceptions; percieving the extra spark would be responding to something beyond the equations themselves. Whatever it is that we percieve when we think we percieve the extraphysical or metaphysical spark, it cannot be something extraphysical or metaphysical. I think similar thinking goes behind the thinking of Deutsch and others as to why our universe is not distinguished from other possible ones. LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows - isn't this more interesting? He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) I think the 'modesty' part is meant more to relate to provability vs.believability, per Goedel/Lob - that we must live with doubt (i.e. empiricism is ineliminable). As to computationalism, there seems to be some confusion on the list (and elsewhere) between (at least) two varieties. At least four! The first might I suppose be characterised as minimalist comp, dealing with programs as instantiated in (as one might say) real - i.e. material - computers. Clearly it would make no sense to say that this kind of computationalism is incompatible with materialism - i.e that physical processes can 'compute'. So how does he get computationalism is incompatible with materialism out of such interviews? From the 8th step of the UDA argument. This attempts to show that if one (but not you, I think?) starts with the much stronger assumption that *consciousness supervenes on computation itself*, What is a computation itself? A process? And algorithm? then it can't also supervene on the physical. Using supplementary assumptions -- such as only activity counts. AFAICS, this stems fundamentally from the inability to stabilise the instantiation of a computation, given the lack of constraint on the material substrates that can be construed as implementing equivalent computations. Given materialism, in other words, 'computation' is just a metaphor - it's the physics that does the work. Yes, but it is still quite possible that a class of phsyical systems picked out by some computational(but ultimately physical) set of properties are conscious/cognitive in veirtue of those proeprties -- ie computationalism is a sort of convenient shorthand or shortcut to the physically relevant properties. I have to say that I think this may really point to a fatal flaw in any assumption - within materialism - that consciousness can supervene on the physical *per computation* in the standard AI sense. However, consciousness may of course still be shown to supervene on some physically stabilisable material process (e.g. at the neurological or some other consistently materially-reducible level of explanation). Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That is an assumption beyond computationalism. But not beyond 'comp', which is a horse of a different colour. A Trojan horse with Plato in its belly... The UDA argument attempts to establish, and show the consequences of, a 'comp' constrained to CT, AR, and the 'modest empiricism' of 'yes doctor'. It *assumes* that putative stable conscious experiences are associated with certain types of machine thus defined. From this stems the claim that the consciousness of such machines can't simultaneously supervene on an unstabilisable externally-defined 'material' substrate - in fact, the 'material' also has to be an emergent from the computational in this view. You are presenting the conclusions, not the argument. Comp and materialism start from radically different assumptions, and have diametrically opposed explanatory directions. The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. If comp is not standard computationalism, the fact that it is incompatible with materalism may be a lot less impactive. comp might simply beg the question. However, I don't think they treat the *observables* in any essential way as less 'real', but differ radically as to the source - and here its does get difficult, because one can no longer simply appeal directly to those observables - as Johnson failed to note in stubbing his toe on the stone. The Johnsonian argument can be used as a wayof establishing the meaning of exist. It answers the question what definition of existence is there other than the mathematical one. How can he come to conclusions about the uneality of matter without assuming the reality of something to take its place? Well, in the end we can only believe that whatever it is must be 'real in the sense that I am real', or where are we? The point is that computationalists can continue to believe in matter so long as they don't believe in numbers. No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not be writing this. What you mean is to establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult. Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim. Well, as you know, I've also had some discomfort with aspects of platonic or other possibly implicit assumptions in this approach, but I think now that it's interesting and fruitful enough to suspend judgement on this pending further (preferably empirically refutable) results, without fully
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 9, 6:35 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What is a computation itself? A process? And algorithm? Bruno covers what he means by 'comp' pretty comprehensively in his various posts and papers. Using supplementary assumptions -- such as only activity counts. Not sure what you're getting at - do you mean that, under materialism, the mere existence (not specific activity) of physical properties suffices to generate conscious experience? If so, I don't follow. I assume (see below) that, under materialism, experience - psychological activity - physical activity. Yes, but it is still quite possible that a class of phsyical systems picked out by some computational(but ultimately physical) set of properties are conscious/cognitive in veirtue of those proeprties -- ie computationalism is a sort of convenient shorthand or shortcut to the physically relevant properties. But this is the very nub. And it may be dead wrong, so would you address this directly? What is being claimed (in this form, a general appeal to the class of arguments referred to by the UDA 8th step) is that under materialism, 'computationalism' (i.e. the 1st variety in my taxonomy) precisely *can't* 'pick out' a set of 'physically relevant properties' in any stable way, because the physical instantiation of any given 'computation' is essentially arbitrary, and can extend to any number of diverse physical properties, to choice. Under materialism, specific conscious experiences should presumably map, or reduce, to the activity of an equivalently stable set of physical properties (in an analogous sense to, say, specific neurological processes reducing stably downwards through the physical substrate). And this can't be the case if I can change the physical properties of the computational substrate at will, from step to step of the program if necessary. So the claim is that, under materialism, some other schema than computationalism must ultimately be deployed to explain any stable *general* mapping from consciousness to physics. I agree that this is a bold claim, but it does appear to stem from a basic dislocation in the supervention scheme consciousness - computation - physicalism. Its consequence is that if we wish to claim that consciousness does in fact supervene stably on computation, as opposed to the physical itself, then such computation must itself be defined in a manner unconstrained to specific *physical* properties. This is a reductio devised to show the consequences of the starting assumptions. You pays your money. The point is that computationalists can continue to believe in matter so long as they don't believe in numbers. But if I'm right, they can't also believe that 'computation' - which is only arbitrarily constrained physically - is an adequate explanatory schema for consciousness. It's just a metaphor, and metaphors per se (as opposed to their instantiations) aren't 'real in the sense that I am real'. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows - isn't this more interesting? He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) I think the 'modesty' part is meant more to relate to provability vs.believability, per Goedel/Lob - that we must live with doubt (i.e. empiricism is ineliminable). As to computationalism, there seems to be some confusion on the list (and elsewhere) between (at least) two varieties.At least four! The first might I suppose be characterised as minimalist comp, dealing with programs as instantiated in (as one might say) real - i.e. material - computers. Clearly it would make no sense to say that this kind of computationalism is incompatible with materialism - i.e that physical processes can 'compute'. So how does he get computationalism is incompatible with materialism out of such interviews? From the 8th step of the UDA argument. This attempts to show that if one (but not you, I think?) starts with the much stronger assumption that *consciousness supervenes on computation itself*,What is a computation itself? A process? And algorithm? then it can't also supervene on the physical.Using supplementary assumptions -- such as only activity counts. AFAICS, this stems fundamentally from the inability to stabilise the instantiation of a computation, given the lack of constraint on the material substrates that can be construed as implementing equivalent computations. Given materialism, in other words, 'computation' is just a metaphor - it's the physics that does the work.Yes, but it is still quite possible that a class of phsyical systems picked out by some computational(but ultimately physical) set of properties are conscious/cognitive in veirtue of those proeprties -- ie computationalism is a sort of
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
LZ: Colin Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. This deficit of mine includes having trouble with ALL numbers. :-) For the life of me I cannot imagine what an 'object' is that has quintessential property of 'five' about it. Sitting in platonia somewhere is this object. Somewhere else in platonia sit the objects 'red' and 'sad' and 'big'. Here on the list we talk of integers and given them a label I and then speak of operations on I. We tend to think of I as 'being' an an integer.. ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in the storage (call it [I]) is not an integer, but a symbolic representation of property of five_ness as mapped from platonia to reality. What we are doing is (very very metaphorically) shining a light (of an infinity of possible numbers) on the object 5 in platonia and letting the reflected light inhabit [I]. We behave as if 5 was in there, but it's not. All the rules of integers act as-if 5 was there. At that moment the storage pointed to by I contains a symbolic rearrangment of matter such as binary 1001 implemented as the temporary state (an arrangement of charge in space) of logic gates. We logically interpret this artrangement of charge in space as having the effect of five_ness, which is property of we assign at the moment we use it (such as one more than 4). To me the actual numbers (things) don't exist at all. All I can really see here in reality is logical relations that behave as-if the platonic entities existed. This all may seem obvious to the rest of you. That's my problem! But to me here watching the industrial scale manipulations of symbols going on, I wonder why it is we think we are saying anything at all about reality - the computation that literally _is_ reality - which, again, I see as a pile of logical relations that sometimes lets the platonic light shine on them in useful ways - say in ways that enable a mathematical generalisation called an empirical law. As to what the non-ideal numbers are Well there aren't any. Not really. At least I can't conceive them. However the logical operations I see around us have the structure of numbers correponding to a rather odd plethora of bases. Quantity is implicit in any natural aggregation resulting from logical operations. One number might be: human.cell.molecule.atom.nucleus.proton.quark.fuzzy1.fuzzy2...fuzzyN (fred.dandruffskincell.omega3.carbon.nucleus.3rd_proton.UP_quark1_string.loop_2.etc1.etc2.) If you work in base atom arithmetic you have and arithmetic where atoms associate with a remainder, say a unit in another base called .photon This is called chemistry. The human (and all the space that expresses it) is one single number consisting of 'digits' that are all the cells(and interstitial molecules) collected together according to affinities of fuzzyN, which acts in the above 'number' like the integer I does to the set of integers expressed in binary I mentioned above. There's no nice neat rows. No neat remainderless arithmetic. But it's all created with logical operators on an assumed elemental 'fuzzyN' (see above) primitive. '.fuzzyN' can be treated as an underlying structural primitive 'pseudo-object' as a fundamental 'thing'. But .fuzzyN can be just another logical relation between deeper primitives. There is no depth limit to it. As to computation - I have already described what we do here in maths and computation - all the same, really - all manipulating 'as-if' labeled entities. At the instant we lose sight of the logical/relational nature of what we are doing then we can delude ourselves that the symbols denote real 'objects' such as those in platonia and - especially - if you happen to 'be' a collection of these logical operations the rest of the logical operations going on around you look very lumpy and thingy indeed! It looks even more compellingly so when you it appears to obey empirical laws like quantum mechanics and the Nernst equation when perception - made of the same logical operations - presents you with a representation of it all using that special logical aggregate called a brain. In terms of the thread subject line, then, a chair is literally mathematics going on. There's an infinity of other mathematics that can symbolically fiddle with entities in an arithmetical base linguistic_token_for_chair or perhaps linguistic_token_la_chaise, but in coming into existence in the minds of humans we instantly lose the native maths of which the chair is an expression - a computation - an unfolding neverending proof - a theorem pushed along by the drive of the master mathematician - the 2nd law of thermodynamics (= natural propensities for
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: LZ: Colin Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. This deficit of mine includes having trouble with ALL numbers. :-) For the life of me I cannot imagine what an 'object' is that has quintessential property of 'five' about it. Sitting in platonia somewhere is this object. Somewhere else in platonia sit the objects 'red' and 'sad' and 'big'. Here on the list we talk of integers and given them a label I and then speak of operations on I. We tend to think of I as 'being' an an integer.. ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in the storage (call it [I]) is not an integer, but a symbolic representation of property of five_ness as mapped from platonia to reality. What we are doing is (very very metaphorically) shining a light (of an infinity of possible numbers) on the object 5 in platonia and letting the reflected light inhabit [I]. We behave as if 5 was in there, but it's not. All the rules of integers act as-if 5 was there. None of them change if it isn't. At that moment the storage pointed to by I contains a symbolic rearrangment of matter such as binary 1001 implemented as the temporary state (an arrangement of charge in space) of logic gates. We logically interpret this artrangement of charge in space as having the effect of five_ness, which is property of we assign at the moment we use it (such as one more than 4). To me the actual numbers (things) don't exist at all. All I can really see here in reality is logical relations that behave as-if the platonic entities existed. This all may seem obvious to the rest of you. That's my problem! But to me here watching the industrial scale manipulations of symbols going on, I wonder why it is we think we are saying anything at all about reality - the computation that literally _is_ reality - which, again, I see as a pile of logical relations that sometimes lets the platonic light shine on them in useful ways - say in ways that enable a mathematical generalisation called an empirical law. If empirical reality isn't necessarily mathematical, how can it be necessarily computational. As to what the non-ideal numbers are Well there aren't any. But you said there were. That's why I asked. Not really. At least I can't conceive them. However the logical operations I see around us have the structure of numbers correponding to a rather odd plethora of bases. Quantity is implicit in any natural aggregation resulting from logical operations. One number might be: human.cell.molecule.atom.nucleus.proton.quark.fuzzy1.fuzzy2...fuzzyN (fred.dandruffskincell.omega3.carbon.nucleus.3rd_proton.UP_quark1_string.loop_2.etc1.etc2.) If you work in base atom arithmetic you have and arithmetic where atoms associate with a remainder, say a unit in another base called .photon This is called chemistry. Hmm. Well, we have a way of mathematising the world. It is called physics, and it bases don't have much to do with it. Real numbers symmetry, and smooth funciton do. The human (and all the space that expresses it) is one single number Didn't you just say numbers odn't exist? Do you mean representation of a number, or something like that? consisting of 'digits' that are all the cells(and interstitial molecules) collected together according to affinities of fuzzyN, which acts in the above 'number' like the integer I does to the set of integers expressed in binary I mentioned above. There's no nice neat rows. No neat remainderless arithmetic. How do you know? But it's all created with logical operators on an assumed elemental 'fuzzyN' (see above) primitive. '.fuzzyN' can be treated as an underlying structural primitive 'pseudo-object' as a fundamental 'thing'. But .fuzzyN can be just another logical relation between deeper primitives. There is no depth limit to it. How do you know? As to computation - I have already described what we do here in maths and computation - all the same, really - all manipulating 'as-if' labeled entities. At the instant we lose sight of the logical/relational nature of what we are doing then we can delude ourselves that the symbols denote real 'objects' such as those in platonia and - especially - if you happen to 'be' a collection of these logical operations the rest of the logical operations going on around you look very lumpy and thingy indeed! It looks even more compellingly so when you it appears to obey empirical laws like quantum mechanics and the Nernst equation when perception - made of the same logical operations - presents you with a representation of it all using that special logical
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
1Z wrote: Whatever properties are picked out by a computation will be relevant to it as a computation. Yes, of course. But how are these properties supposed to simultaneously produce a state of consciousness stably linked to the 'computation' when this self-same computation could have been instantiated in arbitrarily many physically distinct ways? The computations would be equivalent, but you appear to be claiming that however they are implemented, arbitrarily many distinct physical properties somehow become equally 'relevant' to generating the same state of consciousness. There is no requirement that the same connscious state is implemented by the same physical state, so the multiple reliasability of computations is not a problem So you say, but just *what* physical properties are supposed to be relevant and *how* do they contrive always to manifest equivalently within totally different implementations of a computation? Is this just supposed to be a mystery? My point is that under materialism, 'computation' is just a metaphor and what is directly relevant is the activity of the physical substrate in producing the results that we interpret in this way. What's critical to computational equivalence is not the internal states of the physical substrate, but the consistency of the externalised results thus produced. But with consciousness, it's precisely the internal states that are relevant. And here your reasoning appears to become circular - a particular set of physical properties can be construed as 'externalising' a particular set of computational results at a given point in time (fair enough) so, whatever these properties happen to be, they're must also be 'relevant' in generating a specific internal conscious state - and so must any arbitrary alternative set of properties that externalise the same computational results. Only because you say so, AFAICS. By making the rationale for supervention of consciousness on physical activity completely arbitrary in this way (it just *somehow* tracks a 'computation' however instantiated), you've effectively abandoned it as a materialist explanation. Didn't Hofstadter use this sleight of intuition to conjure consciousness from anthills and books - or was he perhaps just joking? David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 9, 6:35 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What is a computation itself? A process? And algorithm? Bruno covers what he means by 'comp' pretty comprehensively in his various posts and papers. Almost all my discussions with him are attempts to clarify it. Using supplementary assumptions -- such as only activity counts. Not sure what you're getting at - do you mean that, under materialism, the mere existence (not specific activity) of physical properties suffices to generate conscious experience? I mean the Activity Thesis http://tigger.uic.edu/~cvklein/papers/maudlin%20on%20comp.pdf If so, I don't follow. I assume (see below) that, under materialism, experience - psychological activity - physical activity. Yes, but it is still quite possible that a class of phsyical systems picked out by some computational(but ultimately physical) set of properties are conscious/cognitive in veirtue of those proeprties -- ie computationalism is a sort of convenient shorthand or shortcut to the physically relevant properties. But this is the very nub. And it may be dead wrong, so would you address this directly? What is the alternative? Computaitonalism is just dead wrong, as a thesis about consciousness ? That is possible. Computation is an extra factor, a ghost in the machine? I don't think that is woth entertaining. What is being claimed (in this form, a general appeal to the class of arguments referred to by the UDA 8th step) is that under materialism, 'computationalism' (i.e. the 1st variety in my taxonomy) precisely *can't* 'pick out' a set of 'physically relevant properties' in any stable way, because the physical instantiation of any given 'computation' is essentially arbitrary, and can extend to any number of diverse physical properties, to choice. Whatever properties are picked out by a computation will be relevant to it as a computation. Under materialism, specific conscious experiences should presumably map, or reduce, to the activity of an equivalently stable set of physical properties (in an analogous sense to, say, specific neurological processes reducing stably downwards through the physical substrate). And this can't be the case if I can change the physical properties of the computational substrate at will, from step to step of the program if necessary. It can't be done if you can change the relevant properties. But then it would not be the same computation. You can do what you like with the irrelevant ones. So the claim is that, under materialism, some other schema than computationalism must ultimately be deployed to explain any stable
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP is incompatible with is eliminative materialism, also sometimes known as physicalism. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably, entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of assumptions involving numbers and their relations. Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. As he often reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive explanatory truth, He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' - limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines and discovering their povs. So how does he get computationalism is incompatible with materialism out of such interviews? In achieving these results, AFAICS, no claims need be made about the fundamental 'ontic realism' of numbers: rather one is doing logic or mathematics from an axiomatic basis in the normal way. How can he come to conclusions about the uneality of matter without assuming the reality of something to take its place? The question of which set of 'ontic prejudices' we in fact employ as we go about our daily affairs is of course another issue. And yet antoher issue is whether the conclusions of a valid arguiment must be contained in its premises. It may of course eventually turn out that theoretical or, preferably empirically disconfirmable, results derived from comp become so compelling as to force fundamental re-consideration of even such quotidian assumptions - e.g. the notorious 'yes doctor' proposition. Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That is an assumption beyond computationalism. But as Bruno is again at pains to point out, this won't be based on 'sure knowledge'. It will always entail some 'act of faith'. To establish what is in some ultimate sense 'real' - as opposed to knowable or communicable - is extraordinarily difficult, No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not be writing this. What you mean is to establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult. Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim. and perhaps at root incoherent. The debate, for example, over whether the computational supervenes on the physical doesn't hinge on the 'ontic reality' of the fundamental assumptions of physicalism or computationalism. Rather, it's about resolving the explanatory commensurability (or otherwise) of the sets of observables and relations characteristic of these theoretical perspectives. Indeed what else could it possibly be for humans (or machines) with only such data at our disposal? David Bruno Marchal wrote: There is no need to reify the numbers.[...] I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be explained quite precisely why numbers (in a third person view-view) are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality and in a unnameable first person reality etc.Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows - isn't this more interesting? He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) I think the 'modesty' part is meant more to relate to provability vs.believability, per Goedel/Lob - that we must live with doubt (i.e. empiricism is ineliminable). As to computationalism, there seems to be some confusion on the list (and elsewhere) between (at least) two varieties. The first might I suppose be characterised as minimalist comp, dealing with programs as instantiated in (as one might say) real - i.e. material - computers. Clearly it would make no sense to say that this kind of computationalism is incompatible with materialism - i.e that physical processes can 'compute'. So how does he get computationalism is incompatible with materialism out of such interviews? From the 8th step of the UDA argument. This attempts to show that if one (but not you, I think?) starts with the much stronger assumption that *consciousness supervenes on computation itself*, then it can't also supervene on the physical. AFAICS, this stems fundamentally from the inability to stabilise the instantiation of a computation, given the lack of constraint on the material substrates that can be construed as implementing equivalent computations. Given materialism, in other words, 'computation' is just a metaphor - it's the physics that does the work. I have to say that I think this may really point to a fatal flaw in any assumption - within materialism - that consciousness can supervene on the physical *per computation* in the standard AI sense. However, consciousness may of course still be shown to supervene on some physically stabilisable material process (e.g. at the neurological or some other consistently materially-reducible level of explanation). Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That is an assumption beyond computationalism. But not beyond 'comp', which is a horse of a different colour. The UDA argument attempts to establish, and show the consequences of, a 'comp' constrained to CT, AR, and the 'modest empiricism' of 'yes doctor'. It *assumes* that putative stable conscious experiences are associated with certain types of machine thus defined. From this stems the claim that the consciousness of such machines can't simultaneously supervene on an unstabilisable externally-defined 'material' substrate - in fact, the 'material' also has to be an emergent from the computational in this view. Comp and materialism start from radically different assumptions, and have diametrically opposed explanatory directions. However, I don't think they treat the *observables* in any essential way as less 'real', but differ radically as to the source - and here its does get difficult, because one can no longer simply appeal directly to those observables - as Johnson failed to note in stubbing his toe on the stone. How can he come to conclusions about the uneality of matter without assuming the reality of something to take its place? Well, in the end we can only believe that whatever it is must be 'real in the sense that I am real', or where are we? No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not be writing this. What you mean is to establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult. Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim. Well, as you know, I've also had some discomfort with aspects of platonic or other possibly implicit assumptions in this approach, but I think now that it's interesting and fruitful enough to suspend judgement on this pending further (preferably empirically refutable) results, without fully committing as a believer - but then that is not what is demanded. However, I acknowledge the robustness of your Johnsonian approach to refutation! David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably, entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of assumptions involving numbers and their relations.Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. As he often reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive explanatory truth,He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' - limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines and discovering their povs.So
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Bruno Marchal wrote: There is no need to reify the numbers. [...] I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be explained quite precisely why numbers (in a third person view-view) are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality and in a unnameable first person reality etc. Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably, entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of assumptions involving numbers and their relations. As he often reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive explanatory truth, and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' - limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines and discovering their povs. In achieving these results, AFAICS, no claims need be made about the fundamental 'ontic realism' of numbers: rather one is doing logic or mathematics from an axiomatic basis in the normal way. The question of which set of 'ontic prejudices' we in fact employ as we go about our daily affairs is of course another issue. It may of course eventually turn out that theoretical or, preferably empirically disconfirmable, results derived from comp become so compelling as to force fundamental re-consideration of even such quotidian assumptions - e.g. the notorious 'yes doctor' proposition. But as Bruno is again at pains to point out, this won't be based on 'sure knowledge'. It will always entail some 'act of faith'. To establish what is in some ultimate sense 'real' - as opposed to knowable or communicable - is extraordinarily difficult, and perhaps at root incoherent. The debate, for example, over whether the computational supervenes on the physical doesn't hinge on the 'ontic reality' of the fundamental assumptions of physicalism or computationalism. Rather, it's about resolving the explanatory commensurability (or otherwise) of the sets of observables and relations characteristic of these theoretical perspectives. Indeed what else could it possibly be for humans (or machines) with only such data at our disposal? David Bruno Marchal wrote: There is no need to reify the numbers.[...] I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be explained quite precisely why numbers (in a third person view-view) are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality and in a unnameable first person reality etc.Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Johnathan, Nice one! :-) As far as I can see there is nothing a-priori which would make these two hypotheses mutually exclusive; one 'cause' is predator related, the other is resource related. I await with interest, but not bated breath, for an ecologist to tell us of any empirical evidence supporting or refuting either. Of equal interest is the question of how the creatures keep count of the passing years and 'know' when their species's lucky number has come up! Presumably *something* grows a bit with each passing year and reaches a threshold size/shape/consentration at the right time. Alternatively something is formed in the first year, which could be the overall size/volume of the grub or the total amount of stored energy, and this thing or substance decreases with each passing year so that emergence is triggered by that key feature or substance reaching its minimum amount needed for survival in the next life stage. Upon reflection I think the latter mechanism is more likely. I can see more easily how it could evolve from a system under a selfective pressure which extended the dormancy period but originally allowed a significant spread of the dormancy period over several years. Cheers, Mark --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Hi Mark, Le 05-oct.-06, à 20:49, markpeaty a écrit : Bruno, I started to read [the English version of] your discourse on Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. I will read more later. It is certainly very interesting and thought provoking. It makes me think of 'Reasons and Persons' by Derek Parfitt. His book is very dry in places but mostly very well worth the effort of ploughing through it. Parfit is good. I stop to follow him when he insists that we are token. I paraphrase myself sometimes by the slogan MANY TYPES NO TOKEN. BTW I like very much Hofstadter (mentionned by David) too except that he could have said much more on the universal machine, and he could have make clearer the relation between logic and computer science, and also I would suggest people read an easier (less diluted) introduction to Godel's theorem before embarking on the golden braid ... if only to extract more juice As a non-mathematician I can only argue using my form of 'common sense' plus general knowledge. [En passant - I am happy to see that your French language discourse features a debate between Jean Pierre Changeaux and a mathematician. Changeaux's book 'Neuronal Man' was a major influence in setting me off on my quest to understand the nature of consciousness. He helped me to find a very reasonable understanding which makes a lot of sense of the world. Merci beacoup a JPC. :-] OK, but note that when Alain Connes explained Quantum Mechanics to JPC, JPC concludes QM must be wrong. Actually, even just current empirical tiny quantum computations support Alain Connes and not JPC. I think JPC is really not convincing in l'homme neuronal, he buries all the interesting questions, not only about mind, but above all about matter. In the dialogs with Connes, he is not really listening (imo). I dispute the assumption that we can consider and reify number/s and/or logic apart from its incarnation. There is no need to reify the numbers. You need only to believe that proposition like 571 is a prime number or all natural numbers can be represented by the sum of 4 squares are either true or false independently of you or me. It is like the 'ceteris paribus' so beloved of economists; it is a conceptual tool not a description of the world. I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be explained quite precisely why numbers (in a third person view-view) are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality and in a unnameable first person reality etc. All this is an sufficiently precise way so as to be testable. I am super busy until the end of october. In november I will come back to the roadmap. I continue to read the conversations anyway, and perhaps make short comments. (I should also come back about thinking to do that english version of my thesis but I have not yet solved the interdisciplinar-pedago-diplomatico problems ... :O(. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Bruno, I started to read [the English version of] your discourse on Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. I will read more later. It is certainly very interesting and thought provoking. It makes me think of 'Reasons and Persons' by Derek Parfitt. His book is very dry in places but mostly very well worth the effort of ploughing through it. As a non-mathematician I can only argue using my form of 'common sense' plus general knowledge. [En passant - I am happy to see that your French language discourse features a debate between Jean Pierre Changeaux and a mathematician. Changeaux's book 'Neuronal Man' was a major influence in setting me off on my quest to understand the nature of consciousness. He helped me to find a very reasonable understanding which makes a lot of sense of the world. Merci beacoup a JPC. :-] I dispute the assumption that we can consider and reify number/s and/or logic apart from its incarnation. It is like the 'ceteris paribus' so beloved of economists; it is a conceptual tool not a description of the world. Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 02-oct.-06, à 18:03, markpeaty a écrit : snip So you assume a primitive world. From this I can already infer you have to distrust the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science. snip I agree. That is what makes the human mind turing universal. When it lacks memory space it extends itself through the use of pebble, wall, etc. There are practical and in-principle limits to what can be achieved computationally. Any computational device, however much it might seem to be divine, has to BE somewhere, instantiated in some form. This means that no computer is ever going to fully emulate a system in the real world. Problems preventing total emulation include, truncation of numbers in calculation, arbitrary cut-offs in the accuracy of measurements, and entropy. [The latter will manifest as 'Murphy's Law' .] Now, are you really saying that mathematical truth (not the mathematical expression that humans have developed to talk about that mathematical truth) is a human's construct. MP: Yes. To assume otherwise is to believe in a 'Truth' or 'Truths' beyond that which we can sense, feel or think. That is OK, as long as it is seen for the religious practice that it is. But in reality [I say :-] we are limited to asserting the existence of self and world, although we are very safe to do so due to the contradictions involved in denying the existence of either self or world. All the rest is descriptions of one sort or another. Would you say that the number 17 was not a prime number at the time of the dinosaurs? In which case you distrust the Arithmetical realism part of comp, and you are remarkably coherent. If dinosaurs could count and think with sufficient levels of abstraction, presumably they would have come across prime numbers in their spare time. Otherwise, like trees falling in the forests of the early carboniferous which made very little 'sound', prime numbers would have been very thin on the ground, so to speak. That said, I read with interest a year or two ago about certain kinds of insects [I think they are in North America somewhere] which lie dormant in the earth in some pre-adult stage for a PRIME number of years, 11, 13, were chosen by different species. Apparently the payoff for this strategy is that few predator species can match this length of time, and repeating cycles of shorter periods cannot 'resonate' so as to launch a large cohort of predators when the prey species produces its glut after waiting for the prime number of years. I suspect that this could have started happening way back in the Cretaceous or whenever. That so much of what occurs in 'the world' CAN be represented by numbers and other mathematical/logical objects and processes, is better expained by assuming that the great 'IT' of noumenal nature is actually made up of many simple elements [taken firstly in the general sense]. This underlying simplicity which yet combines and permutates itself into vast complexity, is something we infer with good reason - it works! This would make sense if you can specify those simple elements. Have you heard about Bell, Kochen and Specker and other weird facts predicted and verified from quantum mechanics. I am afraid such simple elements are already rule out empirically, even, with the Many World assumptions. I fail to see what is the problem here. You cannot separate number from that which is numbered, except as a mental trick, but within the brain mathematical objects are instantiated within neural networks. Now even mentioning quantum mechanics, I refer to my work (see the URL) for an argument showing that the hypothesis that we are turing emulable at some level (whatever that level) entails the laws of physics have to be explained without assuming a physical primitive world. Of course this refutes the current Aristotelian Naturalistic paradigm, but does rehabilitate Plato and the
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Thu, October 5, 2006 11:49, markpeaty wrote: That said, I read with interest a year or two ago about certain kinds of insects [I think they are in North America somewhere] which lie dormant in the earth in some pre-adult stage for a PRIME number of years, 11, 13, were chosen by different species. Apparently the payoff for this strategy is that few predator species can match this length of time, and repeating cycles of shorter periods cannot 'resonate' so as to launch a large cohort of predators when the prey species produces its glut after waiting for the prime number of years. An alternative hypothesis put forth, equally plausible to me, is that different species co-evolved to be dormant different prime numbers of years. This would create the minimum competition for environmental resources as they came out of their dormant period; prime numbers having the largest least common multiple. Of course they didn't do this with any intention or awareness; natural selection on random variations in dormancy period length would favor this kind of outcome. -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Le 02-oct.-06, à 18:03, markpeaty a écrit : I hope you will excuse my butting in here, but I was passing through on a different mission and became disturbed by reading some earlier posts of this thread. You are welcome. My 2 cents worth: I tend to think that David Nyman has the more sceptically acceptable slant on this. Mathematics and logic are constructions of the human brain. They are extremely useful, in appropriate contexts, because they allow effective, efficient and economical representations of processes in the world. So you assume a primitive world. From this I can already infer you have to distrust the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science. There is no particularly good reason however to think that mathematical objects exist outside of human brains or phenotypic extensions such as computers. I think it IS fair to say though that, for example, numbers and formulae written on a page or blackboard are literal extenstions of the constructs within the active mathematical mind. I agree. That is what makes the human mind turing universal. When it lacks memory space it extends itself through the use of pebble, wall, etc. Now, are you really saying that mathematical truth (not the mathematical expression that humans have developed to talk about that mathematical truth) is a human's construct. Would you say that the number 17 was not a prime number at the time of the dinosaurs? In which case you distrust the Arithmetical realism part of comp, and you are remarkably coherent. That so much of what occurs in 'the world' CAN be represented by numbers and other mathematical/logical objects and processes, is better expained by assuming that the great 'IT' of noumenal nature is actually made up of many simple elements [taken firstly in the general sense]. This underlying simplicity which yet combines and permutates itself into vast complexity, is something we infer with good reason - it works! This would make sense if you can specify those simple elements. Have you heard about Bell, Kochen and Specker and other weird facts predicted and verified from quantum mechanics. I am afraid such simple elements are already rule out empirically, eve, with the Many World assumptions. Now even mentioning quantum mechanics, I refer to my work (see the URL) for an argument showing that the hypothesis that we are turing emulable at some level (whatever that level) entails the laws of physics have to be explained without assuming a physical primitive world. Of course this refutes the current Aristotelian Naturalistic paradigm, but does rehabilitate Plato and the neoplatonist conception of matter (Plotinus). But you cannot DEDUCE from it that numbers and other mathematical objects exist 'out there', except in those particular regions of space time that happen now to be mathematically active brains. I do not believe that a number can exist somewhere. It can be implemented or incarnate somewhere, like a chess game, but that is different. Also, this is assumed in the comp hyp, nobody pretends that we can deduce that number exist. Actually it can be proved about the natural number in particular that no theories at all can prove that they exist. All theories enough rich to talk about numbers have to assume them explicitly or implicitly. But they does not need to exist out there or elsewhere: this is a category error. Numbers are not located in time or space, nor are they eternal. Poetically we could say that numbers and their relations are beyond time and space. But I recall, this is among the comp assumption. What we discussed is the fact that if we take comp seriously enough then physics can be derived from number theory/ computer science. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
I hope you will excuse my butting in here, but I was passing through on a different mission and became disturbed by reading some earlier posts of this thread. My 2 cents worth: I tend to think that David Nyman has the more sceptically acceptable slant on this. Mathematics and logic are constructions of the human brain. They are extremely useful, in appropriate contexts, because they allow effective, efficient and economical representations of processes in the world. There is no particularly good reason however to think that mathematical objects exist outside of human brains or phenotypic extensions such as computers. I think it IS fair to say though that, for example, numbers and formulae written on a page or blackboard are literal extenstions of the constructs within the active mathematical mind. That so much of what occurs in 'the world' CAN be represented by numbers and other mathematical/logical objects and processes, is better expained by assuming that the great 'IT' of noumenal nature is actually made up of many simple elements [taken firstly in the general sense]. This underlying simplicity which yet combines and permutates itself into vast complexity, is something we infer with good reason - it works! But you cannot DEDUCE from it that numbers and other mathematical objects exist 'out there', except in those particular regions of space time that happen now to be mathematically active brains. Regards Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: David Nyman wrote: I fail to see any 'knock-down' character in this argument. Peter says that mathematical concepts don't refer to anything 'external', and on one level I agree with him. But they are surely derived from the contingent characteristics of experience, and AFAICS experience in this context reduces to the contents of our brains. So 'infinite sets' is just a model (brain material at another level of description) which IMO counts as a 'physical notion' unless you start off as an idealist. Put simply, you can't think mathematical thoughts without using your brain to instantiate them - and you don't literally have to instantiate an 'infinite set' in the extended sense in order to manipulate a model with the formal characteristics you impute to this concept. In fact, the inability to convert infinite and transfinite sets into physical notions is excellent empirical evidence that they *don't* exist in any literal sense - they don't need to, as their usefulness is as limit cases within models, not as literal existents (nobody has ever literally deployed an infinite set). A particular concrete (brain) instantiation of a mathematical concept can't be equivalent to the math concept itself. I pointed out that many different physical processes can implement the *same* algorithm - this shows that the mathematical concept of the algorithm can't be identified with any particular physical instantiation of it. Read up on the failure of simple Identity theories of mind. Surely you understand the difference between a *Class* (an abstract actegory) and an *Object* (a particular instance of the concept).? The Class is not the object That's the first part of the argument for platonism. (1) The second part of the argument is the argument from indispensibility - you can't remove mathematical concepts from theories of reality because some concepts (like inifnite sets for example) can't be converted into physical notions. (2) It's the combination of (1) and (2) that clinches it. This is a thoroughgoing contingentist position, and I don't see that it can be refuted except by rejecting contingentism and starting from idealism. But then you've begged what you're trying to prove. Aren't you guilty of the same thing? You're simply assuming that materialism is the ultimate metaphysics and trying to reduce everything to that. You do this because the human brain is only capable of representing *physical* things in conscious experience. But what is a *physical* thing really? For instance is the *length* of the computer screen in front of you an objective value? Someone moving close to light speed perpendicular to your computer screen would record a quite different value for the length of your computer screen than you would. This suggests that the physical form is not objectively real. What *is* objectively out, is a 4-dimensional world-time for your computer screen as described by general relativity but this 4-d world-time is a *mathematical* concept. One could imagine an alien race or a super-intelligence which had no consciousness of physical things, but *sensed* everything purely in *mathematical* terms. For instance imagine if they a way to *directly sense* 4-d world-lines. Then it might be 'obvious' to alien philosophers that mathematical things were objevtively real. 'If according to the simplest explanation, an entity is complex and autonomous, then that entity is
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
But why can't it be reduced to classes of specific physical things? How
can you show that it is necessary for anything corresponding to this
description to 'exist' apart from its instantiations as documented
procedures and actual occurrences of their application?
David
I did point out in my last post that there appears to be no simple way
to make such reductions (between math concepts and classes of specific
things). For instance no one has yet succeeded in showing how math
concepts such as infinite sets and transfinite sets (which are precise
math concepts) could be converted into physical notions. A also
pointed to David Deutsch's excellent 'Criteria For Reality':
'If according to the simplest explanation, an entity is complex and
autonomous, then that entity is real.' ('The Fabric Of Reality', Pg 91)
As Detusch points out, mathematical entities do appear to match the
criteria for reality: 'Abstract entities that are complex and
autonomous exist objectively and are part of the fabric of reality.
There exist logically necessary truths about these entities, and these
comprise the subject-matter of mathematics.'
Language, logic, and math are human inventions just as chair is, c.f. William
S.
Cooper The Evolution of Reason.
That chair would continue to exist even if all
humans were wiped off the Earth - but the concept of 'chairs' wouldn't
and neither
would '2'.
Ontology is invented too.
Brent Meeker
I distinguish between two kinds of abstract concepts - abstract
concepts of universal applicability, which I think are objectively real
and abstract concepts of limited applicability, which are clearly human
inventions. You don't accept the distinction. But I pointed out that
for abstract concepts of universal applicability, there appears to be
no difference between cognitive and ontological categories, where as
for abstract concepts of limited applicability, there clearly is a
difference between cognitive and ontologic categories.
So I would tend to say that the concept of '2' is clearly 'out there',
where as the concept of 'chair' is 'in our heads' and quite possibly
even the concrete instances of a 'chair' is 'in our heads' as well!
After all, is it really the case that a chair is an object 'out there'
with definite objective physical dimensions like length? Isn't it
actually the case that all that's 'out there' is a 4-dimensional
'chair' world-time? - which I point out to you as really a
*mathematical construct* ;)
Actually, it's an arguement against doing so. If mathematical
terms referred to particular things, they would not be universally
applicable.
They are universally applicable because they don't refer to anything.
1Z
Math concepts are super-classes or abstract classes being used to
classify *other* astract classes. I pointed out three different
ontological catgories:
(1) Abstract entities of universal applicability (like math concepts)
(2) Abstract entities of limited applicability (human constructs like
alphabets or a chair concept)
(3) Concrete instances (like a particular example of a chair)
I'd say you can make a good case that the entities in (1) are the only
real objective reality. It's (2) and (3) that are actually 'in our
heads'!
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Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But why can't it be reduced to classes of specific physical things? How can you show that it is necessary for anything corresponding to this description to 'exist' apart from its instantiations as documented procedures and actual occurrences of their application? David I did point out in my last post that there appears to be no simple way to make such reductions (between math concepts and classes of specific things). For instance no one has yet succeeded in showing how math concepts such as infinite sets and transfinite sets (which are precise math concepts) could be converted into physical notions. A also pointed to David Deutsch's excellent 'Criteria For Reality': That doesn't mean math concepts refer to non-physical things. They might not refer at all. Indispensability arguments are dispensable: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mathphil-indis/ Math concepts are super-classes or abstract classes being used to classify *other* astract classes. I pointed out three different ontological catgories: (1) Abstract entities of universal applicability (like math concepts) (2) Abstract entities of limited applicability (human constructs like alphabets or a chair concept) (3) Concrete instances (like a particular example of a chair) I'd say you can make a good case that the entities in (1) are the only real objective reality. It's (2) and (3) that are actually 'in our heads'! I don't have a chair in my head. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I did point out in my last post that there appears to be no simple way
to make such reductions (between math concepts and classes of specific
things). For instance no one has yet succeeded in showing how math
concepts such as infinite sets and transfinite sets (which are precise
math concepts) could be converted into physical notions. A also
pointed to David Deutsch's excellent 'Criteria For Reality':
I fail to see any 'knock-down' character in this argument. Peter says
that mathematical concepts don't refer to anything 'external', and on
one level I agree with him. But they are surely derived from the
contingent characteristics of experience, and AFAICS experience in this
context reduces to the contents of our brains. So 'infinite sets' is
just a model (brain material at another level of description) which IMO
counts as a 'physical notion' unless you start off as an idealist. Put
simply, you can't think mathematical thoughts without using your brain
to instantiate them - and you don't literally have to instantiate an
'infinite set' in the extended sense in order to manipulate a model
with the formal characteristics you impute to this concept. In fact,
the inability to convert infinite and transfinite sets into physical
notions is excellent empirical evidence that they *don't* exist in any
literal sense - they don't need to, as their usefulness is as limit
cases within models, not as literal existents (nobody has ever
literally deployed an infinite set).
This is a thoroughgoing contingentist position, and I don't see that it
can be refuted except by rejecting contingentism and starting from
idealism. But then you've begged what you're trying to prove.
'If according to the simplest explanation, an entity is complex and
autonomous, then that entity is real.' ('The Fabric Of Reality', Pg 91)
Autonomous of what precisely? In what sense is a mathematical concept
autonomous of your brain, or the collection of brains and other
recording devices that instantiate it? Remember that we're talking
about mathematical *concepts* - i.e. things we can grasp - it's merely
a metaphor to claim that these models *refer* to autonomously existing
platonic realities. Either a metaphor, or the presumption of such
platonic reality, not its proof.
As Detusch points out, mathematical entities do appear to match the
criteria for reality: 'Abstract entities that are complex and
autonomous exist objectively and are part of the fabric of reality.
There exist logically necessary truths about these entities, and these
comprise the subject-matter of mathematics.'
Truths are only equivalent to 'existents' for an idealist. Fair enough,
but then this has to be accepted axiomatically, or not at all. I can't
honestly see why this is so hard to grasp.
David
But why can't it be reduced to classes of specific physical things? How
can you show that it is necessary for anything corresponding to this
description to 'exist' apart from its instantiations as documented
procedures and actual occurrences of their application?
David
I did point out in my last post that there appears to be no simple way
to make such reductions (between math concepts and classes of specific
things). For instance no one has yet succeeded in showing how math
concepts such as infinite sets and transfinite sets (which are precise
math concepts) could be converted into physical notions. A also
pointed to David Deutsch's excellent 'Criteria For Reality':
'If according to the simplest explanation, an entity is complex and
autonomous, then that entity is real.' ('The Fabric Of Reality', Pg 91)
As Detusch points out, mathematical entities do appear to match the
criteria for reality: 'Abstract entities that are complex and
autonomous exist objectively and are part of the fabric of reality.
There exist logically necessary truths about these entities, and these
comprise the subject-matter of mathematics.'
Language, logic, and math are human inventions just as chair is, c.f.
William S.
Cooper The Evolution of Reason.
That chair would continue to exist even if all
humans were wiped off the Earth - but the concept of 'chairs' wouldn't
and neither
would '2'.
Ontology is invented too.
Brent Meeker
I distinguish between two kinds of abstract concepts - abstract
concepts of universal applicability, which I think are objectively real
and abstract concepts of limited applicability, which are clearly human
inventions. You don't accept the distinction. But I pointed out that
for abstract concepts of universal applicability, there appears to be
no difference between cognitive and ontological categories, where as
for abstract concepts of limited applicability, there clearly is a
difference between cognitive and ontologic categories.
So I would tend to say that the concept of '2' is clearly 'out there',
where as the concept of 'chair' is 'in our heads' and quite possibly
even the concrete
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I did point out in my last post that there appears to be no simple way to make such reductions (between math concepts and classes of specific things). For instance no one has yet succeeded in showing how math concepts such as infinite sets and transfinite sets (which are precise math concepts) could be converted into physical notions. A also pointed to David Deutsch's excellent 'Criteria For Reality': I fail to see any 'knock-down' character in this argument. Peter says that mathematical concepts don't refer to anything 'external', and on one level I agree with him. But they are surely derived from the contingent characteristics of experience, and AFAICS experience in this context reduces to the contents of our brains. So 'infinite sets' is just a model (brain material at another level of description) which IMO counts as a 'physical notion' unless you start off as an idealist. If something is derived from experience , that does not mean it is necessarily a model of experience. The derivation might transofrm it into (a concept of ) something which does not matches expereince. Unicorns re derived from horses (or rhinos) but do not exist as such. Put simply, you can't think mathematical thoughts without using your brain to instantiate them - and you don't literally have to instantiate an 'infinite set' in the extended sense in order to manipulate a model with the formal characteristics you impute to this concept. However, we should not conclude that mathematical entities exist as ptterns of neural firing. The neural firing realises the concept, the mathematical entity is what the concept is about. The concept is not about neural firings (so long as what we are conceptualsiing is maths and not neurology!). The mathematical entity does not exist as a neural pattern. It does not exist at all. It is what the concept (which *does* exist as a neural pattern) is about. But concepts can be about things which don't exist, like unicorns. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Peter; I try to keep out from the ongoing discussions lately (no succes to report) but sometimes I get carried away. I will barge in with 2 remarks into your text below John M --- 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: David Nyman wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I did point out in my last post that there appears to be no simple way to make such reductions (between math concepts and classes of specific things). For instance no one has yet succeeded in showing how math concepts such as infinite sets and transfinite sets (which are precise math concepts) could be converted into physical notions. A also pointed to David Deutsch's excellent 'Criteria For Reality': I fail to see any 'knock-down' character in this argument. Peter says that mathematical concepts don't refer to anything 'external', and on one level I agree with him. But they are surely derived from the contingent characteristics of experience, and AFAICS experience in this context reduces to the contents of our brains. So 'infinite sets' is just a model (brain material at another level of description) which IMO counts as a 'physical notion' unless you start off as an idealist. If something is derived from experience , that does not mean it is necessarily a model of experience. The derivation might transofrm it into (a concept of ) something which does not matches expereince. Unicorns re derived from horses (or rhinos) but do not exist as such. Put simply, you can't think mathematical thoughts without using your brain to instantiate them - and you don't literally have to instantiate an 'infinite set' in the extended sense in order to manipulate a model with the formal characteristics you impute to this concept. However, we should not conclude that mathematical entities exist as ptterns of neural firing. The neural firing realises the concept, ... JM: Neural firing can refer to 'concept' if you have either 1.) topically (conceptually) marked neurons (like: the 1,000 for my poppylove, 2000 for your nosebleeding) - or 2.) distinguished type firings related to topical, within those even ceptually characterised electrical (or else - still unknown?) variations - and/or 3.) there is a topical/conceptual homunculus (organ?) registering the 'meaning' of each firing of THOSE topically marked and distinguished neurons. Otherwise the 'firing' is a physiological process, well measurable in its electrical behavior, but conceptually meaningless as far as we know today. The area of the brain where a certain activity is causing physiological activity is not 'generating' ideas. No indication so far to the generation of such mental authoritative thinking in any bunch of neurons. It is well assumed by the 'neurons only' crowd as a belief. (In congruence with your continuing statement on math). ... the mathematical entity is what the concept is about. The concept is not about neural firings (so long as what we are conceptualsiing is maths and not neurology!). ***The mathematical entity does not exist as a neural pattern.*** It does not exist at all. It is what the concept (which *does* exist as a neural pattern)[] is about. But concepts can be about things which don't exist, like unicorns. JM: Could you describe the 'neural pattern' meaning a unicorn? (or simply: a corn?) John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote:
I fail to see any 'knock-down' character in this argument. Peter says
that mathematical concepts don't refer to anything 'external', and on
one level I agree with him. But they are surely derived from the
contingent characteristics of experience, and AFAICS experience in this
context reduces to the contents of our brains. So 'infinite sets' is
just a model (brain material at another level of description) which IMO
counts as a 'physical notion' unless you start off as an idealist. Put
simply, you can't think mathematical thoughts without using your brain
to instantiate them - and you don't literally have to instantiate an
'infinite set' in the extended sense in order to manipulate a model
with the formal characteristics you impute to this concept. In fact,
the inability to convert infinite and transfinite sets into physical
notions is excellent empirical evidence that they *don't* exist in any
literal sense - they don't need to, as their usefulness is as limit
cases within models, not as literal existents (nobody has ever
literally deployed an infinite set).
A particular concrete (brain) instantiation of a mathematical concept
can't be equivalent to the math concept itself. I pointed out that
many different physical processes can implement the *same* algorithm -
this shows that the mathematical concept of the algorithm can't be
identified with any particular physical instantiation of it. Read up
on the failure of simple Identity theories of mind. Surely you
understand the difference between a *Class* (an abstract actegory) and
an *Object* (a particular instance of the concept).? The Class is not
the object
That's the first part of the argument for platonism. (1) The second
part of the argument is the argument from indispensibility - you can't
remove mathematical concepts from theories of reality because some
concepts (like inifnite sets for example) can't be converted into
physical notions. (2) It's the combination of (1) and (2) that
clinches it.
This is a thoroughgoing contingentist position, and I don't see that it
can be refuted except by rejecting contingentism and starting from
idealism. But then you've begged what you're trying to prove.
Aren't you guilty of the same thing? You're simply assuming that
materialism is the ultimate metaphysics and trying to reduce everything
to that. You do this because the human brain is only capable of
representing *physical* things in conscious experience.
But what is a *physical* thing really? For instance is the *length* of
the computer screen in front of you an objective value? Someone moving
close to light speed perpendicular to your computer screen would record
a quite different value for the length of your computer screen than you
would. This suggests that the physical form is not objectively real.
What *is* objectively out, is a 4-dimensional world-time for your
computer screen as described by general relativity but this 4-d
world-time is a *mathematical* concept.
One could imagine an alien race or a super-intelligence which had no
consciousness of physical things, but *sensed* everything purely in
*mathematical* terms. For instance imagine if they a way to *directly
sense* 4-d world-lines. Then it might be 'obvious' to alien
philosophers that mathematical things were objevtively real.
'If according to the simplest explanation, an entity is complex and
autonomous, then that entity is real.' ('The Fabric Of Reality', Pg 91)
Autonomous of what precisely? In what sense is a mathematical concept
autonomous of your brain, or the collection of brains and other
recording devices that instantiate it? Remember that we're talking
about mathematical *concepts* - i.e. things we can grasp - it's merely
a metaphor to claim that these models *refer* to autonomously existing
platonic realities. Either a metaphor, or the presumption of such
platonic reality, not its proof.
See (1) and (2) above. If the postulation of some entity *simplifies*
our explanations of reality, then this provides (probabilistic)
evidence that the postulated eneity exists. (Occams razor). The
evidence for the existence of platonic entities is that they simplfiy
our models of reality.
As Detusch points out, mathematical entities do appear to match the
criteria for reality: 'Abstract entities that are complex and
autonomous exist objectively and are part of the fabric of reality.
There exist logically necessary truths about these entities, and these
comprise the subject-matter of mathematics.'
Truths are only equivalent to 'existents' for an idealist. Fair enough,
but then this has to be accepted axiomatically, or not at all. I can't
honestly see why this is so hard to grasp.
David
I certainly wouldn't equate Platonism with Idealism! We don't seem to
accept anything 'axiomatically'. Instead we look to see which
postulated entities simplify our explanations of reality the best.
The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
But this only shows that mathematical objects exist in the sense that chair exists; as a abstraction from chairs. So chair isn't identical with any particular chair. Brent Meeker What follows is actually a very important and profound metaphysical point, absolutely fundamental for understanding platonism and reality theory. Both the *concept* of a chair and mathematical concepts are *abstract* things. But there's a big difference. In the case of the chair concept, it's simply a human creation - it's simply a word we humans use to summarize high-level properties of physical arrangements of matter. There are no 'chairs' in reality, only in our heads. We can see this by noting the fact that we can easily dispense with the 'chair concept' and simply use physics descriptions instead. So in the case of the 'chair' concept, we're obviously dealing with a human construct. Critical point: The 'chair' concept is only a (human) cognitive category NOT a metaphysical or ontological categories. Mathematical concepts are quite different. The key difference is that we *cannot* in fact dispense with mathematical descriptions and replace them with something else. We cannot *eliminate* mathematical concepts from our theories like we can with say 'chair' concepts. And this is the argument for regarding mathematical concepts as existing 'out there' and not just in our heads. There are two steps to the argument for thinking that mathematical entities are real: (1) A general mathematical category is not the same as any specific physical thing AND (2) Mathematical entities cannot be removed from our descriptions and replaced with something else ( the argument from indispensibility). It's true that both 'chair' concepts (for example) and math concepts are *abstract*, but the big difference is that for a 'chair' concept, (1) is true, but not (2). For mathematical concepts both (1) AND (2) are true. There's another way of clarifying the difference between the 'chair' concept and math concepts. Math concepts are *universal* in scope (applicable everywhere - we cannot remove them from our theories) where as the 'chair' concept is a cultural construct applicable only in human domains. To make this even clearer, pretend that all of reality is Java Code. It's true that both a 'chair' *concept* and a 'math' concept is an abstraction, and therfore a *class* , but the difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'math' concept is this: 'Math' is a *public class* (an abstract category which can be applied everywhere in reality), where as a 'chair' concept is *private* class, applicable only in specific locations inside reality (in this case inside human heads). Reality Java Code for a math concept: PUBLIC CLASS MATH () Reality Java Code a chair concept: PRIVATE CLASS CHAIR () Big difference! The critical and profound point if we accept this argument, is this: *There is NO difference between *epistemological* and *metaphysical* categories in the cases where we are dealing with cognitive categories which are universal in scope. Math concepts of universal applicability are BOTH epistemological tools AND metaphysical or ontological categories. One needs to think about this carefully to realize just how important this is. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: (1) A general mathematical category is not the same as any specific physical thing But why can't it be reduced to classes of specific physical things? How can you show that it is necessary for anything corresponding to this description to 'exist' apart from its instantiations as documented procedures and actual occurrences of their application? In this case: (2) Mathematical entities cannot be removed from our descriptions and replaced with something else ( the argument from indispensibility). would be false, though such removal would be inconvenient (as would 'chair' for that matter). A 'mathematical entity' would then merely refer to the classes of all descriptions, and all actual occurrences of the application, of a given procedure - i.e. a human cognitive category like 'chair', although as you say of greater generality. David But this only shows that mathematical objects exist in the sense that chair exists; as a abstraction from chairs. So chair isn't identical with any particular chair. Brent Meeker What follows is actually a very important and profound metaphysical point, absolutely fundamental for understanding platonism and reality theory. Both the *concept* of a chair and mathematical concepts are *abstract* things. But there's a big difference. In the case of the chair concept, it's simply a human creation - it's simply a word we humans use to summarize high-level properties of physical arrangements of matter. There are no 'chairs' in reality, only in our heads. We can see this by noting the fact that we can easily dispense with the 'chair concept' and simply use physics descriptions instead. So in the case of the 'chair' concept, we're obviously dealing with a human construct. Critical point: The 'chair' concept is only a (human) cognitive category NOT a metaphysical or ontological categories. Mathematical concepts are quite different. The key difference is that we *cannot* in fact dispense with mathematical descriptions and replace them with something else. We cannot *eliminate* mathematical concepts from our theories like we can with say 'chair' concepts. And this is the argument for regarding mathematical concepts as existing 'out there' and not just in our heads. There are two steps to the argument for thinking that mathematical entities are real: (1) A general mathematical category is not the same as any specific physical thing AND (2) Mathematical entities cannot be removed from our descriptions and replaced with something else ( the argument from indispensibility). It's true that both 'chair' concepts (for example) and math concepts are *abstract*, but the big difference is that for a 'chair' concept, (1) is true, but not (2). For mathematical concepts both (1) AND (2) are true. There's another way of clarifying the difference between the 'chair' concept and math concepts. Math concepts are *universal* in scope (applicable everywhere - we cannot remove them from our theories) where as the 'chair' concept is a cultural construct applicable only in human domains. To make this even clearer, pretend that all of reality is Java Code. It's true that both a 'chair' *concept* and a 'math' concept is an abstraction, and therfore a *class* , but the difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'math' concept is this: 'Math' is a *public class* (an abstract category which can be applied everywhere in reality), where as a 'chair' concept is *private* class, applicable only in specific locations inside reality (in this case inside human heads). Reality Java Code for a math concept: PUBLIC CLASS MATH () Reality Java Code a chair concept: PRIVATE CLASS CHAIR () Big difference! The critical and profound point if we accept this argument, is this: *There is NO difference between *epistemological* and *metaphysical* categories in the cases where we are dealing with cognitive categories which are universal in scope. Math concepts of universal applicability are BOTH epistemological tools AND metaphysical or ontological categories. One needs to think about this carefully to realize just how important this is. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But this only shows that mathematical objects exist in the sense that chair exists; as a abstraction from chairs. So chair isn't identical with any particular chair. Brent Meeker What follows is actually a very important and profound metaphysical point, absolutely fundamental for understanding platonism and reality theory. Both the *concept* of a chair and mathematical concepts are *abstract* things. But there's a big difference. In the case of the chair concept, it's simply a human creation - it's simply a word we humans use to summarize high-level properties of physical arrangements of matter. There are no 'chairs' in reality, only in our heads. We can see this by noting the fact that we can easily dispense with the 'chair concept' and simply use physics descriptions instead. So in the case of the 'chair' concept, we're obviously dealing with a human construct. Critical point: The 'chair' concept is only a (human) cognitive category NOT a metaphysical or ontological categories. Mathematical concepts are quite different. The key difference is that we *cannot* in fact dispense with mathematical descriptions and replace them with something else. We cannot *eliminate* mathematical concepts from our theories like we can with say 'chair' concepts. And this is the argument for regarding mathematical concepts as existing 'out there' and not just in our heads. There are two steps to the argument for thinking that mathematical entities are real: (1) A general mathematical category is not the same as any specific physical thing AND (2) Mathematical entities cannot be removed from our descriptions and replaced with something else ( the argument from indispensibility). It's true that both 'chair' concepts (for example) and math concepts are *abstract*, but the big difference is that for a 'chair' concept, (1) is true, but not (2). For mathematical concepts both (1) AND (2) are true. There's another way of clarifying the difference between the 'chair' concept and math concepts. Math concepts are *universal* in scope (applicable everywhere - we cannot remove them from our theories) where as the 'chair' concept is a cultural construct applicable only in human domains. To make this even clearer, pretend that all of reality is Java Code. It's true that both a 'chair' *concept* and a 'math' concept is an abstraction, and therfore a *class* , but the difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'math' concept is this: 'Math' is a *public class* (an abstract category which can be applied everywhere in reality), where as a 'chair' concept is *private* class, applicable only in specific locations inside reality (in this case inside human heads). Reality Java Code for a math concept: PUBLIC CLASS MATH () Reality Java Code a chair concept: PRIVATE CLASS CHAIR () Big difference! The critical and profound point if we accept this argument, is this: *There is NO difference between *epistemological* and *metaphysical* categories in the cases where we are dealing with cognitive categories which are universal in scope. Math concepts of universal applicability are BOTH epistemological tools AND metaphysical or ontological categories. One needs to think about this carefully to realize just how important this is. It is an interesting point, but it's not so fundamental as you seem to think. We can do without 'chair' and 'table' etc. But we can't do wihtout 'this' and 'that'. Without distinguishing objects we couldn't count and we wouldn't have the integers. Language, logic, and math are human inventions just as chair is, c.f. William S. Cooper The Evolution of Reason. Probably they are nomologically necessary in the sense that any sentient species that evolves would have to invent them. But just because mathematics and logic are built into our language and are necessary to any language that we could recognize, does not show they are out there like the object we call 'that chair' is out there. That chair would continue to exist even if all humans were wiped off the Earth - but the concept of 'chairs' wouldn't and neither would '2'. Ontology is invented too. Most ontologies put the chair 'out there' and math 'in our heads'. Some put the chair 'out there' and math in 'Mathematica' (I don't like to use 'Platonia' because Plato put chair in there too). Java has it's own ontology; that we invented to reflect an idea of instances and classes. There's nothing necessary about that as is easily seen from the fact that anything Java can do can also be done in Fortran or assembly or by a Turing machine. Brent Meeker The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification of such a
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Mathematical concepts are quite different. The key difference is that we *cannot* in fact dispense with mathematical descriptions and replace them with something else. We cannot *eliminate* mathematical concepts from our theories like we can with say 'chair' concepts. And this is the argument for regarding mathematical concepts as existing 'out there' and not just in our heads. Actually, it's an arguement against doing so. If mathematical terms referred to particular things, they would not be universally applicable. They are universally applicable because they don't refer to anything. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
