Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Jon, List,

 

you wrote:

 

"Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901)."

 

I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure" one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.


 

Best regards, Helmut


 

, 15. April 2024 um 19:47 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 



Helmut, List:

 


HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.


 

Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by Peirce--while such a possible sign must be embodied in an existent token in order to act as a sign, it is never itself "an actual material sign."

 


HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:


 

The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with the gist of it in accordance with synechism.

 


HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or".


 

Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901).

 


HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".


 

Determination in sign classification can be described using if-then, but not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme.

 


HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).


 

Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that composition is itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt






 


On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:



 


List,

 

I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

 


"But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."

 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why
the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the
details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and
misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly
treating it as virtually synonymous with "token" instead of
"tone/tuone/tinge/potisign."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 5:42 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Helmut, Jon, List,
>
> That is the reason why the word  'Mark' is the perfect choice:  you won't
> be wrong whether or not you know the details  of Peirce's semeiotic.
>
> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>
> The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a
> word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody:
> academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical
> sense and everybody else who  doesn't know Peirce's technical sense.
>
> In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be
> correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone.  He also
> considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the
> sound  of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that
> subset of marks that could be tinges.  But the word 'mark' covers all those
> sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings.
>
> That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was
> close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended.   Since
> the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little
> about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose
> terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly.
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Helmut, Jon, List,

That is the reason why the word  'Mark' is the perfect choice:  you won't be 
wrong whether or not you know the details  of Peirce's semeiotic.

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, 
that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much 
from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, 
intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a word 
with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody:   academics 
who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical sense and 
everybody else who  doesn't know Peirce's technical sense.

In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be correct 
for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone.  He also considered 
'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the sound  of tones 
or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that subset of marks that 
could be tinges.  But the word 'mark' covers all those sounds as well as 
arbitrary sights and feelings.

That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was close 
to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended.   Since the 
overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little about the 
fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose terms that they 
are capable of remembering and using  correctly.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

Helmut, List:

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, 
that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much 
from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, 
intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about 
using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by 
Peirce--while such a possible sign must be embodied in an existent token in 
order to act as a sign, it is never itself "an actual material sign."

HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with 
the gist of it in accordance with synechism.

HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or".

Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy 
for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is 
icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp 
distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any 
object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any 
interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an 
interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate 
sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901).

HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".

Determination in sign classification can be described using if-then, but not 
rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, 
then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the 
three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or 
possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a 
possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, 
dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always 
a rheme.

HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the 
categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic 
relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it 
can be so composed has overlooked the fact that composition is itself a triadic 
relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 
6.321, c. 1907).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.


Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned
about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by
Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent token
in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual material sign."

HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:


The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree
with the gist of it in accordance with synechism.

HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or".


Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903
trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object
is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp
distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting
any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying
any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and an
interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a
*degenerate
*sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c.
1901).

HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".


Determination in sign classification can be *described *using if-then, but
not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a
necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be
in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be
either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible,
the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a
symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign
or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme.

HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the
categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification
(3ns).


Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic
relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks
it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that *composition *is itself
a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the
composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> List,
>
> I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt,
> that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too
> much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material
> sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
> Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:
>
> "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no
> precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world
> itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be
> counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and
> shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words
> 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are
> so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be
> obsolete today."
>
> Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there
> are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and
> function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or,
> as a matter of retrospection, in the past.
>
> In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of
> classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes,
> there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think
> is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then"
> to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation
> of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and
> classification (3ns).
>
> Best regards
> Helmut
>
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

supplement: thinking about it, I am not clear anymore, if composition "is"or"". Also classification is not simply "either-or", this either-or only applies to parallel classes, but between a class and a subclass it seems more complicated. How exactly, that is how to translate composition, determination, and classification into logic (e.g. Boole, EG, EntG, Venn) I haven´t worked out yet. I even don´t know, whether it is translatable at all, as propositional logic to me seems to suit classification, but not composition. Maybe an Euler-diagram is good for composition? But how to translate one into EG?



 


List,

 

I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

 


"But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."

 

Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past.

 

In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

 

Best regards

Helmut


 

Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Edwina Taborsky" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "Francesco Bellucci" , "Anthony Jappy" , "Nathan Houser" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type



Edwina, Jon, List,

 

Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.  

 

ET:   I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues.  No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines.

 

JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.

 

JAS:  Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.

 

Yes, of course.   As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that.  And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them.

 

But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today.  

 

JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.

 

JAS:  Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...

 

Please note what I was trying to say.  I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy:  The Science of Diagrams".  That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy".  For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article.

 

But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term.  There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point.  In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy".   I wonder wh

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Helmut Raulien]

 


List,

 

I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

 


"But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."

 

Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past.

 

In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

 

Best regards

Helmut


 

Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Edwina Taborsky" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "Francesco Bellucci" , "Anthony Jappy" , "Nathan Houser" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type



Edwina, Jon, List,

 

Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.  

 

ET:   I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues.  No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines.

 

JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.

 

JAS:  Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.

 

Yes, of course.   As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that.  And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them.

 

But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today.  

 

JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.

 

JAS:  Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...

 

Please note what I was trying to say.  I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy:  The Science of Diagrams".  That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy".  For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article.

 

But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term.  There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point.  In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy".   I wonder whether they could explain the difference if anyone asked them.    Since the word 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word.

 

I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'.  It would have been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three major issues:  (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of the internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the world, and to the experiencer.

 

I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to expl

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, List

I think this concept of the ‘right’ to use different terminologies when 
discussing  reality aligns with Peirce’s concept of the advancement of 
knowledge, where he specifically rejects the Cartesian ‘epistemic 
individualism’, ie, making the individual the ‘locus of knowledge’ [ with its 
underlying nominalism] vs the focus on the explorations of the long term 
‘community of inquirers’ .

There’s a nice very readable thesis by Ian MacDonald 2019 on ‘Communal 
Inferentialism: Charles S. Peirce’s Critique of Epistemic Individualism’….which 
has all the relevant quotations etc…and an excellent analysis. 

The rejection of nominalism, with its focus on individual terms/names - and 
thus, an assumption of the ’truth’ of epistemic individualism …moves into a 
focus instead on the ‘essential method of gaining knowledge which is communal 
inferentialism or IF-THEN argumentation…as found in abduction and induction.   
Where “every judgment results from inference’ [W2.240]. And, our judgments 
about the world must be communal. 

Again, this notion of the community of inquirers , who may be using different 
terms for the same phenomenon, is not an argument against the necessity for the 
community to use common terms [ as in chemical names, biological erms, legal 
definitions] but is instead an argument about the importance of recognizing 
that the community of inquirers may be discussing the same phenomenon but using 
different terms - and each person might have something to add to the generation 
of knowledge. 

Edwina



> On Apr 13, 2024, at 9:21 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Jon, List,
> 
> Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.  
> 
> ET:   I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues.  
> No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, 
> in particular, in the scientific disciplines.
> 
> JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for 
> naming biological species.
> 
> JAS:  Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the 
> underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.
> 
> Yes, of course.   As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that.  And that is why 
> Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable 
> that there are national and international committees that set the standards 
> for them.
> 
> But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise 
> boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any 
> attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because 
> it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with 
> changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day 
> and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any 
> precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today.  
> 
> JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' 
> with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 
> 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have 
> continued to use 'phenomenology'.
> 
> JAS:  Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning 
> was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...
> 
> Please note what I was trying to say.  I just finished writing an article 
> with the tite "Phaneroscopy:  The Science of Diagrams".  That article will 
> appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy".  For that 
> purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that 
> distinction in my article.
> 
> But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new 
> term.  There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people 
> won't get the point.  In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the 
> two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy".   I wonder whether 
> they could explain the difference if anyone asked them.Since the word 
> 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or 
> use Peirce's word.
> 
> I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and 
> students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'.  It would 
> have been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three 
> major issues:  (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of 
> the internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the 
> world, and to the experiencer.
> 
> I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to explain Peirce's 
> writings.  But I strongly suspect that more people (including Peirce 
> scholars) would get a better understanding of his intentions if he had not 
> coined that word.
> 
> I believe that Peirce would have written more clearly and even more precisely 
> if he had a regular teaching 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Jon, List,

Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.

ET:   I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues.  No-one 
is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in 
particular, in the scientific disciplines.

JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming 
biological species.

JAS:  Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the 
underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.

Yes, of course.   As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that.  And that is why 
Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that 
there are national and international committees that set the standards for them.

But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise 
boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any 
attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it 
would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes 
over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. 
 The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise 
definition in 1900 would be obsolete today.

JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 
'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 
'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have 
continued to use 'phenomenology'.

JAS:  Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning 
was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...

Please note what I was trying to say.  I just finished writing an article with 
the tite "Phaneroscopy:  The Science of Diagrams".  That article will appear in 
a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy".  For that purpose, 
Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in 
my article.

But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term. 
 There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't 
get the point.  In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words 
in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy".   I wonder whether they could 
explain the difference if anyone asked them.Since the word 'phenomenology' 
is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word.

I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and 
students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'.  It would have 
been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three major 
issues:  (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of the 
internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the world, 
and to the experiencer.

I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to explain Peirce's 
writings.  But I strongly suspect that more people (including Peirce scholars) 
would get a better understanding of his intentions if he had not coined that 
word.

I believe that Peirce would have written more clearly and even more precisely 
if he had a regular teaching job where he would talk to students on a daily 
basis.  Those few years at Johns Hopkins, for example, enabled him to create a 
revolution in logic.  I also believe that his writings in his last decade would 
also have been far clearer and much more convincing if he had met a class of 
students on a daily basis,

Fundamental principle:  If Peirce had more feedback from his readers, I believe 
that he would have made major changes in his choice of terminology and style of 
writing.  He can no longer change his texts, but we can improve the way we 
teach, talk, and write about his theories.   And choice of terminology is a 
good part of that process.

John


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 

List, JAS

I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues.

No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in 
particular, in the scientific disciplines. And this includes the term created 
by an individual for a specific specimen or action or..medical treatment or…

Or - if we are studying one particular person, be it Kant or Aristotle or 
Peirce - then, obviously, our focus is on and only on, that particular 
individual’s works and terms.

What some of us are discussing is totally different from taxonomy  We aren’t 
talking about any one’s particular terminology but about thought and about 
Reality, the Real world. - and refers to the processes of semiosic dynamics, 
ie.., information or cognitive dynamics - in the physicochemical, biological 
and social realms. And in this area, as Peirce points out - “to make single 
individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious” 5.265. 1868.

And therefore what we are talking about is Reality - and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

List, JAS

I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. 

No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in 
particular, in the scientific disciplines. And this includes the term created 
by an individual for a specific specimen or action or..medical treatment or…

Or - if we are studying one particular person, be it Kant or Aristotle or 
Peirce - then, obviously, our focus is on and only on, that particular 
individual’s works and terms. 

What some of us are discussing is totally different from taxonomy  We aren’t 
talking about any one’s particular terminology but about thought and about 
Reality, the Real world. - and refers to the processes of semiosic dynamics, 
ie.., information or cognitive dynamics - in the physicochemical, biological 
and social realms. And in this area, as Peirce points out - “to make single 
individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious” 5.265. 1868. 

And therefore what we are talking about is Reality - and “Thus, the very origin 
of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves 
the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits and capable of a definite 
increase in knowledge” [5.311; emphasis in original]

And this exploration of reality involves a community of scholars, using reason, 
doubt, discussion,ie, “There are Real Things, whose characters are entirely 
independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affects our senses 
according to regular laws, and though our sensations are as different as are 
our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of 
perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are”  
5.384. And we achieve this by a ‘community of inquirers
5.265

That is, Peirce was cautious about the individual [Cartesian] ‘intuition’  and 
reliance on personal ‘clear and distinct ideas' and instead, focused on that 
‘community of inquirers over time’ - Furthermore his focus is on the connection 
that our idea has with the real world; ie,  ’the effects, that might 
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception 
to have’. 5.402.

This isn’t about terminology; this is about the exploration of Reality - and 
requires a community. Therefore - to examine what other scholars are saying 
about their explorations of Reality - and with their terms The fact is - other 
scholars are also exploring Reality; they are using different terms - but- 
their focus and agenda is similar, and in many cases their infrastructure they 
develop is similar to that of Peirce. 

Edwina

> On Apr 13, 2024, at 6:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> John, Edwina, List:
> 
> Like Gary, I would prefer not to engage in another back-and-forth on this 
> well-worn ground, so I will just offer a few comments and hopefully leave it 
> at that.
> 
> JFS: The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming 
> biological species.
> 
> Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the 
> underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.
> 
> CSP: The problem of the biological taxonomists has, however, been 
> incomparably more difficult; and they have solved it (barring small 
> exceptions) with brilliant success. How did they accomplish this? Not by 
> appealing to the power of congresses, but by appealing to the power of the 
> idea of right and wrong. ... [W]hoever deliberately uses a word or other 
> symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole 
> rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the 
> symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat 
> the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903)
> 
> That is why the portion of "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic" where this 
> passage appears bears the title, "The Ethics of Terminology"--it advocates 
> voluntary cooperation by the practitioners of any particular branch of 
> science to use scrupulously consistent terminology. In fact, Peirce 
> acknowledges up-front that it would violate his own principles "to make the 
> smallest pretension to dictate the conduct of others in this matter" (CP 
> 2.219, EP 2:263; emphasis mine). Our disagreement over "tone" vs. "mark" is a 
> good example--we have each attempted to persuade the other (and those reading 
> along) to adopt one of these and abandon the other, but since Peirce himself 
> considered both without definitively choosing one, neither of us can rightly 
> impose his preference on the other (or anyone else). 
> 
> JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' 
> with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that he was 
> justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough overlap 
> that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.
> 
> Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was 
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, Edwina, List:

Like Gary, I would prefer not to engage in another back-and-forth on this
well-worn ground, so I will just offer a few comments and hopefully leave
it at that.

JFS: The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming
biological species.


Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions *themselves *as the
underlying *motivation *that prompted biologists to embrace them.

CSP: The problem of the biological taxonomists has, however, been
incomparably more difficult; and they have solved it (barring small
exceptions) with brilliant success. How did they accomplish this? Not by
appealing to the power of congresses, but by appealing to the power of the
idea of right and wrong. ... [W]hoever deliberately uses a word or other
symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole
rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the
symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat
the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903)


That is why the portion of "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic" where
this passage appears bears the title, "The Ethics of Terminology"--it
advocates *voluntary *cooperation by the practitioners of any particular
branch of science to use scrupulously consistent terminology. In
fact, Peirce acknowledges up-front that it would *violate *his own
principles "to make the smallest pretension to *dictate* the conduct of
others in this matter" (CP 2.219, EP 2:263; emphasis mine). Our
disagreement over "tone" vs. "mark" is a good example--we have each
attempted to *persuade *the other (and those reading along) to adopt one of
these and abandon the other, but since Peirce himself considered both
without definitively choosing one, neither of us can rightly *impose *his
preference on the other (or anyone else).

JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology'
with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that he was
justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough
overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.


Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was
perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out--"for
philosophical conceptions which vary *by a hair's breadth* from those for
which suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the
usages of philosophical terminology and those of the English language, but
yet with a distinctly technical appearance" (CP 2.226, EP 2:266; emphasis
mine). He coined "the phaneron" for whatever is or could be present to any
mind in any way because this is a slightly different conception from "the
phenomenon" as introduced by Hegel and later adopted by Husserl, and he
renamed the corresponding science "phaneroscopy" because it is more about
direct observation than systematic study.

JFS: It is the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for
choosing terminology for that field. I recommend that practice.


In the field of Peirce scholarship, the expert whose advice on choosing
terminology should be given the most weight is obviously Peirce himself.
Otherwise, how can we legitimately claim to be expounding *his *ideas and
applying *his *framework? Unfortunately, when the terminology of modern
research fields is used instead, it is not always clear that those
different terms really have the same meanings as *Peirce's *terms.
Consequently, it can be inaccurate or at least misleading to describe the
resulting framework as *Peircean*--the terminological differences reflect
underlying *conceptual *differences. Frankly, that is one of my concerns
about "mark"--perhaps it *seems *congenial to audiences today because they
already have a sense of what it means, but in fact they *do not* have in
mind "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt
to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 12:07 PM Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> John, List
>
> I think that Peirce’s focus on the ethics of terminology points to his
> claim that a term that he uses means, so to speak, ’this but not that’.In
> other words, his focus was that a term has a specific meaning..and I see
> absolutely nothing wrong with this!!
>
> My point is different - What I’m saying is that other scholars have
> focused on the same issues as Peirce, but they have used different terms.
> When we refer to these issues and this includes within a Peircean
> discussion, I think we should feel free to use those different terms and
> thus, show how Peirce and other scholars have similar or even different
> analyses of these realities…even though they use different terms for the
> same phenomena.
>
> I think it is vital 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Mary Libertin]

I accidentally hit the send button and I apologize for the incompleteness of my 
previous post.  

In response to the question about the definition of nominalism, I must admit 
that I have always been fascinated by Peirce’s discussion of the difference 
between nominalism and realism. 

Max H. Fisch writes the following about nominalism and realism in Published 
Works I: Electric Edition: Part Three. 1901-1908. The following is from pages 
xxviii-xxvix of the introduction. I use the blue coloring to focus Fisch's 
text, as opposed to his footnotes.
Now for the hairsplitting. The Berkeley review is much more emphatic than the 
cognition series on the distinction between the
[7 

 For details see Max H. Fisch, "Peirce's Progress from

  Nominalism

   toward Realism," Monist 51(1967):159–78, at 160–65.]
[8 

 For details see Max H. Fisch, "Peirce's General Theory of Signs," in Sight, 
Sound, and Sense, edited by Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1978), pp. 31–70 at 33–38 and, for Berkeley, pp. 57,63,65. For Peirce's 
early

  nominalism

   and its probable derivation from Whately, see also pp. 60–63. (It is worth 
adding here that Boole in An Investigation of the Laws of Thought after an 
introductory first chapter begins the investigation with Chapter II "Of Signs 
in General, and of the Signs appropriate to the science of Logic in particular; 
also of the Laws to which that class of signs are Subject"; and that Chapter 
III is headed "Derivation of the Laws of the Symbols of Logic from the Laws of 
the Operations of the Human Mind.”)]
― xxviii ―

forward and the backward reference of the term "reality" and the identification 
of

  nominalism

   with the backward and of realism with the forward reference. Which amounts 
to a semeiotic resolution of the controversy. Of the three central categories, 
quality is monadic, relation dyadic, and representation irreducibly triadic. 
The sign represents an object to or for an interpretant. But we may focus on 
the sign-object or on the sign-interpretant. If the question is whether there 
are real universals, the nominalists turn backward to the sign-object and do 
not find them; the realists turn forward to the sign-interpretant and find them 
(pp. 467 ff. below). That is primarily because the backward reference to the 
object is more individualistic, and the forward reference to the interpretant 
is more social. So realism goes with what has been called the social theory of 
logic, or "logical socialism."9 

 If we were selecting key sentences from the Peirce texts in the present 
volume, they might well include these two: (1) "Thus, the very origin of the 
conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the 
notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite 
increase of knowledge" (p. 239). (2) "Whether men really have anything in 
common, so that the community is to be considered as an end in itself, and if 
so, what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most fundamental 
practical question in regard to every public institution the constitution of 
which we have it in our power to influence" (p. 487).

The question about whether there are real universals can be answered via 
nominalism or realism, as explained above. Peirce grappled with the terms. He 
moved from being a nominalist to a realist during his life. See his review of 
Berkeley’s Collected Works where he explains his move from nominalism to 
realism.

Another place where Peirce discusses the term is in “A Description of a 
Notation for the Logic of Relatives.” I find that fascinating and can quote 
from it later.

Overall, I hope we can put the Peirce-L into the 21st century.

Best,
Mary Libertin

> 
> List, 
>  
> I agree with 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Mary Libertin]

List, 
 
I agree with Edwina’s points. I hope Peirce’s comments will focus us on the 
matter at hand. 

87 (20 August 1908) 164-165: Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and 
Meaning of Thought, or Genetic Logic. Vol. II.
On 20 August 1908, Peirce published a review of James Baldwin’s Experimental 
Logic, or Genetic Theory of Thought. 
In it he writes,
 "The main motive of logic has always been to get possession of a method for 
determining the values of arguments. Now, it is obvious that whatever bearing 
the truth of one thought may have upon the truth of another will depend 
exclusively upon what the states of things are which the two thoughts represent 
to be real, and not at all upon the psychical or linguistic forms in which they 
are dressed, nor upon the psychical processes by which that dress is given to 
them. Whether we say that among sea-animals will be found some that give milk 
to their young or whether we say that among animals that give milk to their 
young will be found some that inhabit the sea, is for all purposes of 
argumentation quite indifferent; and the equivalence is here so evident that 
the school of "exact," or mathematical, logicians are almost unanimous in 
adopting, as their standard, or canonical, form of expressing the same fact, 
substantially this: "There is an aquatic mammal." Newton's great discovery is 
usually stated in elementary books, and is thought of by ordinary people in the 
form that each separate body in the solar system has an instantaneous component 
acceleration toward every other proportional to the mass of that other and 
inversely proportioned to the square of the distance between them, but is 
otherwise constant for all and at all times. But in writings on celestial 
mechanics (as in Equation 15 on p. 175 of Dr. Moulton's admirable little 
"Introduction" to the science), the form in which the same fact is often stated 
and intended to be thought is that the sum of the vires vivæ (or their halves, 
according to the old definition) of all the bodies of the system subtracted 
from the sum of the reciprocals of the distances between the several bodies, 
each reciprocal being multiplied by the product of the masses of the pair of 
bodies concerned and these masses being expressed in terms of a gravitational 
unit, remains unchanged. Since these two statements represent, and would in all 
conceivable cases represent precisely the same state of things, they are for 
all purposes of reasoning interchangeable. It follows that for logic they are 
equivalent, although, since this equivalence is not self-evident, they cannot 
strictly he called identical. From such considerations it follows that, in 
general, logic has nothing to do with different dresses of thought which cannot 
possibly represent different states of things; or at most has no more to do 
with them than to demonstrate 
― 299 ―


that whatever state of things is represented by the one is equally represented 
by the other. That this principle, suitably modified for modals, ought to 
determine what is and what is not relevant to logic has been practically or 
virtually acknowledged in every system of logic excepting some of those which 
have arisen since the bankruptcy of Hegelianism, with the consequent de facto 
supremacy of psychology in current philosophy. But none of those which deny 
that application of the principle have improved reasoning in the smallest 
particular.”

This bears repeating: 

"Since these two statements represent, and would in all conceivable cases 
represent precisely the same state of things, they are for all purposes of 
reasoning interchangeable. It follows that for logic they are equivalent, 
although, since this equivalence is not self-evident, they cannot strictly he 
called identical. From such considerations it follows that, in general, logic 
has nothing to do with different dresses of thought which cannot possibly 
represent different states of things…"


> On Apr 13, 2024, at 2:13 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I 
> will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last 
> word.
> 
> We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same 
> situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so fosters confusion, 
> that within a scientific community that a shared shared terminology is a 
> desideratum which affords clarity in discussions of specific subject matter 
> if and when such a shared terminology is adopted. Of course such a 
> desideratum is a kind of ideal for a given scientific discipline, for any 
> scientific community, one that is not always possible, but desirable where 
> and when it is possible. 
> 
> My point today would be that if Peirce's work in semeiotic, etc. is as 
> important as, for example, Jon and John (and I and many others) claim that it 
> is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary, List

 1] With regard to terminology - the question becomes - whose terms are to be 
used?  My point is that there are other researchers who are focused on similar 
issues, each unknown to the others, [such as complex adaptive systems, the 
development of information,  anticipation processes, the development of norms 
of behaviour; genetic developments etc and etc  - the list is enormous]…I don’t 
think that anyone can be certain of ‘who thought it first’ -and therefore we 
must use The First Person's terminology’.  Most certainly, as has been pointed 
out, when we are referring to objective sciences such as  chemistry and 
referring to empirically observable chemicals and molecules and interactions 
etc… the Community of Scholars develops the terminology, over time, together.

But- cognitive and semiosic processes are different - and as I’ve said, there 
are multiple scholars working in these fields - each unknown to the other,  and 
there is no reason why, in my view, that we cannot use their terms when we 
refer to the Peircean framework…I think we should acknowledge the analytic work 
that is being done in other fields that, unknown to the researcher, fits in 
perfectly within the Peircean framework. …And I don’t see why we should insist 
that they use Peircan terminology!

2] I think that ‘purist’ could describe Jon’s approach to Peirce, but I wasn’t 
referencing him in particular - I was referencing my view that it is a fact 
that other research is being done in the same areas that Peirce focused on - 
albeit with different terminology - and I consider it important that Peircean 
research acknowledge this work and see where these analysis, using different 
terms,  align within the Peircean framework. And of course, I always emphasize 
pragmatic applications of theory.

Edwina

> On Apr 13, 2024, at 2:13 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I 
> will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last 
> word.
> 
> We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same 
> situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so fosters confusion, 
> that within a scientific community that a shared shared terminology is a 
> desideratum which affords clarity in discussions of specific subject matter 
> if and when such a shared terminology is adopted. Of course such a 
> desideratum is a kind of ideal for a given scientific discipline, for any 
> scientific community, one that is not always possible, but desirable where 
> and when it is possible. 
> 
> My point today would be that if Peirce's work in semeiotic, etc. is as 
> important as, for example, Jon and John (and I and many others) claim that it 
> is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and if there is no 
> already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of 
> introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that it 
> behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is 
> feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what Claudio 
> Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art, architecture and 
> design. 
> 
> It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L, 
> there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving several 
> forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several others. 
> Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by others (and 
> yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that during that 
> intense exchange I did indeed use such words as "pseudo-Peircean" to describe 
> you, but that I promptly apologized, and that you accepted my apology. [I 
> will not comment here on the unpleasant expressions which were directed at me 
> (and others) by you (and others) in that fusilade of off List exchanges since 
> I would hope that the List is well on its way to putting that difficult 
> period behind us. In any event, I am truly sorry for anything I said then 
> that was offensive.]
> 
> If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does 
> indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's 
> terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my 
> referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant 
> primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the seminar 
> room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put Peirce's 
> ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with those 
> accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in 
> structural engineering on the List.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary
> 
> 
> 
> On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 7:29 AM Edwina Taborsky  > wrote:
>> Gary R, List
>> 
>> 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I
will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last
word.

We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same
situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so fosters confusion,
that within a scientific community that a shared shared terminology is a*
desideratum* which affords clarity in discussions of specific subject
matter *if and when such a shared terminology is adopted*. Of course
such a *desideratum
*is a kind of ideal for a given scientific discipline, for any scientific
community, one that is not always possible, but desirable where and when it
is possible.

My point today would be that if Peirce's work in semeiotic, etc. is as
important as, for example, Jon and John (and I and many others) claim that
it is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and *if* there is
no already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of
introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that
it behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is
feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what
Claudio Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art,
architecture and design.

It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L,
there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving
several forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several
others. Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by
others (and yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that
during that intense exchange I did indeed use such words as
"pseudo-Peircean" to describe you, but that I promptly apologized, and that
you accepted my apology. [I will not comment here on the unpleasant
expressions which were directed at me (and others) by you (and others) in
that fusilade of off List exchanges since I would hope that the List is
well on its way to putting that difficult period behind us. In any event, I
am truly sorry for anything I said then that was offensive.]

If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does
indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's
terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my
referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant
primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the
seminar room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put
Peirce's ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with
those accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in
structural engineering on the List.

Best,

Gary



On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 7:29 AM Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Gary R, List
>
> 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology.  I am
> also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing.  I am
> also aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to
> the same  situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot
> isolate scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only
> the terms that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that
> these different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and
> should be open to using  these different terms for the SAME situation.
>
> 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the
> insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some
> reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to
> the meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction
> into nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality -
> aka universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different
> terms, there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as
> conceptualism.
>
> Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s
> not my point, is it?
>
> 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic,
> idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’.
>
> 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that
> the work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of
> another scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all
> - it is perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce
> using the terms used by other scholars.
>
> 5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an
> ‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given
> conference papers and  published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can
> be made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an
> example of the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, List

I think that Peirce’s focus on the ethics of terminology points to his claim 
that a term that he uses means, so to speak, ’this but not that’.In other 
words, his focus was that a term has a specific meaning..and I see absolutely 
nothing wrong with this!!

My point is different - What I’m saying is that other scholars have focused on 
the same issues as Peirce, but they have used different terms.  When we refer 
to these issues and this includes within a Peircean discussion, I think we 
should feel free to use those different terms and thus, show how Peirce and 
other scholars have similar or even different analyses of these realities…even 
though they use different terms for the same phenomena. 

I think it is vital to move the Peircean framework into modern research fields; 
It is a powerful analytic framework and has a great deal to teach us - and to 
do so, I feel, requires that we use terminology that these other fields feel 
comfortable with. …

Edwina

> On Apr 13, 2024, at 12:53 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Gary, Robert, List,
> 
> I'm sure that we're all familiar with Peirce's note about the ethics of 
> terminology.  But it's not clear whether its influence was good, bad, or 
> indifferent.  The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for 
> naming biological species.  But very few things in the world are so rigidly 
> classifiable.  And those that are have been classified by international 
> conventions:  the integers, the chemical elements, and the chemical 
> compounds.  
> 
> And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 
> 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later.  I believe that he was justified 
> in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough overlap that he 
> could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.   As for the choice of 'mark' vs 
> 'tone', I believe that 'tone' was a poor choice, and his vacillation in 1908 
> indicates that he had some misgivings.  That vacillation nullifies any 
> obligation to continue his practice.
> 
> Another poor choice on Peirce's part was to make 'logic' a synonym for 'logic 
> as semeiotic'.  Until 1902, he used 'logic' as a synonym for the symbolic 
> logic of Boole and his followers (of which he was one).  Instead, he chose 
> the usage for the title of books, such as Whateley's.   I believe that Peirce 
> made a serious mistake, and Fisch (in his 1986 book) deliberately chose the 
> term 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic'.  In my recent 
> article on phaneroscopy, I adopted  Fisch's recommendation.
> 
> And by the way, my citation of Fisch is NOT an appeal to authority.  It is 
> the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing 
> terminology for that field.  I recommend that practice.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> Gary R, List
> 
> 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology.  I am 
> also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing.  I am also 
> aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to the 
> same  situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot isolate 
> scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only the terms 
> that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that these 
> different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and should be 
> open to using  these different terms for the SAME situation.
> 
> 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the 
> insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some 
> reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to the 
> meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction into 
> nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - aka 
> universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different terms, 
> there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as 
> conceptualism. 
> 
> Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s not 
> my point, is it?
> 
> 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, 
> idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’. 
> 
> 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that the 
> work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of another 
> scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all - it is 
> perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce using the 
> terms used by other scholars.
> 
> 5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an 
> ‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given 
> conference papers and  published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can be 
> made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an example of 
> the logical fallacy of 'appeal to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Gary, Robert, List,

I'm sure that we're all familiar with Peirce's note about the ethics of 
terminology.  But it's not clear whether its influence was good, bad, or 
indifferent.  The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for 
naming biological species.  But very few things in the world are so rigidly 
classifiable.  And those that are have been classified by international 
conventions:  the integers, the chemical elements, and the chemical compounds.

And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 
'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later.  I believe that he was justified 
in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough overlap that he 
could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.   As for the choice of 'mark' vs 
'tone', I believe that 'tone' was a poor choice, and his vacillation in 1908 
indicates that he had some misgivings.  That vacillation nullifies any 
obligation to continue his practice.

Another poor choice on Peirce's part was to make 'logic' a synonym for 'logic 
as semeiotic'.  Until 1902, he used 'logic' as a synonym for the symbolic logic 
of Boole and his followers (of which he was one).  Instead, he chose the usage 
for the title of books, such as Whateley's.   I believe that Peirce made a 
serious mistake, and Fisch (in his 1986 book) deliberately chose the term 
'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic'.  In my recent article 
on phaneroscopy, I adopted  Fisch's recommendation.

And by the way, my citation of Fisch is NOT an appeal to authority.  It is the 
practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing terminology 
for that field.  I recommend that practice.

John


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 

Gary R, List

1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology.  I am also 
aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing.  I am also aware 
of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to the same  
situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot isolate scholars and 
research from each other by insisting that use only the terms that specific 
scholar used. We should, rather, understand that these different scholars were 
trying to examine the same situations - and should be open to using  these 
different terms for the SAME situation.

2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the 
insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some 
reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to the 
meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction into 
nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - aka 
universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different terms, 
there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as 
conceptualism.

Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s not 
my point, is it?

3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, 
idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’.

4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that the 
work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of another 
scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all - it is 
perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce using the 
terms used by other scholars.

5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an 
‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given 
conference papers and  published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can be 
made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an example of 
the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have made reference, 
- such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those of other people on 
the list.

Edwina

On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:

Edwina, List,

This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your addendum 
to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions:

You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of 
terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence that 
terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it can 
constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree (which you 
appear to), why?

And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally focus 
on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt, and 
myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a rigorous 
insistence on the importance of terminology has anything to do with nominalism. 
Please explain how it does. And please also include your definition of 
nominalism.

And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with having 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R, List

1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology.  I am also 
aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing.  I am also aware 
of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to the same  
situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot isolate scholars and 
research from each other by insisting that use only the terms that specific 
scholar used. We should, rather, understand that these different scholars were 
trying to examine the same situations - and should be open to using  these 
different terms for the SAME situation.

2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the 
insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some 
reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to the 
meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction into 
nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - aka 
universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different terms, 
there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as 
conceptualism. 

Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s not 
my point, is it?

3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, 
idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’. 

4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that the 
work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of another 
scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all - it is 
perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce using the 
terms used by other scholars.

5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an 
‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given 
conference papers and  published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can be 
made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an example of 
the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have made reference, 
- such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those of other people on 
the list. 

Edwina 

> On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your 
> addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions:
> 
> You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of 
> terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence that 
> terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it can 
> constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree (which you 
> appear to), why?  
> 
> And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally 
> focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt, 
> and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a 
> rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has anything to do with 
> nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your 
> definition of nominalism.
> 
> And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with 
> having different concepts?
> 
> Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the List 
> referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed 
> constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today you 
> suggested that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression 
> been directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild 
> kind of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea what 
> you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain what you 
> mean by this.
> 
> It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean semeiotic, 
> of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and pragmatism -- and 
> that they are not mutually exclusive, that a scholar/scientist can be 
> interested both in theory and practice (and although Peirce once denied it, 
> he himself accomplished much in both theory and practice).
> 
> So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today. 
> 
> And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt, 
> not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean theoretical 
> 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own priority is 
> accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on 
> Peirce's views by carefully studying and adhering to his words," is an 
> accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often invited to speak at 
> conventions and other gatherings because of his expertise.
> 
> And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along 
> with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought is 
> applied 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[robert marty]

John, List,
In the same vein, I also published another article in Academia.edu, which
consists of a commented reading of CP 265, the item that follows his
diagram of affinities between classes of signs of 2.264 (a sort of
intuition that Peirce had of the structure of order that is a lattice,
which I have shown many times). Probably I wasn't convincing enough.
Perhaps this comment will be more convincing. There is no mention of
Tone/Mark, Token, or Type, but of course, they are present in other names.

 https://www.academia.edu/44462107/Other_subdivisions_of_signs
<https://www.academia.edu/44462107/Other_subdivisions_of_signs>

As for hypoicons, which I, too, have noted appear only once in MS 478, I am
in the process of finalizing a solid argument, at my peril, of course, to
the effect that this notion should be abandoned because it is invalidated
by the contents of MS 540.  My conclusion is that these hypoicons, wrongly
considered as a sort of subdivisions of icons (which I myself erroneously
theorized) are a kind of shadow image of the trichotomy of the object of
the sign, forgotten by Peirce in MS 478. But that's another story.
Regards,
Robert

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 21:19, John F Sowa  a écrit :

> Robert, Jon, List,
>
> Thanks for the note.  There is nothing controversial about it, and I agree
> with Jon's comments.
>
> But I would note that Peirce's later shift to semes, phemes, and delomes
> enabled him to simplify, some of the issues, and generalize others.  For
> example, the idea of hypoicons seemed to be a powerful new concept that
> Peirce discussed in only one MS.He didn't need it later because he
> introduced semes as a generalization of rhemes.
>
> This is just one of many ways that Peirce's system developed during the
> decade of 1903 to 1913.  To avoid disturbing this moment of agreement, I
> won't say anything more.
>
> John
>
>
>
> --
> *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> *Sent*: 4/12/24 1:18 PM
> *To*: Peirce-L 
> *Cc*: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>, Anthony Jappy ,
> "Houser, Nathan R." 
> *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
>
> Robert, List:
>
> Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the
> List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's
> 1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his
> 1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only
> quibble with it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is
> why it identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly
> replaces "sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537,
> 1906). Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three
> additional classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost
> oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical
> sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens.
>
> RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should
> make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a
> tone/mark of a particular kind.
>
>
> Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this.
>
> CSP: A *Qualisign *is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act
> as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with
> its character as a sign.
> A *Sinsign ...* is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It
> can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or
> rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and
> only form a sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291,
> 1903)
>
> CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as
> some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon,
> and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only
> be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign.
> (CP 2.255, EP 2:294, 1903)
>
>
> Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be
> carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant
> Forms" (CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied
> in sinsigns/tokens in order to *act *as signs. In fact, every
> sinsign/token *involves *qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every
> iconic sinsign/token *embodies *a qualisign.
>
> Regards,
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your
addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions:

You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of
terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence
that terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it
can constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree
(which you appear to), why?

And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally
focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt,
and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a
rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has *anything* to do
with nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your
definition of nominalism.

And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with
having different concepts?

Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the
List referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed
constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today
*you* suggested
that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression been
directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild
*kind* of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea
what you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain
what you mean by this.

It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean
semeiotic, of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and
pragmatism -- and that they are not mutually exclusive, that a
scholar/scientist can be interested both in theory and practice (and
although Peirce once denied it, he himself accomplished much in both theory
and practice).

So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today.

And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt,
not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean
theoretical 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own
priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully
building on *Peirce's *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *
words," is an accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often
invited to speak at conventions and other gatherings because of his
expertise.

And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along
with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought
is applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and ethics.
 https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cJ=en

Best,

Gary



On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> List
>
> As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the
> correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the
> particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to
> ‘what is real’. [ ie the meaning and function].
>
> Edwina
>
> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’
> of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s
> a debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a
> more basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function
> of the triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on
> ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .
>
>  Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce
> prefer’ with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are
> often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression -
> the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally
> according to Peirce -  these are ‘false distinctions’….
>
> Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which
> Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your
> analysis,  it better explains the operative function of what is
> semiotically  taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour
> of rejection???
>
> I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the
> terms ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic
> object and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic
> mediation….[*Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean;
> you are…*” . But without such modernization and explanation of the
> function of semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only
> Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be
> able to move the real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern
> world. And that -  - is where I believe the focus should be.
>
> Edwina
>
>
> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty 
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Jon,

To begin, I'll quote a highly respected authority about arguments from 
authority.  The following passage about authority comes from Wikiquote, a 
source that is widely considered an authoritative source of information:

"Appeal to an authority which depends on human reason is the weakest kind of 
proof.

- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica

...when we engage in argument we must look to the weight of reason rather than 
authority. Indeed, students who are keen to learn often find the authority of 
those who claim to be teachers to be an obstacle, for they cease to apply their 
own judgement and regard as definitive the solution offered by the mentor of 
whom they approve. I myself tend to disapprove of the alleged practice of the 
Pythagoreans: the story goes that if they were maintaining some position in 
argument, and were asked why, they would reply: "The master said so", the 
master being Pythagoras. Prior judgement exercised such sway that authority 
prevailed even when unsupported by reason."

My argument for the word 'mark' as a better choice than 'tone' is based on my 
own reasoning long before I noticed that Tony Jappy had made the same choice.  
And in the discussions, I supported every point with my own reasons.  However, 
I realized that some readers, such as you, might disagree.  So I said that if 
you don't believe me, go to another Peirce scholar who has spent years of 
research on these issues.

That is the kind of citation that is REQUIRED in peer-reviewed publications in 
every field.  The author is expected to cite related research.  Instead of 
criticizing me, you should thank me for providing that additional information.

JAS:  That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is 
required by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time. Instead, 
it is primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are not the 
author's.

I suggest that you read (or reread) some of the articles in the Summa 
Theologiae by Aquinas.  In every article, he cites what other scholars have 
written pro and con each of the statements he is trying to prove.  He then 
explains the arguments he agrees with and refutes the ones he disagrees with.

The methods of citation by Aquinas established the polices for scholarly 
writing for universities for the next 800 years.  At the top, I quoted Aquinas. 
 I suggest that you read (or reread) a few of his articles.  My citations of 
Jappy's writings are the same kind of references that Aquinas used to cite 
authors who supported the points he was trying to prove.

And by the way, Peirce had also read quite a bit of the writings by Aquinas (in 
Latin, of course).  In fact, the commentary about Aristotle by Aquinas is still 
regarded as a good introduction today.  In fact, Hilary Putnam recommended it.

Those recommendations are very respectable.  They're the kind of references I 
made to Jappy.  Anybody who criticizes that as a fallacy deserves a huge amount 
of criticism.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 4/11/24 10:28 PM

John, List:

JFS: First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical 
fallacy". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or 
an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority.

Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy when "the opinion of an influential 
figure is used as evidence to support an argument" 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority). Quoting a dictionary 
or encyclopedia--including Wikipedia, as in this case--is not a fallacious 
appeal to authority because such references contain facts on which there is 
broad consensus, not opinions whose persuasiveness depends primarily on the 
eminence and purported expertise of a particular person who holds them.

JFS: The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that 
authors are required to show the experts whose authority they depend on for 
their own claims.

That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is required 
by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time. Instead, it is 
primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are not the author's.

JFS: In fact, when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as 
an authority.

Quoting Peirce to support scholarly claims about his own views is also not a 
fallacious appeal to authority. On the contrary, as I have said before, his is 
the only authority that matters in such a context. As someone once said, 
"Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody 
can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce intended" 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00085.html).

JFS: The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are terms in 
exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a term.

Obviously, all these English words are terms--no one is disputing that. The 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Robert, Jon, List,

Thanks for the note.  There is nothing controversial about it, and I agree with 
Jon's comments.

But I would note that Peirce's later shift to semes, phemes, and delomes 
enabled him to simplify, some of the issues, and generalize others.  For 
example, the idea of hypoicons seemed to be a powerful new concept that Peirce 
discussed in only one MS.He didn't need it later because he introduced 
semes as a generalization of rhemes.

This is just one of many ways that Peirce's system developed during the decade 
of 1903 to 1913.  To avoid disturbing this moment of agreement, I won't say 
anything more.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 4/12/24 1:18 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci 
, Anthony Jappy , 
"Houser, Nathan R." 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

Robert, List:

Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the List 
back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's 1903 
taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his 1906-1908 
taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only quibble with 
it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is why it 
identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly replaces 
"sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537, 1906). 
Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three additional 
classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost oval in each Venn 
diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical sinsigns/tokens, and dicent 
sinsigns/tokens.

RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should make it 
possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a tone/mark 
of a particular kind.

Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this.

CSP: A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a sign 
until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character 
as a sign.
A Sinsign ... is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only 
be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, 
several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a 
sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291, 1903)

CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as some 
quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon, and thus 
a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only be 
interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign. (CP 
2.255, EP 2:294, 1903)

Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be 
carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant Forms" 
(CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied in 
sinsigns/tokens in order to act as signs. In fact, every sinsign/token involves 
qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every iconic sinsign/token embodies a 
qualisign.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 5:30 AM robert marty  wrote:
List,I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a 
few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the 
same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types 
of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the
List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's
1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his
1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only
quibble with it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is
why it identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly
replaces "sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537,
1906). Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three
additional classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost
oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical
sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens.

RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should
make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a
tone/mark of a particular kind.


Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this.

CSP: A *Qualisign *is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as
a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its
character as a sign.
A *Sinsign ...* is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It
can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or
rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and
only form a sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291,
1903)

CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as
some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon,
and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only
be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign.
(CP 2.255, EP 2:294, 1903)


Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be
carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant
Forms" (CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied
in sinsigns/tokens in order to *act *as signs. In fact, every
sinsign/token *involves
*qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every iconic sinsign/token *embodies
*a qualisign.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 5:30 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> List,
> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a
> few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but
> the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the
> six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
> Regards,
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the correct 
one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the particular, the 
individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to ‘what is real’. [ ie the 
meaning and function].

Edwina

> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of 
> the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a 
> debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more 
> basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the 
> triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term 
> to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .
> 
>  Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce 
> prefer’ with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are 
> often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - 
> the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally 
> according to Peirce -  these are ‘false distinctions’….
> 
> Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which 
> Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your 
> analysis,  it better explains the operative function of what is semiotically  
> taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection???
> 
> I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
> ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object 
> and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic 
> mediation….[Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you 
> are…” . But without such modernization and explanation of the function of 
> semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - 
> and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be able to move the 
> real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern world. And that -  - 
> is where I believe the focus should be. 
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty  wrote:
>> 
>> List,
>> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a 
>> few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but 
>> the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the 
>> six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
>> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>> Regards,
>> Robert Marty
>> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
>> 
>> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt > > a écrit :
>>> John, List:
>>> 
>>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 
>>> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>>> 
>>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in 
>>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," 
>>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>>> 
>>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be 
>>> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>>> 
>>> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so 
>>> that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, 
>>> then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and 
>>> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting 
>>> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>>> 
>>> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly 
>>> in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>>> 
>>> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is 
>>> the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times 
>>> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and 
>>> necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was published during his 
>>> lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and 
>>> the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found 
>>> solely in the latter, although she subsequently endorsed "tone." As someone 
>>> once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he 
>>> tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to 
>>> understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing 
>>> explanations for his abstract ideas" 
>>> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).
>>> 
>>> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single 
>>> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody 
>>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of 
the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a debate 
not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more basic 
requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the triad 
which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term to use’ 
- and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .

 Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce prefer’ 
with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are often drawn 
between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - the wrangling 
which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally according to Peirce -  
these are ‘false distinctions’….

Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which Peirce 
used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your analysis,  it 
better explains the operative function of what is semiotically  taking place - 
without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection???

I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object and 
the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic mediation….[Peirce 
never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you are…” . But without such 
modernization and explanation of the function of semiosis, and the insistence 
by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite 
terms’ - , we will never be able to move the real analytic power of Peircean 
semiosis into the modern world. And that -  - is where I believe the focus 
should be. 

Edwina


> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> List,
> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a few 
> years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the 
> same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six 
> types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
> Regards,
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> 
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
> 
> 
> 
> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt  > a écrit :
>> John, List:
>> 
>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 
>> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>> 
>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in 
>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," 
>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>> 
>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be 
>> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>> 
>> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so that 
>> it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, then 
>> "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and 
>> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting 
>> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>> 
>> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly 
>> in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>> 
>> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is 
>> the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times 
>> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and 
>> necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was published during his 
>> lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and 
>> the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found 
>> solely in the latter, although she subsequently endorsed "tone." As someone 
>> once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he 
>> tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to 
>> understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing 
>> explanations for his abstract ideas" 
>> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).
>> 
>> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single 
>> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody 
>> else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or the 
>> other, please let us know.
>> 
>> Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his 
>> personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately 
>> understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on Peirce's 
>> views by carefully studying and adhering to his words.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[robert marty]

List,
I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a
few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but
the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the
six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> John, List:
>
> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and
> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>
>
> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in
> Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone,"
> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>
> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be
> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>
>
> Peirce famously *preferred *an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so
> that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion,
> then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and
> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting
> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>
> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often,
> mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>
>
> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is
> the *only *word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times
> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and
> necessitant "type." It is also the *only *one that was published during
> his lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries
> and the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign"
> found solely in the latter, although *she *subsequently endorsed "tone."
> As someone once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining
> principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and
> difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more
> convincing explanations for his abstract ideas" (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).
>
> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single
> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody
> else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or
> the other, please let us know.
>
>
> Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his
> personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately
> understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on *Peirce's
> *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *words.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Gary, Jon, List,
>>
>> My note crossed in the mail with Gary's.  I responded to the previous
>> notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.).
>>
>> My conclusion:  As words, there is no logical difference between the
>> words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.   In fact, any word
>> pulled out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark.  But
>> some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered
>> ugly.   They are certainly not memorable.
>>
>> Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible
>> mark'.  That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word
>> for the future.  Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more
>> often, mainly in obscure MSS.  That is not a ringing endorsement.
>>
>> But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the
>> triad (mark token type).   And he has devoted years of research to the
>> issues.  As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are
>> more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the
>> street).
>>
>> And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in
>> logic, including Peirce's logic.  See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for
>> publications.   There are even more lecture slides.  (Copies upon request.)
>>
>> But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the
>> future.  The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists,
>> and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term,
>> find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone.  I discovered that
>> point while talking to them.  That is not a scientific survey, but I could
>> not find a single non-Peircean scholar who 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and
'tone' as a term for a possible mark.


Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in
Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone,"
"tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.

JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be
considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.


Peirce famously *preferred *an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so
that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion,
then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and
"type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting
with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."

JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly
in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.


It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is
the *only *word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times
between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and
necessitant "type." It is also the *only *one that was published during his
lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and
the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found
solely in the latter, although *she *subsequently endorsed "tone." As
someone once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles
that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to
understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing
explanations for his abstract ideas" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).

JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single
non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody
else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or
the other, please let us know.


Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his
personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately
understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on
*Peirce's *views
by carefully studying and adhering to *his *words.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary, Jon, List,
>
> My note crossed in the mail with Gary's.  I responded to the previous
> notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.).
>
> My conclusion:  As words, there is no logical difference between the words
> 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.   In fact, any word pulled
> out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark.  But some
> words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly.
>   They are certainly not memorable.
>
> Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible
> mark'.  That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word
> for the future.  Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more
> often, mainly in obscure MSS.  That is not a ringing endorsement.
>
> But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the
> triad (mark token type).   And he has devoted years of research to the
> issues.  As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are
> more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the
> street).
>
> And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in
> logic, including Peirce's logic.  See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for
> publications.   There are even more lecture slides.  (Copies upon request.)
>
> But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the
> future.  The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists,
> and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term,
> find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone.  I discovered that
> point while talking to them.  That is not a scientific survey, but I could
> not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word
> 'tone'.
>
> If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference)
> one way or the other, please let us know.
>
> John
>
> --
> *From*: "Gary Richmond" 
> List,
>
> While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as
> it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his
> reminded me that  the principal issue being considered has *not *been resolved
> unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way,
> completely along the lines of *his* analysis. In other words, the 'tone'
> v. 'mark' question has been settled *because* John says it has and, so,
> there's no need for further 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical
*fallacy*". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a
dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority.


Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy when "the opinion of an
influential figure is used as evidence to support an argument" (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority). Quoting a
dictionary or encyclopedia--including Wikipedia, as in this case--is *not *a
fallacious appeal to authority because such references contain *facts *on
which there is broad consensus, not *opinions *whose persuasiveness depends
primarily on the eminence and purported expertise of a particular person
who holds them.

JFS: The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows
that authors are *required *to show the experts whose authority they depend
on for their own claims.


That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is
required by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time.
Instead, it is primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are
not the author's.

JFS: In fact, when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him
as an authority.


Quoting Peirce to support scholarly claims about *his own views* is also
not a fallacious appeal to authority. On the contrary, as I have said
before, his is the *only *authority that matters in such a context. As
someone once said, "Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion
of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce
intended" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00085.html).

JFS: The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are *terms *in
exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a *term*.


Obviously, all these English words *are *terms--no one is disputing that.
The issue here is whether they *signify *a certain kind of term. As defined
by Peirce in Baldwin's dictionary, that is *precisely *what "mark"
signifies; but as defined by Peirce in the various passages that I have
repeatedly cited and quoted, that is *not at all* what "tone," "tuone,"
"tinge," and "potisign" signify.

JFS: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just
pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a
mistake.


I have not accused anyone of anything, nor have I claimed that anyone is
making a mistake. I have simply spelled out *Peirce's *relevant views, as
amply supported by exact quotations. Besides, as someone once said, "we
should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition.
If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the
correction" 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00089.html)--not
treat it as an accusation.

JFS: If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I
have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so.


I have not criticized anyone for believing that "mark" is a better choice
than "tone" for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and
necessitant "type," even though I strongly disagree. On the contrary, I
have explicitly stated more than once that anyone is welcome to hold that
opinion and make a case for it. Nevertheless, as I have also stated more
than once, no one can accurately claim that it was *Peirce's *final and
definitive choice.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, Gary, List,
>
> First, let me dismiss a false claim:  "appeal to authority is a logical
> *fallacy".*
>
> Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an
> encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority.   The requirement to
> cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are
> *required *to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their
> own claims.  In fact , when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are
> appealing to him as an authority.  Of course, everybody is fallible, even
> authorities.  But rejection of an authority requires some evidence.
>
> Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted
> below):  "To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever
> it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to
> say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one
> term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or
> things can be predicated".
>
> The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are *terms *in
> exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a *term*.  Whatever those
> terms may be predicated of, something else (a mark) can be predicated.
> Therefore, the word 'mark' may be used in the same way as the words 'tone'
> or 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Gary, Jon, List,

My note crossed in the mail with Gary's.  I responded to the previous notes by 
Jon and Gary (q.v.).

My conclusion:  As words, there is no logical difference between the words 
'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.   In fact, any word pulled out 
of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark.  But some words, 
such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly.   They are 
certainly not memorable.

Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible mark'.  
That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word for the 
future.  Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly 
in obscure MSS.  That is not a ringing endorsement.

But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the triad 
(mark token type).   And he has devoted years of research to the issues.  As I 
pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are more likely to be 
authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the street).

And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in logic, 
including Peirce's logic.  See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for publications.   
There are even more lecture slides.  (Copies upon request.)

But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the future.  The 
overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists, and philosophers 
who know the pair (token type) but not the first term, find mark far more 
congenial and memorable than tone.  I discovered that point while talking to 
them.  That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single 
non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'.

If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one 
way or the other, please let us know.

John


From: "Gary Richmond" 
List,

While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it has 
continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded me that  
the principal issue being considered has not been resolved unless you want to 
accept John's word that it has been and, by the way, completely along the lines 
of his analysis. In other words, the 'tone' v. 'mark' question has been settled 
because John says it has and, so, there's no need for further discussion.

I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's argumentation is 
bolstered by textual and other support. For example, contra John, he has 
repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than sufficient textual support - 
that any use of 'mark' consistent with Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition 
is contrary to Peirce's discussion of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 
'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by Peirce as a kind of term and, so, 
decidedly not a possible sign. Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 
'mark' is always an existential one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty 
mark.

Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions of a 
possible sign include the idea that its being is a significant "quality of 
feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely possible, [is] felt to 
be positively possible."

John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a "Vague 
Quality" that his listeners, typically not schooled in Peircean thought, "find 
it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his talks and written work. I can 
only say that that has not been my experience over the years. For example, 
earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a session of the George Santayana 
Society at the Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of Peirce's 
Classification of the Sciences where I found that in discussing tone, token, 
type that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were familiar with Peirce's 
semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and, indeed, one suggested that the 
three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic 
device. Well, be that as it may, that notion is certainly trivial (pun 
intended).

Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy used the 
term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but the logical 
fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of discussions with 
Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have faulted my use of 
'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words!

Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his disagreements 
with others on the List. For example, in several of his papers he has expressed 
appreciation for the engagement with several Peirce-L members with whom he has 
'contended' on the List, including John.

And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most recent 
one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown that he in fact did 
provide, and "for the first time," a list of all the passages 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Jon, Gary, List,

First, let me dismiss a false claim:  "appeal to authority is a logical 
fallacy".

Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an 
encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority.   The requirement to cite 
references in an academic publication shows that authors are required to show 
the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims.  In fact , 
when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority.  
Of course, everybody is fallible, even authorities.  But rejection of an 
authority requires some evidence.

Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted below):  
"To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever it can be 
predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to say that two 
terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) 
can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be 
predicated".

The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are terms in exactly 
the same way that the word 'mark' is a term.  Whatever those terms may be 
predicated of, something else (a mark) can be predicated.  Therefore, the word 
'mark' may be used in the same way as the words 'tone' or 'potisign' to refer 
to a possible mark.

In conclusion, the word 'mark' may be used to refer to a possible mark.  In 
fact, it's the simplest and most obvious word for the purpose.  In 1908, Peirce 
recognized that point.  Whether or not he vacillated on that point is 
irrelevant.  He did not deny that it may be so used, and many or perhaps most 
speakers of 21st C English find it more natural and more memorable.   That is 
sufficient justification for preferring it.

JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this 
issue.

JAS: Then why keep posting about it?

Because I believe that it's important to avoid confusing the subscribers to 
Peirce list.   I will stop correcting your mistakes as soon as you stop sending 
them to the list.

Remark to Gary:  Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake.  I 
am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a 
mistake.  If he wants to continue using the word 'tone', he has a right to do 
so.  If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have 
a right to do so without being criticized for doing so.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

John, List:

JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with 
Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its 
favor.

As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, any 
use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's 
dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is inconsistent with 
his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and 
"potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms or 
things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be 
predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be 
predicated"--which entails that it is a necessitant type embodied in existent 
tokens, not a possible sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as 
"what has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a 
quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character 
in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite 
significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 
Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but 
felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25).

JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why 
I adopted it in my writings on this topic.

The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with 
Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly misunderstands the word "mark" 
when it is used for a possible sign, the counterpart of an existent "token" and 
a necessitant "type." For example, as a candidate to replace "tone," "tuone," 
"tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely not "that part of an image that 
determines it as a token of some type" 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again, among 
other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its Instances or 
embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity" (R 
339:277r, 1906 Apr 2).

JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of 
Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his analyses quite 
compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to note that he has 
reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'.

Tony Jappy uses "mark" rather than 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Gary Richmond]

List,

While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it
has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded
me that  the principal issue being considered has *not *been resolved
unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way,
completely along the lines of *his* analysis. In other words, the 'tone' v.
'mark' question has been settled *because* John says it has and, so,
there's no need for further discussion.

I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's
argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example,
contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than
sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with
Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's discussion
of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by
Peirce as a kind of *term* and, so, decidedly *not *a *possible sign*.
Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 'mark' is always an
*existential* one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty mark.

Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions
of a *possible
sign* include the idea that its being is a significant "quality of
feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely possible, [is] felt
to be positively possible."

John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a "Vague
Quality" that his listeners, typically *not* schooled in Peircean thought,
"find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his talks and written
work. I can only say that that has not been my experience over the years.
For example, earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a session of the
George Santayana Society at the Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of
Peirce's Classification of the Sciences where I found that in discussing
tone, token, type that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were
familiar with Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and,
indeed, one suggested that the three all starting with the letter 't'
perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as it may,
that notion is certainly trivial (pun intended).

Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy used
the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but the
logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of
discussions with Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have
faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words!

Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his
disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his
papers he has expressed appreciation for the engagement with* several*
Peirce-L members with whom he has 'contended' on the List, including John.

And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most
recent one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown that he in fact
did provide, and "for the first time," a list of all the passages where
Peirce uses not only 'tone', but its variants (such as 'tuone' and
'potisgin'). John, on the other hand, has kept repeating his opinions with
little textual support.


So I ask each member of this forum who has an interest in this topic to
honestly weigh the arguments presented by Jon and John and determine for
themself who has made the stronger case, John for 'mark' or Jon for 'tone'.
Perhaps then we can put the matter to rest (at least for a time).

Best,

Gary Richmond




On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 2:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, List:
>
> JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent
> with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point
> in its favor.
>
>
> As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support,
> any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's
> dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is
> *inconsistent *with his various explanations of what he means by "tone,"
> "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of
> term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to
> say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these
> terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a
> *necessitant *type embodied in *existent *tokens, not a *possible *sign.
> On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being
> whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling
> which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature
> incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant
> character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31),
> and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt
> to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25).
>
> JFS: But when I 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with
Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in
its favor.


As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support,
any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's
dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is
*inconsistent *with
his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and
"potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms
or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can
be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be
predicated"--which
entails that it is a *necessitant *type embodied in *existent *tokens, not
a *possible *sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what
has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a
quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a
character in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an
indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R
339:285r, 1906 Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are
merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488,
1908 Dec 25).

JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is
why I adopted it in my writings on this topic.


The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with
Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly *misunderstands *the word
"mark" when it is used for a *possible *sign, the counterpart of an *existent
*"token" and a *necessitant *"type." For example, as a candidate to replace
"tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely *not *"that part
of an image that determines it as a token of some type" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again,
among other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its *Instances
*or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only
similarity" (R 339:277r, 1906 Apr 2).

JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution
of Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his
analyses quite compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to
note that he has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather
than 'tone'.


Tony Jappy *uses *"mark" rather than "tone," but does he ever give a
*reason *for doing so? Maybe it is just for convenience when quoting the *only
*sentence where Peirce himself employs it without qualification--"Consequently
an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which
shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives" (CP 8.367, EP 2:489,
1908 Dec 25). Either way, as Gary already observed, appeal to authority is
a logical *fallacy*, and we also need to be mindful of the danger of
confirmation bias. Over the years, I have benefited greatly from my
*disagreements
*with others on the List because they have prompted me to go back to *Peirce's
*relevant writings and then either bolster my arguments (as in this case)
or revise my position accordingly, although I never find bald assertions to
be persuasive.

JFS: I have also read Jon's recent note on this subject. There is nothing
new.


On the contrary, in my last post (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00049.html), I listed
for the first time *all *the different passages where Peirce uses "tone" as
well as "tuone," "tinge," "potisign," and even "idea"; and I provided a
long excerpt from his Logic Notebook that has not previously appeared in
this or any other recent List thread, where he describes what he has in
mind (using "tuone") and carefully distinguishes it from a type. By
contrast, much of the post below is repetition of previously expressed
opinions, with no exact quotations from Peirce to support them.

JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this
issue.


Then why keep posting about it?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 9:02 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary, Jon, List
>
> To develop a complete and consistent set of terminology, some decisions
> have to be made.  I have stated the reasons why I believe that the
> trichotomy (potisign, actisighn, famisign) is based on Peirce's best and
> most detailed reasoning.  I also agree with him that (mark token type) are
> simpler English words that would be better for widespread use.
>
> The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with
> Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in
> its favor.  The words 'tone', 'tinge', or 'tuone' are too narrow.  They
> might be useful for sounds, but they are not as general as 'mark' for
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Gary, Jon, List

To develop a complete and consistent set of terminology, some decisions have to 
be made.  I have stated the reasons why I believe that the trichotomy 
(potisign, actisighn, famisign) is based on Peirce's best and most detailed 
reasoning.  I also agree with him that (mark token type) are simpler English 
words that would be better for widespread use.

The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's 
definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor.  
The words 'tone', 'tinge', or 'tuone' are too narrow.  They might be useful for 
sounds, but they are not as general as 'mark' for images in other sensory 
modalities.

I have also lectured and written articles for a larger audience of 
professionals who are familiar with the terms 'token' and 'type', but have 
never used, read, or heard the word 'tone' for the first member.  The most 
likely reason is that nobody except Peirce scholars would ever use the word 
'tone'.  But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial.  That is 
why I adopted it in my writings on this topic.

Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of 
Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life.  I find his analyses 
quite compatible with my own studies.  Therefore, I am pleased to note that he 
has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'.

I have also read Jon's recent note on this subject.  There is nothing new.  I 
am not asking him to do anything he doesn't want to do.  All I'm saying is that 
there is no reason to continue discussing this issue.

John


From: "Gary Richmond" 

John, Jon, List,

JFS: I'm sorry, but I  don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of 
hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to 
mention just once.  (Except for once more in the LNB.)
GR: It appears to me that if Jon has been 'jumping through hoops' to argue his 
position, then you have been doing no less hoop jumping.

But more to the point, it is your mere opinion that 'tone' is Peirce's "rather 
poor choice of terminology' whereas, as I see it, it has been argued rather 
convincingly by Jon that there is a strong case for preferring 'tone' to 
'mark'. Since you have settled on 'mark' in your own work, I can see why you 
might want to argue for it exclusively. But -- and as I've followed this 
discussion closely -- in my estimation, Jon's argument for 'tone' is stronger 
than yours for 'mark'. And I know I am not alone in that opinion.

This is brought home especially when you throw up your arms and argue from  
authority, principally, your own. But not exclusively your own:

JFS: "I find Tony's [Jappy's] analyses convincing and compatible with my own 
studies and with other studies of Peirce's last decade."
GR: Far different from this approach, Peirce made a whole hearted effort to 
solicit criticism of his own views. Even more than that, he called for 
scientists and other scholars to try to refute his work where possible in the 
interest of correcting possible errors. That seems to me to be almost a 
corollary of the method of science as  opposed to the other methods of inquiry. 
With the exception of well-prepared scientists offering testable hypotheses, 
inquiry is, for Peirce, essentially a communal affair, and the methods of 
tenacity (mere stubborn clinging to a position), the a Priori method (pretty 
much a 'taste' or a 'feel' that some way of looking at some matter is 'right' 
), and that of authority are assiduously avoided in scientific inquiry. Of 
course I needn't remind you, or any logician, that the appeal to authority is a 
well-known logical fallacy.

JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic.
GR: Perhaps not; we shall see. But in any event, it is not for you to 
determine. After all, this is Peirce-L, not Sowa-L, nor Schmidt-L nor, for that 
matter, Richmond-L, but Peirce-L.  Still, I must agree with you that the 
arguments for 'mark' and 'tone' have been fairly fully laid out and List 
members can decide for themselves which argumentation has been strongest, most 
convincing. This is to say that they needn't take your, or Jon's, or my word 
for it.

JFS: You [Jon] said that you had read Tony's writings.  i strongly urge you to 
study them.
GR: Your now repeated request that JAS read and study Jappy's works (which he 
clearly does) appears to me as condescending as your appeal to authority is 
unscientific from the standpoint of Peirce's four methods of fixing belief.

It is my opinion as List moderator that in light of Peirce's ethics of inquiry, 
and along with Joe Ransdell's notes on the Peirce-L page of Arisbe meant to 
apply facets of that ethics to conduct in this forum, that reflecting on those 
ought give you -- and everyone -- pause as to they consider what conduct is and 
is not appropriate here. As did Joe, I have always wanted 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: I don't understand why you're jumping through hoops to defend a rather
poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to mention just once.
(Except for once more in the LNB.)


I am not the one who is jumping through hoops--the textual evidence plainly
*supports* my position. For example, it is blatantly false that Peirce
mentions "tone" just once or twice; on the contrary, he uses it as the
counterpart of "token" and "type" more often than any other candidate after
abandoning qualisign/sinsign/legisign (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31; CP 4.537,
1906; SS 83, EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23; CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25; R
339:340, 1908 Dec 27). In one of the few exceptions, he instead uses
"tuone," which "is a blend of Tone and Tune" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2); more
on that below. By contrast, the December 1908 letter to Lady Welby is the
*sole* place where "mark" and "potisign" appear as alternatives, and the
only other variants are "tinge" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31) and "idea" (R
795, c. 1908).

JFS: The word 'mark' is much more natural, more general, more consistent
with his definition in Baldwin's dictionary, and much, much easier to
explain to intelligent listeners and readers who are not Peirce scholars.


Please review my last post, especially the exact quotations that I provided
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00043.html). In
Baldwin's dictionary, Peirce explicitly defines a "mark" as a certain kind
of *term*, which is a symbol and thus a *necessitant* sign (type) that is
embodied in *existent* signs (tokens)--utterly inconsistent with his
various definitions of a *possible* sign, including the following lengthy
discussion of a tuone and how it differs from a type.

CSP: It means a quality of feeling which is significant, whether it be
simple, like a Tone or complex, like a Tune. But the latter is not *pure*
feeling. By a Token, I mean an existing thing or an historical event which
serves as a Sign. By a Type, I mean a general form which can be repeated
indefinitely, and is in all its repetitions one and the same Sign. Thus the
word *the* is a Type. It is likely to occur over a score of times on a page
of an English book; but it is only one word twenty times repeated. The
distinction between a Type and a Token is obvious. There may be some
confusion between the Tuone and the Type. They may, however, be
distinguished in various ways. In the first place, a Type is absolutely
identical in all its *Instances* or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have
any identity, it has only similarity. Thus the sound of any word will be
slightly different every two times it is pronounced and in so far as it is
so, it is two Tuones. But any two vowels in so far as they are alike are
the same Tuone, in the only sense in which there can be any sameness to a
Tuone. Any thing then that could conceivably be made absolutely definite,
bearing in mind that no two things can be exactly alike in any quality
whatever, cannot be a Tuone. Another test is that Tuone though it may be
composed of many ingredients is, like a chemical compound of many elements,
perfectly homogeneous and structureless in effect; while a Type, though it
may be indecomposable, must be more or less complex in its relations. Tests
might be multiplied; yet after all, it will often require subtlety to
decide whether a given Sign is a Tuone or a Type. Take for example a given
melody, say "The Last Rose of Summer." Considered as to its structure it is
a Type; but considered as a whole in its esthetic effect which is not
composed of one part due to one note and another to another, it is a Tuone.
As ordinarily conceived it is a Tuone, slightly different however every
time it is sung, but from the point of view of counterpoint, it is
absolutely the same every time it is rendered with substantial correctness
(though it be a table out of tune and time) and so it is a Type. But any
one singing of it is neither Tuone nor Type but a Token. Notwithstanding
these difficulties in many cases there is no room for an instant’s
hesitation, and the distinction is not only useful but practically
indispensible. (R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2)


A type is a "definitely significant Form" (CP 4.537) such that it is
*identical*--one and the same sign--in all its embodied instances (tokens),
while a tuone is "an indefinite significant character" (ibid) such that it
can only exhibit *similarity* to other tuones. The *sound* of a word is a
tuone, but the spoken word *itself* is a token of a type.

JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic.


In that case, please do not feel obligated to reply to this post.

JFS: You said that you had read Tony's writings. I strongly urge you to
study them.


I said that I have likewise read *and *carefully studied about a dozen
articles by Tony Jappy, as well as his 2017 book, *Peirce's Twenty-Eight
Sign Classes and the Philosophy of Representation* (

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Gary Richmond]

John, Jon, List,

JFS: I'm sorry, but I  don't understand why you're jumping through all
kinds of hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce
happened to mention just once.  (Except for once more in the LNB.)
GR: It appears to me that *if* Jon has been 'jumping through hoops' to
argue his position, then you have been doing no less hoop jumping.

But more to the point, it is your mere opinion that 'tone' is Peirce's
"rather poor choice of terminology' whereas, as I see it, it has been
argued rather convincingly by Jon that there is a strong case for
preferring 'tone' to 'mark'. Since you have settled on 'mark' in your own
work, I can see why you might want to argue for it exclusively. But -- and
as I've followed this discussion closely -- in my estimation, Jon's
argument for 'tone' is stronger than yours for 'mark'. And I know I am not
alone in that opinion.

This is brought home especially when you throw up your arms and argue from
authority, principally, your own. But not exclusively your own:

JFS: "I find Tony's [Jappy's] analyses convincing and compatible with my
own studies and with other studies of Peirce's last decade."
GR: Far different from this approach, Peirce made a whole hearted effort to
solicit criticism of his own views. Even more than that, he called for
scientists and other scholars to try to *refute* his work where possible in
the interest of correcting possible errors. That seems to me to be almost a
corollary of the method of science as  opposed to the other methods of
inquiry. With the exception of well-prepared scientists offering testable
hypotheses, inquiry is, for Peirce, essentially a communal affair, and the
methods of tenacity (mere stubborn clinging to a position), the a Priori
method (pretty much a 'taste' or a 'feel' that some way of looking at some
matter is 'right' ), and that of authority are assiduously avoided in
scientific inquiry. Of course I needn't remind you, or any logician, that
the *appeal* to authority is a well-known logical fallacy.

JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic.
GR: Perhaps not; we shall see. But in any event, it is not for you to
determine. After all, this is Peirce-L, not Sowa-L, nor Schmidt-L nor, for
that matter, Richmond-L, but Peirce-L.  Still, I must agree with you that
the arguments for 'mark' and 'tone' have been fairly fully laid out and
List members can decide for themselves which argumentation has been
strongest, most convincing. This is to say that they needn't take your, or
Jon's, or my word for it.

JFS: You [Jon] said that you had read Tony's writings.  i strongly urge you
to study them.
GR: Your now repeated request that JAS read and study Jappy's works (which
he clearly does) appears to me as condescending as your appeal to authority
is unscientific from the standpoint of Peirce's four methods of fixing
belief.

It is my opinion as List moderator that in light of Peirce's ethics of
inquiry, and along with Joe Ransdell's notes on the Peirce-L page of Arisbe
meant to apply facets of that ethics to conduct in this forum, that
reflecting on those ought give you -- and everyone -- pause as to they
consider what conduct is and is not appropriate here. As did Joe, I have
always wanted Peirce-L to be essentially self-moderated. But in the past
few years I have seen that there are participants who rather flaunt their
independence from such ethical and collegial practices as Ransdell
outlined. It will no longer be tolerated, and those who have previously
been warned their anti-collegial conduct on the List jeopardizes their
continuation on Peirce-L. In short, they will be removed without further on
or off List discussion.

Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator)

On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 12:15 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> I'm sorry, but I  don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of
> hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to
> mention just once.  (Except for once more in the LNB.)
>
> First, the terms potisign, actisign, and famisign are the kinds of words
> that Peirce frequently coined.  The three pages of EP2 show a great deal of
> thought, which is much more than he wrote about that trichotomy in 1906.
> It's also very closely reasoned thought, which is consistent with many
> issues he had been discussing for years.  Except for the fact that those
> words are rather ugly, they are the result of deep thinking.
>
> By contrast, the word 'tone' in 1906 sounds like a quick choice based on
> one rather rare kind of sign (a tone of voice).  The word 'mark' is much
> more natural, more general, more consistent with his definition in
> Baldwin's dictionary, and much, much easier to explain to intelligent
> listeners and readers who are not Peirce scholars.  (And I believe that
> those people are the most important audience for Peirce scholars to
> address.)
>
> Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been devoting years to his analysis of the
> evolution of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Jon, List,

I'm sorry, but I  don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of 
hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to 
mention just once.  (Except for once more in the LNB.)

First, the terms potisign, actisign, and famisign are the kinds of words that 
Peirce frequently coined.  The three pages of EP2 show a great deal of thought, 
which is much more than he wrote about that trichotomy in 1906.   It's also 
very closely reasoned thought, which is consistent with many issues he had been 
discussing for years.  Except for the fact that those words are rather ugly, 
they are the result of deep thinking.

By contrast, the word 'tone' in 1906 sounds like a quick choice based on one 
rather rare kind of sign (a tone of voice).  The word 'mark' is much more 
natural, more general, more consistent with his definition in Baldwin's 
dictionary, and much, much easier to explain to intelligent listeners and 
readers who are not Peirce scholars.  (And I believe that those people are the 
most important audience for Peirce scholars to address.)

Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been devoting years to his analysis of the 
evolution of Peirce's writings in his last decade.  I have also been devoting a 
great deal of study to the evolution of other aspects, especially EGs during 
that decade.  And I find Tony's analyses convincing and compatible with my own 
studies and with other studies of Peirce's last decade.

There is nothing further to discuss about this topic.  You said that you had 
read Tony's writings.  i strongly urge you to study them.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

John, List:

JFS: Peirce defined this trichotomy [potisign/actisign/famisign] without making 
any reference to (Tone Token Type).

This is highly misleading--Peirce wrote EP 2:478-490 over three consecutive 
days (1908 Dec 23-25), and he did make reference to tone/token/type both before 
and after introducing potisign/actisign/famisign.

CSP: For a "possible" Sign I have no better designation than a Tone, though I 
am considering replacing this by "Mark." Can you suggest a really good name? An 
Actual sign I call a Token; a Necessitant Sign a Type. (EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23)

CSP: Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, 
are divisible into:
A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, 
but felt to be positively possible ...
B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hic et nunc; such as 
any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single paragraph of 
a single page of a single copy of a Book. ...
C. Famisigns, familiar signs, which must be General, as General signs must be 
familiar or composed of Familiar signs. (EP 2:483, 1908 Dec 24)

CSP: But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I 
formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, an Actisign a Token, a Famisign a 
Type ... I think Potisign Actisign Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?) 
(EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25)

Peirce was dissatisfied with potisign/sinsign/actisign and was considering 
replacing "tone" with "mark," so he explicitly asked Lady Welby for her 
opinion, which she gave a few weeks later--"I should prefer tone to mark for 
the homely reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his 
words, but to his tone'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). He tentatively replaced 
"potisign" with "mark," using the word "might" and a parenthetical question 
mark, but then wrote "tone" in his Logic Notebook two days later 
(https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i, 1908 Dec 
27)--his last known mention of this trichotomy.

Again, some might hold the opinion that "mark" is a better choice than "tone" 
for the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification whose other two 
members are "token" and "type," but no one can accurately claim that "mark" was 
Peirce's final and definitive choice.

CSP: In particular, the relations I assumed between the different classes were 
the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think. (EP 2:489, 1908 Dec 
25)

JFS: In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of 
trichotomies "the wildest guesses".

What Peirce here calls "the wildest guesses" are not the trichotomies 
themselves but "the relations I assumed between the different classes." In 
other words, he never presents all ten trichotomies of the 1906-1908 taxonomies 
in their proper logical order of determination for working out the 66 sign 
classes. Instead, he repeatedly presents them in phaneroscopic order.

JFS: For the definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's 
dictionary should be considered and compared to what he wrote about Potisign.

I agree, and sure enough, there is nothing in Peirce's definition of "mark" for 
Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology about it being a sign whose 
mode of being, apprehension, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: Peirce defined this trichotomy [potisign/actisign/famisign] without
making any reference to (Tone Token Type).


This is highly misleading--Peirce wrote EP 2:478-490 over three consecutive
days (1908 Dec 23-25), and he *did* make reference to tone/token/type both
before and after introducing potisign/actisign/famisign.

CSP: For a "possible" Sign I have no better designation than a *Tone*,
though I am considering replacing this by "Mark." Can you suggest a really
good name? An Actual sign I call a *Token*; a Necessitant Sign a *Type*.
(EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23)

CSP: Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible
Presentation, are divisible into:
A. *Potisigns*, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely
possible, but felt to be positively possible ...
B. *Actisigns*, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced *hic et nunc*;
such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single
paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. ...
C. *Famisigns*, familiar signs, which must be General, as General signs
must be familiar or composed of Familiar signs. (EP 2:483, 1908 Dec 24)

CSP: But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now
use. I formerly called a *Potisign* a *Tinge* or *Tone*, an *Actisign* a
*Token*, a *Famisign* a *Type* ... I think *Potisign Actisign Famisign*
might be called *Mark Token Type (?)* (EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25)


Peirce was dissatisfied with potisign/sinsign/actisign and was *considering*
replacing "tone" with "mark," so he explicitly asked Lady Welby for her
opinion, which she gave a few weeks later--"I should prefer *tone* to
*mark* for
the homely reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to
his words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). He *tentatively*
replaced "potisign" with "mark," using the word "might" and a parenthetical
question mark, but then wrote "tone" in his Logic Notebook two days later (
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i, 1908 Dec
27)--his last known mention of this trichotomy.

Again, some might hold the opinion that "mark" is a *better *choice than
"tone" for the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification whose
other two members are "token" and "type," but no one can accurately claim
that "mark" was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice.

CSP: In particular, the relations I assumed between the different classes
were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think. (EP 2:489,
1908 Dec 25)

JFS: In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of
trichotomies "the wildest guesses".


What Peirce here calls "the wildest guesses" are not the trichotomies
themselves but "the *relations* I assumed between the different *classes*."
In other words, he never presents all ten trichotomies of the 1906-1908
taxonomies in their proper *logical* order of determination for working out
the 66 sign classes. Instead, he repeatedly presents them in *phaneroscopic*
order.

JFS: For the definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's
dictionary should be considered and compared to what he wrote about
Potisign.


I agree, and sure enough, there is nothing in Peirce's definition of "mark"
for Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* about it being a
sign whose mode of being, apprehension, or presentation is "merely
possible" as distinguished from an existent token and a necessitant type.
On the contrary ...

CSP: *Mark*. To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of
whatever it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated;
and to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say
that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these
terms or things can be predicated.
The word translates the Latin *nota*. It has many practical synonyms such
as quality, mode, attribute, predicate, character, property, determination,
consequent, sign. Most of these words are sometimes used in special senses;
and even when they are used in a general sense, they may suggest somewhat
different points of view from mark. (
https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)


By this definition, a mark is a term that can be predicated of things of
which other terms are predicated. For example, "scarlet" and "crimson" are
different terms that both have the term "red" as a mark--anything that is
scarlet or crimson is also red. However, the *term* "red" is obviously not
a tone/potisign, it is always a token/actisign of a type/famisign. On the
other hand, the *color* red--as well as a specific shade like scarlet or
crimson--can be a tone/potisign when and where it serves as "an indefinite
significant character."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 9:11 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> We acknowledge that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Jon, List,

We acknowledge that Peirce introduced the trichotomy (Tone Token Type) in the 
Prolegomena article of 1906, and his choice of the name 'Tone' was based on one 
example, "a tone of voice".  After two more years of intensive study, analysis, 
and writings, he presented a more precise specification of the trichotomy 
(Potisign, Actisign, and Famisign) in a letter to Welby (EP2, p.

"Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as such, 
General. Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible 
Presentation, are divisible (o) into:

"A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, 
but felt to be positively possible; as for eample the seventh ray that passes 
through the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's hexagram.8

"B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hie et nunc; such as 
any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single paragraph of 
a single page of a single copy of a Book. There may be repetition of the whole 
paragraph, this word included, in another place. But that other occurrence is 
not this word. The book may be printed in an edition of ten thousand; but THIS 
word is only in my copy."

Peirce defined this trichotomy without making any reference to (Tone Token 
Type).   We don't know what he was thinking when he specified it.  But later 
(EP2, pp. 485-488) he continued to discuss Potisigns, Actisigns, and Famisigns 
without making any references to the signs he defined in 2006.  He also 
discussed universes in considerable detail.  That is a topic he began to 
discuss in the Prolegomena, where he introduced (Tone Token Type).  But he is 
now introducing this new triad without making any reference to it.  But he is 
discussing this new version in quite a bit of detail, and he is referring to 
universes repeatedly.

Then on p. 488, he writes:  "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906,1 
devoted much study
to my ten trichotomies of signs.9 It is time I reverted to the subject, as I 
know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names 
are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or 
Tone,an Actisign a Token. a Famisign a Type  I think Potisign Actisign 
Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?)...

Then he continues:  "I have now given as much time to this letter as I can 
afford and I cannot now reexamine the remaining Trichotomies, although I must 
do so as soon as possible. So I just give them as they stood two years and more 
ago. In particular, the relations I assumed between the different classes were 
the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think...

In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of trichotomies 
"the wildest guesses".  That should not encourage anyone to consider them as 
having any reliable status.  The best definition of (Mark Token Type) should be 
considered the equivalent of (Potisign Actisign Famisign) with the definitions 
stated in EP pp. 485-488.  For the definition of Mark, by itself, his 
definition in Baldwin's dictionary should be considered and compared to what he 
wrote about Potisign.

I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made far 
deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and writings by 
Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908.   As you know, his existential graphs 
also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach their fully complete 
specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta.  For Gamma, the 1903 
version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell lectures.  Peirce used 
metalanguage for specifying modality and a version of higher-order logic in 
1903.

But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911.

There is much more to say.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 4/7/24 6:27 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci 

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

John, List:

JFS: A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an image 
that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and the token 
are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable things.

Whatever these sentences are supposed to be describing, it is certainly not 
what Peirce ever defines as the first member of the trichotomy for sign 
classification "according to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself" (CP 
8.344, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24), the other two members of which are "token" and 
"type." A tone (or mark) is "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 
1906)--it is not itself a physical thing, but it can be possessed by a token, 
which is a physical thing (or event) that exists (or occurs) at a single place 
and time (ibid). A type is "a definitely s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an
image that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and
the token are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable
things.


Whatever these sentences are supposed to be describing, it is certainly not
what *Peirce *ever defines as the first member of the trichotomy for sign
classification "according to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself"
(CP 8.344, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24), the other two members of which are
"token" and "type." A tone (or mark) is "an indefinite significant
character" (CP 4.537, 1906)--it is not *itself *a physical thing, but it
can be *possessed *by a token, which *is *a physical thing (or event) that
exists (or occurs) at a single place and time (ibid). A type is "a
definitely significant form" that can be embodied in any number of
different tokens (ibid), each of which might *also *embody different
tones/marks as *indefinite *characters.

Consequently, two different tokens of the same type can possess different
tones/marks, and two different tokens of two different types can possess
the same tone/mark--there is no strict alignment between indefinite
tones/marks and definite types.

JFS: But Peirce explicitly defined 'mark' or 'tone' as a 'potisign' -- a
sign of a possibility.


To help avoid mistakes, I recommend providing exact quotations when
attributing explicit definitions to Peirce. In this case, he *never*
defines a tone/mark/potisign as a sign *of *a possibility, as if its
(dynamical) *object *were a possibility. Instead, he defines it as a sign
that is *itself *merely possible. "A Sign may *itself *have a 'possible'
Mode of Being ... For a 'possible' Sign I have no better designation than a
Tone, though I am considering replacing this by 'Mark.' Can you suggest a
really good name?" (EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23). "Consequently, Signs, in
respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, are divisible into: A.
*Potisigns*, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible,
but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.347, EP 2:483, 1908 Dec 24).

In short, a tone/mark is a *possible *sign, distinguished from a token as
an *existent *sign and a type as a *necessitant *sign. Again, none of this
is at all controversial among Peirce scholars.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 1:47 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> See the recent notes about the ZOOM talk on Friday.  It is essential for
> Peirce scholars to bring his philosophy and its applications to the
> attention of philosopher, scientists, and engineers in the 21st century --
> Peirce worked in all three professions.
>
> The word 'tone' is a special case that Peirce himself forgot when he
> coined the new term 'potisign'.  He later recalled his definition for
> 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary (consciously or not) when he suggested it as
> a replacement for 'tone'.  I have lectured and adopted Peirce's logic and
> semeiotic for a broad modern audience, and I realize that 'mark' is far
> more natural, more understandable, and more memorable than 'tone' for any
> purpose other than a detailed textual criticism of  the MS.  As Peirce
> himself said, if nobody else adopted a word he coined, he was under no
> obligation to keep it.
>
> JFS:  Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type.
>
> JAS:  A tone of voice is merely the *example *that Peirce gives in CP
> 4.537 (1906) to illustrate what he has in mind. His *definition *of a
> tone in that passage is "an indefinite significant character," as opposed
> to a token as a "Single event which happens once and whose identity is
> limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some
> single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being
> significant only as occurring just when and where it does," and a type as
> "a definitely significant Form."
>
> No.  A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token".  It is that part of an
> image that determines it as a token of some type.  The image, the mark, and
> the token are the same physical "thing".  They are not three separable
> things..
>
> Bur the word 'tone' is an poor choice, which caused the misunderstanding.
>Lady Welby assumed that the word 'tone' was an actisign that referred
> to an existing thing -- some feeling of the speaker.   But Peirce
> explicitly defined 'mark' or 'tone' as a  'potisign' -- a sign of a
> possibility.
>
> As another example, consider the images on Mayan temples.  For years, they
> were considered decorations or images of some significant things.  But
> linguists discovered that they could be interpreted as a notation for Mayan
> words.  By assuming that ancient Mayan was an earlier stage of modern
> spoken Mayan, linguists learned to read those "decorations" as a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Jon, List,

See the recent notes about the ZOOM talk on Friday.  It is essential for Peirce 
scholars to bring his philosophy and its applications to the attention of 
philosopher, scientists, and engineers in the 21st century -- Peirce worked in 
all three professions.

The word 'tone' is a special case that Peirce himself forgot when he coined the 
new term 'potisign'.  He later recalled his definition for 'mark' in Baldwin's 
dictionary (consciously or not) when he suggested it as a replacement for 
'tone'.  I have lectured and adopted Peirce's logic and semeiotic for a broad 
modern audience, and I realize that 'mark' is far more natural, more 
understandable, and more memorable than 'tone' for any purpose other than a 
detailed textual criticism of  the MS.  As Peirce himself said, if nobody else 
adopted a word he coined, he was under no obligation to keep it.

JFS:  Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type.

JAS:  A tone of voice is merely the example that Peirce gives in CP 4.537 
(1906) to illustrate what he has in mind. His definition of a tone in that 
passage is "an indefinite significant character," as opposed to a token as a 
"Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one 
happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one 
instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just 
when and where it does," and a type as "a definitely significant Form."

No.  A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token".  It is that part of an image 
that determines it as a token of some type.  The image, the mark, and the token 
are the same physical "thing".  They are not three separable things..

Bur the word 'tone' is an poor choice, which caused the misunderstanding.
Lady Welby assumed that the word 'tone' was an actisign that referred to an 
existing thing -- some feeling of the speaker.   But Peirce explicitly defined 
'mark' or 'tone' as a  'potisign' -- a sign of a possibility.

As another example, consider the images on Mayan temples.  For years, they were 
considered decorations or images of some significant things.  But linguists 
discovered that they could be interpreted as a notation for Mayan words.  By 
assuming that ancient Mayan was an earlier stage of modern spoken Mayan, 
linguists learned to read those "decorations" as a notation for the words of 
the Mayan language.  The same images from one point of view are marks of tokens 
of decorations.  From another point of view, they are marks of tokens of 
morphemes of the Mayan language.

In textual criticism, Peirce's exact words in any MS must be recorded exactly.  
But in publications about  Peirce's intentions, the terminology must be adapted 
to the way modern readers would interpret the words.  Max Fisch, for example, 
realized that Peirce's decision to use the word 'logic' as an abbreviation for 
'logic as semeiotic'.  In his 1986 book, Fisch stated that he was using the 
word 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic".

Fisch is certainly a respectable authority on the subject, and I believe that 
we should follow his example in choosing which of Peirce's options to consider 
as a standard for the 21st C..

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

John, List:

Anyone is welcome to make a case for the opinion that "mark" is a better choice 
than "tone" for the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification 
whose other two members are "token" and "type," but no one can accurately claim 
that "mark" was Peirce's final and definitive choice. He used "tone" in the 
last known manuscript where he presented that trichotomy, and he heard from 
Lady Welby a few weeks later--in response to his specific request for her 
advice on the matter--that she preferred "tone." Again, I agree with her.

JFS: The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited to 
the sound of a voice that is speaking something.

A tone of voice is merely the example that Peirce gives in CP 4.537 (1906) to 
illustrate what he has in mind. His definition of a tone in that passage is "an 
indefinite significant character," as opposed to a token as a "Single event 
which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a 
Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of 
time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and 
where it does," and a type as "a definitely significant Form." Accordingly, a 
tone is a quality of a token that affects its dynamical interpretant.

JFS: Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type.

In that case, "mark" is a terrible choice--a sign must be classified as either 
a mark/tone, a token, or a type; unlike icon/index/symbol, this trichotomy is 
not a matter of degree. Consider its terminological predecessor--a qualisign 
cannot also be a replica (sinsign) of some legisign. Instead, a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

Anyone is welcome to make a case for the opinion that "mark" is a
*better *choice
than "tone" for the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification
whose other two members are "token" and "type," but no one can accurately
claim that "mark" was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice. He used
"tone" in the last known manuscript where he presented that trichotomy, and
he heard from Lady Welby a few weeks later--in response to his specific
request for her advice on the matter--that she preferred "tone." Again, I
agree with her.

JFS: The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited
to the sound of a voice that is speaking something.


A tone of voice is merely the *example *that Peirce gives in CP 4.537
(1906) to illustrate what he has in mind. His *definition *of a tone in
that passage is "an indefinite significant character," as opposed to a
token as a "Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited
to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single
place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant
only as occurring just when and where it does," and a type as "a definitely
significant Form." Accordingly, a tone is a *quality *of a token that
affects its dynamical interpretant.

JFS: Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type.


In that case, "mark" is a terrible choice--a sign must be classified as *either
*a mark/tone, a token, or a type; unlike icon/index/symbol, this trichotomy
is not a matter of degree. Consider its terminological predecessor--a
qualisign *cannot *also be a replica (sinsign) of some legisign. Instead, a
qualisign must be *embodied *in a sinsign, and likewise, a mark/tone must
be *embodied *in a token.

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Apr 5, 2024 at 4:55 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On this issue, the evidence for the trichotomy (Mark Token Type) is
> overwhelming.Just look at the first instance in the Prolegomena, or the
> copy in CP 4.537 where Peirce adopts 'Tone' as the name of the first item
> in the trichotomy:  "An indefinite significant character such as a tone of
> voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token."
>
> The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited to
> the sound of a voice that is speaking something.  I have a high regard for
> Peirce's choices, but the word 'tone' applies to a tiny subset of marks.
> Just look at Peirce's definition of mark in Baldwin's dictionary.  Every
> tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type.  But only a tiny
> subset of marks are tones.  I have a high regard for Peirce's decisions,
> but when he himself has doubts about his previous choice, that is not a
> solid endorsement.  There is no ethical reason for keeping it.
>
> Now go to the letter to Welby (also CP 8.363):  "From the summer of 1905
> to the same time in 1906, I devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of
> signs. It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it
> much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those
> I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, an Actisign a
> Token, a Famisign a Type;...
>
> CP 367. "an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective,
> which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives...
>
> Note Peirce's choice of Mark.  That is consistent with his definition of
> 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary.  That was written before 1903, when the
> only trichotomy was "Icon Index Symbol".  Every tone of voice is a mark,
> but most marks are not tones of voice or tones of anything else.  Note that
> Peirce had also considered the word 'tinge' instead of 'tone'.  Every tinge
> is also a mark.
>
> JAS:  his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908,
> https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).
>
> I admit that he slipped back to an old (bad) habit in that example two
> days later.   But that example does not negate (1) the fact that a tone of
> voice is a limited special case of a mark, as in his own definition in
> Balwin's dictionary; (2) the fact that he had coined the word 'potisign' as
> a general technical term for the first item in the trichotomy; (3) the fact
> that he selected 'mark', not 'tone', as the replacement for potisign; and
> finally (4) the modern world has adopted Peirce's terms 'token' and 'type',
> but not 'tone'.
>
> But I have found from my lectures and writings that modern logicians,
> philosophers, and computer scientists very readily accept the trichotomy
> (mark token type), but not (tone token type).  Since Peirce was always
> writing for the future, that makes 'mark' the choice for the future.   A
> tone is a limited and confusing special case of mark.
>
> On this point, Tony made the correct choice.  The word 'tone' should be
> used *ONLY *in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS.   In all discussions of
> Peirce's system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice.
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

On this issue, the evidence for the trichotomy (Mark Token Type) is 
overwhelming.Just look at the first instance in the Prolegomena, or the 
copy in CP 4.537 where Peirce adopts 'Tone' as the name of the first item in 
the trichotomy:  "An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice 
can neither be called a Type nor a Token."

The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited to the 
sound of a voice that is speaking something.  I have a high regard for Peirce's 
choices, but the word 'tone' applies to a tiny subset of marks.  Just look at 
Peirce's definition of mark in Baldwin's dictionary.  Every tone is a mark, 
which may also be a token of some type.  But only a tiny subset of marks are 
tones.  I have a high regard for Peirce's decisions, but when he himself has 
doubts about his previous choice, that is not a solid endorsement.  There is no 
ethical reason for keeping it.

Now go to the letter to Welby (also CP 8.363):  "From the summer of 1905 to the 
same time in 1906, I devoted much
study to my ten trichotomies of signs. It is time I reverted to the subject, as 
I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names 
are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, 
an
Actisign a Token, a Famisign a Type;...

CP 367. "an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, 
which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives...

Note Peirce's choice of Mark.  That is consistent with his definition of 'mark' 
in Baldwin's dictionary.  That was written before 1903, when the only 
trichotomy was "Icon Index Symbol".  Every tone of voice is a mark, but most 
marks are not tones of voice or tones of anything else.  Note that Peirce had 
also considered the word 'tinge' instead of 'tone'.  Every tinge is also a mark.

JAS:  his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, 
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).

I admit that he slipped back to an old (bad) habit in that example two days 
later.   But that example does not negate (1) the fact that a tone of voice is 
a limited special case of a mark, as in his own definition in Balwin's 
dictionary; (2) the fact that he had coined the word 'potisign' as a general 
technical term for the first item in the trichotomy; (3) the fact that he 
selected 'mark', not 'tone', as the replacement for potisign; and finally (4) 
the modern world has adopted Peirce's terms 'token' and 'type', but not 'tone'.

But I have found from my lectures and writings that modern logicians, 
philosophers, and computer scientists very readily accept the trichotomy (mark 
token type), but not (tone token type).  Since Peirce was always writing for 
the future, that makes 'mark' the choice for the future.   A tone is a limited 
and confusing special case of mark.

On this point, Tony made the correct choice.  The word 'tone' should be used 
ONLY in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS.   In all discussions of Peirce's 
system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

John, List:

JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two 
tokens of the same type.

This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an 
indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can have 
different tones, yet be tokens of the same type; and two things can have (some 
of) the same tones, yet be tokens of different types.

JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice.

Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, 
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
Jon,

I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of 'mark':

Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)

Yes indeed.   That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are 
two tokens of the same type.

It confirms Peirce's final choice.

John
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two
tokens of the same type.


This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an
indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can
have *different *tones, yet be tokens of the *same *type; and two things
can have (some of) the *same *tones, yet be tokens of *different *types.

JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice.


Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908,
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of
> 'mark':
>
> Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of
> Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)
>
> Yes indeed.   That definition shows that two things that have the same
> mark are two tokens of the same type.
>
> It confirms Peirce's final choice.
>
> John
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
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[PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Jon,

I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of 'mark':

Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)

Yes indeed.   That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are 
two tokens of the same type.

It confirms Peirce's final choice.

John
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
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