Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
chmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 9:11 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > We acknowledge that Peirce introduced the trichotomy (Tone Token Type) in > the Prolegomena article of 1906, and his choice of the name 'Tone' was > based on one example, "a tone of voice". After two more years of intensive > study, analysis, and writings, he presented a more precise specification of > the trichotomy (Potisign, Actisign, and Famisign) in a letter to Welby > (EP2, p. > > "Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as > such, General. Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible > Presentation, are divisible (o) into: > > "A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely > possible, but felt to be positively possible; as for eample the seventh ray > that passes through the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's > hexagram.8 > > "B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hie et nunc; such > as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single > paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. There may be > repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. > But that other occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an > edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy." > Peirce defined this trichotomy without making any reference to (Tone Token > Type). We don't know what he was thinking when he specified it. But > later (EP2, pp. 485-488) he continued to discuss Potisigns, Actisigns, and > Famisigns without making any references to the signs he defined in 2006. > He also discussed universes in considerable detail. That is a topic he > began to discuss in the Prolegomena, where he introduced (Tone Token > Type). But he is now introducing this new triad without making any > reference to it. But he is discussing this new version in quite a bit of > detail, and he is referring to universes repeatedly. > > Then on p. 488, he writes: "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in > 1906,1 devoted much study > to my ten trichotomies of signs.9 It is time I reverted to the subject, as > I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former > names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge > or Tone,an Actisign a Token. a Famisign a Type I think Potisign > Actisign Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?)... > > Then he continues: "I have now given as much time to this letter as I can > afford and I cannot now reexamine the remaining Trichotomies, although I > must do so as soon as possible. So I just give them as they stood two years > and more ago. In particular, the relations I assumed between the different > classes were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think... > > In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of > trichotomies "the wildest guesses". That should not encourage anyone to > consider them as having any reliable status. The best definition of (Mark > Token Type) should be considered the equivalent of (Potisign Actisign > Famisign) with the definitions stated in EP pp. 485-488. For the > definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's dictionary > should be considered and compared to what he wrote about Potisign. > > I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made > far deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and > writings by Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908. As you know, his > existential graphs also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach > their fully complete specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta. > For Gamma, the 1903 version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell > lectures. Peirce used metalanguage for specifying modality and a version > of higher-order logic in 1903. > > But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911. > > There is much more to say. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Jeff, There seem to be quite a few people who are interested in discussing applications of Peirce's logic and philosophy to current issues. That was certainly a hot topic in the various Peirce -ennials. I believe that it would be a topic of general interest. John From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" Sent: 4/8/24 12:35 AM To: "Michael J.J. Tiffany" , "s...@bestweb.net" Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) Hello Michael and John, Nice to hear from you on the List, Michael. I agree with your suggestions in (1) and (2). How might we further draw out some of Peirce’s suggestions for explaining the evolution of cooperation in a wide variety of systems, ranging from ecosystems to human economic and political systems? Complex emergent phenomena, such as the flow of information across the world wide web, provide us with fruitful case studies for modeling and explaining the growth of order in systems having parts that stand in relations of reciprocity and interdependence. I think Peirce’s central model for explaining the growth of order in physical, chemical, biological, and human social systems is the cycle of logical inquiry. Let me know if you are interested in exploring these ideas further on the list or as part of a small research and discussion group. Yours, Jeff Downard Flagstaff, AZ Philosophy, NAU From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Michael J.J. Tiffany Date: Sunday, April 7, 2024 at 10:57 AM To: s...@bestweb.net Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, List: I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century. I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). Two personal observations: 1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > individual selection. However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once put it). 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. Warm regards, Michael J.J. Tiffany Portsmouth, New Hampshire On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa wrote: Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our present. John Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM To: John Sowa Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event
[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [teadus.biosemiotics:9384] Unresolved problems in biosemiotics
FYI: GR Dear friends and colleagues, We invite you to join the panel on biosemiotics which will take place at the world congress of semiotics „Signs and Realities“ in Warsaw, Poland, 2–6 September this year. <https://www.semcon2024.com/> The biosemiotics panel – “Unresolved problems in biosemiotics” – was proposed by Don Favareau and me (description below). Deadline for abstracts is 15 April. Please submit <https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty> your abstract. With all best wishes Kalevi & Don Fundamentals of semiotics are not yet concisely formulated, theory of meaning making requires still much work in clarification. Biosemiotics has the major responsibility in this work inasmuch biosemiotics concerns the general semiotics. Among the unresolved problems we can recognize, for instance, the following: (a) the minimal conditions for a metabolic system to carry semiosis; (b) the relationship between interpretation, free choice, subjective present, umwelt, agency, logical paradox, and semiosis; (c) the operational typology of prelinguistic signs; (d) the nature of (sign) modality as such; (e) existence (and description) of forms of semiosis that never appear in human communication or in human bodies; etc. We should also pay attention to the perspective methods to be used for providing the solutions. In particular, this concerns the role of mathematical and empirical study methods. This includes several problems, for instance: (x) whether the fundamental semiotic theory can be formulated in mathematical terms; (y) which are the general methods to be used for testing semiotic models. The panel will include a roundtable to discuss the unresolved problems in biosemiotics. We ask all interested scholars to participate in this roundtable and to propose the ideas for solutions. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Hello Michael and John, Nice to hear from you on the List, Michael. I agree with your suggestions in (1) and (2). How might we further draw out some of Peirce’s suggestions for explaining the evolution of cooperation in a wide variety of systems, ranging from ecosystems to human economic and political systems? Complex emergent phenomena, such as the flow of information across the world wide web, provide us with fruitful case studies for modeling and explaining the growth of order in systems having parts that stand in relations of reciprocity and interdependence. I think Peirce’s central model for explaining the growth of order in physical, chemical, biological, and human social systems is the cycle of logical inquiry. Let me know if you are interested in exploring these ideas further on the list or as part of a small research and discussion group. Yours, Jeff Downard Flagstaff, AZ Philosophy, NAU From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Michael J.J. Tiffany Date: Sunday, April 7, 2024 at 10:57 AM To: s...@bestweb.net Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, List: I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century. I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). Two personal observations: 1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > individual selection. However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once put it). 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. Warm regards, Michael J.J. Tiffany Portsmouth, New Hampshire On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote: Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our present. John ____ Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM To: John Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s philosophical views would have led to a radically different paradigmatic foundation of the sciences than the ‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently remains entrenched nearly a century later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re long overdue for a revolution. In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the Stanford E
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Jon, List, We acknowledge that Peirce introduced the trichotomy (Tone Token Type) in the Prolegomena article of 1906, and his choice of the name 'Tone' was based on one example, "a tone of voice". After two more years of intensive study, analysis, and writings, he presented a more precise specification of the trichotomy (Potisign, Actisign, and Famisign) in a letter to Welby (EP2, p. "Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as such, General. Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, are divisible (o) into: "A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible; as for eample the seventh ray that passes through the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's hexagram.8 "B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hie et nunc; such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. There may be repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. But that other occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy." Peirce defined this trichotomy without making any reference to (Tone Token Type). We don't know what he was thinking when he specified it. But later (EP2, pp. 485-488) he continued to discuss Potisigns, Actisigns, and Famisigns without making any references to the signs he defined in 2006. He also discussed universes in considerable detail. That is a topic he began to discuss in the Prolegomena, where he introduced (Tone Token Type). But he is now introducing this new triad without making any reference to it. But he is discussing this new version in quite a bit of detail, and he is referring to universes repeatedly. Then on p. 488, he writes: "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906,1 devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs.9 It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone,an Actisign a Token. a Famisign a Type I think Potisign Actisign Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?)... Then he continues: "I have now given as much time to this letter as I can afford and I cannot now reexamine the remaining Trichotomies, although I must do so as soon as possible. So I just give them as they stood two years and more ago. In particular, the relations I assumed between the different classes were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think... In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of trichotomies "the wildest guesses". That should not encourage anyone to consider them as having any reliable status. The best definition of (Mark Token Type) should be considered the equivalent of (Potisign Actisign Famisign) with the definitions stated in EP pp. 485-488. For the definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's dictionary should be considered and compared to what he wrote about Potisign. I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made far deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and writings by Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908. As you know, his existential graphs also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach their fully complete specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta. For Gamma, the 1903 version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell lectures. Peirce used metalanguage for specifying modality and a version of higher-order logic in 1903. But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911. There is much more to say. John ---- From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 4/7/24 6:27 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type John, List: JFS: A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and the token are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable things. Whatever these sentences are supposed to be describing, it is certainly not what Peirce ever defines as the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification "according to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself" (CP 8.344, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24), the other two members of which are "token" and "type." A tone (or mark) is "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906)--it is not itself a physical thing, but it can be possessed by a token, which is a physical thing (or event) that exists (or occurs) at a single place and time (ibid). A type is "a definitely s
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Jerry This section is, I believe,from 1868 - and there are more descriptions of the categories elsewhere., eg. 8/328 1904. The three terms you reference - quality, relation, representation] can be understood to refer to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.The categories, are ‘modes of being’, or the form of the substance in which information is functioning, and are basic to the Peircean framework. And he explains them in the preceding and following paragrdaphs. But you can also see his outline in 5.41 and on-150. And 1.23; And 1.300 and on [1894] 1:277 and on…. I am not sure of your agenda re: icon, index, symbol…which are Relations between the Represetnamen and Object in the mode of Firstness, Secondness and thirdness [ but I assume you know that already]… I think my analogy of the three categorical modes of chance/freedom; current state interaction; and new habits of organization [aka Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness] ae pretty obvious within an economic process. After all- an economy operates within entrepreneurship [ Firstness] where novel ideas are generated and developed. It operates within a steady state daily life process of local interactions [Secondness] - which process takes up most of the ‘energy’ of an economic mode. And - it operates within the development of new economic modes and goods and services - which require the development of new‘habits of organization’ to produce and deliver the products. Even such a system as the use of symbolic units [ money[ went through these three categories, with the introduction of the symbol [Firstness]; and then, the common use in local interactions [ Secondness] and the legislated overseeing of the common value of these ‘bits of metal and paper’ [Thirdness]. And now -we are developing new symbols and new habits of the use of ‘money’..as a symbol of value. .. I analyze economic modes with a triad of Investment/Production/Consumption [and these can even. E understood within 3ns, 2ns, 1ns!!! Edwina > On Apr 7, 2024, at 8:45 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > Dear Edwinia, List > >> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky >> wrote: >> >> And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the >> interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state >> interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ >> Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. >> > > Your exuberant assertions are a bit beyond my amateurish reach. > > I am curious about these theses from the perspective of CSP theory of > categories with respect to your understandings of semiosis and semantic > closures. > > In the “A New List of Categories”, CSP describes the meaning of his terms and > then asserts: > > "BEING > Quality (Reference to a Ground) > Relation(Reference to a Correlate) > Representation (Reference to an Interpretant) > SUBSTANCE > > The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.” > > (The punctuation is reproduced from the Essential Peirce, Vol 1., page 6) > > I am attempting to sort through the terms in light of “icons, indices, and > symbols”. > > Can you briefly connect to an understanding of “BEING”? > Can you briefly elucidate the threads of reasoning that connect this view of > “SUBSTANCE” to the conclusions in economics? > > Yes, I know that you may find these to be “Philosophy 101” questions, but I > have been reading a bit of Metaphysics in recent months… > > Michael, your thoughts are equally welcomed. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > > > > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Dear Edwinia, List > On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the > interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state > interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ > Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. > Your exuberant assertions are a bit beyond my amateurish reach. I am curious about these theses from the perspective of CSP theory of categories with respect to your understandings of semiosis and semantic closures. In the “A New List of Categories”, CSP describes the meaning of his terms and then asserts: "BEING Quality (Reference to a Ground) Relation(Reference to a Correlate) Representation (Reference to an Interpretant) SUBSTANCE The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.” (The punctuation is reproduced from the Essential Peirce, Vol 1., page 6) I am attempting to sort through the terms in light of “icons, indices, and symbols”. Can you briefly connect to an understanding of “BEING”? Can you briefly elucidate the threads of reasoning that connect this view of “SUBSTANCE” to the conclusions in economics? Yes, I know that you may find these to be “Philosophy 101” questions, but I have been reading a bit of Metaphysics in recent months… Michael, your thoughts are equally welcomed. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
corations or images of some significant things. But > linguists discovered that they could be interpreted as a notation for Mayan > words. By assuming that ancient Mayan was an earlier stage of modern > spoken Mayan, linguists learned to read those "decorations" as a notation > for the words of the Mayan language. The same images from one point of > view are marks of tokens of decorations. From another point of view, they > are marks of tokens of morphemes of the Mayan language. > > In textual criticism, Peirce's exact words in any MS must be recorded > exactly. But in publications about Peirce's intentions, the terminology > must be adapted to the way modern readers would interpret the words. Max > Fisch, for example, realized that Peirce's decision to use the word 'logic' > as an abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic'. In his 1986 book, Fisch > stated that he was using the word 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for > 'logic as semeiotic". > > Fisch is certainly a respectable authority on the subject, and I believe > that we should follow his example in choosing which of Peirce's options to > consider as a standard for the 21st C.. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
unlike icon/index/symbol, this trichotomy is not a matter of degree. Consider its terminological predecessor--a qualisign cannot also be a replica (sinsign) of some legisign. Instead, a qualisign must be embodied in a sinsign, and likewise, a mark/tone must be embodied in a token. Regards, Jon On Fri, Apr 5, 2024 at 4:55 PM John F Sowa wrote: On this issue, the evidence for the trichotomy (Mark Token Type) is overwhelming.Just look at the first instance in the Prolegomena, or the copy in CP 4.537 where Peirce adopts 'Tone' as the name of the first item in the trichotomy: "An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token." The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited to the sound of a voice that is speaking something. I have a high regard for Peirce's choices, but the word 'tone' applies to a tiny subset of marks. Just look at Peirce's definition of mark in Baldwin's dictionary. Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type. But only a tiny subset of marks are tones. I have a high regard for Peirce's decisions, but when he himself has doubts about his previous choice, that is not a solid endorsement. There is no ethical reason for keeping it. Now go to the letter to Welby (also CP 8.363): "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906, I devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs. It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, an Actisign a Token, a Famisign a Type;... CP 367. "an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives... Note Peirce's choice of Mark. That is consistent with his definition of 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary. That was written before 1903, when the only trichotomy was "Icon Index Symbol". Every tone of voice is a mark, but most marks are not tones of voice or tones of anything else. Note that Peirce had also considered the word 'tinge' instead of 'tone'. Every tinge is also a mark. JAS: his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). I admit that he slipped back to an old (bad) habit in that example two days later. But that example does not negate (1) the fact that a tone of voice is a limited special case of a mark, as in his own definition in Balwin's dictionary; (2) the fact that he had coined the word 'potisign' as a general technical term for the first item in the trichotomy; (3) the fact that he selected 'mark', not 'tone', as the replacement for potisign; and finally (4) the modern world has adopted Peirce's terms 'token' and 'type', but not 'tone'. But I have found from my lectures and writings that modern logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists very readily accept the trichotomy (mark token type), but not (tone token type). Since Peirce was always writing for the future, that makes 'mark' the choice for the future. A tone is a limited and confusing special case of mark. On this point, Tony made the correct choice. The word 'tone' should be used ONLY in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS. In all discussions of Peirce's system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Michale Thank you for this excellent post. You are exactly right Peirce's agapastic semiosis is a dynamic and generative process- and it explains not merely the increasing complexity of the physicochemical and biological realms [which are, indeed, complex adaptive systems,] but also, explains the socioeconomic world of our species. As you say - wealth creation, which is all about a growth economy- - is quite different from the no-growth zero sum wealth transfer which is found in all no growth steady state populations [ before the industrial age]. And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. Again - thank you for an excellent post, and moving Peirce out of the seminar room into the real world. Edwina > On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:57 PM, Michael J.J. Tiffany > wrote: > > John, List: > > I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century. > > I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that > time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company > (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). > Two personal observations: > > 1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce > railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. > In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in > Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > > individual selection. > > However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about > socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth > transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many > examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted > with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or > even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the > extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of > the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they > shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a > literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, > especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as > the Santa Fe Institute once put it). > > 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates > understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained > transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's > another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to > write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you > can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the > reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of > abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. > > > Warm regards, > > Michael J.J. Tiffany > Portsmouth, New Hampshire > > > On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote: >> Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note >> about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of >> Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). >> >> Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value his >> contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our >> present. >> >> John >> >> >> Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM >> To: John Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> >> Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of >> science (U Pitt) >> John, >> >> I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s >> ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical >> positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead >> in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global >> existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass >> extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in >> his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in >> his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
John, List: I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century. I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). Two personal observations: 1. Agapism has *greater predictive power* than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > individual selection. However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about socio-economic evolution. Wealth *creation* -- distinct from zero sum wealth transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many examples of successful wealth *aggregators* whose success could be predicted with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once put it). 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. Warm regards, Michael J.J. Tiffany Portsmouth, New Hampshire On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa wrote: > Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note > about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of > Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). > > Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value > his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which > is our present. > > John > > > -- > *Sent*: 4/7/24 10:36 AM > *To*: John Sowa > *Subject*: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of > science (U Pitt) > > John, > > I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s > ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical > positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the > beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to > the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of > mass extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more > widely in his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna > Circle in his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s > philosophical views would have led to a radically different paradigmatic > foundation of the sciences than the ‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently > remains entrenched nearly a century later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re > long overdue for a revolution. > > In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the *Stanford > Encyclopedia of Philosophy <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/>*, > Rober Burch seems to report some similar thoughts about Peirce’s > perspective … > > An especially intriguing and curious twist in Peirce’s evolutionism is > that in Peirce’s view evolution involves what he calls its “agapeism.” > Peirce speaks of evolutionary love. According to Peirce, the most > fundamental engine of the evolutionary process is not struggle, strife, > greed, or competition. Rather it is nurturing love, in which an entity is > prepared to sacrifice its own perfection for the sake of the wellbeing of > its neighbor. This doctrine had a social significance for Peirce, who > apparently had the intention of arguing against the morally repugnant but > extremely popular socio-economic Darwinism of the late nineteenth century. > The doctrine also had for Peirce a cosmic significance, which Peirce > associated with the doctrine of the Gospel of John and with the mystical > ideas of Swedenborg and Henry James. In Part IV of the third of Peirc
[PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our present. John Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM To: John Sowa Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s philosophical views would have led to a radically different paradigmatic foundation of the sciences than the ‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently remains entrenched nearly a century later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re long overdue for a revolution. In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rober Burch seems to report some similar thoughts about Peirce’s perspective … An especially intriguing and curious twist in Peirce’s evolutionism is that in Peirce’s view evolution involves what he calls its “agapeism.” Peirce speaks of evolutionary love. According to Peirce, the most fundamental engine of the evolutionary process is not struggle, strife, greed, or competition. Rather it is nurturing love, in which an entity is prepared to sacrifice its own perfection for the sake of the wellbeing of its neighbor. This doctrine had a social significance for Peirce, who apparently had the intention of arguing against the morally repugnant but extremely popular socio-economic Darwinism of the late nineteenth century. The doctrine also had for Peirce a cosmic significance, which Peirce associated with the doctrine of the Gospel of John and with the mystical ideas of Swedenborg and Henry James. In Part IV of the third of Peirce’s six papers in Popular Science Monthly, entitled “The Doctrine of Chances,” Peirce even argued that simply being logical presupposes the ethics of self-sacrifice: “He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively.” To social Darwinism, and to the related sort of thinking that constituted for Herbert Spencer and others a supposed justification for the more rapacious practices of unbridled capitalism, Peirce referred in disgust as “The Gospel of Greed.” All merely hypothetical or purely conjectural, of course. But your admonition to relate Peirce to our 21st century world nudged me into sharing the idea. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of John F Sowa Sent: Saturday, April 6, 2024 5:53 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) Jerry, Thanks for that note. The following sentence shows why we need to relate Peirce's writings to the latest and greatest work that is being done today: >From the abstract: "C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a >canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science." I have attended a few APA conferences where I gave a talk in a Peirce session and attended other talks in more general sessions. And I have not heard anybody mention Peirce (except me in the discussions after a talk). The logicians are constantly talking about Frege, despite the fact that nobody else had ever used his notation for logic. But they don't mention Peirce, despite the fact that every logician uses his algebra of logic (with minor notational changes by Peano). In fact, the reason why Peano changed the notation was for ease of publication. Peirce used the Greek letters, sigma and pi, for the quantifiers, which were rarely available in those days. But any typesetter could easily turn letters upside down and backwards. So instead of mentioning Peirce, they give credit to Peano for the algebraic notation. It's essential for Peirce scholars to relate his writings to the big, wide, modern world. Susan Haack does that very well. Some others do that. And it's essential for Peirce scholars to do much, much more to relate Peirce's work to the hot topics of the 21st century. Peirce himself expected his writings to be hot issues for 400 years. We're almost halfway there, and we need to heat up the discussions. John --
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Jerry, Thanks for that note. The following sentence shows why we need to relate Peirce's writings to the latest and greatest work that is being done today: >From the abstract: "C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a >canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science." I have attended a few APA conferences where I gave a talk in a Peirce session and attended other talks in more general sessions. And I have not heard anybody mention Peirce (except me in the discussions after a talk). The logicians are constantly talking about Frege, despite the fact that nobody else had ever used his notation for logic. But they don't mention Peirce, despite the fact that every logician uses his algebra of logic (with minor notational changes by Peano). In fact, the reason why Peano changed the notation was for ease of publication. Peirce used the Greek letters, sigma and pi, for the quantifiers, which were rarely available in those days. But any typesetter could easily turn letters upside down and backwards. So instead of mentioning Peirce, they give credit to Peano for the algebraic notation. It's essential for Peirce scholars to relate his writings to the big, wide, modern world. Susan Haack does that very well. Some others do that. And it's essential for Peirce scholars to do much, much more to relate Peirce's work to the hot topics of the 21st century. Peirce himself expected his writings to be hot issues for 400 years. We're almost halfway there, and we need to heat up the discussions. John From: "Jerry LR Chandler" Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) FYI JLRC Friday, April 12th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT This talk will also be available live streamed on: Zoom at https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94576817686 Title: Peirce Disappears: C.S. Peirce and Early Logical Empiricism Abstract: Scholars of the history of philosophy of science read and hear a lot about Duhem, Mach, Poincaré, and the members of the Vienna Circle. C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science. But in the early years of the logical empiricist movement in the United States, Peirce received a warm reception from prominent representatives, proponents, and sympathizers of logical empiricism including Charles Morris, Ernst Nagel, Herbert Feigl, Phillip Frank, and W.V.O. Quine. This reception was short-lived though and Peirce gradually disappeared from the mainstream philosophy of science while logical empiricism turned into a formidable movement. In this talk, I begin by discussing examples of the early reception of Peirce’s philosophy in the works of Morris, Nagel (and his student Justus Buchler), Feigl, and Frank. I show the variety of topics (including logic, probability theory, theories of truth and meaning, and social dimensions of science) in which Peirce received a warm (though not uncritical) reception. We see that the engagements with his works are persistent from the late 1920s to the 1950s and get more refined over time. I then provide some explanations for the eventual marginalization of Peirce in mainstream philosophy of science. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
FYI JLRC Friday, April 12th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT This talk will also be available live streamed on: Zoom at https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94576817686 Title: Peirce Disappears: C.S. Peirce and Early Logical Empiricism Abstract: Scholars of the history of philosophy of science read and hear a lot about Duhem, Mach, Poincaré, and the members of the Vienna Circle. C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science. But in the early years of the logical empiricist movement in the United States, Peirce received a warm reception from prominent representatives, proponents, and sympathizers of logical empiricism including Charles Morris, Ernst Nagel, Herbert Feigl, Phillip Frank, and W.V.O. Quine. This reception was short-lived though and Peirce gradually disappeared from the mainstream philosophy of science while logical empiricism turned into a formidable movement. In this talk, I begin by discussing examples of the early reception of Peirce’s philosophy in the works of Morris, Nagel (and his student Justus Buchler), Feigl, and Frank. I show the variety of topics (including logic, probability theory, theories of truth and meaning, and social dimensions of science) in which Peirce received a warm (though not uncritical) reception. We see that the engagements with his works are persistent from the late 1920s to the 1950s and get more refined over time. I then provide some explanations for the eventual marginalization of Peirce in mainstream philosophy of science. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
out > the purely physical world”. 4.551. That is, cognition does not require a > separate brain. Therefore, even a semiosic triad operating in total > Secondness, is a ‘cognitive act, based on the nature of the materials of > the interaction [eg, a Dicent Sinsign, a weathervane’. > > 7] ET: I fully agree - nothing is independent of semiosis and I don’t > think I have ever argued for such a view. > > 8] ET: Again - I have often quoted this section and fully agree. Please > note - ’signs’ is plural. > > 9] ET: My discussion has primarily been around your positioning of the > Final Interpretant before the Dynamic and Immediate Interpretants - In my > post of today, I outlined what I consider to be the function of the FI - > and note that it is not always part of the semiosic action. > > Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
uture. A > tone is a limited and confusing special case of mark. > > On this point, Tony made the correct choice. The word 'tone' should be > used *ONLY *in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS. In all discussions of > Peirce's system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice. > > > John > > -- > *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > > John, List: > > JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two > tokens of the same type. > > > This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an > indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can > have *different *tones, yet be tokens of the *same *type; and two things > can have (some of) the *same *tones, yet be tokens of *different *types. > > JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice. > > > Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, > https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > > Jon, > > I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of > 'mark': > > Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of > Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) > > Yes indeed. That definition shows that two things that have the same > mark are two tokens of the same type. > > It confirms Peirce's final choice. > > John > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
ng] and therefore - can’t provide enough information to the next experience [ the Dynamic Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the clarity of Secondness. So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree. Edwina _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
categorical > sign), or as real relations (for a relative sign). 9] ET: My discussion has primarily been around your positioning of the Final Interpretant before the Dynamic and Immediate Interpretants - In my post of today, I outlined what I consider to be the function of the FI - and note that it is not always part of the semiosic action. Edwina > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 8:07 PM Edwina Taborsky <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> I will try to answer in pints: >> >> 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of >> signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of >> semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical modes >> to the interpretants? >> >> 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the’ >> phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. >> >> 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object >> itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic >> process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘inerpretant, >> of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. >> >> 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between theSign/representamen >> and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the three categorical >> modes. >> >> 5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338 reference >> suggests your conclusion. >> >> 6] My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of >> understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the >> semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of >> the Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of being >> of the DI..and the DI contains the mode of presentation of the II. I don’t >> see how this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual >> example. >> >> I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II >> ‘constrains’ the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a >> ‘purpose to the FI. Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then, th >> DI is also in a mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that the >> mode of Firstness has a limited amount of information [ being primarily >> feeling] and therefore - can’t provide enough information to the next >> experience [ the Dynamic Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the >> clarity of Secondness. >> >> So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree. >> >> Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
On this issue, the evidence for the trichotomy (Mark Token Type) is overwhelming.Just look at the first instance in the Prolegomena, or the copy in CP 4.537 where Peirce adopts 'Tone' as the name of the first item in the trichotomy: "An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token." The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited to the sound of a voice that is speaking something. I have a high regard for Peirce's choices, but the word 'tone' applies to a tiny subset of marks. Just look at Peirce's definition of mark in Baldwin's dictionary. Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type. But only a tiny subset of marks are tones. I have a high regard for Peirce's decisions, but when he himself has doubts about his previous choice, that is not a solid endorsement. There is no ethical reason for keeping it. Now go to the letter to Welby (also CP 8.363): "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906, I devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs. It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, an Actisign a Token, a Famisign a Type;... CP 367. "an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives... Note Peirce's choice of Mark. That is consistent with his definition of 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary. That was written before 1903, when the only trichotomy was "Icon Index Symbol". Every tone of voice is a mark, but most marks are not tones of voice or tones of anything else. Note that Peirce had also considered the word 'tinge' instead of 'tone'. Every tinge is also a mark. JAS: his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). I admit that he slipped back to an old (bad) habit in that example two days later. But that example does not negate (1) the fact that a tone of voice is a limited special case of a mark, as in his own definition in Balwin's dictionary; (2) the fact that he had coined the word 'potisign' as a general technical term for the first item in the trichotomy; (3) the fact that he selected 'mark', not 'tone', as the replacement for potisign; and finally (4) the modern world has adopted Peirce's terms 'token' and 'type', but not 'tone'. But I have found from my lectures and writings that modern logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists very readily accept the trichotomy (mark token type), but not (tone token type). Since Peirce was always writing for the future, that makes 'mark' the choice for the future. A tone is a limited and confusing special case of mark. On this point, Tony made the correct choice. The word 'tone' should be used ONLY in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS. In all discussions of Peirce's system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two tokens of the same type. This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can have different tones, yet be tokens of the same type; and two things can have (some of) the same tones, yet be tokens of different types. JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice. Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of 'mark': Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) Yes indeed. That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two tokens of the same type. It confirms Peirce's final choice. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/use
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
have under ideal circumstances. Finally, just to be clear, although the terminology is similar, this is *not* the same division as possible/existent/necessitant for each individual trichotomy in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign classification. Again, the *purpose* of the final interpretant (ideal effect) is either to produce feeling (for a gratific sign), to produce action (for an actuous sign), or to produce self-control (for a temperative sign); the *mode of being* of the dynamical interpretant (actual effect) is either that of a feeling (for a sympathetic sign), that of an exertion (for a percussive sign), or that of another sign (for a usual sign); and the *mode of presentation* of the immediate interpretant (range of possible effects) is either as abstract qualities (for a hypothetic sign), as concrete inherences (for a categorical sign), or as real relations (for a relative sign). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 8:07 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > I will try to answer in pints: > > 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of > signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of > semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical > modes to the interpretants? > > 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why > the’ phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. > > 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object > itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the > semiosic process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the > ‘inerpretant, of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the > representamen/sign. > > 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between > theSign/representamen and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the > three categorical modes. > > 5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338 > reference suggests your conclusion. > > 6] My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of > understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the > semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of > the Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of > being of the DI..and the DI contains the mode of presentation of the II. I > don’t see how this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual > example. > > I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II > ‘constrains’ the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a > ‘purpose to the FI. Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then, > th DI is also in a mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that > the mode of Firstness has a limited amount of information [ being primarily > feeling] and therefore - can’t provide enough information to the next > experience [ the Dynamic Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the > clarity of Secondness. > > So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree. > > Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
se conclusions as to > whether the terms are logical or temporal. > > 4] I remain concerned about out the definition of the Dynamic Object, which I > reject JAS’s view as “independent of the sign’. Peirce is quite explicit > that “reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but > only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it” 5.408… > I refer to this comment of Peirce only to state that the reality of objects > ‘out there’ is, as he notes elsewhere, outside of our experience [see his > explanations of the ‘ding an sich’ which is not the same as the Dynamic > Object- which is “the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the > Sign of its Representation” 4.536.1906. And “the dynamical object does not > mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in > perception” SS197..1906. > > That is, my understanding of the DO is that it functions as such ONLY when it > becomes part of the semiotic process. > > And as I’ve said before - I reject the use of the terms of genuine, > degenerate etc referring to the DO and IO [ and II, DI, FI] for this use of > terms I think refer more properly to the categorical modes-of-being - and > these nodal sites in the hexad can be in any one of the three modes. . > > 5] I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic > process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to > linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word > ’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s > extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is > confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would > require merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. > > But- I am aware that JAS will not change his conclusions - and I, am not > ready to subscribe to his, so this post seems almost irrelevant, other than > that I prefer to not ‘be silent’ about issues which, to me, undermine the > value of the Peircean framework. > > Edwina _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible to existent to necessitate [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s outlines. Edwina _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
the “process of inference” 3.161, snd not the Fi, and as Peirce writes, these “fresh peripheral excitations are also continually creating new belief-habits” [3.161. I could also note that the Final or logical interpretant is, “that of the conditional mood’ [5.482] and therefore, in my view, not destinate’. And I don’t think that there is much difference in these conclusions as to whether the terms are logical or temporal. 4] I remain concerned about out the definition of the Dynamic Object, which I reject JAS’s view as “independent of the sign’. Peirce is quite explicit that “reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it” 5.408… I refer to this comment of Peirce only to state that the reality of objects ‘out there’ is, as he notes elsewhere, outside of our experience [see his explanations of the ‘ding an sich’ which is not the same as the Dynamic Object- which is “the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign of its Representation” 4.536.1906. And “the dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception” SS197..1906. That is, my understanding of the DO is that it functions as such ONLY when it becomes part of the semiotic process. And as I’ve said before - I reject the use of the terms of genuine, degenerate etc referring to the DO and IO [ and II, DI, FI] for this use of terms I think refer more properly to the categorical modes-of-being - and these nodal sites in the hexad can be in any one of the three modes. . 5] I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word ’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would require merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. But- I am aware that JAS will not change his conclusions - and I, am not ready to subscribe to his, so this post seems almost irrelevant, other than that I prefer to not ‘be silent’ about issues which, to me, undermine the value of the Peircean framework. Edwina _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
e [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean >> that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if >> the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two >> interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant >> is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either >> in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s outlines. >> >> Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
John, List: I have likewise already read (and carefully studied) about a dozen articles by Tony Jappy, as well as his 2017 book, *Peirce's Twenty-Eight Sign Classes and the Philosophy of Representation*. Why assume otherwise? I still disagree with him on destinate=final and explicit=immediate (as I maintain) vs. destinate=immediate and explicit=final (as he maintains). However, having made our cases, I agree with him that we must ultimately "leave the list members to make up their own minds." The only authority that really matters here is that of Peirce himself. I strongly urge everyone to study *his *writings in light of our different arguments, and then draw their own conclusions about *his *views based on those texts. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I have read your comments, and I have read several articles by Tony Jappy > that explain these issues in far greater depth and generality. I strongly > urge you to study his writings. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
immediate interpretant constrains the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, which constrains the purpose of the final interpretant. I find the former much more plausible than the latter. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 12:53 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > List > > I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ > or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that > ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent > to other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?. > > And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes > an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he > says: possible-existent-necessitnat [ for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But > this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. > > And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the > Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [ understood as a > necessitant] but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY > ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are > in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. . I > think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final > Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in > a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint. > > And when we consider Robert Marty’s outline of the hexadic ten classes - > we see, of course, the same format > > Where then is the constraint? It’s within the mediative > representamen/sign, not within the Interpretants. It is this site that > plays the key role in forming the nature of the sign triad’/hexad. > > And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from > possible to existent to necessitate [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not > then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is > that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other > two interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate > interpretant is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants > can be either in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s > outlines. > > Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Jon, I have read your comments, and I have read several articles by Tony Jappy that explain these issues in far greater depth and generality. I strongly urge you to study his writings. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 4/4/24 12:39 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end List: While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the possibility of misinterpretations. Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following restrictions. - A gratific sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only feelings. - Only a temperative sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, can be a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a percussive sign) or possible (for a sympathetic sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might instead produce exertions or feelings. - A sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, must be a hypothetic sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can only present those effects as abstract qualities. - Only a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, can be a relative sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a categorical sign) or possible (for a hypothetic sign); i.e., only a sign that actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract qualities. Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is misinterpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a different universe from that of its final interpretant's purpose, the direction of the deviation is always from necessitant to existent to possible--which makes sense since 3ns always involves 2ns, which always involves 1ns. By contrast, reversing the order of the interpretant trichotomies would require the opposite, such that deviation would always be from possible to existent to necessitant--which does not make sense since 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns. A sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce feelings could sometimes (somehow) actually produce exertions or further signs as its dynamical interpretants instead, while a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control would always actually produce further signs as its dynamical interpretants. Moreover, as I discussed on the List a few weeks ago, the trichotomy according to the nature or mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant is hypothetic/categorical/relative, directly corresponding to the three kinds of propositions that are distinguishable by the number of lines of identity that they require in Existential Graphs (EGs)--zero/one/two or more. The phemic sheet is a strictly logical quasi-mind, so it can only be determined to a further sign, namely, an EG that is explicitly scribed on it. Since all three kinds of propositions can be represented by such an EG, the trichotomy for the immediate interpretant must come after the one for the dynamical interpretant--if it were the other way around, then only relative propositions with at least two lines of ide
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every >>> Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered... >>> The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111, >>> 1909) >>> >>> But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, >>> which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally >>> be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter >>> were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909) >>> >>> It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s >>> ordering: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that >>> toward which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual >>> interpretation (Id) might take place, surely not after the final >>> interpretant. There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant >>> determines the sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the >>> exponent). And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the >>> degree of congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the >>> utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These >>> definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the >>> actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) surely suggest that the >>> only possibility of misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual >>> semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the intended >>> interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that there is >>> ‘the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the >>> utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind >>> of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii follows >>> the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the >>> interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation. >>> >>> · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of >>> determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the >>> order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when >>> accounting for the possibility of misinterpretations.’ (JS) >>> >>> To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying >>> 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of >>> which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS - all >>> the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final interpretants. >>> >>> NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), The Logic of >>> Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie >>> Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906) >>> >>> With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own >>> minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions. >>> >>> TJ >>> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
‘My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must >> have its peculiar interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. My >> Dynamical Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of >> Interpretation and is different in each from that of any other; and the >> Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every >> Interpreter is destined to come if the sign is sufficiently considered. The >> Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The >> Dynamical Interpretant is a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is >> that toward which the actual tends.’ (SS: 111, 1909) >> >> >> >> ...the Immediate Interpretant is what the Question expresses, all that it >> *immediately* expresses. (CP: 8.314, 1909; emphasis added) >> >> And of the *final interpretant* (If) he says this: >> >> That ultimate, definitive, and final (i.e. eventually to be reached), >> interpretant (final I mean, in the logical sense of attaining the purpose, >> is also final in the sense of bringing the series of translations [to a >> stop] for the obvious reason that it is not itself a sign) is to be >> regarded as the ultimate signification of the [sign]. (LI: 356-357; 1906) >> >> >> >> The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every >> Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered... >> The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111, >> 1909) >> >> >> >> But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, >> which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally >> be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter >> were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909) >> >> It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s >> ordering: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that >> toward which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual >> interpretation (Id) might take place, surely not *after *the final >> interpretant. There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant >> determines the sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the >> exponent). And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the >> degree of congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the >> utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These >> definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the >> actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) surely suggest that >> the only possibility of misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual >> semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the intended >> interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that there is ‘the >> *Intentional *Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the >> utterer; the *Effectual *Interpretant, which is a determination of the >> mind of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii >> follows the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the >> interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation. >> >> · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of >> determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the >> order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when >> accounting for the possibility of *mis*interpretations.’ (JS) >> >> To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) >> displaying 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 >> and 1908, of which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given >> by JS - *all* the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named >> final interpretants. >> >> NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), *The Logic of >> Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series*, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie >> Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906) >> >> With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own >> minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions. >> >> TJ >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
t;> The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every >> Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered... >> The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111, 1909) >> >> But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which >> I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally be >> decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were >> carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909) >> >> It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s ordering: >> if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that toward which the >> actual tends one wonders at what point any actual interpretation (Id) might >> take place, surely not after the final interpretant. There is no suggestion >> here that the final interpretant determines the sign’s meaning (of which the >> immediate interpretant is the exponent). And surely misinterpretation and >> misconception depend upon the degree of congruence between the intended >> meaning emanating from the utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the >> interpreter. These definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent >> interpretability, Id the actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) >> surely suggest that the only possibility of misinterpretation comes from >> when, in an actual semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the >> intended interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that >> there is ‘the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind >> of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the >> mind of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii >> follows the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the >> interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation. >> >> · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of >> determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the >> order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when >> accounting for the possibility of misinterpretations.’ (JS) >> >> To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying >> 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of >> which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS - all >> the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final interpretants. >> >> NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), The Logic of >> Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie >> Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906) >> >> With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own >> minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions. >> >> TJ >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two tokens of the same type. This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can have *different *tones, yet be tokens of the *same *type; and two things can have (some of) the *same *tones, yet be tokens of *different *types. JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice. Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of > 'mark': > > Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of > Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) > > Yes indeed. That definition shows that two things that have the same > mark are two tokens of the same type. > > It confirms Peirce's final choice. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
John, List: JFS: I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead of 'tone'. Again, going by the manuscript dates, Peirce's *final *choice was "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i), not "mark" (CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25)--especially since the latter passage includes the word "might" and a parenthetical question mark, clearly indicating that "mark" was tentative rather than definitive. JFS: The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system As quoted, Lady Welby does not say that she does not *understand *Peirce's "exposition of the 'possible' Sign"--on the contrary, she calls it "profoundly interesting"--only that she is "not equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer *tone *to *mark*"; and again, her stated rationale for this preference is strikingly similar to Peirce's stated rationale for coining "tone" in the first place (CP 4.537, 1906). Besides ... JFS: That is the primary reason why he [Peirce] found Lady Welby's correspondence so important: She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing explanations for his abstract ideas. ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html) Why think that "tone" vs. "mark" was an exception to this, such that her "homely" opinion about it did not sway him--especially since he was still vacillating between these two options, and specifically *asked *her to help him choose one? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 1:08 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Edwina, Tony, Jon, List, > > I'd like to emphasize the first word of the subject line: Evolution. I > believe that is the best single word to describe Peirce's developments in > from 1903 to 1906 to 1908 to 1911 to his last long letter of 1913, in which > he highlighted the features he considered important. I'd also emphasize > Tony's point that too many Peirce scholars stopped at the issues, > terminology, and notations of 1903. That was an important beginning, but > the evolution in the following decade made fundamental changes. > > One important source of evidence is Peirce's choice of terminology. He > coined and adopted a wide range of terms, some of which he retained to the > end. But there are others that he stopped using and replaced with new > words. The points where he changed terms also involve critical > innovations. If he never again uses the old terms, that is an important > indication that he began a new way of thinking (paradigm). For example, > the words 'cut' and 'scroll' were banished in June 1911. > > There are multiple places where he made a major shift in terminology, and > every one of them shows a significant innovation in his system. The shift > from phenomenology to phaneroscopy is a permanent shift, and I believe that > it indicates a shift from an abstract Kantian style to the more concrete > examples that Lady Welby used. Another shift from the word-based > terminology, such as dicisign, to terms that include diagrams and images, > such as semes and phemes, is significant. Since semes include hypericons, > he never again needed that word. He also used the term "phemic sheet" as > replacement for 'sheet of assertion'. > > I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead > of 'tone'. The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she > admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason > for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system: "Your > exposition of the 'possible' Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not > equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer > *tone* to *mark* for the homely reason that we often have occasion to say > 'I do not object to his words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). > > There's more to say about these issues, and I'll send another note when I > have the time. > > John > > PS: The initials JS are ambiguous. It's better to write JAS or JFS. > > -- > *From*: "Edwina Taborsky" > *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation > from 1903 to the end > > This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
gt; The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111, > 1909) > > > > But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, > which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally > be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter > were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909) > > It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s > ordering: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that > toward which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual > interpretation (Id) might take place, surely not *after *the final > interpretant. There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant > determines the sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the > exponent). And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the > degree of congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the > utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These > definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the > actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) surely suggest that > the only possibility of misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual > semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the intended > interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that there is ‘the > *Intentional *Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the > utterer; the *Effectual *Interpretant, which is a determination of the > mind of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii > follows the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the > interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation. > > · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of > determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the > order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when > accounting for the possibility of *mis*interpretations.’ (JS) > > To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying 14 > six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of > which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS - > *all* the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final > interpretants. > > NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), *The Logic of > Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series*, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie > Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906) > > With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own > minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions. > > TJ > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Jon, I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of 'mark': Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) Yes indeed. That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two tokens of the same type. It confirms Peirce's final choice. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, Tony, Jon, List, I'd like to emphasize the first word of the subject line: Evolution. I believe that is the best single word to describe Peirce's developments in from 1903 to 1906 to 1908 to 1911 to his last long letter of 1913, in which he highlighted the features he considered important. I'd also emphasize Tony's point that too many Peirce scholars stopped at the issues, terminology, and notations of 1903. That was an important beginning, but the evolution in the following decade made fundamental changes. One important source of evidence is Peirce's choice of terminology. He coined and adopted a wide range of terms, some of which he retained to the end. But there are others that he stopped using and replaced with new words. The points where he changed terms also involve critical innovations. If he never again uses the old terms, that is an important indication that he began a new way of thinking (paradigm). For example, the words 'cut' and 'scroll' were banished in June 1911. There are multiple places where he made a major shift in terminology, and every one of them shows a significant innovation in his system. The shift from phenomenology to phaneroscopy is a permanent shift, and I believe that it indicates a shift from an abstract Kantian style to the more concrete examples that Lady Welby used. Another shift from the word-based terminology, such as dicisign, to terms that include diagrams and images, such as semes and phemes, is significant. Since semes include hypericons, he never again needed that word. He also used the term "phemic sheet" as replacement for 'sheet of assertion'. I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead of 'tone'. The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system: "Your exposition of the 'possible' Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer tone to mark for the homely reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his words, but to his tone'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). There's more to say about these issues, and I'll send another note when I have the time. John PS: The initials JS are ambiguous. It's better to write JAS or JFS. From: "Edwina Taborsky" Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy [TJ]. . I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process of mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process. This would require that the three interpretants function as capable of this generative, creative agapastic evolution - and this means that the Immediate Interpretant, which is internal to the sign-vehicle operates as the most immediate and ambiguously open interpretant form…. Followed by the Dynamic Interpretant as a more specific and discrete result…and sometimes, not always..by the Final Interpretant, which is a communal not individual result. And, any of these Interpretants can be in any of the categorical modes. The way that JAS has set up the three Interpretants, seems to me to set up an priori deterministic, necessitarian process, which is obviously closed [ by the Final Interpretant’s privileged first step role]…and to me, this is the opposite of that open, adaptive Peircean semeiosis. And as TJ points out - it doesn’t make sense that the Dynamic Interpretant follows the Final…unless, in my view, that DI is merely a determined clone of the authoritarian FI. Edwina On Apr 3, 2024, at 3:45 AM, Anthony Jappy wrote: List, I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the three interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper published in Semiotica (which is indeed the published version of the text mentioned by John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his posting, I prefer not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless will offer an alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much greater detail in Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the interpretant ordering of David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS and reply to two of his objections to my ordering. These replies are sufficient to support my position. First this statement: ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical determination for sign classification, not causal nor temporal determination within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If) determines the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate (Ii)’. (JS) Here are two
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] determination
Robert, List, Thank you! And is that definition different from my Boolean assumption? Boole is about true/false, but "renders definitely to such as it will be", and "particular manner" sound like something between true or false, but is that so? "Not particular" and "not definitely" might be translated with "false", i think. Best regards, Helmut Gesendet: Mittwoch, 03. April 2024 um 18:06 Uhr Von: "robert marty" An: "Helmut Raulien" , "Peirce-L" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] determination Helmut, list According to Peirce, the definition if "renders definitely to be such as it will be" "We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner.(CP 8.361)342-379 M-20b (1908)) Within the MS 611, p.67-68, Peirce verify that his definition of determination is transitive. Best regards, Robert Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ Sans virus.www.avast.com Le mer. 3 avr. 2024 à 16:36, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> a écrit : Dear list members, some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or, if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign. Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and classification form a complexity. Best regards, Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] determination
Helmut, list According to Peirce, the definition if "renders definitely to be such as it will be" *"We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner.*(CP 8.361)342-379 M-20b *(1908))* Within the MS 611, p.67-68, Peirce verify that his definition of determination is transitive. Best regards, Robert Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail> Sans virus.www.avast.com <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> Le mer. 3 avr. 2024 à 16:36, Helmut Raulien a écrit : > Dear list members, > > some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds > of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also > determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and > classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it > more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the > second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that > determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or > "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or, > if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign. > > Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society > determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there > is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined > by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the > government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines > the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself > as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion > (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and > classification form a complexity. > > Best regards, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
tail that modern formal systems of modal logic will never turn >> out to be useful in these or any other applications. More to the point, such >> an assessment is utterly irrelevant for ascertaining what Peirce had in mind >> when writing R L376, including his statement, "I shall now have to add a >> Delta part [to Existential Graphs] in order to deal with modals." A >> straightforward reading of that text itself is that he simply needs a new >> notation to replace the unsatisfactory (broken) cuts of 1903 and nonsensical >> tinctures of 1906 for representing and reasoning about propositions >> involving possibility and necessity. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >> On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa > <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote: >>> To provide some background and alternative interpretations of Peirce's >>> theories during his last decade, the attached article by Tony Jappy >>> discusses issues from a different perspective than the recent discussions >>> about Delta graphs. >>> >>> The article by Jappy is a 14-page summary of issues that he discussed in >>> much more detail in a book he wrote in 2017. I inserted commentary at >>> various points marked by "JFS:". But I did not add, delete, or change any >>> of Jappy's text. My comments do not discuss any issues about Delta graphs, >>> but they provide some background information that may be helpful for >>> interpreting L376. >>> >>> John >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while >> to repair / update all the links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >> <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE >> of the message and nothing in the body. More at >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > > -- > Tony Jappy > > CRESEM : Centre de recherches sur les Sociétés et Environnements en > Méditerranée > University of Perpignan-Via Domitia, > 66860 Perpignan Cedex, > France > > e-mail: anthony.ja...@gmail.com <http://mail.com/>, t...@univ-perp.fr > <mailto:t...@univ-perp.fr> > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] determination
Dear list members, some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or, if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign. Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and classification form a complexity. Best regards, Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
>(CP 8.338, SS 34-35, 1904 Oct 12), so it makes sense for the If trichotomy >likewise to come *before *the Id trichotomy. > > I can elaborate on any or all of these if anyone is interested. As for the > inserted comments ... > > JFS: Note that “Mark Token Type” is Peirce's final choice of labels for > that trichotomy. > > > In that draft letter to Lady Welby, Peirce states, "But I dare say some of > my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a *Potisign > *a *Tinge *or *Tone*, an *Actisign *a *Token*, a *Famisign *a *Type *... > I think *Potisign Actisign Famisign* might be called *Mark Token Type (?)* > ..." (CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). The word "might" and the > parenthetical question mark indicate that his choice of "mark" is *not *final. > In fact, he reverts to "Tone" in a Logic Notebook entry dated two days > later (27 Dec 1908, > https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). > > Moreover, two days earlier, Peirce writes, "For a 'possible' Sign I have > no better designation than a *Tone*, though I am considering replacing > this by 'Mark.' Can you suggest a really good name?" (SS 83, 1908 Dec 23). > Lady Welby replies a few weeks later, "Your exposition of the 'possible' > Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not equal to the effort of > discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer *tone* to *mark* for the > homely reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his > words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). > > I agree with her, especially since Peirce himself gives essentially the > same rationale for "tone" when he introduces it--"An indefinite significant > character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. > I propose to call such a Sign a *Tone*" (CP 4.537, 1906). Besides, "mark" > already had a well-established and quite different definition in logic, > which Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of > Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark); > and as discussed on the List recently, "markedness" is now an unrelated > technical term in linguistics. > > JFS: In computer science and applications, the Lewis-style of modal logic > has been useless in practical computations. > > > Again, "useless" strikes me as an overstatement, and even if accurate, it > does not entail that modern formal systems of modal logic will *never *turn > out to be useful in these or any other applications. More to the point, > such an assessment is *utterly irrelevant* for ascertaining what *Peirce *had > in mind when writing R L376, including his statement, "I shall now have to > add a *Delta *part [to Existential Graphs] in order to deal with modals." > A straightforward reading of that text itself is that he simply needs a new > notation to replace the unsatisfactory (broken) cuts of 1903 and > nonsensical tinctures of 1906 for representing and reasoning about > propositions involving possibility and necessity. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa wrote: > >> To provide some background and alternative interpretations of Peirce's >> theories during his last decade, the attached article by Tony Jappy >> discusses issues from a different perspective than the recent discussions >> about Delta graphs. >> >> The article by Jappy is a 14-page summary of issues that he discussed in >> much more detail in a book he wrote in 2017. I inserted commentary at >> various points marked by "JFS:". But I did not add, delete, or change any >> of Jappy's text. My comments do not discuss any issues about Delta graphs, >> but they provide some background information that may be helpful for >> interpreting L376. >> >> John >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Date of CP 2.661
“From manuscripts R 703–4 it is clear that Peirce worked extensively on the third Illustrations article, “The Doctrine of Chances,” that same month.” That month was August 1910, according to Cornelis de Waal’s edition of Illustrations of the Logic of Science, from which the above quote is taken. (Open Court. Kindle Edition). Gary f. Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of James Rizzo Sent: Tuesday, April 2, 2024 6:29 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Date of CP 2.661 Dear All, Would anyone know how to find out when specifically in 1910 (i.e., month) Peirce wrote his additional notes on "The Doctrine of Chances"? The editorial note at CP 2.661, where these additional notes appear, just gives the year 1910, as does Justus Buchler. Thanks in advance for your help, James Rizzo _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Date of CP 2.661
Dear All, Would anyone know how to find out when specifically in 1910 (i.e., month) Peirce wrote his additional notes on "The Doctrine of Chances"? The editorial note at CP 2.661, where these additional notes appear, just gives the year 1910, as does Justus Buchler. Thanks in advance for your help, James Rizzo _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: The Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter 8:1 - March/April 2024
List, FYI: This latest edition of the Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter is packed with information of interest to the Peirce community including an introduction to Hans Joas, the new president of the Society, a section *In Memoriam*: John Lachs, Nicholas Rescher, Don Roberts, and Beverly Kent, news of Society sessions and speakers at the 2024 World Congress of Philosophy being held in Rome this August, and much else. Gary Richmond, Moderator of Peirce-L The Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter 8:1 [image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society] Dear Gary Richmond Internationally, the thought of Charles S. Peirce continues to stimulate significant work and discussion. Dedicated to promoting Peirce’s work and thought, the Charles S. Peirce Society is pleased to update you on its efforts, on new publications relating to Peirce and to pragmatism, and on other news relating to Peirce. We are grateful for your support and for being a part of such a wonderful and expansive community of inquirers. Yours truly, The Charles S. Peirce Society Executive Committee *Spotlight on the Peirce Society President* We are pleased to announce that Professor *Hans Joas*, Ernst Troeltsch Professor for the Sociology of Religion at the Humboldt University of Berlin, is the President of the Charles S. Peirce Society this year, succeeding Professor Yi Jiang, who is now serving as past president and who will be, along with other past presidents, a Society Fellow for life. For more than twenty years, Professor Joas was also a visiting professor in the Department of Sociology and in the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago. He holds honorary doctorates from the University of Tübingen, Uppsala University and the Pazmanyi Peter University in Budapest. >From 2011 until 2014 he was a Fellow at the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS), and before that, from 2002 until 2011, he was the Director of the Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies at the University of Erfurt. Professor Joas’s contributions to pragmatist thought begin with his famous study on George H. Mead, *G. H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of His Thought* (MIT Press, 1985, 1997). Since then, he has authored more than a dozen other books, including *Pragmatism and Social Theory*, *The Creativity of Action* and *The Genesis of Values* (all of them University of Chicago Press, 1993, 1996 and 2000, respectively). They are all contributions to a new social theory based on American pragmatism. A more recent book is *The Power of the Sacred. An Alternative to the Narrative of Disenchantment* (OUP 2021), in which he argues that Peirce’s semiotics can be synthesized with William James’s psychology of religion, and that such a synthesis is crucial to a contemporary theory of religion. His most recent book is *Under the Spell of Freedom: Theory of Religion after Hegel and Nietzsche* (OUP, 2024). It is truly an honor that Professor Joas will help lead our Society this year and into the future. *The 2024-2025 Peirce Essay Prize* Once again, our Society is holding an essay contest directed to promoting work by junior scholars. The 2024-2025 Peirce Essay Prize offers a $1,000 cash prize plus up to $750 for travel to the Society’s annual meeting to present the winning essay, as well as its publication (subjective to editorial revision) in the *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*. The essay can be on any topic related to Peirce’s work, and we consider submissions from graduate students and those who are no more than seven years out from the year they earned their last graduate degree, or ten years for those who have given birth or have had childcare responsibilities (past winners of the contest are ineligible). The list of previous winners can be found here <https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=4aa7dbbfd5=860edf35dc> . The submission deadline is *August 15, 2024*. Because the winning essay may be published in the Transactions, the length of contest submissions should be about the length of an average journal article. The maximum acceptable length is 10,000 words, including notes. The presentation of the winning submission at the annual meeting cannot exceed 30 minutes reading time. Go here <https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=7e9cc86b35=860edf35dc> for more information. *In Memoriam**: John Lachs, Nicholas Rescher, Don Roberts, and Beverly Kent* We are saddened by the passing of four distinguished scholars over the past six months, whose contributions to pragmatism and to Peirce studies are well known. It is our duty and privilege to remember and honor each one of them. *John Lachs* served as the Peirce Society president in 1987. He was professor emeritus at Vanderbilt University, where he had served since 1967. He is the author of more 10 books and 150 articles, with one of his la
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
F Sowa wrote: > To provide some background and alternative interpretations of Peirce's > theories during his last decade, the attached article by Tony Jappy > discusses issues from a different perspective than the recent discussions > about Delta graphs. > > The article by Jappy is a 14-page summary of issues that he discussed in > much more detail in a book he wrote in 2017. I inserted commentary at > various points marked by "JFS:". But I did not add, delete, or change any > of Jappy's text. My comments do not discuss any issues about Delta graphs, > but they provide some background information that may be helpful for > interpreting L376. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Mistake about sodium sulfate (was Meta-languages...
ould be a chemical representation for the word 'that'. John__ On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 8:20 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote: John, Jon: In my opinion your responses to the issues surrounding Tarski’s “metalanguage" are so weak from a scientific point of view that it is simpler to just pose an example of the meanings of metalanguages in the relevant logic used by CSP. The following is an excerpt from Robert’s book, page 22: What is a reasonable interpretation about the “blanks” in sentences relative to concatenations of logical operations between the posits and the consequences? How would the blanks be relative to the copula? Copula’s of “metalanguages? What would be the number of metalanguages necessary for a conclusion from a posited pragmatic sentence with n blanks? Which of the logical particles would associated with a metalanguage in the example cited by Roberts? Have fun! Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Jerry, As you know very well, there is a huge difference in the various kinds of chemical bonds.In a combination of a noun phrase (NP) and a verb phrase (VP). The NP is analogous to a sodium ion Na with a negative charge, and the VP is analogous to a sulfate ion (SO4) with a positive charge. The resulting combination NaSO4 is a compound with a neutral charge that corresponds to a sentence that states a proposition. The negative NP ion corresponds to a rheme, which combines with a positive VP ion to form a neutral proposition. But in organic chemistry, bonds between carbon atoms share electrons. Those chemical bonds don't have the same kinds of analogies with linguistic bonds or with the links in EGs. JLRC: Which of the logical particles would associated with a metalanguage in the example cited by Roberts? Peirce's first recorded example of metalanguage in RLT had a complete sentence "you are a good girl" (which would correspond to a neutral chemical compound) as the subject of a verb phrase, which would have a positive charge. In effect, the word 'that' when attached to a neutral sentence gives it a negative charge so that it could be used as the subject of a positively charged verb phrase "--is much to be wished." As far as I know, Peirce did not use a chemical analogy to explain that combination. Can you suggest some example in chemistry that would correspond to the word 'that'? It would have to take a neutral compound that would correspond to a sentence such as "You are a good girl" and attach some atoms that could form a link to a positive radical, such as "--is much to be wished." For example, the organic acid pattern -COOH would link a neutral organic radical to negative -OH radical or to a negative Na ion. Is there some organic pattern that could link a neutral molecule to a positive ion? That could correspond to the word 'that'. John__ On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 8:20 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote: John, Jon: In my opinion your responses to the issues surrounding Tarski’s “metalanguage" are so weak from a scientific point of view that it is simpler to just pose an example of the meanings of metalanguages in the relevant logic used by CSP. The following is an excerpt from Robert’s book, page 22: What is a reasonable interpretation about the “blanks” in sentences relative to concatenations of logical operations between the posits and the consequences? How would the blanks be relative to the copula? Copula’s of “metalanguages? What would be the number of metalanguages necessary for a conclusion from a posited pragmatic sentence with n blanks? Which of the logical particles would associated with a metalanguage in the example cited by Roberts? Have fun! Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] The philosophy of logic of John Corcoran - LUW March 27, 4pm CET
Logica Universalis Webinar March 27, 2024 at 4pm CET Speaker: José M. Sagüillo Department of Philosophy, University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain Title: "The philosophy of logic of John Corcoran" Abstract: "This talk surveys the philosophy of logic of John Corcoran by focusing on some of its characteristic themes: his understanding of logic as formal epistemology articulating the ontic-epistemic distinction of classical metaphysics, the Socratic belief-knowledge distinction, and the Aristotelian truth-knowledge distinction; his conception of mathematical logic as instrumental when considering mathematical logics as models of underlying reasoning found in the practice of proof; his tireless search for a careful and successful communication in a community of thinkers eliminating ambiguity of key terms and embracing ethical values; his discussion of argumentations and logic as a philosophical realization of the previous dichotomies, allowing precise definitions of key concepts, such as, argument, argumentation, proof, deduction, fallacy, and paradox; finally, his recovering and articulation of the XIX century information-theoretic conception of validity, exploring its heuristic power in the study of omega arguments and suggesting the existence of different paradigms of logical consequence equally entrenched in the theory and practice of logic." https://link.springer.com/book/9783031444609 Universal Logic, Ethics, and Truth Essays in Honor of John Corcoran (1937-2021) https://link.springer.com/book/9783031444609 Presented by the editors of the book: Timothy Madigan and Jean-Yves Beziau Chair : Francesco Paoli, Editorial Board SUL Everybody is welcome to join, register here: https://link.springer.com/journal/11787/updates JYB Founder, Editor, Organizer LU / SUL / LUW https://philpeople.org/profiles/jean-yves-beziau _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Jerry, List: Roberts is not discussing metalanguage at all in that excerpt from p. 22 of his 1973 book, he is talking about rhemata/rhemes (Peirce uses both terms). These are incomplete propositions, with blanks where subjects need to be added in order to turn them into complete propositions. Metalanguage only comes into play if the blank in a rhema/rheme is filled with a proposition, resulting in a proposition *about *a proposition. In Beta EGs, general concepts are attributed to indefinite individuals by attaching names to heavy lines of identity. In Gamma EGs, a line of identity attached to a name can be replaced by a dotted (or lightly drawn) line attached to a dotted (or lightly drawn) oval that contains the EG for a complete proposition. Roberts discusses Peirce's 1903 version of this notation on pp. 76-77, but as John Sowa has observed all along, a much simpler example is on RLT 151 (1898)--"That you are a good girl is much to be wished." [image: image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 8:20 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > John, Jon: > > In my opinion your responses to the issues surrounding Tarski’s > “metalanguage" are so weak from a scientific point of view that it is > simpler to just pose an example of the meanings of metalanguages in the > relevant logic used by CSP. > > The following is an excerpt from Robert’s book, page 22: > > What is a reasonable interpretation about the “blanks” in sentences > relative to concatenations of logical operations between the posits and the > consequences? > > How would the blanks be relative to the copula? Copula’s of > “metalanguages? > > What would be the number of metalanguages necessary for a conclusion from > a posited pragmatic sentence with n blanks? > > Which of the logical particles would associated with a metalanguage in the > example cited by Roberts? > > Have fun! > > Cheers > Jerry > > The collection of Peirce papers at Harvard University contains a number of > undated manuscripts on logical graphs to which Peirce could here be > referring. Consider in the second place Peirce's use of dashes in place of > demonstrative terms and nouns to produce blank forms of propositions called > 'rhemata'. If only one noun is erased~ a non-relative rhema is produced, as > '__ is mortal'. If two or more nouns are erased, the result is a relative > rhema, such as '__ is bought by __ from __ for __ ' (3.420). Consider in > the third place the expressed analogy between logical compounds and > chemical compounds: > A rhema is somewhat closely analogous to a chemical atom or radicle with > unsaturated bonds. A non-relative rhema is like a univalent radicle; it has > but one unsaturated bond. A relative rhema is like a multivalent radicle. > The blanks of a rhema can only be filled by terms, or, what is the same > thing, by "something which" (or the like) followed by a rhema; or, two can > be filled together by means of "itself" or the like. So, in chemistry, > unsaturated bonds can only be saturated by joining two of them, which will > usually, though not necessarily, belong to different radicles. If two > univalent radicles are united, the result is a saturated compound. So, two > non-relative rhemas being joined give a complete proposition. Thus, to join > "__ is mortal" and "__is a man", we have "X is mortal and X is a man", or > some man is mortal. So likewise, a saturated compound may result from > joining two bonds of a bivalent radicle; and, in the same way, the two > blanks of a dual rhema may be joined to make a complete proposition. Thus, > "__ loves __", "X loves X", or something loves itself [3.421]. > This article is important for several reasons. It shows clearly that the > parallel existing between these diagrams and chemical diagrams was strong > in Peirce's mind; > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
In mathematical texts, it's common to say "Given A1, A2, A3..., it follows > THAT T1, T2, T3... where the A's are axioms, and the T's are theorems that > follow from the axioms. > > Note the word 'that'. It is a sign of METALANGUAGE, between two clauses of a > sentence. It is not a sign of implication. The word 'follows' or more > precisely 'my be proved from' indicate the steps of a proof. > > As for the notations in R514 and L376, Peirce made another distinction: > postulates are propositions on which the utterer and the interpreter agree. > The choice of postulates is the result of an AGREEMENT between the utterer > and the interpreter. The results inside the red line are the result of an > INVESTIGATION that may be far more complex than an mathematical proof. The > complexity of the investigation is the reason why Delta graphs are a > completely new branch of EGs. > > In summary, metalanguage is the "secrete sauce" that makes Gamma graphs a > third branch. But investigation makes Delta graphs the fourth branch. That > difference is very important. > > John > > > From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > > Jerry, List: > > No one is claiming that Peirce ever used the term "metalanguage," only the > concept. Specifically, he provided a Gamma EG notation for asserting a > proposition about a proposition--the lightly drawn (1898) or dotted (1903) > oval for treating a complete proposition as a subject that fills the blank in > a rheme attached to the oval by a lightly drawn (1898) or dotted (1903) line > to compose another complete proposition (CP 4.560, 1906). For example, here > is the Gamma EG for "A thinks that it is possible that B," where A is a > person, B is a proposition, "A thinks ___" and "___ is possible" are rhemes, > and each instance of "that" in English corresponds to a dotted oval/line in > the graph. >  > > The "red pencil" notation (1909) is entirely different from this--a red line > is drawn just inside the physical edge of the sheet, and postulates are > written in the resulting margin. These are not propositions about the > propositions written inside the red line (metalanguage), they are premisses > (antecedent) from which the propositions written inside the red line follow > necessarily as deductive conclusions (consequent). For example, if the EGs > for Euclid's five postulates are scribed in the margin, then they can be > iterated to the interior, where the EGs for all the theorems of Euclidean > geometry can be derived from them in accordance with the usual permissions. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 11:43 PM Jerry LR Chandler > mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: > Jon, List >> On Mar 20, 2024, at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> Peirce's 1898 and 1903 notations for metalanguage are identical, except that >> the oval and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in the latter. >> Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do with >> metalanguage--it turns an entire sheet into nested cuts for implication, >> with the antecedent (postulates) in the margin and the consequent (theorems) >> inside the red line. > In these two paragraphs, the term “metalanguage” is used. > Was I misled by the assertion (by another logician) that Tarski was the > first to use this term? > > Although this may seem as a trivial point, it becomes rather critical from > the perspectives of emergence and evolution with the putative levels of > development and the corresponding grammatical distinctions between the social > and natural sciences and current notions of “metalogics”. > > At issue is the languages in which propositions are posited. > > Cheers > Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the m
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
ssibility of a single straight line; while this possibility is only asserted in the postulate that there is, or may be, a straight line through any two points of space. In that statement the possibility of every single straight line in space is asserted, including the single one whose existence is pertinent and concerning which a similar postulate directly or mediately asserts something which is an essential ingredient of the conclusion. Consistent with R 514, postulates "pronounce that certain things are possible." Moreover, the only kind of investigation that Peirce discusses here is a mathematical demonstration. JFS: The complexity of the investigation is the reason why Delta graphs are a completely new branch of EGs. Again, Peirce's only stated reason for needing "to add a Delta part" to EGs is "in order to deal with modals"--not for metalanguage, and not for complex investigations. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Mar 23, 2024 at 4:46 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jerry, Jon, List, JLRC: If the critical concept that is under scrutiny here the issue of “graphs of graphs” , how is this related to the arithmetical notion of division? I agree with Jon's explanation below that Peirce did not use the word "division" to mean the numerical operation of dividing two numbers. He was talking about dividing different parts of a text. As for the phrase "graph of graphs", that excerpt occurred in the introductory paragraphs of Lecture V of Peirce's Lowell lectures of 1903. Immediately before that, he used the synonym "graphs about graphs''. Since the word 'metalanguage' had not yet been introduced in English, the phrase "graphs about graphs" is his best and clearest term. It he had used his Greek, he might have coined the word 'metagraph'. I am happy to say that I completely agree with Jon's note below. However, the following passage from another note is misleading about Peirce, Euclid, and mathematical practice from ancient times to the present. JAS: The "red pencil" notation (1909) is entirely different from this--a red line is drawn just inside the physical edge of the sheet, and postulates are written in the resulting margin. These are not propositions about the propositions written inside the red line (metalanguage), they are premisses (antecedent) from which the propositions written inside the red line follow necessarily as deductive conclusions (consequent). For example, if the EGs for Euclid's five postulates are scribed in the margin, then they can be iterated to the interior, where the EGs for all the theorems of Euclidean geometry can be derived from them in accordance with the usual permissions. It's true that postulates are iterated (or copied) during the process of proving a theorem. But it's also possible to iterate a statement from a that-clause of metalanguage to a collection of statements that are being discussed in other ways. In mathematical texts, it's common to say "Given A1, A2, A3..., it follows THAT T1, T2, T3... where the A's are axioms, and the T's are theorems that follow from the axioms. Note the word 'that'. It is a sign of METALANGUAGE, between two clauses of a sentence. It is not a sign of implication. The word 'follows' or more precisely 'my be proved from' indicate the steps of a proof. As for the notations in R514 and L376, Peirce made another distinction: postulates are propositions on which the utterer and the interpreter agree. The choice of postulates is the result of an AGREEMENT between the utterer and the interpreter. The results inside the red line are the result of an INVESTIGATION that may be far more complex than an mathematical proof. The complexity of the investigation is the reason why Delta graphs are a completely new branch of EGs. In summary, metalanguage is the "secrete sauce" that makes Gamma graphs a third branch. But investigation makes Delta graphs the fourth branch. That difference is very important. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Published 2024-2-19: The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce
Re-send. Sorry, left out the first part of the table of contents. The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce Cornelis de Waal (ed.) Published: 19 February 2024 https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/56073 Contents Front Matter Copyright Page Preface List of Contributors The Significance of Charles Sanders Peirce for the Twenty-First Century Note on the Primary Literature Part I Life and Career 1 Peirce’s Journey to the End of Inquiry: The Tenure of the Soul Daniel L. Everett 2 The Cosmopolitan Peirce: His Five Visits to Europe Jaime Nubiola and Sara Barrena 3 Peirce’s Thwarted Career Cheryl Misak Part II Phenomenology and the Normative Sciences 4 Peirce’s Formal and Material Categories in Phenomenology Richard Kenneth Atkins 5 The Vicissitudes of Experience Nathan Houser 6 Charles S. Peirce on the Inquiry into the Discovery of Ideals, Norms, and Values Tiago da Costa e Silva 7 The Aesthetic Imperative: From Normative Science and Self-Control to Somaesthetics Richard Shusterman 8 Morality and Ethics in the Work of Charles Peirce James Jakόb Liszka 9 Love and the Growth of Justice Juliana Acosta López de Mesa and Daniel G. Campos Part III Logic and Mathematics 10 Why Study Logic? Mark Migotti 11 Peirce’s Philosophy of Logic Leila Haaparanta 12 Peirce’s Abduction and Its Interpretations Ilkka Niiniluoto 13 Peirce’s Theories of Generalized Propositions Frederik Stjernfelt 14 Existential Graphs: History and Interpretation Francesco Bellucci and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen 15 Diagrammatic Thinking, Diagrammatic Representations, and the Moral Economy of Nineteenth-Century Science Chiara Ambrosio 16 The Logic and Mathematics of Charles Sanders Peirce Louis H. Kauffman 17 Advances in Peirce’s Mathematics: A Short Survey (1960–2020) Fernando Zalamea Part IV Pragmatism 18 Pragmatisms? Philip Kitcher 19 Why Philosophers Must Be Pragmatists: Taking Cues from Peirce Cornelis de Waal 20 Theory, Practice, and Deliberation: Peirce’s Pragmatism Comprehensively Conceived Vincent Colapietro 21 Pragmatic Clarification: Contexts and Purposes Mats Bergman 22 Peirce, Perception, and Empiricism Aaron Bruce Wilson Part V Metaphysics 23 Peirce on Reality and Existence Robert Lane 24 Scientific Pride and Metaphysical Prejudice: Ens Quantum Ens, Quantum Theory, and Peirce Rosa Mayorga 25 Peirce on Kant’s Refutation of Idealism Gabriele Gava 26 Peirce on Truth Andrew Howat 27 Peirce and Religion Gary Slater Part VI Science and Semiotics 28 A Science Like Any Other: A Peircean Philosophy of Sex? Shannon Dea 29 Charles S. Peirce and the Feeling of Understanding: The Power and Limit of Science from a Pragmatist Perspective Herman C. D. G. de Regt 30 Peirce’s Views on Education and Learning Torjus Midtgarden 31 The Philosophical Relevance of Peirce’s Historical Studies Tullio Viola 32 Diagrams, Semiosis, and Peirce’s Metaphor Tony Jappy 33 Peirce on Biology: A Critical Review Kalevi Kull 34 Peirce’s Universal Grammar: Some Implications for Modern Linguistics Daniel L. Everett End Matter Index _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Published 2024-2-19: The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce
The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce Cornelis de Waal (ed.) Published: 19 February 2024 https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/56073 Part I Life and Career 1 Peirce’s Journey to the End of Inquiry: The Tenure of the Soul Daniel L. Everett 2 The Cosmopolitan Peirce: His Five Visits to Europe Jaime Nubiola and Sara Barrena 3 Peirce’s Thwarted Career Cheryl Misak Part II Phenomenology and the Normative Sciences 4 Peirce’s Formal and Material Categories in Phenomenology Richard Kenneth Atkins 5 The Vicissitudes of Experience Nathan Houser 6 Charles S. Peirce on the Inquiry into the Discovery of Ideals, Norms, and Values Tiago da Costa e Silva 7 The Aesthetic Imperative: From Normative Science and Self-Control to Somaesthetics Richard Shusterman 8 Morality and Ethics in the Work of Charles Peirce James Jakόb Liszka 9 Love and the Growth of Justice Juliana Acosta López de Mesa and Daniel G. Campos Part III Logic and Mathematics 10 Why Study Logic? Mark Migotti 11 Peirce’s Philosophy of Logic Leila Haaparanta 12 Peirce’s Abduction and Its Interpretations Ilkka Niiniluoto 13 Peirce’s Theories of Generalized Propositions Frederik Stjernfelt 14 Existential Graphs: History and Interpretation Francesco Bellucci and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen 15 Diagrammatic Thinking, Diagrammatic Representations, and the Moral Economy of Nineteenth-Century Science Chiara Ambrosio 16 The Logic and Mathematics of Charles Sanders Peirce Louis H. Kauffman 17 Advances in Peirce’s Mathematics: A Short Survey (1960–2020) Fernando Zalamea Part IV Pragmatism 18 Pragmatisms? Philip Kitcher 19 Why Philosophers Must Be Pragmatists: Taking Cues from Peirce Cornelis de Waal 20 Theory, Practice, and Deliberation: Peirce’s Pragmatism Comprehensively Conceived Vincent Colapietro 21 Pragmatic Clarification: Contexts and Purposes Mats Bergman 22 Peirce, Perception, and Empiricism Aaron Bruce Wilson Part V Metaphysics 23 Peirce on Reality and Existence Robert Lane 24 Scientific Pride and Metaphysical Prejudice: Ens Quantum Ens, Quantum Theory, and Peirce Rosa Mayorga 25 Peirce on Kant’s Refutation of Idealism Gabriele Gava 26 Peirce on Truth Andrew Howat 27 Peirce and Religion Gary Slater Part VI Science and Semiotics 28 A Science Like Any Other: A Peircean Philosophy of Sex? Shannon Dea 29 Charles S. Peirce and the Feeling of Understanding: The Power and Limit of Science from a Pragmatist Perspective Herman C. D. G. de Regt 30 Peirce’s Views on Education and Learning Torjus Midtgarden 31 The Philosophical Relevance of Peirce’s Historical Studies Tullio Viola 32 Diagrams, Semiosis, and Peirce’s Metaphor Tony Jappy 33 Peirce on Biology: A Critical Review Kalevi Kull 34 Peirce’s Universal Grammar: Some Implications for Modern Linguistics Daniel L. Everett End Matter Index _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
898 and 1903 notations for metalanguage are *identical*, >except that the oval and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in >the latter. >- Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do with >metalanguage--it turns an entire sheet into nested cuts for implication, >with the antecedent (postulates) in the margin and the consequent >(theorems) inside the red line. > > In these two paragraphs, the term “metalanguage” is used. > Was I misled by the assertion (by another logician) that Tarski was the > first to use this term? > > Although this may seem as a trivial point, it becomes rather critical from > the perspectives of emergence and evolution with the putative levels of > development and the corresponding grammatical distinctions between the > social and natural sciences and current notions of “metalogics”. > > At issue is the languages in which propositions are posited. > > Cheers > Jerry > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
val and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in the latter. - Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do with metalanguage--it turns an entire sheet into nested cuts for implication, with the antecedent (postulates) in the margin and the consequent (theorems) inside the red line. In these two paragraphs, the term “metalanguage” is used. Was I misled by the assertion (by another logician) that Tarski was the first to use this term? Although this may seem as a trivial point, it becomes rather critical from the perspectives of emergence and evolution with the putative levels of development and the corresponding grammatical distinctions between the social and natural sciences and current notions of “metalogics”. At issue is the languages in which propositions are posited. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Jerry, List: In this context, "division" simply refers to Peirce's 1903 *organization *of Existential Graphs (EGs) into distinct Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts. Alpha implements propositional logic, Beta implements a version of first-order predicate logic by adding the line of identity, and Gamma implements various advanced logics by adding the broken cuts (modal logic), the heavy line with dotted lines along both sides (second-order logic), the dotted oval/line (metalanguage), etc. Again, the latter is equivalent to the 1898 (RLT) notation, which has a lightly drawn oval/line instead of a dotted oval/line. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 11:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > List, John: > > On Mar 20, 2024, at 3:16 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > That quotation shows that Gamma graphs add one and only one *NECESSARY* > feature > to Alpha + Beta graphs: the same or equivalent metalanguage feature used > in 1898 (RLT). When Peirce referred to the *DIVISION *of Gamma graphs, > that is the only feature required.He later did much more talking about > modality and with new notations. He never again used any of the notations > that are unique to the 1903 Gamma graphs. > > I am puzzled by this paragraph. > > If the critical concept that is under scrutiny here the issue of “graphs > of graphs” , how is this related to the arithmetical notion of division? > > And what sort of mental operations would be required to assert the nature > of a division of a “graph of graphs“? > > Cheers > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Jerry, List: No one is claiming that Peirce ever used the *term *"metalanguage," only the *concept*. Specifically, he provided a Gamma EG notation for asserting a proposition about a proposition--the lightly drawn (1898) or dotted (1903) oval for treating a complete proposition as a *subject *that fills the blank in a rheme attached to the oval by a lightly drawn (1898) or dotted (1903) line to compose another complete proposition (CP 4.560, 1906). For example, here is the Gamma EG for "A thinks that it is possible that B," where A is a person, B is a proposition, "A thinks ___" and "___ is possible" are rhemes, and each instance of "that" in English corresponds to a dotted oval/line in the graph. [image: image.png] The "red pencil" notation (1909) is entirely different from this--a red line is drawn just inside the physical edge of the sheet, and postulates are written in the resulting margin. These are not propositions *about *the propositions written inside the red line (metalanguage), they are premisses (antecedent) from which the propositions written inside the red line follow necessarily as deductive conclusions (consequent). For example, if the EGs for Euclid's five postulates are scribed in the margin, then they can be iterated to the interior, where the EGs for all the theorems of Euclidean geometry can be derived from them in accordance with the usual permissions. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 11:43 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Jon, List > > On Mar 20, 2024, at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > >- Peirce's 1898 and 1903 notations for metalanguage are *identical*, >except that the oval and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in >the latter. >- Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do with >metalanguage--it turns an entire sheet into nested cuts for implication, >with the antecedent (postulates) in the margin and the consequent >(theorems) inside the red line. > > In these two paragraphs, the term “metalanguage” is used. > Was I misled by the assertion (by another logician) that Tarski was the > first to use this term? > > Although this may seem as a trivial point, it becomes rather critical from > the perspectives of emergence and evolution with the putative levels of > development and the corresponding grammatical distinctions between the > social and natural sciences and current notions of “metalogics”. > > At issue is the languages in which propositions are posited. > > Cheers > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
List, John: > On Mar 20, 2024, at 3:16 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > That quotation shows that Gamma graphs add one and only one NECESSARY feature > to Alpha + Beta graphs: the same or equivalent metalanguage feature used in > 1898 (RLT). When Peirce referred to the DIVISION of Gamma graphs, that is > the only feature required.He later did much more talking about modality > and with new notations. He never again used any of the notations that are > unique to the 1903 Gamma graphs. I am puzzled by this paragraph. If the critical concept that is under scrutiny here the issue of “graphs of graphs” , how is this related to the arithmetical notion of division? And what sort of mental operations would be required to assert the nature of a division of a “graph of graphs“? Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Jon, List > On Mar 20, 2024, at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Peirce's 1898 and 1903 notations for metalanguage are identical, except that > the oval and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in the latter. > > Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do with > metalanguage--it turns an entire sheet into nested cuts for implication, with > the antecedent (postulates) in the margin and the consequent (theorems) > inside the red line. > In these two paragraphs, the term “metalanguage” is used. Was I misled by the assertion (by another logician) that Tarski was the first to use this term? Although this may seem as a trivial point, it becomes rather critical from the perspectives of emergence and evolution with the putative levels of development and the corresponding grammatical distinctions between the social and natural sciences and current notions of “metalogics”. At issue is the languages in which propositions are posited. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Cuts are out. Tinctures are in.
n related text in L376. Following are excerpts from the > Prolegomena prior to the specifications of tinctured EGs. They have strong > similarities to related material in L376: > > Convention the First: Of the Agency of the Scripture. We are to imagine > that two parties* collaborate in composing a Pheme, and in operating upon > this so as to develop a Delome. [Provision shall be made in these > Conventions for expressing every kind of Pheme as a Graph; and it is > certain that the Method could be applied to aid the development and > analysis of any kind of purposive thought. But hitherto no Graphs have > been studied but such as are Propositions; so that, in the resulting > uncertainty as to what modifications of the Conventions might be required > for other applications, they have mostly been here stated as if they were > only applicable to the expression of Phemes and the working out of > necessary conclusions. > > The two collaborating parties shall be called the Graphist and the > Interpreter. The Graphist shall responsibly scribe each original Graph and > each addition to it, with the proper indications of the Modality to be > attached to it the relative Quality* of its position, and every particular > of its dependence on and connections with other graphs. The Interpreter is > to make such erasures and insertions of the Graph delivered to him by the > Graphist as may accord with the "General Permissions" deducible from the > Conventions and with his own purposes. > Convention the Second: Of the Matter of the Scripture, and the Modality > of the Phemes expressed. The matter which the Graph-instances are to > determine, and which thereby becomes the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist > and Interpreter are at one. . . > > After a complex specification of the tinctured EGs, the document ends: > > In my next paper, the utility of this diagrammatization of thought in the > discussion of the truth of Pragmaticism shall be made to appear. > > There was no "next paper" for Carus. But these topics are related to the > text of L376. The critical issues are (a) A phemic sheet that consists of > multiple papers; (b) A dialog between an utterer and an interpreter; (c) > Options for each of them to designate the status (modality, time, > intention) of any paper, whether indicated by a tincture or by postulates > in the margin or by some other method; (c) an organization of the papers > according to Cayley's trees, which Risteen had studied. (See the > references to Risteen in EP2.) > > If Peirce had been healthy for the following six weeks, a continuation > along these lines could have gone a long way toward establishing that proof > of pragmaticism he had been working on for the last decade of his life. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Cuts are out. Tinctures are in.
al length of the article as originally published in The Monist, which is where he introduces the tinctures. Moreover, he explicitly bemoans "my nonsensical 'tinctures' and heraldry" two years later, in a letter addressed to F. A. Woods (R L477, 1913 Nov 8). I will not further belabor the points that I have already made at length about the "many papers." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 21, 2024 at 4:37 PM John F Sowa wrote: I just wanted to clarify some issues that may be unclear in what Peirce wrote in L376: "in the Monist of Oct. 1906... I made an attempt to make the syntax cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. Carus rejected. For although the system itself is marked by extreme simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to the lines called “cuts” which simply appear in the present description as the boundaries of shadings, or shaded parts of the sheet”. Many people interpreted this text as implying that Peirce was condemning the tinctures. But as he said explicitly, it was "chiefly due to the lines called cuts”, which in 1906 were defined as cuts through the paper from the recto side to the verso side. The last mention of recto/verso was in R669 (May 1911). From R670 (June 1911) to the last long letter in 1913, negative areas were marked by shading, not by cuts. From L231 (June 1911) to the end, Peirce also avoided the word 'cut'. In R670, he also mentioned tinctures as an option: “The nature of the universe or universes of discourse (for several may be referred to in a single assertion) in the rather unusual cases in which such precision is required, is denoted either by using modifications of the heraldic tinctures, marked in something like the usual manner in pale ink upon the surface, or by scribing the graphs in colored inks”. I'm not discussing these issues as a criticism of anybody. I'm just clarifying several points: (1) A notation for distinguishing "the universe or universes of discourse" is important. (2) Tinctures, by themselves, are not a bad way to express the distinction, but they could not be used in print in the early 20th C. (3) But methods for distinguishing the UoD are necessary in any text that happens to mention two or more. (4) This issue is important for any discussion about L376, because Peirce explicitly mentioned the division of the phemic sheet into multiple papers, which might express different opinions by an utterer and an interpreter. (5) In R670 above and in L376 below, the utterer and interpreter may refer to different UoDs and discuss entities in them. Those discussions, when expressed in EGs, would involve lines of identity (or quantified variables) that refer to universes and to entities in them that may be abstract, imaginary, possible, or impossible. Note that they may also discuss "special understandings". An understanding is another ens rations, as Peirce would say. >From L376; "If 'snows' is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in >the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and interpreter >has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is scribed to >relate, it sometimes does snow. For they two may conceive that the “phemic >sheet” embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common >attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions >between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to >one subject and part to another”. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Cuts are out. Tinctures are in.
John, List: In the first passage that you quoted from R L376, I agree that Peirce is primarily condemning cuts, not tinctures. However, he is also condemning his *entire *55-page description of EGs in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism"--that is the total length of the article as originally published in *The Monist*, which is where he *introduces* the tinctures. Moreover, he explicitly bemoans "my nonsensical 'tinctures' and heraldry" two years later, in a letter addressed to F. A. Woods (R L477, 1913 Nov 8). I will not further belabor the points that I have already made at length about the "many papers." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 21, 2024 at 4:37 PM John F Sowa wrote: > I just wanted to clarify some issues that may be unclear in what Peirce > wrote in L376: "in the Monist of Oct. 1906... I made an attempt to make > the syntax cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, > on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. > Carus rejected. For although the system itself is marked by extreme > simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred > technical terms applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to > the lines called “cuts” which simply appear in the present description as > the boundaries of shadings, or shaded parts of the sheet”. > > Many people interpreted this text as implying that Peirce was condemning > the tinctures. But as he said explicitly, it was "chiefly due to the > lines called cuts”, which in 1906 were defined as cuts through the paper > from the recto side to the verso side. The last mention of recto/verso was > in R669 (May 1911). From R670 (June 1911) to the last long letter in 1913, > negative areas were marked by shading, not by cuts. From L231 (June 1911) > to the end, Peirce also avoided the word 'cut'. > > In R670, he also mentioned tinctures as an option: “The nature of the > universe or universes of discourse (for several may be referred to in a > single assertion) in the rather unusual cases in which such precision is > required, is denoted either by using modifications of the heraldic > tinctures, marked in something like the usual manner in pale ink upon the > surface, or by scribing the graphs in colored inks”. > > I'm not discussing these issues as a criticism of anybody. I'm just > clarifying several points: (1) A notation for distinguishing "the universe > or universes of discourse" is important. (2) Tinctures, by themselves, are > not a bad way to express the distinction, but they could not be used in > print in the early 20th C. (3) But methods for distinguishing the UoD are > necessary in any text that happens to mention two or more. (4) This issue > is important for any discussion about L376, because Peirce explicitly > mentioned the division of the phemic sheet into multiple papers, which > might express different opinions by an utterer and an interpreter. (5) In > R670 above and in L376 below, the utterer and interpreter may refer to > different UoDs and discuss entities in them. Those discussions, when > expressed in EGs, would involve lines of identity (or quantified variables) > that refer to universes and to entities in them that may be abstract, > imaginary, possible, or impossible. Note that they may also discuss > "special understandings". An understanding is another* ens rations*, as > Peirce would say. > > From L376; "If 'snows' is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that > in the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and > interpreter has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is > scribed to relate, it sometimes does snow. For they two may conceive that > the “phemic sheet” embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before > the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that > actual conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of > those pieces relate to one subject and part to another”. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Cuts are out. Tinctures are in.
I just wanted to clarify some issues that may be unclear in what Peirce wrote in L376: "in the Monist of Oct. 1906... I made an attempt to make the syntax cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. Carus rejected. For although the system itself is marked by extreme simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to the lines called “cuts” which simply appear in the present description as the boundaries of shadings, or shaded parts of the sheet”. Many people interpreted this text as implying that Peirce was condemning the tinctures. But as he said explicitly, it was "chiefly due to the lines called cuts”, which in 1906 were defined as cuts through the paper from the recto side to the verso side. The last mention of recto/verso was in R669 (May 1911). From R670 (June 1911) to the last long letter in 1913, negative areas were marked by shading, not by cuts. From L231 (June 1911) to the end, Peirce also avoided the word 'cut'. In R670, he also mentioned tinctures as an option: “The nature of the universe or universes of discourse (for several may be referred to in a single assertion) in the rather unusual cases in which such precision is required, is denoted either by using modifications of the heraldic tinctures, marked in something like the usual manner in pale ink upon the surface, or by scribing the graphs in colored inks”. I'm not discussing these issues as a criticism of anybody. I'm just clarifying several points: (1) A notation for distinguishing "the universe or universes of discourse" is important. (2) Tinctures, by themselves, are not a bad way to express the distinction, but they could not be used in print in the early 20th C. (3) But methods for distinguishing the UoD are necessary in any text that happens to mention two or more. (4) This issue is important for any discussion about L376, because Peirce explicitly mentioned the division of the phemic sheet into multiple papers, which might express different opinions by an utterer and an interpreter. (5) In R670 above and in L376 below, the utterer and interpreter may refer to different UoDs and discuss entities in them. Those discussions, when expressed in EGs, would involve lines of identity (or quantified variables) that refer to universes and to entities in them that may be abstract, imaginary, possible, or impossible. Note that they may also discuss "special understandings". An understanding is another ens rations, as Peirce would say. >From L376; "If 'snows' is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in >the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and interpreter >has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is scribed to >relate, it sometimes does snow. For they two may conceive that the “phemic >sheet” embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common >attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions >between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to >one subject and part to another”. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] CfP - 1st Pan African Logic Congress - Cairo, Egypt, April 28-30, 2024
-- Deadline Extension: March 31st - 1st Pan African Logic Congress The logic of nature & the nature of logic in Africa April 28–30, 2024 - The British University in Egypt, Cairo This congress aims to promote logic in Africa. It is focused on Nature in a double sense. Wildlife is very important in Africa, the flora and fauna are very impressive. This is the place where there is the highest number and variety of animals. And for this reason, the people especially in central Africa have a strong connection with nature. It is the opportunity therefore to reflect on the logic of nature and to examine to what extent it is different from the logic of the technological and industrial world (computers, artificial intelligence, and so on). This is a way therefore to challenge the very nature of logic. From this perspective, logic is understood in a very wide sense and in relation to all aspects of the world, natural and artificial. The purpose of this event is to reveal and explore different manners of reasoning embedded in African cults, myths, arts, religions, rituals, economic systems, traditional justice systems, and architectural systems. This congress will enrich logical studies and their relative subjects like AI through elaborating logical interpretations of different aspects of African cultures. Deadline for submission of an abstract for presenting a talk: March 31st, 2024 https://africanlogiccongress.com/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
The examples in the Lowell lectures are similar to his 1898 version. Since he never again used the details he specified in 1903 in any further MSS, it's unlikely that he would revive them in 1911. The only feature he was reviving was the use of metalanguage. The 1898 version was just as good as anything he specified in 1903. Since it was simpler than the Gamma graphs, that would make it better. In fact, Peirce mentioned another version of metalanguage in R514 (June 1911) that was logically equivalent and syntactically similar to what he was writing in L376 (December 1911). The novel features of L376 are sufficiently advanced to qualify as a fourth branch of EGs. But they require a bit more explanation. As I said before, they depend critically on the expertise of Allan Risteen. For that information, see the references to Risteen that are listed in the index to EP2. And the applications discussed in L376 have strong resemblances to the applications of the very similar IKL logic in 2006. For those, see the brief discussion and detailed references in https://jfsowa.com/ikl . I'll write more about these topics in another note later this week. John -- __ Michael K. Bergman 319.621.5225 http://mkbergman.com http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman ______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
lains the issues we have been debating recently. Peirce had > recognized > the importance of graphs of graphs when he wrote "The better exposition > of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, > the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a *DIVISION *I shall here adhere to, > although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with > modals", > > That division would require some version of metalanguage for specifying > modality and higher-order logic. But it does *NOT *imply all (or any) > details that he happened to specify in 1903. Since he had earlier > specified a version of metalanguage in 1898 (RLT), he had previously > recognized the importance of metalanguage. The examples in the Lowell > lectures are similar to his 1898 version. Since he never again used the > details he specified in 1903 in any further MSS, it's unlikely that he > would revive them in 1911. > > The only feature he was reviving was the use of metalanguage. The 1898 > version was just as good as anything he specified in 1903. Since it was > simpler than the Gamma graphs, that would make it better. In fact, Peirce > mentioned another version of metalanguage in R514 (June 1911) that was > logically equivalent and syntactically similar to what he was writing in > L376 (December 1911). > > The novel features of L376 are sufficiently advanced to qualify as a > fourth branch of EGs. But they require a bit more explanation. As I said > before, they depend critically on the expertise of Allan Risteen. For that > information, see the references to Risteen that are listed in the index to > EP2. And the applications discussed in L376 have strong resemblances to > the applications of the very similar IKL logic in 2006. For those, see the > brief discussion and detailed references in https://jfsowa.com/ikl . > > I'll write more about these topics in another note later this week. > > John > > -- > __ > > Michael K. Bergman > 319.621.5225http://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman > __ > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The passing of Don D. Roberts and his wife Beverly Kent
Very sad news. Nathan notified the Peirce Society EC as well. We'll honor them both in our upcoming newsletter. -Aaron Aaron B. Wilson, PhD Executive Director of the Charles S. Peirce Society On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 10:01 PM Gary Richmond wrote: > List, > > Nathan Houser wrote to me this evening with the news of the passing of Dan > Roberts. > > Nathan wrote: > > I have some unhappy news that you may want to share with the list, > especially given the recent and continuing thread on EG. Don Robert’s son > called me yesterday to inform me that Don died on March 4. He died in his > home on Vancouver Island. Don’s wife, Beverley Kent, who wrote the book on > Peirce’s classification of sciences, died eight days later on March 12. > They had both been in poor and deteriorating health. > > > I wrote in reply: > > There is hardly a discussion of EGs which does not reference Roberts' work > including, as you remarked, the recent one on Peirce-L. As for Kent's book > on the classification of sciences, while there is surely *no* work that I > am anywhere close to knowing 'by heart', if recurring study of any book > were to approach at least a very thorough familiarity for me, along with > your two volumes of *The Essential Peirce*, Kent's book would most > certainly qualify. I can't imagine making my recent presentation at APA > without once again having consulted her ground-breaking monograph. > > > Should I receive additional information, I will of course post it to > Peirce-L > > Best, > > Gary > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Paraconsistent Newsletter Winter-Summer 2024
Just released, including an interview with João Marcos papers, books, videos, events of interest for paraconsistentists and a contest to win holidays on the island of inconsistency Enjoy ! Paraconsistent Newsletter Winter-Summer-2024 https://sites.google.com/view/paranews-2024-1 Jean-Yves Beziau Editor of the Paraconsistent Newsletter https://philpeople.org/profiles/jean-yves-beziau _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Hi All, As many have noted, I, too, have learned much and have (generally) enjoyed this interchange between JAS and JFS. Further, I have no dog in this hunt and certainly do not claim any special understanding about Peirce's existential graphs. So, as a voting matter, my impression of this interchange is that I would have no problems with a thesis put forward such as, "Sowa has studied Peirce's EGs for many decades and believes that 'metalanguage' helps exposit . . . " Where I concur with JAS is that these assertions are not backed sufficiently by Peirce's own statements. Further, now from my own perspective, I think these kind of minutiae arguments are deflective from understanding the more important points of what Peirce was trying to do, what he was striving for, what his mindset and thought process and logical rigor were striving to achieve. Much has changed in the six score decades since Peirce but his ultimate objective of trying to reason about the nature of things remains. That is a conversation I welcome, and may initiate at some point myself. If the protagonists want to keep slugging it out, I say, OK, go for it. But the fight from my perspective is growing tiresome. Best, Mike On 3/19/2024 9:04 PM, John F Sowa wrote: To refresh my memory, I reread Peirce's Lowell Lectures about Gamma graphs. And the following passage from Lecture V (NEM 3, p. 365) explains what he meant in L376 when he said that he would keep the Gamma division: "I must begin by a few words concerning gamma graphs; because it is by means of gamma graphs that I have been enabled to understand these subjects... In particular, it is absolutely necessary to representing the reasoning about these subjects that we should be able to reason with graphs about graphs and thus that we should have graphs of graphs." That explains the issues we have been debating recently. Peirce had recognized the importance of graphs of graphs when he wrote "The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a *DIVISION *I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals", That division would require some version of metalanguage for specifying modality and higher-order logic. But it does *NOT *imply all (or any) details that he happened to specify in 1903. Since he had earlier specified a version of metalanguage in 1898 (RLT), he had previously recognized the importance of metalanguage. The examples in the Lowell lectures are similar to his 1898 version. Since he never again used the details he specified in 1903 in any further MSS, it's unlikely that he would revive them in 1911. The only feature he was reviving was the use of metalanguage. The 1898 version was just as good as anything he specified in 1903. Since it was simpler than the Gamma graphs, that would make it better. In fact, Peirce mentioned another version of metalanguage in R514 (June 1911) that was logically equivalent and syntactically similar to what he was writing in L376 (December 1911). The novel features of L376 are sufficiently advanced to qualify as a fourth branch of EGs. But they require a bit more explanation. As I said before, they depend critically on the expertise of Allan Risteen. For that information, see the references to Risteen that are listed in the index to EP2. And the applications discussed in L376 have strong resemblances to the applications of the very similar IKL logic in 2006. For those, see the brief discussion and detailed references in https://jfsowa.com/ikl . I'll write more about these topics in another note later this week. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go topeirc...@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but tol...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More athttps://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. -- __ Michael K. Bergman 319.621.5225 http://mkbergman.com http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirc
[PEIRCE-L] The passing of Don D. Roberts and his wife Beverly Kent
List, Nathan Houser wrote to me this evening with the news of the passing of Dan Roberts. Nathan wrote: I have some unhappy news that you may want to share with the list, especially given the recent and continuing thread on EG. Don Robert’s son called me yesterday to inform me that Don died on March 4. He died in his home on Vancouver Island. Don’s wife, Beverley Kent, who wrote the book on Peirce’s classification of sciences, died eight days later on March 12. They had both been in poor and deteriorating health. I wrote in reply: There is hardly a discussion of EGs which does not reference Roberts' work including, as you remarked, the recent one on Peirce-L. As for Kent's book on the classification of sciences, while there is surely *no* work that I am anywhere close to knowing 'by heart', if recurring study of any book were to approach at least a very thorough familiarity for me, along with your two volumes of *The Essential Peirce*, Kent's book would most certainly qualify. I can't imagine making my recent presentation at APA without once again having consulted her ground-breaking monograph. Should I receive additional information, I will of course post it to Peirce-L Best, Gary _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
To refresh my memory, I reread Peirce's Lowell Lectures about Gamma graphs. And the following passage from Lecture V (NEM 3, p. 365) explains what he meant in L376 when he said that he would keep the Gamma division: "I must begin by a few words concerning gamma graphs; because it is by means of gamma graphs that I have been enabled to understand these subjects... In particular, it is absolutely necessary to representing the reasoning about these subjects that we should be able to reason with graphs about graphs and thus that we should have graphs of graphs." That explains the issues we have been debating recently. Peirce had recognized the importance of graphs of graphs when he wrote "The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a DIVISION I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals", That division would require some version of metalanguage for specifying modality and higher-order logic. But it does NOT imply all (or any) details that he happened to specify in 1903. Since he had earlier specified a version of metalanguage in 1898 (RLT), he had previously recognized the importance of metalanguage. The examples in the Lowell lectures are similar to his 1898 version. Since he never again used the details he specified in 1903 in any further MSS, it's unlikely that he would revive them in 1911. The only feature he was reviving was the use of metalanguage. The 1898 version was just as good as anything he specified in 1903. Since it was simpler than the Gamma graphs, that would make it better. In fact, Peirce mentioned another version of metalanguage in R514 (June 1911) that was logically equivalent and syntactically similar to what he was writing in L376 (December 1911). The novel features of L376 are sufficiently advanced to qualify as a fourth branch of EGs. But they require a bit more explanation. As I said before, they depend critically on the expertise of Allan Risteen. For that information, see the references to Risteen that are listed in the index to EP2. And the applications discussed in L376 have strong resemblances to the applications of the very similar IKL logic in 2006. For those, see the brief discussion and detailed references in https://jfsowa.com/ikl . I'll write more about these topics in another note later this week. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Delta Graphs (was Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
scribed on R 339:[340r] as a candidate for Delta EGs. JFS: I realize that you insist in ignoring everything but the first two paragraphs of L376. I believe that is a serious mistake. You are deliberately putting blinders on your eyes. I think that we can all agree that it's unwise to reject anything Peirce wrote just because of some preconceived notion that it's irrelevant. On the contrary, I am not ignoring anything in R L376, and I have no preconceived notions about it. I am simply reading and explaining what the entire extant text actually says--and does not say. Again, the "many papers" correspond to different subjects that attract "the common attention" of the utterer and interpreter at different times, such that together they represent the entire universe of discourse. This is not new or innovative in 1911--it echoes what Peirce had already written at least twice previously, as I have demonstrated with exact quotations (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-03/msg4.html). Nothing precludes using the "many papers" with Alpha, Beta, or Gamma EGs--they do not "deal with modals" and are not otherwise unique to Delta EGs. Cheers, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt Title: Delta Abstract Delta Graphs: The Logic of Pragmatism John F. SowaAbstract, 18 March 2024 Abstract. In December 1911, C. S. Peirce proposed a major innovation for existential graphs: I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. He wrote the draft in an unfinished letter, but he included enough detail to show how Delta graphs may be used in an investigation. As an important hint, the intended recipient of the letter was Allan Risteen. The text of the letter, supplemented with information about Risteens expertise and Peirces writings on pragmaticism, indicates that the phemic sheet of a Delta graph is a tree of multiple papers, each of which use metalanguage to describe a different time, aspect, or modality of a universe of discourse. Features in other 1911 manuscripts provide evidence for missing details. Developments in the future complete the picture. Peirce’s use of metalanguage for complex reasoning is consistent with theoretical and computational methods in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Once again, he had anticipated innovations in logic by his successors. 1. Logic for a Proof of Pragmatism 2. The Visit by Risteen 3. Specification of Delta Graphs 4. The IKRIS Project and the IKL Logic Appendix: Letter to Risteen, L376 My dear Risteen: A Diagrammatic Syntax. I mentioned to you, while you were [here] last year, that I have a diagrammatic syntax which analyzes the syllogism into no less than six inferential steps. I now describe its latest state of development for the first time. I am glad to think that my account of it will have one such a reader as you. C.S.P. This syntax, which I have hitherto called the “system of Existential Graphs”, was suggested to me in reading the proof sheets of an article by me that was published in the Monist of Jan. 1897; and I at once wrote a full account of it for the same journal. But Dr. Carus would not print it. I gave an oral account of it, soon after, to the National Academy of Sciences; and in 1903 for my audience of a course of Lectures before the Lowell Institute, I printed a brief account of it. An account of slightly further development of it was given in the Monist of Oct. 1906. In this I made an attempt to make the syntax cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. Carus rejected. For although the system itself is marked by extreme simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to the lines called “cuts” which simply appear in the present description as the boundaries of shadings, or shaded parts of the sheet. The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. A cross division of the description which here, as in that of 1903, is given precedence over the other is into the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System. The Conventions. The ultimate purpose of contriving this diagrammatic syntax, is to enable one with facility to divide any necessary, or mathematical, reasoning into its ultimate logical steps. It is more accurate to call such reasoning “necessary” than to call it “mathematical”; but the latter designation will give a person who recognizes that not all mathe
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
John, List: Up until the off-List message that you sent me late Saturday evening, we were having a respectful and substantive discussion despite our ongoing disagreements. I am disappointed that this is no longer the case and inclined to refrain from any further engagement after one more attempt to set the record straight. JFS: The critical additions [for a proof of pragmatism] are closely related to what Peirce specified in L376. I call that material a specification of Delta graphs. I don't care what you call it. The specifications are important. The names are irrelevant. The name is relevant when it is one that Peirce himself used. If he had never mentioned a Delta part of EGs at all, then anyone would be free to invent one and give it that name. However, he *did *mention it, albeit in only one sentence-- "I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals"--so no one should misleadingly use the name "Delta graphs" for anything that deviates from or goes well beyond this very brief description. As I have explicitly and repeatedly acknowledged, unless additional pages of R L376 turn up that spell it out, *no one* can know for sure exactly what he had in mind. That is why I have carefully and consistently referred to the notation that he scribed on R 339:[340r] as a *candidate* for Delta EGs. JFS: I realize that you insist in ignoring everything but the first two paragraphs of L376. I believe that is a serious mistake. You are deliberately putting blinders on your eyes. I think that we can all agree that it's unwise to reject anything Peirce wrote just because of some preconceived notion that it's irrelevant. On the contrary, I am not ignoring *anything *in R L376, and I have no preconceived notions about it. I am simply reading and explaining what the *entire *extant text actually says--and does not say. Again, the "many papers" correspond to different *subjects *that attract "the common attention" of the utterer and interpreter at different times, such that *together *they represent the entire universe of discourse. This is not new or innovative in 1911--it echoes what Peirce had already written at least twice previously, as I have demonstrated with exact quotations ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-03/msg4.html). Nothing precludes using the "many papers" with Alpha, Beta, or Gamma EGs--they do not "deal with modals" and are not otherwise unique to Delta EGs. Cheers, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Mar 17, 2024 at 9:29 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > Before I read your note below, I had just sent an off-list note to you and > Gary R. to recommend that you make very important revisions to your > article. It's a pity that you had sent the article to the publisher so > long ago. It's probably too late to stop the publication and make the > necessary revisions. > > Basic point: Peirce added the notation for metalanguage to EGs in 1898 > (RLT). That is 5 years before the Gamma graphs of 1903. That addition is > sufficient to support modality. It makes the modal features of Gamma > graphs irrelevant. > > But modality alone is not sufficient for a proof of pragmatism (a major > goal of Peirce's last decade). Metalanguage is a prerequisite, but much > more is necessary. I have been urging you (and other subscribers to > P-list) to read the developments of the IKRIS project of 2004 to 2006, > which uses a metalanguage feature added to the ISO standard for Common > Logic. See https://jfsowa.com/ikl . > > I was just one of a committee of 9 who defined the IKL logic. But that > logic, by itself, was not sufficient to support the major developments > needed for a proof of pragmatism. The critical additions are closely > related to what Peirce specified in L376. I call that material a > specification of Delta graphs. I don't care what you call it. The > specifications are important. The names are irrelevant. > > Allan Risteen was also highly influential in discussing the issues with > Peirce before he started to write L376. Please read the references to > Risteen in EP2 -- they're all listed in the index. And one of Risteen's > areas of expertise was his study of the mathematics by Arthur Cayley (see > his Wikipedia page). > > I realize that you insist in ignoring everything but the first two > paragraphs of L376. I believe that is a serious mistake. You are > deliberately putting blinders on your eyes. I think that we can all agree > that it's unwise to reject anything Peirce wrote just because of some > preconceived notion that it's irrelevant. > > I have a strong background in mathematics and logic and their application
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
Jon, List, Before I read your note below, I had just sent an off-list note to you and Gary R. to recommend that you make very important revisions to your article. It's a pity that you had sent the article to the publisher so long ago. It's probably too late to stop the publication and make the necessary revisions. Basic point: Peirce added the notation for metalanguage to EGs in 1898 (RLT). That is 5 years before the Gamma graphs of 1903. That addition is sufficient to support modality. It makes the modal features of Gamma graphs irrelevant. But modality alone is not sufficient for a proof of pragmatism (a major goal of Peirce's last decade). Metalanguage is a prerequisite, but much more is necessary. I have been urging you (and other subscribers to P-list) to read the developments of the IKRIS project of 2004 to 2006, which uses a metalanguage feature added to the ISO standard for Common Logic. See https://jfsowa.com/ikl . I was just one of a committee of 9 who defined the IKL logic. But that logic, by itself, was not sufficient to support the major developments needed for a proof of pragmatism. The critical additions are closely related to what Peirce specified in L376. I call that material a specification of Delta graphs. I don't care what you call it. The specifications are important. The names are irrelevant. Allan Risteen was also highly influential in discussing the issues with Peirce before he started to write L376. Please read the references to Risteen in EP2 -- they're all listed in the index. And one of Risteen's areas of expertise was his study of the mathematics by Arthur Cayley (see his Wikipedia page). I realize that you insist in ignoring everything but the first two paragraphs of L376. I believe that is a serious mistake. You are deliberately putting blinders on your eyes. I think that we can all agree that it's unwise to reject anything Peirce wrote just because of some preconceived notion that it's irrelevant. I have a strong background in mathematics and logic and their applications to computer systems. By working with a logic similar to the one Peirce developed (IKL), I learned how such a logic is important for scientific and engineering applications. The IKRIS project is an important example. That is one reason why I have been so enthusiastic about L376. Modern technology is more advanced, but the principles of pragmatism are just as important. In summary, the specifications in L376, supplemented with R514, L231, and the kinds of topics Peirce would have discussed with Risteen, are essential for a proof of pragmatism. The iKRIS project of 2004-2006 shows the value of a very similar logic, but much more is needed beyond the metalanguage Peirce knew that, and the full IKRIS project (much more than just the logic) demonstrated that. What you or Peirce or I may call it is irrelevant. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma John, List: JFS: Since your article has just been accepted for publication, you probably still have time to make a few corrections. Actually, my paper was accepted for publication (after review and revision) six months ago, and I see no need to correct anything at this point anyway--I stand by everything that I wrote in it. JFS: More precisely, Peirce had a notation for metalanguage in 1898, which is simpler and does not need the useless baggage of Gamma graphs. Simpler than what? Peirce explicitly incorporated the 1898 notation for metalanguage into Gamma EGs in 1903, only changing the oval/line from thinly drawn to dotted. Consequently, any EG with that notation is a Gamma EG. JFS: But metalanguage, by itself, is not sufficient for a proof of pragmatism. There is an open-ended variety of ways for using metalanguage. Peirce never states nor implies in R L376 that he needs to add a Delta part to EGs in order to use metalanguage or provide a proof of pragmatism. Instead, he says that he needs to add a Delta part to EGs "in order to deal with modals," i.e., he needs a new notation for representing and reasoning about propositions involving possibility or necessity to replace the unsatisfactory (broken) cuts of 1903 and the nonsensical tinctures of 1906. Accordingly, ascribing any other purpose whatsoever to Delta EGs is utterly unwarranted. As you stated not long ago, "Any attempt to say anything beyond what Peirce wrote is an opinion of the person who does the writing. ... Nobody can claim that their opinion is what Peirce intended" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-01/msg00098.html). JFS: Please note that EGs that refer to "circumstances" can be translated to ordinary statements in Peirce's algebraic notion for first-order logic. There is nothing special about circumstances, by themselves, that makes them modal. As I have explained re
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
>> I pose these questions because as the discussion unfolds into the vast >> richness of modal logics within the modern forms of symbolic logics, the >> roles of individual minds in expressing semes appears to become dominant. >> In other words, the boundaries between symbols and icons seems to >> disappearing... >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
John, List: JFS: Since your article has just been accepted for publication, you probably still have time to make a few corrections. Actually, my paper was accepted for publication (after review and revision) six months ago, and I see no need to correct anything at this point anyway--I stand by everything that I wrote in it. JFS: More precisely, Peirce had a notation for metalanguage in 1898, which is simpler and does not need the useless baggage of Gamma graphs. Simpler than what? Peirce explicitly incorporated the 1898 notation for metalanguage into Gamma EGs in 1903, only changing the oval/line from thinly drawn to dotted. Consequently, any EG with that notation is a Gamma EG. JFS: But metalanguage, by itself, is not sufficient for a proof of pragmatism. There is an open-ended variety of ways for using metalanguage. Peirce never states nor implies in R L376 that he needs to add a Delta part to EGs in order to use metalanguage or provide a proof of pragmatism. Instead, he says that he needs to add a Delta part to EGs "in order to deal with modals," i.e., he needs a new notation for representing and reasoning about propositions involving possibility or necessity to replace the unsatisfactory (broken) cuts of 1903 and the nonsensical tinctures of 1906. Accordingly, ascribing any other purpose whatsoever to Delta EGs is utterly unwarranted. As you stated not long ago, "Any attempt to say anything beyond what Peirce wrote is an opinion of the person who does the writing. ... Nobody can claim that their opinion is what Peirce intended" ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-01/msg00098.html). JFS: Please note that EGs that refer to "circumstances" can be translated to ordinary statements in Peirce's algebraic notion for first-order logic. There is nothing special about circumstances, by themselves, that makes them modal. As I have explained repeatedly, the EGs scribed on R 339:[340r] *cannot *be properly interpreted as Beta EGs. The heavy lines for "circumstances" or "times" do not denote indefinite individuals, they represent possible states of things--*exactly *what is needed for modal logic but missing from previous versions of EGs. The attached letters "p" and "q" do not denote general concepts being attributed to individuals, they denote propositions that would be true in those possible states of things--i.e., *modal *propositions. The additional modal axioms added to classical propositional logic do not correspond to valid theorems in first-order predicate logic as implemented with Beta EGs. There are no counterparts in the latter for propositions that are non-modal (no attached heavy lines) or that include iterated modalities (multiple attached heavy lines). JFS: Those topics would explain why Delta graphs (as described in L376) have much more structure than just a notation for metalanguage. Peirce used that structure to support a phemic sheet that has multiple "papers". Nothing in the extant 19 pages of R L376 *describes *Delta EGs. Everything in that letter is applicable to the other three parts, as confirmed by your ongoing refusal/inability to provide any exact quotations from it to the contrary, despite my repeated requests. The "many papers" are neither new nor unique to Delta EGs--they correspond to different *subjects *that attract "the common attention" of the utterer and interpreter at different times, such that the collection of *all *of them represents the *entire *universe of discourse. Accordingly, nothing precludes them from being employed with Alpha, Beta, and Gamma EGs; in fact, Peirce was simply reiterating in 1911 what he had already written previously (R 280, c. 1905; CP 4.561n, 1908; https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-03/msg4.html). JFS: And the remainder of L376 describes how they may be used in an "investigation". That is necessary to support a logic of pragmatism. Why did you put "investigation" in quotation marks? That word never appears in R L376. Can you provide an exact quotation from that letter where Peirce describes how the "many papers" may be used in an "investigation"? I am not seeing it. JFS: That additional structure is what makes Delta graphs the fourth kind of logic that goes beyond Gamma graphs. You say that as if you somehow know *exactly *what Peirce had in mind for Delta graphs. Perhaps you meant to say, "That additional structure is what would make my [John Sowa's] candidate for Delta graphs the fourth kind of logic that goes beyond Gamma graphs." Even so, as I already pointed out, the "many papers" are equally applicable to Alpha, Beta, and Gamma EGs; there is nothing about them that specifically deals with modals or would otherwise be unique to Delta EGs. JFS: And by the way, when you make these additions to your article, you can include an acknowled
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
John: > On Mar 13, 2024, at 4:24 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > JFS: Once again, Peirce's logic is at the forefront of 21st C developments. While in one sense, I agree with your ascertain, but probably for different reasons. The question is, what aspects of “21st C developments” are you referring to? Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
e tinctures of 1906 were Peirce's previous attempts to "deal with modals," but they were ultimately unsatisfactory--even "nonsensical" in the case of the tinctures, as he called them two years later (R L477, LF 3/2, 1913 Nov 8). The badness of his description of EGs in 1906 was chiefly due to the use of cuts, a deficiency that he had already rectified by replacing them with shading (R 670, LF 3/1, 1911 Jun 11-12). What he needed now was a better graphical notation, compatible with shading, for representing and reasoning about modal propositions. Attaching heavy lines denoting possible states of things to the top of letters denoting propositions that would be true in them fits the bill. Moreover, Peirce himself suggested this solution (R 339:[340r], LF 1:624, 1909 Jan 7), although he evidently never worked out the details. I believe that I have done so in my forthcoming paper. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
ivalent to > the English conjunction 'that'. In short, that thin line attached to an > oval is Peirce's 1898 notation for metalanguage -- five years before the > Gamma graphs, > > JAS: I posted an example of this last night--proposition B = "C is a good > girl" fills the blank in "___ is possibly true," and that entire > proposition then fills the blank in "A thinks ." In English, each > instance of a dotted oval/line corresponds to the word "that," e.g., "A > thinks *that *it is possibly true *that *C is a good girl." > > I basically agree, but note that the 1898 example has a SOLID oval > attached to a thin line. There is no need for anything from 1903. The > metalanguage of 1898 combined with EGs that contain symbols such as > "possibly true" in a verb phrase does represent modality. But note the > huge difference between EGs that *CONTAIN *words like 'possible' or > 'necessary' from EGs that do *NOT **CONTAIN *any symbols (words or other > notations) that indicate modality. > > JAS: As I have spelled out in a soon-to-be-published paper, "Peirce and > Modal Logic: Delta Existential Graphs and Pragmaticism... > > I suggest that you study the paper I'm writing, since any peer-reviewed > paper that makes any claims about modal logic is likely to be reviewed by > two kinds of people: (1) Logicians who know modal logic; and (2) Ordinary > readers who will assume that any talk about specifications in a paragraph > that immediately follows "I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order > to deal with modals" is very likely to be a specification of something > called Delta. > > Peirce had discussed many kinds of logics in the years between 1903 and > 1911 without mentioning or drawing any of the 1903 modal graphs. During > those years, he wrote various MSS about modal logic and modal reasoning > that were very different from any of the 1903 EGs. > > Look at the transition between the two paragraphs below. Note especially > the words 'now', 'here', and 'conventions' in the ending of the first > paragraph, and the title "The conventions" at the beginning of the second > paragraph. How could any reader think that those conventions do not > specify Delta graphs? > > Excerpt from L376: I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal > with modals. A cross division of the description which here, as in that of > 1903, is given precedence over the other is into the conventions, the > Rules, and the working of the System. > > Excerpt from the beginning of the next paragraph: The Conventions. The > ultimate purpose of contriving this diagrammatic syntax, is to enable one > with facility to divide any necessary, or mathematical, reasoning into its > ultimate logical steps. > > If the reviewers see that transition, they will immediately ask very > serious questions. If you don't include the full L376 in an appendix (as I > am doing in my article), reviewers will ask why not? > > Finally, if Peirce thought that the notations in his Gamma graphs of 1903 > were adequate to represent everything in the Delta graphs, why did he claim > that the he needed to add a fourth part to his system of EGs? There must > be something in those Delta graphs that cannot be represented with just > some excerpts from the old Gamma graphs. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
ut by a series of erasures, insertions, iterations, and/or deiterations? JFS: I believe that Peirce recognized the need for more expressive power. And metalanguage adds that power without losing anything that might be expressed with the 1903 EGs. Again, the 1903 Gamma EGs *already *included the dotted oval/line notation for metalanguage, so there was no need for Peirce to invent something new for *that *purpose in 1911. In order to represent *modal *propositions with EGs, his *only *stated reason for adding a Delta part, he needed a better notation to replace the unsatisfying broken cuts of 1903 and nonsensical tinctures of 1906. The vertical heavy lines of R 339:[340r] fit the bill, and as spelled out in my forthcoming paper, they provide *graphical *solutions for iterated modalities, modal axioms, etc. JFS: And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction. ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00089.html) I continue to agree wholeheartedly with these sentiments and hope that you will give serious consideration to my feedback accordingly. I am sincerely trying to help you as I work through all this myself. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 1:54 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > Every statement about a thought expresses a possibility. Every statement > about a claim, a wish, a fear, etc, expresses a possibility. That is why > metalanguage is a more explicit method for expressing and reasoning about > possibility. Quine said that in the 1960s, and other logicians have been > developing methods for doing that since the 1970s. Today, nobody uses the > Lewis-style of modal logic for any practical purpose. > > JAS: how would you scribe the graph for "A thinks that B is *possibly * > true"? > > I'm sorry that I forgot to answer that question. I was commenting on > other points, and I forgot to state the translation for the EG you drew. > For my recommended version of metalevel EGs, I would first replace the > dotted line of your EG with a solid line. That would express the sentence > "A is thinking the proposition that there exists a B." Then I would > connect that solid line by a ligature to the word 'possible'. > > Literally, that new EG could be read "A is thinking the possible > proposition that there exists a B." But it could be read more simply "A > thinks it's possible that there is a B." > > Exactly the same procedure can be used to attach any other adjective or > phrase, such as 'necessary', 'impossible', 'probable', 'useful', > 'desirable', 'feared', 'doubted', 'lawful', 'illegal' or 'written in Holy > Scriptures". That is the reason why the version of modality that C. I. > Lewis specified in 1932 is a dead end. Anything you can express with it can > be expressed more clearly and generally with metalanguage. > > I believe that Peirce recognized the need for more expressive power. And > metalanguage adds that power without losing anything that might be > expressed with the 1903 EGs. Some people dabbled with methods for > computing with a Lewis-style of reasoning, but they have never been used > for any practical applications. Metalanguage is simpler and more general. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
Jon, Every statement about a thought expresses a possibility. Every statement about a claim, a wish, a fear, etc, expresses a possibility. That is why metalanguage is a more explicit method for expressing and reasoning about possibility. Quine said that in the 1960s, and other logicians have been developing methods for doing that since the 1970s. Today, nobody uses the Lewis-style of modal logic for any practical purpose. JAS: how would you scribe the graph for "A thinks that B is possibly true"? I'm sorry that I forgot to answer that question. I was commenting on other points, and I forgot to state the translation for the EG you drew. For my recommended version of metalevel EGs, I would first replace the dotted line of your EG with a solid line. That would express the sentence "A is thinking the proposition that there exists a B." Then I would connect that solid line by a ligature to the word 'possible'. Literally, that new EG could be read "A is thinking the possible proposition that there exists a B." But it could be read more simply "A thinks it's possible that there is a B." Exactly the same procedure can be used to attach any other adjective or phrase, such as 'necessary', 'impossible', 'probable', 'useful', 'desirable', 'feared', 'doubted', 'lawful', 'illegal' or 'written in Holy Scriptures". That is the reason why the version of modality that C. I. Lewis specified in 1932 is a dead end. Anything you can express with it can be expressed more clearly and generally with metalanguage. I believe that Peirce recognized the need for more expressive power. And metalanguage adds that power without losing anything that might be expressed with the 1903 EGs. Some people dabbled with methods for computing with a Lewis-style of reasoning, but they have never been used for any practical applications. Metalanguage is simpler and more general. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: In both graphs in your note below, the thin line may be read as "that"' Yes, of course; that is obvious from the syntax of the English sentences that I translated into those two graphs--although, as I said in that post, it is a dotted line, not a thin line. JFS: But neither of those two sentences can be translated to any version of modal logic based on the modal logics by C. I. Lewis or later variations of it. No, of course not; that is obvious from the fact that neither of those two sentences expresses a modal proposition, i.e., one that involves possibility or necessity. JFS: They can also be translated to and from Peirce's Delta graphs No, this is incorrect; that is obvious from the fact that such propositions about propositions can already be represented by Gamma EGs using the dotted oval/line notation that Peirce introduced in 1903 (LF 2/1:166), which is isomorphic with the thinly drawn oval/line notation that he used in 1898 (RLT 151). In 1911, he did not need a new Delta part of EGs in order to deal with metalanguage; according to his own explicit statement in R L376, he needed a new Delta part of EGs in order to deal with modals, due to his dissatisfaction with the cuts (including broken cuts) of 1903 and the tinctures of 1906. With that in mind, in your candidate for Delta EGs, how would you scribe the graph for "A thinks that B is possibly true"? Or will you continue refusing to provide any examples of how you would represent (and reason about) even very simple modal propositions, despite my multiple requests? By contrast, I am happy to show you how I would scribe that graph in my candidate for Delta EGs based on R 339:[340r] (1909). [image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 4:51 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, In both graphs in your note below, the thin line may be read as "that"' A thinks THAT C is a good girl. A is claiming THAT A is thinking THAT C is a good girl. Both of those sentences and both of those EGs can be translated to and from the IKL logic of 2006, which uses the symbol "that" to represent metalanguage. They can also be translated to and from Peirce's Delta graphs, which can be translated to and from the IKL logic. But neither of those two sentences can be translated to any version of modal logic based on the modal logics by C. I. Lewis or later variations of it. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ►
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4481, 1964, pp. 31-32) The CP reference here is to the paragraph right before the one where Peirce suggests the notation of a dotted oval and dotted line to assert a proposition about a proposition (CP 4.471, 1903), similar to the first EG on RLT 151 (1898), as John and I discussed recently (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Here is what Peirce says (and scribes) in that text; the image is from LF 2/1:165, with Peirce's handiwork on the right and Pietarinen's reproduction on the left. CSP: Convention No. 13. The letters ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, etc. each with a number of hooks greater by one than the subscript number, may be taken as rhemata signifying that the individuals joined to the hooks, other than the one vertically above the ρ taken in their order clockwise are capable of being asserted of the rhema indicated by the line of identity joined vertically to the ρ. Thus, Fig. 57 expresses that there is a relation in which every man stands to some woman to whom no other man stands in the same relation; that is, there is a woman corresponding to every man or, in other words, there are at least as many women as men. The dotted lines between which, in Fig. 57, the line of identity denoting the ens rationis is placed, are by no means necessary. [image.png] On the other hand, as I keep pointing out, Peirce's only stated purpose for needing to add a new Delta part was "in order to deal with modals" (R L376, 1911 Dec 6), so I doubt that it would have had anything to do with higher-order logics. John Sowa seems to be convinced that Peirce had in mind a more generalized situation/context logic using metalanguage, but so far, I see no evidence for this in the extant 19 pages of that letter to Risteen. Pietarinen speculates, "Perhaps he planned the Delta part on quantificational multi-modal logics as can be discerned in his theory of tinctured graphs that was fledgling since 1905" (LF 1:21), but that also seems unlikely to me since Peirce ultimately describes the tinctures as "nonsensical" (R 477, 1913 Nov 8). As far as I know, the only new notation that Peirce ever proposes for representing modal propositions with EGs after abandoning broken cuts (1903) and tinctures (1906) is the one in his Logic Notebook that I have been advocating (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). Echoing Zeman's remark in the quotation above, the sameness or continuity of a possible state of things (PST) as represented by a heavy line of compossibility (LoC) in my candidate for Delta EGs is not the same as the identity of individuals as represented by a heavy line of identity in Beta EGs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 8, 2024 at 5:11 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Hello John, Jon, List, Peirce examines both first and second intentional logics. The distinction appears to be similar, in some respects, to the contemporary distinction between first and second order logics. Here, for instance, is an SEP entry on higher order logics: https://seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/logic-higher-order/#HighOrdeLogiVisVisTypeTheo Does Peirce’s explorations in the Gamma system of the EG, and his contemplation of a possible Delta system, bear some similarities to contemporary discussions of higher order logics, such as third order, or fourth order, etc.? --Jeff D _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
John, List: JFS: In both graphs in your note below, the thin line may be read as "that"' Yes, of course; that is obvious from the syntax of the English sentences that I translated into those two graphs--although, as I said in that post, it is a *dotted *line, not a *thin *line. JFS: But neither of those two sentences can be translated to any version of modal logic based on the modal logics by C. I. Lewis or later variations of it. No, of course not; that is obvious from the fact that neither of those two sentences expresses a *modal *proposition, i.e., one that involves possibility or necessity. JFS: They can also be translated to and from Peirce's Delta graphs No, this is incorrect; that is obvious from the fact that such propositions about propositions can already be represented by *Gamma *EGs using the dotted oval/line notation that Peirce introduced in 1903 (LF 2/1:166), which is isomorphic with the thinly drawn oval/line notation that he used in 1898 (RLT 151). In 1911, he did not need a new Delta part of EGs in order to deal with *metalanguage*; according to his own explicit statement in R L376, he needed a new Delta part of EGs in order to deal with *modals*, due to his dissatisfaction with the cuts (including broken cuts) of 1903 and the tinctures of 1906. With that in mind, in your candidate for Delta EGs, how would you scribe the graph for "A thinks that B is *possibly *true"? Or will you continue refusing to provide *any *examples of how you would represent (and reason about) even *very simple* modal propositions, despite my multiple requests? By contrast, I am happy to show you how I would scribe that graph in my candidate for Delta EGs based on R 339:[340r] (1909). [image: image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 4:51 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > In both graphs in your note below, the thin line may be read as "that"' > > A thinks THAT C is a good girl. > > A is claiming THAT A is thinking THAT C is a good girl. > > Both of those sentences and both of those EGs can be translated to and > from the IKL logic of 2006, which uses the symbol "that" to represent > metalanguage. They can also be translated to and from Peirce's Delta > graphs, which can be translated to and from the IKL logic. > > But neither of those two sentences can be translated to any version of > modal logic based on the modal logics by C. I. Lewis or later variations of > it. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
Jon, In both graphs in your note below, the thin line may be read as "that"' A thinks THAT C is a good girl. A is claiming THAT A is thinking THAT C is a good girl. Both of those sentences and both of those EGs can be translated to and from the IKL logic of 2006, which uses the symbol "that" to represent metalanguage. They can also be translated to and from Peirce's Delta graphs, which can be translated to and from the IKL logic. But neither of those two sentences can be translated to any version of modal logic based on the modal logics by C. I. Lewis or later variations of it. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 3/13/24 5:39 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics) Helmut, List: Different kinds of possibility can be addressed with different formal systems of modal logic--alethic, deontic, doxastic, dynamic, epistemic, temporal, etc. For example, deontic logic defines possibility as permissibility and necessity as obligation, which is why its alternativeness/accessibility relation is merely serial and not reflexive--every obligation is permissible, but not every obligation is actually fulfilled, i.e., people can (and do) behave in ways that are not permissible. It is a fundamental principle of Peirce's Existential Graphs (EGs) that the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse as already agreed upon by the utterer (or graphist) who scribes discrete EGs on them and the interpreter who reads them. In other words, the underlying assumption is that both are genuine inquirers who are sincerely seeking the truth together. If the utterer scribes the EG for "A thinks that B," then this is true within that universe of discourse--it has nothing to do with what A claims to think, only what A really does think, unless the utterer instead scribes "A claims that A thinks that B." By the way, since B designates a proposition instead of a name for a general concept, the Gamma EG for "A thinks that B" has A attached by a heavy line of identity to "thinking," which is then attached by a dotted line to a dotted oval around B, preferably spelled out as a Beta EG (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Likewise, the Gamma EG for "A claims that A thinks that B" has A attached by a heavy line of identity to "claiming," which is then attached by a dotted line to a dotted oval around the Gamma EG for "A thinks that B" as just described, except that A is not repeated; instead, the one heavy line is branched and extended to "thinking." Here are those Gamma EGs, substituting "C is a good girl" for B. [image.png] As far as I know, the only place in Peirce's writings where he discusses a specific role for God in EGs is R 280 (c. 1905). In three different drafts, he states the following. CSP: The Graphist is really Plastic Nature, or the Artifex of Nature; and the special permissions are the experiences given to the interpreter of Nature, to the man, to which he is at liberty to attend, or not to attend at all, or to attend and immediately put out of sight, as he will. CSP: The sheet of assertion is the mirror of the interpreter’s mind, and through that it is the sign of what the Graphist authorizes. Now the graphist, as the author of truth (for we have seen that falsity is what he forbids and truth what he permits) and source of all the interpreter’s knowledge must be recognized as being either Plastic Nature or the Artifex of Nature. The universe is simply the collective whole of all things to the assertion of whose existence the Graphist interposes no veto, or extends a positive permission. CSP: We further conceive that this feigned sensible state of things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely, the immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of the interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field of view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is forced upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts forth sufficient effort. The Graphist must be regarded as corresponding to the "Plastic Nature" of Cudworth, or else to the Artifex of Nature. Again, everything that is asserted on the sheet is true, in this case because the one scribing all the EGs is "the author of truth"--either God the Creator himself or what Peirce describes elsewhere (referencing Cudworth) as "a blind agent intermediate between God and the world" (R 870, 1901). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 12:15 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: List, I p
Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
Helmut, List: Different kinds of possibility can be addressed with different formal systems of modal logic--alethic, deontic, doxastic, dynamic, epistemic, temporal, etc. For example, deontic logic defines possibility as *permissibility *and necessity as *obligation*, which is why its alternativeness/accessibility relation is merely serial and not reflexive--every obligation is permissible, but not every obligation is actually fulfilled, i.e., people can (and do) behave in ways that are *not * permissible. It is a fundamental principle of Peirce's Existential Graphs (EGs) that the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse *as already agreed upon* by the utterer (or graphist) who scribes discrete EGs on them and the interpreter who reads them. In other words, the underlying assumption is that both are genuine inquirers who are sincerely seeking the truth together. If the utterer scribes the EG for "A thinks that B," then this is true within that universe of discourse--it has nothing to do with what A *claims *to think, only what A *really does *think, unless the utterer instead scribes "A claims that A thinks that B." By the way, since B designates a proposition instead of a name for a general concept, the Gamma EG for "A thinks that B" has A attached by a heavy line of identity to "thinking," which is then attached by a dotted line to a dotted oval around B, preferably spelled out as a Beta EG ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Likewise, the Gamma EG for "A claims that A thinks that B" has A attached by a heavy line of identity to "claiming," which is then attached by a dotted line to a dotted oval around the Gamma EG for "A thinks that B" as just described, except that A is not repeated; instead, the one heavy line is branched and extended to "thinking." Here are those Gamma EGs, substituting "C is a good girl" for B. [image: image.png] As far as I know, the only place in Peirce's writings where he discusses a specific role for God in EGs is R 280 (c. 1905). In three different drafts, he states the following. CSP: The Graphist is really Plastic Nature, or the Artifex of Nature; and the special permissions are the experiences given to the interpreter of Nature, to the man, to which he is at liberty to attend, or not to attend at all, or to attend and immediately put out of sight, as he will. CSP: The sheet of assertion is the mirror of the interpreter’s mind, and through that it is the sign of what the Graphist authorizes. Now the graphist, as the author of truth (for we have seen that falsity is what he forbids and truth what he permits) and source of all the interpreter’s knowledge must be recognized as being either Plastic Nature or the Artifex of Nature. The universe is simply the collective whole of all things to the assertion of whose existence the Graphist interposes no veto, or extends a positive permission. CSP: We further conceive that this feigned sensible state of things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely, the immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of the interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field of view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is forced upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts forth sufficient effort. The Graphist must be regarded as corresponding to the "Plastic Nature" of Cudworth, or else to the Artifex of Nature. Again, everything that is asserted on the sheet is true, in this case because the one scribing all the EGs is "the author of truth"--either God the Creator himself or what Peirce describes elsewhere (referencing Cudworth) as "a blind agent intermediate between God and the world" (R 870, 1901). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 12:15 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: > List, > > I put a new name to this, because I am not inside the discussion, just > want to mention a problem I have with the topic. First, there are different > types of possibility: Is it not definite but possible about the past or > about the future, is it due to limited knowledge or to different options of > decision, and so on. All in all it is the same problem as with > metalanguage, like "A says B": Who heard him/her saying so?, and "A thinks, > that B": Who knows how, what A thinks? Like with possibility: Who or what > group of people regards it merely for possible instead of true, and might > there not exist somebody, e.g. God or "the universe", who knows, whether it > is true or false? > > For example, if you have an EG with the term "A thinks, that B", it is > written on t
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
John, List, JFS: I have responded precisely to every one of Jon's comments. GR: A review of your recent exchange strongly suggests to me and, I believe, anyone who might undertake that review herself, that you have responded *precisely* to *very few *of Jon's comments. I would say that you have been quite *selective *about responding to his comments and questions, mostly making what appears to me to be appeals to authority (such as to that group of "eminent logicians" who, as do you, appear dismissive re: formal modal logic). However, as earlier noted, I am certain that I am not alone in eagerly anticipating reading in the next few days the draft of your paper in progress, "Delta Graphs: The Logic of Pragmatism," especially as "it will include precise reasons why Delta graphs are based on metalanguage -- which is the primary method that is used for *computational purposes* in the 21st C." (Emphasis added by GR) GR: A quick question: Why do you valorize "computational purposes"" Are they the only useful applications as you see it? JFS: The axioms by C. I. Lewis and related developments are a dead end for any purpose in science and engineering. GR: How can you know that for sure? Please explain. JFS: Once again, Peirce's logic is at the forefront of 21st C developments. GR: For now, although it is very much to be desired, I will have to take your word for it. Best, Gary On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 3:24 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Gary, > > I have responded precisely to every one of Jon's comments. I am now > writing an article with the title "Delta Graphs: The Logic of > Pragmatism". I'll send a draft to P-list in a few days. I guarantee that > it will include precise reasons why Delta graphs are based on metalanguage > -- which is the primary method that is used for computational purposes in > the 21st C. > > The axioms by C. I. Lewis and related developments are a dead end for any > purpose in science and engineering. After 1903, Peirce wrote a great deal > about possibility and necessity, but he never used his 1903 modal logic for > any of that. > > Once again, Peirce's logic is at the forefront of 21st C developments. > > John > > > -- > *From*: "Gary Richmond" > *Sent*: 3/12/24 8:48 PM > *To*: John F Sowa > *Cc*: Peirce-L , Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order > Logics) > > John, > > Despite your earlier comment in a post addressed to me on March 6 where > you wrote that "the important references are in the future, not the past" > -- a remark which, in this matter of Delta EGs, I cannot say I much agree > with insofar as it relates to Peirce's work -- it remains impossible for > me, and I'd imagine others, to fully grasp your position on this issue that > you've been clearly disagreeing with Jon on. > > In short, without your addressing Jon's repeated requests for Peirce > quotations supporting your claims -- as well as a few examples of how you > would represent (and reason about) modal propositions in your "candidate" > for Delta EGs -- your contender for Delta graphs continues to be for me > unclear, really, unfathomable. > > Of course those following this discussion look forward to reading the > article which you are working on discussing Delta EGs. But it would be more > than helpful to forum members if you'd offer some *quotations *and a few > simple *examples* to clarify your views on the matter. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 1:38 PM Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > John, List: > > CSP: The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, > distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I > shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in > order to deal with modals. > > > JFS: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the details of the 1903 > logics. He is saying that he is preserving that DIVISION into Alpha > (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and Gamma (something beyond > Alpha and Beta). > > > Please do not put words in Peirce's mouth. Preserving the division without > also preserving the details of "the better exposition of 1903" would make > no sense. Going straight into a specification for the new Delta part > without saying anything at all about the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts, > having just stated the intention to "adhere to" that division, would > likewise make no sense. Again, can you identify even *one sentence* from > the entire extant letter to Risteen that is about EGs but *not *applicable > to those other
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
Gary, I have responded precisely to every one of Jon's comments. I am now writing an article with the title "Delta Graphs: The Logic of Pragmatism". I'll send a draft to P-list in a few days. I guarantee that it will include precise reasons why Delta graphs are based on metalanguage -- which is the primary method that is used for computational purposes in the 21st C. The axioms by C. I. Lewis and related developments are a dead end for any purpose in science and engineering. After 1903, Peirce wrote a great deal about possibility and necessity, but he never used his 1903 modal logic for any of that. Once again, Peirce's logic is at the forefront of 21st C developments. John From: "Gary Richmond" Sent: 3/12/24 8:48 PM To: John F Sowa Cc: Peirce-L , Jon Alan Schmidt Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics) John, Despite your earlier comment in a post addressed to me on March 6 where you wrote that "the important references are in the future, not the past" -- a remark which, in this matter of Delta EGs, I cannot say I much agree with insofar as it relates to Peirce's work -- it remains impossible for me, and I'd imagine others, to fully grasp your position on this issue that you've been clearly disagreeing with Jon on. In short, without your addressing Jon's repeated requests for Peirce quotations supporting your claims -- as well as a few examples of how you would represent (and reason about) modal propositions in your "candidate" for Delta EGs -- your contender for Delta graphs continues to be for me unclear, really, unfathomable. Of course those following this discussion look forward to reading the article which you are working on discussing Delta EGs. But it would be more than helpful to forum members if you'd offer some quotations and a few simple examples to clarify your views on the matter. Best, Gary On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 1:38 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: John, List: CSP: The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. JFS: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the details of the 1903 logics. He is saying that he is preserving that DIVISION into Alpha (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and Gamma (something beyond Alpha and Beta). Please do not put words in Peirce's mouth. Preserving the division without also preserving the details of "the better exposition of 1903" would make no sense. Going straight into a specification for the new Delta part without saying anything at all about the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts, having just stated the intention to "adhere to" that division, would likewise make no sense. Again, can you identify even one sentence from the entire extant letter to Risteen that is about EGs but not applicable to those other three parts, i.e., unique to Delta? JFS: Quine correctly said that modal logic was just a version of metalanguage about logic. That is Quine's opinion, apparently one that you share. However, it is by no means universal, even among logicians today, and there is no basis for claiming that Peirce would agree unless you can provide an exact quotation to that effect. Again, having made up your own mind, I suspect that you are reading that position back into his texts, including R L376. JFS: All the useful applications are based on some version of metalanguage, along the lines of the December 1911 article. It is a letter, not an article, and as far as I can tell, it neither states nor implies anything about the use of metalanguage instead of formal modal logic. Please provide an exact quotation to support your claim. JFS: Logics that use the two operators for necessary and possible, have no practical applications of any kind. Again, I would caution against making such sweeping and dismissive pronouncements. After all, there might very well be practical applications of formal modal logic that have not yet come to your attention or that get discovered in the future. In any case, according to Peirce, "True science is distinctively the study of useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). JFS: Peirce has an unusually large percentage of successful revivals. His Delta graphs are among them. I recognized their importance, because I have used and worked with similar logics from the late 20th and early 21st C. No one can say for sure what Peirce had in mind for Delta EGs since he never spelled it out himself, unless there are more pages of R L376 somewhere out there, waiting to be discovered. I still see no evidence in the extant text of that letter nor elsewhere (including R 514) to
[PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
List, I put a new name to this, because I am not inside the discussion, just want to mention a problem I have with the topic. First, there are different types of possibility: Is it not definite but possible about the past or about the future, is it due to limited knowledge or to different options of decision, and so on. All in all it is the same problem as with metalanguage, like "A says B": Who heard him/her saying so?, and "A thinks, that B": Who knows how, what A thinks? Like with possibility: Who or what group of people regards it merely for possible instead of true, and might there not exist somebody, e.g. God or "the universe", who knows, whether it is true or false? For example, if you have an EG with the term "A thinks, that B", it is written on the so called blank sheet, which shows the universe of discourse. If this discourse is that of a certain group of people, none of these people except A has access to what A thinks. So to write "A thinks" , if in words or as a symbol, on this sheet, is not justified. Because maybe A is a liar, and thinks the opposite of what he/she claims to think. It may seem possible to circumvene this problem, by e.g. saying: This certain group of discoursers consists of both theists and atheists, so we now incude God or the universe (according to belief) into the universe of discourse. Both God and the universe should know, what A thinks. But then there still is a problem, when it is about possibility in the future. I vaguely remember a quantum physicist, was it Newman, who spoke of hidden variables, and also somebody with "B", who claimed, that everything, even the farthest future, can be precalculated. I dont think so, but it shows, that a possibility about the future cannot be proved to be a mere possibility. Therefore it is not justified to write it on a blank sheet, I guess. That is, because I think, that not only atheists, but also theists don´t have a clear concept about what the universe or God knows about the future, and what not. Maybe some theists say, that God knows everything about the future too, but then His job would be quite boring and futile, and there would be no need e.g. for angels. You dont need a post office, if no message would be able to change the future. So, if this deterministic view is right, then possibility does not exist, and if it is false (of course it is), possibility cannot be proved to be one. Best regards, helmut Dienstag, 12. März 2024 um 22:59 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" An: "Peirce-L" Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics) Jerry, List: Your questions as posed are extremely general, and their answers depend heavily on the particular context of interest. Peirce assigns specific logical content to certain signs in his Existential Graphs (EGs) and develops the transformation rules for them accordingly. In all parts, the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse, graphs scribed on it represent propositions that are asserted as true in that universe, juxtaposition represents coexistence in that universe (conjunction), and a scroll (double cut or ring-shaped shaded area) represents a consequence (material implication) from which a single cut or shaded area is derived as representing negation (implication of falsity/absurdity). In the Beta part, heavy lines of identity denote indefinite individuals and attached names denote general concepts being attributed to those individuals. In the Gamma part, there are various additional signs for various purposes, such as the broken cut for possible falsity (modal logic), the heavy line with dotted lines along both sides for quantifying predicates (second-order logic), and the dotted oval for treating a proposition as a subject that fills the blank in a rheme attached to the oval by a dotted line (metalanguage). As I keep emphasizing, we cannot know for sure what Peirce had in mind for the Delta part, other than that it would "deal with modals," unless and until new manuscript evidence turns up, such as the missing pages of R L376. My hypothesis is that he was considering a new notation for representing and reasoning about modal propositions involving possibility or necessity, such as the one that he introduces in his Logic Notebook (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). In that case, heavy lines represent "circumstances" or "times"--more formally, possible states of things (PSTs)--and attached letters represent propositions that would be true under those circumstances, at those times, or in those PSTs. The transformation rules for these "lines of compossibility" (my term) are different from the ones for the "lines of identity" (Peirce's term) in the Beta part because of the obvious and fundamental semiotic difference between describing things with names (rhemes/semes) and describing state
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
/ twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 10:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > >> Jon, >> >> I'll go into much more detail in the preview article, which I am now >> working on. I'll just respond to the following point: >> >> JAS: Your quotation here omits the crucial first part of the only >> sentence in R L376 that mentions Delta--"The better exposition of 1903 >> divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, >> and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall >> now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals." >> >> I answered that before: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the >> details of the 1903 logics. He is saying that he is preserving that >> *DIVISION* into Alpha (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and >> Gamma (something beyond Alpha and Beta). >> >> The most significant Gamma graphs are the the ones that represent the >> second-order version of his 1885 Algebra of Logic. He had reviewed >> Russell's logic of 1903, and he must have heard about (but didn't have time >> to study) Whitehead & Russell's logic of 1910. Both of them discussed >> higher-order logic (second order and higher), but not modal logic. >> >> During the years after 1903, Peirce mentioned the modal words in English >> many, many times. And he experimented with new notations for modality, but >> he never used or even mentioned his 1903 modal logic for any purpose. In >> fact, he had only used it for a few examples in 1903. >> >> But the most important evidence is to look at the developments in the >> years after Peirce. C. I. Lewis introduced a new version of propositional >> modal logic in 1932, which had been inspired by Peirce's 1903 modal logic. >> It was different from Peirce's version, but equivalent in expressive power >> to the propositional subset of his modal logic of 1903. During the 30 or >> 40 years after 1932, many logicians built on that logic. But many others >> (Quine among them) rejected it. Quine correctly said that modal logic was >> just a version of metalanguage about logic. Other logicians criticized it >> or ignored it altogether. Very few did much with it after the 1960s. From >> the 1970s and later, new versions of logic were developed to handle modal >> issues, but (a) they did not use the box and diamond operators for >> modality; (b) they used different words. such as contexts, situations, or >> domains; and (c) they combined predicate calculus with metalanguage, as >> Peirce did in L376. >> >> In my preview of the Delta graph article, I'll explain these issues in >> more detail and discuss the directions taken in 1973 and later. Short >> summary: All the useful applications are based on some version of >> metalanguage, along the lines of the December 1911 article. Logics that >> use the two operators for necessary and possible, have no practical >> applications of any kind. >> >> Peirce had good taste and good insights into the kind of logic required >> for problems in philosophy, science, and engineering. Metalanguage is the >> foundation for all useful modal reasoning in the 21st C. Textbooks still >> mention the Lewis-style of modal logic, but there are no applications to >> any kind of practical applications. >> >> Summary: Any version of mathematics and/or logic that has no >> applications is. literally, useless. There are many such versions in the >> many years of published tomes. And most of them have few or no citations. >> >> On rare occasions, something from the distant past is revived and becomes >> a big success. Peirce has an unusually large percentage of successful >> revivals. His Delta graphs are among them. I recognized their importance, >> because I have used and worked with similar logics from the late 20th and >> early 21st C. >> >> John >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
Jerry, List: Your questions as posed are extremely general, and their answers depend heavily on the particular context of interest. Peirce *assigns *specific logical content to certain signs in his Existential Graphs (EGs) and develops the transformation rules for them accordingly. In all parts, the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse, graphs scribed on it represent propositions that are asserted as true in that universe, juxtaposition represents coexistence in that universe (conjunction), and a scroll (double cut or ring-shaped shaded area) represents a consequence (material implication) from which a single cut or shaded area is derived as representing negation (implication of falsity/absurdity). In the Beta part, heavy lines of identity denote indefinite individuals and attached names denote general concepts being attributed to those individuals. In the Gamma part, there are various additional signs for various purposes, such as the broken cut for possible falsity (modal logic), the heavy line with dotted lines along both sides for quantifying predicates (second-order logic), and the dotted oval for treating a proposition as a subject that fills the blank in a rheme attached to the oval by a dotted line (metalanguage). As I keep emphasizing, we cannot know for sure what Peirce had in mind for the Delta part, other than that it would "deal with modals," unless and until new manuscript evidence turns up, such as the missing pages of R L376. My hypothesis is that he was considering a new notation for representing and reasoning about modal propositions involving possibility or necessity, such as the one that he introduces in his Logic Notebook (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). In that case, heavy lines represent "circumstances" or "times"--more formally, possible states of things (PSTs)--and attached letters represent propositions that would be true under those circumstances, at those times, or in those PSTs. The transformation rules for these "lines of compossibility" (my term) are different from the ones for the "lines of identity" (Peirce's term) in the Beta part because of the obvious and fundamental semiotic difference between describing *things *with names (rhemes/semes) and describing *states of things* with propositions (dicisigns/phemes). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 8:01 AM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Jon, John, List: > > The attempts to interpret the on going discussions leads to simple > questions about meaning of symbols and logics. > > Given a graphic object, how does one decipher the logical content of it? > > What types of semantics can be associated with what types of visual > distinctions? > > How many distinctions are to be associated with a graphic object? And how > are these distinctions associated with the forms embodied in the objects > with logical premises OF ANY ORDER? > > I pose these questions because as the discussion unfolds into the vast > richness of modal logics within the modern forms of symbolic logics, the > roles of individual minds in expressing semes appears to become dominant. > In other words, the boundaries between symbols and icons seems to > disappearing... > > Cheers > > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Reading Peirce Reading Others
scientists, mathematicians (etc.) Peirce was reading--especially those he was drawing on in a sustained manner; - the inquiries of those following in Peirce's wake (self-consciously or not). In addition to asking how Peirce used this or that term in a given text (as in 1, above), I think that it is essential that we (5) try to reconstruct his arguments and, at the same time, engage in the inquiries ourselves. After all, Peirce's writings were not written for armchair philosophers. Rather, they were written for inquirers willing to engage in philosophy as an experimental science. Are there other resources not on this list that should be considered when interpreting Peirce's arguments and inquiries? If so, then I think it is worth saying so. That way, we can talk about the relative importance of these different resources in our respective approaches. My hope is that we can compare notes, acknowledge our differences, and learn from one another. Doing so will put us all in a better position to engage with philosophers and other inquirers who are not following in Peirce's wake--and who insist that they have more fruitful assumptions and better methods than the pragmatic methods we are looking to Peirce for guidance in putting to better use. Hope that helps. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
r used or even mentioned his 1903 modal logic for any purpose. In > fact, he had only used it for a few examples in 1903. > > But the most important evidence is to look at the developments in the > years after Peirce. C. I. Lewis introduced a new version of propositional > modal logic in 1932, which had been inspired by Peirce's 1903 modal logic. > It was different from Peirce's version, but equivalent in expressive power > to the propositional subset of his modal logic of 1903. During the 30 or > 40 years after 1932, many logicians built on that logic. But many others > (Quine among them) rejected it. Quine correctly said that modal logic was > just a version of metalanguage about logic. Other logicians criticized it > or ignored it altogether. Very few did much with it after the 1960s. From > the 1970s and later, new versions of logic were developed to handle modal > issues, but (a) they did not use the box and diamond operators for > modality; (b) they used different words. such as contexts, situations, or > domains; and (c) they combined predicate calculus with metalanguage, as > Peirce did in L376. > > In my preview of the Delta graph article, I'll explain these issues in > more detail and discuss the directions taken in 1973 and later. Short > summary: All the useful applications are based on some version of > metalanguage, along the lines of the December 1911 article. Logics that > use the two operators for necessary and possible, have no practical > applications of any kind. > > Peirce had good taste and good insights into the kind of logic required > for problems in philosophy, science, and engineering. Metalanguage is the > foundation for all useful modal reasoning in the 21st C. Textbooks still > mention the Lewis-style of modal logic, but there are no applications to > any kind of practical applications. > > Summary: Any version of mathematics and/or logic that has no applications > is. literally, useless. There are many such versions in the many years of > published tomes. And most of them have few or no citations. > > On rare occasions, something from the distant past is revived and becomes > a big success. Peirce has an unusually large percentage of successful > revivals. His Delta graphs are among them. I recognized their importance, > because I have used and worked with similar logics from the late 20th and > early 21st C. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
Jon, John, List: The attempts to interpret the on going discussions leads to simple questions about meaning of symbols and logics. Given a graphic object, how does one decipher the logical content of it? What types of semantics can be associated with what types of visual distinctions? How many distinctions are to be associated with a graphic object? And how are these distinctions associated with the forms embodied in the objects with logical premises OF ANY ORDER? I pose these questions because as the discussion unfolds into the vast richness of modal logics within the modern forms of symbolic logics, the roles of individual minds in expressing semes appears to become dominant. In other words, the boundaries between symbols and icons seems to disappearing... Cheers Jerry > On Mar 8, 2024, at 9:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Jeff, List: > > Indeed, as Don Roberts summarizes, "The Gamma part of EG corresponds, > roughly, to second (and higher) order functional calculi, and to modal logic. > ... By means of this new section of EG Peirce wanted to take account of > abstractions, including qualities and relations and graphs themselves as > subjects to be reasoned about" > (https://www.felsemiotica.com/descargas/Roberts-Don-D.-The-Existential-Graphs-of-Charles-S.-Peirce.pdf, > 1973, p. 64). Likewise, according to Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, "In the Gamma > part Peirce proposes a bouquet of logics beyond the extensional, > propositional and first-order systems. Those concern systems of modal logics, > second-order (higher-order) logics, abstractions, and logic of multitudes and > collections, among others" (LF 2/1:28). Jay Zeman says a bit more about Gamma > EGs for second-order logic in his dissertation. > > JZ: There is also another suggestion, in 4.470, which is interesting but to > which Peirce devotes very little time. Here he shows us a different kind of > line of identity, one which expresses the identity of spots rather than of > individuals. This is an intriguing move, since it strongly suggests at least > the second order predicate calculus, with spots now acquiring > quantifications. Peirce did very little with this idea, so far as I am able > to determine, but it seems to me that there would not be too much of a > problem in working it into a graphical system which would stand to the higher > order calculi as beta stands to the first-order calculus. The continuity > interpretation of the "spot line of identity" is fairly clear; it maps the > continuity of a property or a relation. The redness of an apple is the same, > in a sense, as the redness of my face if I am wrong; the continuity of the > special line of identity introduced in 4.470 represents graphically this > sameness. This sameness or continuity is not the same as the identity of > individuals; although its representation is scribed upon the beta sheet of > assertion, its "second intentional" nature seems to cause Peirce to classify > it with the gamma signs. (https://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4481, 1964, pp. > 31-32) > > The CP reference here is to the paragraph right before the one where Peirce > suggests the notation of a dotted oval and dotted line to assert a > proposition about a proposition (CP 4.471, 1903), similar to the first EG on > RLT 151 (1898), as John and I discussed recently > (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Here is > what Peirce says (and scribes) in that text; the image is from LF 2/1:165, > with Peirce's handiwork on the right and Pietarinen's reproduction on the > left. > > CSP: Convention No. 13. The letters ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, etc. each with a number > of hooks greater by one than the subscript number, may be taken as rhemata > signifying that the individuals joined to the hooks, other than the one > vertically above the ρ taken in their order clockwise are capable of being > asserted of the rhema indicated by the line of identity joined vertically to > the ρ. > Thus, Fig. 57 expresses that there is a relation in which every man stands to > some woman to whom no other man stands in the same relation; that is, there > is a woman corresponding to every man or, in other words, there are at least > as many women as men. The dotted lines between which, in Fig. 57, the line of > identity denoting the ens rationis is placed, are by no means necessary.  > > On the other hand, as I keep pointing out, Peirce's only stated purpose for > needing to add a new Delta part was "in order to deal with modals" (R L376, > 1911 Dec 6), so I doubt that it would have had anything to do with > higher-order logics. John Sowa seems to be convinced that Peirce had in mind > a more generalized situation
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [CG] Artificial empathy by a central executive
John It seems to me that an emphasis on ’semantics rather than syntax’ sets up an analytic frame focusing only on entities operating within a mode of Secondness - and ignoring the mode of Thirdness operating in syntax.. Edwina > On Mar 11, 2024, at 3:27 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > In my previous note, I forgot to include a link to the updated (March 8} > slides for my talk on March 6. Here is the URL: > https://ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com/OntologySummit2024/TrackA/LLMs-are-clueless--JohnSowa_20240228.pdf > . > > I also received an offline note about a linguistic theory that emphasizes > semantics rather than syntax: > The method of Generative semantics by Seuren, > https://www.mpi.nl/sites/default/files/2020-07/Seuren_Abralin_Article_2020.pdf > . Other linguists and computational linguists have proposed, developed, > and/or implemented related versions. > > Methods that emphasize semantics have been used in conjunction with ontology > to correct and avoid the errors and hallucinations created by LLMs. For > critical applications, 99% correct can be a disaster. Nobody wants to fly > in an airplane that has a 1% chance of crashing. > > LLMs are very good for translating linear languages and notations. But when > accuracy is essential, precise semantics is much more important than elegant > syntax. > > I also want to emphasize Section 3. That begins with slide 32, which has the > title Neuro-Cognitive Cycles. The word 'cognitive' is much more general than > 'symbolic', since it includes images as well as linear notations for > language. Note slide 7, which shows an image in the mind of a policeman, and > the attempt by a man who is trying to reconstruct an image from a verbal > explanation. > > In slide 24, I added a picture of a baby who is using sign language. For > multi-dimensional topics, a sign language can be more detailed and precise > that a spoken language. > > This section also emphasizes Peirce's methods of reasoning in Slides 33 and > 34, and their applications in the remaining slides. Slide 35 on the Central > Executive, as defined by neuroscientists, shows how to avoid the errors, > hallucinations, and dangers created by the Large Language Models (LLMs): > Include a Central Executive, which has the responsibility and the power to > evaluate any proposed language or actions and revise or reject those that may > be erroneous or even dangerous. > > Also note slide 39 on "Wicked Problems"; slide 40, which explains "Why Humans > are not obsolete; and Slide 41, which asks whether there is "A Path to AGI?" > The answer to that question is joke by George Burns, which might be taken > seriously. > > That reminds me of a remark by Ludwig Wittgenstein: "It's possible to write > a book on philosophy that consists entirely of jokes." A Zen Buddhist could > write a book on religion that consists entirely of jokes. Depending on the > definition of 'joke', somebody might say that they have. > > John > ___ > CG mailing list -- c...@lists.iccs-conference.org > To unsubscribe send an email to cg-le...@lists.iccs-conference.org _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
Jon, I'll go into much more detail in the preview article, which I am now working on. I'll just respond to the following point: JAS: Your quotation here omits the crucial first part of the only sentence in R L376 that mentions Delta--"The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals." I answered that before: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the details of the 1903 logics. He is saying that he is preserving that DIVISION into Alpha (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and Gamma (something beyond Alpha and Beta). The most significant Gamma graphs are the the ones that represent the second-order version of his 1885 Algebra of Logic. He had reviewed Russell's logic of 1903, and he must have heard about (but didn't have time to study) Whitehead & Russell's logic of 1910. Both of them discussed higher-order logic (second order and higher), but not modal logic. During the years after 1903, Peirce mentioned the modal words in English many, many times. And he experimented with new notations for modality, but he never used or even mentioned his 1903 modal logic for any purpose. In fact, he had only used it for a few examples in 1903. But the most important evidence is to look at the developments in the years after Peirce. C. I. Lewis introduced a new version of propositional modal logic in 1932, which had been inspired by Peirce's 1903 modal logic. It was different from Peirce's version, but equivalent in expressive power to the propositional subset of his modal logic of 1903. During the 30 or 40 years after 1932, many logicians built on that logic. But many others (Quine among them) rejected it. Quine correctly said that modal logic was just a version of metalanguage about logic. Other logicians criticized it or ignored it altogether. Very few did much with it after the 1960s. From the 1970s and later, new versions of logic were developed to handle modal issues, but (a) they did not use the box and diamond operators for modality; (b) they used different words. such as contexts, situations, or domains; and (c) they combined predicate calculus with metalanguage, as Peirce did in L376. In my preview of the Delta graph article, I'll explain these issues in more detail and discuss the directions taken in 1973 and later. Short summary: All the useful applications are based on some version of metalanguage, along the lines of the December 1911 article. Logics that use the two operators for necessary and possible, have no practical applications of any kind. Peirce had good taste and good insights into the kind of logic required for problems in philosophy, science, and engineering. Metalanguage is the foundation for all useful modal reasoning in the 21st C. Textbooks still mention the Lewis-style of modal logic, but there are no applications to any kind of practical applications. Summary: Any version of mathematics and/or logic that has no applications is. literally, useless. There are many such versions in the many years of published tomes. And most of them have few or no citations. On rare occasions, something from the distant past is revived and becomes a big success. Peirce has an unusually large percentage of successful revivals. His Delta graphs are among them. I recognized their importance, because I have used and worked with similar logics from the late 20th and early 21st C. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 3/11/24 9:07 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics) John, List: JFS: For convenience, see the attached Delta376.txt. I appreciate the complete transcription, although it would still be very helpful if you could quote specific sentences that you interpret as supporting each of your claims. JFS: I believe that there is no way to interpret that text without acknowledging the fact that it is the beginning of a specification of Delta graphs. Note the ending of the second paragraph: "I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. A cross division of the description which here, as in that of 1903, is given precedence over the other is into the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System." Your quotation here omits the crucial first part of the only sentence in R L376 that mentions Delta--"The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals." Accordingly, I believe that there is no way to interpret the 19 extant pages of this letter as the beginning of a specification of
[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
John, List: JFS: For convenience, see the attached Delta376.txt. I appreciate the complete transcription, although it would still be very helpful if you could quote specific sentences that you interpret as supporting each of your claims. JFS: I believe that there is no way to interpret that text without acknowledging the fact that it is the beginning of a specification of Delta graphs. Note the ending of the second paragraph: "I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. A cross division of the description which here, as in that of 1903, is given precedence over the other is into the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System." Your quotation here omits the crucial first part of the only sentence in R L376 that mentions Delta--"The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals." Accordingly, I believe that there is no way to interpret the 19 extant pages of this letter *as *the beginning of a specification of (only) Delta graphs. On the contrary, Peirce plainly states his intention to describe *all four parts* of EGs, but he never gets around to explaining their differences, let alone dealing with modals or discussing anything else that is unique to the new Delta part. JFS: Then the paragraph immediately after that begins "The Conventions." And it continues with a specification of the conventions for something. I cannot imagine that the "something" is anything other than Delta graphs. Your failure of imagination is not dispositive. Can you identify even *one sentence* from the entire section on "The Conventions"--or, for that matter, the rest of the letter--that is about EGs but *not *applicable to Alpha, Beta, and Gamma? JFS: Note the later discussion about different "parts" of the phemic sheet, which may be asserted and interpreted in different ways. Peirce states, "For they two [utterer and interpreter] may conceive that the 'phemic sheet' embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to one subject and part to another." As I have noted before, the different parts relate to different *subjects *to which both parties pay attention at different times--equivalent what Peirce describes in previous texts such as R 280 (c. 1905) and CP 4.561n (1908), both of which I quoted last week ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-03/msg4.html). As such, this concept is fully applicable to Alpha, Beta, and Gamma EGs--it does not exclusively "deal with modals," and thus is not unique to Delta EGs. JFS: That is why metalanguage must be used to state the many kinds of modality that Peirce discusses in the attached text. Peirce indeed briefly discusses modality in R L376, but he does not address how to represent and reason about modal propositions using EGs, which is his only stated reason for needing a Delta part. JFS: But the original MS, a copy of which you included in your note, had a thin line that connected the oval to the word 'is'. I suspect that who drew that diagram thought that the thin line between the oval and the word 'is' was just part of the word 'is'. But in his handwiriting, Peirce never drew a line in front of an initial letter 'i'. Therefore, that graph was mistakenly drawn. Thank you for correcting my mistake. I noticed that line, drawn even more lightly than the one in the first EG on RLT 151, but assumed that it was part of Peirce's cursive "i"--just as Ketner evidently did. However, after looking at a few other manuscripts, I agree that Peirce generally *did not* include such a line when handwriting "i" as the first letter of a word, so there is indeed a lightly drawn line connecting the oval (containing a proposition) to the rheme (whose blank that proposition fills). Of course, I already brought to your attention his similar notation in a later manuscript--R 492 (1903), erroneously reproduced in CP 4.471 but corrected by both Roberts and Pietarinen--where the oval and line are dotted instead of lightly drawn ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). This notation in Gamma EGs asserts a proposition about a proposition, but there is no hint of anything like it in R L376 (nor R 514). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 3:56 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, Jeff, Gary, List, > > I am now writing the article on Delta graphs. In a few days, I'll send a > preview. For conveni
[PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
Jon, Jeff, Gary, List, I am now writing the article on Delta graphs. In a few days, I'll send a preview. For convenience, see the attached Delta376.txt. (Since Peirce's paragraphs tend to be very long, I added some additional paragraph breaks,) I believe that there is no way to interpret that text without acknowledging the fact that it is the beginning of a specification of Delta graphs. Note the ending of the second paragraph: "I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. A cross division of the description which here, as in that of 1903, is given precedence over the other is into the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System." Then the paragraph immediately after that begins "The Conventions." And it continues with a specification of he conventions for something. I cannot imagine that the "something" is anything other than Delta graphs. (That paragraph break, by the way, is Peirce's.) Note the later discussion about different "parts" of the phemic sheet, which may be asserted and interpreted in different ways. That is why metalanguage must be used to state the many kinds of modality that Peirce discusses in the attached text. John I'll also mention that three people misinterpreted the two diagrams on p. 151 of RLT -- you, me, and Ken Ketner. I misinterpreted the first diagram as having a line of identity between an oval that encloses the sentence "You are a good girl". With that interpretation, it would assert "There exists a proposition that you are a good girl, and that proposition is much to be wished." But you correctly noticed that the line is so thin that it cannot be interpreted as a line of identity. Peirce did not state any reading for that complete EG. Therefore, I read it as asserting a complete grammatical sentence "That you are a good girl is much to be wished. That assertion is correct. It is logically equivalent to the above reading, but it is not syntactically equivalent to it. Then Ken Ketner (or somebody else who drew the second EG) did not show an attached line between the oval and the verb phrase "is false." But the original MS, a copy of which you included in your note, had a thin line that connected the oval to the word 'is'. I suspect that who drew that diagram thought that the thin line between the oval and the word 'is' was just part of the word 'is'. But in his handwiriting, Peirce never drew a line in front of an initial letter 'i'. Therefore, that graph was mistakenly drawn. Neither you nor Ken noticed that error. You did mention that Peirce had not introduced the convention of using an oval for negation until the next example. That is true, but it does not excuse the mistake of not noticing the thin line that connects the previous oval to the word 'is. There is much more to say, and I'll include it in the preview, which I plan to send in the next few days. John In that case, I believe that the thin line implies that the proposition in the oval is a THING that is the subject of the verb phrase "is much to be wished." ---- From: "John F Sowa" Sent: 3/9/24 1:02 PM To: "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "Peirce-L" Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic) Jeff, Jon, List, In his 1885 Algebra of Logic, Peirce presented the modern versions of both first-order and second-order predicate logic. The only difference between his notation and the modern versions is the choice of symbols. Since Peano wanted to make his logic publishable by ordinary type setters, he had to avoid Peirce's Greek letters and subscripts. Therefore, he invented the practice of turning letters upside-down or backwards, which type setters could do very easily. For every version of first-order logic, there is a fixed domain D1 of entities in the domain of quantification. Those entities could be anything of any kind -- that includes abstractions, fictions, imaginary beasts, and even hypothetical or possible worlds. For second order logic, the domain D2 consists of all possible functions and/or predicates that range over entities in D1. Second order logic is the only kind of higher order logic that anybody uses for any practical applications in any version of science, engineering, or computer systems. When they use the term HOL, they actually mean some kind of second order logic, which may be the one described above or something with a different way of specifying D2. The first (and most widely cited or defined) version of higher order logic that goes beyond second was developed by Whitehead and Russell (1910). It goes beyond second order logic by introducing domains D3, D4,..., which are so huge that nobody has ever found a use for them in any practical application. Given
[PEIRCE-L] Artificial empathy by a central executive
In my previous note, I forgot to include a link to the updated (March 8} slides for my talk on March 6. Here is the URL: https://ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com/OntologySummit2024/TrackA/LLMs-are-clueless--JohnSowa_20240228.pdf . I also received an offline note about a linguistic theory that emphasizes semantics rather than syntax: The method of Generative semantics by Seuren, https://www.mpi.nl/sites/default/files/2020-07/Seuren_Abralin_Article_2020.pdf . Other linguists and computational linguists have proposed, developed, and/or implemented related versions. Methods that emphasize semantics have been used in conjunction with ontology to correct and avoid the errors and hallucinations created by LLMs. For critical applications, 99% correct can be a disaster. Nobody wants to fly in an airplane that has a 1% chance of crashing. LLMs are very good for translating linear languages and notations. But when accuracy is essential, precise semantics is much more important than elegant syntax. I also want to emphasize Section 3. That begins with slide 32, which has the title Neuro-Cognitive Cycles. The word 'cognitive' is much more general than 'symbolic', since it includes images as well as linear notations for language. Note slide 7, which shows an image in the mind of a policeman, and the attempt by a man who is trying to reconstruct an image from a verbal explanation. In slide 24, I added a picture of a baby who is using sign language. For multi-dimensional topics, a sign language can be more detailed and precise that a spoken language. This section also emphasizes Peirce's methods of reasoning in Slides 33 and 34, and their applications in the remaining slides. Slide 35 on the Central Executive, as defined by neuroscientists, shows how to avoid the errors, hallucinations, and dangers created by the Large Language Models (LLMs): Include a Central Executive, which has the responsibility and the power to evaluate any proposed language or actions and revise or reject those that may be erroneous or even dangerous. Also note slide 39 on "Wicked Problems"; slide 40, which explains "Why Humans are not obsolete; and Slide 41, which asks whether there is "A Path to AGI?" The answer to that question is joke by George Burns, which might be taken seriously. That reminds me of a remark by Ludwig Wittgenstein: "It's possible to write a book on philosophy that consists entirely of jokes." A Zen Buddhist could write a book on religion that consists entirely of jokes. Depending on the definition of 'joke', somebody might say that they have. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
art" at all is "in order to deal with modals." It seems much more plausible that he was considering a new notation for representing and reasoning about modal propositions to replace his unsatisfactory broken cuts (1903) and tinctures (1906), such as the one that he introduces on R 339:[340r]. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Mar 9, 2024 at 12:02 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jeff, Jon, List, > > In his 1885 Algebra of Logic, Peirce presented the modern versions of both > first-order and second-order predicate logic. The only difference between > his notation and the modern versions is the choice of symbols. Since > Peano wanted to make his logic publishable by ordinary type setters, he had > to avoid Peirce's Greek letters and subscripts. Therefore, he invented the > practice of turning letters upside-down or backwards, which type setters > could do very easily. > > For every version of first-order logic, there is a fixed domain D1 of > entities in the domain of quantification. Those entities could be anything > of any kind -- that includes abstractions, fictions, imaginary beasts, and > even hypothetical or possible worlds. For second order logic, the domain > D2 consists of all possible functions and/or predicates that range over > entities in D1. > > Second order logic is the only kind of higher order logic that anybody > uses for any practical applications in any version of science, engineering, > or computer systems. When they use the term HOL, they actually mean some > kind of second order logic, which may be the one described above or > something with a different way of specifying D2. > > The first (and most widely cited or defined) version of higher order logic > that goes beyond second was developed by Whitehead and Russell (1910). It > goes beyond second order logic by introducing domains D3, D4,..., which are > so huge that nobody has ever found a use for them in any practical > application. > > Given D1 and D2 as above, W & R specified D3 as the set of all possible > functions or predicates that may be defined over the union of D1 and D2. > Then D4 is defined over the union of D1, D2, D3. And so on. Logicians > (usually graduate students who need to find a thesis topic) publish papers > about such things in the Journal of Symbolic Logic. And the only people > who read them are graduate students who need to find a thesis topic. > > Peirce never went beyond second order logic. But any statement in any > language or logic about any language or logic is metalanguage. Since that > word was coined over 20 years after Peirce, he never used it. But there > are many uses of metalanguage in Peirce's publications and MSS. But he > never chose or coined a word that would relate all the instances. > > In the example that Jon copied below, "the line of identity denoting the *ens > rationis",* Peirce used the term 'ens rationis' for that example of > metalanguage. But he described other examples with other words. > > In the passage below by Jay Zeman, "a different kind of line of > identity, one which expresses the identity of spots rather than of > individuals. This is an intriguing move, since it strongly suggests at > least the second order predicate calculus, with spots now acquiring > quantifications. Peirce did very little with this idea, so far as I am able > to determine", Jay mistakenly used the term "second order PC". There is > no quantified variable for some kind of logic. It is just another example > of metalanguage that makes an assertion about the EG. > > There is much more to say about metalanguage, which I'll discuss in a > separate reply to Jon. But these examples are a small fraction of the many > instances of metalanguage throughout Peirce's publications and MSS. Once > you start looking for them, you'll find them throughout his writings. > Unfortunately, Peirce had no standard terminology for talking about them. > > I hate to say it, but this is one time when I wish Peirce had found a > Greek word for it. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
this idea, so far as I am able to determine, but it seems to me that there would not be too much of a problem in working it into a graphical system which would stand to the higher order calculi as beta stands to the first-order calculus. The continuity interpretation of the "spot line of identity" is fairly clear; it maps the continuity of a property or a relation. The redness of an apple is the same, in a sense, as the redness of my face if I am wrong; the continuity of the special line of identity introduced in 4.470 represents graphically this sameness. This sameness or continuity is not the same as the identity of individuals; although its representation is scribed upon the beta sheet of assertion, its "second intentional" nature seems to cause Peirce to classify it with the gamma signs. (https://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4481, 1964, pp. 31-32) The CP reference here is to the paragraph right before the one where Peirce suggests the notation of a dotted oval and dotted line to assert a proposition about a proposition (CP 4.471, 1903), similar to the first EG on RLT 151 (1898), as John and I discussed recently (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Here is what Peirce says (and scribes) in that text; the image is from LF 2/1:165, with Peirce's handiwork on the right and Pietarinen's reproduction on the left. CSP: Convention No. 13. The letters ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, etc. each with a number of hooks greater by one than the subscript number, may be taken as rhemata signifying that the individuals joined to the hooks, other than the one vertically above the ρ taken in their order clockwise are capable of being asserted of the rhema indicated by the line of identity joined vertically to the ρ. Thus, Fig. 57 expresses that there is a relation in which every man stands to some woman to whom no other man stands in the same relation; that is, there is a woman corresponding to every man or, in other words, there are at least as many women as men. The dotted lines between which, in Fig. 57, the line of identity denoting the ens rationis is placed, are by no means necessary. [image.png] On the other hand, as I keep pointing out, Peirce's only stated purpose for needing to add a new Delta part was "in order to deal with modals" (R L376, 1911 Dec 6), so I doubt that it would have had anything to do with higher-order logics. John Sowa seems to be convinced that Peirce had in mind a more generalized situation/context logic using metalanguage, but so far, I see no evidence for this in the extant 19 pages of that letter to Risteen. Pietarinen speculates, "Perhaps he planned the Delta part on quantificational multi-modal logics as can be discerned in his theory of tinctured graphs that was fledgling since 1905" (LF 1:21), but that also seems unlikely to me since Peirce ultimately describes the tinctures as "nonsensical" (R 477, 1913 Nov 8). As far as I know, the only new notation that Peirce ever proposes for representing modal propositions with EGs after abandoning broken cuts (1903) and tinctures (1906) is the one in his Logic Notebook that I have been advocating (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). Echoing Zeman's remark in the quotation above, the sameness or continuity of a possible state of things (PST) as represented by a heavy line of compossibility (LoC) in my candidate for Delta EGs is not the same as the identity of individuals as represented by a heavy line of identity in Beta EGs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 8, 2024 at 5:11 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Hello John, Jon, List, Peirce examines both first and second intentional logics. The distinction appears to be similar, in some respects, to the contemporary distinction between first and second order logics. Here, for instance, is an SEP entry on higher order logics: https://seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/logic-higher-order/#HighOrdeLogiVisVisTypeTheo Does Peirce’s explorations in the Gamma system of the EG, and his contemplation of a possible Delta system, bear some similarities to contemporary discussions of higher order logics, such as third order, or fourth order, etc.? --Jeff D _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
Jeff, List: Indeed, as Don Roberts summarizes, "The Gamma part of EG corresponds, roughly, to second (and higher) order functional calculi, and to modal logic. ... By means of this new section of EG Peirce wanted to take account of abstractions, including qualities and relations and graphs themselves as subjects to be reasoned about" ( https://www.felsemiotica.com/descargas/Roberts-Don-D.-The-Existential-Graphs-of-Charles-S.-Peirce.pdf, 1973, p. 64). Likewise, according to Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, "In the Gamma part Peirce proposes a bouquet of logics beyond the extensional, propositional and first-order systems. Those concern systems of modal logics, second-order (higher-order) logics, abstractions, and logic of multitudes and collections, among others" (LF 2/1:28). Jay Zeman says a bit more about Gamma EGs for second-order logic in his dissertation. JZ: There is also another suggestion, in 4.470, which is interesting but to which Peirce devotes very little time. Here he shows us a different kind of line of identity, one which expresses the identity of spots rather than of individuals. This is an intriguing move, since it strongly suggests at least the second order predicate calculus, with spots now acquiring quantifications. Peirce did very little with this idea, so far as I am able to determine, but it seems to me that there would not be too much of a problem in working it into a graphical system which would stand to the higher order calculi as beta stands to the first-order calculus. The continuity interpretation of the "spot line of identity" is fairly clear; it maps the continuity of a property or a relation. The redness of an apple is the same, in a sense, as the redness of my face if I am wrong; the continuity of the special line of identity introduced in 4.470 represents graphically this sameness. This sameness or continuity is not the same as the identity of individuals; although its representation is scribed upon the beta sheet of assertion, its "second intentional" nature seems to cause Peirce to classify it with the gamma signs. ( https://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4481, 1964, pp. 31-32) The CP reference here is to the paragraph right before the one where Peirce suggests the notation of a dotted oval and dotted line to assert a proposition about a proposition (CP 4.471, 1903), similar to the first EG on RLT 151 (1898), as John and I discussed recently ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Here is what Peirce says (and scribes) in that text; the image is from LF 2/1:165, with Peirce's handiwork on the right and Pietarinen's reproduction on the left. CSP: Convention No. 13. The letters ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, etc. each with a number of hooks greater by one than the subscript number, may be taken as rhemata signifying that the individuals joined to the hooks, other than the one vertically above the ρ taken in their order clockwise are capable of being asserted of the rhema indicated by the line of identity joined vertically to the ρ. Thus, Fig. 57 expresses that there is a relation in which every man stands to some woman to whom no other man stands in the same relation; that is, there is a woman corresponding to every man or, in other words, there are at least as many women as men. The dotted lines between which, in Fig. 57, the line of identity denoting the *ens rationis* is placed, are by no means necessary. [image: image.png] On the other hand, as I keep pointing out, Peirce's *only *stated purpose for needing to add a new Delta part was "in order to deal with modals" (R L376, 1911 Dec 6), so I doubt that it would have had anything to do with higher-order logics. John Sowa seems to be convinced that Peirce had in mind a more generalized situation/context logic using metalanguage, but so far, I see no evidence for this in the extant 19 pages of that letter to Risteen. Pietarinen speculates, "Perhaps he planned the Delta part on quantificational multi-modal logics as can be discerned in his theory of *tinctured graphs* that was fledgling since 1905" (LF 1:21), but that also seems unlikely to me since Peirce ultimately describes the tinctures as "nonsensical" (R 477, 1913 Nov 8). As far as I know, the *only *new notation that Peirce ever proposes for representing modal propositions with EGs after abandoning broken cuts (1903) and tinctures (1906) is the one in his Logic Notebook that I have been advocating (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). Echoing Zeman's remark in the quotation above, the sameness or continuity of a possible state of things (PST) as represented by a heavy line of compossibility (LoC) in my candidate for Delta EGs is *not *the same as the identity of individuals as represented by a heavy line of identity in Beta EGs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSc
