[agi] Paper: Voodoo Correlations in Social Neuroscience
http://machineslikeus.com/news/paper-voodoo-correlations-social-neuroscience http://www.pashler.com/Articles/Vul_etal_2008inpress.pdf --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=126863270-d7b0b0 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] The Smushaby of Flatway.
But how can it dequark the tachyon antimatter containment field? Richard, You missed Mike Tintner's explanation . . . . You're not thinking your argument through. Look carefully at my spontaneous "COW" - DOG - TAIL - CURRENT CRISIS - LOCAL VS GLOBAL THINKING - WHAT A NICE DAY - MUST GET ON- CANT SPEND MUCH MORE TIME ON THIS" etc. etc" It can do this partly because a) single ideas have multiple, often massively mutiple, idea/domain connections in the human brain, and allow one to go off in any of multiple tangents/directions b) humans have many things - and therefore multiple domains - on their mind at the same time concurrently - and can switch as above from the immediate subject to some other pressing subject domain (e.g. from economics/politics (local vs global) to the weather (what a nice day). So maybe it's worth taking 20 secs. of time - producing your own chain-of-free-association starting say with "MAHONEY" and going on for another 10 or so items - and trying to figure out how - Original Message - From: "Richard Loosemore" To: Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2009 8:05 PM Subject: Re: [agi] The Smushaby of Flatway. Ronald C. Blue wrote: [snip] [snip] ... chaos stimulation because ... correlational wavelet opponent processing machine ... globally entangled ... Paul rf trap ... parallel > modulating string pulses ... a relative zero energy value or opponent process ... phase locked ... parallel opponent process ... reciprocal Eigenfunction ... opponent process ... summation interference ... gaussian reference rf trap ... > oscillon output picture ... locked into the forth harmonic ... > ... entangled with its Eigenfunction .. [snip] That is what entangled memory means. Okay, I got that. But how can it dequark the tachyon antimatter containment field? Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=123753653-47f84b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Religious attitudes to NBIC technologies
>> The problem here is that WE don't have anything to point to as OUR religion Why not go with Unitarian Universalism? It's non-creedal (i.e. you don't have to believe in God -or- you can believe in any God ) and has a long history and already established community. Form the Unitarian Universalist Association website at http://www.uua.org Our Principles Principios en Espanol There are seven principles which Unitarian Universalist congregations affirm and promote: a.. The inherent worth and dignity of every person; b.. Justice, equity and compassion in human relations; c.. Acceptance of one another and encouragement to spiritual growth in our congregations; d.. A free and responsible search for truth and meaning; e.. The right of conscience and the use of the democratic process within our congregations and in society at large; f.. The goal of world community with peace, liberty, and justice for all; g.. Respect for the interdependent web of all existence of which we are a part. Unitarian Universalism (UU) draws from many sources: a.. Direct experience of that transcending mystery and wonder, affirmed in all cultures, which moves us to a renewal of the spirit and an openness to the forces which create and uphold life; b.. Words and deeds of prophetic women and men which challenge us to confront powers and structures of evil with justice, compassion, and the transforming power of love; c.. Wisdom from the world's religions which inspires us in our ethical and spiritual life; d.. Jewish and Christian teachings which call us to respond to God's love by loving our neighbors as ourselves; e.. Humanist teachings which counsel us to heed the guidance of reason and the results of science, and warn us against idolatries of the mind and spirit. f.. Spiritual teachings of earth-centered traditions which celebrate the sacred circle of life and instruct us to live in harmony with the rhythms of nature. These principles and sources of faith are the backbone of our religious community. - Original Message - From: Steve Richfield To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Monday, December 08, 2008 8:14 PM Subject: Re: [agi] Religious attitudes to NBIC technologies Everyone, The problem here is that WE don't have anything to point to as OUR religion, so that everyone else has the power of stupidity in general and the 1st amendment in particular, yet we don't have any such power. I believe that it is possible to fill in this gap, but I don't wish to discuss incomplete solutions on public forums. However, if you have any ideas just how OUR religion should be structured, then please feel free to send them to me, preferably off-line. It would be a real shame to do a bad job of this, so I'm keeping my detailed thoughts to myself pending a "live birth". Note Buddhism's belief structure that does NOT include a Deity. Note Islam's various provisions for unbelievers to get a free pass, and sometimes even break a rule here and there, so long as they pretend to believe. Any thoughts? Steve Richfield On 12/8/08, Philip Hunt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: 2008/12/8 Bob Mottram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > People who are highly religious tend to be very "past positive" > according the Zimbardo classification of people according to their > temporal orientation. [...] > I agree that in time we will see more polarization around a variety of > technology related issues. You're probably right. Part of the problem is that these people [correctly] believe that science and technology are destroying their worldview. And as the gaps in scientific knowledge decrease, there's less roo for the "God of the gaps" to occupy. Having said that, I'm not aware that nanotechnology or AI are specifically prohibited by any of the major religions. And if one society forgoes science, they'll just get outcompeted by their neighbours. -- Philip Hunt, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Please avoid sending me Word or PowerPoint attachments. See http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] The Future of AGI
- Original Message - From: "Mike Tintner" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> I should explain "rationality" No Mike, you *really* shouldn't. Repurposing words like you do merely leads to confusion not clarity . . . . Actual general intelligence in humans and animals is indisputably continuously "screen-based." You keep contending this with absolutely no evidence or proof. You can have conscious intelligence without language, logic or maths. You can't have it without a "screen" - the continuous movie of consciousness. And that screen is not just vision but sound. And how do you know this? If you're smart, I suggest, you'll acknowledge the truth here, which is that you know next to nothing about imaginative intelligence I see, so if Ben is smart he'll acknowledge that you, with far less knowledge and experience, have the correct answer (despite being unable to explain it coherently enough to convince *anyone*). --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Professor Asim Roy Finally Publishes Controversial Brain Theory
??? Did you read the article? Absolutely. I don't comment on things without reading them (unlike some people on this list). Not only that, I also read the paper that someone was nice enough to send the link for. Now his 'new' theory may be old hat to you personally, but apparently not to the majority of AI researchers, (according to the article). The phrase "according to the article" is what is telling. It is an improper (and incorrect) portrayal of "the majority of AI researchers". He must be saying something a bit unusual to have been fighting for ten years to get it published and accepted enough for him to now have been invited to do a workshop on his theory. Something a bit unusual like Mike Tintner fighting us on this list for ten years and then finding someone to accept his theories and run a workshop? Note who is running the workshop . . . . not the normal BICA community for sure . . . . - Original Message - From: "BillK" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2008 10:37 AM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] Professor Asim Roy Finally Publishes Controversial Brain Theory On Thu, Nov 20, 2008 at 3:06 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Yeah. Great headline -- "Man beats dead horse beyond death!" I'm sure that there will be more details at 11. Though I am curious . . . . BillK, why did you think that this was worth posting? ??? Did you read the article? --- Quote: In the late '90s, Asim Roy, a professor of information systems at Arizona State University, began to write a paper on a new brain theory. Now, 10 years later and after several rejections and resubmissions, the paper "Connectionism, Controllers, and a Brain Theory" has finally been published in the November issue of IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics – Part A: Systems and Humans. Roy's theory undermines the roots of connectionism, and that's why his ideas have experienced a tremendous amount of resistance from the cognitive science community. For the past 15 years, Roy has engaged researchers in public debates, in which it's usually him arguing against a dozen or so connectionist researchers. Roy says he wasn't surprised at the resistance, though. "I was attempting to take down their whole body of science," he explained. "So I would probably have behaved the same way if I were in their shoes." No matter exactly where or what the brain controllers are, Roy hopes that his theory will enable research on new kinds of learning algorithms. Currently, restrictions such as local and memoryless learning have limited AI designers, but these concepts are derived directly from that idea that control is local, not high-level. Possibly, a controller-based theory could lead to the development of truly autonomous learning systems, and a next generation of intelligent robots. The sentiment that the "science is stuck" is becoming common to AI researchers. In July 2007, the National Science Foundation (NSF) hosted a workshop on the "Future Challenges for the Science and Engineering of Learning." The NSF's summary of the "Open Questions in Both Biological and Machine Learning" [see below] from the workshop emphasizes the limitations in current approaches to machine learning, especially when compared with biological learners' ability to learn autonomously under their own self-supervision: "Virtually all current approaches to machine learning typically require a human supervisor to design the learning architecture, select the training examples, design the form of the representation of the training examples, choose the learning algorithm, set the learning parameters, decide when to stop learning, and choose the way in which the performance of the learning algorithm is evaluated. This strong dependence on human supervision is greatly retarding the development and ubiquitous deployment of autonomous artificial learning systems. Although we are beginning to understand some of the learning systems used by brains, many aspects of autonomous learning have not yet been identified." Roy sees the NSF's call for a new science as an open door for a new theory, and he plans to work hard to ensure that his colleagues realize the potential of the controller model. Next April, he will present a four-hour workshop on autonomous machine learning, having been invited by the Program Committee of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN). - Now his 'new' theory may be old hat to you personally, but apparently not to the majority of AI researchers, (according to the article). He must be saying something a bit unusual to have been fighting for ten years to get it published and accepted enough for him to now have been invited to do a workshop on his t
RE: [agi] Professor Asim Roy Finally Publishes Controversial Brain Theory
Yeah. Great headline -- "Man beats dead horse beyond death!" I'm sure that there will be more details at 11. Though I am curious . . . . BillK, why did you think that this was worth posting? - Original Message - From: Derek Zahn To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2008 9:43 AM Subject: **SPAM** RE: [agi] Professor Asim Roy Finally Publishes Controversial Brain Theory From the paper: > This paper has proposed a new paradigm for the > internal mechanisms of the brain, one that postulates > that there are parts of the brain that control other parts. Sometimes I despair. -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: **SPAM** Re: [agi] My prospective plan to neutralize AGI and other dangerous technologies...
>> Seed AI is a myth. Ah. Now I get it. You are on this list solely to try to slow down progress as much as possible . . . . (sorry that I've been so slow to realize this) add-rule kill-file "Matt Mahoney" - Original Message - From: Matt Mahoney To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 8:23 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] My prospective plan to neutralize AGI and other dangerous technologies... Steve, what is the purpose of your political litmus test? If you are trying to assemble a team of seed-AI programmers with the "correct" ethics, forget it. Seed AI is a myth. http://www.mattmahoney.net/agi2.html (section 2). -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- On Tue, 11/18/08, Steve Richfield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Steve Richfield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: [agi] My prospective plan to neutralize AGI and other dangerous technologies... To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Tuesday, November 18, 2008, 6:39 PM Richard and Bill, On 11/18/08, BillK <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 1:22 PM, Richard Loosemore wrote: > I see how this would work: crazy people never tell lies, so you'd be able > to nail 'em when they gave the wrong answers. Yup. That's how they pass lie detector tests as well. They sincerely believe the garbage they spread around. In 1994 I was literally sold into servitude in Saudi Arabia as a sort of slave programmer (In COBOL on HP-3000 computers) to the Royal Saudi Air Force. I managed to escape that situation with the help of the same Wahhabist Sunni Muslims that are now causing so many problems. With that background, I think I understand them better than most people. As in all other societies, they are not given the whole truth, e.g. most have never heard of the slaughter at Medina, and believe that Mohamed never hurt anyone at all. My hope and expectation is that, by allowing people to research various issues as they work on their test, that a LOT of people who might otherwise fail the test will instead reevaluate their beliefs, at least enough to come up with the right answers, whether or not they truly believe them. At least that level of understanding assures that they can carry on a reasoned conversation. This is a MAJOR problem now. Even here on this forum, many people still don't get reverse reductio ad absurdum. BTW, I place most of the blame for the middle east impasse on the West rather than on the East. The Koran says that most of the evil in the world is done by people who think they are doing good, which brings with it a good social mandate to publicly reconsider and defend any actions that others claim to be evil. The next step is to proclaim evil doers as "unwitting agents of Satan". If there is still no good defense, then they drop the "unwitting". Of course, us stupid uncivilized Westerners have fallen into this, and so 19 brave men sacrificed their lives just to get our attention, but even that failed to work as planned. Just what DOES it take to get our attention - a nuke in NYC? What the West has failed to realize is that they are playing a losing hand, but nonetheless, they just keep increasing the bet on the expectation that the other side will fold. They won't. I was as much intending my test for the sort of stupidity that nearly all Americans harbor as that carried by Al Queda. Neither side seems to be playing with a full deck. Steve Richfield -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
>> I am just trying to point out the contradictions in Mark's sweeping >> generalizations about the treatment of intelligent machines Huh? That's what you're trying to do? Normally people do that by pointing to two different statements and arguing that they contradict each other. Not by creating new, really silly definitions and then trying to posit a universe where blue equals red so everybody is confused. >> But to be fair, such criticism is unwarranted. So exactly why are you persisting? >> Ethical beliefs are emotional, not rational, Ethical beliefs are subconscious and deliberately obscured from the conscious mind so that defections can be explained away without triggering other primate's lie-detecting senses. However, contrary to your antiquated beliefs, they are *purely* a survival trait with a very solid grounding. >> Ethical beliefs are also algorithmically complex Absolutely not. Ethical beliefs are actually pretty darn simple as far as the subconscious is concerned. It's only when the conscious "rational" mind gets involved that ethics are twisted beyond recognition (just like all your arguments). >> so the result of this argument could only result in increasingly complex >> rules to fit his model Again, absolutely not. You have no clue as to what my argument is yet you fantasize that you can predict it's results. BAH! >> For the record, I do have ethical beliefs like most other people Yet you persist in arguing otherwise. *Most* people would call that dishonest, deceitful, and time-wasting. >> The question is not how should we interact with machines, but how will we? No, it isn't. Study the results on ethical behavior when people are convinced that they don't have free will. = = = = = BAH! I should have quit answering you long ago. No more. - Original Message - From: Matt Mahoney To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 7:58 PM Subject: Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction) Just to clarify, I'm not really interested in whether machines feel pain. I am just trying to point out the contradictions in Mark's sweeping generalizations about the treatment of intelligent machines. But to be fair, such criticism is unwarented. Mark is arguing about ethics. Everyone has ethical beliefs. Ethical beliefs are emotional, not rational, although we often forget this. Ethical beliefs are also algorithmically complex, so the result of this argument could only result in increasingly complex rules to fit his model. It would be unfair to bore the rest of this list with such a discussion. For the record, I do have ethical beliefs like most other people, but they are irrelevant to the design of AGI. The question is not how should we interact with machines, but how will we? For example, when we develop the technology to simulate human minds in general, or to simulate specific humans who have died, common ethical models among humans will probably result in the granting of legal and property rights to these simulations. Since these simulations could reproduce, evolve, and acquire computing resources much faster than humans, the likely result will be human extinction, or viewed another way, our evolution into a non-DNA based life form. I won't offer an opinion on whether this is desirable or not, because my opinion would be based on my ethical beliefs. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- On Tue, 11/18/08, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction) To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Tuesday, November 18, 2008, 6:29 PM On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 6:26 PM, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: --- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no > volition. By what definitions does it feel pain? Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. There is no other requirement. You stated that machines can feel pain, and you stated that we don't get to decide which ones. So can you precisely define grounding, internal feedback and volition (as properties of Turing machines) Clearly, this can be done, and has largely been done already ... though cutting and pasting or summarizing the relevant literature in emails would not a productive use of time and prove that these criteria ar
Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. There is no other requirement. I made up no rules. I merely asked a question. You are the one who makes a definition like this and then says that it is up to people to decide whether other humans feel pain or not. That is hypocritical to an extreme. I also believe that your definition is a total crock that was developed for no purpose other than to support your BS. You stated that machines can feel pain, and you stated that we don't get to decide which ones. So can you precisely define grounding, internal feedback and volition (as properties of Turing machines) and prove that these criteria are valid? I stated that *SOME* future machines will be able to feel pain. I can define grounding, internal feedback and volition but feel no need to do so "as properties of a Turing machine" and decline to attempt to prove anything to you since you're so full of it that your mother couldn't prove to you that you were born. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 6:26 PM Subject: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction) --- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no volition. By what definitions does it feel pain? Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. There is no other requirement. You stated that machines can feel pain, and you stated that we don't get to decide which ones. So can you precisely define grounding, internal feedback and volition (as properties of Turing machines) and prove that these criteria are valid? And just to avoid confusion, my question has nothing to do with ethics. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
Aren't you the one who decided that autobliss feels pain? Or did you decide that it doesn't? Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no volition. By what definitions does it feel pain? On the other hand, by what definitions do people not feel pain (other than by some fictitious what-if scenario solely designed to split logical and ethical hairs with ABSOLUTELY NO PHYSICAL BASIS for even starting to believe it). Go back to happily playing with yourself in your nice little solipsistic world. You clearly aren't reliably attached to this one. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 5:05 PM Subject: Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction --- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. Wow! You are one sick puppy, dude. Personally, you have just hit my "Do not bother debating with" list. You can "decide" anything you like -- but that doesn't make it true. Aren't you the one who decided that autobliss feels pain? Or did you decide that it doesn't? -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
My problem is if qualia are atomic, with no differentiable details, why do some "feel" different than others -- shouldn't they all be separate but equal? "Red" is relatively neutral, while "searing hot" is not. Part of that is certainly lower brain function, below the level of consciousness, but that doesn't explain to me why it "feels" qualitatively different. If it was just something like increased activity (franticness) in response to "searing hot," then fine, that could just be something like adrenaline being pumped into the system, but there is a subjective feeling that goes beyond that. Maybe I missed it but why do you assume that because qualia are atomic that they have no differentiable details? Evolution is, quite correctly, going to give pain qualia higher priority and less ability to be shut down than red qualia. In a good representation system, that means that searing hot is going to be *very* and very tough to ignore. - Original Message - From: "Harry Chesley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 1:57 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness Richard Loosemore wrote: Harry Chesley wrote: Richard Loosemore wrote: I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be found at: http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf One other point: Although this is a possible explanation for our subjective experience of qualia like "red" or "soft," I don't see it explaining "pain" or "happy" quite so easily. You can hypothesize a sort of mechanism-level explanation of those by relegating them to the older or "lower" parts of the brain (i.e., they're atomic at the conscious level, but have more effects at the physiological level (like releasing chemicals into the system)), but that doesn't satisfactorily cover the subjective side for me. I do have a quick answer to that one. Remember that the core of the model is the *scope* of the analysis mechanism. If there is a sharp boundary (as well there might be), then this defines the point where the qualia kick in. Pain receptors are fairly easy: they are primitive signal lines. Emotions are, I believe, caused by clusters of lower brain structures, so the interface between "lower brain" and "foreground" is the place where the foreground sees a limit to the analysis mechanisms. More generally, the significance of the "foreground" is that it sets a boundary on how far the analysis mechanisms can reach. I am not sure why that would seem less satisfactory as an explanation of the subjectivity. It is a "raw feel", and that is the key idea, no? My problem is if qualia are atomic, with no differentiable details, why do some "feel" different than others -- shouldn't they all be separate but equal? "Red" is relatively neutral, while "searing hot" is not. Part of that is certainly lower brain function, below the level of consciousness, but that doesn't explain to me why it "feels" qualitatively different. If it was just something like increased activity (franticness) in response to "searing hot," then fine, that could just be something like adrenaline being pumped into the system, but there is a subjective feeling that goes beyond that. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. Wow! You are one sick puppy, dude. Personally, you have just hit my "Do not bother debating with" list. You can "decide" anything you like -- but that doesn't make it true. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 4:44 PM Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: First, it is not clear "people are free to decide what makes pain "real"," at least subjectively real. I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it squirms just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify one's ethics to feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and Nazi war crime trials. If we have anything close to the advances in brain scanning and brain science that Kurzweil predicts 1, we should come to understand the correlates of consciousness quite well No. I used examples like autobliss ( http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt ) and the roundworm c. elegans as examples of simple systems whose functions are completely understood, yet the question of whether such systems experience pain remains a philosophical question that cannot be answered by experiment. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
Autobliss responds to pain by changing its behavior to make it less likely. Please explain how this is different from human suffering. And don't tell me its because one is human and the other is a simple program, because... Why don't you resend the link to this new autobliss that "responds to pain by changing its behavior to make it less likely" and clearly explain why what you refer to as "pain" for autobliss isn't just some ungrounded label that has absolutely nothing to do with pain in any real sense of the word. As far as I have seen, your autobliss argument is akin to claiming that a rock feels pain and runs away to avoid pain when I kick it So either pain is real to both, or to neither, or there is some other criteria which you haven't specified, in which case I would like to know what that is. Absolutely. Pain is real for both. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 2:17 PM Subject: Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> No it won't, because people are free to decide what makes pain "real". What? You've got to be kidding . . . . What makes pain real is how the sufferer reacts to it -- not some abstract wishful thinking that we use to justify our decisions of how we wish to behave. Autobliss responds to pain by changing its behavior to make it less likely. Please explain how this is different from human suffering. And don't tell me its because one is human and the other is a simple program, because... >> Do you think that the addition of intelligent robots will make the boundary between human and non-human any sharper? No, I think that it will make it much fuzzier . . . . but since the boundary is just a strawman for lazy thinkers, removing it will actually make our ethics much sharper. So either pain is real to both, or to neither, or there is some other criteria which you haven't specified, in which case I would like to know what that is. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
An excellent question from Harry . . . . So when I don't remember anything about those towns, from a few minutes ago on my road trip, is it because (a) the attentional mechanism did not bother to lay down any episodic memory traces, so I cannot bring back the memories and analyze them, or (b) that I was actually not experiencing any qualia during that time when I was on autopilot? I believe that the answer is (a), and that IF I can stopped at any point during the observation period and thought about the experience I just had, I would be able to appreciate the last few seconds of subjective experience. So . . . . what if the *you* that you/we speak of is simply the attentional mechanism? What if qualia are simply the way that other brain processes appear to you/the attentional mechanism? Why would "you" be experiencing qualia when you were on autopilot? It's quite clear from experiments that human's don't "see" things in their visual field when they are concentrating on other things in their visual field (for example, when you are told to concentrate on counting something that someone is doing in the foreground while a man in an ape suit walks by in the background). Do you really have qualia from stuff that you don't sense (even though your sensory apparatus picked it up, it was clearly discarded at some level below the conscious/attentional level)? - Original Message - From: "Richard Loosemore" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 1:46 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness Harry Chesley wrote: On 11/14/2008 9:27 AM, Richard Loosemore wrote: I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be found at: http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf Good paper. A related question: How do you explain the fact that we sometimes are aware of qualia and sometimes not? You can perform the same actions paying attention or "on auto pilot." In one case, qualia "manifest," while in the other they do not. Why is that? I actually *really* like this question: I was trying to compose an answer to it while lying in bed this morning. This is what I started referring to (in a longer version of the paper) as a "Consciousness Holiday". In fact, if start unpacking the idea of what we mean by conscious experience, we start to realize that it inly really exists when we look at it. It is not even logically possible to think about consciousness - any form of it, including *memories* of the consciousness that I had a few minutes ago, when I was driving along the road and talking to my companion without bothering to look at several large towns that we drove through - without applying the analysis mechanism to the consciousness episode. So when I don't remember anything about those towns, from a few minutes ago on my road trip, is it because (a) the attentional mechanism did not bother to lay down any episodic memory traces, so I cannot bring back the memories and analyze them, or (b) that I was actually not experiencing any qualia during that time when I was on autopilot? I believe that the answer is (a), and that IF I can stopped at any point during the observation period and thought about the experience I just had, I would be able to appreciate the last few seconds of subjective experience. The real reply to your question goes much much deeper, and it is fascinating because we need to get a handle on creatures that probably do not do any reflective, language-based philosophical thinking (like guinea pigs and crocodiles). I want to say more, but will have to set it down in a longer form. Does this seem to make sense so far, though? Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
I have no doubt that if you did the experiments you describe, that the brains would be rearranged consistently with your predictions. But what does that say about consciousness? What are you asking about consciousness? - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 1:11 PM Subject: Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Okay, let me phrase it like this: I specifically say (or rather I should have done... this is another thing I need to make more explicit!) that the predictions are about making alterations at EXACTLY the boundary of the "analysis mechanisms". So, when we test the predictions, we must first understand the mechanics of human (or AGI) cognition well enough to be able to locate the exact scope of the analysis mechanisms. Then, we make the tests by changing things around just outside the reach of those mechanisms. Then we ask subjects (human or AGI) what happened to their subjective experiences. If the subjects are ourselves - which I strongly suggest must be the case - then we can ask ourselves what happened to our subjective experiences. My prediction is that if the swaps are made at that boundary, then things will be as I state. But if changes are made within the scope of the analysis mechanisms, then we will not see those changes in the qualia. So the theory could be falsified if changes in the qualia are NOT consistent with the theory, when changes are made at different points in the system. The theory is all about the analysis mechanisms being the culprit, so in that sense it is extremely falsifiable. Now, correct me if I am wrong, but is there anywhere else in the literature where you have you seen anyone make a prediction that the qualia will be changed by the alteration of a specific mechanism, but not by other, fairly similar alterations? Your predictions are not testable. How do you know if another person has experienced a change in qualia, or is simply saying that they do? If you do the experiment on yourself, how do you know if you really experience a change in qualia, or only believe that you do? There is a difference, you know. Belief is only a rearrangement of your neurons. I have no doubt that if you did the experiments you describe, that the brains would be rearranged consistently with your predictions. But what does that say about consciousness? -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
No it won't, because people are free to decide what makes pain "real". What? You've got to be kidding . . . . What makes pain real is how the sufferer reacts to it -- not some abstract wishful thinking that we use to justify our decisions of how we wish to behave. I'm sorry that it's taken me this long to realize exactly how morally bankrupt you are. What about autobliss? Autobliss is a toy that proves absolutely nothing. It learns to avoid negative reinforcement and it says "ouch". Not the version that you posted . . . . more hot air and hyperbole. Do you really think that if we build AGI in the likeness of a human mind, and stick it with a pin and it says "ouch", that we will finally have an answer to the question of whether machines have a consciousness? I think that we have the answer now but that people like you won't be convinced even if given overwhelming proof. 100 years ago there was little controversy over animal rights, euthanasia, abortion, or capital punishment. Because our standard of living wasn't high enough to support it . . . . Do you think that the addition of intelligent robots will make the boundary between human and non-human any sharper? No, I think that it will make it much fuzzier . . . . but since the boundary is just a strawman for lazy thinkers, removing it will actually make our ethics much sharper. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 12:44 PM Subject: Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: For example, in fifty years, I think it is quite possible we will be able to say with some confidence if certain machine intelligences we design are conscious nor not, and whether their pain is as real as the pain of another type of animal, such as chimpanzee, dog, bird, reptile, fly, or amoeba . No it won't, because people are free to decide what makes pain "real". The question is not resolved for simple systems which are completely understood, for example, the 302 neuron nervous system of C. elegans. If it can be trained by reinforcement learning, it that "real" pain? What about autobliss? It learns to avoid negative reinforcement and it says "ouch". Do you really think that if we build AGI in the likeness of a human mind, and stick it with a pin and it says "ouch", that we will finally have an answer to the question of whether machines have a consciousness? And there is no reason to believe the question will be easier in the future. 100 years ago there was little controversy over animal rights, euthanasia, abortion, or capital punishment. Do you think that the addition of intelligent robots will make the boundary between human and non-human any sharper? -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
An ethical model tells you what is good or bad. It does not make useful predictions. What determines whether something is good or bad? Merely the declaration of the model? That is precisely what makes *your* ethics ungrounded and useless . . . . Why should you be ethical? I would argue it is so that you will have the best probability of having the best life possible. This is an eminently testable hypothesis. Do what the model says is good, see what happens. Do what the model says is bad, see what happens. Yes, you clearly need to extrapolate but your model gives nothing except ivory tower pontification. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 12:20 PM Subject: Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > How do you propose testing whether a model is correct or not? By determining whether it is useful and predictive -- just like what we always do when we're practicing science (as opposed to spouting BS). An ethical model tells you what is good or bad. It does not make useful predictions. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
How do you propose grounding ethics? Ethics is building and maintaining healthy relationships for the betterment of all. Evolution has equipped us all with a good solid moral sense that frequently we don't/can't even override with our short-sighted selfish desires (that, more frequently than not, eventually end up screwing us over when we follow them). It's pretty easy to ground ethics as long as you realize that there are some cases that are just too close to call with the information that you possess at the time you need to make a decision. But then again, that's precisely what intelligence is -- making effective decisions under uncertainty. I have a complex model that says some things are right and others are wrong. That's nice -- but you've already pointed out that your model has numerous shortcomings such that you won't even stand behind it. Why do you keep bringing it up? It's like saying "I have an economic theory" when you clearly don't have the expertise to form a competent one. So does everyone else. These models don't agree. And lots of people have theories of creationism. Do you want to use that to argue that evolution is incorrect? How do you propose testing whether a model is correct or not? By determining whether it is useful and predictive -- just like what we always do when we're practicing science (as opposed to spouting BS). If everyone agreed that torturing people was wrong, then torture wouldn't exist. Wrong. People agree that things are wrong and then they go and do them anyways because they believe that it is beneficial for them. Why do you spout obviously untrue BS? How do you prove that Richard's definition of consciousness is correct and Colin's is wrong, or vice versa? All you can say about either definition is that some entities are conscious and others are not, according to whichever definition you accept. But so what? Wow! You really do practice useless sophistry. For definitions, correct simply means useful and predictive. I'll go with whichever definition most accurately reflects the world. Are you trying to propose that there is an absolute truth out there as far as definitions go? Because people nevertheless make this arbitrary distinction in order to make ethical decisions. So when lemmings go into the river you believe that they are correct and you should follow them? - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 9:35 AM Subject: Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness --- On Sun, 11/16/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I wrote: >> I think the reason that the hard question is interesting at all is that it would presumably be OK to torture a zombie because it doesn't actually experience pain, even though it would react exactly like a human being tortured. That's an ethical question. Ethics is a belief system that exists in our minds about what we should or should not do. There is no objective experiment you can do that will tell you whether any act, such as inflicting pain on a human, animal, or machine, is ethical or not. The only thing you can measure is belief, for example, by taking a poll. What is the point to ethics? The reason why you can't do objective experiments is because *YOU* don't have a grounded concept of ethics. The second that you ground your concepts in effects that can be seen in "the real world", there are numerous possible experiments. How do you propose grounding ethics? I have a complex model that says some things are right and others are wrong. So does everyone else. These models don't agree. How do you propose testing whether a model is correct or not? If everyone agreed that torturing people was wrong, then torture wouldn't exist. The same is true of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness is hard because the question is ungrounded. Define all of the arguments in terms of things that appear and matter in the real world and the question goes away. It's only because you invent ungrounded unprovable distinctions that the so-called hard problem appears. How do you prove that Richard's definition of consciousness is correct and Colin's is wrong, or vice versa? All you can say about either definition is that some entities are conscious and others are not, according to whichever definition you accept. But so what? Torturing a p-zombie is unethical because whether it feels pain or not is 100% irrelevant in "the real world". If it 100% acts as if it feels pain, then for all purposes that matter it does feel pain. Why invent this mystical situation where it doesn't feel pain yet acts as if it does? Because people nevertheless make this arbitrary distinction
Re: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
I think the reason that the hard question is interesting at all is that it would presumably be OK to torture a zombie because it doesn't actually experience pain, even though it would react exactly like a human being tortured. That's an ethical question. Ethics is a belief system that exists in our minds about what we should or should not do. There is no objective experiment you can do that will tell you whether any act, such as inflicting pain on a human, animal, or machine, is ethical or not. The only thing you can measure is belief, for example, by taking a poll. What is the point to ethics? The reason why you can't do objective experiments is because *YOU* don't have a grounded concept of ethics. The second that you ground your concepts in effects that can be seen in "the real world", there are numerous possible experiments. The same is true of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness is hard because the question is ungrounded. Define all of the arguments in terms of things that appear and matter in the real world and the question goes away. It's only because you invent ungrounded unprovable distinctions that the so-called hard problem appears. Torturing a p-zombie is unethical because whether it feels pain or not is 100% irrelevant in "the real world". If it 100% acts as if it feels pain, then for all purposes that matter it does feel pain. Why invent this mystical situation where it doesn't feel pain yet acts as if it does? Richard's paper attempts to solve the hard problem by grounding some of the silliness. It's the best possible effort short of just ignoring the silliness and going on to something else that is actually relevant to the real world. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2008 10:02 PM Subject: RE: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness --- On Sat, 11/15/08, Ed Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: With regard to the second notion, that conscious phenomena are not subject to scientific explanation, there is extensive evidence to the contrary. The prescient psychological writings of William James, and Dr. Alexander Luria’s famous studies of the effects of variously located bullet wounds on the minds of Russian soldiers after World War II, both illustrate that human consciousness can be scientifically studied. The effects of various drugs on consciousness have been scientifically studied. Richard's paper is only about the "hard" question of consciousness, that which distinguishes you from a P-zombie, not the easy question about mental states that distinguish between being awake or asleep. I think the reason that the hard question is interesting at all is that it would presumably be OK to torture a zombie because it doesn't actually experience pain, even though it would react exactly like a human being tortured. That's an ethical question. Ethics is a belief system that exists in our minds about what we should or should not do. There is no objective experiment you can do that will tell you whether any act, such as inflicting pain on a human, animal, or machine, is ethical or not. The only thing you can measure is belief, for example, by taking a poll. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Ethics of computer-based cognitive experimentation
This does not mean that certain practices are good or bad. If there was such a thing, then there would be no debate about war, abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, or animal rights, because these questions could be answered experimentally. Given a goal and a context, there is absolutely such a thing as good or bad. The problem with the examples that you cited is that you're attempting to generalize to a universal answer across contexts (because I would argue that there is a useful universal goal) which is nonsensical. All of this can be answered both logically and experimentally if you just ask the right question instead of engaging in vacuous hand-waving about how tough it all is after you've mindlessly expanded your problem beyond solution. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2008 5:58 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] Ethics of computer-based cognitive experimentation --- On Tue, 11/11/08, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Your 'belief' explanation is a cop-out because it does not address any of the issues that need to be addressed for something to count as a definition or an explanation of the facts that need to be explained. As I explained, animals that have no concept of death have nevertheless evolved to fear most of the things that can kill them. Humans have learned to associate these things with death, and invented the concept of consciousness as the large set of features which distinguishes living humans from dead humans. Thus, humans fear the loss or destruction of consciousness, which is equivalent to death. Consciousness, free will, qualia, and good and bad are universal human beliefs. We should not confuse them with truth by asking the wrong questions. Thus, Turing sidestepped the question of "can machines think?" by asking instead "can machines appear to think"? Since we can't (by definition) distinguish doing something from appearing to do something, it makes no sense for us to make this distinction. Likewise, asking if it is ethical to inflict simulated pain on machines is asking the wrong question. Evolution favors the survival of tribes that practice altruism toward other tribe members and teach these ethical values to their children. This does not mean that certain practices are good or bad. If there was such a thing, then there would be no debate about war, abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, or animal rights, because these questions could be answered experimentally. The question is not "how should machines be treated"? The question is "how will we treat machines"? My proposal is being written up now and will be available at the end of tomorrow. It does address all of the facts that need to be explained. I am looking forward to reading it. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Ethics of computer-based cognitive experimentation
An understanding of what consciousness actually is, for
starters.
It is a belief.
No it is not.
And that statement ("It is a belief") is a cop-out theory.
An "understanding" of what consciousness is requires a consensus definition
of what it is.
For most people, it seems to be an undifferentiated mess that includes all
of attentional components, intentional components, understanding components,
and, frequently, experiential components (i.e. qualia).
If you only buy into the first three and do it in a very concrete fashion,
consciousness (and ethics) isn't all that tough.
Or you can follow Alice and star debating the "real" meaning of the third
and whether or not the truly fourth exists in anyone except yourself.
Personally, if something has a will (intentionality/goals) that it can focus
effectively (attentional and understanding), I figure that you'd better
start treating it ethically for your own long-term self-interest.
Of course, that then begs the question of what ethics is . . . . but I think
that that is pretty easy to solve as well . . . .
---
agi
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Re: [agi] An AI with, quote, 'evil' cognition.
I've noticed lately that the paranoid fear of computers becoming intelligent and taking over the world has almost entirely disappeared from the common culture. Is this sarcasm, irony, or are you that unaware of current popular culture (i.e. Terminator Chronicles on TV, a new Terminator movie in the works, "I, Robot", etc.)? --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse
I think Hutter is being modest. Huh? So . . . . are you going to continue claiming that Occam's Razor is proved or are you going to stop (or are you going to point me to the proof)? - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 31, 2008 5:54 PM Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse I think Hutter is being modest. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- On Fri, 10/31/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Friday, October 31, 2008, 5:41 PM Let's try this . . . . In Universal Algorithmic Intelligence on page 20, Hutter uses Occam's razor in the definition of . Then, at the bottom of the page, he merely claims that "using as an estimate for ? may be a reasonable thing to do" That's not a proof of Occam's Razor. = = = = = = He also references Occam's Razor on page 33 where he says: "We believe the answer to be negative, which on the positive side would show the necessity of Occam's razor assumption, and the distinguishedness of AIXI." That's calling Occam's razor a necessary assumption and bases that upon a *belief*. = = = = = = Where do you believe that he proves Occam's razor? - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2008 10:46 PM Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse > --- On Wed, 10/29/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Hutter *defined* the measure of correctness using >> simplicity as a component. >> Of course, they're correlated when you do such a thing. >> That's not a proof, >> that's an assumption. > > Hutter defined the measure of correctness as the accumulated reward by the agent in AIXI. > > -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > --- > agi > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse
Let's try this . . . . In Universal Algorithmic Intelligence on page 20, Hutter uses Occam's razor in the definition of . Then, at the bottom of the page, he merely claims that "using as an estimate for ? may be a reasonable thing to do" That's not a proof of Occam's Razor. = = = = = = He also references Occam's Razor on page 33 where he says: "We believe the answer to be negative, which on the positive side would show the necessity of Occam's razor assumption, and the distinguishedness of AIXI." That's calling Occam's razor a necessary assumption and bases that upon a *belief*. = = = = = = Where do you believe that he proves Occam's razor? - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2008 10:46 PM Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse --- On Wed, 10/29/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Hutter *defined* the measure of correctness using simplicity as a component. Of course, they're correlated when you do such a thing. That's not a proof, that's an assumption. Hutter defined the measure of correctness as the accumulated reward by the agent in AIXI. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse
Hutter proved (3), although as a general principle it was already a well established practice in machine learning. Also, I agree with (4) but this is not the primary reason to prefer simplicity. Hutter *defined* the measure of correctness using simplicity as a component. Of course, they're correlated when you do such a thing. That's not a proof, that's an assumption. Regarding (4), I was deliberately ambiguous as to whether I meant implementation of "thinking" system or implementation of thought itself. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2008 11:11 AM Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse --- On Wed, 10/29/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > (1) Simplicity (in conclusions, hypothesis, theories, > etc.) is preferred. > (2) The preference to simplicity does not need a > reason or justification. > (3) Simplicity is preferred because it is correlated > with correctness. > I agree with (1), but not (2) and (3). I concur but would add that (4) Simplicity is preferred because it is correlated with correctness *of implementation* (or ease of implementation correctly :-) Occam said (1) but had no proof. Hutter proved (3), although as a general principle it was already a well established practice in machine learning. Also, I agree with (4) but this is not the primary reason to prefer simplicity. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> sorry, I should have been more precise. There is some K so that we never >> need integers with algorithmic information exceeding K. Ah . . . . but is K predictable? Or do we "need" all the integers above it as a safety margin? :-) (What is the meaning of "need"? :-) The inductive proof to show that all integers are necessary as a safety margin is pretty obvious . . . . - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2008 10:38 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues sorry, I should have been more precise. There is some K so that we never need integers with algorithmic information exceeding K. On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 10:32 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> but we never need arbitrarily large integers in any particular case, we only need integers going up to the size of the universe ;-) But measured in which units? For any given integer, I can come up with (invent :-) a unit of measurement that requires a larger/greater number than that integer to describe the size of the universe. ;-) Nice try, but . . . . :-p - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2008 9:48 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues but we never need arbitrarily large integers in any particular case, we only need integers going up to the size of the universe ;-) On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 7:24 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> However, it does seem clear that "the integers" (for instance) is not an entity with *scientific* meaning, if you accept my formalization of science in the blog entry I recently posted... Huh? Integers are a class (which I would argue is an entity) that is I would argue is well-defined and useful in science. What is meaning if not well-defined and useful? I need to go back to your paper because I didn't get that out of it at all. - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 6:41 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues "well-defined" is not well-defined in my view... However, it does seem clear that "the integers" (for instance) is not an entity with *scientific* meaning, if you accept my formalization of science in the blog entry I recently posted... On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 3:34 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Any formal system that contains some basic arithmetic apparatus equivalent to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms is doomed to be incomplete with respect to statements about numbers... that is what Godel originally showed... Oh. Ick! My bad phrasing. WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS should have been WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION OF NUMBERS since I was responding to "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be". Further, I should not have said "information about numbers" when I meant "definition of numbers". Argh! = = = = = = = = So Ben, how would you answer Abram's question "So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)?" Does the statement that a formal system is "incomplete with respect to statements about numbers" mean that "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be". = = = = = = = (Semi-)Retraction - maybe? (mostly for Abram). Ick again! I was assuming that we were talking about constructivism as in Constructivist epistemology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivist_epistemology). I have just had Constructivism (mathematics) pointed out to me (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism_(mathematics)) All I can say is "Ick!" I emphatically do not believe "When one assumes that an object does not exist and derives a contradiction from that assumption, one still has not found the object and therefore not proved its existence". = = = = = = = = I'm quitting and going home now to avoid digging myself a deeper hole :-) Mark PS. Ben, I read and, at first glance, liked and agreed with your argument as to why uncomputable entities are useless for science. I'm going to need to go back over it a few more times though.:-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com S
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
Here's another slant . . . . I really liked Pei's phrasing (which I consider to be the heart of "Constructivism: The Epistemology" :-) Generally speaking, I'm not "building some system that learns about the world", in the sense that there is a correct way to describe the world waiting to be discovered, which can be captured by some algorithm. Instead, learning to me is a non-algorithmic open-ended process by which the system summarizes its own experience, and uses it to predict the future. Classicists (to me) seem to frequently want one and only one truth that must be accurate, complete, and not only provable but for proofs of all of it's implications to exist (which is obviously thwarted by Tarski and Gödel). So . . . . is true that light is a particle? is it true that light is a wave? That's why Ben and I are stuck answering many of your questions with requests for clarification -- Which question -- pi or cat? Which subset of what *might* be considered mathematics/arithmetic? Why are you asking the question? Certain statements appear obviously untrue (read inconsistent with the empirical world or our assumed extensions of it) in the vast majority of cases/contexts but many others are just/simply context-dependent. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2008 10:08 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Ben, Thanks, that writeup did help me understand your viewpoint. However, I don't completely unserstand/agree with the argument (one of the two, not both!). My comments to that effect are posted on your blog. About the earlier question... (Mark) So Ben, how would you answer Abram's question "So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)?" (Ben) "well-defined" is not well-defined in my view... To rephrase. Do you think there is a truth of the matter concerning formally undecidable statements about numbers? --Abram On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 5:26 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Hi guys, I took a couple hours on a red-eye flight last night to write up in more detail my argument as to why uncomputable entities are useless for science: http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2008/10/are-uncomputable-entities-useless-for.html Of course, I had to assume a specific formal model of science which may be controversial. But at any rate, I think I did succeed in writing down my argument in a more clear way than I'd been able to do in scattershot emails. The only real AGI relevance here is some comments on Penrose's nasty AI theories, e.g. in the last paragraph and near the intro... -- Ben G On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:02 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Mark, That is thanks to Godel's incompleteness theorem. Any formal system that describes numbers is doomed to be incomplete, meaning there will be statements that can be constructed purely by reference to numbers (no red cats!) that the system will fail to prove either true or false. So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)? Hmm By the way, I might not be using the term "constructivist" in a way that all constructivists would agree with. I think "intuitionist" (a specific type of constructivist) would be a better term for the view I'm referring to. --Abram Demski On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 4:13 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> Numbers can be fully defined in the classical sense, but not in the > > constructivist sense. So, when you say "fully defined question", do > you mean a question for which all answers are stipulated by logical > necessity (classical), or logical deduction (constructivist)? > > How (or why) are numbers not fully defined in a constructionist sense? > > (I was about to ask you whether or not you had answered your own > question > until that caught my eye on the second or third read-through). > > --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog,
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> but we never need arbitrarily large integers in any particular case, we only >> need integers going up to the size of the universe ;-) But measured in which units? For any given integer, I can come up with (invent :-) a unit of measurement that requires a larger/greater number than that integer to describe the size of the universe. ;-) Nice try, but . . . . :-p - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2008 9:48 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues but we never need arbitrarily large integers in any particular case, we only need integers going up to the size of the universe ;-) On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 7:24 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> However, it does seem clear that "the integers" (for instance) is not an entity with *scientific* meaning, if you accept my formalization of science in the blog entry I recently posted... Huh? Integers are a class (which I would argue is an entity) that is I would argue is well-defined and useful in science. What is meaning if not well-defined and useful? I need to go back to your paper because I didn't get that out of it at all. - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 6:41 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues "well-defined" is not well-defined in my view... However, it does seem clear that "the integers" (for instance) is not an entity with *scientific* meaning, if you accept my formalization of science in the blog entry I recently posted... On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 3:34 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Any formal system that contains some basic arithmetic apparatus equivalent to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms is doomed to be incomplete with respect to statements about numbers... that is what Godel originally showed... Oh. Ick! My bad phrasing. WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS should have been WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION OF NUMBERS since I was responding to "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be". Further, I should not have said "information about numbers" when I meant "definition of numbers". Argh! = = = = = = = = So Ben, how would you answer Abram's question "So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)?" Does the statement that a formal system is "incomplete with respect to statements about numbers" mean that "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be". = = = = = = = (Semi-)Retraction - maybe? (mostly for Abram). Ick again! I was assuming that we were talking about constructivism as in Constructivist epistemology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivist_epistemology). I have just had Constructivism (mathematics) pointed out to me (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism_(mathematics)) All I can say is "Ick!" I emphatically do not believe "When one assumes that an object does not exist and derives a contradiction from that assumption, one still has not found the object and therefore not proved its existence". = = = = = = = = I'm quitting and going home now to avoid digging myself a deeper hole :-) Mark PS. Ben, I read and, at first glance, liked and agreed with your argument as to why uncomputable entities are useless for science. I'm going to need to go back over it a few more times though.:-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 5:55 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Any formal system that contains some basic arithmetic apparatus equivalent to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms is doomed to be incomplete with respect to statements about numbers... that is what Godel originally showed... On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:50 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: That is thanks to Godel's incompleteness theorem. Any formal system that describes numbers is doomed to be incomplete Yes, any formal system is doomed to be incomplete. Emphatically, NO! It is not true that "any formal system" is doomed to be incomplete WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS. It is entirely possible (nay, almost certain) that there is a larger system where the information about numbers is complete but that the other things that t
Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse
(1) Simplicity (in conclusions, hypothesis, theories, etc.) is preferred. (2) The preference to simplicity does not need a reason or justification. (3) Simplicity is preferred because it is correlated with correctness. I agree with (1), but not (2) and (3). I concur but would add that (4) Simplicity is preferred because it is correlated with correctness *of implementation* (or ease of implementation correctly :-) - Original Message - From: "Pei Wang" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 10:15 PM Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse Eric, I highly respect your work, though we clearly have different opinions on what intelligence is, as well as on how to achieve it. For example, though learning and generalization play central roles in my theory about intelligence, I don't think PAC learning (or the other learning algorithms proposed so far) provides a proper conceptual framework for the typical situation of this process. Generally speaking, I'm not "building some system that learns about the world", in the sense that there is a correct way to describe the world waiting to be discovered, which can be captured by some algorithm. Instead, learning to me is a non-algorithmic open-ended process by which the system summarizes its own experience, and uses it to predict the future. I fully understand that most people in this field probably consider this opinion wrong, though I haven't been convinced yet by the arguments I've seen so far. Instead of addressing all of the relevant issues, in this discussion I have a very limited goal. To rephrase what I said initially, I see that under the term "Occam's Razor", currently there are three different statements: (1) Simplicity (in conclusions, hypothesis, theories, etc.) is preferred. (2) The preference to simplicity does not need a reason or justification. (3) Simplicity is preferred because it is correlated with correctness. I agree with (1), but not (2) and (3). I know many people have different opinions, and I don't attempt to argue with them here --- these problems are too complicated to be settled by email exchanges. However, I do hope to convince people in this discussion that the three statements are not logically equivalent, and (2) and (3) are not implied by (1), so to use "Occam's Razor" to refer to all of them is not a good idea, because it is going to mix different issues. Therefore, I suggest people to use "Occam's Razor" in its original and basic sense, that is (1), and to use other terms to refer to (2) and (3). Otherwise, when people talk about "Occam's Razor", I just don't know what to say. Pei On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 8:09 PM, Eric Baum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Pei> Triggered by several recent discussions, I'd like to make the Pei> following position statement, though won't commit myself to long Pei> debate on it. ;-) Pei> Occam's Razor, in its original form, goes like "entities must not Pei> be multiplied beyond necessity", and it is often stated as "All Pei> other things being equal, the simplest solution is the best" or Pei> "when multiple competing theories are equal in other respects, Pei> the principle recommends selecting the theory that introduces the Pei> fewest assumptions and postulates the fewest entities" --- all Pei> from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam's_razor Pei> I fully agree with all of the above statements. Pei> However, to me, there are two common misunderstandings associated Pei> with it in the context of AGI and philosophy of science. Pei> (1) To take this statement as self-evident or a stand-alone Pei> postulate Pei> To me, it is derived or implied by the insufficiency of Pei> resources. If a system has sufficient resources, it has no good Pei> reason to prefer a simpler theory. With all due respect, this is mistaken. Occam's Razor, in some form, is the heart of Generalization, which is the essence (and G) of GI. For example, if you study concept learning from examples, say in the PAC learning context (related theorems hold in some other contexts as well), there are theorems to the effect that if you find a hypothesis from a simple enough class of a hypotheses it will with very high probability accurately classify new examples chosen from the same distribution, and conversely theorems that state (roughly speaking) that any method that chooses a hypothesis from too expressive a class of hypotheses will have a probability that can be bounded below by some reasonable number like 1/7, of having large error in its predictions on new examples-- in other words it is impossible to PAC learn without respecting Occam's Razor. For discussion of the above paragraphs, I'd refer you to Chapter 4 of What is Thought? (MIT Press, 2004). In other words, if you are building some system that learns about the world, it had better respect Occam's razor if you want whatever it learns to apply to new experience. (I use the term Occam's razor loosely; using hypotheses that are hig
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> However, it does seem clear that "the integers" (for instance) is not an >> entity with *scientific* meaning, if you accept my formalization of science >> in the blog entry I recently posted... Huh? Integers are a class (which I would argue is an entity) that is I would argue is well-defined and useful in science. What is meaning if not well-defined and useful? I need to go back to your paper because I didn't get that out of it at all. - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 6:41 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues "well-defined" is not well-defined in my view... However, it does seem clear that "the integers" (for instance) is not an entity with *scientific* meaning, if you accept my formalization of science in the blog entry I recently posted... On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 3:34 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Any formal system that contains some basic arithmetic apparatus equivalent to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms is doomed to be incomplete with respect to statements about numbers... that is what Godel originally showed... Oh. Ick! My bad phrasing. WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS should have been WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION OF NUMBERS since I was responding to "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be". Further, I should not have said "information about numbers" when I meant "definition of numbers". Argh! = = = = = = = = So Ben, how would you answer Abram's question "So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)?" Does the statement that a formal system is "incomplete with respect to statements about numbers" mean that "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be". = = = = = = = (Semi-)Retraction - maybe? (mostly for Abram). Ick again! I was assuming that we were talking about constructivism as in Constructivist epistemology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivist_epistemology). I have just had Constructivism (mathematics) pointed out to me (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism_(mathematics)) All I can say is "Ick!" I emphatically do not believe "When one assumes that an object does not exist and derives a contradiction from that assumption, one still has not found the object and therefore not proved its existence". = = = = = = = = I'm quitting and going home now to avoid digging myself a deeper hole :-) Mark PS. Ben, I read and, at first glance, liked and agreed with your argument as to why uncomputable entities are useless for science. I'm going to need to go back over it a few more times though.:-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 5:55 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Any formal system that contains some basic arithmetic apparatus equivalent to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms is doomed to be incomplete with respect to statements about numbers... that is what Godel originally showed... On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:50 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: That is thanks to Godel's incompleteness theorem. Any formal system that describes numbers is doomed to be incomplete Yes, any formal system is doomed to be incomplete. Emphatically, NO! It is not true that "any formal system" is doomed to be incomplete WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS. It is entirely possible (nay, almost certain) that there is a larger system where the information about numbers is complete but that the other things that the system describes are incomplete. So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)? Hmmm. From a larger reference framework, the former claimed-to-be-constructivist view isn't true/correct because it clearly *is* possible that numbers may be well-defined within a larger system (i.e. the "can never be" is incorrect). Does that mean that I'm a classicist or that you are mis-interpreting constructivism (because you're attributing a provably false statement to constructivists)? I'm leaning towards the latter currently. ;-) - Original Message - From: "Abr
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> Any formal system that contains some basic arithmetic apparatus equivalent >> to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms is doomed to be incomplete with >> respect to statements about numbers... that is what Godel originally >> showed... Oh. Ick! My bad phrasing. WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS should have been WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION OF NUMBERS since I was responding to "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be". Further, I should not have said "information about numbers" when I meant "definition of numbers". Argh! = = = = = = = = So Ben, how would you answer Abram's question "So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)?" Does the statement that a formal system is "incomplete with respect to statements about numbers" mean that "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be". = = = = = = = (Semi-)Retraction - maybe? (mostly for Abram). Ick again! I was assuming that we were talking about constructivism as in Constructivist epistemology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivist_epistemology). I have just had Constructivism (mathematics) pointed out to me (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism_(mathematics)) All I can say is "Ick!" I emphatically do not believe "When one assumes that an object does not exist and derives a contradiction from that assumption, one still has not found the object and therefore not proved its existence". = = = = = = = = I'm quitting and going home now to avoid digging myself a deeper hole :-) Mark PS. Ben, I read and, at first glance, liked and agreed with your argument as to why uncomputable entities are useless for science. I'm going to need to go back over it a few more times though.:-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 5:55 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Any formal system that contains some basic arithmetic apparatus equivalent to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms is doomed to be incomplete with respect to statements about numbers... that is what Godel originally showed... On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:50 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: That is thanks to Godel's incompleteness theorem. Any formal system that describes numbers is doomed to be incomplete Yes, any formal system is doomed to be incomplete. Emphatically, NO! It is not true that "any formal system" is doomed to be incomplete WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS. It is entirely possible (nay, almost certain) that there is a larger system where the information about numbers is complete but that the other things that the system describes are incomplete. So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)? Hmmm. From a larger reference framework, the former claimed-to-be-constructivist view isn't true/correct because it clearly *is* possible that numbers may be well-defined within a larger system (i.e. the "can never be" is incorrect). Does that mean that I'm a classicist or that you are mis-interpreting constructivism (because you're attributing a provably false statement to constructivists)? I'm leaning towards the latter currently. ;-) - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 5:02 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, That is thanks to Godel's incompleteness theorem. Any formal system that describes numbers is doomed to be incomplete, meaning there will be statements that can be constructed purely by reference to numbers (no red cats!) that the system will fail to prove either true or false. So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)? Hmm By the way, I might not be using the term "constructivist" in a way that all constructivists would agree with. I think "intuitionist" (a specific type of constructivist) would be a better term for the view I'm referring to. --Abram Demski On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 4:13
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
That is thanks to Godel's incompleteness theorem. Any formal system that describes numbers is doomed to be incomplete Yes, any formal system is doomed to be incomplete. Emphatically, NO! It is not true that "any formal system" is doomed to be incomplete WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS. It is entirely possible (nay, almost certain) that there is a larger system where the information about numbers is complete but that the other things that the system describes are incomplete. So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)? Hmmm. From a larger reference framework, the former claimed-to-be-constructivist view isn't true/correct because it clearly *is* possible that numbers may be well-defined within a larger system (i.e. the "can never be" is incorrect). Does that mean that I'm a classicist or that you are mis-interpreting constructivism (because you're attributing a provably false statement to constructivists)? I'm leaning towards the latter currently. ;-) - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 5:02 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, That is thanks to Godel's incompleteness theorem. Any formal system that describes numbers is doomed to be incomplete, meaning there will be statements that can be constructed purely by reference to numbers (no red cats!) that the system will fail to prove either true or false. So my question is, do you interpret this as meaning "Numbers are not well-defined and can never be" (constructivist), or do you interpret this as "It is impossible to pack all true information about numbers into an axiom system" (classical)? Hmm By the way, I might not be using the term "constructivist" in a way that all constructivists would agree with. I think "intuitionist" (a specific type of constructivist) would be a better term for the view I'm referring to. --Abram Demski On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 4:13 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Numbers can be fully defined in the classical sense, but not in the constructivist sense. So, when you say "fully defined question", do you mean a question for which all answers are stipulated by logical necessity (classical), or logical deduction (constructivist)? How (or why) are numbers not fully defined in a constructionist sense? (I was about to ask you whether or not you had answered your own question until that caught my eye on the second or third read-through). --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
Numbers can be fully defined in the classical sense, but not in the constructivist sense. So, when you say "fully defined question", do you mean a question for which all answers are stipulated by logical necessity (classical), or logical deduction (constructivist)? How (or why) are numbers not fully defined in a constructionist sense? (I was about to ask you whether or not you had answered your own question until that caught my eye on the second or third read-through). - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 3:47 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, Thank you, that clarifies somewhat. But, *my* answer to *your* question would seem to depend on what you mean when you say "fully defined". Under the classical interpretation, yes: the question is fully defined, so it is a "pi question". Under the constructivist interpretation, no: the question is not fully defined, so it is a "cat question". Numbers can be fully defined in the classical sense, but not in the constructivist sense. So, when you say "fully defined question", do you mean a question for which all answers are stipulated by logical necessity (classical), or logical deduction (constructivist)? --Abram Demski On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 3:28 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: In that case, shouldn't you agree with the classical perspective on Godelian incompleteness, since Godel's incompleteness theorem is about mathematical systems? It depends. Are you asking me a fully defined question within the current axioms of what you call mathematical systems (i.e. a pi question) or a cat question (which could *eventually* be defined by some massive extensions to your mathematical systems but which isn't currently defined in what you're calling mathematical systems)? Saying that Gödel is about mathematical systems is not saying that it's not about cat-including systems. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 12:06 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
In that case, shouldn't you agree with the classical perspective on Godelian incompleteness, since Godel's incompleteness theorem is about mathematical systems? It depends. Are you asking me a fully defined question within the current axioms of what you call mathematical systems (i.e. a pi question) or a cat question (which could *eventually* be defined by some massive extensions to your mathematical systems but which isn't currently defined in what you're calling mathematical systems)? Saying that Gödel is about mathematical systems is not saying that it's not about cat-including systems. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 12:06 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, Yes, I do keep dropping the context. This is because I am concerned only with mathematical knowledge at the moment. I should have been more specific. So, if I understand you right, you are saying that you take the classical view when it comes to mathematics. In that case, shouldn't you agree with the classical perspective on Godelian incompleteness, since Godel's incompleteness theorem is about mathematical systems? --Abram On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 10:20 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Hi, We keep going around and around because you keep dropping my distinction between two different cases . . . . The statement that "The cat is red" is undecidable by arithmetic because it can't even be defined in terms of the axioms of arithmetic (i.e. it has *meaning* outside of arithmetic). You need to construct additions/extensions to arithmetic to even start to deal with it. The statement that "Pi is a normal number" is decidable by arithmetic because each of the terms has meaning in arithmetic (so it certainly can be disproved by counter-example). It may not be deducible from the axioms but the meaning of the statement is contained within the axioms. The first example is what you call a constructivist view. The second example is what you call a classical view. Which one I take is eminently context-dependent and you keep dropping the context. If the meaning of the statement is contained within the system, it is decidable even if it is not deducible. If the meaning is beyond the system, then it is not decidable because you can't even express what you're deciding. Mark - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 9:32 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> The question that is puzzling, though, is: how can it be that these >> uncomputable, inexpressible entities are so bloody useful ;-) ... for >> instance in differential calculus ... Differential calculus doesn't use those individual entities . . . . >> Also, to say that uncomputable entities don't exist because they can't be >> finitely described, is basically just to *define* existence as "finite >> describability." I never said any such thing. I referenced a class of numbers that I defined as never physically manifesting and never being conceptually distinct and then asked if they existed. Clearly some portion of your liver that I can't define finitely still exists because it is physically manifest. >> So this is more a philosophical position on what "exists" means than an >> argument that could convince anyone. Yes, in that I basically defined my version of exists as physically manifest and/or described or invoked and then asked if that matched Abram's definition. No, in that you're now coming in with half (or less) of my definition and arguing that I'm unconvincing. :-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 11:44 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, The question that is puzzling, though, is: how can it be that these uncomputable, inexpressible entities are so bloody useful ;-) ... for instance in differential calculus ... Also, to say that uncomputable entities don't exist because they can't be finitely described, is basically just to *define* existence as "finite describability." So this is more a philosophical position on what "exists" means than an argument that could convince anyone. I have some more detailed thoughts on these issues that I'll write down sometime soon when I get the time. My position is fairly close to yours but I think that with these sorts of issues, the devil is in the details. ben On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 6:53 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Abram, I could agree with the statement that there are uncountably many *potential* numbers but I'm going to argue that any number that actually exists is eminently describable. Take the set of all numbers that are defined far enough after the decimal point that they never accurately describe anything manifest in the physical universe and are never described or invoked by any entity in the physical universe (specifically including a method for the generation of that number). Pi is clearly not in the set since a) it describes all sorts of ratios in the physical universe and b) there is a clear formula for generating successive approximations of it. My question is -- do these numbers really exist? And, if so, by what definition of exist since my definition is meant to rule out any form of manifestation whether physical or as a concept. Clearly these numbers have the potential to exist -- but it should be equally clear that they do not actually "exist" (i.e. they are never individuated out of the class). Any number which truly exists has at least one description either of the type of a) the number which is manifest as or b) the number which is generated by. Classicists seem to want to insist that all of these potential numbers actually do exist -- so they can make statements like "There are uncountably many real numbers that no one can ever describe in any manner." I ask of them (and you) -- Show me just one.:-) agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
Hi, We keep going around and around because you keep dropping my distinction between two different cases . . . . The statement that "The cat is red" is undecidable by arithmetic because it can't even be defined in terms of the axioms of arithmetic (i.e. it has *meaning* outside of arithmetic). You need to construct additions/extensions to arithmetic to even start to deal with it. The statement that "Pi is a normal number" is decidable by arithmetic because each of the terms has meaning in arithmetic (so it certainly can be disproved by counter-example). It may not be deducible from the axioms but the meaning of the statement is contained within the axioms. The first example is what you call a constructivist view. The second example is what you call a classical view. Which one I take is eminently context-dependent and you keep dropping the context. If the meaning of the statement is contained within the system, it is decidable even if it is not deducible. If the meaning is beyond the system, then it is not decidable because you can't even express what you're deciding. Mark - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 9:32 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, You assert that the extensions are judged on how well they reflect the world. The extension currently under discussion is one that allows us to prove the consistency of Arithmetic. So, it seems, you count that as something observable in the world-- no mathematician has ever proved a contradiction from the axioms of arithmetic, so they seem consistent. If this is indeed what you are saying, then you are in line with the classical view in this respect (and with my opinion). But, if this is your view, I don't see how you can maintain the constructivist assertion that Godelian statements are undecidable because they are undefined by the axioms. It seems that, instead, you are agreeing with the classical notion that there is in fact a truth of the matter concerning Godelian statements, we're just unable to deduce that truth from the axioms. --Abram On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 7:21 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: *That* is what I was asking about when I asked which side you fell on. Do you think such extensions are arbitrary, or do you think there is a fact of the matter? The extensions are clearly judged on whether or not they accurately reflect the empirical world *as currently known* -- so they aren't arbitrary in that sense. On the other hand, there may not be just a single set of extensions that accurately reflect the world so I guess that you could say that choosing among sets of extensions that both accurately reflect the world is (necessarily) an arbitrary process since there is no additional information to go on (though there are certainly heuristics like Occam's razor -- but they are more about getting a usable or "more likely" to hold up under future observations or more likely to be easily modified to match future observations theory . . . .). The world is real. Our explanations and theories are constructed. For any complete system, you can take the classical approach but incompleteness (of current information which then causes undecidability) ever forces you into constructivism to create an ever-expanding series of shells of stronger systems to explain those systems contained by them. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
Abram, I could agree with the statement that there are uncountably many *potential* numbers but I'm going to argue that any number that actually exists is eminently describable. Take the set of all numbers that are defined far enough after the decimal point that they never accurately describe anything manifest in the physical universe and are never described or invoked by any entity in the physical universe (specifically including a method for the generation of that number). Pi is clearly not in the set since a) it describes all sorts of ratios in the physical universe and b) there is a clear formula for generating successive approximations of it. My question is -- do these numbers really exist? And, if so, by what definition of exist since my definition is meant to rule out any form of manifestation whether physical or as a concept. Clearly these numbers have the potential to exist -- but it should be equally clear that they do not actually "exist" (i.e. they are never individuated out of the class). Any number which truly exists has at least one description either of the type of a) the number which is manifest as or b) the number which is generated by. Classicists seem to want to insist that all of these potential numbers actually do exist -- so they can make statements like "There are uncountably many real numbers that no one can ever describe in any manner." I ask of them (and you) -- Show me just one.:-) --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
*That* is what I was asking about when I asked which side you fell on. Do you think such extensions are arbitrary, or do you think there is a fact of the matter? The extensions are clearly judged on whether or not they accurately reflect the empirical world *as currently known* -- so they aren't arbitrary in that sense. On the other hand, there may not be just a single set of extensions that accurately reflect the world so I guess that you could say that choosing among sets of extensions that both accurately reflect the world is (necessarily) an arbitrary process since there is no additional information to go on (though there are certainly heuristics like Occam's razor -- but they are more about getting a usable or "more likely" to hold up under future observations or more likely to be easily modified to match future observations theory . . . .). The world is real. Our explanations and theories are constructed. For any complete system, you can take the classical approach but incompleteness (of current information which then causes undecidability) ever forces you into constructivism to create an ever-expanding series of shells of stronger systems to explain those systems contained by them. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, October 27, 2008 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, Sorry, I accidentally called you "Mike" in the previous email! Anyway, you said: "Also, you seem to be ascribing arbitrariness to constructivism which is emphatically not the case." I didn't mean to ascribe arbitrariness to constructivism-- what I meant was that constructivists would (as I understand it) ascribe arbitrariness to extensions of arithmetic. A constructivist sees the fact of the matter as undefined for undecidable statements, so adding axioms that make them decidable is necessarily an arbitrary process. The classical view, on the other hand, sees it as an attempt to increase the amount of true information contained in the axioms-- so there is a right and wrong. *That* is what I was asking about when I asked which side you fell on. Do you think such extensions are arbitrary, or do you think there is a fact of the matter? --Abram On Mon, Oct 27, 2008 at 3:33 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: The number of possible descriptions is countable I disagree. if we were able to randomly pick a real number between 1 and 0, it would be indescribable with probability 1. If we were able to randomly pick a real number between 1 and 0, it would be indescribable with probability *approaching* 1. Which side do you fall on? I still say that the sides are parts of the same coin. In other words, we're proving arithmetic consistent only by adding to its definition, which hardly counts. The classical viewpoint, of course, is that the stronger system is actually correct. Its additional axioms are not arbitrary. So, the proof reflects the truth. What is the stronger system other than an addition? And the viewpoint that the stronger system is actually correct -- is that an assumption? a truth? what? (And how do you know?) Also, you seem to be ascribing arbitrariness to constructivism which is emphatically not the case. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, October 27, 2008 2:53 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, The number of possible descriptions is countable, while the number of possible real numbers is uncountable. So, there are infinitely many more real numbers that are individually indescribable, then describable; so much so that if we were able to randomly pick a real number between 1 and 0, it would be indescribable with probability 1. I am getting this from Chaitin's book "Meta Math!". "I believe that arithmetic is a formal and complete system. I'm not a constructivist where formal and complete systems are concerned (since there is nothing more to construct)." Oh, I believe there is some confusion here because of my use of the word "arithmetic". I don't mean grade-school addition/subtraction/multiplication/division. What I mean is the axiomatic theory of numbers, which Godel showed to be incomplete if it is consistent. Godel also proved that one of the incompletenesses in arithmetic was that it could not prove its own consistency. Stronger logical systems can and have proven its consistency, but any particular logical system cannot prove its own consistency. It seems to me that the constructivist viewpoint says, "The so-called stronger system merely defines truth in more cases; but, we could just as easily take the opposite definitions." In other words, we're proving arithmetic consistent only by adding to its definition, which hardly counts. The classical viewpoint, of course, is
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
The number of possible descriptions is countable I disagree. if we were able to randomly pick a real number between 1 and 0, it would be indescribable with probability 1. If we were able to randomly pick a real number between 1 and 0, it would be indescribable with probability *approaching* 1. Which side do you fall on? I still say that the sides are parts of the same coin. In other words, we're proving arithmetic consistent only by adding to its definition, which hardly counts. The classical viewpoint, of course, is that the stronger system is actually correct. Its additional axioms are not arbitrary. So, the proof reflects the truth. What is the stronger system other than an addition? And the viewpoint that the stronger system is actually correct -- is that an assumption? a truth? what? (And how do you know?) Also, you seem to be ascribing arbitrariness to constructivism which is emphatically not the case. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, October 27, 2008 2:53 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, The number of possible descriptions is countable, while the number of possible real numbers is uncountable. So, there are infinitely many more real numbers that are individually indescribable, then describable; so much so that if we were able to randomly pick a real number between 1 and 0, it would be indescribable with probability 1. I am getting this from Chaitin's book "Meta Math!". "I believe that arithmetic is a formal and complete system. I'm not a constructivist where formal and complete systems are concerned (since there is nothing more to construct)." Oh, I believe there is some confusion here because of my use of the word "arithmetic". I don't mean grade-school addition/subtraction/multiplication/division. What I mean is the axiomatic theory of numbers, which Godel showed to be incomplete if it is consistent. Godel also proved that one of the incompletenesses in arithmetic was that it could not prove its own consistency. Stronger logical systems can and have proven its consistency, but any particular logical system cannot prove its own consistency. It seems to me that the constructivist viewpoint says, "The so-called stronger system merely defines truth in more cases; but, we could just as easily take the opposite definitions." In other words, we're proving arithmetic consistent only by adding to its definition, which hardly counts. The classical viewpoint, of course, is that the stronger system is actually correct. Its additional axioms are not arbitrary. So, the proof reflects the truth. Which side do you fall on? --Abram On Mon, Oct 27, 2008 at 1:03 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I, being of the classical persuasion, believe that arithmetic is either consistent or inconsistent. You, to the extent that you are a constructivist, should say that the matter is undecidable and therefore undefined. I believe that arithmetic is a formal and complete system. I'm not a constructivist where formal and complete systems are concerned (since there is nothing more to construct). On the other hand, if you want to try to get into the "meaning" of arithmetic . . . . = = = = = = = since the infinity of real numbers is larger than the infinity of possible names/descriptions. Huh? The constructivist in me points out that via compound constructions the infinity of possible names/descriptions is exponentially larger than the infinity of real numbers. You can reference *any* real number to the extent that you can define it. And yes, that is both a trick statement AND also the crux of the matter at the same time -- you can't name pi as a sequence of numbers but you certainly can define it by a description of what it is and what it does and any description can also be said to be a name (or a "true name" if you will :-). If the Gödelian truths are unreachable because they are undefined, then there is something *wrong* with the classical insistence that they are true or false but we just don't know which. They are undefined unless they are part of a formal and complete system. If they are part of a formal and complete system, then they are defined but may be indeterminable. There is nothing *wrong* with the classical insistence as long as it is applied to a limited domain (i.e. that of closed systems) which is what you are doing. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, October 27, 2008 12:29 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, An example of people who would argue with the meaningfulness of classical mathematics: there are some people who contest the concept of real numbers. The cite things like that the vast majority of real numbers cannot even be named or referenced in any
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
I, being of the classical persuasion, believe that arithmetic is either consistent or inconsistent. You, to the extent that you are a constructivist, should say that the matter is undecidable and therefore undefined. I believe that arithmetic is a formal and complete system. I'm not a constructivist where formal and complete systems are concerned (since there is nothing more to construct). On the other hand, if you want to try to get into the "meaning" of arithmetic . . . . = = = = = = = since the infinity of real numbers is larger than the infinity of possible names/descriptions. Huh? The constructivist in me points out that via compound constructions the infinity of possible names/descriptions is exponentially larger than the infinity of real numbers. You can reference *any* real number to the extent that you can define it. And yes, that is both a trick statement AND also the crux of the matter at the same time -- you can't name pi as a sequence of numbers but you certainly can define it by a description of what it is and what it does and any description can also be said to be a name (or a "true name" if you will :-). If the Gödelian truths are unreachable because they are undefined, then there is something *wrong* with the classical insistence that they are true or false but we just don't know which. They are undefined unless they are part of a formal and complete system. If they are part of a formal and complete system, then they are defined but may be indeterminable. There is nothing *wrong* with the classical insistence as long as it is applied to a limited domain (i.e. that of closed systems) which is what you are doing. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, October 27, 2008 12:29 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, An example of people who would argue with the meaningfulness of classical mathematics: there are some people who contest the concept of real numbers. The cite things like that the vast majority of real numbers cannot even be named or referenced in any way as individuals, since the infinity of real numbers is larger than the infinity of possible names/descriptions. "OK. But I'm not sure where this is going . . . . I agree with all that you're saying but can't see where/how it's supposed to address/go back into my domain model ;-)" Well, you already agreed that classical mathematics is meaningful. But, you also asserted that you are a constructivist where meaning is concerned, and therefore collapse Godel's and Tarski's theorems. I do not think you can consistently assert both! If the Godelian truths are unreachable because they are undefined, then there is something *wrong* with the classical insistence that they are true or false but we just don't know which. To take a concrete example: One of these truths that suffers from Godelian incompleteness is the consistency of arithmetic. I, being of the classical persuasion, believe that arithmetic is either consistent or inconsistent. You, to the extent that you are a constructivist, should say that the matter is undecidable and therefore undefined. --Abram On Mon, Oct 27, 2008 at 12:04 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Hi, It's interesting (and useful) that you didn't use the word meaning until your last paragraph. I'm not sure what you mean when you say that meaning is constructed, yet truth is absolute. Could you clarify? Hmmm. What if I say that meaning is your domain model and that truth is whether that domain model (or rather, a given preposition phrased in the semantics of the domain model) accurately represents the empirical world? = = = = = = = = I'm a classicalist in the sense that I think classical mathematics needs to be accounted for in a theory of meaning. Would *anyone* argue with this? Is there anyone (with a clue ;-) who isn't a classicist in this sense? I am also a classicalist in the sense that I think that the mathematically true is a proper subset of the mathematically provable, so that Gödelian truths are not undefined, just unprovable. OK. But that is talking about a formal (and complete -- though still infinite) system. I might be called a constructivist in the sense that I think there needs to be a tight, well-defined connection between syntax and semantics... Agreed but you seem to be overlooking the question of "Syntax and semantics of what?" The semantics of an AGI's internal logic needs to follow from its manipulation rules. Absolutely. But, partly because I accept the implementability of super-recursive algorithms, I think there is a chance to allow at least *some* classical mathematics into the picture. And, since I believe in the computational nature of the mind, I think that and classical mathematics that
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
Cool. Thank you for the assist. I think that math has the distinction that it is a closed formal system and that therefore people segregate it from the open mess that science has to deal with (though arguably the scientific method applies). Art seems to be that which deals with an even bigger open mess (since it always includes humans in the system ;-) and which is even less codified though it seems to frequently want to migrate to be science. = = = = = = Actually, in a way, it almost seems as if you want a spectrum running from MATH through SCIENCE continuing through ART to ??DISORDER?? - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Monday, October 27, 2008 12:07 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI I think you're converging on better and better wording ... however, I think somehow you do need to account for the differences between -- science on the one hand and -- math -- art etc. on the other hand, which also involve group learning and codification and communication of results, etc. ... but are different from science. I'm not sure the best way to formalize the difference in general, in a way that encompasses all the cases of science and is descriptive rather than normative ... but I haven't thought about it much and have other stuff to do... ben On Mon, Oct 27, 2008 at 8:40 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> You've now changed your statement to "science = optimal formalized group learning" ... I'm not sure if this is intended as descriptive or prescriptive Our previous e-mails about the sociology of science should have made it quite clear that its not descriptive ;-) Of course it was intended to be prescriptive. (Though, on second thought, if you removed the "optimal", maybe it could be descriptive -- what do you think?) And yes, I'm constantly changing the phrasing of my statement in an attempt to get my intended meaning across. This is going to loop back to my belief that the degree to which you are a general intelligence is the degree to which you're a(n optimal) scientist. So I haven't really changed my basic point at all (although admittedly, I've certainly refined it some -- which is my whole purpose in having this discussion :-) >> Also, learning could be learning about mathematics, which we don't normally think of as being science ... True. But I would argue that that is a shortcoming of our thinking. This is similar to your previous cosmology example. I'm including both under the umbrella of what you'd clearly be happier phrasing as "a system of thought intended to guide a group in learning about . . . ." What would you say if I defined science as "a system of thought intended to guide a group in learning about the empirical world" and a scientist simply as someone who employs science (i.e. that system of thought). I would also tend to think of "system of thought" as being interchangeable with "process" and/or "method". >> If you said "A scientific research programme is a system of thought intended to guide a group in learning about some aspect of the empirical world (as understood by this group) and formalizing their conclusions and methods" I wouldn't complain as much... So you like SCIENCE PROGRAM = SYSTEM FOR GROUP LEARNING + FORMALIZATION OF RESULTS but you don't like SCIENCE = LEARNING + TRANSMISSION (which is the individual case) OR SCIENCE = GROUP LEARNING (which probably should have + CODIFICATION added to assist the learning of future group members). - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Monday, October 27, 2008 10:55 AM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI No, it's really just that I've been spending too much time on this mailing list. I've got an AGI to build, as well as too many other responsibilities ;-p You've now changed your statement to "science = optimal formalized group learning" ... I'm not sure if this is intended as descriptive or prescriptive Obviously, science as practiced is not optimal and has many cultural properties besides those implied by being "group learning" Also, learning could be learning about mathematics, which we don't normally think of as being science ... If you said "A scientific research programme is a system of thought intended to guide a group in learning about some aspect of the empirical world (as understood by this group) and formalizing their conclusions and methods" I wouldn't complain as much... ben O
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
Hi, It's interesting (and useful) that you didn't use the word meaning until your last paragraph. I'm not sure what you mean when you say that meaning is constructed, yet truth is absolute. Could you clarify? Hmmm. What if I say that meaning is your domain model and that truth is whether that domain model (or rather, a given preposition phrased in the semantics of the domain model) accurately represents the empirical world? = = = = = = = = I'm a classicalist in the sense that I think classical mathematics needs to be accounted for in a theory of meaning. Would *anyone* argue with this? Is there anyone (with a clue ;-) who isn't a classicist in this sense? I am also a classicalist in the sense that I think that the mathematically true is a proper subset of the mathematically provable, so that Gödelian truths are not undefined, just unprovable. OK. But that is talking about a formal (and complete -- though still infinite) system. I might be called a constructivist in the sense that I think there needs to be a tight, well-defined connection between syntax and semantics... Agreed but you seem to be overlooking the question of "Syntax and semantics of what?" The semantics of an AGI's internal logic needs to follow from its manipulation rules. Absolutely. But, partly because I accept the implementability of super-recursive algorithms, I think there is a chance to allow at least *some* classical mathematics into the picture. And, since I believe in the computational nature of the mind, I think that and classical mathematics that *can't* fit into the picture is literally nonsense! So, since I don't feel like much of math is nonsense, I won't be satisfied until I've fit most of it in. OK. But I'm not sure where this is going . . . . I agree with all that you're saying but can't see where/how it's supposed to address/go back into my domain model ;-) - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, October 27, 2008 11:05 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, I'm a classicalist in the sense that I think classical mathematics needs to be accounted for in a theory of meaning. (Ben seems to think that a constructivist can do this by equating classical mathematics with axiom-systems-of-classical-mathematics, but I am unconvinced.) I am also a classicalist in the sense that I think that the mathematically true is a proper subset of the mathematically provable, so that Godelian truths are not undefined, just unprovable. I might be called a constructivist in the sense that I think there needs to be a tight, well-defined connection between syntax and semantics... The semantics of an AGI's internal logic needs to follow from its manipulation rules. But, partly because I accept the implementability of super-recursive algorithms, I think there is a chance to allow at least *some* classical mathematics into the picture. And, since I believe in the computational nature of the mind, I think that and classical mathematics that *can't* fit into the picture is literally nonsense! So, since I don't feel like much of math is nonsense, I won't be satisfied until I've fit most of it in. I'm not sure what you mean when you say that meaning is constructed, yet truth is absolute. Could you clarify? --Abram On Mon, Oct 27, 2008 at 10:27 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Hmmm. I think that some of our miscommunication might have been due to the fact that you seem to be talking about two things while I think that I'm talking about third . . . . I believe that *meaning* is constructed. I believe that truth is absolute (within a given context) and is a proper subset of meaning. I believe that proof is constructed and is a proper subset of truth (and therefore a proper subset of meaning as well). So, fundamentally, I *am* a constructivist as far as meaning is concerned and take Gödel's theorem to say that meaning is not completely defined or definable. Since I'm being a constructionist about meaning, it would seem that your statement that A constructivist would be justified in asserting the equivalence of Gödel's incompleteness theorem and Tarski's undefinability theorem, would mean that I was "correct" (or, at least, not wrong) in using Gödel's theorem but probably not as clear as I could have been if I'd used Tarski since an additional condition/assumption (constructivism) was required. So, interchanging the two theorems is fully justifiable in some intellectual circles! Just don't do it when non-constructivists are around :). I guess the question is . . . . How many people *aren't* constructivists when it comes to meaning? Actually, I get the impression that this mailing list is seriously split . . . . Where do
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
>> You've now changed your statement to "science = optimal formalized group >> learning" ... I'm not sure if this is intended as descriptive or prescriptive Our previous e-mails about the sociology of science should have made it quite clear that its not descriptive ;-) Of course it was intended to be prescriptive. (Though, on second thought, if you removed the "optimal", maybe it could be descriptive -- what do you think?) And yes, I'm constantly changing the phrasing of my statement in an attempt to get my intended meaning across. This is going to loop back to my belief that the degree to which you are a general intelligence is the degree to which you're a(n optimal) scientist. So I haven't really changed my basic point at all (although admittedly, I've certainly refined it some -- which is my whole purpose in having this discussion :-) >> Also, learning could be learning about mathematics, which we don't normally >> think of as being science ... True. But I would argue that that is a shortcoming of our thinking. This is similar to your previous cosmology example. I'm including both under the umbrella of what you'd clearly be happier phrasing as "a system of thought intended to guide a group in learning about . . . ." What would you say if I defined science as "a system of thought intended to guide a group in learning about the empirical world" and a scientist simply as someone who employs science (i.e. that system of thought). I would also tend to think of "system of thought" as being interchangeable with "process" and/or "method". >> If you said "A scientific research programme is a system of thought intended >> to guide a group in learning about some aspect of the empirical world (as >> understood by this group) and formalizing their conclusions and methods" I >> wouldn't complain as much... So you like SCIENCE PROGRAM = SYSTEM FOR GROUP LEARNING + FORMALIZATION OF RESULTS but you don't like SCIENCE = LEARNING + TRANSMISSION (which is the individual case) OR SCIENCE = GROUP LEARNING (which probably should have + CODIFICATION added to assist the learning of future group members). - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Monday, October 27, 2008 10:55 AM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI No, it's really just that I've been spending too much time on this mailing list. I've got an AGI to build, as well as too many other responsibilities ;-p You've now changed your statement to "science = optimal formalized group learning" ... I'm not sure if this is intended as descriptive or prescriptive Obviously, science as practiced is not optimal and has many cultural properties besides those implied by being "group learning" Also, learning could be learning about mathematics, which we don't normally think of as being science ... If you said "A scientific research programme is a system of thought intended to guide a group in learning about some aspect of the empirical world (as understood by this group) and formalizing their conclusions and methods" I wouldn't complain as much... ben On Mon, Oct 27, 2008 at 3:13 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Or, in other words, you can't even start to draw a clear distinction in a small number of words. That would argue that maybe those equalities aren't so silly after all. - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2008 7:38 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI Sorry, I'm just going to have to choose to be ignored on this topic ;-) ... I have too much AGI stuff to do to be spending so much time chatting on mailing lists ... and I've already published my thoughts on philosophy of science in The Hidden Pattern and online... ben g On Sun, Oct 26, 2008 at 9:51 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> These equations seem silly to me ... obviously science is much more than that, as Mark should know as he has studied philosophy of science extensively Mark is looking for well-defined distinctions. Claiming that science is "obviously" much more than is a non-sequitor. What does science include that learning does not? Please be specific or you *should* be ignored. The transmission or communication of results (or, as Matt puts it, language) is one necessary addition. Do you wish to provide another or do you just want to say that there must be one without being able to come up with one? Mark c
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
Hmmm. I think that some of our miscommunication might have been due to the fact that you seem to be talking about two things while I think that I'm talking about third . . . . I believe that *meaning* is constructed. I believe that truth is absolute (within a given context) and is a proper subset of meaning. I believe that proof is constructed and is a proper subset of truth (and therefore a proper subset of meaning as well). So, fundamentally, I *am* a constructivist as far as meaning is concerned and take Gödel's theorem to say that meaning is not completely defined or definable. Since I'm being a constructionist about meaning, it would seem that your statement that A constructivist would be justified in asserting the equivalence of Gödel's incompleteness theorem and Tarski's undefinability theorem, would mean that I was "correct" (or, at least, not wrong) in using Gödel's theorem but probably not as clear as I could have been if I'd used Tarski since an additional condition/assumption (constructivism) was required. So, interchanging the two theorems is fully justifiable in some intellectual circles! Just don't do it when non-constructivists are around :). I guess the question is . . . . How many people *aren't* constructivists when it comes to meaning? Actually, I get the impression that this mailing list is seriously split . . . . Where do you fall on the constructivism of meaning? - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2008 10:00 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, After some thought... A constructivist would be justified in asserting the equivalence of Godel's incompleteness theorem and Tarski's undefinability theorem, based on the idea that truth is constructable truth. Where classical logicians take Godels theorem to prove that provability cannot equal truth, constructivists can take it to show that provability is not completely defined or definable (and neither is truth, since they are the same). So, interchanging the two theorems is fully justifiable in some intellectual circles! Just don't do it when non-constructivists are around :). --Abram On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 6:18 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: OK. A good explanation and I stand corrected and more educated. Thank you. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 6:06 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, Yes. I wouldn't normally be so picky, but Godel's theorem *really* gets misused. Using Godel's theorem to say made it sound (to me) as if you have a very fundamental confusion. You were using a theorem about the incompleteness of proof to talk about the incompleteness of truth, so it sounded like you thought "logically true" and "logically provable" were equivalent, which is of course the *opposite* of what Godel proved. Intuitively, Godel's theorem says "If a logic can talk about number theory, it can't have a complete system of proof." Tarski's says, "If a logic can talk about number theory, it can't talk about its own notion of truth." Both theorems rely on the Diagonal Lemma, which states "If a logic can talk about number theory, it can talk about its own proof method." So, Tarski's theorem immediately implies Godel's theorem: if a logic can talk about its own notion of proof, but not its own notion of truth, then the two can't be equivalent! So, since Godel's theorem follows so closely from Tarski's (even though Tarski's came later), it is better to invoke Tarski's by default if you aren't sure which one applies. --Abram On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 4:22 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: So you're saying that if I switch to using Tarski's theory (which I believe is fundamentally just a very slightly different aspect of the same critical concept -- but unfortunately much less well-known and therefore less powerful as an explanation) that you'll agree with me? That seems akin to picayune arguments over phrasing when trying to simply reach general broad agreement . . . . (or am I misinterpreting?) - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 5:29 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: htt
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
Or, in other words, you can't even start to draw a clear distinction in a small number of words. That would argue that maybe those equalities aren't so silly after all. - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2008 7:38 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI Sorry, I'm just going to have to choose to be ignored on this topic ;-) ... I have too much AGI stuff to do to be spending so much time chatting on mailing lists ... and I've already published my thoughts on philosophy of science in The Hidden Pattern and online... ben g On Sun, Oct 26, 2008 at 9:51 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> These equations seem silly to me ... obviously science is much more than that, as Mark should know as he has studied philosophy of science extensively Mark is looking for well-defined distinctions. Claiming that science is "obviously" much more than is a non-sequitor. What does science include that learning does not? Please be specific or you *should* be ignored. The transmission or communication of results (or, as Matt puts it, language) is one necessary addition. Do you wish to provide another or do you just want to say that there must be one without being able to come up with one? Mark can still think of at least one other thing (which may be multiples depending upon how you look at it) but isn't comfortable that he has an optimal view of it so he's looking for other viewpoints/phrasings. >> Cognitively, the precursor for science seems to be Piaget's formal stage of cognitive development. If you have a community of minds that have reached the formal stage, then potentially they can develop the mental and social patterns corresponding to the practice of science. So how is science different from optimal formalized group learning? What's the distinction? - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2008 11:14 AM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI These equations seem silly to me ... obviously science is much more than that, as Mark should know as he has studied philosophy of science extensively Cognitively, the precursor for science seems to be Piaget's formal stage of cognitive development. If you have a community of minds that have reached the formal stage, then potentially they can develop the mental and social patterns corresponding to the practice of science. -- Ben On Sun, Oct 26, 2008 at 8:08 AM, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: --- On Sat, 10/25/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Would it then be accurate to saySCIENCE = LEARNING + > TRANSMISSION? > > Or, how about,SCIENCE = GROUP LEARNING? Science = learning + language. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein -- agi | Archives | Modify Y
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
>> These equations seem silly to me ... obviously science is much more than >> that, as Mark should know as he has studied philosophy of science extensively Mark is looking for well-defined distinctions. Claiming that science is "obviously" much more than is a non-sequitor. What does science include that learning does not? Please be specific or you *should* be ignored. The transmission or communication of results (or, as Matt puts it, language) is one necessary addition. Do you wish to provide another or do you just want to say that there must be one without being able to come up with one? Mark can still think of at least one other thing (which may be multiples depending upon how you look at it) but isn't comfortable that he has an optimal view of it so he's looking for other viewpoints/phrasings. >> Cognitively, the precursor for science seems to be Piaget's formal stage of >> cognitive development. If you have a community of minds that have reached >> the formal stage, then potentially they can develop the mental and social >> patterns corresponding to the practice of science. So how is science different from optimal formalized group learning? What's the distinction? - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2008 11:14 AM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI These equations seem silly to me ... obviously science is much more than that, as Mark should know as he has studied philosophy of science extensively Cognitively, the precursor for science seems to be Piaget's formal stage of cognitive development. If you have a community of minds that have reached the formal stage, then potentially they can develop the mental and social patterns corresponding to the practice of science. -- Ben On Sun, Oct 26, 2008 at 8:08 AM, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: --- On Sat, 10/25/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Would it then be accurate to saySCIENCE = LEARNING + > TRANSMISSION? > > Or, how about,SCIENCE = GROUP LEARNING? Science = learning + language. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: AIXI (was Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI)
>> -- truly general AI, even assuming the universe is computable, is impossible >> for any finite system Excellent. Unfortunately, I personally missed (or have forgotten) how AIXI shows or proves this (as opposed to invoking some other form of incompleteness) unless it is merely because of the assumption that the universe itself is assumed to be infinite (which I do understand but which then makes the argument rather pedestrian and less interesting). >> The computability of the universe is something that can't really be proved, >> but I argue that it's an implicit assumption underlying the whole scientific >> method. It seems to me (and I certainly can be wrong about this) that computability is frequently improperly conflated with consistency (though may be you want to argue that such a conflation isn't improper) and that the (actually explicit) assumption underlying the whole scientific method is that the same causes produces the same results. Comments? - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 7:48 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: AIXI (was Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI) AIXI shows a couple interesting things... -- truly general AI, even assuming the universe is computable, is impossible for any finite system -- given any finite level L of general intelligence that one desires, there are some finite R, M so that you can create a computer with less than R processing speed and M memory capacity, so that the computer can achieve level L of general intelligence This doesn't tell you *anything* about how to make AGI in practice. It does tell you that, in principle, creating AGI is a matter of *computational efficiency* ... assuming the universe is computable. The computability of the universe is something that can't really be proved, but I argue that it's an implicit assumption underlying the whole scientific method. If the universe can't be usefully modelable as computable then the whole methodology of gathering finite datasets of finite-precision data is fundamentally limited in what it can tell us about the universe ... which would really suck... -- Ben G -- Ben G On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 7:21 PM, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: --- On Sat, 10/25/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Ummm. It seems like you were/are saying then that because > AIXI makes an > assumption limiting it's own applicability/proof (that > it requires that the > environment be computable) and because AIXI can make some > valid conclusions, > that that "suggests" that AIXI's limiting > assumptions are true of the > universe. That simply doesn't work, dude, unless you > have a very loose > inductive-type definition of "suggests" that is > more suited for inference > control than anything like a logical proof. I am arguing by induction, not deduction: If the universe is computable, then Occam's Razor holds. Occam's Razor holds. Therefore the universe is computable. Of course, I have proved no such thing. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: AIXI (was Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI)
I am arguing by induction, not deduction: If the universe is computable, then Occam's Razor holds. Occam's Razor holds. Therefore the universe is computable. Of course, I have proved no such thing. Yep. That's a better summation of what I was trying to say . . . . Except that I'd like to bring back my point that induction really is only suited for inference control and determining what should be evaluated/examined/proved . . . . NOT actually doing the evaluation/proving *with*. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 7:21 PM Subject: AIXI (was Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI) --- On Sat, 10/25/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Ummm. It seems like you were/are saying then that because AIXI makes an assumption limiting it's own applicability/proof (that it requires that the environment be computable) and because AIXI can make some valid conclusions, that that "suggests" that AIXI's limiting assumptions are true of the universe. That simply doesn't work, dude, unless you have a very loose inductive-type definition of "suggests" that is more suited for inference control than anything like a logical proof. I am arguing by induction, not deduction: If the universe is computable, then Occam's Razor holds. Occam's Razor holds. Therefore the universe is computable. Of course, I have proved no such thing. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] On programming languages
>> People seem to debate programming languages and OS's endlessly, and this >> list is no exception. Yes. And like all other debates there are good points and bad points.:-) >> To make progress on AGI, you just gotta make *some* reasonable choice and >> start building Strongly agree. Otherwise it's just empty theorizing. But sometimes it's worth gathering up your learning from what you have and making a fresh start (a la Eric Raymond). You may not be at that point yet . . . . you may be past that point since a lot of the stuff that OpenCog is depending upon seems to have been lost in the mists of time (to judge by some of the e-mails among team members). The OpenCog documents are a great start (though it's too bad that some important stuff seems to have been lost before they were created and now remains to be rediscovered -- though that's pretty typical of *any* large long-term project) >> there's no choice that's going to please everyone, since this stuff is so >> contentious... On the other hand, there are projects where most of the people are pleased with them (or, at least, not displeased) and horrible projects. You seem to be pretty much on the correct side with many of your naysayers more of the variety keeping you honest than really actively disagreeing with you. Actually I don't debate language and OS endlessly -- indeed, I generally don't argue them at all if you truly understand what I'm arguing (i.e. platform which is distinct from either though it may be dependent upon or include both -- to it's detriment) -- but I do bring them up periodically (or rather respond to others brining them up) just to keep people abreast of changing circumstances (admittedly, as I see/evaluate them). I'd debate your coding on Windows comment (since I don't code on Windows even though Windows is the operating system that my computer is running) but I think we've reached the point where continuing to agree to disagree pending further developments is best. :-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 6:38 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages Strong agreement with what you say but then effective rejection as a valid point because language issues frequently are a total barrier to entry for people who might have been able to do the algorithms and structures and cognitive architecture. I'll even go so far as to use myself as an example. I can easily do C++ (since I've done so in the past) but all the baggage around it make me consider it not worth my while. I certainly won't hesitate to use what is learned on that architecture but I'll be totally shocked if you aren't massively leap-frogged because of the inherent shortcomings of what you're trying to work with. Somewhat similarly, I've done coding on Windows before, but I dislike the operating system quite a lot, so in general I try to avoid any projects where I have to use it. However, if I found some AGI project that I thought were more promising than OpenCog/Novamente on the level of algorithms, philosophy-of-mind and structures ... and, egads, this project ran only on Windows ... I would certainly not hesitate to join that project, even though my feeling is that any serious large-scale software project based exclusively on Windows is going to be seriously impaired by its OS choice... In short, I just don't think these issues are **all that** important. They're important, but having the right AGI design is far, far more so. People seem to debate programming languages and OS's endlessly, and this list is no exception. There are smart people on multiple sides of these debates. To make progress on AGI, you just gotta make *some* reasonable choice and start building ... there's no choice that's going to please everyone, since this stuff is so contentious... -- Ben G -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
Ah. An excellent distinction . . . .Thank you. Very helpful. Would it then be accurate to saySCIENCE = LEARNING + TRANSMISSION? Or, how about,SCIENCE = GROUP LEARNING? - Original Message - From: "Russell Wallace" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 6:27 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 11:14 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Anyone else want to take up the issue of whether there is a distinction between competent scientific research and competent learning (whether or not both are being done by a machine) and, if so, what that distinction is? Science is about public knowledge. I can learn from personal experience, but it's only science if I publish my results in such a way that other people can repeat them. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
OK. A good explanation and I stand corrected and more educated. Thank you. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 6:06 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, Yes. I wouldn't normally be so picky, but Godel's theorem *really* gets misused. Using Godel's theorem to say made it sound (to me) as if you have a very fundamental confusion. You were using a theorem about the incompleteness of proof to talk about the incompleteness of truth, so it sounded like you thought "logically true" and "logically provable" were equivalent, which is of course the *opposite* of what Godel proved. Intuitively, Godel's theorem says "If a logic can talk about number theory, it can't have a complete system of proof." Tarski's says, "If a logic can talk about number theory, it can't talk about its own notion of truth." Both theorems rely on the Diagonal Lemma, which states "If a logic can talk about number theory, it can talk about its own proof method." So, Tarski's theorem immediately implies Godel's theorem: if a logic can talk about its own notion of proof, but not its own notion of truth, then the two can't be equivalent! So, since Godel's theorem follows so closely from Tarski's (even though Tarski's came later), it is better to invoke Tarski's by default if you aren't sure which one applies. --Abram On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 4:22 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: So you're saying that if I switch to using Tarski's theory (which I believe is fundamentally just a very slightly different aspect of the same critical concept -- but unfortunately much less well-known and therefore less powerful as an explanation) that you'll agree with me? That seems akin to picayune arguments over phrasing when trying to simply reach general broad agreement . . . . (or am I misinterpreting?) - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 5:29 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
So where is the difference There is no difference. Cool. That's one vote. Anyone else want to take up the issue of whether there is a distinction between competent scientific research and competent learning (whether or not both are being done by a machine) and, if so, what that distinction is? Or how about if I'm bold and follow up with the question of whether there is a distinction between a machine (or other entity) that is capable of competent scientific research/competent generic learning and a general intelligence? That's an interesting definition of general intelligence that could have an awful lot of power if it's acceptable . . . . . - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 5:59 PM Subject: Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI --- On Sat, 10/25/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Scientists choose experiments to maximize information > gain. There is no > reason that machine learning algorithms couldn't > do this, but often they don't. Heh. I would say that scientists attempt to do this and machine learning algorithms should do it. So where is the difference other than in the quality of implementation (i.e. "other than who performs it, of course"). There is no difference. I originally distinguished machine learning because all of the usual algorithms depend on minimizing the complexity of the hypothesis space. For example, we use neural networks with the minimum number of connections to learn the training data because we want to avoid over fitting. Likewise, decision trees and rule learning algorithms like RIPPER try to find the minimum number of rules that fit the data. I knew about clustering algorithms, but not why they worked. I learned all these different strategies for various algorithms in a machine learning course I took, but was unaware of the general principle and the reasoning behind it until I learned about AIXI. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
Ummm. It seems like you were/are saying then that because AIXI makes an assumption limiting it's own applicability/proof (that it requires that the environment be computable) and because AIXI can make some valid conclusions, that that "suggests" that AIXI's limiting assumptions are true of the universe. That simply doesn't work, dude, unless you have a very loose inductive-type definition of "suggests" that is more suited for inference control than anything like a logical proof. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 5:51 PM Subject: Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI --- On Sat, 10/25/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > The fact that Occam's Razor works in the real world > suggests that the > physics of the universe is computable. Otherwise AIXI > would not apply. Hmmm. I don't get this. Occam's razor simply says go with the simplest explanation until forced to expand it and then only expand it as necessary. How does this suggest that the physics of the universe is computable? Or conversely, why and how would Occam's razor *not* work in a universe where the physics aren't computable. The proof of AIXI assumes the environment is computable by a Turing machine (possibly with a random element). I realize this is not a proof that the universe is computable. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] On programming languages
Surely a coherent reply to this assertion would involve the phrases "superstitious", "ignorant" and "FUD" So why don't you try to generate one to prove your guess? Are you claiming that I'm superstitious and ignorant? That I'm fearful and uncertain or trying to generate fearfulness and uncertainty? Or are you just trying to win a perceived argument by innuendo since you don't have any competent response that you can defend? This is an example of the worst of this mailing list. Hey Ben, can you at least speak out against garbage like this? - Original Message - From: "Eric Burton" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 5:41 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages I'll even go so far as to use myself as an example. I can easily do C++ (since I've done so in the past) but all the baggage around it make me consider it not worth my while. I certainly won't hesitate to use what is learned on that architecture but I'll be totally shocked if you aren't massively leap-frogged because of the inherent shortcomings of what you're trying to work with. Surely a coherent reply to this assertion would involve the phrases "superstitious", "ignorant" and "FUD" Eric B --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
Which "faulty" reasoning step are you talking about? You said that there is an alternative to ad hoc in optimal approximation. My request is that you show that the optimal approximation isn't going to just be determined in an ad hoc fashion. Your absurd strawman example of *using* a bad solution instead of a good one doesn't address Matt's point of how you *arrive at* a solution at all. Are you sure that you know the meaning of the term "ad hoc"? - Original Message - From: "Vladimir Nesov" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 5:32 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI On Sun, Oct 26, 2008 at 1:19 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: You are now apparently declining to provide an algorithmic solution without arguing that not doing so is a disproof of your statement. Or, in other words, you are declining to prove that Matt is incorrect in saying that we have no choice -- You're just simply repeating your insistence that your now-unsupported point is valid. This is tedious. I didn't try to prove that the conclusion is wrong, I pointed to a faulty reasoning step by showing that in general that reasoning step is wrong. If you need to find the best solution to x*3=7, but you can only use integers, the perfect solution is impossible, but it doesn't mean that we are justified in using x=3 that looks good enough, as x=2 is the best solution given limitations. -- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/ --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
Vladimir said> > I pointed out only that it doesn't follow from AIXI that ad-hoc is justified. Matt used a chain of logic that went as follows: AIXI says that a perfect solution is not computable. However, a very general principle of both scientific research and machine learning is to favor simple hypotheses over complex ones. AIXI justifies these > practices in a formal way. It also says we can stop looking for a universal solution, which I think is important. It justifies our current ad-hoc approach to problem solving -- we have no choice. Or, in summary, ad hoc is justified because we have no choice. You claimed that we had a choice *BECAUSE* optimal approximation is an alternative to ad hoc. I then asked So what is an optimal approximation under uncertainty? How do you know when you've gotten there? and said: If you don't believe in ad-hoc then you must have an algorithmic solution . You are now apparently declining to provide an algorithmic solution without arguing that not doing so is a disproof of your statement. Or, in other words, you are declining to prove that Matt is incorrect in saying that we have no choice -- You're just simply repeating your insistence that your now-unsupported point is valid. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
Scientists choose experiments to maximize information gain. There is no reason that machine learning algorithms couldn't do this, but often they don't. Heh. I would say that scientists attempt to do this and machine learning algorithms should do it. So where is the difference other than in the quality of implementation (i.e. "other than who performs it, of course"). - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 1:41 PM Subject: Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI --- On Sat, 10/25/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > AIXI says that a perfect solution is not computable. However, a very > general principle of both scientific research and machine learning is > to > favor simple hypotheses over complex ones. AIXI justifies these > practices > in a formal way. It also says we can stop looking for a universal > solution, which I think is important. It justifies our current ad-hoc > approach to problem solving -- we have no choice. Excellent. Thank you. Another good point to be pinned (since a number of people frequently go around and around on it). Is there anything else that it tells us that is useful and not a distraction? The fact that Occam's Razor works in the real world suggests that the physics of the universe is computable. Otherwise AIXI would not apply. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Also, since you invoked the two in the same sentence as if they were different things . . . . What is the distinction between scientific research and machine learning (other than who performs it, of course). Or, re-phrased, what is the difference between a machine doing scientific research and a machine that is simply learning? Scientists choose experiments to maximize information gain. There is no reason that machine learning algorithms couldn't do this, but often they don't. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
The fact that Occam's Razor works in the real world suggests that the physics of the universe is computable. Otherwise AIXI would not apply. Hmmm. I don't get this. Occam's razor simply says go with the simplest explanation until forced to expand it and then only expand it as necessary. How does this suggest that the physics of the universe is computable? Or conversely, why and how would Occam's razor *not* work in a universe where the physics aren't computable. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2008 1:41 PM Subject: Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI --- On Sat, 10/25/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > AIXI says that a perfect solution is not computable. However, a very > general principle of both scientific research and machine learning is > to > favor simple hypotheses over complex ones. AIXI justifies these > practices > in a formal way. It also says we can stop looking for a universal > solution, which I think is important. It justifies our current ad-hoc > approach to problem solving -- we have no choice. Excellent. Thank you. Another good point to be pinned (since a number of people frequently go around and around on it). Is there anything else that it tells us that is useful and not a distraction? The fact that Occam's Razor works in the real world suggests that the physics of the universe is computable. Otherwise AIXI would not apply. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Also, since you invoked the two in the same sentence as if they were different things . . . . What is the distinction between scientific research and machine learning (other than who performs it, of course). Or, re-phrased, what is the difference between a machine doing scientific research and a machine that is simply learning? Scientists choose experiments to maximize information gain. There is no reason that machine learning algorithms couldn't do this, but often they don't. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] On programming languages
>> Anyway language issues are just not the main problem in creating AGI. >> Getting the algorithms and structures and cognitive architecture right are >> dramatically more important. Strong agreement with what you say but then effective rejection as a valid point because language issues frequently are a total barrier to entry for people who might have been able to do the algorithms and structures and cognitive architecture. I'll even go so far as to use myself as an example. I can easily do C++ (since I've done so in the past) but all the baggage around it make me consider it not worth my while. I certainly won't hesitate to use what is learned on that architecture but I'll be totally shocked if you aren't massively leap-frogged because of the inherent shortcomings of what you're trying to work with. - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 7:40 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages Mark, In OpenCog we use all sorts of libraries for all sorts of things, of course. Like everyone else we try to avoid reinventing the wheel. We nearly always avoid coding our own data structures, using either Boost or STL stuff, or third-party stuff such as the vtree library that is the basis of PLN and MOSES libraries (soon to be replaced with Moshe's superior variant treetree, though ;-). The peeve you have seems to be with the Atomspace, which is custom code for managing the Atom knowledge base ... but this is one piece of code that was written in 2001 and works and has not consumed a significant percentage of the time of the project. This particular object seemed so central to the system and so performance and memory-usage critical that it seemed worthwhile to create it in a custom way. But even if this judgment was wrong (and I'm not saying it was) it does not represent a particularly large impact on the project. The main problem I have seen with using C++ for OpenCog is the large barrier to entry. Not that many programmers are really good at C++. But LISP has the same problem. For ease of entry I'd probably choose Java, I guess ... or C# if Mono were better. Of course, C++ being a complex language there are plusses and minuses to various choices within it. We've made really good use of the power afforded by templates, but it's also true that debugging complex template constructs can be a bitch. Anyway language issues are just not the main problem in creating AGI. Getting the algorithms and structures and cognitive architecture right are dramatically more important. Ben G On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 3:51 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Relatively a small amount of code is my own creation, and the libraries I used, e.go. Sesame, Glib, are well maintained. Steve is a man after my own heart. Grab the available solid infrastructure/libraries and build on top of it/them. To me, it's all a question of the size and coherence of the communities building and maintaining the infrastructure. My personal *best guess* is that the Windows community is more cohesive and therefore the rate of interoperable infrastructure is growing faster. It's even clearer that *nix started with a big lead. Currently I'd still say that which is best to use for any given project depends upon the project timeline, your comfort factor, whether or not you're willing to re-write and/or port, etc., etc. -- but I'm also increasingly of the *opinion* that the balance is starting to swing and swing hard . . . . (but I'm not really willing to defend that *opinion* against entrenched resistance -- merely to suggest and educate to those who don't know all of the things that are now available "out-of-the-box"). The only people that I mean to criticize are those who are attempting to do everything themselves and are re-inventing the same things that many others are doing and continue to do . . . - Original Message - From: Stephen Reed To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 1:42 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages Hi Mark, I readily concede that .Net is superior to Java out-of-the box with respect to reflection and metadata support as you say. I spent my first project year creating three successive versions of a Java persistence framework for an RDF quad store using third party libraries for these features. Now I am completely satisfied with respect to these capabilities. Relatively a small amount of code is my own creation, and the libraries I used, e.g. Sesame, Cglib, are well maintained. -Steve Stephen L. Reed Artificial Intelligence Researcher http://texai.org/blog http://texai.org 3
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
So you're saying that if I switch to using Tarski's theory (which I believe is fundamentally just a very slightly different aspect of the same critical concept -- but unfortunately much less well-known and therefore less powerful as an explanation) that you'll agree with me? That seems akin to picayune arguments over phrasing when trying to simply reach general broad agreement . . . . (or am I misinterpreting?) - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 5:29 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mike, "Personally, I always have trouble separating out Godel and Tarski as they are obviously both facets of the same underlying principles." This is essentially what I'm complaining about. If you had used Tarski's theorem to begin with, I wouldn't be bugging you :). --Abram On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 12:58 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I'm making the point "natural language is incompletely defined" for you, but *not* the point "natural language suffers from Godelian incompleteness", unless you specify what concept of "proof" applies to natural language. I'm back to being lost I think. You agree that natural language is incompletely defined. Cool. My saying that natural language suffers from Godelian incompleteness merely adds that it *can't* be defined. Do you mean to say that natural languages *can* be completely defined? Or are you arguing that I can't *prove* that they can't be defined? If it is the last, then that's like saying that Godel's theorem can't prove itself -- which is exactly the point to what Godel's theorem says . . . . Have you heard of Tarski's undefinability theorem? It is relevant to this discussion. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indefinability_theory_of_truth Yes. In fact, the restatement of Tarski's theory as "No sufficiently powerful language is strongly-semantically-self-representational" also fundamentally says that I can't prove in natural language what you're asking me to prove about natural language. Personally, I always have trouble separating out Godel and Tarski as they are obviously both facets of the same underlying principles. I'm still not sure of what you're getting at. If it's a "proof", then Godel says I can't give it to you. If it's something else, then I'm not getting it. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 11:31 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, "It makes sense but I'm arguing that you're making my point for me . . . ." I'm making the point "natural language is incompletely defined" for you, but *not* the point "natural language suffers from Godelian incompleteness", unless you specify what concept of "proof" applies to natural language. "It emphatically does *not* tell us anything about "any approach that can be implemented on normal computers" and this is where all the people who insist that "because computers operate algorithmically, they will never achieve true general intelligence" are going wrong." It tells us that any approach that is implementable on a normal computer will not always be able to come up with correct answers to all halting-problem questions (along with other problems that suffer from incompleteness). "You are correct in saying that Godel's theory has been improperly overused and abused over the years but my point was merely that AGI is Godellian Incomplete, natural language is Godellian Incomplete, " Specify "truth" and "proof" in these domains before applying the theorem, please. For "agi" I am OK, since "X is provable" would mean "the AGI will come to believe X", and "X is true" would mean something close to what it intuitively means. But for natural language? "Natural language will come to believe X" makes no sense, so it can't be our definition of proof... Really, it is a small objection, and I'm only making it because I don't want the theorem abused. You could fix your statement just by saying "any proof system we might want to provide" will be incomplete for "any well-defined subset of natural language semantics that is large enough to talk fully about numbers". Doing this just seems pointless, because the real point you are trying to make is that the semantics is ill-defined in general, *not* that some hypothetical proof system is incomplete. "and effectively AGI-Complete most probably pretty much exactly means Godellian-Incomplete. (Yes, that is a radically new phrasing and not necessarily quite
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
No, it doesn't justify ad-hoc, even when perfect solution is impossible, you could still have an optimal approximation under given limitations. So what is an optimal approximation under uncertainty? How do you know when you've gotten there? If you don't believe in ad-hoc then you must have an algorithmic solution . . . . Numerous scientific studies show that humans frequently under- and over-think problems and data collection. Tell us your solution for fixing this. - Original Message - From: "Vladimir Nesov" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 5:03 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 12:54 AM, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: AIXI says that a perfect solution is not computable. [...] It justifies our current ad-hoc approach to problem solving -- we have no choice. No, it doesn't justify ad-hoc, even when perfect solution is impossible, you could still have an optimal approximation under given limitations. -- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/ --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
AIXI says that a perfect solution is not computable. However, a very general principle of both scientific research and machine learning is to favor simple hypotheses over complex ones. AIXI justifies these practices in a formal way. It also says we can stop looking for a universal solution, which I think is important. It justifies our current ad-hoc approach to problem solving -- we have no choice. Excellent. Thank you. Another good point to be pinned (since a number of people frequently go around and around on it). Is there anything else that it tells us that is useful and not a distraction? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Also, since you invoked the two in the same sentence as if they were different things . . . . What is the distinction between scientific research and machine learning (other than who performs it, of course). Or, re-phrased, what is the difference between a machine doing scientific research and a machine that is simply learning? - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 4:54 PM Subject: Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI --- On Fri, 10/24/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Cool. And you're saying that intelligence is not computable. So why else are we constantly invoking AIXI? Does it tell us anything else about general intelligence? AIXI says that a perfect solution is not computable. However, a very general principle of both scientific research and machine learning is to favor simple hypotheses over complex ones. AIXI justifies these practices in a formal way. It also says we can stop looking for a universal solution, which I think is important. It justifies our current ad-hoc approach to problem solving -- we have no choice. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] On programming languages
>> Relatively a small amount of code is my own creation, and the libraries I >> used, e.go. Sesame, Glib, are well maintained. Steve is a man after my own heart. Grab the available solid infrastructure/libraries and build on top of it/them. To me, it's all a question of the size and coherence of the communities building and maintaining the infrastructure. My personal *best guess* is that the Windows community is more cohesive and therefore the rate of interoperable infrastructure is growing faster. It's even clearer that *nix started with a big lead. Currently I'd still say that which is best to use for any given project depends upon the project timeline, your comfort factor, whether or not you're willing to re-write and/or port, etc., etc. -- but I'm also increasingly of the *opinion* that the balance is starting to swing and swing hard . . . . (but I'm not really willing to defend that *opinion* against entrenched resistance -- merely to suggest and educate to those who don't know all of the things that are now available "out-of-the-box"). The only people that I mean to criticize are those who are attempting to do everything themselves and are re-inventing the same things that many others are doing and continue to do . . . - Original Message - From: Stephen Reed To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 1:42 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages Hi Mark, I readily concede that .Net is superior to Java out-of-the box with respect to reflection and metadata support as you say. I spent my first project year creating three successive versions of a Java persistence framework for an RDF quad store using third party libraries for these features. Now I am completely satisfied with respect to these capabilities. Relatively a small amount of code is my own creation, and the libraries I used, e.g. Sesame, Cglib, are well maintained. -Steve Stephen L. Reed Artificial Intelligence Researcher http://texai.org/blog http://texai.org 3008 Oak Crest Ave. Austin, Texas, USA 78704 512.791.7860 - Original Message From: Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 12:28:36 PM Subject: Re: [agi] On programming languages AGI *really* needs an environment that comes with reflection and metadata support (including persistence, accessibility, etc.) baked right in. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/cc301780.aspx (And note that the referenced article is six years old and several major releases back) This isn't your father's programming *language* . . . . - Original Message - From: Stephen Reed To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 12:55 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages Russell asked: But if it can't read the syntax tree, how will it know what the main body actually does? My line of thinking arose while considering how to reason over syntax trees. I came to realize that source code composition is somewhat analogous to program compilation in this way: When a source code program is compiled into executable machine instructions, much of the conceptual intent of the programmer is lost, but the computer can none the less execute the program. Humans cannot read compiled binary code; they cannot reason about it. We need source code for reasoning about programs. Accordingly, I thought about the program composition process. Exactly what is lost, i.e. not explicitly recorded, when a human programmer writes a correct source code program from high-level specifications. This "lost" information is what I model as the nested composition framework. When a programmer tries to understand a source code program written by someone else, the programmer must reverse-engineer the deductive chain that leads from the observed source code back to the perhaps only partially known original specifications. I will not have a worked out example until next year, but a sketch would be as follows. In Java, a main body could be a method or a block within a method. For a method, I do not persist simply the syntax tree for the method, but rather the nested composition operations that when subsequently processed generate the method source code. For a composed method I would persist: a.. composed preconditions with respect to the method parameters and possibly other scoped variables such as class variables b.. composed invariant conditions c.. composed postconditions d.. composed method comment e.. composed method type f.. composed method access modifiers (i.e. public, private, abstract etc.) g.. composed method parameter type, comment, modifier (e.g. final) h.. composed statements Composed statements generate
Re: [agi] On programming languages
The obvious fly in the ointment is that a lot of technical work is done on Unix, so an AI project really wants to keep that option open if at all possible. Is Mono ready for prime time yet? No. Unfortunately not. But I would argue that most work done on *nix is not easily accessible to or usable by other work. Why do you say that? Python code is concise and very readable, both of which are positive attributes for extensibility and maintenance. Yes, but not markedly more so than most other choices. The problem is that Python does not enforce, promote, or even facilitate any number of practices and procedures that are necessary to make large complex project extensible and maintainable. A person who knew all of these practices and procedures could laboriously follow and/or re-implement them but in many ways it's like trying to program in assembly language. Quick and dirty (and simple) is always a trade-off for complex and lasting and extensible. I always hate discussion about languages because to me the most advanced versions of Basic, Pascal, Object-Oriented C (whether ObjectiveC, C++, or C#), Java, etc. are basically the same language with slightly different syntax from case to case. The *real* difference between the languages is the infrastructure/functionality that is immediately available. I sneered at C++ in an earlier message not because of it's syntax but because you are *always* burdened with memory management, garbage collection, etc. This makes C++ code much more expensive (and slow) to develop, maintain, and extend. Python does not have much of the rich infrastructure that other languages frequently have and all the really creative Python work seems to be migrating on to Ruby . . . . As you say, I really don't want to choose either language or platform. What I want is the most flexibility so that I can get access to the widest variety of already created and tested infrastructure. Language is far more splintered than platform and each language has a rational place (i.e. a set of trade-offs) where it is best. .Net is a great platform because it provides the foundations for all languages to co-exist, work together, and even intermingle. It's even better because it's building up more and more and more useful infrastructure while *nix development continues to fragment into the flavor of the month. Take a look, for example, at an the lambda closure and LINQ stuff that is now part of the platform and available to *all* of the supported languages. Now look at all the people who are re-implementing all that stuff in their project. The bad point of .Net is that it is now an absolute, stone-cold b*tch to learn because there is so much infrastructure available and it's not always clear what is most effective when . . . . but once you start using it, you'll find that due to the available infrastructure you'll need an order of magnitude less code (literally) to produce the same functionality. But I'm going to quit here. Language is politics and I find myself tiring easily of that these days :-) - Original Message - From: "Russell Wallace" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 12:56 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 5:37 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Instead of arguing language, why don't you argue platform? Platform is certainly an interesting question. I take the view that Common Lisp has the advantage of allowing me to defer the choice of platform. You take the view that .Net has the advantage of allowing you to defer the choice of language, which is not unreasonable. As far as I know, there isn't a version of Common Lisp for .Net, but there is a Scheme, which would be suitable for writing things that the AI needs to understand, and still allow interoperability with other chunks of code written in C# or whatever. The obvious fly in the ointment is that a lot of technical work is done on Unix, so an AI project really wants to keep that option open if at all possible. Is Mono ready for prime time yet? And as for Python? Great for getting reasonably small projects up quickly and easily. The cost is trade-offs on extensibility and maintenance -- which means that, for a large, complex system, some day you're either going to rewrite and replace it (not necessarily a bad thing) or you're going to rue the day that you used it. Why do you say that? Python code is concise and very readable, both of which are positive attributes for extensibility and maintenance. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
Cool. And you're saying that intelligence is not computable. So why else are we constantly invoking AIXI? Does it tell us anything else about general intelligence? - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 12:59 PM Subject: Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI --- On Fri, 10/24/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: The value of AIXI is not that it tells us how to solve AGI. The value is that it tells us intelligence is not computable Define "not computable" Too many people are incorrectly interpreting it to mean "not implementable on a computer". Not implementable by a Turing machine. AIXI says the optimal solution is to find the shortest program consistent with observation so far. This implies the ability to compute Kolmogorov complexity. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] On programming languages
AGI *really* needs an environment that comes with reflection and metadata support (including persistence, accessibility, etc.) baked right in. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/cc301780.aspx (And note that the referenced article is six years old and several major releases back) This isn't your father's programming *language* . . . . - Original Message - From: Stephen Reed To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 12:55 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages Russell asked: But if it can't read the syntax tree, how will it know what the main body actually does? My line of thinking arose while considering how to reason over syntax trees. I came to realize that source code composition is somewhat analogous to program compilation in this way: When a source code program is compiled into executable machine instructions, much of the conceptual intent of the programmer is lost, but the computer can none the less execute the program. Humans cannot read compiled binary code; they cannot reason about it. We need source code for reasoning about programs. Accordingly, I thought about the program composition process. Exactly what is lost, i.e. not explicitly recorded, when a human programmer writes a correct source code program from high-level specifications. This "lost" information is what I model as the nested composition framework. When a programmer tries to understand a source code program written by someone else, the programmer must reverse-engineer the deductive chain that leads from the observed source code back to the perhaps only partially known original specifications. I will not have a worked out example until next year, but a sketch would be as follows. In Java, a main body could be a method or a block within a method. For a method, I do not persist simply the syntax tree for the method, but rather the nested composition operations that when subsequently processed generate the method source code. For a composed method I would persist: a.. composed preconditions with respect to the method parameters and possibly other scoped variables such as class variables b.. composed invariant conditions c.. composed postconditions d.. composed method comment e.. composed method type f.. composed method access modifiers (i.e. public, private, abstract etc.) g.. composed method parameter type, comment, modifier (e.g. final) h.. composed statements Composed statements generate Java statements such as an assignment statement, block statement and so forth. You can see that there is a tree structure that can be navigated when performing a deductive composition operation like "is ArrayList imported into the containing class? - if not then compose that import in the right place". Persisted composition instances are KB terms that can be linked to the justifying algorithmic and domain knowledge. I hypothesize this is cleaner and more flexible than directly tying lower-level persisted syntax trees to their justifications. -Steve Stephen L. Reed Artificial Intelligence Researcher http://texai.org/blog http://texai.org 3008 Oak Crest Ave. Austin, Texas, USA 78704 512.791.7860 - Original Message From: Russell Wallace <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 10:28:39 AM Subject: Re: [agi] On programming languages On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 4:10 PM, Stephen Reed <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Russell, > Although I've already chosen an implementation language for my Texai project > - Java, I believe that my experience may interest you. Very much so, thank you. > I moved up one level of procedural abstraction to view program composition > as the key intelligent activity. Supporting this abstraction level is the > capability to perform source code editing for the desired target language - > in my case Java. In my paradigm, its not the program syntax tree that gets > persisted in the knowledge base but rather the nested composition framework > that bottoms out in primitives that generate Java program elements. The > nested composition framework is my attempt to model the conceptual aspects > of program composition. For example a procedure may have an initialization > section, a main body, and a finalization section. I desire Texai to be able > to figure out for itself where to insert a new required variable in the > source code so that it has the appropriate scope, and so forth. But if it can't read the syntax tree, how will it know what the main body actually does? --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] On programming languages
But I thought I'd mention that for OpenCog we are planning on a cross-language approach. The core system is C++, for scalability and efficiency reasons, but the MindAgent objects that do the actual AI algorithms should be creatable in various languages, including Scheme or LISP. *nods* As you know, I'm of the opinion that C++ is literally the worst possible choice in this context. However... ROTFL. OpenCog is dead-set on reinventing the wheel while developing the car. They may eventually create a better product for doing so -- but many of us software engineers contend that the car could be more quickly and easily developed without going that far back (while the OpenCog folk contend that the current wheel is insufficient). (To be clear, the specific "wheels" in this case are things like memory management, garbage collection, etc. -- all those things that need to be written in C++ and are baked into more modern languages and platforms). Note: You can even create AGI in machine code -- I just wouldn't want to try (unless of course, it's simply by creating it a real competent set of langauges and compiling it down) But then again, this is an argument that Ben and I have been having for years (and he, admittedly has the dollars and the programmers ;-). - Original Message - From: "Russell Wallace" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 12:45 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 5:30 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Interesting! I have a good friend who is also an AGI enthusiast who followed the same path as you ... a lot of time burned making his own superior, stripped-down, AGI-customized variant of LISP, followed by a decision to just go with LISP ;-) I'm not surprised :-) But I thought I'd mention that for OpenCog we are planning on a cross-language approach. The core system is C++, for scalability and efficiency reasons, but the MindAgent objects that do the actual AI algorithms should be creatable in various languages, including Scheme or LISP. *nods* As you know, I'm of the opinion that C++ is literally the worst possible choice in this context. However... We can do self-modification of components of the system by coding these components in LISP or other highly manipulable languages. This is good, and for what it's worth I think the best approach for OpenCog at this stage to aim to stabilize the C++ core as soon as possible, and try to write AI code at the higher level in Lisp, Combo or whatever. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
I'm making the point "natural language is incompletely defined" for you, but *not* the point "natural language suffers from Godelian incompleteness", unless you specify what concept of "proof" applies to natural language. I'm back to being lost I think. You agree that natural language is incompletely defined. Cool. My saying that natural language suffers from Godelian incompleteness merely adds that it *can't* be defined. Do you mean to say that natural languages *can* be completely defined? Or are you arguing that I can't *prove* that they can't be defined? If it is the last, then that's like saying that Godel's theorem can't prove itself -- which is exactly the point to what Godel's theorem says . . . . Have you heard of Tarski's undefinability theorem? It is relevant to this discussion. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indefinability_theory_of_truth Yes. In fact, the restatement of Tarski's theory as "No sufficiently powerful language is strongly-semantically-self-representational" also fundamentally says that I can't prove in natural language what you're asking me to prove about natural language. Personally, I always have trouble separating out Godel and Tarski as they are obviously both facets of the same underlying principles. I'm still not sure of what you're getting at. If it's a "proof", then Godel says I can't give it to you. If it's something else, then I'm not getting it. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 11:31 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, "It makes sense but I'm arguing that you're making my point for me . . . ." I'm making the point "natural language is incompletely defined" for you, but *not* the point "natural language suffers from Godelian incompleteness", unless you specify what concept of "proof" applies to natural language. "It emphatically does *not* tell us anything about "any approach that can be implemented on normal computers" and this is where all the people who insist that "because computers operate algorithmically, they will never achieve true general intelligence" are going wrong." It tells us that any approach that is implementable on a normal computer will not always be able to come up with correct answers to all halting-problem questions (along with other problems that suffer from incompleteness). "You are correct in saying that Godel's theory has been improperly overused and abused over the years but my point was merely that AGI is Godellian Incomplete, natural language is Godellian Incomplete, " Specify "truth" and "proof" in these domains before applying the theorem, please. For "agi" I am OK, since "X is provable" would mean "the AGI will come to believe X", and "X is true" would mean something close to what it intuitively means. But for natural language? "Natural language will come to believe X" makes no sense, so it can't be our definition of proof... Really, it is a small objection, and I'm only making it because I don't want the theorem abused. You could fix your statement just by saying "any proof system we might want to provide" will be incomplete for "any well-defined subset of natural language semantics that is large enough to talk fully about numbers". Doing this just seems pointless, because the real point you are trying to make is that the semantics is ill-defined in general, *not* that some hypothetical proof system is incomplete. "and effectively AGI-Complete most probably pretty much exactly means Godellian-Incomplete. (Yes, that is a radically new phrasing and not necessarily quite what I mean/meant but . . . . )." I used to agree that Godelian incompleteness was enough to show that the semantics of a knowledge representation was strong enough for AGI. But, that alone doesn't seem to guarantee that a knowledge representation can faithfully reflect concepts like "continuous differentiable function" (which gets back to the whole discussion with Ben). Have you heard of Tarski's undefinability theorem? It is relevant to this discussion. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indefinability_theory_of_truth --Abram On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 9:19 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I'm saying Godelian completeness/incompleteness can't be easily defined in the context of natural language, so it shouldn't be applied there without providing justification for that application (specifically, unambiguous definitions of "provably true" and "semantically true" for natural language). Does that make sense,
Re: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
>> The value of AIXI is not that it tells us how to solve AGI. The value is
>> that it tells us intelligence is not computable
Define "not computable" Too many people are incorrectly interpreting it to
mean "not implementable on a computer".
- Original Message -
From: Matt Mahoney
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 10:49 AM
Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
The value of AIXI is not that it tells us how to solve AGI. The value
is that it tells us intelligence is not computable.
-- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- On Fri, 10/24/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Date: Friday, October 24, 2008, 9:51 AM
>> E.g. according to this, AIXI (with infinite computational power)
but not AIXItl
>> would have general intelligence, because the latter can only find
regularities
>> expressible using programs of length bounded by l and runtime
bounded
>> by t
I hate AIXI because not only does it have infinite computational
power but people also unconsciously assume that it has infinite data (or, at
least, sufficient data to determine *everything*).
AIXI is *not* a general intelligence by any definition that I would
use. It is omniscient and need only be a GLUT (giant look-up table) and I
argue that that is emphatically *NOT* intelligence.
AIXI may have the problem-solving capabilities of general
intelligence but does not operate under the constraints that *DEFINE* a general
intelligence. If it had to operate under those constraints, it would fail,
fail, fail.
AIXI is useful for determining limits but horrible for drawing other
types of conclusions about GI.
- Original Message -
From: Ben Goertzel
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 5:02 AM
Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess
it is no AGI
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 4:09 AM, Dr. Matthias Heger <[EMAIL
PROTECTED]> wrote:
No Mike. AGI must be able to discover regularities of all kind in
all
domains.
If you can find a single domain where your AGI fails, it is no
AGI.
According to this definition **no finite computational system can
be an AGI**,
so this is definition obviously overly strong for any practical
purposes
E.g. according to this, AIXI (with infinite computational power)
but not AIXItl
would have general intelligence, because the latter can only find
regularities
expressible using programs of length bounded by l and runtime
bounded
by t
Unfortunately, the pragmatic notion of AGI we need to use as
researchers is
not as simple as the above ... but fortunately, it's more
achievable ;-)
One could view the pragmatic task of AGI as being able to discover
all regularities
expressible as programs with length bounded by l and runtime
bounded by t ...
[and one can add a restriction about the resources used to make this
discover], but the thing is, this depends highly on the underlying
computational model,
which then can be used to encode some significant "domain bias."
-- Ben G
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Re: [agi] On programming languages
Instead of arguing language, why don't you argue platform? Name a language and there's probably a .Net version. They are all interoperable so you can use whatever is most appropriate. Personally, the fact that you can now even easily embed functional language statements in procedural languages (via methods like using F#-style calls in your C# code and vice versa) means that it is silly to use languages and platforms that lack the wide variety of features and interoperability of one single, common low-level architecture supporting all the variety that people need and want. (but, then again, I'm just a voice in the wilderness on this list ;-) And as for Python? Great for getting reasonably small projects up quickly and easily. The cost is trade-offs on extensibility and maintenance -- which means that, for a large, complex system, some day you're either going to rewrite and replace it (not necessarily a bad thing) or you're going to rue the day that you used it. - Original Message - From: "Russell Wallace" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 10:41 AM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 3:37 PM, Eric Burton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Due to a characteristic paucity of datatypes, all powerful, and a terse, readable syntax, I usually recommend Python for any project that is just out the gate. It's my favourite way by far at present to mangle huge tables. By far! Python is definitely a very good language. Unless this has changed since I last looked at it, though, it doesn't expose the parse tree, so isn't suitable for representing AI content? --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
But I do not agree that most humans can be scientists. If this is necessary for general intelligence then most humans are not general intelligences. Soften "be scientists" to "generally use the scientific method". Does this change your opinion? - Original Message - From: "Dr. Matthias Heger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 10:27 AM Subject: AW: [agi] constructivist issues Mark Waser wrote: Can we get a listing of what you believe these limitations are and whether or not you believe that they apply to humans? I believe that humans are constrained by *all* the limits of finite automata yet are general intelligences so I'm not sure of your point. <<<<<<<< It is also my opinion that humans are constrained by *all* the limits of finite automata. But I do not agree that most humans can be scientists. If this is necessary for general intelligence then most humans are not general intelligences. It depends on your definition of general intelligence. Surely there are rules (=algorithms) to be a scientist. If not, AGI would not be possible and there would not be any scientist at all. But you cannot separate the rules (algorithm) from the evaluation whether a human or a machine is intelligent. Intelligence comes essentially from these rules and from a lot of data. The mere ability to use arbitrary rules does not imply general intelligence. Your computer has this ability but without the rules it is not intelligent at all. - Matthias --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] On programming languages
Abram, Would you agree that this thread is analogous to our debate? - Original Message - From: "Vladimir Nesov" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 6:49 AM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] On programming languages On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 2:16 PM, Russell Wallace <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 10:56 AM, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Needing many different features just doesn't look like a natural thing for AI-generated programs. No, it doesn't, does it? And then you run into this requirement that wasn't obvious on day one, and you cater for that, and then you run into another requirement, that has to be dealt with in a different way, and then you run into another... and you end up realizing you've wasted a great deal of irreplaceable time for no good reason whatsoever. So I figure I might as well document the mistake, in case it saves someone having to repeat it. Well, my point was that maybe the mistake is use of additional language constructions and not their absence? You yourself should be able to emulate anything in lambda-calculus (you can add interpreter for any extension as a part of a program), and so should your AI, if it's to ever learn open-ended models. -- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/ --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
>> E.g. according to this, AIXI (with infinite computational power) but not >> AIXItl >> would have general intelligence, because the latter can only find >> regularities >> expressible using programs of length bounded by l and runtime bounded >> by t I hate AIXI because not only does it have infinite computational power but people also unconsciously assume that it has infinite data (or, at least, sufficient data to determine *everything*). AIXI is *not* a general intelligence by any definition that I would use. It is omniscient and need only be a GLUT (giant look-up table) and I argue that that is emphatically *NOT* intelligence. AIXI may have the problem-solving capabilities of general intelligence but does not operate under the constraints that *DEFINE* a general intelligence. If it had to operate under those constraints, it would fail, fail, fail. AIXI is useful for determining limits but horrible for drawing other types of conclusions about GI. - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 5:02 AM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 4:09 AM, Dr. Matthias Heger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: No Mike. AGI must be able to discover regularities of all kind in all domains. If you can find a single domain where your AGI fails, it is no AGI. According to this definition **no finite computational system can be an AGI**, so this is definition obviously overly strong for any practical purposes E.g. according to this, AIXI (with infinite computational power) but not AIXItl would have general intelligence, because the latter can only find regularities expressible using programs of length bounded by l and runtime bounded by t Unfortunately, the pragmatic notion of AGI we need to use as researchers is not as simple as the above ... but fortunately, it's more achievable ;-) One could view the pragmatic task of AGI as being able to discover all regularities expressible as programs with length bounded by l and runtime bounded by t ... [and one can add a restriction about the resources used to make this discover], but the thing is, this depends highly on the underlying computational model, which then can be used to encode some significant "domain bias." -- Ben G -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
This does not imply that people usually do not use visual patterns to solve chess. It only implies that visual patterns are not necessary. So . . . wouldn't dolphins and bats use sonar patterns to play chess? So . . . is it *vision* or is it the most developed (for the individual), highest bandwidth sensory modality that allows the creation and update of a competent domain model? Humans usually do use vision . . . . Sonar may prove to be more easily implemented for AGI. - Original Message - From: "Dr. Matthias Heger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 4:30 AM Subject: **SPAM** AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI This does not imply that people usually do not use visual patterns to solve chess. It only implies that visual patterns are not necessary. Since I do not know any good blind chess player I would suspect that visual patterns are better for chess then those patterns which are used by blind people. http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/reingold/publications/Reingold_Charness_P omplun_&_Stampe_press/ http://www.psychology.gatech.edu/create/pubs/reingold&charness_perception-in -chess_2005_underwood.pdf Von: Trent Waddington [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote http://www.eyeway.org/inform/sp-chess.htm Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
The limitations of Godelian completeness/incompleteness are a subset of the much stronger limitations of finite automata. Can we get a listing of what you believe these limitations are and whether or not you believe that they apply to humans? I believe that humans are constrained by *all* the limits of finite automata yet are general intelligences so I'm not sure of your point. - Original Message - From: "Dr. Matthias Heger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 4:09 AM Subject: AW: [agi] constructivist issues The limitations of Godelian completeness/incompleteness are a subset of the much stronger limitations of finite automata. If you want to build a spaceship to go to mars it is of no practical relevance to think whether it is theoretically possible to move through wormholes in the universe. I think, this comparison is adequate to evaluate the role of Gödel's theorem for AGI. - Matthias Abram Demski [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote I agree with your point in this context, but I think you also mean to imply that Godel's incompleteness theorem isn't of any importance for artificial intelligence, which (probably pretty obviously) I wouldn't agree with. Godel's incompleteness theorem tells us important limitations of the logical approach to AI (and, indeed, any approach that can be implemented on normal computers). It *has* however been overused and abused throughout the years... which is one reason I jumped on Mark... --Abram --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
No Mike. AGI must be able to discover regularities of all kind in all domains. Must it be able to *discover* regularities or must it be able to be taught and subsequently effectively use regularities? I would argue the latter. (Can we get a show of hands of those who believe the former? I think that it's a small minority but . . . ) If you can find a single domain where your AGI fails, it is no AGI. Failure is an interesting evaluation. Ben's made it quite clear that advanced science is a domain that stupid (if not non-exceptional) humans fail at. Does that mean that most humans aren't general intelligences? Chess is broad and narrow at the same time. It is easy programmable and testable and humans can solve problems of this domain using abilities which are essential for AGI. Thus chess is a good milestone. Chess is a good milestone because of it's very difficulty. The reason why human's learn chess so easily (and that is a relative term) is because they already have an excellent spatial domain model in place, a ton of strategy knowledge available from other learned domains, and the immense array of mental tools that we're going to need to bootstrap an AI. Chess as a GI task (or, via a GI approach) is emphatically NOT easily programmable. - Original Message - From: "Dr. Matthias Heger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 24, 2008 4:09 AM Subject: **SPAM** AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI No Mike. AGI must be able to discover regularities of all kind in all domains. If you can find a single domain where your AGI fails, it is no AGI. Chess is broad and narrow at the same time. It is easy programmable and testable and humans can solve problems of this domain using abilities which are essential for AGI. Thus chess is a good milestone. Of course it is not sufficient for AGI. But before you think about sufficient features, necessary abilities are good milestones to verify whether your roadmap towards AGI will not go into a dead-end after a long way of vague hope, that future embodied experience will solve your problems which you cannot solve today. - Matthias Mike wrote P.S. Matthias seems to be cheerfully cutting his own throat here. The idea of a single domain AGI or pre-AGI is a contradiction in terms every which way - not just in terms of domains/subjects or fields, but also sensory domains. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
I'm saying Godelian completeness/incompleteness can't be easily defined in the context of natural language, so it shouldn't be applied there without providing justification for that application (specifically, unambiguous definitions of "provably true" and "semantically true" for natural language). Does that make sense, or am I still confusing? It makes sense but I'm arguing that you're making my point for me . . . . agree with. Godel's incompleteness theorem tells us important limitations of the logical approach to AI (and, indeed, any approach that can be implemented on normal computers). It *has* however been overused and abused throughout the years... which is one reason I jumped on Mark... Godel's incompleteness theorem tells us important limitations of all formal *and complete* approaches and systems (like logic). It clearly means that any approach to AI is going to have to be open-ended (Godellian-incomplete? ;-) It emphatically does *not* tell us anything about "any approach that can be implemented on normal computers" and this is where all the people who insist that "because computers operate algorithmically, they will never achieve true general intelligence" are going wrong. The later argument is similar to saying that because an inductive mathematical proof always operates only on just the next number, it will never successfully prove anything about infinity. I'm a firm believe in inductive proofs and the fact that general intelligences can be implemented on the computers that we have today. You are correct in saying that Godel's theory has been improperly overused and abused over the years but my point was merely that AGI is Godellian Incomplete, natural language is Godellian Incomplete, and effectively AGI-Complete most probably pretty much exactly means Godellian-Incomplete. (Yes, that is a radically new phrasing and not necessarily quite what I mean/meant but . . . . ). - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2008 11:42 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, I'm saying Godelian completeness/incompleteness can't be easily defined in the context of natural language, so it shouldn't be applied there without providing justification for that application (specifically, unambiguous definitions of "provably true" and "semantically true" for natural language). Does that make sense, or am I still confusing? Matthias, I agree with your point in this context, but I think you also mean to imply that Godel's incompleteness theorem isn't of any importance for artificial intelligence, which (probably pretty obviously) I wouldn't agree with. Godel's incompleteness theorem tells us important limitations of the logical approach to AI (and, indeed, any approach that can be implemented on normal computers). It *has* however been overused and abused throughout the years... which is one reason I jumped on Mark... --Abram On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 4:07 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: So to sum up, while you think linguistic vagueness comes from Godelian incompleteness, I think Godelian incompleteness can't even be defined in this context, due to linguistic vagueness. OK. Personally, I think that you did a good job of defining Godelian Incompleteness this time but arguably you did it by reference and by building a new semantic structure as you went along. On the other hand, you now seem to be arguing that my thinking that linguistic vagueness comes from Godelian incompleteness is wrong because Godelian incompleteness can't be defined . . . . I'm sort of at a loss as to how to proceed from here. If Godelian Incompleteness can't be defined, then by definition I can't prove anything but you can't disprove anything. This is nicely Escheresque and very Hofstadterian but . . . . - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2008 11:54 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
So to sum up, while you think linguistic vagueness comes from Godelian incompleteness, I think Godelian incompleteness can't even be defined in this context, due to linguistic vagueness. OK. Personally, I think that you did a good job of defining Godelian Incompleteness this time but arguably you did it by reference and by building a new semantic structure as you went along. On the other hand, you now seem to be arguing that my thinking that linguistic vagueness comes from Godelian incompleteness is wrong because Godelian incompleteness can't be defined . . . . I'm sort of at a loss as to how to proceed from here. If Godelian Incompleteness can't be defined, then by definition I can't prove anything but you can't disprove anything. This is nicely Escheresque and very Hofstadterian but . . . . - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2008 11:54 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, My type 1 & 2 are probably the source of your confusion, since I phrased them so that (as you said) they depend on "intention". Logicians codify the intension using semantics, so it is actually well defined, even though it sounds messy. But, since that explanation did not work well, let me try to put it a completely different way rather than trying to better explain the difference between 1 and 2. Godel's incompleteness theorem says that any logic with a sufficiently strong semantics will be syntactically incomplete; there will be theorems that are true according to the semantics, but based on allowed proofs, they will be neither true nor false. So Godel's theorem is about an essential lack of match-up between proof and truth, or as is often said, syntax and semantics. To apply the theorem to natural language, we've got to identify the syntax and semantics: the notions of "proof" and "truth" that apply. But in attempting to define these, we will run into some serious problems: proof and truth in natural language is only partially defined. Furthermore, those "serious problems" are (it seems to me) precisely what you are referring to. So to sum up, while you think linguistic vagueness comes from Godelian incompleteness, I think Godelian incompleteness can't even be defined in this context, due to linguistic vagueness. --Abram On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 9:54 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: But, I still do not agree with the way you are using the incompleteness theorem. Um. OK. Could you point to a specific example where you disagree? I'm a little at a loss here . . . . It is important to distinguish between two different types of incompleteness. 1. Normal Incompleteness-- a logical theory fails to completely specify something. 2. Godelian Incompleteness-- a logical theory fails to completely specify something, even though we want it to. I'm also not getting this. If I read the words, it looks like the difference between Normal and Godelian incompleteness is based upon our desires. I think I'm having a complete disconnect with your intended meaning. However, it seems like all you need is type 1 completeness for what you are saying. So, Godel's theorem is way overkill here in my opinion. Um. OK. So I used a bazooka on a fly? If it was a really pesky fly and I didn't destroy anything else, is that wrong? :-) It seems as if you're not arguing with my conclusion but saying that my arguments were way better than they needed to be (like I'm being over-efficient?) . . . . = = = = = Seriously though, I having a complete disconnect here. Maybe I'm just having a bad morning but . . . huh? :-) If I read the words, all I'm getting is that you disagree with the way that I am using the theory because the theory is overkill for what is necessary. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 9:05 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, I own and have read the book-- but my first introduction to Godel's Theorem was Douglas Hofstadter's earlier work, Godel Escher Bach. Since I had already been guided through the details of the proof (and grappled with the consequences), to be honest chapter 10 you refer to was a little boring :). But, I still do not agree with the way you are using the incompleteness theorem. It is important to distinguish between two different types of incompleteness. 1. Normal Incompleteness-- a logical theory fails to completely specify something. 2. Godelian Incompleteness-- a logical theory fails to completely specify something, even though we want it to. Logicians always mean type 2 incompleteness when they use the term. To formalize the difference between the two, the measuring stick of "semantics" is
Re: [agi] Understanding and Problem Solving
I like that. NLU isn't AGI-complete but achieving it is (if you've got a vaguely mammalian-brain-like architecture :-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2008 10:18 AM Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] Understanding and Problem Solving On whether NLU is AGI-complete, it really depends on the particulars of the definition of NLU ... but according to my own working definition of NLU I agree that it isn't ... However, as I stated before, within any vaguely mammalian-brain-like AI architecture, I do suspect that achieving NLU is AGI-complete... -- Ben G On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 10:12 AM, Dr. Matthias Heger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I do not agree. Understanding a domain does not imply the ability to solve problems in that domain. And the ability to solve problems in a domain even does not imply to have a generally a deeper understanding of that domain. Once again my example of the problem to find a path within a graph from node A to node B: Program p1 (= problem solver) can find a path. Program p2 (= expert in understanding) can verify and analyze paths. For instance, p2 could be able compare the length of the path for the first half of the nodes with the length of the path for the second half of the nodes. It is not necessary that P1 can do this as well. P2 can not necessarily find a path. But p1 can not necessarily analyze its solution. Understanding and problem solving are different things which might have a common subset but it is wrong that the one implies the other one or vice versa. And that's the main reason why natural language understanding is not necessarily AGI-complete. -Matthias Terren Suydam [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Once again, there is a depth to understanding - it's not simply a binary proposition. Don't you agree that a grandmaster understands chess better than you do, even if his moves are understandable to you in hindsight? If I'm not good at math, I might not be able to solve y=3x+4 for x, but I might understand that y equals 3 times x plus four. My understanding is superficial compared to someone who can solve for x. Finally, don't you agree that understanding natural language requires solving problems? If not, how would you account for an AI's ability to understand novel metaphor? Terren --- On Thu, 10/23/08, Dr. Matthias Heger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Dr. Matthias Heger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [agi] Understanding and Problem Solving To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Thursday, October 23, 2008, 1:47 AM Terren Suydam wrote: >>> Understanding goes far beyond mere knowledge - understanding *is* the ability to solve problems. One's understanding of a situation or problem is only as deep as one's (theoretical) ability to act in such a way as to achieve a desired outcome. <<< I disagree. A grandmaster of chess can explain his decisions and I will understand them. Einstein could explain his theory to other physicist(at least a subset) and they could understand it. I can read a proof in mathematics and I will understand it – because I only have to understand (= check) every step of the proof. Problem solving is much much more than only understanding. Problem solving is the ability to *create* a sequence of actions to change a system's state from A to a desired state B. For example: Problem Find a path from A to B within a graph. An algorithm which can check a solution and can answer details about the solution is not necessarily able to find a solution. -Matthias -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein --
Re: Lojban (was Re: [agi] constructivist issues)
Hi. I don't understand the following statements. Could you explain it some
more?
- Natural language can be learned from examples. Formal language can not.
I think that you're basing this upon the methods that *you* would apply to each
of the types of language. It makes sense to me that because of the
regularities of a formal language that you would be able to use more effective
methods -- but it doesn't mean that the methods used on natural language
wouldn't work (just that they would be as inefficient as they are on natural
languages.
I would also argue that the same argument applies to the first statement of
following the following two.
- Formal language must be parsed before it can be understood. Natural language
must be understood before it can be parsed.
- Original Message -
From: Matt Mahoney
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 9:23 PM
Subject: Lojban (was Re: [agi] constructivist issues)
Why would anyone use a simplified or formalized English (with regular
grammar and no ambiguities) as a path to natural language understanding? Formal
language processing has nothing to do with natural language processing other
than sharing a common lexicon that make them appear superficially similar.
- Natural language can be learned from examples. Formal language can
not.
- Formal language has an exact grammar and semantics. Natural language
does not.
- Formal language must be parsed before it can be understood. Natural
language must be understood before it can be parsed.
- Formal language is designed to be processed efficiently on a fast,
reliable, sequential computer that neither makes nor tolerates errors, between
systems that have identical, fixed language models. Natural language evolved to
be processed efficiently by a slow, unreliable, massively parallel computer
with enormous memory in a noisy environment between systems that have different
but adaptive language models.
So how does yet another formal language processing system help us
understand natural language? This route has been a dead end for 50 years, in
spite of the ability to always make some initial progress before getting stuck.
-- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- On Wed, 10/22/08, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wednesday, October 22, 2008, 12:27 PM
This is the standard Lojban dictionary
http://jbovlaste.lojban.org/
I am not so worried about word meanings, they can always be handled
via reference to WordNet via usages like run_1, run_2, etc. ... or as you say
by using rarer, less ambiguous words
Prepositions are more worrisome, however, I suppose they can be
handled in a similar way, e.g. by defining an ontology of preposition meanings
like with_1, with_2, with_3, etc.
In fact we had someone spend a couple months integrating existing
resources into a preposition-meaning ontology like this a while back ... the
so-called PrepositionWordNet ... or as it eventually came to be called the
LARDict or LogicalArgumentRelationshipDictionary ...
I think it would be feasible to tweak RelEx to recognize these sorts
of subscripts, and in this way to recognize a highly controlled English that
would be unproblematic to map semantically...
We would then say e.g.
I ate dinner with_2 my fork
I live in_2 Maryland
I have lived_6 for_3 41 years
(where I suppress all _1's, so that e.g. ate means ate_1)
Because, RelEx already happily parses the syntax of all simple
sentences, so the only real hassle to deal with is disambiguation. We could
use similar hacking for reference resolution, temporal sequencing, etc.
The terrorists_v1 robbed_v2 my house. After that_v2, the jerks_v1
urinated in_3 my yard.
I think this would be a relatively pain-free way to communicate with
an AI that lacks the common sense to carry out disambiguation and reference
resolution reliably. Also, the log of communication would provide a nice
training DB for it to use in studying disambiguation.
-- Ben G
On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 12:00 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>> IMHO that is an almost hopeless approach, ambiguity is too
integral to English or any natural language ... e.g preposition ambiguity
Actually, I've been making pretty good progress. You just always
use big words and never use small words and/or you use a specific phrase as a
"word". Ambiguous prepositions just disambiguate to one of
three/four/five/more possible unambiguous words/phrases.
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
But, I still do not agree with the way you are using the incompleteness theorem. Um. OK. Could you point to a specific example where you disagree? I'm a little at a loss here . . . . It is important to distinguish between two different types of incompleteness. 1. Normal Incompleteness-- a logical theory fails to completely specify something. 2. Godelian Incompleteness-- a logical theory fails to completely specify something, even though we want it to. I'm also not getting this. If I read the words, it looks like the difference between Normal and Godelian incompleteness is based upon our desires. I think I'm having a complete disconnect with your intended meaning. However, it seems like all you need is type 1 completeness for what you are saying. So, Godel's theorem is way overkill here in my opinion. Um. OK. So I used a bazooka on a fly? If it was a really pesky fly and I didn't destroy anything else, is that wrong? :-) It seems as if you're not arguing with my conclusion but saying that my arguments were way better than they needed to be (like I'm being over-efficient?) . . . . = = = = = Seriously though, I having a complete disconnect here. Maybe I'm just having a bad morning but . . . huh? :-) If I read the words, all I'm getting is that you disagree with the way that I am using the theory because the theory is overkill for what is necessary. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 9:05 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, I own and have read the book-- but my first introduction to Godel's Theorem was Douglas Hofstadter's earlier work, Godel Escher Bach. Since I had already been guided through the details of the proof (and grappled with the consequences), to be honest chapter 10 you refer to was a little boring :). But, I still do not agree with the way you are using the incompleteness theorem. It is important to distinguish between two different types of incompleteness. 1. Normal Incompleteness-- a logical theory fails to completely specify something. 2. Godelian Incompleteness-- a logical theory fails to completely specify something, even though we want it to. Logicians always mean type 2 incompleteness when they use the term. To formalize the difference between the two, the measuring stick of "semantics" is used. If a logic's provably-true statements don't match up to its semantically-true statements, it is incomplete. However, it seems like all you need is type 1 completeness for what you are saying. Nobody claims that there is a complete, well-defined semantics for natural language against which we could measure the "provably-true" (whatever THAT would mean). So, Godel's theorem is way overkill here in my opinion. --Abram On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 7:48 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Most of what I was thinking of and referring to is in Chapter 10. Gödel's Quintessential Strange Loop (pages 125-145 in my version) but I would suggest that you really need to read the shorter Chapter 9. Pattern and Provability (pages 113-122) first. I actually had them conflated into a single chapter in my memory. I think that you'll enjoy them tremendously. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 4:19 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, Chapter number please? --Abram On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 1:16 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Douglas Hofstadter's newest book I Am A Strange Loop (currently available from Amazon for $7.99 - http://www.amazon.com/Am-Strange-Loop-Douglas-Hofstadter/dp/B001FA23HM) has an excellent chapter showing Godel in syntax and semantics. I highly recommend it. The upshot is that while it is easily possible to define a complete formal system of syntax, that formal system can always be used to convey something (some semantics) that is (are) outside/beyond the system -- OR, to paraphrase -- meaning is always incomplete because it can always be added to even inside a formal system of syntax. This is why I contend that language translation ends up being AGI-complete (although bounded subsets clearly don't need to be -- the question is whether you get a usable/useful subset more easily with or without first creating a seed AGI). - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 12:38 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, The way you invoke Godel's Theorem is strange to me... perhaps you have explained your argument more fully elsewhere, but as it stands I do not see your reasoning. --Abram On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 12:20 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: It looks like a
Re: AW: AW: [agi] Language learning (was Re: Defining AGI)
I have already proved something stronger What would you consider your best reference/paper outlining your arguments? Thanks in advance. - Original Message - From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 8:55 PM Subject: Re: AW: AW: [agi] Language learning (was Re: Defining AGI) --- On Wed, 10/22/08, Dr. Matthias Heger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: You make the implicit assumption that a natural language understanding system will pass the turing test. Can you prove this? If you accept that a language model is a probability distribution over text, then I have already proved something stronger. A language model exactly duplicates the distribution of answers that a human would give. The output is indistinguishable by any test. In fact a judge would have some uncertainty about other people's language models. A judge could be expected to attribute some errors in the model to normal human variation. Furthermore, it is just an assumption that the ability to have and to apply the rules are really necessary to pass the turing test. For these two reasons, you still haven't shown 3a and 3b. I suppose you are right. Instead of encoding mathematical rules as a grammar, with enough training data you can just code all possible instances that are likely to be encountered. For example, instead of a grammar rule to encode the commutative law of addition, 5 + 3 = a + b = b + a = 3 + 5 a model with a much larger training data set could just encode instances with no generalization: 12 + 7 = 7 + 12 92 + 0.5 = 0.5 + 92 etc. I believe this is how Google gets away with brute force n-gram statistics instead of more sophisticated grammars. It's language model is probably 10^5 times larger than a human model (10^14 bits vs 10^9 bits). Shannon observed in 1949 that random strings generated by n-gram models of English (where n is the number of either letters or words) look like natural language up to length 2n. For a typical human sized model (1 GB text), n is about 3 words. To model strings longer than 6 words we would need more sophisticated grammar rules. Google can model 5-grams (see http://googleresearch.blogspot.com/2006/08/all-our-n-gram-are-belong-to-you.html ) , so it is able to generate and recognize (thus appear to understand) sentences up to about 10 words. By the way: The turing test must convince 30% of the people. Today there is a system which can already convince 25% http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/10/081013112148.htm It would be interesting to see a version of the Turing test where the human confederate, machine, and judge all have access to a computer with an internet connection. I wonder if this intelligence augmentation would make the test easier or harder to pass? -Matthias > 3) you apply rules such as 5 * 7 = 35 -> 35 / 7 = 5 but > you have not shown that > 3a) that a language understanding system necessarily(!) has > this rules > 3b) that a language understanding system necessarily(!) can > apply such rules It must have the rules and apply them to pass the Turing test. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
My point was meant to be that control is part of effective concept creation. You had phrased it as if concept creation was an additional necessity on top of inference control. But I think we're reaching the point of silliness here . . . . - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 6:35 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI all these words ... "inference", "control", "concept", "creation" ... are inadequately specified in natural language so misunderstandings will be easy to come by. However, I don't have time to point out the references to my particular intended definitions.. I did not mean to imply that the control involved would be entirely in the domain of inference, even when inference is broadly construed... just that control of inference, broadly construed, is a key aspect... ben g On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 5:41 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> No system can make those kinds of inventions without sophisticated inference control. Concept creation of course is required also, though. I'd argue that this is bad phrasing. Sure, effective control is necessary to create the concepts that you need to fulfill your goals (as opposed to far too many random unuseful concepts) . . . . But it isn't "Concept creation of course is required also", it really is "Effective control is necessary for effective concept creation which is necessary for effective goal fulfillment." And assuming that control must be sophisticated and necessarily entirely in the realm of inference are just assumptions . . . . :-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 3:54 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI >> Mathematics, though, is interesting in other ways. I don't believe that much of mathematics involves the logical transformations performed in proof steps. A system that invents new fields of mathematics, new terms, new mathematical "ideas" -- that is truly interesting. Inference control is boring, but inventing mathematical induction, complex numbers, or ring theory -- THAT is AGI-worthy. Is this different from generic concept formulation and explanation (just in a slightly different domain)? No system can make those kinds of inventions without sophisticated inference control. Concept creation of course is required also, though. -- Ben -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
Most of what I was thinking of and referring to is in Chapter 10. Gödel's Quintessential Strange Loop (pages 125-145 in my version) but I would suggest that you really need to read the shorter Chapter 9. Pattern and Provability (pages 113-122) first. I actually had them conflated into a single chapter in my memory. I think that you'll enjoy them tremendously. - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 4:19 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, Chapter number please? --Abram On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 1:16 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Douglas Hofstadter's newest book I Am A Strange Loop (currently available from Amazon for $7.99 - http://www.amazon.com/Am-Strange-Loop-Douglas-Hofstadter/dp/B001FA23HM) has an excellent chapter showing Godel in syntax and semantics. I highly recommend it. The upshot is that while it is easily possible to define a complete formal system of syntax, that formal system can always be used to convey something (some semantics) that is (are) outside/beyond the system -- OR, to paraphrase -- meaning is always incomplete because it can always be added to even inside a formal system of syntax. This is why I contend that language translation ends up being AGI-complete (although bounded subsets clearly don't need to be -- the question is whether you get a usable/useful subset more easily with or without first creating a seed AGI). - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 12:38 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, The way you invoke Godel's Theorem is strange to me... perhaps you have explained your argument more fully elsewhere, but as it stands I do not see your reasoning. --Abram On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 12:20 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: It looks like all this "disambiguation" by moving to a more formal language is about sweeping the problem under the rug, removing the need for uncertain reasoning from surface levels of syntax and semantics, to remember about it 10 years later, retouch the most annoying holes with simple statistical techniques, and continue as before. That's an excellent criticism but not the intent. Godel's Incompleteness Theorem means that you will be forever building . . . . All that disambiguation does is provides a solid, commonly-agreed upon foundation to build from. English and all natural languages are *HARD*. They are not optimal for simple understanding particularly given the realms we are currently in and ambiguity makes things even worse. Languages have so many ambiguities because of the way that they (and concepts) develop. You see something new, you grab the nearest analogy and word/label and then modify it to fit. That's why you then later need the much longer words and very specific scientific terms and names. Simple language is what you need to build the more specific complex language. Having an unambiguous constructed language is simply a template or mold that you can use as scaffolding while you develop NLU. Children start out very unambiguous and concrete and so should we. (And I don't believe in statistical techniques unless you have the resources of Google or AIXI) --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
>> No system can make those kinds of inventions without sophisticated inference >> control. Concept creation of course is required also, though. I'd argue that this is bad phrasing. Sure, effective control is necessary to create the concepts that you need to fulfill your goals (as opposed to far too many random unuseful concepts) . . . . But it isn't "Concept creation of course is required also", it really is "Effective control is necessary for effective concept creation which is necessary for effective goal fulfillment." And assuming that control must be sophisticated and necessarily entirely in the realm of inference are just assumptions . . . . :-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 3:54 PM Subject: **SPAM** Re: AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI >> Mathematics, though, is interesting in other ways. I don't believe that much of mathematics involves the logical transformations performed in proof steps. A system that invents new fields of mathematics, new terms, new mathematical "ideas" -- that is truly interesting. Inference control is boring, but inventing mathematical induction, complex numbers, or ring theory -- THAT is AGI-worthy. Is this different from generic concept formulation and explanation (just in a slightly different domain)? No system can make those kinds of inventions without sophisticated inference control. Concept creation of course is required also, though. -- Ben -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
>> Still, using chess as a test case may not be useless; a system that produces >> a convincing story about concept formation in the chess domain (that is, >> that invents concepts for pinning, pawn chains, speculative sacrifices in >> exchange for piece mobility, zugzwang, and so on without an identifiable >> bias toward these things) would at least be interesting to those interested >> in AGI. I believe that generic concept formation and explanation is an AGI-complete problem. Would you agree or disagree? >> Mathematics, though, is interesting in other ways. I don't believe that >> much of mathematics involves the logical transformations performed in proof >> steps. A system that invents new fields of mathematics, new terms, new >> mathematical "ideas" -- that is truly interesting. Inference control is >> boring, but inventing mathematical induction, complex numbers, or ring >> theory -- THAT is AGI-worthy. Is this different from generic concept formulation and explanation (just in a slightly different domain)? --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: AW: [agi] If your AGI can't learn to play chess it is no AGI
A couple of distinctions that I think would be really helpful for this discussion . . . . There is a profound difference between learning to play chess legally and learning to play chess well. There is an equally profound difference between discovering how to play chess well and being taught to play chess well. Personally, I think that a minimal AGI should be able to be taught to play chess reasonably well (i.e. about how well an average human would play after being taught the rules and playing a reasonable number of games with hints/pointers/tutoring provided) at about the same rate as a human when given the same assistance as that human. Given that grandmasters don't learn solely from chess-only examples without help or without analogies and strategies from other domains, I don't see why an AGI should be forced to operate under those constraints. Being taught is much faster and easier than discovering on your own. Translating an analogy or transferring a strategy from another domain is much faster than discovering something new or developing something from scratch. Why are we crippling our AGI in the name of simplicity? (And Go is obviously the same) --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [OpenCog] Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> Well, I am confident my approach with subscripts to handle disambiguation >> and reference resolution would work, in conjunction with the existing >> link-parser/RelEx framework... >> If anyone wants to implement it, it seems like "just" some hacking with the >> open-source Java RelEx code... Like what I called a "semantically-driven English->subset translator"?. Oh, I'm pretty confidant that it will work as well . . . . after the LaBrea tar pit of implementations . . . . (exactly how little semantic-related coding do you think will be necessary? ;-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 1:06 PM Subject: Re: [OpenCog] Re: [agi] constructivist issues Well, I am confident my approach with subscripts to handle disambiguation and reference resolution would work, in conjunction with the existing link-parser/RelEx framework... If anyone wants to implement it, it seems like "just" some hacking with the open-source Java RelEx code... ben g On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 12:59 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> I think this would be a relatively pain-free way to communicate with an AI that lacks the common sense to carry out disambiguation and reference resolution reliably. Also, the log of communication would provide a nice training DB for it to use in studying disambiguation. Awesome. Like I said, it's a piece of something that I'm trying currently. If I get positive results, I'm certainly not going to hide the fact. ;-) (or, it could turn into a learning experience like my attempts with Simplified English and Basic English :-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 12:27 PM Subject: [OpenCog] Re: [agi] constructivist issues This is the standard Lojban dictionary http://jbovlaste.lojban.org/ I am not so worried about word meanings, they can always be handled via reference to WordNet via usages like run_1, run_2, etc. ... or as you say by using rarer, less ambiguous words Prepositions are more worrisome, however, I suppose they can be handled in a similar way, e.g. by defining an ontology of preposition meanings like with_1, with_2, with_3, etc. In fact we had someone spend a couple months integrating existing resources into a preposition-meaning ontology like this a while back ... the so-called PrepositionWordNet ... or as it eventually came to be called the LARDict or LogicalArgumentRelationshipDictionary ... I think it would be feasible to tweak RelEx to recognize these sorts of subscripts, and in this way to recognize a highly controlled English that would be unproblematic to map semantically... We would then say e.g. I ate dinner with_2 my fork I live in_2 Maryland I have lived_6 for_3 41 years (where I suppress all _1's, so that e.g. ate means ate_1) Because, RelEx already happily parses the syntax of all simple sentences, so the only real hassle to deal with is disambiguation. We could use similar hacking for reference resolution, temporal sequencing, etc. The terrorists_v1 robbed_v2 my house. After that_v2, the jerks_v1 urinated in_3 my yard. I think this would be a relatively pain-free way to communicate with an AI that lacks the common sense to carry out disambiguation and reference resolution reliably. Also, the log of communication would provide a nice training DB for it to use in studying disambiguation. -- Ben G On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 12:00 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> IMHO that is an almost hopeless approach, ambiguity is too integral to English or any natural language ... e.g preposition ambiguity Actually, I've been making pretty good progress. You just always use big words and never use small words and/or you use a specific phrase as a "word". Ambiguous prepositions just disambiguate to one of three/four/five/more possible unambiguous words/phrases. The problem is that most previous subsets (Simplified English, Basic English) actually *favored* the small tremendously over-used/ambiguous words (because you got so much more "bang for the buck" with them). Try only using big unambiguous words and see if you still have the same opinion. >> If you want to take this sort of approach, you'd better start with Lojban instead Learning Lojban is a pain but far less pain than you'll have trying to make a disambiguated subset of English. My first reaction is . . . . Take a Lojban dictionary and see if you can come up with an unambiguous Engl
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
Douglas Hofstadter's newest book I Am A Strange Loop (currently available from Amazon for $7.99 - http://www.amazon.com/Am-Strange-Loop-Douglas-Hofstadter/dp/B001FA23HM) has an excellent chapter showing Godel in syntax and semantics. I highly recommend it. The upshot is that while it is easily possible to define a complete formal system of syntax, that formal system can always be used to convey something (some semantics) that is (are) outside/beyond the system -- OR, to paraphrase -- meaning is always incomplete because it can always be added to even inside a formal system of syntax. This is why I contend that language translation ends up being AGI-complete (although bounded subsets clearly don't need to be -- the question is whether you get a usable/useful subset more easily with or without first creating a seed AGI). - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 12:38 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Mark, The way you invoke Godel's Theorem is strange to me... perhaps you have explained your argument more fully elsewhere, but as it stands I do not see your reasoning. --Abram On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 12:20 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: It looks like all this "disambiguation" by moving to a more formal language is about sweeping the problem under the rug, removing the need for uncertain reasoning from surface levels of syntax and semantics, to remember about it 10 years later, retouch the most annoying holes with simple statistical techniques, and continue as before. That's an excellent criticism but not the intent. Godel's Incompleteness Theorem means that you will be forever building . . . . All that disambiguation does is provides a solid, commonly-agreed upon foundation to build from. English and all natural languages are *HARD*. They are not optimal for simple understanding particularly given the realms we are currently in and ambiguity makes things even worse. Languages have so many ambiguities because of the way that they (and concepts) develop. You see something new, you grab the nearest analogy and word/label and then modify it to fit. That's why you then later need the much longer words and very specific scientific terms and names. Simple language is what you need to build the more specific complex language. Having an unambiguous constructed language is simply a template or mold that you can use as scaffolding while you develop NLU. Children start out very unambiguous and concrete and so should we. (And I don't believe in statistical techniques unless you have the resources of Google or AIXI) --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [OpenCog] Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> I think this would be a relatively pain-free way to communicate with an AI >> that lacks the common sense to carry out disambiguation and reference >> resolution reliably. Also, the log of communication would provide a nice >> training DB for it to use in studying disambiguation. Awesome. Like I said, it's a piece of something that I'm trying currently. If I get positive results, I'm certainly not going to hide the fact. ;-) (or, it could turn into a learning experience like my attempts with Simplified English and Basic English :-) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 12:27 PM Subject: [OpenCog] Re: [agi] constructivist issues This is the standard Lojban dictionary http://jbovlaste.lojban.org/ I am not so worried about word meanings, they can always be handled via reference to WordNet via usages like run_1, run_2, etc. ... or as you say by using rarer, less ambiguous words Prepositions are more worrisome, however, I suppose they can be handled in a similar way, e.g. by defining an ontology of preposition meanings like with_1, with_2, with_3, etc. In fact we had someone spend a couple months integrating existing resources into a preposition-meaning ontology like this a while back ... the so-called PrepositionWordNet ... or as it eventually came to be called the LARDict or LogicalArgumentRelationshipDictionary ... I think it would be feasible to tweak RelEx to recognize these sorts of subscripts, and in this way to recognize a highly controlled English that would be unproblematic to map semantically... We would then say e.g. I ate dinner with_2 my fork I live in_2 Maryland I have lived_6 for_3 41 years (where I suppress all _1's, so that e.g. ate means ate_1) Because, RelEx already happily parses the syntax of all simple sentences, so the only real hassle to deal with is disambiguation. We could use similar hacking for reference resolution, temporal sequencing, etc. The terrorists_v1 robbed_v2 my house. After that_v2, the jerks_v1 urinated in_3 my yard. I think this would be a relatively pain-free way to communicate with an AI that lacks the common sense to carry out disambiguation and reference resolution reliably. Also, the log of communication would provide a nice training DB for it to use in studying disambiguation. -- Ben G On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 12:00 PM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> IMHO that is an almost hopeless approach, ambiguity is too integral to English or any natural language ... e.g preposition ambiguity Actually, I've been making pretty good progress. You just always use big words and never use small words and/or you use a specific phrase as a "word". Ambiguous prepositions just disambiguate to one of three/four/five/more possible unambiguous words/phrases. The problem is that most previous subsets (Simplified English, Basic English) actually *favored* the small tremendously over-used/ambiguous words (because you got so much more "bang for the buck" with them). Try only using big unambiguous words and see if you still have the same opinion. >> If you want to take this sort of approach, you'd better start with Lojban instead Learning Lojban is a pain but far less pain than you'll have trying to make a disambiguated subset of English. My first reaction is . . . . Take a Lojban dictionary and see if you can come up with an unambiguous English word or very short phrase for each Lojban word. If you can do it, my approach will work and will have the advantage that the output can be read by anyone (i.e. it's the equivalent of me having done it in Lojban and then added a Lojban -> English translation on the end) though the input is still *very* problematical (thus the need for a semantically-driven English->subset translator). If you can't do it, then my approach won't work. Can you do it? Why or why not? If you can, do you still believe that my approach won't work? Oh, wait . . . . a Lojban-to-English dictionary *does* attempt to come up with an unambiguous English word or very short phrase for each Lojban word. :-) Actually, h . . . . a Lojban dictionary would probably help me focus my efforts a bit better and highlight things that I may have missed . . . . do you have a preferred dictionary or resource? (Google has too many for me to do a decent perusal quickly) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 11:11 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Personally, rather than starting with NLP, I think that we're going to need to start with a formal language that is a
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
What I meant was, it seems like humans are "logically complete" in some sense. In practice we are greatly limited by memory and processing speed and so on; but I *don't* think we're limited by lacking some important logical construct. It would be like us discovering some alien species whose mathematicians were able to understand each individual case of mathematical induction, but were unable to comprehend the argument for accepting it as a general principle, because they lack the abstraction. Something like that is what I find implausible. I like the phrase "logically complete". The way that I like to think about it is that we have the necessary seed of whatever intelligence/competence is that can be logically extended to cover all circumstances. We may not have the personal time or resources to do so but given infinite time and resources there is no block on the path from what we have to getting there. Note, however, that it is my understanding that a number of people on this list do not agree with this statement (feel free to chime in with you reasons why folks). - Original Message - From: "Abram Demski" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 12:20 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Too many responses for me to comment on everything! So, sorry to those I don't address... Ben, When I claim a mathematical entity exists, I'm saying loosely that meaningful statements can be made using it. So, I think "meaning" is more basic. I mentioned already what my current definition of meaning is: a statement is meaningful if it is associated with a computable rule of deduction that it can use to operate on other (meaningful) statements. This is in contrast to positivist-style definitions of meaning, that would instead require a computable test of truth and/or falsehood. So, a statement is meaningful if it has procedural deductive meaning. We *understand* a statement if we are capable of carrying out the corresponding deductive procedure. A statement is *true* if carrying out that deductive procedure only produces more true statements. We *believe* a statement if we not only understand it, but proceed to apply its deductive procedure. There is of course some basic level of meaningful statements, such as sensory observations, so that this is a working recursive definition of meaning and truth. By this definition of meaning, any statement in the arithmetical hierarchy is meaningful (because each statement can be represented by computable consequences on other statements in the arithmetical hierarchy). I think some hyperarithmetical truths are captured as well. I am more doubtful about it capturing anything beyond the first level of the analytic hierarchy, and general set-theoretic discourse seems far beyond its reach. Regardless, the definition of meaning makes a very large number of uncomputable truths nonetheless meaningful. Russel, I think both Ben and I would approximately agree with everything you said, but that doesn't change our disagreeing with each other :). Mark, Good call... I shouldn't be talking like I think it is terrifically unlikely that some more-intelligent alien species would find humans mathematically crude. What I meant was, it seems like humans are "logically complete" in some sense. In practice we are greatly limited by memory and processing speed and so on; but I *don't* think we're limited by lacking some important logical construct. It would be like us discovering some alien species whose mathematicians were able to understand each individual case of mathematical induction, but were unable to comprehend the argument for accepting it as a general principle, because they lack the abstraction. Something like that is what I find implausible. --Abram --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> Come by the house, we'll drop some acid together and you'll be convinced ;-) Been there, done that. Just because some logically inconsistent thoughts have no value doesn't mean that all logically inconsistent thoughts have no value. Not to mention the fact that hallucinogens, if not the subsequently warped thoughts, do have the serious value of raising your mental Boltzmann temperature. - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 11:11 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 10:51 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> I don't want to diss the personal value of logically inconsistent thoughts. But I doubt their scientific and engineering value. I doesn't seem to make sense that something would have personal value and then not have scientific or engineering value. Come by the house, we'll drop some acid together and you'll be convinced ;-) -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
(joke) What? You don't love me any more? - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 11:11 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues (joke) On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 11:11 AM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 10:51 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> I don't want to diss the personal value of logically inconsistent thoughts. But I doubt their scientific and engineering value. I doesn't seem to make sense that something would have personal value and then not have scientific or engineering value. Come by the house, we'll drop some acid together and you'll be convinced ;-) -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> IMHO that is an almost hopeless approach, ambiguity is too integral to >> English or any natural language ... e.g preposition ambiguity Actually, I've been making pretty good progress. You just always use big words and never use small words and/or you use a specific phrase as a "word". Ambiguous prepositions just disambiguate to one of three/four/five/more possible unambiguous words/phrases. The problem is that most previous subsets (Simplified English, Basic English) actually *favored* the small tremendously over-used/ambiguous words (because you got so much more "bang for the buck" with them). Try only using big unambiguous words and see if you still have the same opinion. >> If you want to take this sort of approach, you'd better start with Lojban >> instead Learning Lojban is a pain but far less pain than you'll have >> trying to make a disambiguated subset of English. My first reaction is . . . . Take a Lojban dictionary and see if you can come up with an unambiguous English word or very short phrase for each Lojban word. If you can do it, my approach will work and will have the advantage that the output can be read by anyone (i.e. it's the equivalent of me having done it in Lojban and then added a Lojban -> English translation on the end) though the input is still *very* problematical (thus the need for a semantically-driven English->subset translator). If you can't do it, then my approach won't work. Can you do it? Why or why not? If you can, do you still believe that my approach won't work? Oh, wait . . . . a Lojban-to-English dictionary *does* attempt to come up with an unambiguous English word or very short phrase for each Lojban word. :-) Actually, h . . . . a Lojban dictionary would probably help me focus my efforts a bit better and highlight things that I may have missed . . . . do you have a preferred dictionary or resource? (Google has too many for me to do a decent perusal quickly) - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 11:11 AM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Personally, rather than starting with NLP, I think that we're going to need to start with a formal language that is a disambiguated subset of English IMHO that is an almost hopeless approach, ambiguity is too integral to English or any natural language ... e.g preposition ambiguity If you want to take this sort of approach, you'd better start with Lojban instead Learning Lojban is a pain but far less pain than you'll have trying to make a disambiguated subset of English. ben g -- agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> I disagree, and believe that I can think X: "This is a thought (T) that is >> way too complex for me to ever have." >> Obviously, I can't think T and then think X, but I might represent T as a >> combination of myself plus a notebook or some other external media. Even if >> I only observe part of T at once, I might appreciate that it is one thought >> and believe (perhaps in error) that I could never think it. >> I might even observe T in action, if T is the result of billions of >> measurements, comparisons and calculations in a computer program. >> Isn't it just like thinking "This is an image that is way too detailed for >> me to ever see"? Excellent! This is precisely how I feel about intelligence . . . . (and why we *can* understand it even if we can't hold the totality of it -- or fully predict it -- sort of like the weather :-) --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> Well, if you are a computable system, and if by "think" you mean "represent >> accurately and internally" then you can only think that odd thought via >> being logically inconsistent... ;-) True -- but why are we assuming *internally*? Drop that assumption as Charles clearly did and there is no problem. It's like infrastructure . . . . I don't have to know all the details of something to use it under normal circumstances though I frequently need to know the details is I'm doing something odd with it or looking for extreme performance and I definitely need to know the details if I'm diagnosing/fixing/debugging it -- but I can always learn them as I go . . . . - Original Message - From: Ben Goertzel To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2008 11:26 PM Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues Well, if you are a computable system, and if by "think" you mean "represent accurately and internally" then you can only think that odd thought via being logically inconsistent... ;-) On Tue, Oct 21, 2008 at 11:23 PM, charles griffiths <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I disagree, and believe that I can think X: "This is a thought (T) that is way too complex for me to ever have." Obviously, I can't think T and then think X, but I might represent T as a combination of myself plus a notebook or some other external media. Even if I only observe part of T at once, I might appreciate that it is one thought and believe (perhaps in error) that I could never think it. I might even observe T in action, if T is the result of billions of measurements, comparisons and calculations in a computer program. Isn't it just like thinking "This is an image that is way too detailed for me to ever see"? Charles Griffiths --- On Tue, 10/21/08, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: [agi] constructivist issues To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Tuesday, October 21, 2008, 7:56 PM I am a Peircean pragmatist ... I have no objection to using infinities in mathematics ... they can certainly be quite useful. I'd rather use differential calculus to do calculations, than do everything using finite differences. It's just that, from a science perspective, these mathematical infinities have to be considered finite formal constructs ... they don't existP except in this way ... I'm not going to claim the pragmatist perspective is the only subjectively meaningful one. But so far as I can tell it's the only useful one for science and engineering... To take a totally different angle, consider the thought X = "This is a thought that is way too complex for me to ever have" Can I actually think X? Well, I can understand the *idea* of X. I can manipulate it symbolically and formally. I can reason about it and empathize with it by analogy to "A thought that is way too complex for my three-year-old past-self to have ever had" , and so forth. But it seems I can't ever really think X, except by being logically inconsistent within that same thought ... this is the Godel limitation applied to my own mind... I don't want to diss the personal value of logically inconsistent thoughts. But I doubt their scientific and engineering value. -- Ben G On Tue, Oct 21, 2008 at 10:43 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Ben, How accurate would it be to describe you as a finitist or ultrafinitist? I ask because your view about restricting quantifiers seems to reject even the infinities normally allowed by constructivists. --Abram --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome " - Dr Samuel Johnson agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections
Re: AW: AW: [agi] Re: Defining AGI
I'm also confused. This has been a strange thread. People of average and around-average intelligence are trained as lab technicians or database architects every day. Many of them are doing real science. Perhaps a person with down's syndrome would do poorly in one of these largely practical positions. Perhaps. The consensus seems to be that there is no way to make a fool do a scientist's job. But he can do parts of it. A scientist with a dozen fools at hand could be a great deal more effective than a rival with none, whereas a dozen fools on their own might not be expected to do anything at all. So it is complicated. Or maybe another way to rephrase it is combine it with another thread . . . . Any individual piece of science is understandable/teachable to (or my original point -- verifiable or able to be validated by) any general intelligence but the totally of science combined with the world is far too large to . . . . (which is effectively Ben's point) --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
(1) We humans understand the semantics of formal system X. No. This is the root of your problem. For example, replace "formal system X" with "XML". Saying that "We humans understand the semantics of XML" certainly doesn't work and why I would argue that natural language understanding is AGI-complete (i.e. by the time all the RDF, OWL, and other ontology work is completed -- you'll have an AGI). Any formal system can always be extended *within it's defined syntax* to have any meaning. That is the essence of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. It's also sort of the basis for my argument with Dr. Matthias Heger. Semantics are never finished except when your model of the world is finished (including all possibilities and infinitudes) so language understanding can't be simple and complete. Personally, rather than starting with NLP, I think that we're going to need to start with a formal language that is a disambiguated subset of English and figure out how to use our world model/knowledge to translate English to this disambiguated subset -- and then we can build from there. (or maybe this makes Heger's argument for him . . . . ;-) --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> You have not convinced me that you can do anything a computer can't do. >> And, using language or math, you never will -- because any finite set of >> symbols >> you can utter, could also be uttered by some computational system. >> -- Ben G Can we pin this somewhere? (Maybe on Penrose? ;-) --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] constructivist issues
>> I don't want to diss the personal value of logically inconsistent thoughts. >> But I doubt their scientific and engineering value. I doesn't seem to make sense that something would have personal value and then not have scientific or engineering value. I can sort of understand science if you're interpreting science looking for the final correct/optimal value but engineering generally goes for either "good enough" or "the best of the currently known available options" and anything that really/truly has personal value would seem to have engineering value. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
