I don't normally follow unsolicited links on the Internet because of potential
fishing scams no fence but I'd be happy to share my research interests here
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I wonder what would happen to someone's mind if they were born in a white
(or any color) isolation tank. What would happen as years wore on? Would
the person ever hallucinate anything? It has only seen the tank for his
whole life. So what would inspire him to hallucinate something? Can he
Thank you everyone for responding. Please keep in mind that I wrote that
when my ideas about formal systems were more naive than they are now two
years ago :D
On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at 12:43 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 15 Jun 2015, at 17:15, Brian Tenneson wrote:
I had
I had forgotten I wrote this a while back, from my FB feed on this day.
Seems relevant.
Can truth ever be proven? Here's something I wrote in a discussion I'm
having.
Structure does not cause something to be non-fictional, nor does lack of
structure cause something to be fictional. A theorem
Hi Brent
On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 6/3/2015 7:16 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
On Wednesday, June 3, 2015 at 2:16:31 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Jun 2015, at 20:10, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Grammatical systems just might be the type
On Wednesday, June 3, 2015 at 2:16:31 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Jun 2015, at 20:10, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Grammatical systems just might be the type of thing Tegmark is looking for
that is a framework for all mathematical structures... or at least a large
class of them.
I
Grammatical systems just might be the type of thing Tegmark is looking for
that is a framework for all mathematical structures... or at least a large
class of them.
I am still exploring the idea of grammatical system induction. I believe
it can be used to provide an induction principle that
, May 10, 2015 at 10:42:20 PM UTC-7, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Hi Everyone,
In the final section of the document I linked to earlier, I am trying to
prove a principle that, if correct, would be a way to prove something is
true for all sets in ZFC; the methods could possibly be adapted to other
promising...
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1amDb4Yti4egpKfcO2oLcnGAH8UpC8_tKb7ivuH3AT7A/edit?usp=sharing
The juicy parts start on page 10-11.
I'd like to be proven wrong before I go much further!
Cheers
Brian
On Thursday, May 7, 2015 at 9:30:50 AM UTC-7, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Hi Bruno
Hi Bruno,
Thank you!
Cheers
Brian
On Thursday, May 7, 2015 at 6:18:35 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Brian,
On 06 May 2015, at 18:48, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Good morning Everything List,
Bruno Marchal's (sorry if I misspelled your name, Bruno!) feedback
on my work has
Good morning Everything List,
Bruno Marchal's (sorry if I misspelled your name, Bruno!) feedback on my work
has been instrumental in helping me realize when certain ideas need revision.
I have been trying to figure out which mathematical entity is our external
reality. Tegmark and others
This is what they call a google bomb. Historians may think google searches
represent something about the mind of humanity. So this particular google
bomb might lead them to think the Fukushima reactor exploded in 2014.
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are
a smaller set than the reals. I'd suppose that if people can figure that
out with our nifty fleshy brains, then a well-designed computer brain
could, too.
-Gabe
On Friday, January 24, 2014 1:23:40 AM UTC-6, Brian Tenneson wrote:
There are undecidable statements (about arithmetic
:
On 27 Jan 2014, at 16:12, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Yes, some day a computer might be able to figure out that the set of
rationals is not equipollent to the set of real numbers.
A Lôbian machine like ZF can do that already.
I saw somewhere that using an automated theorem prover, one of Godel's
You could always just add it and its negation to the list of axioms (though
not at the same time, of course) and see where that leads, if anywhere.
On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 10:55 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 2:23 AM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote
There are undecidable statements (about arithmetic)... There are true
statements lacking proof. There are also false statements about arithmetic
the proof of whose falsehood is impossible; not just impossible for you and
me but for a computer of any capacity or other forms of rational
I had a question about the quote below of Edgar's. In what sense of
'compute' do you believe that something computes reality? Also, I'm
wondering if Laplace's demon is relevant.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace%27s_demon
According to the article, we have:
In 2008, David
On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 11:37:14 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
You keep claiming that we understand this and that or know this and
that. And, yes, saying something along the lines of we know we understand
On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 4:46 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 4:31:55 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:
On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 11:37:14 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote
, 2013 10:09:44 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 4:46 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:
On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 4:31:55 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:
On Tuesday, April 23
Interesting read.
The problem I have with this is that in set theory, there are several
examples of sets who owe their existence to axioms alone. In other words,
there is an axiom that states there is a set X such that (blah, blah,
blah). How are we to know which sets/notions are meaningless
On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out
that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is
accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts.
How do we
On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:13 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 4:31:05 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:
Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point
...@gmail.comwrote:
On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 7:59:26 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:13 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:
On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 4:31:05 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Craig Weinberg whats
So is that a yes? If so, can you stipulate such a physical object?
On Sunday, December 30, 2012 9:08:27 PM UTC-8, Brent wrote:
On 12/30/2012 11:23 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Is there a physical object that exists physically which is not
isomorphic to a
mathematical object, having
Is there a physical object that exists physically which is not isomorphic
to a mathematical object, having mathematical existence?
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Why not take the categories of all categories (besides that Lawyere tried
that without to much success, except rediscovering Grothendieck topoi).
I'm more interested in the smallest mathematical object in which all
mathematical structures are embedded but the category of all categories
, rclough wrote:
Hi Brian Tenneson
Tegmark has many many good ideas, but I am not a believer in multiverses,
which only a strict mechanistic 19th century type can believe.
Multiverses defy reason. Just off the top of head:
1) For one reason because of Occam's razor: it is a needless
What do you think of Tegmark's version of a mathematical Platoia?
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So suppose there is a choice to be made. A or B. Is there software that
enables the computer to independently choose A or B.
What about a neural network of many nodes and connections that has been
through many epochs to the point where its outputs perfectly
*resemble*pseudorandom number
Hi Bruno
On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 1:20 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Brian,
On 13 Sep 2012, at 22:04, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Bruno,
You use B as a predicate symbol for belief I think.
I use for the modal unspecified box, in some context (in place of the more
common
We might as well just use ordered pairs of integers or rational numbers.
On Thursday, September 13, 2012 8:45:53 AM UTC-7, rclough wrote:
Hi everything-list
Since human thought and perception consists of both a logical quantitative
or objective
component as well as a feelings-spiritual
All numbers can be defined in terms of sets. The question becomes this:
do sets have ontological primacy relative to mankind or are sets invented
or created by mankind?
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 5:11 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Yes, of course, but I wanted a
do agree that numbers are not created by man but neither are sets.
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 8:19 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Brian Tenneson
I'm just to establish the fact that numbers are a priori
and so not created by man. Given that, it doesn't matter if sets are
a priori
Unicorns! The idea is just silly! The
point is that properties do not occur at the whim of any one thing, never
have and never will.
On 9/6/2012 11:19 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Brian Tenneson
I'm just to establish the fact that numbers are a priori
and so not created by man. Given
A too much powerful God leads to inconsistency.
What if reality does not always obey the laws of logic? What if reality is
sometimes inconsistent?
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Thinking implies a progression of time. So perhaps it is equally important
to define time.
On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 8:10 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi John Clark
Please define the term thinking.
What is thinking ?
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/30/2012
Leibniz
as something
abstract.
On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 8:31 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Brian Tenneson
Thought itself, IMHO, is beyond spacetime.
It belongs to that Platonic realm to which the
circumstances of time are wholly irrelevant.
But the brain is not. Perhaps it is something
The universe is purely subjective.
Is that statement purely subjective?
Maybe you meant: other than this statement, the universe is purely
subjective.
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This is already a consequence of computer science. All sound machines
looking inward, or doing self-reference, cannot avoid the discovery between
what they can justify with words, and what they can intuit as truth.
What do justify and intuit mean?
There are some machines out there that do not
Yeah but you can't define what a set is either, so...
On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 2:22 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Roger,
On 07 Aug 2012, at 11:53, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
OUR FATHER, WHICH ART IN HEAVBEN,
HALLOWED BE THY NAME.
Luther said that to meditate of the
So you don't know what God wants. Is that what you're saying? I hope
you're not for any reason obsessed with the Bible.
On Wed, Aug 1, 2012 at 9:43 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Aug 1, 2012 at 12:26 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:
How do you know what God
We may be overthinking things here. What's wrong with defining it as the
capacity to make choices when more than one option is available?
On Wed, Aug 1, 2012 at 9:17 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/1/2012 5:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
Yes - and rationality often does not
On Wed, Aug 1, 2012 at 9:24 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
So free will is the ability to always get what we want, after all if we
don't get what we want its because something has stopped us from doing so.
Thus even God doesn't have free will because He doesn't want us to sin and
Isn't every (alleged) proof of something's truth just a list of things
(steps) implied by the previous statement until one arrives at the final
statement...a tautology?
Briefly: isn't every proof just a (possibly lengthy) list of tautologies?
Therefore, using that notion, calling out alleged
The thread is about the possibility of an omnipotent being being able to
manipulate what is true.
On Wed, Jul 4, 2012 at 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy
multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:
Hello Everythinglisters,
First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions from
time to
What I was wondering, and I know this is ill-formed, is if in different
parallels, different things are absolutely true. Things like 2+2=17. It
may be completely impractical to imagine such parallels since there is
presumably zero overlap and no means of travel to there. The basic
premise is
What I meant is an omnipotent being being able to manipulate what is
actually, absolutely true (so in a parallel 2+2 might actually be 17). Not
manipulate the perception of truth.
On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 1:11 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 6/28/2012 1:06 PM, Brian Tenneson wrote
I have many questions.
One is what if truth were malleable?
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I will exercise my *insert gibberish here* by disagreeing.
On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 8:53 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Jun 5, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
while you do not *always* know what you're going to do, you know your
preferences most of the time.
Speaking of the legal aspect,
Yes, Hitler exercised his *insert gibberish here* when he issued orders to
kill the Jews.
IF *gibberish* does not exist, then how can we hold criminals culpable in
that they had no choice but to commit crime? Seems unfair to punish anyone
under those circumstances.
I think people make choices from among available options many times every
day and that is why the concept in question exists.
On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 9:15 AM, R AM ramra...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:08 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:
Speaking of the legal aspect
, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jun 1, 2012 Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:
The fact that free will is debated lends credence to the notion that
Free will is not meaningless. Free will has to mean something before
it can be attacked.
But I'm not saying free
FREE means being *able *to choose *any *among a number of choices. You
want freedom of will to mean an agent can choose something beyond what the
given choices are? That would imply free will does not exist yet, in that
event, free will is still NOT meaningless.
Right now I am unconcerned with
with free will. To test something you need an
operational definition. Agent might be defined as an entity with acts
unpredictably but purposefully. But both of those are a little fuzzy.
Brent
On 6/2/2012 10:40 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
The capacity (which can be defined) of an agent (which
Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII string free will means and neither
do you.
John K Clark
Of course there are various degrees to which it can be free but that
doesn't mean free will is a meaningless string. Freedom is defined by
the observer. I note the freedom I have in choosing
The fact that free will is debated lends credence to the notion that Free
will is not meaningless. Free will has to mean something before it can
be attacked.
On Fri, Jun 1, 2012 at 12:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 6/1/2012 11:43 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Cannot comment
Of course it doesn't, nothing real can have anything to do with free
will because free will is gibberish.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/
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What about Gabriel's Horn or the Koch Snowflake curve?
They may also contradict intuition but the results are not dependent upon
the axiom of choice.
On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 9:17 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 5/30/2012 1:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Banach and Tarski proved an
It doesn't take free will to prove that every even number is divisible by
2. How to prove a statement with a universal quantifier is pretty basic.
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Aleksandr Lokshin aaloks...@gmail.comwrote:
*The notion of choosing isn't actually important--if a proof says
There is an important distinction between the names and notations of
mathematics and the objects of study of mathematics. I believe the former
are inventions of humans while the latter exist independently of mankind.
For example, I am saying that the symbol 0 is an invention of mankind but
what
Are you talking about tautology?
On Thu, Feb 16, 2012 at 12:38 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 2/16/2012 2:15 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
[SPK] All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the
possibility that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing
Lots of interesting ideas going about.
It sounds like you're pondering how many elements are in the set of all
world-lines consistent with the true laws of physics (e.g., possibly, the
least action principle). (Incidentally, that set oddly enough is timeless
yet the bundles of world-lines that
suffering ethically
equivalent to actual suffering... and that sort of thing.)
On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand.
Digital brain. What's
?
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote:
From page 17
It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the
initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program
can
generate
From page 17
It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the
initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular
program can
generate conscious awareness in the first place.
What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious
moments
Self aware in what sense?
On Sat, Jun 4, 2011 at 2:09 AM, Felix Hoenikker fhoenikk...@gmail.comwrote:
Sorry again, but I want to add one thing:
The broadest mathematical closure of the existence of computation,
the observation of consciousness anywhere suggests the following, in
my mind:
em (barring any sort of infinite time). Is that right?
I've had some exposure to Alan Watts and all I have seen is both
profound and simple.
Dt is a bit hard for me to understand. Would you elaborate for me?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Jan 2011, at 21:45, Brian Tenneson wrote:
"The Tao that can be described is not the ultimate Tao"
Interesting. I wonder if it's so. Whether or not the ultimate Tao can
be described has been the object of all my research-related thinking
for a while now. I finally made a breakthrough this year on the
problem. I still have to
Ah, ok. Well, as your friend checked my proof, what I was/am working
on is an effective theory.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Jan 2011, at 18:01, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Jan 2011, at 11:31, silky wrote:
On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 8:31 PM
Have you read the whole thread?
silky wrote:
On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 4:43 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:
We're talking about a mathematical theory about E.
What relevance does this comment have?
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In the case of a TOE, the model IS reality.
Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
on
02.01.2011 08:47 silky said the following:
On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 4:43 PM, Brian
Tennesontenn...@gmail.com
wrote:
We're talking about a mathematical theory
about E.
What relevance does
at 8:31 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:
In the case of a TOE, the model IS reality.
Okay, I won't reply further, this has become irrelevant noise.
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e is physical existence (which
Tegmark puts into a -testable- theory in the paper I cited), chairs are
mathematical structures which agrees with your quote.
But Bruno is really the expert here.
Evgenii
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/08/computable-universes.html
on 02.01.2011 10:31 Bri
Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
on
02.01.2011 12:07 Brian Tenneson said the following:
Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
Some time ago, I have read
David Chalmers, The Matrix as Metaphysics
http://consc.net/papers/matrix.pdf
Let me make one
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Jan 2011, at 11:31, silky wrote:
On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 8:31 PM, Brian
Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:
In the case of a TOE, the model IS reality.
Okay, I won't reply further, this has become irrelevant noise.
I
Also, the _expression_ "superstring are made of numbers" is unclear. If
computationalism is correct the _expression_ "made of" has no sense.
Things are not made of something, they are dreamed by (infinities) of
computation. The physical worlds becomes the border of the "matrix",
that is a
How can we know that? Reality is the totality of all that exists is
a finite complete description.
Well, that is my favorite definition of reality. But it is not a
theory: you don't say what exist.
RA says what exist. It says that 1 exists (Ex(x = s(0)), it says that
you current
I was unaware of this. Seems like it's a crucial part of Bruno's
work.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dovetailing_%28computer_science%29
Trying to understand the concept here.
Suppose there are infinitely many instructions of two programs. One
way to run that program is to start putting green
We're talking about a mathematical theory about E.
silky wrote:
On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 12:03 AM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:
[...]
One way to describe something, a real basic way to describe something,
is to form an aggregate of all things that meet that description.
There may
On Dec 31, 1:42 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Dec 2010, at 13:50, Brian Tenneson wrote:
If a complete description of arithmetical truth is not possible,
what
exactly are we talking about?
We, humans, have a rather good intuition of what is a true
arithmetical
If a complete description of arithmetical truth is not possible, what
exactly are we talking about?
We, humans, have a rather good intuition of what is a true
arithmetical sentence, independently of the fact that we have to
recognize that it can be quite tricky to decide if this or
Thank you, happy new year to you, too!
On Dec 27, 8:36 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Dec 2010, at 22:51, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Limits To Science: God, Godel, Gravity
http://www.science20.com/hammock_physicist/limits_science_god_godel_g...
Here is my comment
Limits To Science: God, Godel, Gravity
http://www.science20.com/hammock_physicist/limits_science_god_godel_gravity
Here is my comment:
An important question is whether or not a TOE will be finite in
length. I am taking 'TOE' to be, as a working definition, a complete
description of reality or a
There is evidently a weaker version of the embedding concept.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embedding#Universal_algebra_and_model_theory
(No references as far as I can tell for this definition)
I am looking at this definition and the flaw in my proof on page 13
and, while I will have to study it
I'm trying to do? What I'm trying to do is
one major leg of my paper: there is a superstructure to all
structures. What super means could be any comparitive relation. But
what relation is 'good'?
On Dec 9, 8:12 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 09 Dec 2010, at 05:12, Brian Tenneson
On Dec 5, 12:02 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Dec 2010, at 18:50, Brian Tenneson wrote:
That means that R (standard model of the first order theory of the
reals + archimedian axiom, without the term natural number) is not
elementary embeddable in R*, given
So is it impossible that there are enough redundancies in an
infinitely long statement of a TOE to make it into an equivalent,
finite document?
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On Dec 4, 2:52 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I just said that if M1 M2, then M1 [=] M2. This means that M2 needs
higher order logical formula to be distinguished from M1.
Elementary embeddings () are a too much strong notion of model
theory. It is used in context where we
I'm going to try to concentrate on each issue, one per post. Let me
say again that your feedback is absolutely invaluable to my work.
In an earlier post you say something that implies the following:
Suppose M1, M2, and M3 are mathematical structures
Let denote the elementarily embedded relation
If there is a TOE, I would expect it to be pretty lengthy and
complicated. The TOE would basically be a conjunction of all
answers to all questions.
But can this even be done in human terms? Wouldn't there be
infinitely many questions (e.g., what is 1+1, what is 1+2, what is
1+3)? That would
If they are all elementary embeddable within it, then they are all
elementary equivalent, given that the truth of first order formula are
preserved.
How would all structures be elementarily equivalent?
All mathematical theories would have the same theorems. So
eventually there has to
I am starting a new thread which begins with some quotes by myself and
to continue the conversation with Bruno.
I figure this is especially of interest because of the references to
Tegmark's works.
From a logician's standpoint, it may be of interest that I show that
there is a structure U
I figure this is especially of interest because of the references to
Tegmark's works.
From a logician's standpoint, it may be of interest that I show that
there is a structure U such that all structures, regardless of symbol
set, can be elementarily embedded within it.
From a physicist's
My apologies, I didn't mean to insert this into your thread!
Sorry!
On Oct 6, 8:43 am, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:
I figure this is especially of interest because of the references to
Tegmark's works.
From a logician's standpoint, it may be of interest that I show
John Mikes wrote:
...Rectangles are not found in nature and not are numbers; both are
abstractions of things we see in nature...
Pray: what things? and how are they 'abstracted into numbers?
(Rectangles etc. - IMO - are artifacts made (upon/within) a system of
human application).
Yet
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Tegmark argues that reality is a mathematical structure and states that an
open problem is finding a mathematical structure which is isomorphic to
reality. This might or might not be clear: the mathematical structure with
the property that all mathematical structures can be
John Mikes wrote:
Brian,
nothing could be more remote for me than to argue 'math' (number's
application and theories) with you. I thinkyou mix up* 'counting'* for
the stuff that serves it. As I usually do, I looked up Google for the
Peano axioms and found nothing in them that pertains to the
2:01 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:
Numbers existed before people on this rock began to understand them.
If not number of atoms in the universe, then the number of cells in
organisms one day prior to 10,000 years ago. or anything really, that
had the potential to be counted, one
As a corollary to some of Tegmark's theory I believe it will be possible
to prove that the level 4 multiverse is accounted for by a
mathematical structure.. It's a project I've been working on which
assumes that the reality hypothesis implies the mathematical universe
hypothesis.
Bruno
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