Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
COL
Yes. Causal chains, no matter how improbable, executed at the tiniest
of
scales the same ones that make LUCY our literal ancestor. connect
us.
LZ
It depends
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through
being
observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
Not only. Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.
Yes. But the instruments are observed. All
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
COL
Yes. Causal chains, no matter how improbable, executed at the tiniest
of
scales the same ones that make LUCY our literal ancestor. connect
us.
LZ
It depends what you , mean by connect. I am
Colin Hales wrote:
1Z
Colin Hales wrote:
So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted as-if MIND
EXISTED. So far
the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
Brent Meeker
FIRSTLY
Formally we would investigate new physics of
The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being
observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
Not only. Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.
Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend
the causal chain between your phenomenality and
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being
observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
Not only. Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.
Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend
the causal
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through
being
observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
Not only. Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.
Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend
the causal
--- Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
(among a lot other things, quoted and replied to):
I disagree and can show empirical proof that we
scientists only THINK we are not being solipsistic.
I wrote in this sense lately (for the past say 40
years) but now I tend to change my solipsistic mind
Colin Hales wrote:
1Z
snip
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 3:19 AM
Brent Meeker
It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would
behave exactly as they do behave,
most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world any
consideration at
Colin Hales wrote:
So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted as-if MIND
EXISTED. So far
the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
Brent Meeker
FIRSTLY
Formally we would investigate new physics of underlying reality such as
this:
Why not
1Z
Colin Hales wrote:
So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted as-if MIND
EXISTED. So far
the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
Brent Meeker
FIRSTLY
Formally we would investigate new physics of underlying reality such as
this:
On Sat, Sep 23, 2006 at 03:26:21PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Please allows me at this stage to be the most precise as possible. From
a logical point of view, your theory of Nothing is equivalent to
Q1 + Q2 + Q3. It is a very weaker subtheory of RA. It is not sigma1
complete, you don't
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John,
Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under
the impression that everything is a
construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend
Le 23-sept.-06, 07:01, Russell Standish a crit :
Anything provable by a finite set of axioms is necessarily a finite
string of
symbols, and can be found as a subset of my Nothing.
You told us that your Nothing contains all strings. So it contains all
formula as theorems. But a theory
pretend to be smart liars.
*
Your last paragraph paved my way to the nuthouse.
Thanks
John M
- Original Message -
From: Colin Geoffrey Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, September 23, 2006 11:11 PM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing
Russell Standish wrote:
The Nothing itself does not have any properties in itself to speak
of. Rather it is the PROJECTION postulate that means we can treat it
as the set of all strings, from which any conscious viewpoint must
correspond to a subset of strings.
That sounds rather like the
- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 2:16 AM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
(upon Bruno's question)...
To be more precise, I identify Nothing
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John,
Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all
under the impression that everything is a
construction of his own mind. People willingly
On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 08:05:14AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
The Nothing itself does not have any properties in itself to speak
of. Rather it is the PROJECTION postulate that means we can treat it
as the set of all strings, from which any conscious viewpoint must
On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 03:23:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-sept.-06, 07:01, Russell Standish a crit :
Anything provable by a finite set of axioms is necessarily a finite
string of
symbols, and can be found as a subset of my Nothing.
You told us that your Nothing
On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 12:11:54PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In my narrative for a substitute Big Bang I called the originating
zero-info-'object' Plenitude, as I realize from your words (thank you) it is
close to the Old Greek Chaos. In that narrative Universes occur by
On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 02:59:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Any person's experience is obtained by
differentiating - selecting something from that nothing.
The relationship between this zero information object, and
arithmetical platonia is a bit unclear, but I would say that
On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 12:18:37PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
It is really the key to understand that if my 3-person I is a machine,
then the I, (the 1-person I) is not! This can be used to explain why
the 1-person is solipsist, although the 1-person does not need to be
was not thinking on the intermittent solips as pointed to by some
(reasonable) list-colleagues.
John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 10:59 PM
Subject: RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John,
Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under the
impression that everything is a
construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order
to indulge in fiction or computer
games,
on the intermittent solips as pointed to by some
(reasonable) list-colleagues.
John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 10:59 PM
Subject: RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
Le 22-sept.-06, à 19:10, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 02:59:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Any person's experience is obtained by
differentiating - selecting something from that nothing.
The relationship between this zero information object, and
arithmetical
Le 22-sept.-06, à 19:18, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 12:18:37PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
It is really the key to understand that if my 3-person I is a machine,
then the I, (the 1-person I) is not! This can be used to explain why
the 1-person is solipsist,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John,
Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under
the impression that everything is a
construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order
to indulge
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John,
Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all
under the impression that everything is a
construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in
order to indulge in
Le 20-sept.-06, à 21:06, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno
Le 22-sept.-06, à 08:16, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Thu, Sep 21, 2006 at 04:16:53PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Russell, when you say nothing external exist, do you mean nothing
primitively material exist, or do you mean there is no independent
reality at all, not even an immaterial
-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2006 09:51:28 -0400
Stathis:
wouod a real solipsist even talk to you?
John M
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Bruno Marchal everything-list
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John,
Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under the
impression that everything is a
construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order to
indulge in fiction or computer
games, and a solipsist may believe
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
This paradoxical situation I have analysed out and, I hope, straightened
out. The answer lies not in adopting/rejecting solipsism per se (although
solipsism is logically untenable for subtle reasons) , but in merely
recognising what scientific evidence is actually
On Thu, Sep 21, 2006 at 10:36:00AM -, David Nyman wrote:
I think we will never be able to engage with the issues you describe
until we realise that what we are faced with is a view from the inside
of a situation that has no outside. Our characterisation of 'what
exists' as 'outside' of
@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 7:51 PM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
Colin Hales wrote:
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
Sent: Thursday, September 21
About solipsism I think it is useful to distinguish:
- the (ridiculous) *doctrine* of solipsism. It says that I exist and
you don't.
- the quasi trivial fact that any pure first person view is
solipsistic. This makes the doctrine of solipsism non refutable, and
thus non scientific in Popper
Russell Standish wrote:
It makes absolute sense to me, and it is really one of the central
themes of my book Theory of Nothing. The only points of view are
interior ones, because what is external is just nothing.
But I know that Colin comes from a different ontological bias, since
we had a
Le 19-sept.-06, à 08:02, Colin Hales a écrit :
x-tad-biggerHi,/x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerI/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger’/x-tad-biggerx-tad-biggerm overrun with stuff at uni, but I have this one issue /x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger–/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger solipsism- which is hot and we seem to be
Colin Hales wrote:
Hi,
I'm overrun with stuff at uni, but I have this one issue - solipsism- which
is hot and we seem to be touching on, so I thought you may help me collect
my thoughts before I run off. gotta leave all those threads hanging
there.and I left them in an awfully under
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were
thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of
individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.
About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
to
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.
If
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
it doesn't prove the existence of
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were
thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of
individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.
About solipsism I am not sure why
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
it doesn't prove the existence of
Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
it doesn't
Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, September 19, 2006 9:23 AM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
On Tue, Sep 19, 2006 at 04:02:36PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote:
BACK TO THE REAL ISSUE (solipsism)
I am confused as to what
Bruno Marchal writes:
About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
to me nobody defend it in the list.
Is anyone out there really a solipsist? Has anyone ever met or talked to a
real solipsist?
Stathis Papaioannou
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
to me nobody defend it in the list.
Is anyone out there really a solipsist? Has anyone ever met or talked to a
real solipsist?
Stathis Papaioannou
Will all those
Colin Hales wrote:
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 9:31 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 9:52 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
Colin Hales
On Tue, Sep 19, 2006 at 04:02:36PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote:
BACK TO THE REAL ISSUE (solipsism)
I am confused as to what the received view of the solipsist is. As us usual
in philosophical discourse, definitions disagree:
An epistemological position that one's own perceptions
Le 16-sept.-06, à 23:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
Bruno wrote
Colin Geoffrey Hales a ��it :
5) Re a fatal test for the Turing machine? Give it exquisite novelty by
asking it to do science on an unknown area of the natural world. Proper
science. It will fail because it does not know there
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