Le 15-sept.-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Yes, that's just what I would say. The only purpose served by the rock
> is to provide the real world
> dynamism part of the computation, even if it does this simply by
> mapping lines of code to the otherwise
> idle passage of time. The
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
...
> COLIN:
> Hi a bunch of points...
>
> 1) Re paper.. it is undergoing review and growing..
> The point of the paper is to squash the solipsism argument ...in
> particular the specific flavour of it that deals with 'other minds' and as
> it has (albeit tacitly)
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> >
> >
> > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> >> >
> >
> >> Q. What is it like to be a human? It is like being a mind. There is
> >> information delivered into the mind by the action of brain material
> >> which
> >> bestows on the human intrinsic knowledge about the natur
>
>
> Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
>> >
>
>> Q. What is it like to be a human? It is like being a mind. There is
>> information delivered into the mind by the action of brain material
>> which
>> bestows on the human intrinsic knowledge about the natural world outside
>> the humanin the form of
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> >
> Q. What is it like to be a human? It is like being a mind. There is
> information delivered into the mind by the action of brain material which
> bestows on the human intrinsic knowledge about the natural world outside
> the humanin the form of phenomenal co
Le 16-sept.-06, à 10:10, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
> 5) Re a fatal test for the Turing machine? Give it exquisite novelty by
> asking it to do science on an unknown area of the natural world. Proper
> science. It will fail because it does not know there is an outside
> world.
And you *k
Colin Hales writes:
> > I've had another think about this after reading the paper you sent
me.
> It
> > seems that
> > you are making two separate claims. The first is that a zombie would
not
> be able to
> > behave like a conscious being in every situation: specifically, when
> called upon to be
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > OK, but then you have the situation whereby a very complex, and to
our
> mind disorganised, conscious
> > computer might be designed and built by aliens, then discovered by
us
> after the aliens have become
> > extinct and their design blueprints, programming
>
> Colin Hales writes:
>
>> Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of
sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal
encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the
>> zombie.
>> Add a capacity to detect regularity in the
Peter Jones writes:
> > > > > > That is what I mean
> > > > > > when I say that any computation can map onto any physical system.
> > > > > > The physical structure and activity
> > > > > > of computer A implementing program a may be completely different to
> > > > > > that of computer B imple
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Colin Hales writes:
>
>
>>Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of
>>sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal
>>encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the
>>zombie.
>>
>>Add a cap
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > >
> > > > > > > I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but
> > > > > > > you have
> > > > > > > made the point several times that a computation depends
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > > > That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees
> > > > > with me on the list, and
> > > > > I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> > Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
> > Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 04:43:54 -0700
> >
> >
> >
>
Brent Meeker writes:
> >>>We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person
> >>>sense, except by analogy with our
> >>>own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what
> >>>can be known by observing an
> >>>entity and what can be known by being
Peter Jones writes:
> > What if the computer is built according to some ridiculously complex plan,
> > plugged in, then all the engineers, manuals,
> > etc. disappear. If it was conscious to begin with, does it suddenly cease
> > being conscious because no-one is able to
> > understand it?
> If
Peter Jones writes:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > >
> > >>>That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with
> > >>>me on the list, and
> > >>>I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd:
>
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > > That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees
> > > > with me on the list, and
> > > > I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd:
> > > > every physical system
> >
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> >
> > > > > > I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you
> > > > > > have
> > > > > > made the point several times that a computation depends on an
> > > > > > observer
> > > > >
> >
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
> Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 04:43:54 -0700
>
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
Colin Hales writes:
> Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of
> sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal
> encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the
> zombie.
>
> Add a capacity to detect regularity in the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
>>>We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person
>>>sense, except by analogy with our
>>>own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what
>>>can be known by observing an
>>>entity and wh
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in
>>>rather simple cases,
>>>like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and it
>>>can also be implemented
>>>so we can interact with it,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
> > I don't recall anything about all computations implementing consciousness?
> >
> > Brent Meeker
>
> OK, this is the basis of our disagreement. I understood computationalism as
> the idea that it is the
> actual computation that gives rise
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > > I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in
> > > rather simple cases,
> > > like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and
> > > it can also be implemented
> > > so we can interac
Brent meeker writes:
> >>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
> >>>conscious
> >>>computation has some inherent structural property.
> >
> >
> > I should have said, that the *hardware* has some special structural
> > property goes
> > against computationalism.
Brent meeker writes:
> > We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person
> > sense, except by analogy with our
> > own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what
> > can be known by observing an
> > entity and what can be known by being the
Brent Meeker writes:
> > I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in
> > rather simple cases,
> > like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and
> > it can also be implemented
> > so we can interact with it, as when there is a collectio
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Didn't what?...decide we had acted freely?...noticed?
if we noticed our decisions at the same time as we made them.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
T
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Peter Jones writes:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with
>me on the list, and
>I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
>phys
1Z wrote:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>Thanks for the quotes from Dennett's "Freedom Evolves". The physiological
>>experiments are interesting,
>>but the fact is, even if they can be shown to be flawed in some way, it would
>>still be entirely consistent
>>with our behaviour and our subj
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> >
> >>>That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with
> >>>me on the list, and
> >>>I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
> >>>physical system
> >>>implem
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with
> > > me on the list, and
> > > I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
> > > physical system
> > > implements every conscious comp
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Thanks for the quotes from Dennett's "Freedom Evolves". The physiological
> experiments are interesting,
> but the fact is, even if they can be shown to be flawed in some way, it would
> still be entirely consistent
> with our behaviour and our subjective experience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>
> > > > > I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you
> > > > > have
> > > > > made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > No, I haven't! I have tried ot foll
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Brent meeker writes:
> > >
> > > > >>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
> > > > >>>conscious
> > > > >>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
> > >
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > If consciousness supervenes on inherent non-interprtation-dependent
> > features,
> > it can supervene on features which are binary, either present or
> > absent.
> >
> > For instance, whether a programme examines or modifies its own code is
termined" part, you could be rich.
Stathis Papaioannou
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
> Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2006 09:15:12 -0700
>
>
>
&
Brent Meeker:
>
> Colin Hales wrote:
> ...
>
> >> As far as the internal life of the CPU is
> >>concerned...
> >>>whatever it is like to be an electrically noisy hot rock, regardless of
> >>the
> >>>programalthough the character of the noise may alter with different
> >>>programs!
> >
> >>Th
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Brent meeker writes:
> >
> > > >>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
> > > >>>conscious
> > > >>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
> > > >>>computationalism
> > > >>>have used th
Colin Hales wrote:
...
>> As far as the internal life of the CPU is
>>
>>concerned...
>>
>>>whatever it is like to be an electrically noisy hot rock, regardless of
>>
>>the
>>
>>>programalthough the character of the noise may alter with different
>>>programs!
>>
>
>>That's like say whatever
Peter Jones writes:
> If consciousness supervenes on inherent non-interprtation-dependent
> features,
> it can supervene on features which are binary, either present or
> absent.
>
> For instance, whether a programme examines or modifies its own code is
> surely
> such a feature.
>
>
> >Even
Brent Meeker:
>
> Colin Hales wrote:
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> >
> >>Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically
> >>possible to explain what consciousness
> >>*is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a
> >>blind man: he might be the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>>That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me
>>>on the list, and
>>>I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
>>>physical system
>>>implements every conscious computation, no
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Peter Jones writes:
>>>
>>>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your
>>>abacus has consciousness associated with it, which i
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>
>
>I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have
>made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer
No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences
Peter Jones writes:
> > That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me
> > on the list, and
> > I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
> > physical system
> > implements every conscious computation, no physical system implements an
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > >
> > > > > > Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your
> > > > > > abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of
> > > > > > the ten
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > > > I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have
> > > > made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer
> > >
> > >
> > > No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of
> > > assuming it mus
1Z wrote:
...
> Dennett's idea of "stored" conscious volition is quite in line with our
> theory. Indeed, we would like to extend it in a way that Dennett does
> not. We would like to extend it to stored indeterminism. Any decision
> we make in exigent situations wher we do nto have the luxury of
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Peter Jones writes:
>>>
>>>
>>>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that
>it is the case if
>computationalism is t
1Z wrote:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>Brent meeker writes:
>>
>>
>>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>>We should ask ourselves how do we know the thermometer isn't conscious of the
>>>temperature? It seems that the answer has been that it's state or activity
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Brent meeker writes (quoting SP):
>
>
>>>Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible
>>>to explain what consciousness
>>>*is* unless you have it.
>>
>>Not being *logically* possible means entailing a contradiction - I doubt
>>t
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Colin Hales writes:
>
>
>>Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of
>>sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal
>>encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the
>>zombie.
>>
>>Add a capa
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
>conscious
>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
>computationalism
>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anyt
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > >>I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
> > >>withdraw it's
> > >>hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the
> > >>robot with
> > >>"feelings", i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
> > >>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
> > >>>conscious
> > >>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
> > >>>computationalism
> > >>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that an
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > > I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
> > > conscious
> > > computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
> > > computationalism
> > > have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anythin
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > We should ask ourselves how do we know the thermometer isn't conscious of
> > the
> > temperature? It seems that the answer has been that it's state or activity
> > *could*
> > be
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me
> on the list, and
> I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
> physical system
> implements every conscious computation, no physical system implements any
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > > > Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your
> > > > > abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the
> > > > > tenets of computationalism. Some time lat
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have
> > > made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer
> >
> >
> > No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of
> > assuming
Brent meeker writes (quoting SP):
> > Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically
> > possible to explain what consciousness
> > *is* unless you have it.
>
> Not being *logically* possible means entailing a contradiction - I doubt
> that. But
> anyway you do have i
Colin Hales writes:
> Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of
> sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal
> encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the
> zombie.
>
> Add a capacity to detect regularity in the s
Brent meeker writes:
> >>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
> >>>conscious
> >>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
> >>>computationalism
> >>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any
> >>>conscious
> Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 13:10:52 -0700
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >
Brent meeker writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> >
> >>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that
> >>>it is the case if
> >>>computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have
Colin Hales wrote:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
>>Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically
>>possible to explain what consciousness
>>*is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a
>>blind man: he might be the world's
>>greatest scientific exp
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
>>I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
>>withdraw it's
>>hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the
>>robot with
>>"feelings", i.e. judgements about go
Stathis Papaioannou
> Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically
> possible to explain what consciousness
> *is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a
> blind man: he might be the world's
> greatest scientific expert on it but still have zer
Brent meeker writes:
> I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
> withdraw it's
> hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the
> robot with
> "feelings", i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
>>>conscious
>>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
>>>computationalism
>>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implemen
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human
conscious-computation;
since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're
thinking,
since there a practical infinity of maps (even a counta
> -Original Message-
Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > >>Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-
> computation;
> > >>since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But,
> you're thinking,
> > >>since there a practical infinity
Brent Meeker writes:
> > I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
> > conscious
> > computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
> > computationalism
> > have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any
> > conscious
> > co
Brent Meeker writes:
> >>Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human
> >>conscious-computation;
> >>since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're
> >>thinking,
> >>since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you
> >>allow
>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>I think we need to say what it means for a computation to be
>>self-interpreting. Many
>>control programs are written with self-monitoring functions and logging
>>functions.
>>Why would we not attribute consciousness to them?
>
>
> W
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that it
>>>is the case if
>>>computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the
>>>self-evident
>>>absurdity of
Brent Meeker wrote (through many posts):
> I won't insist, because you might be right, but I don't think that is
> proven. It may
> be that interaction with the environment is essential to continued
> consciousness.
Assuming comp, I think that this is a red herring. To make this clear I
Brent Meeker writes:
> I think we need to say what it means for a computation to be
> self-interpreting. Many
> control programs are written with self-monitoring functions and logging
> functions.
> Why would we not attribute consciousness to them?
Well, why not? Some people don't even thin
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that
> > it is the case if
> > computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the
> > self-evident
> > absurdity of the idea as an argument demonst
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>>I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have
>>>made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer
>>
>>
>>No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of
>>assuming it must.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
withdraw it's
hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot
with
"feelings", i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/plea
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Peter Jones writes:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>With physical supervenience, it is possible for the same person to
>>supervene on multiple physical objects. What is disallowed is multiple
>>persons to superven
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > > > Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your
> > > > abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the
> > > > tenets of computationalism. Some time later, you are walking in the
> > > > Amaz
Peter Jones writes:
> > I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have
> > made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer
>
>
> No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of
> assuming it must.
> It seems to me that some sort
Brent Meeker writes:
> >>I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
> >>withdraw it's
> >>hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot
> >>with
> >>"feelings", i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it
> >>would be
Brent meeker writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> >
> With physical supervenience, it is possible for the same person to
> supervene on multiple physical objects. What is disallowed is multiple
> persons to supervene on the same physical object.
> >>>
>
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >>>That's not very interesting for non-conscious computations, because
> >>>they are only useful or meaningful if they can be observed or interact
> >>>with their
> >>>environment. However, a conscious computation is interesti
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 07-sept.-06, à 16:42, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > Rationalists, and hence everythingists, are no better off because they
> > still have to appeal to some contingent brute fact, that *onl*
> > mathemematical
> > (or computational) entities exist, even if *all* such entities do.
>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 07-sept.-06, à 06:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>
>>>This seems to me very close to saying that every conscious
>>>computation is
>>>implemented necessarily in Platonia, as the physical reality seems
>>>hardly
>>>relevant.
>>
>>It seems to me to be very close to a r
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>>That's not very interesting for non-conscious computations, because
>>>they are only useful or meaningful if they can be observed or interact with
>>>their
>>>environment. However, a conscious computation is interesting all on its own.
>>>It
>>>might h
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>A non-conscious computation cannot be *useful* without the
>>>manual/interpretation,
>>>and in this sense could be called just a potential computation, but a
>>>conscious
>>>computation is still *conscious* even if no-one else is able to
Le 07-sept.-06, à 16:42, 1Z a écrit :
> Rationalists, and hence everythingists, are no better off because they
> still have to appeal to some contingent brute fact, that *onl*
> mathemematical
> (or computational) entities exist, even if *all* such entities do.
> (Platonia
> is broad but flat).
Le 07-sept.-06, à 14:14, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 06-sept.-06, à 21:59, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>> Of course it is not natural, or we would not
>>> have two separate words for "possible" and "actual".
>>
>> Well, Platonist theories are counter-intuitive. Aristotle is the one
>> res
Le 07-sept.-06, à 06:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>> This seems to me very close to saying that every conscious
>> computation is
>> implemented necessarily in Platonia, as the physical reality seems
>> hardly
>> relevant.
>
> It seems to me to be very close to a reductio ad absurdum.
Reduct
Le 07-sept.-06, à 03:19, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Why do you disagree that one of the bitstrings is conscious? It seems
> to
> me that "the subcollection of bitstrings that corresponds to the
> actions of
> a program emulating a person under all possible inputs" is a
> collection of
>
Le 07-sept.-06, à 01:56, Russell Standish a écrit :
> This simplest way of addressing this is to use your dovetailer instead
> of quantum multiverses, which tends to confuse people, and get
> associated with quantum mysticism. The dovetailer is obviously
> computable, but not the internal "trace
Brent Meeker wrote:
> >That's not very interesting for non-conscious computations, because
> > they are only useful or meaningful if they can be observed or interact with
> > their
> > environment. However, a conscious computation is interesting all on its
> > own. It
> > might have a fuller l
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le jeudi 7 septembre 2006 14:14, 1Z a écrit :
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > Le 06-sept.-06, à 21:59, 1Z a écrit :
> > > > Of course it is not natural, or we would not
> > > > have two separate words for "possible" and "actual".
> > >
> > > Well, Platonist theories are co
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