Hello Bruno,
I think you are correct, but allowing the observer to be mechanically
described as obeying the wave equation (which solutions obeys to comp),
Hmm well if you have a basis, yes; - but naked infinite-dimensional
Hilbert Space (the everything in QM)?
You put the finger on a
Hi Mirek,
On 12 Jan 2009, at 15:36, Mirek Dobsicek wrote:
Hello Bruno,
I think you are correct, but allowing the observer to be
mechanically
described as obeying the wave equation (which solutions obeys to
comp),
Hmm well if you have a basis, yes; - but naked infinite-
On Dec 3, 2008, at 5:02 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I struggle with the question of what a platonic object actually is,
even for something very simple. Let's say the implementation of a
circle supports roundness in the same way that a certain computation
supports consciousness. We can
2008/12/7 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
I see what you mean. But I'm uncomfortable with (what I perceive as)
the resulting vagueness in the platonic view of consciousness. You've
indicated that you think of consciousness as fundamentally
computational and Platonic - that's it's an essential
2008/12/1 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Ok, I'm with you so far. But I'd like to get a better handle your
concept of a computation in Platonia. Here's one way I've been
picturing platonic computation:
Imagine an infinite 2-dimensional grid filled with the binary digits
of PI. Now imagine
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the
religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the alternatives?
As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the only alternative
is to deny that consciousness exists at all, which
On 30 Nov 2008, at 16:31, Günther Greindl wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the
religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the
alternatives?
As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the only
On Nov 30, 2008, at 3:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Yes, and I think of consciousness as an essential side-effect of the
computation, as addition is an essential side-effect of the sum of two
numbers.
Ok, I'm with you so far. But I'd like to get a better handle your
concept of a
2008/11/28 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
I still feel like I don't have a handle on how you feel the move to
Platonia solves these problems. If we imagine the mathematical
description of filling a 3D grid with the binary digits of PI,
somewhere within it we will find some patterns of bits
On Nov 29, 2008, at 7:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Threeness, computations and consciousness
exist eternally and necessarily, and can't be created, destroyed or
localised.
I understand (I think) how threeness and computations exist eternally
in Platonia, but I don't understand your
2008/11/27 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Doesn't this antinomy arise because we equivocate on running Firefox. Do we
mean a causal chain of events in the computer according to a certain program
specification or do we mean the appearance on the screen of the same thing
that
the causal
On Nov 26, 2008, at 5:29 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Yes. Suppose one of the components in my computer is defective but,
with incredible luck, is outputting the appropriate signals due to
thermal noise. Would it then make sense to say that the computer isn't
really running Firefox, but
Si nisi non esset perfectum quodlibet esset (if IF not existed everything
would be perfect.
Maybe I am a partial zombie for these things.
(Mildly said).
John M
On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 4:36 PM, Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Nov 26, 2008, at 5:29 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Yes.
2008/11/26 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The question turns on what is a computation and why it should have
magical properties. For example, if someone flips the squares on a
Life board at random and accidentally duplicates the Life
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2008/11/26 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The question turns on what is a computation and why it should have
magical properties. For example, if someone flips the squares on a
Life board at random and
On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 12:28:45PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 24-nov.-08, à 02:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Sun, Nov 23, 2008 at 03:59:02PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would side with Kory that a looked up recording of conscious
activity is not conscious.
I
Thanks for providing me with even more motivations for MGA 3.
I will try to do it as soon as possible. It could time because I am
hesitating on the best way to proceed. I know that what is obvious for
some is not for others, and vice versa ... That is why we do proof, to
met universal
On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The question turns on what is a computation and why it should have
magical properties. For example, if someone flips the squares on a
Life board at random and accidentally duplicates the Life rules does
that mean the computation is
Le 24-nov.-08, à 02:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Sun, Nov 23, 2008 at 03:59:02PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would side with Kory that a looked up recording of conscious
activity is not conscious.
I agree with you. The point here is just that MEC+MAT implies it.
This I don't
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
If infinities are at play... what is a MAT-history ? it can't even be
written.
Agreed. And that is why we should be more reluctant to drop COMP than to
drop MAT.
But IF we drop COMP, we could accept unwriteable MAT-histories.
Cheers,
Günther
On 24 Nov 2008, at 16:11, Günther Greindl wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
If infinities are at play... what is a MAT-history ? it can't even be
written.
Agreed. And that is why we should be more reluctant to drop COMP
than to
drop MAT.
But IF we drop COMP, we could accept
Hi Günther,
I think you are correct, but allowing the observer to be mechanically
described as obeying the wave equation (which solutions obeys to
comp),
Hmm well if you have a basis, yes; - but naked infinite-dimensional
Hilbert Space (the everything in QM)?
You put the finger on a
On Nov 23, 2008, at 11:24 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Kory Heath wrote:
Or maybe I'm still misdiagnosing the problem. Is anyone arguing that,
when you play back the lookup table like a movie, this counts as
performing all of the Conway's Life computations a second time?
Why shouldn't it?
On Nov 24, 2008, at 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
MGA 1 shows that MEC+MAT implies lucky Alice is conscious (during the
exam). OK?
MGA 2 shows that MEC+MAT implies Alice is dreaming (and thus
conscious)
when the film is projected. OK?
I don't mean to hold up the show, but I'm still stuck
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 24, 2008, at 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
MGA 1 shows that MEC+MAT implies lucky Alice is conscious (during the
exam). OK?
MGA 2 shows that MEC+MAT implies Alice is dreaming (and thus
conscious)
when the film is projected. OK?
I don't mean to hold up the
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 23, 2008, at 11:24 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Kory Heath wrote:
Or maybe I'm still misdiagnosing the problem. Is anyone arguing that,
when you play back the lookup table like a movie, this counts as
performing all of the Conway's Life computations a second time?
Why
2008/11/24 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your
objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious?
How would that be inconsistent with observation, or lead
On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:26 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 23, 2008, at 11:24 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Kory Heath wrote:
Or maybe I'm still misdiagnosing the problem. Is anyone arguing
that,
when you play back the lookup table like a movie, this counts as
performing all of
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:26 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 23, 2008, at 11:24 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Kory Heath wrote:
Or maybe I'm still misdiagnosing the problem. Is anyone arguing
that,
when you play back the lookup table
2008/11/23 Jason Resch [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
I would side with Kory that a looked up recording of conscious activity is
not conscious. My argument being that static information has no implicit
meaning because there are an infinite number of ways a bit string can be
interpreted. However in a
On 22 Nov 2008, at 17:27, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 22, 2008, at 7:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that
potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's
suppose
for example that quantum particles are the fundamental
On 22 Nov 2008, at 21:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
Telmo Menezes wrote:
Quentin,
Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that
potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's
suppose
for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building
blocks,
On 22 Nov 2008, at 22:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems like
the
creatures in the grid ought to be conscious. If we don't apply the
Life rule to any of the cells, but just pull the data from our
previously-created lookup table, it seems
On Nov 22, 2008, at 1:56 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
But how would they agree on this? If we knew the answer to that we
wouldn't
need to be considering these (nomologically) impossible thought
experiments.
They would use the same criteria that they use to decide that humans
are conscious
On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your
objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious?
How would that be inconsistent with observation, or lead to logical
contradiction?
I can only
On 23 Nov 2008, at 04:46, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
2008/11/23 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems like
the
creatures in the grid ought to be conscious.
We have to go from consciousness at (dx,dt)
Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event?
Anna
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On Nov 22, 2008, at 1:10 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
So why should it make a difference
whether those state changes are decided by gates in the cpu or a
huge look-up table?
The difference is in the number of times that the relevant computation
was physically implemented. When you query the
On 23 Nov 2008, at 16:06, A. Wolf wrote:
We have to go from consciousness at (dx,dt)
Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event?
Oops! replace with (Dx,Dt). I have no deltas.
Bruno
Anna
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
On 23 Nov 2008, at 15:48, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your
objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious?
How would that be inconsistent with observation, or
Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event?
Oops! replace with (Dx,Dt). I have no deltas.
Yeah, but still. I don't think consciousness can be freeze-framed
mathematically like this. I haven't been reading the conversation,
though...I should probably try to catch up.
Anna
On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:23, A. Wolf wrote:
Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event?
Oops! replace with (Dx,Dt). I have no deltas.
Yeah, but still. I don't think consciousness can be freeze-framed
mathematically like this. I haven't been reading the conversation,
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 22, 2008, at 1:10 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
So why should it make a difference
whether those state changes are decided by gates in the cpu or a
huge look-up table?
The difference is in the number of times that the relevant computation
was physically
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Nov 2008, at 15:48, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your
objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious?
How would that be inconsistent
On 23 Nov 2008, at 21:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Nov 2008, at 15:48, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your
objection to saying that the looked up computation is
Bruno,
From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and
compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and
already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectively.
you could refute COMP (MEC) if it would contradict empirical QM, but QM
(and
Hi,
Le dimanche 23 novembre 2008 à 22:09 +0100, Günther Greindl a écrit :
Bruno,
From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and
compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and
already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectively.
On 23 Nov 2008, at 22:09, Günther Greindl wrote:
Bruno,
From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and
compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and
already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectively.
you could refute COMP (MEC) if it
On Sun, Nov 23, 2008 at 03:59:02PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would side with Kory that a looked up recording of conscious
activity is not conscious.
I agree with you. The point here is just that MEC+MAT implies it.
This I don't follow. I would have thought it implies the
Bruno,
Conserving MEC+MAT, one could argue that no isolation from the
environment is possible, even while dreaming. Even if you put Alice in
a sensory isolation tank, there is still the possibility that
interactions with the entire environment are an essential part of the
process that produces
Hi,
if you conserve MEC+MAT... then you conserve MEC, which means
consciousness is a computational process (running on real hardware per
MAT) but it is a computational process hence the process cannot rely on
the entire universe because if it is then MEC should obviously be false
unless the
Quentin,
Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that
potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose
for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building
blocks, i.e. the hardware, and that consciousness is a computational
process that emerges
Well what is the entire state of the universe ? if it is an infinite
string then it cannot be computational, it is not simulable.
Also if all my consciousness depends on all the universe, then it
depends also on yours (and everything else) that I know you or not... I
believe this a lot
On Nov 21, 2008, at 10:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So let us suppose that poor Alice got, again, a not very good optical
plane graph, so that some (1 to many to all, again) NOR gates break
down, in that precise computation corresponding to her dream
experience. And let us project, in real
Well what is the entire state of the universe ? if it is an infinite
string then it cannot be computational, it is not simulable.
I tend to think our universe is finite. The multiverse, that's another
story... But even in an infinite universe, we could have a finite
consciousness computation
On Nov 22, 2008, at 7:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that
potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose
for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building
blocks, i.e. the hardware, and that
Telmo Menezes wrote:
Quentin,
Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that
potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose
for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building
blocks, i.e. the hardware, and that consciousness is a
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 22, 2008, at 7:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that
potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose
for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building
blocks, i.e. the
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 22, 2008, at 7:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that
potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose
for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building
blocks, i.e. the
2008/11/23 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems like the
creatures in the grid ought to be conscious. If we don't apply the
Life rule to any of the cells, but just pull the data from our
previously-created lookup table, it seems like the
On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote:
2008/11/23 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems like the
creatures in the grid ought to be conscious. If we don't apply the
Life rule to any of the cells,
Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
2008/11/23 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]:
If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems
like the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
MGA 2
The second step of the MGA, consists in making a change to MGA 1 so
that we don't have to introduce that unreasonable amount of cosmic
luck, or of apparent randomness. It shows the lucky aspect of the
coming information is not relevant. Jason thought on
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