Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2011, at 18:46, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/14/2011 1:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 14 Feb 2011, at 07:13, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:

On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meeker  wrote:


What do you think the chances are that any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support  
intelligent life?

1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing  
machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand  
by answering the following questions:


Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing  
machine?


How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven  
distinguish it from a universe that does not?


That is a good argument which convinces many people, who actually  
ask "what is the MGA for?"


Here I can imagine what 1Z could answer to "How can entities within  
a universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a  
universe that does not?".
He assumes the existence of primary matter or of a primitively real  
physical universe,


It's equivocation to speak of entities existing in a domain that  
doesn't exist.


I agree.



If something like arithmetical universe exists, it exists in a very  
different sense of the word than material objects exist.


Arithmetical universe (model of arithmetic theories) already exist in  
a different sense than the existence of natural number. For the  
existence of natural numbers you don't need to postulate sets or  
'universes'. In the comp physics, both person and matter exists in a  
quite different sense than numbers. All the different type of  
existence can be explained intuitively with the notion of persons  
views, or technically by the use of the modalities. "ExP(x)" means  
usually that there exist a number n such that it is the case that  
P(n), but the existence of matter will be described by a "quantized  
formula" of the type BD(ExBD(P(n)), or something like that. The  
intensional difference makes all the difference of the notion of  
"existence" rather transparent. All existence are build from the  
number existence, but none are equivalent to number existence which  
can be taken as the most primitive form of existence.




If there are entities in that universe that are aware of it  
(whatever that may mean) then they a perforce aware in a different  
sense.


Not necessarily. If their awareness is emulated by a computation, then  
such an awareness will not feel any difference if the computation is  
done by this or that type of reality, but the content of their  
consciousness, and the stability of the experience may depend on it in  
the long term. The indeterminacy of their first person experience  
depends on the set of all continuations available in the maximal  
"everything" structure. That is why we can test the mechanist  
hypothesis.








and will, by decision, attribute consciousness, only to the  
creature made off that primary matter,


No, there is no need to assume primary matter.  One need only  
recognize that there is *this* universe which we are aware of and  
exist in and it is not the same as some other universe which may or  
may not exist in some different sense or another.


OK.





even if the consciousness relies in the computation implemented in  
that matter. So 1Z accepts the idea that arithmetical truth is full  
of zombies, like the "1Z" described in arithmetic through the  
arithmetical emulation of our galaxy (say).
But that moves is made impossible by the MGA. To attach  
consciousness to matter, you have to introduce something non Turing  
emulable in that consciousness, or, like Jack Mallah did, attribute  
a physical activity to a piece of matter having no physical  
activity at all relevant with the computation.


But the idea of multiple worlds started with Everett whose  
interpretation of QM implies that there are no pieces of matter with  
no activity.  The universe is defined by a wave function in a  
Hilbert space and pieces of matter are just certain projections.


OK. I don't see why this change anything in the paragraph you quoted.





But this prevent to say "yes" to the doctor *qua computatio*.


No it doesn't.  Whatever the doctor uses to replace neurons in your  
head is also matter and also part of the universal wave function.


OK.







Do you (the reader of the list, not Jason) agree with the 323  
principle? If the phy

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[David Nyman]

On 15 February 2011 00:42, 1Z  wrote:

>> I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
>> very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
>> consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
>> The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
>> reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
>> "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
>> constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
>> were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
>> perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
>> such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
>> (but by whom?) to underlie them.
>
> No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!

Yes, so you keep saying, or in this case, shouting ;-)  And of course
I agree with you.  To claim that reality consisted solely of
"disconnected events" would of course be nonsensical.  Any such
proposition leads directly to a reductio ad absurdum; observation
informs us that reality is manifestly integrated at multiple levels.
But this is the point: all such observation is a posteriori; it isn't
a priori deducible from the theory of a fundamental substrate of
micro-physical entities and their relations.  Moreover, such a theory
does not, a priori, legitimise or require the postulation of complex
higher-order entities in order to account for the state of affairs at
its own level.  But this state of affairs, ex hypothesi, exhausts what
is real.  Therefore if we properly reduce - or restrict - our account
to this level, and hence eliminate any appeal to higher-level concepts
or states, nothing real should be left out.  But this does not accord
with observation. Consequently, higher-level states must also be, in
some ineliminable sense "real", or to put it another way, both
differentiation and integration must play a role in an adequate
account of reality.

Remember I'm just doing accounting, not peddling solutions.  My point,
on this accounting, is that the elusive HP and its zombie spawn seem
to be the consequence of an incomplete tally of what is "real", and
that this in turn is consequent on intuiting the "completeness" of
micro-physical theory in the wrong spirit.

David

>
>
> On Feb 14, 11:08 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
>> On 14 February 2011 20:46, John Mikes  wrote:
>>
>> > I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
>> > reply.
>> > Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.
>>
>> That may be, but I would also like to see if we can get things
>> untwisted.  I'm not peddling any theory of my own here, I'm just
>> trying to do some simple accounting.  For example according to some
>> theory "X doesn't exist" and then somewhere else in the same theory
>> something supposedly depends on "assuming X".  This doesn't add up.
>> Part of the problem - most of it, perhaps - is
>> psychological-linguistic.  Being dead wrong about some theory of the
>> mind (fortunately) doesn't stop our minds from functioning.  But that
>> very same fact can blind us to circular reasoning.
>>
>> I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
>> very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
>> consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
>> The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
>> reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
>> "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
>> constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
>> were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
>> perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
>> such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
>> (but by whom?) to underlie them.
>
> No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!
>
>>  Of course this hardly reflects our
>> experience (how could it?).  We do not discover ourselves to be in
>> some maximally fragmented state (what could it be "like"?) but rather
>> in some integrated state of an altogether higher order;
>
> Do you think reduction means reduction to *disconnected* bits and
> pieces.
>
>> but such
>> quotidian reality apparently impresses us so little that we are quite
>> capable of theorising it cheerfully out of existence (e.g. eliminative
>> materialism).  Well, as Groucho Marx once innocently enquired "who you
>> gonna believe - me or your own eyes?".
>>
>> David
>>
>> > David,
>>
>> > I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
>> > yes, it does not.
>> > Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
>> > It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
>> > I am willing to go as far as "if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist"
>> > so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridg

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2011, at 19:53, 1Z wrote:


CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.


No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing (me,
passim)


Reread the definition of AR. I define AR by bivalence.





If you believe the contrary,
could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?


"Every effectively calculable function is a computable function"


What is an effectively computable function? What is a computable  
function. Function computable form what to what?







See my papers.



That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
response to your writings.



The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
reality (doctor, brain, etc.).



If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
computers,
the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot  
follow


Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging the
question.


No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
does't follo
without it.


Platonism in your sense is not used at all in the reasoning.






It does not assume that physical things
"really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers
really
exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.



There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore
not one.


Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of  
natural

numbers.


Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
your conclusion



Why?






They all agree with statement like "there exist prime
number", etc.


Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and to
disagree on
what existence means.


Only during the pause café. It does not change their mind on the  
issues in their papers.








Read a book on logic and computability.



Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical
ontology.



You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive
and
physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what  
i am

taking about.



You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.


On consciousness. Not on numbers,


You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!


Where? Consciousness, like truth, is not even definable in arithmetic.  
I keep insisting on that all the time.







which I use in the usual
mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is agonstic
on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my
consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of
universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either  
that

such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the
reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a
primitively material reality.


You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
existence
of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers


I assume no more than the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic. Physicists  
assumes them too, albeit not explicitly.







Boolos and
Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are
excellent.
It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in  
arithmetic.



I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes
out of hypothetical machines.


You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless  
you

believe that the number seven is hypothetical,



I do. Haven't you got that yet?


I did understand that seven is immaterial.


Not just immaterial. Non existent.


Ex(x = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)) is provable in Robinson Arithmetic.
And you tell me that your are formalist, so be it.







But I am OK with seven
being hypothetical. It changes nothing in the reasoning.


I am not running on some immaterial TM that exists only in your head


How do you know that?









in which case I get
hypothetical minds and hypothetical universes.



I am not generated by a hypothesis: I generate hypotheses.


Confusion level. If you suppose a TOE you are supposed to be  
explained

by that TOE.


Explained by, not caused by. Things fell before Newton explained
gravity


That was my point.






In that sense you are generated by an hypothesis,


I am not generated by a hypothesis, even a true one, any more
than my house is built on a map, even an accurate one.


That's why I put 'in that (uninteresting) sense'.






Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to be
reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
epiphenomena.


Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
Numbers
have to exist for th

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
enough for the comp consequences.,



Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.


That's my point.


Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.


It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the  
philosophy you want. Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a  
physically real doctor.








Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to  
say

that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'



Not at all.


OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense
which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at  
all.


I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
through.


To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P  
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the  
use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I  
called Arithmetical realism.
I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in  
which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the  
projection of something else. That use of Platonism come up in the  
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.







. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.



No, they just need to be anti realist.


Same remark.


Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.


Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the  
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.







Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is  
hard to

define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
realist about them.



Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.


You contradict your self,


No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence


Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor +  
occam gives the ontological conclusion.







unless you mean that seven is not made of
matter. In which case comp nothing exists.


What does "comp nothing exists" mean?


Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."





Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
enough to be an arithmetical realist



Nonsense.


Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
realism in mathematics.


I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
and you think you are a  number


I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital  
backup. So locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns  
only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person  
naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory of  
knowledge) is not a number.








. A real anti-ariothmetical
realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need  
to be

an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.



Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
is not
just reference.


A reasoning is valid, or not valid.


A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity


In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or  
not. We judge validity only.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[David Nyman]

On 15 February 2011 13:27, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
>> and you think you are a  number
>
> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
> locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my third
> person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
> its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.

I hesitate (really!) to but into one of these delightful to-ings and
fro-ings, but it strikes me that a focus on Peter's claim, and Bruno's
rebuttal, above might be fruitful for the overall discussion.  Peter's
objection seems to be summed up by "you think you are a number".  But
Bruno's reply is that "the first person naturally associated (by its
memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number."
He has said elsewhere that comp can be considered a form of
(objective) idealism, and hence its ontological basis - i.e. what is
RITSIAR - is the "ideal", or equivalently, "consciousness" in some
primary or undifferentiated sense.  From this perspective, the number
realm is conceived not as an independent ontology in itself, but
rather as the effective means of differentiating the epistemology of
persons and their "physical" environments, whose ontology is inherited
from the whole.

Does this help?

David


>
> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
 On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
> enough for the comp consequences.,
>>>
 Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
 not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>>>
>>> That's my point.
>>
>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
> philosophy you want. Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
> physically real doctor.
>
>
>
>>
>>>
> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
>>>
 Not at all.
>>>
>>> OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense
>>> which is not relevant for the reasoning.
>>> If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at all.
>>
>> I accept CT and reject Platonism,
>> and thus the reasoning does not go
>> through.
>
> To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P on any
> input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the use of
> classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I called
> Arithmetical realism.
> I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in which
> the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the projection of
> something else. That use of Platonism come up in the conclusion of the
> reasoning and is not assumed at the start.
>
>
>
>>
> . People needs to be
> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
>>>
 No, they just need to be anti realist.
>>>
>>> Same remark.
>>
>> Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
>
> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the fact
> that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
>
>
>
>
>>
> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
> realist about them.
>>>
 Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
 you 7 doesn't exist.
>>>
>>> You contradict your self,
>>
>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that
>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
>> sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor + occam
> gives the ontological conclusion.
>
>
>
>>
>>> unless you mean that seven is not made of
>>> matter. In which case comp nothing exists.
>>
>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
>
> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
>
>
>>
> Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
> enough to be an arithmetical realist
>>>
 Nonsense.
>>>
>>> Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
>>> realism in mathematics.
>>
>> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
>> and you think you are a  number
>
> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
> locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my third
> person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
> its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.
>
>
>
>
>>
> . A real

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 12:56 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> On 15 February 2011 00:42, 1Z  wrote:
>
> >> I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
> >> very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
> >> consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
> >> The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
> >> reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
> >> "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
> >> constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
> >> were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
> >> perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
> >> such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
> >> (but by whom?) to underlie them.
>
> > No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!
>
> Yes, so you keep saying, or in this case, shouting ;-)  And of course
> I agree with you.  To claim that reality consisted solely of
> "disconnected events" would of course be nonsensical.  Any such
> proposition leads directly to a reductio ad absurdum; observation
> informs us that reality is manifestly integrated at multiple levels.
> But this is the point: all such observation is a posteriori; it isn't
> a priori deducible from the theory of a fundamental substrate of
> micro-physical entities and their relations.

Asserted without evidence argument.

AFAICS, any *correct* theory must, as an analytical truth, recover
*all* appearances
including appearances of integration...that is what a "correct theory"
means.

> Moreover, such a theory
> does not, a priori, legitimise or require the postulation of complex
> higher-order entities

*irreducible* higher order entities. Houses still exist, but they
are made of bricks which are made of

> in order to account for the state of affairs at
> its own level.  But this state of affairs, ex hypothesi, exhausts what
> is real.  Therefore if we properly reduce - or restrict - our account
> to this level, and hence eliminate any appeal to higher-level concepts
> or states, nothing real should be left out.  But this does not accord
> with observation.

What  observation? That there are higher order entities? But
reductionism *says* there are. It just says they are reducible.

> Consequently, higher-level states must also be, in
> some ineliminable sense "real",

So what? The claim of reductionism is that they are
reducible, not that they are eliminable! You
are arguing from your incorrect premise.

>or to put it another way, both
> differentiation and integration must play a role in an adequate
> account of reality.

But didn't you just agree that integration isn't absent from
scientific accounts? If we want to explain how ice, liquid water and
steam
are made of the same components, we must also explain how
those components are "integrated" in each case--how they are
bound together or not as the case may be-- so that we can save
appearances, and explain
the differences between them.

> Remember I'm just doing accounting, not peddling solutions.  My point,
> on this accounting, is that the elusive HP and its zombie spawn seem
> to be the consequence of an incomplete tally of what is "real", and
> that this in turn is consequent on intuiting the "completeness" of
> micro-physical theory in the wrong spirit.
>

Still unclear. Are you saying that reductionism can't solve the HP
because it can't integrate anything (although I have just explained
how it can and must)?

Or just making the more standard argument that the HP is an
exceptional problem?

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 1:16 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 14 Feb 2011, at 19:53, 1Z wrote:
>
> >> CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.
>
> > No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing (me,
> > passim)
>
> Reread the definition of AR. I define AR by bivalence.

Fine. Then it isn't an ontological premiss, and the ontological
conclusion
that I am an Immaterial Dreaming Machine doesn't follow.

 >> If you believe the contrary,
> >> could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?
>
> > "Every effectively calculable function is a computable function"
>
> What is an effectively computable function?

Something a human can work out given instruction

> What is a computable  
> function.

Something a computer can do given a programme

> Function computable form what to what?


> >> See my papers.
>
> > That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
> > premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
> > and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
> > response to your writings.
>
>  The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
>  reality (doctor, brain, etc.).
>
> >>> If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
> >>> computers,
> >>> the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot  
> >>> follow
>
> >> Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging the
> >> question.
>
> > No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
> > does't follo
> > without it.
>
> Platonism in your sense is not used at all in the reasoning.

The the conclusion doesn't follow.

>  It does not assume that physical things
>  "really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers
>  really
>  exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.
>
> >>> There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
> >>> anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore
> >>> not one.
>
> >> Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of  
> >> natural
> >> numbers.
>
> > Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
> > your conclusion
>
> Why?

Because the conclusions of ontolgocial arguments either
follow from ontological premisses, or don't follow at all.

> >> They all agree with statement like "there exist prime
> >> number", etc.
>
> > Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and to
> > disagree on
> > what existence means.
>
> Only during the pause café. It does not change their mind on the  
> issues in their papers.

Why would it, since they are not doing *philosophy* of maths.

> >> Read a book on logic and computability.
>
> > Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
> > apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical
> > ontology.
>
>  You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive
>  and
>  physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what  
>  i am
>  taking about.
>
> >>> You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.
>
> >> On consciousness. Not on numbers,
>
> > You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!
>
> Where? Consciousness, like truth, is not even definable in arithmetic.  
> I keep insisting on that all the time.

Fine. Then consc. doesn't emerge from aritmetic, and physics does't
emerge
from consc.

> >> which I use in the usual
> >> mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is agonstic
> >> on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
> >> The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my
> >> consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of
> >> universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either  
> >> that
> >> such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the
> >> reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a
> >> primitively material reality.
>
> > You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
> > existence
> > of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers
>
> I assume no more than the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic.

You obviously don't adopt those axioms in the sense that
an anti realist would. Why keep arguing against anti realism?

>Physicists  
> assumes them too, albeit not explicitly.



> >> Boolos and
> >> Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are
> >> excellent.
> >> It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in  
> >> arithmetic.
>
> > I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes
> > out of hypothetical machines.
>
>  You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless  
>  you
>  believe that the number seven is hypothetical,
>
> >>> I do. Haven't you got that yet?
>
> >> I did understand that seven is immaterial.
>
> > Not just immaterial. Non existent.
>
> Ex(x = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
>  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
>  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>
> >> That's my point.
>
> > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the  
> philosophy you want.

I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"

>Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a  
> physically real doctor.
>
>
>
>
>
>  Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to  
>  say
>  that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
>
> >>> Not at all.
>
> >> OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense
> >> which is not relevant for the reasoning.
> >> If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at  
> >> all.
>
> > I accept CT and reject Platonism,
> > and thus the reasoning does not go
> > through.
>
> To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P  
> on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the  
> use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I  
> called Arithmetical realism.

That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.

> I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in  
> which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the  
> projection of something else.

In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
existence

>That use of Platonism come up in the  
> conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.
>
>
>
>  . People needs to be
>  ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
>
> >>> No, they just need to be anti realist.
>
> >> Same remark.
>
> > Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
>
> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the  
> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.

I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number

>  Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is  
>  hard to
>  define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
>  realist about them.
>
> >>> Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> >>> you 7 doesn't exist.
>
> >> You contradict your self,
>
> > No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> > mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> > sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor +  
> occam gives the ontological conclusion.

No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.

>
> >> unless you mean that seven is not made of
> >> matter. In which case comp nothing exists.
>
> > What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
>
> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."

Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.

>  Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
>  enough to be an arithmetical realist
>
> >>> Nonsense.
>
> >> Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
> >> realism in mathematics.
>
> > I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
> > and you think you are a  number
>
> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital  
> backup. So locally "I am a number", in that sense.

That's misleading. There is a difference between being tied
to no particular physical instance and being tied to no instance at
all.

>But this concerns  
> only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person  
> naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory of  
> knowledge) is not a number.
>
>
>
>  . A real anti-ariothmetical
>  realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need  
>  to be
>  an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
>
> >>> Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
> >>> is not
> >>> just reference.
>
> >> A reasoning is valid, or not valid.
>
> > A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity
>
> In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or  
> not.

I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
to be false, while believing comp to be true.

>We judge validity only.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~mar

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 1:54 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> On 15 February 2011 13:27, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> >> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
> >> and you think you are a  number
>
> > I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
> > locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my third
> > person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
> > its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.
>
> I hesitate (really!) to but into one of these delightful to-ings and
> fro-ings, but it strikes me that a focus on Peter's claim, and Bruno's
> rebuttal, above might be fruitful for the overall discussion.  Peter's
> objection seems to be summed up by "you think you are a number".  But
> Bruno's reply is that "the first person naturally associated (by its
> memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number."

He thinks he's an immaterial something or other. I am not particularly
bothered about whether that is an immaterial number, immaterial
machine,
etc.

> He has said elsewhere that comp can be considered a form of
> (objective) idealism, and hence its ontological basis - i.e. what is
> RITSIAR - is the "ideal", or equivalently, "consciousness" in some
> primary or undifferentiated sense.  From this perspective, the number
> realm is conceived not as an independent ontology in itself, but
> rather as the effective means of differentiating the epistemology of
> persons and their "physical" environments, whose ontology is inherited
> from the whole.
>
> Does this help?
>
> David

No. I don't thinkBM is assuming the primacy of consciousness, and I
can make  no sense of it.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2011, at 01:42, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/14/2011 11:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Programs are not written with physical instantiation in mind...  
even if eventually you run it.


Really?  Did people write programs before computers were invented?


If you abstract from Babbage quasi-computer, then yes. Combinators,  
lambda expressions, including universal one, have been written before  
computers have been builded.






What is important is the computation which doesn't care about the  
physical instantiation as such.


A program could be written to care about it's instantiation, but  
usually it's the programmer who cares.


We care about higher level instantiation. Theoretically and  
empirically we know that our lowest level instantiation is given by a  
sum on many histories.


Bruno






When I stop executing a program does it cease to exist ? And come  
back to existence the instant I run it ?


A program may be written on paper, punched on cards, or encoded in  
neurons.


Brent


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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:09, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 1:16 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 19:53, 1Z wrote:


CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.


No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing  
(me,

passim)


Reread the definition of AR. I define AR by bivalence.


Fine. Then it isn't an ontological premiss, and the ontological
conclusion
that I am an Immaterial Dreaming Machine doesn't follow.



But comp is not just CT. Comp is also "yes" doctor, which uses some  
ontological commitment, notably is physical reality (albeit not  
necessarily a primitive one), and bet on self-consciousness. And the  
conclusion is not ontological per se. The reasoning does not show that  
primary matter does not exist, only that it cannot be used to select  
my consciousness evolution.







If you believe the contrary,

could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?



"Every effectively calculable function is a computable function"


What is an effectively computable function?


Something a human can work out given instruction


No. That is a computable function.




What is a computable
function.


Something a computer can do given a programme


No. You need CT to define a computer as anything computing what a  
universal machine (an immaterial mathematical concept) computes.







Function computable form what to what?



I answer for you: from N to N. N is the set of natural numbers.






See my papers.



That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
response to your writings.


The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of  
consensual

reality (doctor, brain, etc.).



If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
computers,
the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot
follow


Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging  
the

question.



No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
does't follo
without it.


Platonism in your sense is not used at all in the reasoning.


The the conclusion doesn't follow.



?





It does not assume that physical things
"really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers
really
exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical  
sense.



There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am  
therefore

not one.



Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of
natural
numbers.



Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
your conclusion


Why?


Because the conclusions of ontolgocial arguments either
follow from ontological premisses, or don't follow at all.



Yes. I have already acquiesce ten times on this. And then?







They all agree with statement like "there exist prime
number", etc.


Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and  
to

disagree on
what existence means.


Only during the pause café. It does not change their mind on the
issues in their papers.


Why would it, since they are not doing *philosophy* of maths.



So why would I?






Read a book on logic and computability.



Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical
ontology.


You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the  
cognitive

and
physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what
i am
taking about.



You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.



On consciousness. Not on numbers,



You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!


Where? Consciousness, like truth, is not even definable in  
arithmetic.

I keep insisting on that all the time.


Fine. Then consc. doesn't emerge from aritmetic, and physics does't
emerge
from consc.


You are quick here. I don't see argument. Just assertions.






which I use in the usual
mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is  
agonstic

on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my
consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of
universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either
that
such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the
reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a
primitively material reality.



You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
existence
of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers


I assume no more than the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic.


You obviously don't adopt those axioms in the sense that
an anti realist would. Why keep arguing against anti realism?



I don't argue against anti-realism. I argue against the relevance of  
anti-realism, and philosophy for showing the validity or non validity  
of a reasoning.







Physicists

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:






On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or  
false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,  
which is

enough for the comp consequences.,



Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.



That's my point.



Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.


It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
philosophy you want.


I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"


All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me  
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not real,  
which is a bit absurd at the start.

Could you define what you mean by "real"?






Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
physically real doctor.






Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to
say
that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'



Not at all.


OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a  
sense

which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at
all.



I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
through.


To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the
use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is  
what I

called Arithmetical realism.


That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.


Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a  
memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body such  
that  " (see the paper).







I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in
which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
projection of something else.


In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
existence


I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a conclusion  
related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the  
"arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A  
arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true  
independently of me, you, etc.








That use of Platonism come up in the
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.




. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.



No, they just need to be anti realist.



Same remark.



Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.


Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.


I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number


It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being  
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand  
that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is  
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains  
all the emulation of all programs, and this in relative proportion. AT  
contains a natural "matrix", and we can test it because it has a non  
trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self- 
referential points of view available to the universal numbers.








Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is
hard to
define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are  
not

realist about them.



Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.



You contradict your self,



No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence


Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes  
doctor +

occam gives the ontological conclusion.


No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.


That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as you  
want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the  
testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).








unless you mean that seven is not made of
matter. In which case comp nothing exists.



What does "comp nothing exists" mean?


Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."


Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.


You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which use  
the notion of primary matter.
You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of  
matter. Exce

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>  On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or  
> >> false? If
> >> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,  
> >> which is
> >> enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> > Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> > not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>
>  That's my point.
>
> >>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> >>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> >> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
> >> philosophy you want.
>
> > I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me  
> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not real,  

Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

> which is a bit absurd at the start.
> Could you define what you mean by "real"?

i can point to my own reality.

> >> Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
> >> physically real doctor.
>
> >> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to
> >> say
> >> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
>
> > Not at all.
>
>  OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a  
>  sense
>  which is not relevant for the reasoning.
>  If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at
>  all.
>
> >>> I accept CT and reject Platonism,
> >>> and thus the reasoning does not go
> >>> through.
>
> >> To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P
> >> on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the
> >> use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is  
> >> what I
> >> called Arithmetical realism.
>
> > That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.
>
> Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a  
> memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body such  
> that  " (see the paper).

I am not a description. I for descriptions.

> >> I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in
> >> which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
> >> projection of something else.
>
> > In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
> > is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
> > existence
>
> I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a conclusion  
> related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the  
> "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A  
> arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true  
> independently of me, you, etc.

You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence

>
> >> That use of Platonism come up in the
> >> conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.
>
> >> . People needs to be
> >> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
>
> > No, they just need to be anti realist.
>
>  Same remark.
>
> >>> Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
>
> >> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
> >> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
>
> > I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> > medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
>
> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being  
> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand  
> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is  
> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains  
> all the emulation of all programs,

As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.

>and this in relative proportion. AT  
> contains a natural "matrix", and we can test it because it has a non  
> trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self-
> referential points of view available to the universal numbers.
>
>
>
>
>
> >> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is
> >> hard to
> >> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are  
> >> not
> >> realist about them.
>
> > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> > you 7 doesn't exist.
>
>  You contradict your self,
>
> >>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> >>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> >>> sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
> >> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes  
> >> doctor

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:






On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
which is
enough for the comp consequences.,



Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.



That's my point.



Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.


It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with  
the

philosophy you want.



I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"


All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not  
real,


Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?


I meant "in general".






which is a bit absurd at the start.
Could you define what you mean by "real"?


i can point to my own reality.


To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up!






Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
physically real doctor.


Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough  
to

say
that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'



Not at all.



OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a
sense
which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning  
at

all.



I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
through.


To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any  
program P
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept  
the

use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is
what I
called Arithmetical realism.



That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.


Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a
memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body  
such

that  " (see the paper).


I am not a description. I for descriptions.


I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third  
person view.
The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the  
difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a  
description of that fact, like "1+1=2". Modern tools makes it possible  
to handle that difference in purely formal ways.
The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between  
a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a  
computation (be it immaterial or material).





I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology  
in

which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
projection of something else.



In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
existence


I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a  
conclusion

related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the
"arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A
arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true
independently of me, you, etc.


You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence


I use bivalence but also "yes doctor". Then after concluding, we can  
take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is  
explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other  
things) from that.










That use of Platonism come up in the
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.



. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.



No, they just need to be anti realist.



Same remark.



Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.



Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.



I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number


It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand
that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains
all the emulation of all programs,


As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.


Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations.






and this in relative proportion. AT
contains a natural "matrix", and we can test it because it has a non
trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self-
referential points of view availabl

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>

>  In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are  
>  true or
>  not.
>
> >>> I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
> >>> to be false, while believing comp to be true.
>
> >> "platonism" is ambiguous.
>
> > I mean and have always meant mathematical Platonism
>
> But you talk on a paper with a different terminology.

What paper? The Klein paper doesn't mention it.

> You are  
> confusing people.
>
>
>
> >> Any way, you can resist any conclusion in
> >> science with some ad-hoc philosophy.
>
> > There is nothing unscientific in the attitude
> > the immaterial things don't exist.
>
> Right, but irrelevant.
>
>
>
> >> So you are not saying something
> >> informative here.
> >> Ad without a minimal amount of arithmetical realism you cannot  
> >> endorse
> >> Church thesis,
>
> > A formalist can endorses anything with no ontological
> > realism whatsoever. All that is left without any ontological
> > realism is a formal axiom of bivalence
>
> ... which added to the theological bet "yes doctor" entails that  
> materialism, to explain matter,  is not better than vitalism to  
> explain life.

Materialism can solve WR just fine

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Quentin Anciaux]

2011/2/15 1Z 

>
>
> On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
> >  false? If
> >  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
> >  which is
> >  enough for the comp consequences.,
> >
> > >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> > >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
> >
> > >> That's my point.
> >
> > > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
> >
> >  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with
> >  the
> >  philosophy you want.
> >
> > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
> >
> > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
> > >> real,
> >
> > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
> >
> > I meant "in general".
>
>
> I don't need anything more than
> 1) I am real
> 2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>
> I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>

You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that prove
that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The principle is sound, the
choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't exist... but as I
said before, I can think about them in my mind... I exist, hence they
transitively exist through my mind at the least. I do not chose if a number
is prime or not hence I'm not inventing them as I'm not inventing the world
around me.


>
> > >> which is a bit absurd at the start.
> > >> Could you define what you mean by "real"?
> >
> > > i can point to my own reality.
> >
> > To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up!
>
>
>
> > >>> That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.
> >
> > >> Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a
> > >> memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body
> > >> such
> > >> that  " (see the paper).
> >
> > > I am not a description. I for descriptions.
> >
> > I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third
> > person view.
> > The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the
> > difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a
> > description of that fact, like "1+1=2". Modern tools makes it possible
> > to handle that difference in purely formal ways.
> > The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between
> > a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a
> > computation (be it immaterial or material).
>  existence
> >
> > >> I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a
> > >> conclusion
> > >> related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the
> > >> "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A
> > >> arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true
> > >> independently of me, you, etc.
> >
> > > You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
> > > with a merely formal statement of bivalence
> >
> > I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".
>
> But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
> to a physical substitution
>
> > Then after concluding, we can
> > take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
> > explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other
> > things) from that.
>
> >  Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
> >  fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
> >
> > >>> I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> > >>> medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
> >
> > >> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
> > >> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand
> > >> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is
> > >> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains
> > >> all the emulation of all programs,
> >
> > > As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
> > > running programmes.
> >
> > Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations.
>
>
> If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
> and indexical judgement of actuality.
>
>
> > >> You contradict your self,
> >
> > > No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> > > mathematical existence claims are 

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
>  false? If
>  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
>  which is
>  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>
> >> That's my point.
>
> > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
>  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with  
>  the
>  philosophy you want.
>
> >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
> >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not  
> >> real,
>
> > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> I meant "in general".


I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.

> >> which is a bit absurd at the start.
> >> Could you define what you mean by "real"?
>
> > i can point to my own reality.
>
> To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up!



> >>> That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.
>
> >> Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a
> >> memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body  
> >> such
> >> that  " (see the paper).
>
> > I am not a description. I for descriptions.
>
> I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third  
> person view.
> The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the  
> difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a  
> description of that fact, like "1+1=2". Modern tools makes it possible  
> to handle that difference in purely formal ways.
> The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between  
> a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a  
> computation (be it immaterial or material).
 existence
>
> >> I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a  
> >> conclusion
> >> related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the
> >> "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A
> >> arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true
> >> independently of me, you, etc.
>
> > You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
> > with a merely formal statement of bivalence
>
> I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".

But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
to a physical substitution

> Then after concluding, we can  
> take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is  
> explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other  
> things) from that.

>  Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
>  fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
>
> >>> I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> >>> medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
>
> >> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
> >> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand
> >> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is
> >> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains
> >> all the emulation of all programs,
>
> > As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
> > running programmes.
>
> Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations.


If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
and indexical judgement of actuality.


> >> You contradict your self,
>
> > No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> > mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> > sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
>  Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
>  doctor +
>  occam gives the ontological conclusion.
>
> >>> No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
>
> >> That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as you
> >> want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
> >> testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).
>
> > If it is testable, it is false.
>
> Why?

Not enough WR's.

> > What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
>
>  Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
>
> >>> Comp implies that the

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Brent Meeker]

On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2011/2/15 1Z mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com>>



On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
>  false? If
>  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
>  which is
>  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and
therefore
> >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or
don't.
>
> >> That's my point.
>
> > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
>  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you
want, with
>  the
>  philosophy you want.
>
> >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
> >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
> >> real,
>
> > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> I meant "in general".


I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.


You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that 
prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The principle is 
sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't 
exist... but as I said before, I can think about them in my mind...


Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol "7" and the 
word "seven" and you can probably think of seven things, xxx,  but I 
doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm pretty sure you can't 
think of the set of all sets with seven members.  And I'm quite sure you 
can't think of all the integers or all arithmetic.


I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the least. I 
do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not inventing them 
as I'm not inventing the world around me.


Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think of a 
number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can think of 
(which per Peano must exist)?


Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Quentin Anciaux]

2011/2/15 Brent Meeker 

>  On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2011/2/15 1Z 
>
>>
>>
>> On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>> >
>> > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> >  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>> >
>> > > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> > >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>> >
>> > >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> >  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
>> >  false? If
>> >  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
>> >  which is
>> >  enough for the comp consequences.,
>> >
>> > >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
>> > >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>> >
>> > >> That's my point.
>> >
>> > > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
>> > > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>> >
>> >  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with
>> >  the
>> >  philosophy you want.
>> >
>> > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>> >
>> > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
>> > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
>> > >> real,
>> >
>> > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>> >
>> > I meant "in general".
>>
>>
>>  I don't need anything more than
>> 1) I am real
>> 2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>>
>> I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>>
>
>  You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that
> prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The principle is sound,
> the choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't exist... but as I
> said before, I can think about them in my mind...
>
>
> Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol "7" and the
> word "seven" and you can probably think of seven things, xxx,  but I
> doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm pretty sure you can't think of
> the set of all sets with seven members.  And I'm quite sure you can't think
> of all the integers or all arithmetic.
>
>
>  I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the least. I do
> not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not inventing them as I'm
> not inventing the world around me.
>
>
> Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think of a
> number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can think of (which
> per Peano must exist)?
>
> Brent
>

The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of... Sherlock
 holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an axiomatic system is
chosen.

Quentin


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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Brent Meeker]

On 2/15/2011 12:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2011/2/15 Brent Meeker >


On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2011/2/15 1Z mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com>>



On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either
true or
>  false? If
>  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical
realism,
>  which is
>  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule
and therefore
> >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either
exist or don't.
>
> >> That's my point.
>
> > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
>  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you
want, with
>  the
>  philosophy you want.
>
> >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a
number"
>
> >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and
what is not
> >> real,
>
> > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you
know that?
>
> I meant "in general".


I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.


You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument
that prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The
principle is sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say
numbers don't exist... but as I said before, I can think about
them in my mind...


Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol "7"
and the word "seven" and you can probably think of seven things,
xxx,  but I doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm
pretty sure you can't think of the set of all sets with seven
members.  And I'm quite sure you can't think of all the integers
or all arithmetic.



I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the
least. I do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not
inventing them as I'm not inventing the world around me.


Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think
of a number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can
think of (which per Peano must exist)?

Brent


The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of... 
Sherlock  holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an 
axiomatic system is chosen.


No, it's only a difference of degree.  You can't choose Sherlock Holmes 
to be an American or a bus driver.  He "exists" in a looser axiomatic 
system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with 
the character in the stories by Conan Doyle.  Similarly, you can't 
imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns.


Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 8:39 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> On 2/15/2011 12:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > 2011/2/15 Brent Meeker  > >
>
> >     On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> >>     2011/2/15 1Z mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com>>
>
> >>         On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  >>         > wrote:
> >>         > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>         > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  >>         > wrote:
> >>         > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>         > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  >>         > wrote:
> >>         >  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>         > > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  >>         > wrote:
> >>         > >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>         > >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal
> >>         mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> >>         >  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either
> >>         true or
> >>         >  false? If
> >>         >  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical
> >>         realism,
> >>         >  which is
> >>         >  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> >>         > >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule
> >>         and therefore
> >>         > >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either
> >>         exist or don't.
>
> >>         > >> That's my point.
>
> >>         > > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> >>         > > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> >>         >  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you
> >>         want, with
> >>         >  the
> >>         >  philosophy you want.
>
> >>         > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a
> >>         number"
>
> >>         > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >>         > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and
> >>         what is not
> >>         > >> real,
>
> >>         > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you
> >>         know that?
>
> >>         > I meant "in general".
>
> >>         I don't need anything more than
> >>         1) I am real
> >>         2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>
> >>         I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>
> >>     You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument
> >>     that prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The
> >>     principle is sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say
> >>     numbers don't exist... but as I said before, I can think about
> >>     them in my mind...
>
> >     Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol "7"
> >     and the word "seven" and you can probably think of seven things,
> >     xxx,  but I doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm
> >     pretty sure you can't think of the set of all sets with seven
> >     members.  And I'm quite sure you can't think of all the integers
> >     or all arithmetic.
>
> >>     I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the
> >>     least. I do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not
> >>     inventing them as I'm not inventing the world around me.
>
> >     Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think
> >     of a number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can
> >     think of (which per Peano must exist)?
>
> >     Brent
>
> > The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of...
> > Sherlock  holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an
> > axiomatic system is chosen.
>
> No, it's only a difference of degree.  You can't choose Sherlock Holmes
> to be an American or a bus driver.  He "exists" in a looser axiomatic
> system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with
> the character in the stories by Conan Doyle.  Similarly, you can't
> imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns.
>
> Brent

The ontology of fiction can be true of mathematics even if the
methodology isn't.

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 7:28 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2011/2/15 1Z 
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > >  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > > >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > >  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
> > >  false? If
> > >  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
> > >  which is
> > >  enough for the comp consequences.,
>
> > > >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> > > >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>
> > > >> That's my point.
>
> > > > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > > > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> > >  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with
> > >  the
> > >  philosophy you want.
>
> > > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
> > > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> > > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
> > > >> real,
>
> > > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> > > I meant "in general".
>
> > I don't need anything more than
> > 1) I am real
> > 2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>
> > I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>
> You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that prove
> that they are unreal (or real or whatever).

It's the inverse of Bruno's argument: immateriality is an unnecessary
posit
given materiality.

> The principle is sound, the
> choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't exist... but as I
> said before, I can think about them in my mind

You can think about fictional entities too. Why would
something have to exist outside your head in order for you
to think about it?

>... I exist, hence they
> transitively exist through my mind at the least.

But Bruno claims *they* are generating *you*.

> I do not chose if a number
> is prime or not hence

Certain things follow inevitably when you are
following rules. That does not need to be explained
by positing anything beyond the rules themselves.

> I'm not inventing them

Well, someone told you the rules. You didn't invent
chess either

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Brent Meeker]

On 2/15/2011 1:01 PM, 1Z wrote:

The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of...
>  >  Sherlock  holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an
>  >  axiomatic system is chosen.
   

>
>  No, it's only a difference of degree.  You can't choose Sherlock Holmes
>  to be an American or a bus driver.  He "exists" in a looser axiomatic
>  system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with
>  the character in the stories by Conan Doyle.  Similarly, you can't
>  imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns.
>
>  Brent
 

The ontology of fiction can be true of mathematics even if the
methodology isn't.
   


It seems that fictional characters exist in a different domain than 
Platonia.  One of the attributes of fictional characters that 
distinguishes them from real people is that there questions about them 
that would have factual answers if they were real but which don't 
because they are fictional.  For example, did Sherlock Holmes have a 
mole on his left arm?  If I asked that of say, Conan Doyle, we wouldn't 
know the answer but we would suppose there is a definite fact of the 
matter.


Because numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems that 
they are more real than fictional characters.  Whatever question you can 
ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or 
how to find it.  But when you consider arithmetic as a whole this no 
longer holds.  There may be questions that aren't decidable and whose 
answer could be added as an axiom; the way a writer could add a mole to 
Sherlock Holmes' arm.


Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 9:22 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
  Whatever question you can
> ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or
> how to find it...numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems that
> they are more real than fictional characters.

But being able to answer question is essentially epistemic. It doesn't
imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in
principle, answer
questions about real people may be explained by the existence and
perceptual accessibility
of real people: but our ability to answer questions about mathematical
objects
is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doesn't
need to posit
of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual
access
to them).

  But when you consider arithmetic as a whole this no
> longer holds.  There may be questions that aren't decidable and whose
> answer could be added as an axiom; the way a writer could add a mole to
> Sherlock Holmes' arm.
>
> Brent

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Brent Meeker]

On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 15, 9:22 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
   
 

Whatever question you can
   

ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or
how to find it...numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems that
they are more real than fictional characters.
 

But being able to answer question is essentially epistemic. It doesn't
imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in
principle, answer
questions about real people may be explained by the existence and
perceptual accessibility
of real people:


So the epistemic facts have an ontological implication.  If I describe a 
man who lives at 10 Baker Street, smokes dope, and works as a detective 
you won't know whether he's real or not.  But if I tell you there is no 
fact of the matter about whether he has a mole on his arm, then you'll 
know he's a fiction.



but our ability to answer questions about mathematical
objects
is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doesn't
need to posit
of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual
access
to them).
   


I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia 
apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.


Brent


But when you consider arithmetic as a whole this no
   

longer holds.  There may be questions that aren't decidable and whose
answer could be added as an axiom; the way a writer could add a mole to
Sherlock Holmes' arm.

Brent
 
   


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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[1Z]

On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 15, 9:22 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
> >     Whatever question you can
>
> >> ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or
> >> how to find it...numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems 
> >> that
> >> they are more real than fictional characters.
>
> > But being able to answer question is essentially epistemic. It doesn't
> > imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in
> > principle, answer
> > questions about real people may be explained by the existence and
> > perceptual accessibility
> > of real people:
>
> So the epistemic facts have an ontological implication.  If I describe a
> man who lives at 10 Baker Street, smokes dope, and works as a detective
> you won't know whether he's real or not.  But if I tell you there is no
> fact of the matter about whether he has a mole on his arm, then you'll
> know he's a fiction.

If I can figure out information I haven't been given
from information I have been given, I don't need to suppose
that I didn't figure it out and instead perceived it  by by some
sixth sense.

> > but our ability to answer questions about mathematical
> > objects
> > is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doesn't
> > need to posit
> > of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual
> > access
> > to them).
>
> I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
> apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.

Some people "perceive" pink elephants too. However, other people don't
"perceive" them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
really being perceived at all.

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