Colin Hales wrote:
> Hi,
> Can you please send a .PDF or a .DOC
> I can't read .DOCX and I can't upgrade my PC to read ituni rules... :-(
> regards
> Colin Hales
Download OpenOffice. It's free. It'll read .doc and .docx files and it will
save in .doc
and .pdf (but it won't import .pdf).
Hi,
Can you please send a .PDF or a .DOC
I can't read .DOCX and I can't upgrade my PC to read ituni rules... :-(
regards
Colin Hales
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On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I think you are right that the MGA is at the crux. But I don't know whether
> to regard it
> as proving that computation need not be physically instantiated or as a
> reductio against
> the "yes doctor" hypothesis. Saying yes to the doctor seems very
On 19 Aug, 01:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
> It seems that your argument uses MGA to
> conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so
> Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated. It
> seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct
> argument
> showing they are material. B
On 19 Aug, 01:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
> It seems that your argument uses MGA to
> conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so
> Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated. It
> seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct
> argument
> showing they are material. B
David Nyman wrote:
> On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
>> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
>> assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of
>> universal mach
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence o
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
> assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of
> universal machines (to be short). There i
On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
>>> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
>>> some
>>> possible mathe
Some of you may be interested in my model of our Universe in which I propose
that the fundamental building blocks of our Universe are tronnies each of
which is one-half of nothing, with no mass and no volume and a charge of +e
or -e. I have attached a copy of the first portion of my latest patent
On 18 Aug, 15:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 12:14, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >> Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp,
> >> we
> >> have a lot choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take
> >> arithmetical existence, if only because this is taug
2009/8/18 Flammarion :
>> >> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a
>> >> statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about reality
>> >> and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could
>> >> instead paraphrase this in ter
2009/8/18 Brent Meeker :
>> I presume that one could substitute 'computation' for 'unicorn' in the above
>> passage?
>> If so, the human concept that it is 'computation' that gives rise to
>> consciousness
>> could be "paraphrased using statements about physical processes in human
>> brains".
On 18 Aug, 09:55, Flammarion wrote:
> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> some
> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have furthe
On Tue, 2009-08-18 at 11:09 -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> It has long been noted that microtubles are ubiquitous in the cells of other
> organs, not
> just in the brain.
While I find the Penrose/Hameroff proposal very unconvincing for other
reasons, this is not one of them.
There are many shar
On 18 Aug, 12:52, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 04:32:18 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> > On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> > > > Subject:
On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> > Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> > some
> > possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> >
On 18 Aug 2009, at 19:36, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> QM mechanics solves mathematically the white rabbit problem. I do
>> agree with this, but to say it does this by invoking primitive matter
>> does not follow. On the contrary QM amplitude makes primitive matter
>> still more hard to figure out.
On 18 Aug 2009, at 19:17, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
Some posts ago, you seem to accept arithmetical realism, so I am no
more sure of your position.
>>> I may have assented to the *truth* of some propositions...
>>> but truth is not existence. At least, the claim that
>>> truth=existenc
Mirek Dobsicek wrote:
> Somebody might be interested in ..
>
> PHYSICAL REVIEW E 80, 021912 2009
>
> Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated objective-reduction proposal for human
> consciousness is not biologically feasible
It has long been noted that microtubles are ubiquitous in the cells of other
o
Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:37:02 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > Peter Jones wrote:
> > >
> > > > On 17 Aug, 1
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:41, Flammarion wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>>> 1Z wrote:
> But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
> mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers
> described or
> expla
Flammarion wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>> Peter Jones wrote:
>>
>>> On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
>> But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
>> mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or
>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>>>
Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the
Ronald,
On 18 Aug 2009, at 14:14, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> I have heard of Octonians but have not used them.
> I do not know anything about intelligible hypostases
Have you heard about Gödel's provability (beweisbar) predicate bew(x)?
If you have, define con(x) by ~bew ('~x') (carefully taking in
On 18 Aug 2009, at 12:14, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp,
>> we
>> have a lot choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take
>> arithmetical existence, if only because this is taught in school, and
>> its enough to justified the exis
On 18 Aug 2009, at 11:59, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 10:01, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:48, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
What do you mean by "ontological existence"?
>>
>>> Real in the Sense that I am Real.
>>
>> What does that mean?
>>
>> Do you mean "real in the
Bruno:
I have heard of Octonians but have not used them.
I do not know anything about intelligible hypostases
. Ronald
On Aug 18, 2:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 16:23, ronaldheld wrote:
>
>
>
> > arxiv.org:0908.2063v1
> > Any comments?
>
> Very cute li
> Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 04:32:18 -0700
> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > From: peter
Actually Tegmark already proposed a similar no go theorem.
BTW, it is weird people that continue to talk about the Penrose-
Hameroff argument.
Hameroff is OK with the idea that a brain could be a machine (of the
quantum kind).
Penrose is not OK, with that idea. Penrose, in his book and papers,
Somebody might be interested in ..
PHYSICAL REVIEW E 80, 021912 2009
Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated objective-reduction proposal for human
consciousness is not biologically feasible
>From the abstract:
Penrose and Hameroff have argued that the conventional models of a
brain fun
On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> > On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > > > Subject:
> Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > From: peter
On 18 Aug, 09:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
> >> So you reject arithmetical realism, and thus you reject comp.
>
> > The computaitonal Theory of Mind has no implications about Platonism.
>
> Comp is based on the notion of digitalness, which needs Church
On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>
> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> some
> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I h
On 16 Aug, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 14:34, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >> You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can
> >> run
> >> a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that
> >> computation,
> >>
On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> > >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > > the term in a way that clearly has re
On 18 Aug, 10:01, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:48, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >> What do you mean by "ontological existence"?
>
> > Real in the Sense that I am Real.
>
> What does that mean?
>
> Do you mean "real in the sense that 1-I is real"? or
> do you mean "real in the sens
On 18 Aug, 09:52, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:41, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >> 1Z wrote:
> But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
> mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers
> de
> Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
> >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
>
> Any Plat
> Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:37:02 -0700
> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > Peter Jones wrote:
> >
> > > On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > > >
On 18 Aug, 09:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
> >>> physical space. So the UDA is based o
On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:48, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> What do you mean by "ontological existence"?
>
> Real in the Sense that I am Real.
What does that mean?
Do you mean "real in the sense that 1-I is real"? or
do you mean "real in the sense that 3-I is real"?
The 1-I reality (my consciousnes
On 18 Aug, 01:43, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/17 Flammarion :
>
> > I am trying to persuade Bruno that his argument has an implict
> > assumption of Platonism that should be made explicit. An assumption
> > of Platonism as a non-observable background might be
> > justifiiable in the way you su
On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:44, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 17 Aug, 18:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>> Does Bruno assume arithmetic is really real or just a really good
>> model, and can the
>> difference be known?
>
> I don't think Bruno believes there is anything else
> for ar
On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:41, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers
described or
explain.
>
>> But what is this "primar
On 18 Aug, 00:41, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/17 Flammarion :
>
> > Yep. I have no problem with any of that
>
> Really? Let's see then.
>
> >> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a
> >> statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about r
On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Peter Jones wrote:
>
> > On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > > But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
> > > > > mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or
> > > > >
> > > > >
On 18 Aug, 02:47, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/18 Jesse Mazer wrote:
> AFAICS the assumption of primary matter 'solves' the white rabbit
> problem by making it circular: i.e. assuming that primary matter
> exists entails restricting the theory to just those mathematics and
> parameters capable
On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>>
>>> Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
>>> physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
>>> round.
>>
>> Are y
On 17 Aug 2009, at 16:23, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> arxiv.org:0908.2063v1
> Any comments?
Very cute little paper.
I think the author would have found gravity waves, and thus space-
time, by extending its approach to the Octonions (I intuit this since
my reading of Kaufman book on knots and phy
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