Re: The free will function
On Feb 20, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial simulation or not. I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to verifiable (empirically) constraints. With comp we are in a complex matrix whose existence is deducible from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *. Of course, Platonism/AR cannot be deduced mathematically: it is ontology. Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism without the notion of computational realism? Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including physicalism. There is no such incompatibility. It is mutual redundancy, not mutual contradiction. What BM calls incompatibility actually hinges on Occams Razor, and O's R cuts both ways: AR/Platonism is redundant given materialism. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 20, 6:37 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 20, 10:32 am, acw a...@lavabit.com wrote: On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote: .. Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions still aren't reality It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer reality than the simulation. If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things, true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right. Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. No. True = true of unsimulated reality. If I make a simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude that there is an omnipotent entity They can only wrongly conclude that since you are not omnipotent. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 20, 5:38 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 11:52 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all kinds of Gods. But then why did you say There is something that prevents infinite nonsense universes? How did you find this out, did you somehow check on every one of those infinite number of Many Worlds to see? John K Clark Good question. CW doesn't seem to be subject to the same epistemic contraints as the rest of us. Maybe he IS God! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 20, 1:45 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological control means god or supernaural You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would have to admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make changes to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your universe and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God? You are natural. How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial simulation or not. That doens't make you supernatural. You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus. No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a Pegasus The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications. and that is all that is required. But we are natural so they would be wrong. They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though. So? Is appearance reality? That is what comp says. Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind. Both. Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism without the notion of computational realism? What do you mean by computational realism? The simulation is reality as far as the simulatees are concerned. And if they are wrong, it still isn't the real reality. It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still their reality. their reality=appearance=/= reality. Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience. But it it is in reality simulated, it is in reality simulated, and our reality is delusional. You seem to be arguing appearance=reality on the premise that opinion=truth. Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which is in fact a logical program. That is uncontentious. It is also not what you are saying elsewhere. Appearances may not reflect the truest level of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable representation of the simulation's function. Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions still aren't reality It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer reality than the simulation. Can't a red pill be programmed in? If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better. Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI + Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as *their* Gods. ANd I am saying that is fallacious. CTM, MWI and AP are all sceintific princples with no room for the supernatural. SInce gods are supernatural by definition, no belief in a god arising in such circumsntances is *correct*, be it every so persuasive. Did say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean poisonous. Poisonous is a term with a more literal meaning. 'Natural' has no place in MWI, comp, or the anthropic principle. I'm surprised that you would use it. I thought most people here were on board with comp's view that silicon machines could be no less natural as conscious agents than living organisms. What we are arguing about is the supernatural. No. What you are arguing about is the supernatural. What I am arguing about are gods Gods are supernatural by definition. (entities with absolute superiority or omnipotence over the subordinate entities who inhabit the simulations they create) and their inevitability in MWI. That's superbeings, not gods. You do not rescue the supernatural by rendering the natural meaningless. Why not? Because, if the one is meaningless, so is the other. Besides, as I keep saying, I am not trying to rescue the supernatural, I am pointing out that God is not supernatural at all, it is an accurate description of the relationship between the programmer and the programmed. Gods are superntarual by definition. You can no more provide evidecne of a natural god than of a married bachelor. I don't know. Who? You. No, you have
Re: The free will function
On Feb 20, 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/2/20 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com He said and I quote and emphasis: Now comp makes **almost all** (not any) UMs' physics identical. Note that there will still be an infinite variety of HP/WR physics even if it is a small subset of the whole. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
2012/2/21 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 20, 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/2/20 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com He said and I quote and emphasis: Now comp makes **almost all** (not any) UMs' physics identical. Note that there will still be an infinite variety of HP/WR physics even if it is a small subset of the whole. Sure but it must be of low measure... and this is compatible with QM. Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On 2/21/2012 5:41 AM, 1Z wrote: On Feb 20, 1:45 pm, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological control means god or supernaural You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would have to admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make changes to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your universe and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God? You are natural. How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial simulation or not. That doens't make you supernatural. Hi Craig, I think that you are missing a point here. COMP is showing us how there is no inherent bias on what we can believe ourselves to be, thus it is throwing open the options. This is a good with with regards to Free Will for without the multiplicity of options or alternatives there is no choice. We just would be one thing and there would be no debate on free will. You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus. No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a Pegasus The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications. False, Semantics is said to only be possible because we can lie, i.e. if we cannot lie then we cannot tell truths either. See Umberto Echo's Semiotics Theory http://books.google.com/books?id=RaFrIAAJq=lie#search_anchor pg. 7. and that is all that is required. But we are natural so they would be wrong. They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though. So? Is appearance reality? That is what comp says. Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind. Both. Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory. It is scientific if it is falsifiable. Is it? What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism without the notion of computational realism? What do you mean by computational realism? The belief that what is real is what is computable or expressible with enumerable recursive functions. The simulation is reality as far as the simulatees are concerned. And if they are wrong, it still isn't the real reality. It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still their reality. their reality=appearance=/= reality. This is really a debate about Realism, no? Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience. But it it is in reality simulated, it is in reality simulated, and our reality is delusional. It is delusion only if there are alternative realities against which we can judge the validity of such statements as what I am experiencing at this moment is not real. You seem to be arguing appearance=reality on the premise that opinion=truth. Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which is in fact a logical program. That is uncontentious. It is also not what you are saying elsewhere. Appearances may not reflect the truest level of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable representation of the simulation's function. Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions still aren't reality It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer reality than the simulation. Can't a red pill be programmed in? No, as that would render the entire edifice of alternatives impossible and thus not even conceivable. If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better. Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI + Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as *their* Gods. ANd I am saying that is fallacious. CTM, MWI and AP are all sceintific princples with no room for the supernatural. SInce gods are supernatural by definition, no belief in a god arising in such circumsntances is *correct*, be it every so persuasive. Would A.C. Clarck's dictum have an answer to this all sufficiently advanced technology appears to be magic? Did say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean poisonous. Poisonous is a term with a more literal
Re: The free will function
On 20 Feb 2012, at 17:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote: On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote: On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Comp says that any UM's experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right? Computaionalism or Bruno's comp? We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker hypothesis than most forms of CTM, ? given that comp allows the substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are automatically lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level. Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical. That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not one physics for each UTM, ? That's exactly what I am saying above. No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler ontology than multiple solipsistic physicses. I show that the CTM theory entais that physics is the same for all Löbian entity (machine or not), so that we canb derive physics from machine's introspection. The general shape is given by a relative sum on all computations. It depends for each machine to the competition between infinities of machines. Negative amplitude of probability comes from the formula p-[]p satisfied by the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (that is the UD). Without this I would have already conclude that comp and/or the classical theory of knowledge is refuted. and there is a physical hardware platform at level 0. A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in physics. Occam;s razor says we should assume what we see is level 0. Occam razor says that we must not assume ontologicaly what we can explain phenomenologically. That why QM + Occam = MWI = QM without collapse. With CTM, we have that the theory of everything is arithmetic, for it explains why and how numbers, relatively to other numbers develop stable and persistent beliefs and knowledge about quanta and qualia. And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in fundamental cognitive science. Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with materialism (weak materialism). According to a string of controversial arguments. You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7, I never said anything of the kind. I asked you, after a summing up of the argument, and we got into a long conversation on step 8 only. I debunked earlier critics of the step 0 (the definition of comp) because you asserted it was platonist, when I insist that it is only realist on arithmetic, and this means that we just agree with the validity of (A V ~A) for arithmetical sentences. and when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error, but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making sense. Not according to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers and brains are made of matter. Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate for marrying GR and QM. Not being able to define matter and disbelieving in it are two very different issues. I am OK with this. For example consciousness, reality, truth, etc. are all concept which are intuitively not definable, and have been proved to be not definable in the comp (meta) theory, and in the machines' discourse (that is formally). But primitive matter is different. Not only we cannot define it, but we cannot experiment with it, we cannot experience it, nor find any use of the notion in physics, nor even mention of it. It is only a vague everyday-like extrapolation from our animal experience. In occident, science is born from taking some distance from such kind of idea. Given more than 2000 years of not being able to solve the mind body problem, we should not take it for granted, at the least. It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA reasoning. Lucky them. The UDA argument rests on Platonism. Oh no! You are coming back with this? I already answer this by asking you to prove this. To show me where in the paper I assume Platonism. The Platonism comes from the conclusion. I use only the minimal amount of arithmetical realism to give sense to Church thesis. Nothing else. Non Patonists are fully entitled to disregard it. Others might wish to treat it as a reductio of Platonism. This is philosophical nonsense. COMP + the usual occam used in
Re: The free will function
On 21 Feb 2012, at 14:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/2/21 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 20, 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/2/20 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com He said and I quote and emphasis: Now comp makes **almost all** (not any) UMs' physics identical. Note that there will still be an infinite variety of HP/WR physics even if it is a small subset of the whole. Sure but it must be of low measure... and this is compatible with QM. Yes. With QM without collapse, there are also infinite varieties of HP/ WR first person (even plural) realities. But they are relatively rare, and when plural, they are very unstable. The probability to get there is something like 1/big number, and the probability to stay there is (1/bib number)^big number. --Why do you build each week a lottery ticket, given that you have never won? --Oh, I continue to play *every week* because my goal is to win ten times in a row ... :) Bruno Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: it is important to conceive that comp might be false. Why? If it's false I don't see how there could be a way to prove it false, and as we can not function unless we assume it's true it would seem pointless to worry about it. I mean it's not as if there were not other important things to think about. Intelligent behavior and consciousness might be related, but should not be equated, because those are different things. Yes they are different things. And you can have consciousness without intelligent behavior but you can't have intelligent behavior without consciousness; I can't prove that last part but I could not function if I didn't believe it as strongly as I believe anything. it is generally accepted that we are conscious during the dreams. But the REM dream state occurs for only about 20% of the total time you sleep. The same for some comatose state. As I said you can be conscious even when no intelligent behavior is observed, but even so it is generally accepted that cadavers are not conscious. That shows that consciousness can be independent of macro-behavior Yes, but if that macro-behavior is intelligent then even without proof I don't believe and can not believe the reverse is true. Actually I argue that comp, when taken seriously enough, has to reduce physics to the 'theology of numbers', like biochemistry can be said to have been reduced to quantum mechanics. I think I know what you mean but I don't see what the word theology adds to the above, all it does is muddy the waters and give respect to something that does not deserve it. Beyond arithmetic you can already doubt. Are you sure? We can point to many non computable real number, called non computable function in modern computability theory. [...] There is the famous Chaitin number, etc. Chaitin proved that such a number, now called Omega or Chaitin's constant exists, and it is greater than 0 but less than 1 but he could be no more specific than that; he could not point to it but he could at least prove that nobody could ever do better, nobody else would ever be able to point to it either. What he actually did is show that if by some magical power you knew what Omega's value is you could use that information to determine the truth or falsehood of every mathematical statement, and that would contradict the proofs of Godel and Turing, thus Chaitin proved such magical powers do not exist and nobody will ever know what the numeric value of Chaitin's constant is. non-computable numbers were only discovered by Turing in the 1930's Emil Post discovered them in 1922. Others were close. Alonzo Church discovered them independently about the same time as Turing but as far as I know Emil Post's work in the early 1920's involved propositional logic, a system not powerful enough to perform arithmetic. Comp is an hypothesis concerning consciousness. Why should we must to assume it. Because it's important but nobody will ever be able to prove or disprove it and most of all because nobody can function if they thought they were the only conscious being in the universe. Atheist and materialist often use comp (even a stronger version) like if it solves the mind-body problem. Atheist and materialist are under no obligation to solve this problem because their competition, Bible thumpers, can't solve it either. And what exactly is this mind body problem anyway, it has never been entirely clear to me. comp can only help to formulate the problem. In a nutshell, comp seems to be incompatible with an already weak form of materialism (the belief in an ontological primitive matter). It is far from clear that there is even a problem to be solved, if consciousness is really fundamental, and most think it is, then after you say that consciousness is the way data feels like when it is being processed then there is simply nothing more to be said on the subject of consciousness. If you can explain something that is fundamental then it can't be fundamental, the things in your explanation are. I argue that comp reduces the mind-body problem into a appearance-of-body problem in arithmetic. In a nutshell, comp seems to be incompatible with an already weak form of materialism (the belief in an ontological primitive matter). Maybe that's because consciousness is a adjective not a noun and has nothing to do with what matter is but has to do with the way matter behaves, theoretically if something other than matter behaved that way it would be conscious too. Even for the layman, there is a general belief that modern science has solved everything, when, in my opinion, it has not Obviously I agree, science has done a lot but it hasn't solved everything, but the difference is that religion hasn't solved anything. When you say: If God is omnipotent he could certainly make his existence obvious to even the stupidest most unobservant person if he
UD* and consciousness
Bruno and others, Here's a thought experiment that for me casts doubt on the notion that consciousness requires 1p indeterminacy. Imagine that we have scanned my friend Mary so that we have a complete functional description of her brain (down to some substitution level that we are betting on). We run the scan in a simulated classical physics. The simulation is completely closed, which is to say, deterministic. In other words, we can run the simulation a million times for a million years each time, and the state of all them will be identical. Now, when we run the simulation, we can ask her (within the context of the simulation) Are you conscious, Mary? Are you aware of your thoughts? She replies yes. Next, we tweak the simulation in the following way. We plug in a source of quantum randomness (random numbers from a quantum random number generator) into a simulated water fountain. Now, the simulation is no longer deterministic. A million runs of the simulation will result in a million different computational states after a million years. We ask the same questions of Mary and she replies yes. In the deterministic scenario, Mary's computational state is traced an infinite number of times in the UD*, but only because of the infinite number of ways a particular computational state can be instantiated in the UD* (different levels, UD implementing other UDs recursively, iteration along the reals, etc). It's a stretch however to say that there is 1p indeterminacy, because her computational state as implemented in the simulation is deterministic. In the second scenario, her computational state is traced in the UD* and it is clear there is 1p indeterminacy, as the splitting entailed by the quantum number generator brings Mary along, so to speak. So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level. If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p indeterminacy. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On 2/21/2012 5:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: I think that you are missing a point here. COMP is showing us how there is no inherent bias on what we can believe ourselves to be, thus it is throwing open the options. This is a good with with regards to Free Will for without the multiplicity of options or alternatives there is no choice. Options implies one-or-the-other. All the theories based on COMP and MWI assume there is no choice and everything happens. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On Feb 21, 4:16 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: it is important to conceive that comp might be false. Why? If it's false I don't see how there could be a way to prove it false, Huh? Hardly anything is exactly computer-emulable. Flight simulators don't fly. The Computational Theory of X has been disproved (or never even entertained) for many values of X and as we can not function unless we assume it's true WHT??? How did we function before the 20th century??? Comp is an hypothesis concerning consciousness. Why should we must to assume it. Because it's important but nobody will ever be able to prove or disprove it and most of all because nobody can function if they thought they were the only conscious being in the universe. What the hell has solipsism got to do with CTM? I argue that comp reduces the mind-body problem into a appearance-of-body problem in arithmetic. In a nutshell, comp seems to be incompatible with an already weak form of materialism (the belief in an ontological primitive matter). Maybe that's because consciousness is a adjective not a noun It isn;t -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On 2/21/2012 7:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Negative amplitude of probability comes from the formula p-[]p satisfied by the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (that is the UD). How does that work? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 2/21/2012 8:16 AM, John Clark wrote: it is important to conceive that comp might be false. Why? If it's false I don't see how there could be a way to prove it false, and as we can not function unless we assume it's true it would seem pointless to worry about it. I mean it's not as if there were not other important things to think about. I have the impression that John and Bruno are using two different meanings of comp. Maybe they could explicate. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 2/21/2012 8:16 AM, John Clark wrote: Yes they are different things. And you can have consciousness without intelligent behavior but you can't have intelligent behavior without consciousness; I can't prove that last part but I could not function if I didn't believe it as strongly as I believe anything. Why not? I think it pretty likely too. But if, for example Watson behaved intelligently I'm not sure I would have to believe it's conscious, at least not in a human way. A robot could behave intelligently but with different values (e.g. no personal ego, think of The Borg) such that I would think its consciousness must be very different. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UD* and consciousness
On 2/21/2012 8:32 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Bruno and others, Here's a thought experiment that for me casts doubt on the notion that consciousness requires 1p indeterminacy. Imagine that we have scanned my friend Mary so that we have a complete functional description of her brain (down to some substitution level that we are betting on). We run the scan in a simulated classical physics. The simulation is completely closed, which is to say, deterministic. In other words, we can run the simulation a million times for a million years each time, and the state of all them will be identical. Now, when we run the simulation, we can ask her (within the context of the simulation) Are you conscious, Mary? Are you aware of your thoughts? She replies yes. Next, we tweak the simulation in the following way. We plug in a source of quantum randomness (random numbers from a quantum random number generator) into a simulated water fountain. Now, the simulation is no longer deterministic. A million runs of the simulation will result in a million different computational states after a million years. We ask the same questions of Mary and she replies yes. In the deterministic scenario, Mary's computational state is traced an infinite number of times in the UD*, but only because of the infinite number of ways a particular computational state can be instantiated in the UD* (different levels, UD implementing other UDs recursively, iteration along the reals, etc). It's a stretch however to say that there is 1p indeterminacy, because her computational state as implemented in the simulation is deterministic. In the second scenario, her computational state is traced in the UD* and it is clear there is 1p indeterminacy, as the splitting entailed by the quantum number generator brings Mary along, so to speak. So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level. If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p indeterminacy. But is it really either-or? Isn't it likely there are different kinds and degrees of consciousness. I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about this. On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?) conscious, but then he says it depends on the program they are executing. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On 2/21/2012 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2012, at 17:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote: On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote: On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Comp says that any UM's experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right? Computaionalism or Bruno's comp? We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker hypothesis than most forms of CTM, ? given that comp allows the substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are automatically lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level. Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical. That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not one physics for each UTM, ? That's exactly what I am saying above. No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler ontology than multiple solipsistic physicses. I show that the CTM theory entais that physics is the same for all Löbian entity (machine or not), so that we canb derive physics from machine's introspection. The general shape is given by a relative sum on all computations. It depends for each machine to the competition between infinities of machines. Negative amplitude of probability comes from the formula p-[]p satisfied by the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (that is the UD). Without this I would have already conclude that comp and/or the classical theory of knowledge is refuted. Does this introspection manifest all possible means of generating the appearance of other minds? and there is a physical hardware platform at level 0. A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in physics. Occam;s razor says we should assume what we see is level 0. Occam razor says that we must not assume ontologicaly what we can explain phenomenologically. That why QM + Occam = MWI = QM without collapse. With CTM, we have that the theory of everything is arithmetic, for it explains why and how numbers, relatively to other numbers develop stable and persistent beliefs and knowledge about quanta and qualia. And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in fundamental cognitive science. Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with materialism (weak materialism). According to a string of controversial arguments. You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7, I never said anything of the kind. I asked you, after a summing up of the argument, and we got into a long conversation on step 8 only. I debunked earlier critics of the step 0 (the definition of comp) because you asserted it was platonist, when I insist that it is only realist on arithmetic, and this means that we just agree with the validity of (A V ~A) for arithmetical sentences. and when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error, but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making sense. Not according to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers and brains are made of matter. Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate for marrying GR and QM. Not being able to define matter and disbelieving in it are two very different issues. I am OK with this. For example consciousness, reality, truth, etc. are all concept which are intuitively not definable, and have been proved to be not definable in the comp (meta) theory, and in the machines' discourse (that is formally). But primitive matter is different. Not only we cannot define it, but we cannot experiment with it, we cannot experience it, nor find any use of the notion in physics, nor even mention of it. It is only a vague everyday-like extrapolation from our animal experience. In occident, science is born from taking some distance from such kind of idea. Given more than 2000 years of not being able to solve the mind body problem, we should not take it for granted, at the least. It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA reasoning. Lucky them. The UDA argument rests on Platonism. Oh no! You are coming back with this? I already answer this by asking you to prove this. To show me where in the paper I assume Platonism. The Platonism comes from the conclusion. I use only the minimal amount of arithmetical realism to give sense to Church thesis. Nothing else. Non Patonists are fully entitled to disregard it. Others
Re: The free will function
On 2/21/2012 11:45 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/21/2012 5:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: I think that you are missing a point here. COMP is showing us how there is no inherent bias on what we can believe ourselves to be, thus it is throwing open the options. This is a good with with regards to Free Will for without the multiplicity of options or alternatives there is no choice. Options implies one-or-the-other. All the theories based on COMP and MWI assume there is no choice and everything happens. Brent Hi Brent, Your assertion is true but irrelevant because the agency aspect of choice does not span all of the happenings simultaneously. We have a notion of free will because we cannot be conscious of all the superposed possibilities. The point is that we can conveive multiple possibility from which we can imagine making a choice. Ben Goertzel's paper, found here http://www.google.com/url?sa=trct=jq=%22hyperset+models+of+self%2C+Will+and+Reflective+consciousness%22source=webcd=1ved=0CCEQFjAAurl=http%3A%2F%2Fgoertzel.org%2Fconsciousness%2Fconsciousness_paper.pdfei=t-NDT4m_O5CUtwft1tyaBQusg=AFQjCNGPbt16jLOtezl_8Cg0vfBxcOYdhwcad=rja, explains this quite well IMHO. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 2/21/2012 11:53 AM, 1Z wrote: On Feb 21, 4:16 pm, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: it is important to conceive that comp might be false. Why? If it's false I don't see how there could be a way to prove it false, Huh? Hardly anything is exactly computer-emulable. Flight simulators don't fly. The Computational Theory of X has been disproved (or never even entertained) for many values of X and as we can not function unless we assume it's true WHT??? How did we function before the 20th century??? Comp is an hypothesis concerning consciousness. Why should we must to assume it. Because it's important but nobody will ever be able to prove or disprove it and most of all because nobody can function if they thought they were the only conscious being in the universe. What the hell has solipsism got to do with CTM? What Craig wrote is not solipsism. I argue that comp reduces the mind-body problem into a appearance-of-body problem in arithmetic. In a nutshell, comp seems to be incompatible with an already weak form of materialism (the belief in an ontological primitive matter). Maybe that's because consciousness is a adjective not a noun It isn;t -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
A cosmologist laments his fate
http://harpers.org/archive/2011/12/0083720 Excerpted from the above article on multiverse theories: “The reason I went into theoretical physics,” Guth tells me, “is that I liked the idea that we could understand everything—i.e., the universe—in terms of mathematics and logic.” He gives a bitter laugh. We have been talking about the multiverse. Perhaps he should have a word with Bruno? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/aVDOFHyR80YJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 21 Feb 2012, at 17:16, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: it is important to conceive that comp might be false. Why? If it's false I don't see how there could be a way to prove it false, You have to study UDA a little bit perhaps. Comp makes physics a branch of arithmetic. I provide a constructive proof, (accepting the most admitted classical theory of knowledge). This makes comp refutable. Just compare the comp-physics and the inferred physics. I want to be short and non technical, the details are a bit more subtle, for example, we might also conclude that we are in a relative simulation, if the difference between comp-physics and empiric-physics belongs to a certain type. and as we can not function unless we assume it's true it would seem pointless to worry about it. Here I really do not understand what you say. Why would the falsity of comp prevent us to function. I know some people who disbelieve in comp, they do function. Comp is a theory. We cannot prove it to be true (like any applied theory), but we might refute it one day (like any serious theory). I mean it's not as if there were not other important things to think about. I think it is crucially important for the consequence. Comp eventually teach a respect for machine, which seems to be rather sleepy for humans (like with prohibition, NDAA bill, etc.). Comp also illustrates that physicalism might be false, and that rationalism might come back to the original quite different conception conceived by the Platonist and the neo-platonists, instead of the primary matter dogma common to Chirstians and Atheists (and the non Sufi Muslim, or non Cabbala judaism). Intelligent behavior and consciousness might be related, but should not be equated, because those are different things. Yes they are different things. And you can have consciousness without intelligent behavior but you can't have intelligent behavior without consciousness; That is not obvious, for me. Perhaps. It depends on possible (approximation of) definition of intelligence, and consciousness. I can't prove that last part but I could not function if I didn't believe it as strongly as I believe anything. You might not let your functioning be so dependent of your beliefs. It is not good for the health. Seriously, you should doubt *all* your belief everyday before breakfast. it is generally accepted that we are conscious during the dreams. But the REM dream state occurs for only about 20% of the total time you sleep. Yes. But with some training you can remember your experience, and that can help to understand that we should not make conclusion on reality and the nature of reality too much quickly from experience. This plays some role in the UDA reasoning. The same for some comatose state. As I said you can be conscious even when no intelligent behavior is observed, but even so it is generally accepted that cadavers are not conscious. I do agree on this. but with comp living bodies are not conscious either. They just make able for a person to manifest her consciousness relatively to some collection of universal numbers (the neighbors person, and universal entities). That shows that consciousness can be independent of macro-behavior Yes, but if that macro-behavior is intelligent then even without proof I don't believe and can not believe the reverse is true. This is a bit unclear. Actually I argue that comp, when taken seriously enough, has to reduce physics to the 'theology of numbers', like biochemistry can be said to have been reduced to quantum mechanics. I think I know what you mean but I don't see what the word theology adds to the above, all it does is muddy the waters and give respect to something that does not deserve it. Here are the reason why I call it theology: 1) to avoid the situation where people could enforce the use of a digital brain, withoiut permission of parents or of the candidates (avoid the pro-life trap, if you want). 2) to tell the patient that he has to make an act of faith for it, and that his survive is not guarantied by any theory, not even comp (paradoxically enough). Comp meta-guaranties it, but only by justifying that it is itself machine's unbelievable. So the brain transplant is as much a medical operation, than a death ritual. 3) Comp implies a vast complex spectrum of notion of afterlife. Is it not natural to call theology a science which admits as sub-branch the study of afterlives? 4) Plato's God, according to Hirschberger, and through my own reading, is basically Truth, with the understanding that conviction is private, not public. Defining the God of the machine, or the theology of the machine by the truth *about* the machine helps to distinguish truth and provability in simple term. Arithmetical truth does beg-have like a
Re: UD* and consciousness
On Feb 21, 11:32 am, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level. If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p indeterminacy. Or, there may be no substitution level at all, in which case the deterministic simulation is a brain puppet, which responds 'yes' when you pull the right string. For the other simulation, I'm not sure why the quantum-random numbers wouldn't change 'Mary' enough to give different answers. You have a brain puppet which is flipping coins...what is the presumed effect of these flips? If we consider instead that the brain (and all of physics) is more like a mass-shadow of experienced events, then we can understand how duplicating the shadow of a tree precisely doesn't render a living tree as the result. To apply this metaphor to our reality, you would have to turn it around to realize that in place of a tree and shadow, there is a dialectic unity where Thesis = Figurative private phenomenology (tree-like experience) and Antithesis = Literal public empiricism (material tree). Since the thesis is fundamental, any change to the antithesis will simultaneously be changing the thesis, as the thesis is an *experience* - a sensorimotive fugue. Emulating the antithesis however, like trying to cast a shadow of a shadow, yields back only universal generic defaults and not idiosyncratic identity grounded in cohesive experience. There is no 'here' there. You have a hologram of a human brain with no I associated with it. The indeterminacy of 1p is caused by the authoritative authenticity of the thesis, not by randomness. 1p awareness could even be deterministic (and it probably is in matter below the cellular threshold) but as awareness scales up through experience over generations and lifetimes, it condenses as qualitative mass: significance. This is figurative mass, not literal mass of a pseudosubstance. It is 'importance', 'specialness', 'meaning', 'feeling', etc. If this signifying condensation is the thesis, we can understand it by looking at the a-signifying antithesis of mass through gravity and density. What happens to motive power and autonomy under high gravity? It is crushed and absorbed into the collective inertia. Separate bodies lose their power to escape the pull...they fall. When this happens to us subjectively, our thesis falls as well - asleep. We feel 'down'. We are 'crushed', depressed, deflated, low, bummed, etc. Because the thesis and antithesis are symmetrical however, significance scales up as freedom, autonomy, high spirits, lifted moods, grandeur, delusions of grandeur, mania, etc. As celebrity and wealth are associated with super-power, freedom, and luxury, the increased autonomy of living organisms is arrived at through historical narrative. You cannot clone Beyonce and expect to make a celebrity automatically. The celebrity-ness is not in her body (although her body image is already part of a cultural narrative which is being exalted at this time, so body similarity gives a head start). What I'm getting at is that human consciousness is the latest chapter in a long story of famous molecules that became famous cells who became famous organisms. A simulation is a mere portrait of the fruits of this fame. The costumes and scenery are there, but not the heroes and heroines. The simulation is not from the right family, has not attended the right schools, did not win American Idol. It isn't a who, it is a pretender - a what. It has no why, only how. Don't be fooled by the four dimensionality of matter's appearance. It is still a shadow/antithesis of our perception of all perceptions of it. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 21, 5:21 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 20, 6:37 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. No. True = true of unsimulated reality. Where is there unsimulated reality in comp? If I make a simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude that there is an omnipotent entity They can only wrongly conclude that since you are not omnipotent. Those who I find doubting my omnipotence will find that there are more important things than not being wrong. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The thermodynamics of computation
On 20.02.2012 22:43 Russell Standish said the following: On Mon, Feb 20, 2012 at 07:33:13PM +0100, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I have nothing against Adami's book as such. His description of his software avida and his experiments with it are okay. My point was about his claim that his work has something to do with thermodynamics. It is definitely not. The thermodynamic entropy is not there. The quotes from the book displays this pretty clear. You have written about an analogous role. I would not object if Chris uses the word analogy to connect mutation and temperature. But not between information and entropy. This what I have meant and this is the point where I disagree. Adami comes to the conclusion that the thermodynamic entropy is subjective. Let me quote him again p. 96 “If an observer gains knowledge about the system and thus determines that a number of states that were previously deemed probable are in fact unlikely, the entropy of the system (which now has turned into a conditional entropy), is lowered, simply because the number of different possible states in the lower. (Note that such a change in uncertainty is usually due to a measurement). p. 97 “Clearly, the entropy can also depend on what we consider “different”. For example, one may count states as different that differ by, at most, del_x in some observable x (for example, the color of a ball drawn from an ensemble of differently shaded balls in an urn). Such entropies are then called fine-grained (if del_x is small), or course-grained (if del_x is large) entropies.” The entropy he is talking about in these quotes has nothing to do with the thermodynamic entropy. You can close or open your eyes, the entropies as determined in the JANAF Tables do not change. you say that there is an analogy between the thermodynamic entropy and information. Yet, I am against the statement that the thermodynamic entropy is information and I believe that I have given many examples that show this. Thermodynamic entropy is not subjective and not context dependent*, so my claim is that Adami does not understand what the thermodynamic entropy is. He has never taken a class in experimental thermodynamics, this is the problem. I can't speak for Chris, but somehow I doubt that very much. * I would accept the notation that the entropy is context dependent in a sense that its definition depends on the thermodynamics theory. If we change the theory, then the entropy could have some other meaning. But it seems not what you have meant. It is true that in thermodynamics, there is usually little argument about what the macroscopic variables are. As a consequence, entropy is essentially an objective quantity, and the context fades into the background. But even between (micro-/grand-) canonical ensembles, there are subtle differences between what macroscopic variables are significant, hence difference between the entropies, which vanish in the thermodynamic limit. What does it mean for the application I have mentioned and for information in the IT? I still do not understand this, as the numerical values of information in IT and as derived from the thermodynamic entropy are quite different. Hence it is completely unclear how to use this in practical applications. Then what does it bring? You have written about semiotics I've never seen one useful conjecture come out of it. What are useful conjecture from saying that because the equations for information and the entropy are the same, they must be the same thing? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 2/21/2012 11:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 7) I have used biology and psychology for years, but it leads to more confusion, including exclamation like it is theology, which I can't answer, except by accepting that it is theology. It concerns indeed what machine's can hope, not what they can prove. You should call it aletheology, the study of truth. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The thermodynamics of computation
On 20.02.2012 21:20 meekerdb said the following: On 2/20/2012 12:02 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... I am ready to learn the meaning of information in thermodynamics. Please just explain it by means of practical examples. The link I sent below works out the entropy of an ideal gas using information. You keep asking for practical examples but that's like asking for practical examples of calculating molecular reaction free energy from quantum mechanics. It is very difficult because it depends on the electron energy levels. It has been done in a few simple (not necessarily practical) cases as a proof of principle. But it is not the way engineering or chemistry is done because it is both easier and more reliable to measure them. But that doesn't mean that they don't have energy or that the concept of energy doesn't apply. No one calculates the strength of steel from carbon and iron atomic bonds and crystal structure either. But that doesn't mean the strength of steel is a separate, independent property. I do not get your point. Chemists use molecular simulation extensively and you will find the works where even phase diagram are computed from the first principle. Please run phase diagram from the first principles on the Google Scholar. Yet, information is not there. Hence I am lost. ... If you would like to show that information is very useful in thermodynamics, Other, smarter people have already done that. Could you please give an example? Then it would be easier to understand your position. please apply it to simple thermodynamic problems to show how the concept of information has simplified for example the computation of the phase diagram (or equilibrium composition between N2, H2 and NH3). Should I repeat my examples? No, you should consider why chemists don't just calculate all reactions and structure from atomic theory and QM. You underestimate chemists. As I have mentioned they use molecular simulation extensively. You can find some examples in my old lectures (they are a bit outdated though as they are about eight years old) http://evgenii.rudnyi.ru/teaching.html#md But Shannon's information is not there. Evgenii Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UD* and consciousness
On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 2:56 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 21, 11:32 am, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level. If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p indeterminacy. Or, there may be no substitution level at all snip (I only included the relevant parts of your response) My thought experiment assumes comp. T -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UD* and consciousness
On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 12:05 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/21/2012 8:32 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level. If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p indeterminacy. But is it really either-or? Isn't it likely there are different kinds and degrees of consciousness. I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about this. On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?) conscious, but then he says it depends on the program they are executing. Brent I'm not too keen on 'partial zombies'. Partial zombies admit full zombies, as far as I'm concerned. The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through the current computational state is what I'm questioning. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UD* and consciousness
On 2/21/2012 12:34 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 12:05 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/21/2012 8:32 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level. If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p indeterminacy. But is it really either-or? Isn't it likely there are different kinds and degrees of consciousness. I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about this. On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?) conscious, but then he says it depends on the program they are executing. Brent I'm not too keen on 'partial zombies'. Partial zombies admit full zombies, as far as I'm concerned. When I refer to degrees of consciousness I'm not talking about partial zombies (beings that act exactly like humans but are not fully conscious). I'm talking about dogs and chimpanzees and Watson and spiders. The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through the current computational state is what I'm questioning. Yes, I think that's a dubious proposition. Although brains no doubt have some degree of inherent quantum randomness it's clear that intelligent behavior need not depend on that. But I'm not sure your thought experiment proves its point. It's about simulated Mary. Suppose consciousness depended on quantum entanglements of brain structures with the environment (and they must in order for the brain to quasi-classical). Then in your simulation Mary would be a zombie (because your computation is purely classical and you're not simulating the quantum entanglements). But an actual macroscopic device substituted for part of real Mary's brain would be quantum entangled with the environment even if were at the neuron level. So consciousness would, ex hypothesi, still occur - although it might be different in some way. Brent Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 21, 5:41 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: You are natural. How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial simulation or not. That doens't make you supernatural. Why would I be? I'm not the administrator of a virtual universe. You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus. No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a Pegasus The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications. Why not? Fiction is arguably the basis for all culture. I'm not talking about that though, I'm referring to comp's view of epistemology. That's the whole question is whether the truths of our universe are as true as any to us. and that is all that is required. But we are natural so they would be wrong. They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though. So? Is appearance reality? That is what comp says. Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind. Both. Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory. What does that have to do with it's conception of in-simulation epistemology? What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism without the notion of computational realism? What do you mean by computational realism? That the reality within any simulation derives from computation rather than material substance. The simulation is reality as far as the simulatees are concerned. And if they are wrong, it still isn't the real reality. It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still their reality. their reality=appearance=/= reality. What is reality without an appearance? If the only world I know is not my reality, then what is it? Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience. But it it is in reality simulated, it is in reality simulated, and our reality is delusional. It's simulated from our perspective, but from inside the simulation it's the only reality there is - according to comp. Of course I disagree with comp. You seem to be arguing appearance=reality on the premise that opinion=truth. Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which is in fact a logical program. That is uncontentious. It is also not what you are saying elsewhere. I'm giving you the comp version. I don't subscribe to it personally, so I have no reason to talk about it elsewhere. Appearances may not reflect the truest level of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable representation of the simulation's function. Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions still aren't reality It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer reality than the simulation. Can't a red pill be programmed in? Not unless you are already a being outside the simulation who is participating vicariously. Different than being a native entity born within a simulation. If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better. Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI + Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as *their* Gods. ANd I am saying that is fallacious. CTM, MWI and AP are all sceintific princples with no room for the supernatural. SInce gods are supernatural by definition This is just begging the question and arguing from authority. Your claim is that the word 'scientific' wards off the supernatural and that alone makes anything that anyone decides is supernatural impossible. I'm telling you that because 1. comp makes godlike influence over a simulation possible 2. MWI makes such influence and simulations inevitable 3. AP makes the relative numbers of MWI universes with godlike simulation influence irrelevant. 4. comp makes it impossible to tell whether such influence is physics or extra-simulation intervention from inside the sim. Therefore, whatever your reality, if you believe Comp and AP, then you could be in a simulation subject to godlike intervention. , no belief in a god arising in such circumsntances is *correct*, be it every so persuasive. Are you saying that a belief can only be true if it
Re: UD* and consciousness
On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 4:01 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/21/2012 12:34 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through the current computational state is what I'm questioning. Yes, I think that's a dubious proposition. Although brains no doubt have some degree of inherent quantum randomness it's clear that intelligent behavior need not depend on that. But I'm not sure your thought experiment proves its point. It's about simulated Mary. Suppose consciousness depended on quantum entanglements of brain structures with the environment (and they must in order for the brain to quasi-classical). Then in your simulation Mary would be a zombie (because your computation is purely classical and you're not simulating the quantum entanglements). But an actual macroscopic device substituted for part of real Mary's brain would be quantum entangled with the environment even if were at the neuron level. So consciousness would, ex hypothesi, still occur - although it might be different in some way. Brent Why must consciousness depend on quantum entanglements for the brain to be quasi-classical? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 21, 8:03 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 21, 5:21 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 20, 6:37 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. No. True = true of unsimulated reality. Where is there unsimulated reality in comp? As ever, that depends what you mean by comp. CTM doens't require anything to be simulated at all. in Bruno;s Platonic COMP, the unsimulated reailty is a Plato's heaven full of numbers. If I make a simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude that there is an omnipotent entity They can only wrongly conclude that since you are not omnipotent. Those who I find doubting my omnipotence will find that there are more important things than not being wrong. Well, you're not simulating me, so i remain unpersuaded. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 21, 10:41 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 21, 5:41 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial simulation or not. That doens't make you supernatural. Why would I be? I'm not the administrator of a virtual universe. You would not be supernatural if you were. The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications. Why not? Fiction is arguably the basis for all culture. Only it arguably isn't, because without the fiction/fact distinction, science would not be science. I'm not talking about that though, I'm referring to comp's view of epistemology. Comp has to justify itself in the face of epistemology not vice versa. That's the whole question is whether the truths of our universe are as true as any to us. Both. Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory. What does that have to do with it's conception of in-simulation epistemology? The issue is whether Bruno's Comp = science's CTM. Since CTM requires nothing to be simulated, and has no epistemoloogical implications, the two are not the same. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism without the notion of computational realism? What do you mean by computational realism? That the reality within any simulation derives from computation rather than material substance. OK. Then the answer to What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism without the notion of computational realism? would be something like There is a real reality, containing humans and their brains, and human the human mind is like software running on the hardware of the real physical brain, and that is the Computational Theory of Mind. The simulation is reality as far as the simulatees are concerned. It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still their reality. their reality=appearance=/= reality. What is reality without an appearance? If the only world I know is not my reality, then what is it? The answer is supplied by the Simulation Hypothesis, the Deception Hypothesis, etc. if you world is simulated, then reality is the place where and means wheresby it is being simulatd. The Simulation Hypothesis--which you call comp-- is a claim about reality. To claim that what you know is not reality because it is simulated is to claim something else is reality. But it it is in reality simulated, it is in reality simulated, and our reality is delusional. It's simulated from our perspective, but from inside the simulation it's the only reality there is - according to comp.r False. It is not the Only Reality There Is Accoding to Comp, because there hypothses state that there is a ground level... the lab where the sim is running (or Platonia in Bruno's case). Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which is in fact a logical program. That is uncontentious. It is also not what you are saying elsewhere. I'm giving you the comp version. I don't subscribe to it personally, so I have no reason to talk about it elsewhere. You have given me two versions of comp. It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer reality than the simulation. Can't a red pill be programmed in? Not unless you are already a being outside the simulation who is participating vicariously. Prove that. Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI + Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as *their* Gods. ANd I am saying that is fallacious. CTM, MWI and AP are all sceintific princples with no room for the supernatural. SInce gods are supernatural by definition This is just begging the question and arguing from authority. No, it is valid analytical apriori argument. Your claim is that the word 'scientific' wards off the supernatural and that alone makes anything that anyone decides is supernatural impossible. I'm telling you that because 1. comp makes godlike influence over a simulation possible Godlike only in a delusional sense. 2. MWI makes such influence and simulations inevitable not necessarily. Depends on the flavour. 3. AP makes the relative numbers of MWI universes with godlike simulation influence irrelevant. 4. comp makes it impossible to tell whether such influence is physics or extra-simulation intervention from inside the sim. Yep. and impossible to tell--epistemic inaccessibility-- still doens't mean there is no fact of the matter. You assume absolute, transcendent facts when you
Re: UD* and consciousness
On 2/21/2012 2:45 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 4:01 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/21/2012 12:34 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through the current computational state is what I'm questioning. Yes, I think that's a dubious proposition. Although brains no doubt have some degree of inherent quantum randomness it's clear that intelligent behavior need not depend on that. But I'm not sure your thought experiment proves its point. It's about simulated Mary. Suppose consciousness depended on quantum entanglements of brain structures with the environment (and they must in order for the brain to quasi-classical). Then in your simulation Mary would be a zombie (because your computation is purely classical and you're not simulating the quantum entanglements). But an actual macroscopic device substituted for part of real Mary's brain would be quantum entangled with the environment even if were at the neuron level. So consciousness would, ex hypothesi, still occur - although it might be different in some way. Brent Why must consciousness depend on quantum entanglements for the brain to be quasi-classical? The best theory of how the (quasi) classical world arises from the underlying quantum world depends on decoherence, i.e. macroscopic things appear classical because they are entangled with the environment which makes a few variables, like position and momentum, quasi-classical (c.f. Zurek or Schlosshauer). If a thing is isolated from the environment it may be able to exist in a superposition of states, i.e. be non-classical; although internal degrees of freedom might also produce quasi-classical dynamics. Brent Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UD* and consciousness
On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 7:47 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/21/2012 2:45 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 4:01 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/21/2012 12:34 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through the current computational state is what I'm questioning. Yes, I think that's a dubious proposition. Although brains no doubt have some degree of inherent quantum randomness it's clear that intelligent behavior need not depend on that. But I'm not sure your thought experiment proves its point. It's about simulated Mary. Suppose consciousness depended on quantum entanglements of brain structures with the environment (and they must in order for the brain to quasi-classical). Then in your simulation Mary would be a zombie (because your computation is purely classical and you're not simulating the quantum entanglements). But an actual macroscopic device substituted for part of real Mary's brain would be quantum entangled with the environment even if were at the neuron level. So consciousness would, ex hypothesi, still occur - although it might be different in some way. Brent Why must consciousness depend on quantum entanglements for the brain to be quasi-classical? The best theory of how the (quasi) classical world arises from the underlying quantum world depends on decoherence, i.e. macroscopic things appear classical because they are entangled with the environment which makes a few variables, like position and momentum, quasi-classical (c.f. Zurek or Schlosshauer). If a thing is isolated from the environment it may be able to exist in a superposition of states, i.e. be non-classical; although internal degrees of freedom might also produce quasi-classical dynamics. OK, but that assumes more than is necessary for the argument. I don't think Bruno's theory demands an account of how the classical arises from the quantum. The brain (or its functional equivalent) just implements computations at or above some substitution level we are willing to bet on... whether they are entangled with a level lower than the substitution level is irrelevant. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Yes Doctor circularity
Has someone already mentioned this? I woke up in the middle of the night with this, so it might not make sense...or... The idea of saying yes to the doctor presumes that we, in the thought experiment, bring to the thought experiment universe: 1. our sense of own significance (we have to be able to care about ourselves and our fate in the first place) 2. our perceptual capacity to jump to conclusions without logic (we have to be able feel what it seems like rather than know what it simply is.) Because of 1, it is assumed that the thought experiment universe includes the subjective experience of personal value - that the patient has a stake, or 'money to bet'. Because of 2, it is assumed that libertarian free will exists in the scenario - we have to be able to 'bet' in the first place. As far as I know, comp can only answer 'True, doctor', 'False, doctor', or 'I don't know, or I can't answer, doctor.' So, what this means is that in the scenario, while not precluding that a form of comp based consciousness could exist, does preclude that it is the only form of consciousness that exists, so therefore does not prove that in comp consciousness must arise from comp since it relies on non-comp to prove it. The same goes for the Turing Test, which after all is only about betting on imitation. Does the robot seem real to me? Bruno adds another layer to this by forcing our thought experimenter to care whether they are or not. What say ye, mighty logicians? Both of these tests succeed unintentionally at revealing the essentials of consciousness, not in front of our eyes with the thought experiment, but behind our backs. The sleight of hand is hidden innocently in the assumption of free will (and significance). In any universe where consciousness arises from comp, consciousness may be able to pass or fail the test as the tested object, but it cannot receive the test as a testing subject unless free will and significance are already presumed to be comp. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
