On 10/8/2012 3:49 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Russell,
Question: Why has little if any thought been given in AGI to self-modeling and some
capacity to track the model of self under the evolutionary transformations?
It's probably because AI's have not needed to operate in environments w
Please, please read Edward de Bono's book "The Mechanism of Mind" for some
genuine insights into creativity and how this comes about in mind. Russell if
you can't track down a copy I'll lend you mine but it's a treasured object, not
least because of the fact that the author autographed it!
O
On 10/8/2012 10:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 10:58 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy
mailto:multiplecit...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Hi Stephen, Bruno, and Jason,
Do I understand correctly that comp requires a relative measure on
the set of all partial computable function
On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 10:58 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy <
multiplecit...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Stephen, Bruno, and Jason,
>
> Do I understand correctly that comp requires a relative measure on the set
> of all partial computable functions and that for Steven "Both abstractions,
> such as numbers
On 10/8/2012 7:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 06:49:12PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Russell,
Question: Why has little if any thought been given in AGI to
self-modeling and some capacity to track the model of self under the
evolutionary transformations?
Its
On Monday, October 8, 2012 5:51:56 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 1:39 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> Well, if it's not the laws of physics then it's something supernatural,
> >> isn't it?
> >
> >
> > Not unless you assume that physics is complete. To me, if w
On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 06:49:12PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Hi Russell,
>
> Question: Why has little if any thought been given in AGI to
> self-modeling and some capacity to track the model of self under the
> evolutionary transformations?
>
>
Its not my field - general evolutionary
On 10/8/2012 5:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 01:13:35PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
A response to David Deutsch’s recent article on AGI
October 8, 2012 by Ben Goertzel
Thanks for posting this, Richard. I was thinking of writing
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 1:39 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> Well, if it's not the laws of physics then it's something supernatural,
>> isn't it?
>
>
> Not unless you assume that physics is complete. To me, if we have no idea
> how anything detects anything then we haven't completely understood physi
On Monday, October 8, 2012 5:19:03 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 10/8/2012 2:10 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 8, 2012 4:57:08 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 10/8/2012 1:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:38:42 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 01:13:35PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
> A response to David Deutsch’s recent article on AGI
> October 8, 2012 by Ben Goertzel
>
>
Thanks for posting this, Richard. I was thinking of writing my own
detailed response to David Deut
On 10/8/2012 2:10 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 8, 2012 4:57:08 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/8/2012 1:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:38:42 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, Oct
On Monday, October 8, 2012 4:57:08 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 10/8/2012 1:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:38:42 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/8/2012 1:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:38:42 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
So the mor
>
>
> "If the universe were a simulation, would the constant speed of light
correspond to the clock speed driving the simulation? In other words, the
“CPU speed?”
As we are “inside” the simulation, all attempts to measure the speed of the
simulation appear as a constant value.
Light “execu
On 10/8/2012 11:45 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Deutsch is right about the need to advance in Popperian epistemology,
which ultimately is evolutionary epistemology. How evolution makes a
portion of matter ascertain what is truth in virtue of what and for
what purpose. The idea of intelligence nee
On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:38:42 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the ou
*RS:I'm not sure how that comment is restricted to anything???*
JM: I think it is: to practicality. I allowed myself to be in the ivory
tower.
J
On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 8:09 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 05, 2012 at 03:58:13PM -0400, John Mikes wrote:
> > Russell,
> > you seem to be r
On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside
environment
the less conscious you become. Huh?
St
Bruno:
It could be that the indeterminacy in the I means that everything else
is not a machine, but supposedly, an hallucination.
But this hallucination has a well defined set of mathematical
properties that are communicable to other hallucinated expectators.
This means that something is keeping
Deutsch is right. Searle is right. Genuine AGI can only come when thoughts
are driven by feeling and will rather than programmatic logic. It's a
fundamental misunderstanding to assume that feeling can be generated by
equipment which is incapable of caring about itself. Without personal
investme
Deutsch is right about the need to advance in Popperian epistemology,
which ultimately is evolutionary epistemology. How evolution makes a
portion of matter ascertain what is truth in virtue of what and for
what purpose. The idea of intelligence need a knowledge of what is
truth but also a motive f
On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside
>> environment the less conscious you become. Huh?
>>
>
> Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the ou
On Monday, October 8, 2012 1:35:31 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 10/8/2012 8:42 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> 2) Intelligent behavior is NOT associated with subjective experience, in
> which case there is no reason for Evolution to produce consciousness and I
> have no explanation for why I am he
On 10/8/2012 1:13 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
except from
/The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet/
A response to David Deutsch’s recent article on AGI
October 8, 2012 by Ben Goertzel
So in this view, the main missing ingredient in AGI so far is
“cognitive synergy”: the fitting-together of differ
On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside
environment the
less conscious you become. Huh?
Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the outside environment does not
control you.
How could you possibly know
On 10/8/2012 8:42 AM, John Clark wrote:
2) Intelligent behavior is NOT associated with subjective experience, in which case
there is no reason for Evolution to produce consciousness and I have no explanation for
why I am here, and I have reason to believe that I am the only conscious being in th
How David Deutsch can watch a computer beat the 2 best human Jeopardy!
players on planet Earth and then say that AI has made “no progress whatever
during the entire six decades of its existence” is a complete mystery to me.
John K Clark
--
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On Monday, October 8, 2012 12:58:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>
> May I suggest that entangled BECs in their brains may allow for more
> or less instant communication of thoughts, but that one or the other
> may be able to disentangle and have independent thoughts, or have
> independent thought
On Monday, October 8, 2012 11:42:02 AM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this
>>> universe allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they
>>> do it but we know for a fact
On 10/8/2012 12:58 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
May I suggest that entangled BECs in their brains may allow for more
or less instant communication of thoughts, but that one or the other
may be able to disentangle and have independent thoughts, or have
independent thoughts that are instantly communi
The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
A response to David Deutsch’s recent article on AGI
October 8, 2012 by Ben Goertzel
(Credit: iStockphoto)
As we noted in a recent post, physicist David Deutsch said the field
of “artificial general intelligence” or AGI has made “no progress
whatever during
May I suggest that entangled BECs in their brains may allow for more
or less instant communication of thoughts, but that one or the other
may be able to disentangle and have independent thoughts, or have
independent thoughts that are instantly communicated and disagreed
with. Just a shot in the dar
Roger,
Monads are everywhere, inside computers
as well as humans, rocks and free space.
Whatever allows monads to connect to physical objects
may be operative for inanimates as well as animates.
So the first step is to identify the connecting mechanism.
For physical consciousness I conjecture the
Have a look at the first few minutes of this show with conjoined twins Abby
and Brittany:
http://tlc.howstuffworks.com/tv/abby-and-brittany/videos/big-moves.htm
You can see that although they do not share the same brain they clearly
share aspects of the same mind. They often speak in unison but
Hi Stephen, Bruno, and Jason,
Do I understand correctly that comp requires a relative measure on the set
of all partial computable functions and that for Steven "Both abstractions,
such as numbers and their truths, and physical worlds must emerge together
from a primitive ground which is neutral i
On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this
>> universe allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they
>> do it but we know for a fact that it can be done.
>>
>
> > Absolutely not. We know no such thing.
>
We d
On Sunday, October 7, 2012 8:58:53 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 11:44 PM, Roger Clough
> >
> wrote:
> > Hi Evgenii Rudnyi
> >
> > I know that, but his theory of electromagnetism is a physical theory,
> > even if it's hard to pin down the extension property.
> >
> >
On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:14:36 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 08/10/2012, at 3:07 AM, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
>
> > Absolutely not. We know no such thing. Quite the opposite, we know with
> relative certainty that what we understand of physics provides no
> possibility of anything
On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:06:42 AM UTC-4, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2012/10/7 Craig Weinberg >
>
>> On Saturday, October 6, 2012 1:56:33 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>I'm openly saying that a high school kid can m
Hi Richard Ruquist
True, but to be a monad, you have to be inextended.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Richard Ruquist
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-
Hi Richard Ruquist
Leibniz's point in the divisibility argument is that
you cannot call matter a substance, because if it is
infinitely divisible, there can be no "there" there,
nothing that couldn't be cut in two.
IMHO Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle achieves the
same intended result, beca
Hi Roger,
On 08 Oct 2012, at 16:14, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stathis Papaioannou
I would put it that mind is superphysical. Beyond spacetime.
Supernatural as a word carries too much baggage.
With comp, the natural numbers are supernatural enough.
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
1
Hi Stathis Papaioannou
I would put it that mind is superphysical. Beyond spacetime.
Supernatural as a word carries too much baggage.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
Fr
Hi Stathis Papaioannou
An atheist with any intelligence would agree with me because
it's just logic.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
Receiv
Hi Stathis Papaioannou
Certainly all possible universes can or may exist,
I leave open that possibility. But I personally believe
that God actually made only one, selecting the best possible one.
It isn't more than a plausibility proof, but the fine-tuning
numbers, that our current universe
On 08 Oct 2012, at 13:19, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno,
There are two different things,
1) a description of a living experience (publicly available to any
persons)
and
2) the living experience itself (only available personally, that is,
to a particular person.)
No problem with this.
Hi Richard Ruquist
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Richard Ruquist
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-07, 11:17:19
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: On complexity and b
Hi Richard Ruquist
Fine, except I think that intelligence, since it was needed
for the Big Bang, had to be there "beforehand", where time did not
yet exist. But intelligence is beyond spacetime anyway,
so it always was.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
"Forever is a long time,
Hi Richard Ruquist
I may have given that impression, sorry, but
a monad can only make what's "inside" do what it can do.
Human and animal monads can both feel, so they can be conscious.
But a rock is at best unconscious as it cannot feel or think.\
There's no way to tell what faculties a comp
Hi Stathis Papaioannou
Computation can give you letters on a page.
Are they conscious ?
There's no way that I can think of however, to prove or
disprove that objects are conscious or not, only that
they may simulate consciousness.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
"Forever is
Hi Evgenii Rudnyi
Yes. But alone, the equations have no human meaning.
Each individual will invent that for himself.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Evgenii
>a) as Leibniz says, perception of any kind must be a unity of the many in
the one, just as in Plato's All.>
The spherical CYM monads of string theory
each maps the entire universe into
its 1000 Planck-length diameter
with unity of all directions
achieved at the point
of its center.
So despite be
On 07 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Evgenii Rudnyi
>
> I know that, but his theory of electromagnetism is a physical theory,
> even if it's hard to pin down the extension property.
>
> Physical theories can tell us nothing about philosophy or mind or God,
> since they cannot
Hi Roger,
We now know that matter is not infinitely divisible.
So the argument of Leibniz is falsified.
In appreciation,
Richard
On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 6:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/
Hi Bruno Marchal
True, I may not be able to prove that the computer is not conscious.
For I certainly cannot be sure if another person is conscious.
For the computer, I can say however, that it would need
a self to be consciousness, a singular unitary entity into
which the many can be experien
Hi Bruno Marchal
I was just trying to formulate my view of subjectivity into
terms you use, like 1p, but I only seem to have confused things.
Apparently 1p is not the state of living subjectivity, at best it is a
description of that.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
"Forever is
1) Anything written in words or code cannot be a living experience.
2) One reason for this is that words are multiple, but
an experience (such as in the reading of the words) is unitary,
is the meaning of the many words as one. I now see
that this is what I meant by saying that consciousness
pr
Hi Bruno,
There are two different things,
1) a description of a living experience (publicly available to any persons)
and
2) the living experience itself (only available personally, that is, to a
particular person.)
It is easy to get these confused and I no doubt have sometimes confused the
Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/
"In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of
perception and consciousness
that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The following
pas
On 07 Oct 2012, at 21:39, Stephen P. King wrote:
In my thinking, a physical world = a reality = that which is
incontrovertible (free of contradictions = Boolean Satisfiable)
Many logic are consistent without being boolean.
for some finite collection of observers, where observers are
On 08/10/2012, at 3:07 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Absolutely not. We know no such thing. Quite the opposite, we know with
> relative certainty that what we understand of physics provides no possibility
> of anything other than more physics. There is no hint of any kind that these
> laws sho
2012/10/7 Craig Weinberg
> On Saturday, October 6, 2012 1:56:33 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> >>I'm openly saying that a high school kid can make a robot that
behaves sensibly with just a few transistors.
>>>
>>> > Onl
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