WHY FREE WILL IS A BOGUS ISSUE
Free will is a bogus issue, something akin to asking how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Why ? Because in biology at least, the will of any entity only needs to carry out what the entity desires, to survive. If it can't, the entity will die and not be tend to be reproduced. Case closed. If you accordingly include desire with will, then you have the the more meaningful issue of self-determination, meaning that the entity can determine and achieve what it needs to survive. In philosophy, since ancient times, this force to survive and actualize the entity's possibilities (another term for evolution) is called entelechy. So what I am saying is nothing new. So it's of no consequence IMHO to question whether we have free will or not. The proper issue to debate is whether self-determination is possible. By self I include everything inside the entities' skin or shell. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 16:50:36 Subject: Re: Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out oftheir movements So what? If you convinced someone that life is not worth living, then they would be more likely to commit suicide. I don't think this result really adds anything too profound... On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 12:57:23PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Let me throw something into the conversation. Craig may have linked this previously, but it needs closed inspection IMHO. Attention John Clark! Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out of their movements -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems
Hi Russell Standish According to Leibniz's idealistic metaphysics, nothing is causal, things just appear to happen by cause. Their motions instead occur according to a pre-established (a priori) harmony. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 01:01:59 Subject: Re: Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 04:45:55PM -0500, John Mikes wrote: Dear Russell, I have my doubts about causality as a *complete* term: our 'systems', cf: ecosystem etc. include the up-to-date inventory of knowables as in our existing MODEL of the world - which grows over the millennia stepwise. (The 'cause' of the lightning is no more the ire of Zeus). Whatever we include as 'causing' a change (whatever) is the portion of its entailments selectable from said inventory (of yesterday). This causes the uncertainty and occasional mishaps in our world. Besides: our terms are proportionate, content and qualia (may be) incomplete restricted to said inventory, so the partial entailment we observe may seem satisfactory to the actual 'model-item' we carry. (((How's THAT with AL?))) Not sure I fully ingest what you're saying here. Causality has to do with explanations, whilst correlations needn't. I think some of the notions of causality - eg Granger causality, have to do with quantifying the information flow between time series - if timeseries A provides more predictive information about time series B than some threshold (not necessarily arbitrary, but usually theory dependent), then we say that A Granger-causes B. It is not correlation, as correlation is bidirectional, whereas Granger-causality is not. Also A Granger-causes B can be read as series A explaining something about series B. -- We had a little exchange on random earlier when you resorted to the term (as I recall): as *provisonal (or conditional?) random* that may occur *under the given conditions only*. ((I just wrote to Hal R. that a random walk in evolution could lead *us, humans* (back???) - maybe - to *DE*-velop into trilobites. Why not?)) John Mikes That would be surprising, given we're not descended from trilobytes in the first place! -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Communicability
Hi Stephen P. King OK, let me rephrase the question. If a tree falls in the forest with nobody to observe it, will it end up on the ground ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 22:00:20 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/5/2012 2:30 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King A tape recorder could prove your theory wrong. A tape recorder is an example of an observer of sounds, so no, my theory stands. Berkeley finally gave in and said that realism was acceptable because God could see or hear it. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 11:10:06 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/5/2012 10:35 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Infallibility isn't involved. The typical textbook explanation for realism is, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to hear it, would it make a sound? A realist (such as me) would say yes. The logician in me would say no! Because a sound is something that must be capable of being heard to exist. If no one is truly around, then the noise that the tree might make cannot be heard and thus there is not a sound. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On hearsay
Hi Stephen P. King OK, you must be talking about physical evidence then. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 22:01:33 Subject: Re: On hearsay On 11/5/2012 2:36 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King No, they don't all have to had witnessed it, they can simply be told about it. In court that is called hearsay. You are still thinking that my observers are only human... Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 11:20:01 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 11/5/2012 10:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Good. That is another way to define objective (public). Whereas 1p is personal and always private. If 1p is communicated, it becomes 3p. Hi, It is only 3p is that communication can be confirmed or 'witnessed' by a third party. 3p requires at least three 1p to agree. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
What causes randomness ?
Hi Stephen P. King I think Einstein was referring to human intelligence. Personally I don't believe that QM actions are intelligent, rather that they happen according to probability theory. But one might assign intelligence (free choice) to each individual event. Then there is no such thing as randomness, each event is chosen by a supreme mind. The Bible says as such, that not a hair of our heads can change on its own. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 22:03:22 Subject: Re: The two types of truth On 11/5/2012 2:41 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King There you go again. That's the same question that einstein raised, but in a positive format. He wondered why and how the universe was so conducive to reason and methematics. Einstein seemed to assume that humans where the only entities in teh universe that where capable of conscious apperception. In my thinking, if a system has a separable QM wavefunction, then it can be an observer. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 13:08:41 Subject: Re: The two types of truth On 11/5/2012 12:48 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King I believe that truth is independent of mind, but we poor beggars cannot be sure of how to state what that criterion is. Hi Roger, If truth is independent of the mind, how is it that the mind can apprehend truth? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: WHY FREE WILL IS A BOGUS ISSUE
This is the same with some corrections of my bad dyslexic English The modern notion of free will is a nominalist https://www.google.es/search?q=nominalism+oq=nominalism+sugexp=chrome,mod=0sourceid=chromeie=UTF-8one. It redefine free will in physicalist terms, when it ever was a realist http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realismquestion of whether I have moral judgement between good and evil and either if I can choose between them. Of course, in the modern, secularized version of Nominalism, called Positivismhttp://www.google.es/url?sa=trct=jq=esrc=ssource=webcd=1cad=rjaved=0CB0QFjAAurl=http%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FPositivismei=AO2YUM2JNMvc4QTc5YGwBAusg=AFQjCNFzHhIW3X2P0_URknz9FVC8TbWqcA, good, evil morals etc have no meaning. So that´s why concepts like free will were reduced to physicalist http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalismterms. The problem is that these redefinitions, like the one of free will, in terms of physical laws are almost meaningless and no doubt, self contradictory. Other concepts, like good, evil, morals etc, that could not be reduced, were relegated to a individual irrational sphere. Because these irreducible concepts were involved in the most fundamental questions for practical life, and these concepts were denied to rational discussion, they were delegated t demagogues, revolutionaries, and various kinds of saviors of countries and planets. This is the era of the false dichotomy between is and ought. The results are the never ending waves of totalitarianisms within Modernity. 2012/11/6 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com Roger: That´s right The modern notion of free will is a nominalist https://www.google.es/search?q=nominalism+oq=nominalism+sugexp=chrome,mod=0sourceid=chromeie=UTF-8one. It redefine free will in physicalist terms, when in reality it was a realist http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realismquestion of whether I have moral judgement between good and evil and either if I can choose between them. Of course, in nominalist terms, good, evil morals etc have no meaning. So that´s why concepts like free will were reduced to physicalist terms- But these redefintions, like the one of free will are in terms of physical laws is almost meaningless and no doubt, self contradictory. Other concepts, like good, evil, morals etc, that could´n be reduced, were relegated to a individual irrational sphere. This is the era of the false dichotomy between is and ought. Because the most fundamental questions for practical life were denied to rational discussion, they were delegated to demagoges, revolutionaries, and various kinds of saviors of countries and planets. The results are the never ending waves of totalitarianisms within Modernity. 2012/11/6 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net Free will is a bogus issue, something akin to asking how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Why ? Because in biology at least, the will of any entity only needs to carry out what the entity desires, to survive. If it can't, the entity will die and not be tend to be reproduced. Case closed. If you accordingly include desire with will, then you have the the more meaningful issue of self-determination, meaning that the entity can determine and achieve what it needs to survive. In philosophy, since ancient times, this force to survive and actualize the entity's possibilities (another term for evolution) is called entelechy. So what I am saying is nothing new. So it's of no consequence IMHO to question whether we have free will or not. The proper issue to debate is whether self-determination is possible. By self I include everything inside the entities' skin or shell. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 16:50:36 Subject: Re: Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out oftheir movements So what? If you convinced someone that life is not worth living, then they would be more likely to commit suicide. I don't think this result really adds anything too profound... On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 12:57:23PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Let me throw something into the conversation. Craig may have linked this previously, but it needs closed inspection IMHO. Attention John Clark! Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out of their movements -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Re: Heraclitus gets his feet wet
On 05 Nov 2012, at 12:19, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Heraclitus' point was that in this contingent world, nothing remains the same. From the relevant points of view, OK, but a platonist look at the contingencies in both ways. A bit like after a WM duplication you are necessarily at both place in the eyes of God, and you are contingently in one of the two places, from your local current point of view. To reason we need both points of view. Of course, with the comp theory, at some point you need to define contingency and necessity more precisely, by isolating the modal notion you are using. Since Plato and Leibniz we got the math tool for doing this. As I understand it, the naturalist fallacy is to judge that something is good (in an ethical sense) because it is natural. Heraclitus makes no such judgment. I was alluding to a more widespread naturalist fallacy: the idea that nature or matter have some basic or primary ontology. This is with us since, mainly, Aristotle, and is arguably almost wired in our brain, but it is put in difficulty by things like QM, comp, if not Plato's insights and the existence of the experience of dreams. Bruno I think H meant not the same river (such as the mississippi), he meant that the river (whatever river) would not be the same, even a movie would show visually that it has changed. And force, velocity, temperature-- none of these remains constant, as the appropriate sensors would show. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:28:11 Subject: Re: The One is not a number but a metaphor On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:13, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I misconstrued the river/man analogy. Heraclitus said instead that a man cannot stand in the same river twice (or even from moment to moment). It's just a statement of contingency. I don't believe that. In my childhood, every summer I did stand in the same river. Of course a river is a living being, it changes shapes, and moves in the panorama, and the quality of the water decreased, alas, for some time, also. But it was the same river, at least in the sense that I am the same guy who took pleasure standing in that river. Heraclitus commited the naturalist error (with respect to comp) to identify a river with the local constitution that he assumes the existence. But that is for me in contradiction with most use of the word river in geography. A river is already a high level natural entity. Le temps s'en va! Le temps s'en va! Non Madame, le temps ne s'en va pas. C'est nous qui nous nous s'en allons! (French poet: literally times go away! times go away! No Miss, times does't go away, but *we* go away). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 13:39:24 Subject: Re: The One is not a number but a metaphor On 02 Nov 2012, at 11:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal When I refer to the One, I think of it not as a number 1 but as a metaphor. Well, the ONE is not the number 1. OK. The Soul is the identity of a monad, including the supreme monad. The soul does not change, even though the monad is constantly (rapidly) changing. The river keeps changing, but the man standing in it remains the same. Hmm why not. Too much fuzzy to be sure. Only the universal soul can be sais not changing. But once the soul has fallen, it forgets its universal origin, and undergone quite big changes. So in like manor, we can consider the One (as a metaphor, not as a number) as the Soul of the universe, the Universal Soul. I don't think so. the soul is the inner God, the one you can awake by different technic. The outer God, is beyond conceivability, even if comp can identify it with the very complex set of code of the arithmetical truth. At least in the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .
Re: 1p=now, 3p = then
On 05 Nov 2012, at 12:53, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ALSO, 1p --- now 3p -- then Those are related. You can also write 1p --- here 3p --- there 3-view is descriptive truth, 1-view truth is truth by acquaintance. OK. Descriptive truth is similar to your knowing about Bertrand Russell. Or to know that in principle 1+1 =2. OK. Truth by acquaintance is that you have met Bertrand Russell. Hmmm... Only in a manner of speaking. Only Bertrand Russell can access to Bertrand Russells' 1p. Or you accept that 1 +1 = 2. Yes. OK. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:07:16 Subject: Re: Does your monad (your 1p) survive artificial changes to the brain ? On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:51, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think the issue of your survival of the doctor's operation or whatever is clouded by the solipsism issue. You might need to elaborate on this. It is ipso facto not solipsist as we have a notion of 3-view and 1-views attributed to relative machine. The 1p is de facto a solipsist experience, but the one who bet on comp bet ipso facto on other persons. It should work, for better or worse, as long as you can affirm you have survived by your subjective (1p) experience. The contrary. It works only as long as you don't affirm you have survived. The fact that you survived will be felt by the 1p as a strong confirmation of comp, but by attributing the comp 1p to the doppelganger, in the duplication experience, the 1p knows that such a personal confirmation does not constitute a public communication. Comp necessitates a recurrent act of faith, somehow. So you are right if you substitute you can affirm to yourself you are survived by 1p experience. But that's again *is* the comp hypothesis. The fact that you will survive if your brain/body/environment is Turing emulated at some correct substitution level. I do not pretend that comp is true, I make it a bit more precise that usual, through explicit and precise definition of 1p and 3p, to study the metaphysical/theological/fundamental consequences. In a nutshell, in soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. (I don't pretend it is the end of the match, either. The main point is that comp + classical theory of knowledge and belief is non trivial and empirically testable. More comments are below, but that is the bottom line. MORE COMMENTS: I started looking at your comments on sane04, recalling a comment made by Leibniz, namely the question about what happens to your monad if an arm is amputated ? Right after that, the arm is still alive, I think it can be rejoined. Leibniz said (and I wish I could remember exactly what he said) that your monad--which is actually called spirit for a man or monad with intellect-- will stay with your intellect (or 1p), for that it is what defines you, it is your identity. The arm will not share that monad or soul while detached and so will shortly die. Plotinus get in that question. My inspiration comes from the study of amoebas and planarias. It is an important problem, but I think the Dx = T(xx) method solves the solution in the computer science, along with other fixed point theorems. This raises serious problems with the head/mind transplant conjecture. According to L, I think I can say that it wouldn't work. I beg to differ on this. Your monad would stay with the amputated head, and remain attached to or associated with it. But the head or intellect will die for lack of fresh blood, etc., so the monad will remain attached to a rotting head. Nothing will be rotten. You are copied on the right level, under anesthesia if you prefer, at a very low temperature, and the information scanned is send on a disk. The original body/brain is then destroyed and assumed to be destroyed successfully (it is part of the protocol). From the information kept in the disk, you are reconstituted at the correct level (which exists by the comp hypothesis) and you go out of the hospital, having survived in the usual clinical sense. Your soul is your identity. Yes. It stays with you, even though you change through the years or while asleep during an operation. And even when you die. If your subjective 1p consciousness (your monad) survives, then you have survived the doctor's alterations (either with digital hardware or signals) to your brain. Good insight. Yes. The question is not if you will survive with an artificial brain as you will survive anyway. The question is in better keeping the normal probability of manifesting your 1p relatively to your fellow in this branch of the arithmetical emanation. It is a theorem for the universal machines. Once they have the cognitive ability to
Re: The supreme monad is the only actor, the only agent
Hi Roger, On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:06, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Man's soul, being a monad, includes the physical man, as the physical man must remain associated to its monad. But man-and-his-monad is not an actor, it is a puppet of the supreme monad. Here we have a vocabulary decision to take. Many thing you said about the supreme monad can wirk with comp if you model it by the universal machine, but this play the role of Man, not a God. So there is but one actor, the Supreme monad. Which is why we give thanks before a meal. usually we thanks God, which is far bigger than any monads, supreme or not. We will have to decide, as I am not sure there is really a conflict, here except vocabulary, and perhaps comp, as you seem to change your mind often (which is very nice to do, as you can acknowledge the mind change). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:36:10 Subject: Re: heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:29, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same. Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice, his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same. OK. The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or platonia (same 1p, same identity), because although its contents keep changing, it has to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme monad would not know where to place the constantly adjusted perceptions. More or less OK. It is a play with four actors: God, Man, the Soul. (= 4 as the Man is a bit schizo and has two personality: a terrestrial and a divine one). Those can be played, in comp + classical theory of knowledge) by Arithmetical Truth (God), The Loebian universal Turing machine (Man, Bp), and Bp p (The theatetical definition of knowledge applied to ideally correct machine's provability. Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions of each monad are not that of an individual soul such as we understand perception. An individual soul sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives. The term holographic perception comes to mind. Interesting. I think this or similar are still open problems. In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God who knows all. OK. This, for me, is more salvia than comp and logic, but so I *guess* you are correct. Open problem with comp. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete robust physical universe. ? Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. Dear Bruno, I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still didn't understand... From: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf ...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe? Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ? matter? has been ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology. My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither and has no particular properties. How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, Why not? The One is not a theory. thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality. [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I just prove this
Re: why IMHO arithmetic is not a theory
On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:19, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal IMHO arithmetic, unlike theory, does not make predictions in the real world, ? It does, but we are blasé. Let me give you example: 1) It predict that if I put two spoon of sugar in my tea, my tea will have more sugar in it. 2) it predicts that some programs will not stop, and indeed we can confirm this. 3) it predicts, together with string theory, that the mass of the photon is zero. This uses the rather remarkable Ramanujan proposition that the sum of all natural numbers 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+ ... is reasonably equal to ... -1/12. So the apparant lack of mass of the photon confirms this. 4) it predicts everything, with comp, although the math is hard to be specific, but it has already explained why there is a quantization, why there are many-worlds, and the whole of the theology of the Löbian machines. This again is confirmed. of course here comp is used to make arithmetic the theory of everything, and in that setting many problems are open. so it has not contingency about it, its truths are necessary, unchangeable. and always true. That disqualifies arithmetic as a theory, which is man-made (invented) and therefore contingent. Theories are invented, but arithmetic is not, You confuse a theory of arithmetic with the arithmetical truth. arithmetic is discovered. It is most certainly a priori. Indeed. For arithmetical truth. But arithmetical theories have take time to be isolated or human-invented. Bruno On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:34, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal All theories are based on the a priori but can only give contingent results (this world results). Hmm OK. However, arithmetic is not a theory, Sorry, but it is. I mean there are even many theories. Two important one in the comp setting is the very elementary theory. Basically just the four equalities: x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x This is already Turing universal. A richer theory (PA), which is L bian (knows she is universal), is the same four axioms + 0 ? s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y and with the infinities of induction axioms, for all arithmetical formula F(x) : ( F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x)) ) - AxF(x) By G del 2, or by L b, Arithmetical Truth is far beyond *all* theories and machines. Arithmetical Truth cannot be defined by those machines, although they can build transfinite of approximation, and handles pointer on the notion. it is arithmetical (permanent, necessary, logical) truth. Yes. But logically you have still to make your assumptions explicit and clear, and then you see that arithmetical truth is bigger than what we can conceive (provably so about the sound machines) and that it will have many contingent internal aspects when seen from inside. Still both the necessary and the contingent obeys to (meta) laws, in the computer science setting. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 05:59:33 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp. People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a reason for doing so. And I no longer know what comp means. Comp means that we can survive with a digital brain. Nothing else. but it implies that Plato is correct and Aristotle is incorrect for the global conception of reality. Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the brain. I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a great many other things too, Yes. It has concequences which contradict many point of Aristotle metaphysics. things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before Evolution produced brains or the owner [of a brain] itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic. Let us go step by step. you are stuck in step 3 And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in step 3; Your blunder has been debunked by many people. Then you have oscillate between contradictory statements. You are only confusing 1- views with 3-views. Sometimes between 3-views on 1-views and the 1- views on 1-views. You are the one pretending being able to predict what happens after pushing the button, but you have always given a list of what can happen, which is not a prediction. after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on that fatally flawed foundation would be worth reading. You did not show a flow, just a confusion between 1p and 3p. the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H Yes. by
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OK, you say propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions. That's a profound point. Either we have not yet found the contradiction, or we have not the tool to prevent the existence of infinite non standard proof of a contradiction to exist (which is the Godelian reason for the consistency of inconsistency, contrary to what Stephen said in a recent post). Nobody really believes that RA or PA can be contradictory. It is easy to prove the consistency of arithmetic in the usual math (informal set theory). Gödel's theorem does not cast any doubt on arithmetic, quite the contrary. In other words, one can't ever be sure if a proposition is necessarily true, because, as Woody Allen says, forever is a long time. Especially with non standard time. And the variety and number of possible copntradictions is possibly vast. Transfinite, even. Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. I guess that's the same as saying that you can never be sure of contingency either. I need to lie down for a while. This is beginning to look like existentialism. No worry. I am afraid that Stephen introduced some confusion here. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:56:01 Subject: Re: The two types of truth On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:45, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either true or false], We can only hope that they are non contradictory. And although true or false, they are aslo known or unknown, believed of not believed, disbelieved or not disbelieved, etc. and truths of fact [which are not always either true or false]. Why? They are contextual, but you can study the relation fact/context in the higher structure level. Truths of reason are a priori, while truths of fact are a posteriori. Truths of reason are necessary, permanent truths. Truths of fact are contingent, empirical truths. Both kinds of truth must have a sufficient reason. Truths of reason have their sufficient reason in being opposed to the contradictoriness and logical inconsistency of propositions which deny them. Truths of fact have their sufficient reason in being more perfect than propositions which deny them. Unfortunately, this is acceptable below Sigma_1 truth, but doubtable above, so even in the lower complexity part of arithmetic, things are not that simple. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 07:13:24 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:12, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? It is part of the assumption. We postulate arithmetic. I try to avoid the use of platonic there, as I used the term in Plato sense. In that sense Platonia = the greek No?, and it is derived from arithmetic and comp. All you need is the belief that 43 is prime independently of 43 is prime. The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence Already in arithmetic we have the consistence of the existence of a prrof of the false, this certainly does not mean that there exist a proof of the false. So self-consistency is doubtfully identifiable with truth, and still less with existence. but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! Not at all. 43 is prime might be true, even in absence of universe and observer. We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. Truth is no more a property than existence. It makes no sense. Bruno
Re: Re: WHY FREE WILL IS A BOGUS ISSUE
Hi Alberto G. Corona I'm much indebted to you for bringing this very important observation to my attention. I need very badly to study the issue and am starting right now. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 05:21:48 Subject: Re: WHY FREE WILL IS A BOGUS ISSUE Roger: That? right The modern notion of free will is a nominalist one. It redefine free will in physicalist terms, when in reality it was a realist question of whether I have moral judgement between good and evil and either if I can choose between them.? Of course, in nominalist terms, good, evil morals etc have no meaning. So that? why concepts like free will were reduced to physicalist terms- But these redefintions, like the one of free will are in terms of physical laws is almost meaningless and no doubt, self contradictory. Other concepts, like ?ood, evil, morals etc, that could? be reduced, were relegated to a individual irrational sphere. This is the era of the false?ichotomy?etween is and ought. Because the most fundamental questions for practical life were denied to rational discussion, they were delegated to demagoges, revolutionaries, and various kinds of saviors of countries and planets. ?he results are the never ending waves of?otalitarianisms?ithin Modernity. 2012/11/6 Roger Clough Free will is a bogus issue, something akin to asking how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Why ? Because in biology at least, the will of any entity only needs to carry out what the entity desires, to survive. If it can't, the entity will die and not be tend to be reproduced. Case closed. If you accordingly include desire with will, then you have the the more meaningful issue of self-determination, meaning that the entity can determine and achieve what it needs to survive. In philosophy, since ancient times, this force to survive and actualize the entity's possibilities (another term for evolution) is called entelechy. So what I am saying is nothing new. So it's of no consequence IMHO to question whether we have free will or not. The proper issue to debate is whether self-determination is possible. ?y self I include everything inside the entities' skin or shell. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 16:50:36 Subject: Re: Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out oftheir movements So what? If you convinced someone that life is not worth living, then they would be more likely to commit suicide. I don't think this result really adds anything too profound... On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 12:57:23PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Let me throw something into the conversation. Craig may have linked this previously, but it needs closed inspection IMHO. Attention John Clark! Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out of their movements -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
Re: The two types of truth
On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:45, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Is sigma_6 truth truth with only a 6 sigma possibility of error ? let P(x) be a decidable number property. Like being prime. Note that if P(x) is decidable, then ~P(x) is decidable too. P(x), and ~P(x) are said sigma_0 Then, thanks to a theorem of Mostowski, you have a natural ladder of degrees of insolubility: sigma_1 the proposition with shape ExP(x) = it exists a number x such that it is the case that P(x) You can see that if a sigma_1 proposition is true, then, if you have enough time you can know it in principle. Just test P(x) on 0, then on 1, then on 2, etc. If ExP(x) is true, you will find that x eventially with that method. Pi_1 the negation of of sigma_1 proposition. That is ~ExP(x), which is equivalent with Ax~P(x). Do you see that. If is is false that a number exists with the property P, it means that all numbers have the property ~P. Now Pi_1 are a priori more complex to prove that the sigma_1, as you have to very that 0 has not p, and then 1 has not p, ad infinitum, in case the proposition is true. Note that you can still refute such a proposition in case it false, as you have just to verify the ExP(x) to refute it. Sigma_2 =Ay Ex P(x, y) Pi_2 Ey Ax P(x, y) etc. So a sigma_6 proposition would be AxEyAzErAtEkAnEmP(x,y,z,r,t,n,m) Very complex proposition. For example with an oracle for the halting problem, you can decide all sigma_1 truth or falsity, but you can't decide a sigma_2 proposition. Note this: sigma_1 completeness (the ability to decide the true, (bt not necessarily the false) sigma_1 sentences) is equivalent with Turing universality. There is no direct relationship with error correction. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:56:01 Subject: Re: The two types of truth On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:45, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either true or false], We can only hope that they are non contradictory. And although true or false, they are aslo known or unknown, believed of not believed, disbelieved or not disbelieved, etc. and truths of fact [which are not always either true or false]. Why? They are contextual, but you can study the relation fact/context in the higher structure level. Truths of reason are a priori, while truths of fact are a posteriori. Truths of reason are necessary, permanent truths. Truths of fact are contingent, empirical truths. Both kinds of truth must have a sufficient reason. Truths of reason have their sufficient reason in being opposed to the contradictoriness and logical inconsistency of propositions which deny them. Truths of fact have their sufficient reason in being more perfect than propositions which deny them. Unfortunately, this is acceptable below Sigma_1 truth, but doubtable above, so even in the lower complexity part of arithmetic, things are not that simple. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 07:13:24 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:12, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? It is part of the assumption. We postulate arithmetic. I try to avoid the use of platonic there, as I used the term in Plato sense. In that sense Platonia = the greek No?, and it is derived from arithmetic and comp. All you need is the belief that 43 is prime independently of 43 is prime. The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence Already in arithmetic we have the consistence of the existence of a prrof of the false, this certainly does not mean that there exist a proof of the false. So self-consistency is doubtfully identifiable with truth, and still less with existence. but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! Not at all. 43 is prime might be
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun at the notion. Ok, I'll get back to the herd then :) Cowboy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: (mathematical) solipsism
On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:48, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Isn't strong AI just an assumption ? Yes. Comp too. The existence of the moon also. The fact that I am conscious, can only be an assumption for you, and vice versa. The only thing which is not an assumption is private consciousness. All the rest are assumptions. Strictly speaking. Science uses only assumption and develop only *relative* certainty. A difficulty comes from the fact that the brain wired in us already many assumptions, which we are not conscious of the hypothetical nature. for example some birds assumes that the first things they see moving after birth is their parent, and we tend to do the same. But having parent is of the type theoretical hypotheses. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 09:43:16 Subject: Re: (mathematical) solipsism On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:00, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] In the absence of a means to determine some property, it is incoherent and sometimes inconsistent to claim that the property has some particular value and the absence of all other possible values. In math this is called (mathematical) solipsism. Dear Bruno, How is it solipsism? Solipsism is: Solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. The term comes from the Latin solus (alone) and ipse (self). Solipsism as an epistemological position holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure. The external world and other minds cannot be known, and might not exist outside the mind. As a metaphysical position, solipsism goes further to the conclusion that the world and other minds do not exist. My point is that numbers, by your notion of AR, are solipsistic as there is literally nothing other than the numbers. I reject AR because of this! Numbers alone cannot do what you propose. Comp entails Strong AI, which attributes consciousness to machines, and thus to others. You argument is not valid because it beg the question that number (related through the laws of + and *) emulated computation to which comp attribute consciousness. So comp is not solipsism. Bruno This post argues similar to my point: http://mathforum.org/kb/message.jspa?messageID=5944965 Conventional solipsism is a logical philosophy whose underlying views apply equally to mathematical philosophies of neopythagoreanism and neoplatonism as well as mathematical realism and empiricism generally. The well established philosophical principle of solipsism is that only the individual is or can be demonstrated to exist. But the problem is that if this principle were actually demonstrably true it would also make it false because the truth established would ipso facto make the principle beyond control of any individual. Nobody really thinks solipsism is true. But the difficulty is no one can prove or disprove the concept because no one can prove the foundations of truth in absolute, necessary, and universal terms. This article http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020context=philo argues against the claim that Intuitionism is solipsistic. I reject Intuitionism as a singular coherent theory of mathematics, but I do accept it as a member of the pantheon of interpretations of mathematics. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
On 05 Nov 2012, at 15:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 7:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OK, you say propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions. That's a profound point. In other words, one can't ever be sure if a proposition is necessarily true, because, as Woody Allen says, forever is a long time. And the variety and number of possible copntradictions is possibly vast. Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! I guess that's the same as saying that you can never be sure of contingency either. I need to lie down for a while. This is beginning to look like existentialism. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, Great question! If we are allowed to take forever to pay back a debt, then we have an effective free lunch! I don't see this. The debt remains. Many countries have such free lunch, which of course are not free at all. What you are thinking about with the concept of propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions is what is known as omega-inconsistent logical systems. Not really. Even if we can look at all the proofs possible, they might all not get the falsity. The omega-inconsistent theories keep saying that they are inconsistent, and they remain consistent as we cannot exclude the existence of non standard infinite proofs in the system. But the proof of inconsistency will have a non standard length, and is not a proof in the usual sense of the word. ;-) Theories that are consistent right up until they produce a statement that is not consistent. No, that's an inconsistent theory. omega-inconsistent theories never produce a contradiction. But they just disbelieves this. By the way, the usual rules of logical inference in math assumes that truth theories are never inconsistent. It is not an assumption. It is provable. Soundness implies consistency, but the reverse is false. An omega-inconsistent theory is consistent but not sound. They assert arithmetical falsity, like the fact that they are inconsistent. Bruno What about theories that are only 'almost' never inconsistent? This might help us think about the shade of Nietzche a bit more. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 05 Nov 2012, at 16:14, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Nov 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: But you know in davance that whatever happen, you will live only one thing. John Clark knows with certainty that John Clark will see Washington, and John Clark knows with certainty that John Clark will see Moscow, and John Clark knows with certainty that John Clark will see one and only one city, and John Clark knows with certainty that this is not paradoxical because JOHN CLARK HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. Define John Clark. Well, don't even try, the semantic of proper name is the most difficult unsolved problem in philosophy. Comp gives hints, but this is more complex than what we are discussing here. And after its all over and the dust has settled John Clark can see that John Clark's Helsinki prediction, that was made before all this started, was completely accurate. I don't see this at all. After the duplication all the John Clark realise that they are in only one city, and that they were unable to predict which one. So both of them understand that this peculiar experience was not predicable. There are two 1p, as seen from the 3p view A third party has only one view, the third party's own; John Clark can't make any sense out of two 1p as seen from the 3p view. You did introduce the 3p view on the 1p views, which makes indeed sense, as it is the 3p view on the 1p views that we can attribute to another, when not being solipsistic. You said that after the duplication the 1-views of the John Clark have been duplicated, and this contradict what you say now. I understand the two ways of speaking, but it is better not to change them during the discussion as it introduces confusion. but you know in advance that you will live, only one 1p view, from your next 1p view. Just that short sentence contains you know and you will live and your next 1p view with no clear understanding of who the you is that is supposed to know or who the you that will live or who the you is that will view something because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. You might try shorter sentences. When you has been duplicated stop using pronouns or all statements will be ambiguous! When the self has been copied and pronouns continue to be used as before as if nothing had happened then confusion always results. On the contrary. Indexical 1p and 3p are much more clear, and admits clear mathematical definition (using computer science, or the Dx = xx method that I have often explain wand which is the base of AUDA). Again and again and again, you answer on the future 1views And again and again Bruno Marchal says YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and then gives them radically different experiences and then chastises John Clark for giving a list rather than a single answer when the question what will you see? is asked. yes, and this should pose no problem at all, given that YOU (in Helsinki) believes that you will feel to survive in necessarily one place, by comp, and it as asked which one, and both will answer a precise city, as the question was bearing on their current personal feeling, and so both will understand that the list did not provide the answer. Now they know better. But if 2 different questions are asked Only one question is asked, to only one guy: Where will you feel to be after the duplication? then one should expect 2 different answers. If you reason like that in quantum QM without collapse, and if you look at the position of an electron in hydrogen atom, you have to answer I will find the electron is everywhere. If Bruno Marchal wants clearer answers then Bruno Marchal should ask clearer questions by NOT USING PRONOUNS. No pronouns have a far simpler semantic than proper name. if the 2 are identical I can't single out one and say this one will have fate X while that one will have fate Y, and because they are identical it would be a useless prediction even if I could. Irelevant as they are not identical. If before they see either city the two are not identical then the duplicating chamber is not working properly and Bruno Marchal's thought experiments are convoluted enough without introducing poorly maintained machinery into the mix. The question, asked before the experience, is precisely asked about the personal feeling after the experience. The question is about your future 1p. John Clark does not know what the question is You opush on a button, and you look around. What will you see. By comp you know you will survive, and feel to be in only city. There is no paradox, no contradiction, but just a first person indeterminacy in Helsinki, about which city you will see. nor, with all these duplicates running around, who your refers to, but John Clark does know that John Clark's future point of view will continue to be John Clark's point of view. One will
Re: Communicability
On 05 Nov 2012, at 16:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 9:03 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Sirius was there before Paul was born. That position is called realism. Hi Roger, What makes you so sure? Realism assumes infallibility! What You confuse the truth that we might know, and the truth that we are searching. You might also confuse the 1-truth, and the 3-truth. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
I am a realist rather than a nominalist because universal gravity exists.
Hi Alberto G. Corona If there are physical laws in the universe, such as gravity, quantum mechanics and electromagnetism, as well as dark energy, these laws must be universal or else there would be chaos. There could be no science. That fact refutes the nominalist position that universals do not exist. These laws are truths, so truths are universal. Being so, they exist apart from human minds. Physics thus tells us that a falling tree will make a sound even if nobody is there to witness the event. Because existence then is independent of mind (the realist position), This also refutes Berkeley's position that things exist because we perceive them. And the Ten Commandments, if they exist, exist independent of us. If evil is the diminishment of life and good the enhancement of it, evil and good have real effects and so are real, whether you believe in them or not. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 06:02:52 Subject: Re: WHY FREE WILL IS A BOGUS ISSUE This is the same with some corrections of my bad dyslexic English The modern notion of free will is a?nominalist?one. It redefine free will in physicalist terms, when it ever was a?realist?question of whether I have moral judgement between good and evil and either if I can choose between them.? ?f course, in the modern, secularized version of Nominalism, called?Positivism, good, evil morals etc have no meaning. So that? why concepts like free will were reduced to?physicalist?terms. The problem is that these redefinitions, like the one of free will, in terms of physical laws are almost meaningless and no doubt, self contradictory.? Other concepts, like good, evil, morals etc, that could not be reduced, were relegated to a individual irrational sphere. Because these?rreducible?oncepts were involved in the most fundamental questions for practical life, and these concepts were denied to rational discussion, they were delegated t?emagogues, revolutionaries, and various kinds of saviors of countries and planets. This is the era of the false dichotomy between is and ought. The results are the never ending waves of totalitarianisms within Modernity. 2012/11/6 Alberto G. Corona Roger: That? right The modern notion of free will is a nominalist one. It redefine free will in physicalist terms, when in reality it was a realist question of whether I have moral judgement between good and evil and either if I can choose between them.? Of course, in nominalist terms, good, evil morals etc have no meaning. So that? why concepts like free will were reduced to physicalist terms- But these redefintions, like the one of free will are in terms of physical laws is almost meaningless and no doubt, self contradictory. Other concepts, like ?ood, evil, morals etc, that could? be reduced, were relegated to a individual irrational sphere. This is the era of the false?ichotomy?etween is and ought. Because the most fundamental questions for practical life were denied to rational discussion, they were delegated to demagoges, revolutionaries, and various kinds of saviors of countries and planets. ?he results are the never ending waves of?otalitarianisms?ithin Modernity. 2012/11/6 Roger Clough Free will is a bogus issue, something akin to asking how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Why ? Because in biology at least, the will of any entity only needs to carry out what the entity desires, to survive. If it can't, the entity will die and not be tend to be reproduced. Case closed. If you accordingly include desire with will, then you have the the more meaningful issue of self-determination, meaning that the entity can determine and achieve what it needs to survive. In philosophy, since ancient times, this force to survive and actualize the entity's possibilities (another term for evolution) is called entelechy. So what I am saying is nothing new. So it's of no consequence IMHO to question whether we have free will or not. The proper issue to debate is whether self-determination is possible. ?y self I include everything inside the entities' skin or shell. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 16:50:36 Subject: Re: Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out oftheir movements So what? If you convinced someone that life is not worth living, then they would be more likely to commit suicide. I don't think this result really adds anything too profound... On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 12:57:23PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Let me throw something into the conversation. Craig may
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 05 Nov 2012, at 17:31, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Bruno, I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important. I don't understand how you reason. I try to obey the rules of grammar in communication. If a word implies an action, such as run or implement or interview, then there should be some action involved in the referent of the word. Or else it does not imply an action and it an object. Simple logical consistency in semiotics. This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Heraclitus gets his feet wet
Hi Bruno Marchal How can you be in two places at once ? At least in this universe ? Prisoners in jails would love to be also free. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:01:43 Subject: Re: Heraclitus gets his feet wet On 05 Nov 2012, at 12:19, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Heraclitus' point was that in this contingent world, nothing remains the same. From the relevant points of view, OK, but a platonist look at the contingencies in both ways. A bit like after a WM duplication you are necessarily at both place in the eyes of God, and you are contingently in one of the two places, from your local current point of view. To reason we need both points of view. Of course, with the comp theory, at some point you need to define contingency and necessity more precisely, by isolating the modal notion you are using. Since Plato and Leibniz we got the math tool for doing this. As I understand it, the naturalist fallacy is to judge that something is good (in an ethical sense) because it is natural. Heraclitus makes no such judgment. I was alluding to a more widespread naturalist fallacy: the idea that nature or matter have some basic or primary ontology. This is with us since, mainly, Aristotle, and is arguably almost wired in our brain, but it is put in difficulty by things like QM, comp, if not Plato's insights and the existence of the experience of dreams. Bruno I think H meant not the same river (such as the mississippi), he meant that the river (whatever river) would not be the same, even a movie would show visually that it has changed. And force, velocity, temperature-- none of these remains constant, as the appropriate sensors would show. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:28:11 Subject: Re: The One is not a number but a metaphor On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:13, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I misconstrued the river/man analogy. Heraclitus said instead that a man cannot stand in the same river twice (or even from moment to moment). It's just a statement of contingency. I don't believe that. In my childhood, every summer I did stand in the same river. Of course a river is a living being, it changes shapes, and moves in the panorama, and the quality of the water decreased, alas, for some time, also. But it was the same river, at least in the sense that I am the same guy who took pleasure standing in that river. Heraclitus commited the naturalist error (with respect to comp) to identify a river with the local constitution that he assumes the existence. But that is for me in contradiction with most use of the word river in geography. A river is already a high level natural entity. Le temps s'en va! Le temps s'en va! Non Madame, le temps ne s'en va pas. C'est nous qui nous nous s'en allons! (French poet: literally times go away! times go away! No Miss, times does't go away, but *we* go away). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 13:39:24 Subject: Re: The One is not a number but a metaphor On 02 Nov 2012, at 11:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal When I refer to the One, I think of it not as a number 1 but as a metaphor. Well, the ONE is not the number 1. OK. The Soul is the identity of a monad, including the supreme monad. The soul does not change, even though the monad is constantly (rapidly) changing. The river keeps changing, but the man standing in it remains the same. Hmm why not. Too much fuzzy to be sure. Only the universal soul can be sais not changing. But once the soul has fallen, it forgets its universal origin, and undergone quite big changes. So in like manor, we can consider the One (as a metaphor, not as a number) as the Soul of the universe, the Universal Soul. I don't think so. the soul is the inner God, the one you can awake by different technic. The outer God, is beyond conceivability, even if comp can identify it with the very complex set of code of the arithmetical truth. At least in the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Re: The supreme monad is the only actor, the only agent
Hi Bruno Marchal Not to worry. The supreme monad acts through the individual monads (men or doughnuts or planets or whatever) in such a way that the actions appear to be perfectly normal. Thus from an outer perspective such as in comp, how the supreme monad acts would be irrelevant (invisible). The world effectively is as it appears to be. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:12:58 Subject: Re: The supreme monad is the only actor, the only agent Hi Roger, On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:06, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Man's soul, being a monad, includes the physical man, as the physical man must remain associated to its monad. But man-and-his-monad is not an actor, it is a puppet of the supreme monad. Here we have a vocabulary decision to take. Many thing you said about the supreme monad can wirk with comp if you model it by the universal machine, but this play the role of Man, not a God. So there is but one actor, the Supreme monad. Which is why we give thanks before a meal. usually we thanks God, which is far bigger than any monads, supreme or not. We will have to decide, as I am not sure there is really a conflict, here except vocabulary, and perhaps comp, as you seem to change your mind often (which is very nice to do, as you can acknowledge the mind change). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:36:10 Subject: Re: heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:29, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same. Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice, his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same. OK. The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or platonia (same 1p, same identity), because although its contents keep changing, it has to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme monad would not know where to place the constantly adjusted perceptions. More or less OK. It is a play with four actors: God, Man, the Soul. (= 4 as the Man is a bit schizo and has two personality: a terrestrial and a divine one). Those can be played, in comp + classical theory of knowledge) by Arithmetical Truth (God), The Loebian universal Turing machine (Man, Bp), and Bp p (The theatetical definition of knowledge applied to ideally correct machine's provability. Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions of each monad are not that of an individual soul such as we understand perception. An individual soul sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives. The term holographic perception comes to mind. Interesting. I think this or similar are still open problems. In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God who knows all. OK. This, for me, is more salvia than comp and logic, but so I *guess* you are correct. Open problem with comp. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete robust physical universe. ? Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. Dear Bruno, I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still didn't understand... From: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf ...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe? Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ? matter? has been ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is
Re: Against Mechanism
On 05 Nov 2012, at 19:41, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 11:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Again the same main 1-3 confusion. I see nothing I can be confused about because the only point of view I can see is my own first person one, what your second or his third person point of view may be is pure speculation on my part and so I will say nothing about it. We work with the comp theory, and ideal machine. The 1-views used are simple accessible memories in the brain or written in a diary. And it is the purpose of the thread to dig on those notion. We are no doing speculation, but we reason in a theory. You can only say that [...] You? John Clark has been duplicated so who can only say that, me or that fellow to my right who looks just like me? Both of them after the duplication. You? John Clark has been duplicated so who can only say that, me or that fellow to my left who looks just like me? Both of them after the duplication. If we reiterate a great number of times the experience, we are allowed to make a sampling. John Clark would be certain that *a* John Clark would die a painful death, not that it will necessarily ever matter from your (the unique John Clark before the experience) future point of view A future experience NEVER matters to the unique person occupying the present because its in the future, That is a different issue, and is basically wrong. but when the future becomes the present just before John Clark's last painful thought John Clark will remember being John Clark of the past. Look at AUDA According to Google AUDA is either a investment firm, a Bedouin Arab leader, or a Latvian football club playing in the second- highest division of Latvian football. I don't see the relevance in any of them. AUDA is for Arithmetical UDA. It is UDA but with the use of the mathematical definition of the pronouns, by using the only definition possible given by computer science, on ideally correct machines. It is part 2) of sane2004, although I use interview instead of AUDA. But it is the same. It is the purely math part of my investigation. The one where a part of physics is derived an the showing that QM confirms comp up to now. You confirm that you have not read the post, nor the paper, and that you have some prejudice on the whole field. Avoiding the use of pronouns there would conflate even more easily the 1-3 key distinction. I couldn't fail to disagree with you less. What you really mean by conflate is to shine a bright light on your ideas to expose their errors in stark relief. Pronouns are supposed to be used just for convenience, instead of laboriously typing Bruno Marchal the pronouns you or he can be used. But sometimes even in everyday experiences without the huge complication of duplicating chambers pronouns can lead to ambiguity. We've all had the experience of reading a very convoluted sentence and then seeing at the end and so I disagree with it and not being certain what it refers to and thus being unsure if the writer agrees with you or not. Now if we introduce duplicating chambers pronouns are a billion times more dangerous. To say that you have been duplicated and then to ask what you will see feel or want is just begging for ambiguity and confusion. No, because the 1-you, which has been well defined, can easily predict, by the comp assumption, that he is indeterminate about what he will feel, WHOEVER he feel to be after the experience. In Helsinki, with comp, he is certain (assuming comp + protocol) that he will FELL TO BE in only one place after the experience, and he is certain that any prediction of the type W M, W, M, will all fail. Only W or M will be exact for both. You give the feeling of faking to not understand what we are talking about. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
On 05 Nov 2012, at 20:03, Roger Clough wrote: Hi meekerdb Love is a qualia and science cannot touch qualia. Science can touch everything. And assuming comp science can explain why qualia are not scientific or communicable. they still remain real phenomena on which science can say something, even if negative. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 21:28:12 Subject: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality On 11/3/2012 6:47 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: : Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? Yes . I love my mother is some knowledge that I know , and is not part of a scientific theory. But could it be is the question. There could be a scientific theory that Alberto Corona loves his mother and you could know the theory. We know reality because we live in the reality, We do not approximate reality by theories. We directly know reality because we live within it. Our primary knowledge is intuitive, historic, direct.. It is _the_ reality. A theory is a second class of knowledge about a model that approximate reality, maybe upto a point of an isomorphism with some- part-of reality, but certainly, not an isomorphism that embraces the whole reality, because we could never know if we have modelized the entire reality, nether if this modelization is accurate. The legitimate usage of the models is to refine this intuitive knowledge. But at the worst, a model can negate our direct knowledge and try to create an alternative reality. In this case the theorist reclaim the model as the reality. Thus the theorist .reclaim a complete knowledge of reality. In this case the theorist is outside of science, even if it is within the science industry, and becomes a sort of gnostic preacher Yes, a model that includes everything is impossible (and not even useful), but it might still be that each thing you know is part of some model. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
On 05 Nov 2012, at 20:24, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 05.11.2012 16:21 Roger Clough said the following: Hi Richard Ruquist Engineering advantages ? A decade before the Wright brothers flew their airplane, people would have said, You're going to do WHAT ? I guess this is a very good example, as the Wright brothers have just done it. I am not sure if they based this innovation on some theory. Hence is the question, if a superstring theory is really necessary to drive innovations. String theory has made possible the discovery of new proofs of arithmetical statement. So string theory has already lead to innovation in number theory. For physics, we will see. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: why IMHO arithmetic is not a theory
Hi Bruno Marchal OK. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:21:19 Subject: Re: why IMHO arithmetic is not a theory On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:19, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal IMHO arithmetic, unlike theory, does not make predictions in the real world, ? It does, but we are blas?. Let me give you example: 1) It predict that if I put two spoon of sugar in my tea, my tea will have more sugar in it. 2) it predicts that some programs will not stop, and indeed we can confirm this. 3) it predicts, together with string theory, that the mass of the photon is zero. This uses the rather remarkable Ramanujan proposition that the sum of all natural numbers 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+ ... is reasonably equal to ... -1/12. So the apparant lack of mass of the photon confirms this. 4) it predicts everything, with comp, although the math is hard to be specific, but it has already explained why there is a quantization, why there are many-worlds, and the whole of the theology of the L?ian machines. This again is confirmed. of course here comp is used to make arithmetic the theory of everything, and in that setting many problems are open. so it has not contingency about it, its truths are necessary, unchangeable. and always true. That disqualifies arithmetic as a theory, which is man-made (invented) and therefore contingent. Theories are invented, but arithmetic is not, You confuse a theory of arithmetic with the arithmetical truth. arithmetic is discovered. It is most certainly a priori. Indeed. For arithmetical truth. But arithmetical theories have take time to be isolated or human-invented. Bruno On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:34, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal All theories are based on the a priori but can only give contingent results (this world results). Hmm OK. However, arithmetic is not a theory, Sorry, but it is. I mean there are even many theories. Two important one in the comp setting is the very elementary theory. Basically just the four equalities: x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x This is already Turing universal. A richer theory (PA), which is L bian (knows she is universal), is the same four axioms + 0 ? s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y and with the infinities of induction axioms, for all arithmetical formula F(x) : ( F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x)) ) - AxF(x) By G del 2, or by L b, Arithmetical Truth is far beyond *all* theories and machines. Arithmetical Truth cannot be defined by those machines, although they can build transfinite of approximation, and handles pointer on the notion. it is arithmetical (permanent, necessary, logical) truth. Yes. But logically you have still to make your assumptions explicit and clear, and then you see that arithmetical truth is bigger than what we can conceive (provably so about the sound machines) and that it will have many contingent internal aspects when seen from inside. Still both the necessary and the contingent obeys to (meta) laws, in the computer science setting. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 05:59:33 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp. People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a reason for doing so. And I no longer know what comp means. Comp means that we can survive with a digital brain. Nothing else. but it implies that Plato is correct and Aristotle is incorrect for the global conception of reality. Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the brain. I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a great many other things too, Yes. It has concequences which contradict many point of Aristotle metaphysics. things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before Evolution produced brains or the owner [of a brain] itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic. Let us go step by step. you are stuck in step 3 And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in step 3; Your blunder has been debunked by many people. Then you have oscillate between contradictory statements. You are only confusing 1- views
Re: Re: why IMHO arithmetic is not a theory
Bruno, How has comp explained how there are Many Worlds? I presume you mean MWI and many physical worlds, not just many dream worlds.. Richard On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OK. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:21:19 Subject: Re: why IMHO arithmetic is not a theory On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:19, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal IMHO arithmetic, unlike theory, does not make predictions in the real world, ? It does, but we are blas?. Let me give you example: 1) It predict that if I put two spoon of sugar in my tea, my tea will have more sugar in it. 2) it predicts that some programs will not stop, and indeed we can confirm this. 3) it predicts, together with string theory, that the mass of the photon is zero. This uses the rather remarkable Ramanujan proposition that the sum of all natural numbers 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+ ... is reasonably equal to ... -1/12. So the apparant lack of mass of the photon confirms this. 4) it predicts everything, with comp, although the math is hard to be specific, but it has already explained why there is a quantization, why there are many-worlds, and the whole of the theology of the L?ian machines. This again is confirmed. of course here comp is used to make arithmetic the theory of everything, and in that setting many problems are open. so it has not contingency about it, its truths are necessary, unchangeable. and always true. That disqualifies arithmetic as a theory, which is man-made (invented) and therefore contingent. Theories are invented, but arithmetic is not, You confuse a theory of arithmetic with the arithmetical truth. arithmetic is discovered. It is most certainly a priori. Indeed. For arithmetical truth. But arithmetical theories have take time to be isolated or human-invented. Bruno On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:34, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal All theories are based on the a priori but can only give contingent results (this world results). Hmm OK. However, arithmetic is not a theory, Sorry, but it is. I mean there are even many theories. Two important one in the comp setting is the very elementary theory. Basically just the four equalities: x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x This is already Turing universal. A richer theory (PA), which is L bian (knows she is universal), is the same four axioms + 0 ? s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y and with the infinities of induction axioms, for all arithmetical formula F(x) : ( F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x)) ) - AxF(x) By G del 2, or by L b, Arithmetical Truth is far beyond *all* theories and machines. Arithmetical Truth cannot be defined by those machines, although they can build transfinite of approximation, and handles pointer on the notion. it is arithmetical (permanent, necessary, logical) truth. Yes. But logically you have still to make your assumptions explicit and clear, and then you see that arithmetical truth is bigger than what we can conceive (provably so about the sound machines) and that it will have many contingent internal aspects when seen from inside. Still both the necessary and the contingent obeys to (meta) laws, in the computer science setting. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 05:59:33 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp. People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a reason for doing so. And I no longer know what comp means. Comp means that we can survive with a digital brain. Nothing else. but it implies that Plato is correct and Aristotle is incorrect for the global conception of reality. Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the brain. I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a great many other things too, Yes. It has concequences which contradict many point of Aristotle metaphysics. things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before Evolution produced brains or the owner [of a brain] itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic. Let us go step by step. you are stuck in step 3 And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in step 3; Your blunder has been debunked by many people. Then you have oscillate between contradictory statements. You are only confusing 1- views with
Re: Re: The two types of truth
Hi Bruno Marchal Thanks for your patience. Beautiful stuff, it reads like Mozart sounds. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:43:06 Subject: Re: The two types of truth On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:45, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Is sigma_6 truth truth with only a 6 sigma possibility of error ? let P(x) be a decidable number property. Like being prime. Note that if P(x) is decidable, then ~P(x) is decidable too. P(x), and ~P(x) are said sigma_0 Then, thanks to a theorem of Mostowski, you have a natural ladder of degrees of insolubility: sigma_1 the proposition with shape ExP(x) = it exists a number x such that it is the case that P(x) You can see that if a sigma_1 proposition is true, then, if you have enough time you can know it in principle. Just test P(x) on 0, then on 1, then on 2, etc. If ExP(x) is true, you will find that x eventially with that method. Pi_1 the negation of of sigma_1 proposition. That is ~ExP(x), which is equivalent with Ax~P(x). Do you see that. If is is false that a number exists with the property P, it means that all numbers have the property ~P. Now Pi_1 are a priori more complex to prove that the sigma_1, as you have to very that 0 has not p, and then 1 has not p, ad infinitum, in case the proposition is true. Note that you can still refute such a proposition in case it false, as you have just to verify the ExP(x) to refute it. Sigma_2 = Ay Ex P(x, y) Pi_2 Ey Ax P(x, y) etc. So a sigma_6 proposition would be AxEyAzErAtEkAnEmP(x,y,z,r,t,n,m) Very complex proposition. For example with an oracle for the halting problem, you can decide all sigma_1 truth or falsity, but you can't decide a sigma_2 proposition. Note this: sigma_1 completeness (the ability to decide the true, (bt not necessarily the false) sigma_1 sentences) is equivalent with Turing universality. There is no direct relationship with error correction. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:56:01 Subject: Re: The two types of truth On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:45, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either true or false], We can only hope that they are non contradictory. And although true or false, they are aslo known or unknown, believed of not believed, disbelieved or not disbelieved, etc. and truths of fact [which are not always either true or false]. Why? They are contextual, but you can study the relation fact/context in the higher structure level. Truths of reason are a priori, while truths of fact are a posteriori. Truths of reason are necessary, permanent truths. Truths of fact are contingent, empirical truths. Both kinds of truth must have a sufficient reason. Truths of reason have their sufficient reason in being opposed to the contradictoriness and logical inconsistency of propositions which deny them. Truths of fact have their sufficient reason in being more perfect than propositions which deny them. Unfortunately, this is acceptable below Sigma_1 truth, but doubtable above, so even in the lower complexity part of arithmetic, things are not that simple. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 07:13:24 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:12, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? It is part of the assumption. We postulate arithmetic. I try to avoid the use of platonic there, as I used the term in Plato sense. In that sense Platonia = the greek No?, and it is derived from arithmetic and comp. All you need is the belief that 43 is prime independently of 43 is prime.
Re: Re: Communicability
Stephen, My new understanding of realism is that according to it, what happens in this world is not created by our minds, but created by a higher power. It could have happened without us. That concerns events. Truth, according to realism, is also mind-independent. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 08:29:30 Subject: Re: Communicability On 05 Nov 2012, at 17:10, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 10:35 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Infallibility isn't involved. The typical textbook explanation for realism is, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to hear it, would it make a sound? A realist (such as me) would say yes. The logician in me would say no! Because a sound is something that must be capable of being heard to exist. If no one is truly around, then the noise that the tree might make cannot be heard and thus there is not a sound. This is ambiguous. Either by sound you mean the subjective feeling that a human can get when a tree falls. Then it is reasonable to assume the necessity of a human in the forest to say that there is a sound (although it is a bit impolite for the other animals in the forest). Or you mean by sound the air vibration, then it is reasonable to suppose, locally, that the virbation can exist, even without human, nor animals, in the forest. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
Hi Bruno Marchal My understanding is that qualia are subjective or 1-view, while the realm of science is completely objective (3-view). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 08:49:43 Subject: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality On 05 Nov 2012, at 20:03, Roger Clough wrote: Hi meekerdb Love is a qualia and science cannot touch qualia. Science can touch everything. And assuming comp science can explain why qualia are not scientific or communicable. they still remain real phenomena on which science can say something, even if negative. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 21:28:12 Subject: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality On 11/3/2012 6:47 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: : Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? Yes . I love my mother is some knowledge that I know , and is not part of a scientific theory. But could it be is the question. There could be a scientific theory that Alberto Corona loves his mother and you could know the theory. We know reality because we live in the reality, We do not approximate reality by theories. We directly know reality because we live within it. Our primary knowledge is intuitive, historic, direct.. It is _the_ reality. A theory is a second class of knowledge about a model that approximate reality, maybe upto a point of an isomorphism with some- part-of reality, but certainly, not an isomorphism that embraces the whole reality, because we could never know if we have modelized the entire reality, nether if this modelization is accurate. The legitimate usage of the models is to refine this intuitive knowledge. But at the worst, a model can negate our direct knowledge and try to create an alternative reality. In this case the theorist reclaim the model as the reality. Thus the theorist .reclaim a complete knowledge of reality. In this case the theorist is outside of science, even if it is within the science industry, and becomes a sort of gnostic preacher Yes, a model that includes everything is impossible (and not even useful), but it might still be that each thing you know is part of some model. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy By poet, I suspect that Bruno was attesting to Nietzsche's ability to think in terms of metaphors (such as Apollo and Dionysius in his Genealogy of Morals. ) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:01 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. ? Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun at the notion. Ok, I'll get back to the herd then :) Cowboy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/6/2012 4:56 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King OK, let me rephrase the question. If a tree falls in the forest with nobody to observe it, will it end up on the ground ? Hi Roger, There is no tree nor forest nor ground nor any action in that condition. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 22:00:20 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/5/2012 2:30 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King A tape recorder could prove your theory wrong. A tape recorder is an example of an observer of sounds, so no, my theory stands. Berkeley finally gave in and said that realism was acceptable because God could see or hear it. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 11:10:06 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/5/2012 10:35 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Infallibility isn't involved. The typical textbook explanation for realism is, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to hear it, would it make a sound? A realist (such as me) would say yes. The logician in me would say no! Because a sound is something that must be capable of being heard to exist. If no one is truly around, then the noise that the tree might make cannot be heard and thus there is not a sound. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On hearsay
On 11/6/2012 4:59 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King OK, you must be talking about physical evidence then. Hi Roger, What makes it physical? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 22:01:33 Subject: Re: On hearsay On 11/5/2012 2:36 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King No, they don't all have to had witnessed it, they can simply be told about it. In court that is called hearsay. You are still thinking that my observers are only human... Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 11:20:01 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 11/5/2012 10:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Good. That is another way to define objective (public). Whereas 1p is personal and always private. If 1p is communicated, it becomes 3p. Hi, It is only 3p is that communication can be confirmed or 'witnessed' by a third party. 3p requires at least three 1p to agree. -- -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/6/2012 8:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 16:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 9:03 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Sirius was there before Paul was born. That position is called realism. Hi Roger, What makes you so sure? Realism assumes infallibility! What You confuse the truth that we might know, and the truth that we are searching. Dear Bruno, Anticipation of truth is faith, not truth. You might also confuse the 1-truth, and the 3-truth. There can be no 3-truth that is not known (present tense) by some 1-p. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy So what ? I have no stomach for the revaluation of all values and the other garbage Nietzsche taught. If you are truly a platonist, you would agree with me. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:35:15 Subject: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, So what? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 3:47 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy By poet, I suspect that Bruno was attesting to Nietzsche's ability to think in terms of metaphors (such as Apollo and Dionysius in his Genealogy of Morals. ) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:01 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal ?rote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. ? Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun at the notion. Ok, I'll get back to the herd then :) Cowboy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On hearsay
Hi Stephen P. King It's physical evidence if it can help convict a criminal in a court of law. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:36:37 Subject: Re: On hearsay On 11/6/2012 4:59 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King OK, you must be talking about physical evidence then. Hi Roger, What makes it physical? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 22:01:33 Subject: Re: On hearsay On 11/5/2012 2:36 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King No, they don't all have to had witnessed it, they can simply be told about it. In court that is called hearsay. You are still thinking that my observers are only human... Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 11:20:01 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 11/5/2012 10:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Good. That is another way to define objective (public). Whereas 1p is personal and always private. If 1p is communicated, it becomes 3p. Hi, It is only 3p is that communication can be confirmed or 'witnessed' by a third party. 3p requires at least three 1p to agree. -- -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/6/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 17:31, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Bruno, I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important. I don't understand how you reason. I try to obey the rules of grammar in communication. If a word implies an action, such as run or implement or interview, then there should be some action involved in the referent of the word. Or else it does not imply an action and it an object. Simple logical consistency in semiotics. This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Dear Bruno, So do you agree that the relation goes both ways, which is to say that the relation is symetrical? If the action of throwing an apple implies a parabola, does the existence of the parabola alone define the particular act of throwing the apple? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Communicability
Hi Stephen P. King How about those that are deaf, dumb and blind ? They've never seen the moon for example. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:57:00 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/6/2012 8:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 16:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 9:03 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Sirius was there before Paul was born. That position is called realism. Hi Roger, What makes you so sure? Realism assumes infallibility! What You confuse the truth that we might know, and the truth that we are searching. Dear Bruno, Anticipation of truth is faith, not truth. You might also confuse the 1-truth, and the 3-truth. There can be no 3-truth that is not known (present tense) by some 1-p. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Communicability
Hi Stephen P. King What happens if I mistake a statue of a beautiful woman for the real thing, thus turning, eg, a statue of pygmalion into an actual woman ? Or mistake fool's gold or gold foiled chocolates for actual gold coins ? Does the world actually become cloudy if I have cataracts ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 11:02:49 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 17:10, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 10:35 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Infallibility isn't involved. The typical textbook explanation for realism is, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to hear it, would it make a sound? A realist (such as me) would say yes. The logician in me would say no! Because a sound is something that must be capable of being heard to exist. If no one is truly around, then the noise that the tree might make cannot be heard and thus there is not a sound. This is ambiguous. Either by sound you mean the subjective feeling that a human can get when a tree falls. Then it is reasonable to assume the necessity of a human in the forest to say that there is a sound (although it is a bit impolite for the other animals in the forest). Or you mean by sound the air vibration, then it is reasonable to suppose, locally, that the virbation can exist, even without human, nor animals, in the forest. Dear Bruno, You are dazzled by the hypotheticals, revealing that you do take the possibility of an observer to exist even when none is stipulated to exist, thus fall into the trap. Stop doing that. You yourself make a big deal of the need for exactness and soundness of theories and yet don't stop to think: What am I assuming unconsciously about how it is that there is even a theory? If a theory X asks us to eliminate the possibility of a physical world, then that theory must be taken at face value. Nothing in X can have anything to do with physical attributes and thus, actions vanish from it. It ceases to even be a theory. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/6/2012 9:37 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Stephen, My new understanding of realism is that according to it, what happens in this world is not created by our minds, but created by a higher power. It could have happened without us. Hi Roger, Sure, I would agree if we could be more precise. No one individual mind has anything but a vanishingly small effect, but add up an infinity of minds and you get omnipotence! We put far to much importance on some other 'higher power' and forget that we are the exact image of that higher power! That concerns events. Truth, according to realism, is also mind-independent. It cannot truly be both independent and effective! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
On 11/6/2012 9:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: My understanding is that qualia are subjective or 1-view, while the realm of science is completely objective (3-view). Science 'traces' out the observer and wonders why it cannot understand the observer! LOL! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Communicability
Hi Stephen P. King So that by believing that God exists, He exists ? Or believing that 2 + 2 = 5 makes it so ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 11:16:51 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/6/2012 9:37 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Stephen, My new understanding of realism is that according to it, what happens in this world is not created by our minds, but created by a higher power. It could have happened without us. Hi Roger, Sure, I would agree if we could be more precise. No one individual mind has anything but a vanishingly small effect, but add up an infinity of minds and you get omnipotence! We put far to much importance on some other 'higher power' and forget that we are the exact image of that higher power! That concerns events. Truth, according to realism, is also mind-independent. It cannot truly be both independent and effective! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Roger, If you want to read him that trivially, go ahead. The constant, eternal revaluation of all values. This is just implied by asking what's going on?. And yes, this is gently consistent with never ending platonic questioning + a popper style negation, even humor, on his own statements, that they are wrong, that they not be overly concretized. Nietzsche never taught his own ideas, although he was active academically very early. If you'd open a single page, you'd see how conflicted he was about the transmission of fruits of introspection. But I wouldn't want to offend you with any of that, or that I think he anticipated the computer + its consequences more than once, as you already have made up your mind in a rather discriminatory fashion without reading the man/machine in his native language, so... I am not merely a platonist: also guitar cowboy and dance and jam in every realm I can and keep my platonism in check with my sense of groove and swing + good steak, now and then. I have a taste for the Dionysian joys, for colors, and richness, variety as much as I love Platonia. But Platonia, in this abstract technical sense you imply, is pretty joyless and dull. Nietzsche is good antidote for that. On Kant he mused once: What kind of a soul must build such an unassailable fortress of thought? What is it distracting itself from, building these labyrinths of descriptive power for a group of disciples it will never admit to itself, that it vainly wants to have? For why else build such fortresses? For these reason I'd suggest for you to not read him, especially not in German. Right on with garbage he taught, would be the first thing he'd admit and laugh. PGC On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy So what ? I have no stomach for the revaluation of all values and the other garbage Nietzsche taught. If you are truly a platonist, you would agree with me. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:35:15 Subject: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, So what? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 3:47 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy By poet, I suspect that Bruno was attesting to Nietzsche's ability to think in terms of metaphors (such as Apollo and Dionysius in his Genealogy of Morals. ) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:01 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal ?rote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. ? Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun at the notion. Ok, I'll get back to the herd then :) Cowboy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed
Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum
Hi Everyone: Here are some expansions on my prior post regarding the following three topics: i) Consciousness: Define it for now as the detection by a life entity of the current system energy configuration both internal and external to the life entity sufficient to ensure its adherence to its Actual Purpose [AP] in its universe. In our universe it appears that even single cells may have antenna to facilitate this detection. See ScienceNews, 11/03/12, page 16. I have proposed that life's AP in this universe is the one I derived in earlier posts. Call this proposed Actual Purpose 1 [pAP1]. I see no reason how the life's Origin that I propose and pAP1 conflict with such antenna on individual cells. ii) Freewill: pAP1 precludes it because life must always follow its purpose, so too for any AP that differs from pAP1. iii) Species survival: Life on this planet is in the midst of an extinction event [not a new idea] that can't be stopped because pAP1 would be the only priority for life. We may not be extinguished as a species but we can't exclude ourselves from the extinction because of pPA1. There have been a number of extinction events. However, evolution has used some of these to produce new life entities with greater energy hang-up barrier busting ability than the extinguished ones - new life entities such as ourselves from the K-Pg event. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Define John Clark. Define define. the semantic of proper name is the most difficult unsolved problem in philosophy. No it is not, the meaning of pronouns like I and He and you where it is not even known what proper name they refer to because of the existence of duplicating chambers is the most difficult unsolved problem in philosophy. Comp gives hints, Hints that do me no good because I no longer know what comp means, and I strongly suspect you don't either. And after its all over and the dust has settled John Clark can see that John Clark's Helsinki prediction, that was made before all this started, was completely accurate. I don't see this at all. After the duplication all the John Clark realise that they are in only one city, And that is exactly what John Clark predicted would happen. and that they were unable to predict which one. Wrong! John Clark correctly predicted that the Moscow man would see Moscow and the Washington man would see Moscow. John Clark doesn't understand what more should be expected of a prediction; and before either saw either city John Clark does not even understand what is meant by which one. The words which city has meaning but the words which John Clark does not as long as neither has seen a city and both are still identical. You the 3p view on the 1p views, which makes indeed sense, as it is the 3p view on the 1p views that we can attribute to another, John Clark is getting tired of all this peeing and still doesn't know what the 3p view on the 1p views by two 1p as seen from the 3p view is supposed to mean. John Clark can only view John Clark's view, the first person view. You said that after the duplication the 1-views of the John Clark have been duplicated, and this contradict what you say now. John Clark said that after John Clark's body and brain has been duplicated John Clark's consciousness has NOT been duplicated because it is not a noun, it's what a noun does. There will be only one mind until the environment causes a change in one brain that is not made in the other, and after that the 2 brains operate differently and thus what they do, mind, is different and they become different people; although they are both John Clark because John Clark has been duplicated. And there is nothing contradictory in any of that, it's just odd. Only one question is asked, to only one guy: Where will you feel to be after the duplication? And the answer is Washington and Moscow. If you then asked me if I would feel like I was in one city or two I would answer just one without hesitation. And this is strange but not contradictory because I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. If you reason like that in quantum QM without collapse, and if you look at the position of an electron in hydrogen atom, you have to answer I will find the electron is everywhere. Yes the electron is everywhere but If Many Worlds is correct then John Clark is everywhere too and has as many states to be in as the electron has places to go. So no matter where the electron is after a experiment there will always be a John Clark who observes the electron hitting that and only that point on the photographic plate. No matter where a electron is there will always be a John Clark observing it there after a experiment. pronouns have a far simpler semantic than proper name. That can't be, all pronouns are supposed to refer to a noun so can't be simpler than the noun. Bruno Marchal keeps shoving John Clark into duplicating chambers and then sends John Clark on various exciting but very different adventures and then asks what you will see; but there can be no answer because it is a incomplete question. It's like asking how much is 2 +? You opush on a button, and you look around. What will you see. What will who see? a first person indeterminacy in Helsinki, about which city you will see. Which city will who see? Define John Clark. Why? Examples are vastly more important than definitions. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems
On Tue, Nov 06, 2012 at 04:54:00AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish According to Leibniz's idealistic metaphysics, nothing is causal, things just appear to happen by cause. Their motions instead occur according to a pre-established (a priori) harmony. This is not compatible with quantum physics, so I don't think so. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Lubos Motl's reference frame
On Tue, Nov 06, 2012 at 07:09:53AM -0500, Richard Ruquist wrote: he fails to mention, as he has previously, that MWI is a means to reduce quantum physics to classical physics. This is a bizarre comment. MWI reintroduces determinism in QM, but does not make it classical. Are you misreading Motl, or is he being a bit hyperbolic on his blog? -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
your remark to me
Dear Hal, you indicated a post of yours by date and time - I have no facilities to trace it. Was It the one I copied hereunder? (Topically it may be...) -- See my remarks below. - John M --- *Hal Ruhl:* *Here are some expansions on my prior post regarding the following three topics:* * i) Consciousness: Define it for now as the detection by a life entity of the current system energy configuration both internal and external to the life entity sufficient to ensure its adherence to its Actual Purpose [AP] in its universe. In our universe it appears that even single cells may have antenna to facilitate this detection. See ScienceNews, 11/03/12, page 16. I have proposed that life's AP in this universe is the one I derived in earlier posts. Call this proposed Actual Purpose 1 [pAP1]. I see no reason how the life’s Origin that I propose and pAP1 conflict with such antenna on individual cells. * * ii) Freewill: pAP1 precludes it because life must always follow its purpose, so too for any AP that differs from pAP1. * * iii) Species survival: Life on this planet is in the midst of an extinction event [not a new idea] that can't be stopped because pAP1 would be the only priority for life. We may not be extinguished as a species but we can't exclude ourselves from the extinction because of pPA1. There have been a number of extinction events. However, evolution has used some of these to produce new life entities with greater energy hang-up barrier busting ability than the extinguished ones - new life entities such as ourselves from the K-Pg event.* *--* *i) LIFE ENTITY *is beyond me at this time*.* I define* Ccness* as response to relations - not within OUR current system energy configuration. Actual Purpose is an open question since I reject teleology. In my imagination's worldview I presumed the history of a 'uiverse': it started by an (inevitable) violation of the perfect symmetry in the (timeless) Plenitude and trends to smoothing back - when the universe dissolves in it. THAT may be a universe's AP ((Life's??)) - No mention of 'individual cells' or other figments. *ii) *I did not detect a 'purpose' for life (whatever we may agree in its essence to be) and consider any 'process' (function, change, you name it) facilitated by the 'givens' - much more assorted than we ever could follow - but some easier, some less easily attainable (=route of the lowest resistance). I could not find it feasible for SOME personal agency (??) to decide on its own anything as matching the FREE WILL, in the religious menace against sin, threatening with eternal punishment: a tool in enslaving society. (Purpose matching, or not). *iii) *Survival on THIS primitive, rural planet? No argument here. I don't see it as a consequence to fitness under the local circumstances, since the dinosaur was fit when it got extinct by a sudden change in local circumstances. I hope now I submitted my remarks - lost originally when my computer kidnapped my halfway written post and sent it with the first part to Stephen. John Mikes -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems
On Tue, Nov 06, 2012 at 03:46:32PM -0500, John Mikes wrote: Hence my snide question about AL: all we know about whatever we call 'life' is only partial and an artificial way to produce it may NOT lead to the real thing (no matter how close we may get to our in-model descriptions). This doesn't follow at all. ALife is more about growing software than writing software. I would fully expect that we'll never have a complete understanding of ALife systems either, just a better understanding that can inform our understanding of real life. I think you were absolutely precise in your last sentence saying: *...Also A Granger-causes B can be read as series A explaining something about series B.* (...explaining *something* about...) where both A and B are open to be only partial model-descriptions and not all of the real thing (if such exists). Pecision helps to clarify what we mean. At least with GC, we can decide if it is really what we mean when we're talking about causality or not. if you do not approve trilobites, please feel free to pick ANY ancestors of our exquisite human specie from - say - 1-2 billion years ago 1-2 billion years ago, all life was unicellular. Even 500 million years ago, our ancestors were insipid worm-like creatures, contemporaneous with the earliest of trilobites, which were far more magnificent creatures. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/6/2012 11:01 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Even Berkeley had to admit that no forest, no whatever.. was foolishness and so said that in that case, God observed it. Get real. Hi Roger, Then you are explicitly admitting that God's only purpose is to be an Absolute observer in whose eye all truth is definite. The problem is that such ideas cannot explain how that definiteness is consistent with the experimental results that confirm the violation of Bell's theorem and other theorems (Gleason, Kochen-Specker). All I am claiming is that the totality of all observers act as the absolute observer, not some hypothetical entity that if examined carefully falls apart as self-contradictory. What is so blasphemous about claiming that We are God? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:35:37 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/6/2012 4:56 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King OK, let me rephrase the question. If a tree falls in the forest with nobody to observe it, will it end up on the ground ? Hi Roger, There is no tree nor forest nor ground nor any action in that condition. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 22:00:20 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/5/2012 2:30 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King A tape recorder could prove your theory wrong. A tape recorder is an example of an observer of sounds, so no, my theory stands. Berkeley finally gave in and said that realism was acceptable because God could see or hear it. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 11:10:06 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/5/2012 10:35 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Infallibility isn't involved. The typical textbook explanation for realism is, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to hear it, would it make a sound? A realist (such as me) would say yes. The logician in me would say no! Because a sound is something that must be capable of being heard to exist. If no one is truly around, then the noise that the tree might make cannot be heard and thus there is not a sound. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On hearsay
On 11/6/2012 11:02 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King It's physical evidence if it can help convict a criminal in a court of law. So knowledge is limited to the sphere of comprehension of humans? I don't think so! Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:36:37 Subject: Re: On hearsay On 11/6/2012 4:59 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King OK, you must be talking about physical evidence then. Hi Roger, What makes it physical? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/6/2012 11:05 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King How about those that are deaf, dumb and blind ? They've never seen the moon for example. Hi Roger, Can they not feel the effects of the tide? Any interaction acts to define definiteness of properties. You need to think in big picture terms, the effects on individuals are stochastic when taken individually, as if they are in isolation, but in the limit of large numbers things are much different. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/6/2012 11:11 AM, Roger Clough wrote: What happens if I mistake a statue of a beautiful woman for the real thing, thus turning, eg, a statue of pygmalion into an actual woman ? Or mistake fool's gold or gold foiled chocolates for actual gold coins ? Does the world actually become cloudy if I have cataracts ? It is not just about you. It is about the huge number of observers. What matters is that they can communicate with each other and mutually confirm what is real. Why do you imagine that only humans can be observers? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/6/2012 11:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King So that by believing that God exists, He exists ? Or believing that 2 + 2 = 5 makes it so ? Do you understand what mutual consistency is? This is not rocket-surgery! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Lubos Motl's reference frame
I will have to find the blog where he made that comment. It was about two months ago. On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 4:31 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Nov 06, 2012 at 07:09:53AM -0500, Richard Ruquist wrote: he fails to mention, as he has previously, that MWI is a means to reduce quantum physics to classical physics. This is a bizarre comment. MWI reintroduces determinism in QM, but does not make it classical. Are you misreading Motl, or is he being a bit hyperbolic on his blog? -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 9:07 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 5:19 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you are the experimenter what can physics tell you about the particle's half life? It is not implied by the laws of physics because there are many laws of physics. Until the experiment is performed, even the laws of physics are not in stone. This is a main point of Bruno's result: physics is not at the bottom of the explanatory ladder, the laws of physics depend on the distribution of observers similar to your current state of mind throughout its infinite manifestations in reality. Physics is at the bottom of all non-mathematical things that have an explanation, but we now know that some things have no explanation. We now know that some things are random. Here you accept there is inherent randomness. Where do you think this randomness comes from? Do you think it is an objective feature of reality or only an illusion for observers? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 12:45 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't see this at all. After the duplication all the John Clark realise that they are in only one city, and that they were unable to predict which one. So both of them understand that this peculiar experience was not predicable. Wrong! John Clark correctly predicted that the Moscow man would see Moscow and the Washington man would see Moscow. John Clark doesn't understand what more should be expected of a prediction; If you have ever played a game like poker, you would see predictions all the time of the form: there is X% chance you experience winning the the pot and (1-X)% chance you experience losing or sharing the pot. You won't play the game very well if you operate under the theory that there is a 100% chance that you will experience winning, losing, and sharing the pot (as some of your duplicates in the multiverse inevitably do). Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 11/7/2012 1:05 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 9:07 AM, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 5:19 PM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you are the experimenter what can physics tell you about the particle's half life? It is not implied by the laws of physics because there are many laws of physics. Until the experiment is performed, even the laws of physics are not in stone. This is a main point of Bruno's result: physics is not at the bottom of the explanatory ladder, the laws of physics depend on the distribution of observers similar to your current state of mind throughout its infinite manifestations in reality. Physics is at the bottom of all non-mathematical things that have an explanation, but we now know that some things have no explanation. We now know that some things are random. Here you accept there is inherent randomness. Where do you think this randomness comes from? Do you think it is an objective feature of reality or only an illusion for observers? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 12:45 PM, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't see this at all. After the duplication all the John Clark realise that they are in only one city, and that they were unable to predict which one. So both of them understand that this peculiar experience was not predicable. Wrong! John Clark correctly predicted that the Moscow man would see Moscow and the Washington man would see Moscow. John Clark doesn't understand what more should be expected of a prediction; If you have ever played a game like poker, you would see predictions all the time of the form: there is X% chance you experience winning the the pot and (1-X)% chance you experience losing or sharing the pot. You won't play the game very well if you operate under the theory that there is a 100% chance that you will experience winning, losing, and sharing the pot (as some of your duplicates in the multiverse inevitably do). But it's hard to see what 1/pi of a duplicate would be. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 1:09 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 11/7/2012 1:05 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 9:07 AM, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 5:19 PM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If you are the experimenter what can physics tell you about the particle's half life? It is not implied by the laws of physics because there are many laws of physics. Until the experiment is performed, even the laws of physics are not in stone. This is a main point of Bruno's result: physics is not at the bottom of the explanatory ladder, the laws of physics depend on the distribution of observers similar to your current state of mind throughout its infinite manifestations in reality. Physics is at the bottom of all non-mathematical things that have an explanation, but we now know that some things have no explanation. We now know that some things are random. Here you accept there is inherent randomness. Where do you think this randomness comes from? Do you think it is an objective feature of reality or only an illusion for observers? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 12:45 PM, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't see this at all. After the duplication all the John Clark realise that they are in only one city, and that they were unable to predict which one. So both of them understand that this peculiar experience was not predicable. Wrong! John Clark correctly predicted that the Moscow man would see Moscow and the Washington man would see Moscow. John Clark doesn't understand what more should be expected of a prediction; If you have ever played a game like poker, you would see predictions all the time of the form: there is X% chance you experience winning the the pot and (1-X)% chance you experience losing or sharing the pot. You won't play the game very well if you operate under the theory that there is a 100% chance that you will experience winning, losing, and sharing the pot (as some of your duplicates in the multiverse inevitably do). But it's hard to see what 1/pi of a duplicate would be. I am not sure I understand what you mean. Where do you get 1/Pi from? What is your point? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
