Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote: On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote: So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?). And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs? If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), disappearing, please do. I don't understand the question. What parallel experiences do you refer to? And you're asking why they disappeared? The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the observer I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics. But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon interference in the two slits experiment. ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of observer required. But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us. When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication. There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures. I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many? Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified. OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real, which is a bit weird to me. The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures. Or even the result of considering all possible paths. That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to understand or get a bigger picture. I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not a problem for me. there are still many. Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours. I think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at the end of his book The Evolution of Reason - a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in Interview with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv: 1207.2141v1 OK. It is still Everett wave as seen from inside. We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp. Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of solipsism, and it can generate some strong don't ask imperative. You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected. I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce. I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you do the same). What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, itself define by a relative universal numbers. Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his actions. Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its octalist points of view, and an whole theology including his physics, etc. Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally comfortable with not explaining everything. Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using. What's your explanation for the existence of persons? So far what I've heard is that it's an inside view of arithmetic - which I don't find very enlightening. What do you miss in the UDA? As I understand it the UD computes everything computable and it's only your inference that observers (and the rest of the multiverse) *must be in there somewhere* because you've assumed that everything is computable. On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Fuchs, correctly I think, says an 'interpretation'
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 14 Oct 2013, at 22:04, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 3:17:06 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 20:13, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, October 13, 2013 5:03:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: All object are conscious? No objects are conscious. We agree on this. Not at all. It is here and now. I have already interview such machines. Are there any such machines available to interview online? I can give you the code in Lisp, and it is up to you to find a good free lisp. But don't mind too much, AUDA is an integral description of the interview. Today, such interviews is done by paper and pencils, and appears in books and papers. You better buy Boolos 1979, or 1993, but you have to study more logic too. Doesn't it seem odd that there isn't much out there that is newer than 20 years old, That is simply wrong, and I don't see why you say that. But even if that was true, that would prove nothing. and that paper and pencils are the preferred instruments? Maybe I was premature in saying it was promissory...it would appears that there has not been any promise for it in quite some time. It is almost applicable, but the hard part is that it is blind to its own blindness, so that the certainty offered by mathematics comes at a cost which mathematics has no choice but to deny completely. Because mathematics cannot lie, G* proves []f Even Peano Arithmetic can lie. Mathematical theories (set of beliefs) can lie. Only truth cannot lie, but nobody know the truth as such. Something that is a paradox or inconsistent is not the same thing as an intentional attempt to deceive. I'm not sure what 'G* proves []f' means but I think it will mean the same thing to anyone who understands it, and not something different to the boss than it does to the neighbor. Actually it will have as much meaning as there are correct machines (a lot), but the laws remains the same. Then adding the non- monotonical umbrella, saving the Lôbian machines from the constant mistakes and lies they do, provides different interpretation of []f, like I dream, I die, I get mad, I am in a cul-de-sac I get wrong etc. It will depend on the intensional nuances in play. Couldn't the machine output the same product as musical notes or colored pixels instead? Why not. Humans can do that too. it cannot intentionally tell the truth either, and no matter how sophisticated and self-referential a logic it is based on, it can never transcend its own alienation from feeling, physics, and authenticity. That is correct, but again, that is justifiable by all correct sufficiently rich machines. Not sure I understand. Are you saying that we, as rich machines, cannot intentionally lie or tell the truth either? No, I am saying that all correct machines can eventually justify that if they are correct they can't express it, and if they are consistent, it will be consistent they are wrong. So it means they can eventually exploits the false locally. Team of universal numbers get entangled in very subtle prisoner dilemma. Universal machines can lie, and can crash. That sounds like they can lie only when they calculate that they must, not that they can lie intentionally because they enjoy it or out of sadism. That sounds like an opportunistic inference. Bruno Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 6:39 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 2:14 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes justified to give them different names. Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago Yes. But things would get a bit confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now. Yes. Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark. Yes. Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Yes. Which one is it? I do. I suspect you think they are the same No, your prediction failed. There goes my daily dose of dopamine. Will have to find some other way to get it... I think the 2 things are fundamentally different because the John Clark of one second ago and the John Clark of right now will never meet, Alright, but this again leaves us at a crossroad: 1) You believe that teleportation is fundamentally impossible, so this type of thought experiment is based on an absurd premise; 2) You believe that teleportation is possible, in which case you accept the thought experiment and are confronted with the question of what you would perceive if you went through such an experience. I don't feel I am sufficiently knowledge in physics to have and educated opinion on teleportation. I'm pretty sure you have a much more sophisticated knowledge of physics than I do, so I'm more than happy to listen to your arguments. Not going to make any more prediction on what you might think because my dopamine is already low. On the next point you will see why I wasn't paying attention in physics class. so there is no confusion and separate names are not needed to avoid confusion and pronouns cause no trouble. But with duplicating chambers the 2 John Clarks could meet and stand right next to each other, and if you were to say I like John Clark but I don't like John Clark your meaning might be clear in your mind but you would need to change your language if you wanted to communicate the idea to others. I had a very unpleasant physics teacher (coincidently... :) ) who appeared to wear the same trousers throughout the entire semester. A scientifically-minded colleague of mind decided to throw some ink at her ass. It turns out that she, indeed, wore the same trousers for the entire semester. How do you feel about tattoos? And the place to start would be to be careful with pronouns and give one of the John Clarks, it doesn't matter which one, the nickname Mary Sue. http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_OW6wa7cAFBY/TPACSytH_kI/AvQ/BmLVAQA/s1600/mary_sue.jpg True, John Clark might not like it, but a lot of people don't like their nickname. I also predict an attempt to avoid answering the question directly That prediction has also failed but you still feel like Telmo Menezes because predictions, right or wrong, have nothing to do with identity; I don't think I claimed predictions had anything to do with identity. you feel like Telmo Menezes because you remember being Telmo Menezes yesterday and for no other reason. Yes. Marry Sue (aka John K Clark) Telmo Menezes (aka T-bone*) * bonus points if you get the reference -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote: On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote: So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?). And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs? If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), disappearing, please do. I don't understand the question. What parallel experiences do you refer to? And you're asking why they disappeared? The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the observer I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics. But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon interference in the two slits experiment. ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of observer required. But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us. When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication. There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures. I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many? Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified. OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real, which is a bit weird to me. The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures. Or even the result of considering all possible paths. That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to understand or get a bigger picture. I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not a problem for me. there are still many. Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours. I think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at the end of his book The Evolution of Reason - a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in Interview with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv:1207.2141v1 OK. It is still Everett wave as seen from inside. We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp. Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of solipsism, and it can generate some strong don't ask imperative. You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected. I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce. I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you do the same). What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, itself define by a relative universal numbers. Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his actions. Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its octalist points of view, and an whole theology including his physics, etc. Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally comfortable with not explaining everything. Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using. What's your explanation for the existence of
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed. A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity of computations. Quentin On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote: On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote: So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?). And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs? If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), disappearing, please do. I don't understand the question. What parallel experiences do you refer to? And you're asking why they disappeared? The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the observer I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics. But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon interference in the two slits experiment. ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of observer required. But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us. When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication. There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures. I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many? Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified. OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real, which is a bit weird to me. The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures. Or even the result of considering all possible paths. That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to understand or get a bigger picture. I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not a problem for me. there are still many. Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours. I think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at the end of his book The Evolution of Reason - a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in Interview with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv:1207.2141v1 OK. It is still Everett wave as seen from inside. We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp. Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of solipsism, and it can generate some strong don't ask imperative. You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected. I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce. I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you do the same). What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, itself define by a relative universal numbers. Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his
Fwd: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
-- Forwarded message -- From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed. A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity of computations. Quentin You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed. That does not make sense. Richard On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote: On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote: So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?). And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs? If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), disappearing, please do. I don't understand the question. What parallel experiences do you refer to? And you're asking why they disappeared? The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the observer I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics. But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon interference in the two slits experiment. ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of observer required. But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us. When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication. There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures. I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many? Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified. OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real, which is a bit weird to me. The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures. Or even the result of considering all possible paths. That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to understand or get a bigger picture. I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not a problem for me. there are still many. Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours. I think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at the end of his book The Evolution of Reason - a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in Interview with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv:1207.2141v1 OK. It is still Everett wave as seen from inside. We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp. Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of solipsism, and it can generate some strong don't ask imperative. You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected. I just ask
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com -- Forwarded message -- From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed. A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity of computations. Quentin No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the infinite set of computations going through your current state (at every state, an infinity of computations diverge, but there is still an infinity going through that state and it's for every state). Quentin You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed. That does not make sense. Richard On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote: On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote: So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?). And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs? If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), disappearing, please do. I don't understand the question. What parallel experiences do you refer to? And you're asking why they disappeared? The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the observer I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics. But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon interference in the two slits experiment. ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of observer required. But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us. When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication. There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures. I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many? Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified. OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real, which is a bit weird to me. The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures. Or even the result of considering all possible paths. That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to understand or get a bigger picture. I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not a problem for me. there are still many. Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours. I think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at the end of his book The Evolution of Reason - a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in Interview with a Quantum Bayesian, arXiv:1207.2141v1 OK. It is still Everett wave as seen from inside. We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) physical
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 4:37:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 10:54 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:08:01 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 4:52 PM, LizR liz...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: It's not that computers can't do what humans do, it's that they can't experience anything. Mozart could dig a hole as well as compose music, but that doesn't mean that a backhoe with a player piano on it is Mozart. It's a much deeper problem with how machines are conceptualized that has nothing at all to do with humans. So you think strong AI is wrong. OK. But why can't computers experience anything, in principle, given that people can, and assuming people are complicated machines? I think Craig would say he does think computers (and many/all other things) do experience something, You're half right. I would say: 1. All experiences correspond to some natural thing. 2. Not all things are natural things. Bugs Bunny has no independent experience, and neither does Pinocchio. 3. Computers are made of natural things but, like all machines, are ultimately assembled unnaturally. 4. The natural things that machines are made of would have to be very low level, i.e., not gears but the molecules that make up the gears. Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the only natural things which an experience would be associated with. They don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every atom of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some radically different time scale from ours. It's not really important - the main thing is to see how there is no substitute for experience and a machine which is assembled from unrelated parts has no experience and cannot gain new experience in an alien context. I think that a machine (or any inanimate object or symbol) can also serve as a vehicle for synchronicity. That's a completely different thing because it is the super-personal, holistic end of the sensible spectrum, not the sub-personal, granular end. The creepiness of a ventriloquist dummy is in our imagination, but that too is 'real' in an absolute sense. If your life takes you on a path which tempts you to believe that machines are conscious, then the super-personal lensing of your life will stack the deck just enough to let you jump to those conclusions. It's what we would call supernatural or coincidental, depending on which lens we use to define it.. http://s33light.org/post/**62173912616http://s33light.org/post/62173912616 (Don't you want to have a body?) After reading this ( http://marshallbrain.com/**discard1.htmhttp://marshallbrain.com/discard1.htm ) I am not so sure... just that it is necessarily different from what we experience. The reason for this has something to do with our history as biological organisms (according to his theory). Right, although not necessarily just biological history, it could be chemical too. We may have branched off from anything that could be made into a useful machine (servant to alien agendas) long before life on Earth. What if humanity left behind a nano-technology that eventually evolved into mechanical organisms like dogs and fish, would they have animal like experiences despite that they descended from unnatural things? The thing that makes sense to me is that the richness of sensation and intention are inversely proportionate to the degree to which a phenomenon can be controlled from the outside. If we put nano-tech extensions on some living organism, then sure, the organism could learn how to use those extensions and evolve a symbiotic post-biology. I don't think that project would be controllable though. They would not be machines in the sense that they would not necessarily be of service to those who created them. Craig, Thanks for your answer. That was not quite what I was asking though. Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living organism, but were some entirely autonomous, entirely artificial cell-like structures, which could find and utilize energy sources in the environment and reproduce themselves. Let's say after millions (or billions) of years, these self-replicating nanobots evolved into multi-cellular organisms like animals we are familiar with today. Could they have experiences like other biological creatures that have a biological lineage?
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 5:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: Alright, but this again leaves us at a crossroad: 1) You believe that teleportation is fundamentally impossible No. 2) You believe that teleportation is possible Yes. in which case you accept the thought experiment Yes, both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark see nothing fundamentally wrong with the thought experiment, so the pronoun in the above causes no problems. and are confronted with the question of what you would perceive if you went through such an experience. ^^^ ^^^ What both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark perceive is that Telmo Menezes has caught the pronoun disease from Bruno Marchal. Telmo Menezes (aka T-bone*) * bonus points if you get the reference Well I hear that a restaurant in Ecuador called San Telmo serves a excellent T-bone steak. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? We assume the arithmetical truth. In particular we assume that all closed formula written in the language of arithmetic (and thus using logical symbol + the symbol 0, s (+1), + and *) are all either true or false, independently of us. From this we cannot prove that matter exists, or not, but we can prove that the average universal numbers will (correctly) believe in matter (but it will not know that it is correct). So, if you have no problem in believing propositions like there is no biggest prime number are true independently of me and you, and the universe, then you can understand that the proposition asserting the existence of (infinitely many) computations in which you believe reading my current post, is also true independently of us. The appearance of matter emerges from the FPI that the machines cannot avoid in the arithmetical truth. Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel). And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, Only the computations associated to your mind. not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. I guess you missed the step seven of the UDA, and are perhaps not aware that arithmetical truth is incredibly big, *much* bigger than what any computer can generate or compute. Then my, or your, mind is associated to *all* computations going through your actual state of mind, and below your substitution level there are infinitely many such computations. They all exist in arithmetic, and the FPI glues them, in a non computable way, in possible long and deep physical histories. Bruno On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote: On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote: So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?). And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs? If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), disappearing, please do. I don't understand the question. What parallel experiences do you refer to? And you're asking why they disappeared? The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the observer I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics. But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon interference in the two slits experiment. ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of observer required. But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us. When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical- realities, including the many self-multiplication. There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures. I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many? Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified. OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real, which is a bit weird to me. The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures. Or even the result of considering all possible paths. That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to understand or get a bigger picture. I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition disappearing. he only makes
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
2013/10/15 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 5:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: Alright, but this again leaves us at a crossroad: 1) You believe that teleportation is fundamentally impossible No. 2) You believe that teleportation is possible Yes. in which case you accept the thought experiment Yes, both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark see nothing fundamentally wrong with the thought experiment, so the pronoun in the above causes no problems. and are confronted with the question of what you would perceive if you went through such an experience. ^^^ ^^^ What both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark perceive is that Telmo Menezes has caught the pronoun disease from Bruno Marchal. Are you saying that John Clark after going through a (duplicating teleporter cannot use anymore the indexical 'I' when talking about himself, and both copy will talk about themselve like Alain Delon and never use 'I' again because 'I' is an ill concept when a duplicating teleporter exist ? Quentin Telmo Menezes (aka T-bone*) * bonus points if you get the reference Well I hear that a restaurant in Ecuador called San Telmo serves a excellent T-bone steak. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 15 Oct 2013, at 13:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com -- Forwarded message -- From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed. A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity of computations. Quentin No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the infinite set of computations going through your current state (at every state, an infinity of computations diverge, but there is still an infinity going through that state and it's for every state). Yes. It generalizes what Everett did on the universal quantum wave, on the whole arithmetical truth (which contains the whole computer science theoretical truth). If QM is correct, the SWE is redundant, and a consequence of comp. Physics is one aspect of arithmetic seen by its internal creatures (the universal or not numbers). We can concretely extract physics from the interview of the chatty rich one (the Löbian numbers). Bruno Quentin You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed. That does not make sense. Richard On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote: On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote: So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?). And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs? If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), disappearing, please do. I don't understand the question. What parallel experiences do you refer to? And you're asking why they disappeared? The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the observer I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics. But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon interference in the two slits experiment. ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of observer required. But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us. When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical- realities, including the many self-multiplication. There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures. I notice the plural of futures. Are those not many? Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified. OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real, which is a bit weird to me. The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures. Or even the result of considering all possible paths. That leads to instrumentalism. That is dont ask, don't try to understand or get a bigger picture. I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not a
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: what you say confirms that both the W-man and the M-man will assess that they were unable to predict the result of opening the door Bruno I really didn't need your help on that, I already knew that I can't always successfully predict what I will see after I open a door. I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago. That applies to all indeterminacies. You would have said to the founders of QM that we know about indeterminacy since Pascal or Boltzman. No, the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that neither Pascal or Boltzman were: 1) Some events have no cause. 2) Probability is a property of the thing itself and not just a measure of our lack of information. The sort of indeterminacy you're talking about was first discovered by Professor Og of Caveman University who didn't write in the journal Paleolithic Times because Professor Og didn't know how to write. What is new with the FPI in this setting is that everything is deterministic in the 3p-view, yet indetermistic in the 1-view, The trouble is that Bruno Marchal is unable to say who exactly is that is experiencing this 1-view. Without using pronouns please explain who the hell Mr. 1 is and then maybe I can answer your questions. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 10:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: Are you saying that John Clark after going through a (duplicating teleporter cannot use anymore the indexical 'I' when talking about himself No. me myself and I John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 15 Oct 2013, at 17:18, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
what you say confirms that both the W-man and the M-man will
assess that they were unable to predict the result of opening the door
Bruno I really didn't need your help on that, I already knew that I
can't always successfully predict what I will see after I open a door.
The point is that with the step 3 protocol, you (the H-guy) can never
predict among {W, M}, if the result will be I feel being the W-man,
or I feel being the M-man.
If you are OK with this, please proceed.
I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know
what you're going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a
long time ago.
That applies to all indeterminacies. You would have said to the
founders of QM that we know about indeterminacy since Pascal or
Boltzman.
No, the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that
neither Pascal or Boltzman were:
1) Some events have no cause.
Only those believing in the collapse (that Feynman called a collective
hallucination). You confuse QM and one of his most nonsensical
interpretation.
2) Probability is a property of the thing itself and not just a
measure of our lack of information.
In QM-withoit collapse, the probability comes, like in comp, from the
ignorance about which computation we belong too.
The sort of indeterminacy you're talking about was first discovered
by Professor Og of Caveman University who didn't write in the
journal Paleolithic Times because Professor Og didn't know how to
write.
Lol
What is new with the FPI in this setting is that everything is
deterministic in the 3p-view, yet indetermistic in the 1-view,
The trouble is that Bruno Marchal is unable to say who exactly is
that is experiencing this 1-view.
I don't need this. This should be made utterly clear in the iterated
self-duplication, where I multiply you 24 times per second (24) during
1h30 (60 * 90), into as many copies that can be sent in front of one
of the 2^(16180 * 1) possible images on a screen with 16180 *
1 pixels, which can be black or white each.
All you need to understand is that almost all among the 2^(16180 *
1) * (60 * 90) * 24 see white noise, independently of who they
are. The predictions bears on the relative experiences.
I do not need more about identity than your definition. Anyone
capable of remembering having been X, has the right to be recognized
as X.
Without using pronouns please explain who the hell Mr. 1 is and then
maybe I can answer your questions.
Without using pronouns, I lost my job.
The whole approach is indexical, and the third person I is
eventually defined in the Gödel-Kleene manner (the Dx = xx trick,
that I promised to Liz to redo in the terms of the phi_i and the w_i).
Then the first person I is defined, in UDA, as being only the content
of the memory (= your definition).
The only difference between first person and third person, used here,
is that the first person memories (the content of the diaries), are
annihilated and reconstituted together with the person's body.
In the arithmetical version, the first person is proved to be not
directly amenable to the use of the dx = xx algorithm (an obvious
cousin of the famous Mocking Bird combinators, btw), but, by a sort of
miracle, thanks to Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, (using the
Dx = xx algorithm at another level!), we can recover it with the
Theaetetus definition of the knower, which recovers in the only way
possible (a result proved by Artemov) a knower from the Gödel's notion
of self-reference.
So, asking me to not use pronouns, in what is in great part a theory
of pronouns, is like asking me to square the circle.
The eight arithmetical hypostases are eight precise mathematics of
eight simple and deep machine's self-referential points of view, that
is pronouns, like 1-I, 3-I, singular, plural, etc.
But in UDA, you don't need Gödel-Kleene, as the first person histories
are defined in simple third person terms (sequences of W and M written
in the personal diaries), and it is rather obvious that, with the
protocols, all are 1-self non predictable, although some statistical
distribution can be predicted.
Step 4 asks if those statistical distribution [of those first person
experiences (diary content of the one who actually do the self
multiplications)] have to change if we introduce reconstitution
delays in some branches of the self-multiplication changes ).
That's just step 2 + step 3. So it should be easy.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel). Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible arithmetical truth can produce the physical. Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours. On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 10:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 15 Oct 2013, at 13:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com -- Forwarded message -- From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed. A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity of computations. Quentin No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the infinite set of computations going through your current state (at every state, an infinity of computations diverge, but there is still an infinity going through that state and it's for every state). Yes. It generalizes what Everett did on the universal quantum wave, on the whole arithmetical truth (which contains the whole computer science theoretical truth). If QM is correct, the SWE is redundant, and a consequence of comp. Physics is one aspect of arithmetic seen by its internal creatures (the universal or not numbers). We can concretely extract physics from the interview of the chatty rich one (the Löbian numbers). Bruno Quentin You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed. That does not make sense. Richard On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote: On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote: So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?). And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs? If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel experiences, (then), disappearing, please do. I don't understand the question. What parallel experiences do you refer to? And you're asking why they disappeared? The question is how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the observer I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics. But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon interference in the two slits experiment. ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of observer required. But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us. When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the quantum wave describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication. There is no many in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 10/15/2013 3:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum What does sum mean? And how does is constitute a piece of matter? of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed. But that's not a definition. It's saying the piece of matter is *constituted* by an infinity of computations. But what associates the computations to a piece of matter that we *define* ostensively? Brent A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity of computations. Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 10/15/2013 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? We assume the arithmetical truth. In particular we assume that all closed formula written in the language of arithmetic (and thus using logical symbol + the symbol 0, s (+1), + and *) are all either true or false, independently of us. From this we cannot prove that matter exists, or not, but we can prove that the average universal numbers will (correctly) believe in matter (but it will not know that it is correct). That's not at all clear to me. A universal number encodes proofs - is that what you mean by it believes something? But how is this something identified at 'matter'? So, if you have no problem in believing propositions like there is no biggest prime number are true independently of me and you, and the universe, then you can understand that the proposition asserting the existence of (infinitely many) computations in which you believe reading my current post, is also true independently of us. The appearance of matter emerges from the FPI that the machines cannot avoid in the arithmetical truth. Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel). And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, Only the computations associated to your mind. not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. I guess you missed the step seven of the UDA, and are perhaps not aware that arithmetical truth is incredibly big, *much* bigger than what any computer can generate or compute. Then my, or your, mind is associated to *all* computations going through your actual state of mind, That sounds like an uncomputable totality. Brent and below your substitution level there are infinitely many such computations. They all exist in arithmetic, and the FPI glues them, in a non computable way, in possible long and deep physical histories. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Karl Pribram: the holographic brain
I once have heard that Karl Pribram has a theory of a holographic brain and decided to read his latest book Karl H Pribram, The Form Within: My Point of View. Unfortunately I was unable to understand his theory, as for me the book was too eclectic. One quote that I like is below, but I have failed to understand how he has come exactly to such a conclusion based on neuroscience. Does someone here know his theory? Is there somewhere a better description of his ideas as in his book? Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/karl-h-pribram p. 531-532 “Most important, ‘in ancient times’ we navigated our world and discovered experiences in ourselves that reflected what we observed in the world: We woke at sunrise and slept at sunset. We were intimately connected at every level with the cycles of nature. This process was disrupted by the Copernican revolution, by its aftermaths in biology – even by our explorations of quantum physics and cosmology – and in the resulting interpretations of our personal experiences. But today, once again, we have rediscovered that it is we who observe our cosmos and are aware that we observe; that it is we who observe our navigation of our world and observe our own observations.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 01:02:13PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel). Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible arithmetical truth can produce the physical. Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours. Then you might well be interested in the Movie Graph Argument, which deals directly with the case where the universe doesn't have sufficient resources to run the universal dovetailer. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Oct 15, 2013, at 7:26 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 4:37:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 10:54 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:08:01 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 4:52 PM, LizR liz...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: It's not that computers can't do what humans do, it's that they can't experience anything. Mozart could dig a hole as well as compose music, but that doesn't mean that a backhoe with a player piano on it is Mozart. It's a much deeper problem with how machines are conceptualized that has nothing at all to do with humans. So you think strong AI is wrong. OK. But why can't computers experience anything, in principle, given that people can, and assuming people are complicated machines? I think Craig would say he does think computers (and many/all other things) do experience something, You're half right. I would say: 1. All experiences correspond to some natural thing. 2. Not all things are natural things. Bugs Bunny has no independent experience, and neither does Pinocchio. 3. Computers are made of natural things but, like all machines, are ultimately assembled unnaturally. 4. The natural things that machines are made of would have to be very low level, i.e., not gears but the molecules that make up the gears. Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the only natural things which an experience would be associated with. They don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every atom of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some radically different time scale from ours. It's not really important - the main thing is to see how there is no substitute for experience and a machine which is assembled from unrelated parts has no experience and cannot gain new experience in an alien context. I think that a machine (or any inanimate object or symbol) can also serve as a vehicle for synchronicity. That's a completely different thing because it is the super-personal, holistic end of the sensible spectrum, not the sub-personal, granular end. The creepiness of a ventriloquist dummy is in our imagination, but that too is 'real' in an absolute sense. If your life takes you on a path which tempts you to believe that machines are conscious, then the super-personal lensing of your life will stack the deck just enough to let you jump to those conclusions. It's what we would call supernatural or coincidental, depending on which lens we use to define it.. http://s33light.org/post/62173912616 (Don't you want to have a body?) After reading this ( http://marshallbrain.com/discard1.htm ) I am not so sure... just that it is necessarily different from what we experience. The reason for this has something to do with our history as biological organisms (according to his theory). Right, although not necessarily just biological history, it could be chemical too. We may have branched off from anything that could be made into a useful machine (servant to alien agendas) long before life on Earth. What if humanity left behind a nano-technology that eventually evolved into mechanical organisms like dogs and fish, would they have animal like experiences despite that they descended from unnatural things? The thing that makes sense to me is that the richness of sensation and intention are inversely proportionate to the degree to which a phenomenon can be controlled from the outside. If we put nano-tech extensions on some living organism, then sure, the organism could learn how to use those extensions and evolve a symbiotic post- biology. I don't think that project would be controllable though. They would not be machines in the sense that they would not necessarily be of service to those who created them. Craig, Thanks for your answer. That was not quite what I was asking though. Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living organism, but were some entirely autonomous, entirely artificial cell-like structures, which could find and utilize energy sources in the environment and reproduce themselves. Let's say after millions (or billions) of years, these self-replicating nanobots evolved into multi-cellular organisms like animals we are familiar with today. Could they have experiences like other biological creatures that have a biological lineage? If not, why not? No, I don't think that
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 10/15/2013 12:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 8. an organism which emerges spontaneously from Boltzmann conditions in the environment rather than seeded inheritance Like the first RNA replicators on Earth. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 16 October 2013 01:26, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: Thanks for your answer. That was not quite what I was asking though. Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living organism, but were some entirely autonomous, entirely artificial cell-like structures, which could find and utilize energy sources in the environment and reproduce themselves. Let's say after millions (or billions) of years, these self-replicating nanobots evolved into multi-cellular organisms like animals we are familiar with today. Could they have experiences like other biological creatures that have a biological lineage? If not, why not? No, I don't think that they could have experiences like biological creatures. If they could, then we *should *probably see at least one example of Excuse me for butting in, but I'm not sure what should means here. Are you saying these things should *already* exist? But the original suggestion was about future technology... Though I can't see what else you could mean, though. 1. a natural occurrence of inorganic biology Why would it occur naturally, when organic biology has done so, and presumably used up all the food sources that might be available? 2. an organism which can survive only on inorganic nutrients ??? 3. a successful experiment to create life from basic molecules Arguably the biosphere counts as this, presumably not an intentional experiment. 4. a machine which seems to feel, care, and have a unique and unrepeatable personal presence Arguably a human being is one of these 5. a mechanized process which produces artifacts that seem handmade and unique 6. two separate bodies who are the same person 7. an organism which reproduces by transforming its environment rather than reproducing by cell division This seems to me to have gone completely off the point. 8. an organism which emerges spontaneously from Boltzmann conditions in the environment rather than seeded inheritance What?!? (He said billions of years, not googolplexes...!) 9. an event or observation which leads us to conclude that gathering energy and reproduction are sufficient to constitute bio-quality awareness. I don't understand that sentence. I may be missing something here but I believe the question is whether machines can have experiences. Isn't a human being a machine that has experiences? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 16 October 2013 08:59, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: 7. an organism which reproduces by transforming its environment rather than reproducing by cell division Bruno said cigarettes might qualify as such life forms. Viruses, surely? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Oct 15, 2013, at 5:52 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 16 October 2013 08:59, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: 7. an organism which reproduces by transforming its environment rather than reproducing by cell division Bruno said cigarettes might qualify as such life forms. Viruses, surely? Yes that's a much better example. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:59:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Oct 15, 2013, at 7:26 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 4:37:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 10:54 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:08:01 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 4:52 PM, LizR liz...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: It's not that computers can't do what humans do, it's that they can't experience anything. Mozart could dig a hole as well as compose music, but that doesn't mean that a backhoe with a player piano on it is Mozart. It's a much deeper problem with how machines are conceptualized that has nothing at all to do with humans. So you think strong AI is wrong. OK. But why can't computers experience anything, in principle, given that people can, and assuming people are complicated machines? I think Craig would say he does think computers (and many/all other things) do experience something, You're half right. I would say: 1. All experiences correspond to some natural thing. 2. Not all things are natural things. Bugs Bunny has no independent experience, and neither does Pinocchio. 3. Computers are made of natural things but, like all machines, are ultimately assembled unnaturally. 4. The natural things that machines are made of would have to be very low level, i.e., not gears but the molecules that make up the gears. Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the only natural things which an experience would be associated with. They don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every atom of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some radically different time scale from ours. It's not really important - the main thing is to see how there is no substitute for experience and a machine which is assembled from unrelated parts has no experience and cannot gain new experience in an alien context. I think that a machine (or any inanimate object or symbol) can also serve as a vehicle for synchronicity. That's a completely different thing because it is the super-personal, holistic end of the sensible spectrum, not the sub-personal, granular end. The creepiness of a ventriloquist dummy is in our imagination, but that too is 'real' in an absolute sense. If your life takes you on a path which tempts you to believe that machines are conscious, then the super-personal lensing of your life will stack the deck just enough to let you jump to those conclusions. It's what we would call supernatural or coincidental, depending on which lens we use to define it.. http://s33light.org/post/62173912616http://s33light.org/post/* *62173912616 (Don't you want to have a body?) After reading this ( http://marshallbrain.com/discard1.htm http://marshallbrain.com/**discard1.htm ) I am not so sure... just that it is necessarily different from what we experience. The reason for this has something to do with our history as biological organisms (according to his theory). Right, although not necessarily just biological history, it could be chemical too. We may have branched off from anything that could be made into a useful machine (servant to alien agendas) long before life on Earth. What if humanity left behind a nano-technology that eventually evolved into mechanical organisms like dogs and fish, would they have animal like experiences despite that they descended from unnatural things? The thing that makes sense to me is that the richness of sensation and intention are inversely proportionate to the degree to which a phenomenon can be controlled from the outside. If we put nano-tech extensions on some living organism, then sure, the organism could learn how to use those extensions and evolve a symbiotic post-biology. I don't think that project would be controllable though. They would not be machines in the sense that they would not necessarily be of service to those who created them. Craig, Thanks for your answer. That was not quite what I was asking though. Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living organism, but were some entirely autonomous, entirely artificial cell-like structures, which could find and utilize energy sources in the environment and reproduce themselves. Let's say after millions (or billions) of years, these self-replicating nanobots evolved into multi-cellular organisms
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 16 October 2013 13:30, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: All that we know for sure is that there does not seem to be a single example of an inorganic species now, nor does there seem to be a single example from the fossil record. It doesn't mean that conscious machines cannot evolve, but since it appears that they have not so far, we should not, scientifically speaking, give it the benefit of the doubt. I thought the default stance of science was that they did evolve, and here we are. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 6:50:53 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 October 2013 01:26, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: Thanks for your answer. That was not quite what I was asking though. Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living organism, but were some entirely autonomous, entirely artificial cell-like structures, which could find and utilize energy sources in the environment and reproduce themselves. Let's say after millions (or billions) of years, these self-replicating nanobots evolved into multi-cellular organisms like animals we are familiar with today. Could they have experiences like other biological creatures that have a biological lineage? If not, why not? No, I don't think that they could have experiences like biological creatures. If they could, then we *should *probably see at least one example of Excuse me for butting in, but I'm not sure what should means here. Are you saying these things should *already* exist? But the original suggestion was about future technology... Though I can't see what else you could mean, though. 1. a natural occurrence of inorganic biology Why would it occur naturally, when organic biology has done so, and presumably used up all the food sources that might be available? If inorganic biology were possible, shouldn't it use inorganic food sources? 2. an organism which can survive only on inorganic nutrients ??? A bird that can live on rocks, etc. 3. a successful experiment to create life from basic molecules Arguably the biosphere counts as this, presumably not an intentional experiment. That's begging the question. We don't know that abiogenesis is a fact, or if it was, we don't know that it is possible to reoccur. Our experiments thus far have not supported the idea that biological life can be be created again. 4. a machine which seems to feel, care, and have a unique and unrepeatable personal presence Arguably a human being is one of these It's begging the question. I'm saying people are not like machines, because people are all unique but machines are not. You can't use that fact to claim that people are representative of machines, and then therefore that machines can be like people. If I said oil and water don't mix, you can't say 'arguably oil is a type of water'. 5. a mechanized process which produces artifacts that seem handmade and unique 6. two separate bodies who are the same person 7. an organism which reproduces by transforming its environment rather than reproducing by cell division This seems to me to have gone completely off the point. I would need you to explain more of what you mean. 8. an organism which emerges spontaneously from Boltzmann conditions in the environment rather than seeded inheritance What?!? (He said billions of years, not googolplexes...!) I didn't say Boltzmann brain, just a Boltzmann organism. 9. an event or observation which leads us to conclude that gathering energy and reproduction are sufficient to constitute bio-quality awareness. I don't understand that sentence. The whole basis of computationalism hinges on the assumption that acting like you are alive is the same as being alive, which I think is demonstrably false. We know for a fact that something that is not alive can seem like it is. We know that a machine can produce strings of language that carry no meaning for it. So what is it, other than pure blue-sky wishful thinking, that leads us to conclude that moving a puppet around in the right way is going to bring Pinocchio to life? I may be missing something here but I believe the question is whether machines can have experiences. Isn't a human being a machine that has experiences? No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that it could be defined by mechanism. Thanks, Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that it could be defined by mechanism. So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, molecular-component-containing) machine? (Or is machine being defined in a specialised sense here?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
Sorry I should have added... your statement A human body may be a machine contradicts a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired - unless a human being is not the same thing as a human body, of course. Is that the point? On 16 October 2013 13:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that it could be defined by mechanism. So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, molecular-component-containing) machine? (Or is machine being defined in a specialised sense here?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:45:38 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 22:04, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 3:17:06 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 20:13, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, October 13, 2013 5:03:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: All object are conscious? No objects are conscious. We agree on this. Not at all. It is here and now. I have already interview such machines. Are there any such machines available to interview online? I can give you the code in Lisp, and it is up to you to find a good free lisp. But don't mind too much, AUDA is an integral description of the interview. Today, such interviews is done by paper and pencils, and appears in books and papers. You better buy Boolos 1979, or 1993, but you have to study more logic too. Doesn't it seem odd that there isn't much out there that is newer than 20 years old, That is simply wrong, and I don't see why you say that. But even if that was true, that would prove nothing. It still seems odd. There are a lot of good programmers out there. If this is the frontier of machine intelligence, where is the interest? Not saying it proves something, but it doesn't instill much confidence that this is as fertile an area as you imply. and that paper and pencils are the preferred instruments? Maybe I was premature in saying it was promissory...it would appears that there has not been any promise for it in quite some time. It is almost applicable, but the hard part is that it is blind to its own blindness, so that the certainty offered by mathematics comes at a cost which mathematics has no choice but to deny completely. Because mathematics cannot lie, G* proves []f Even Peano Arithmetic can lie. Mathematical theories (set of beliefs) can lie. Only truth cannot lie, but nobody know the truth as such. Something that is a paradox or inconsistent is not the same thing as an intentional attempt to deceive. I'm not sure what 'G* proves []f' means but I think it will mean the same thing to anyone who understands it, and not something different to the boss than it does to the neighbor. Actually it will have as much meaning as there are correct machines (a lot), but the laws remains the same. Then adding the non-monotonical umbrella, saving the Lôbian machines from the constant mistakes and lies they do, provides different interpretation of []f, like I dream, I die, I get mad, I am in a cul-de-sac I get wrong etc. It will depend on the intensional nuances in play. Couldn't the machine output the same product as musical notes or colored pixels instead? Why not. Humans can do that too. If I asked a person to turn some data into music or art, no two people would agree on what that output would be and no person's output would be decipherable as input to another person. Computers, on the other hand, would automatically be able to reverse any kind of i/o in the same way. One computer could play a file as a song, and another could make a graphic file out of the audio line out data which would be fully reversible to the original binary file. it cannot intentionally tell the truth either, and no matter how sophisticated and self-referential a logic it is based on, it can never transcend its own alienation from feeling, physics, and authenticity. That is correct, but again, that is justifiable by all correct sufficiently rich machines. Not sure I understand. Are you saying that we, as rich machines, cannot intentionally lie or tell the truth either? No, I am saying that all correct machines can eventually justify that if they are correct they can't express it, and if they are consistent, it will be consistent they are wrong. So it means they can eventually exploits the false locally. Team of universal numbers get entangled in very subtle prisoner dilemma. Universal machines can lie, and can crash. That sounds like they can lie only when they calculate that they must, not that they can lie intentionally because they enjoy it or out of sadism. That sounds like an opportunistic inference. I think that computationalism maintains the illusion of legitimacy on basis of seducing us to play only by its rules. It says that we must give the undead a chance to be alive - that we cannot know for sure whether a machine is not at least as worthy of our love as a newborn baby. To fight this seduction, we must use what is our birthright as living beings. We can be opportunistic, we can cheat, and lie, and unplug machines whenever we want, because that is what makes us superior to recorded logic. We are alive, so we get to do whatever we want to that which is not alive. Craig Bruno Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:51:17 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that it could be defined by mechanism. So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, molecular-component-containing) machine? (Or is machine being defined in a specialised sense here?) A human being is the collective self experience received during the phenomenon known as a human lifetime. The body is only one aspect of that experience - a reflection defined as a familiar body in the context of its own perception. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:52:48 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Sorry I should have added... your statement A human body may be a machine contradicts a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired - unless a human being is not the same thing as a human body, of course. Is that the point? Right, a human body is not the same thing as a human being. A human body is still a body after the human ceases being. Not because there is an immaterial spirit, but because the entire universe is a nested experience and the body is more about experiences on the cellular and molecular level than it is about individual lifetimes. Craig On 16 October 2013 13:51, LizR liz...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that it could be defined by mechanism. So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, molecular-component-containing) machine? (Or is machine being defined in a specialised sense here?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 16 October 2013 14:05, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:51:17 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that it could be defined by mechanism. So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, molecular-component-**containing) machine? (Or is machine being defined in a specialised sense here?) A human being is the collective self experience received during the phenomenon known as a human lifetime. The body is only one aspect of that experience - a reflection defined as a familiar body in the context of its own perception. That's cool, but if the body is a (complicated, etc) machine, then either those experiences are part of the machine, or they're something else. If they're part of the machine then you're wrong in some of the above-quoted statements (and you contradicted yourself by saying that a machine doesn't grow from a cell, by the way) If it's something else, then - depending on the nature of that something else - it's possible that other things have it, and we don't recognise the fact. It would be important to know what that something else is before one can construct an argument. (For example, I believe Bruno thinks the something else is an infinite sheaf of computations.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 16 October 2013 14:09, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:52:48 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Sorry I should have added... your statement A human body may be a machine contradicts a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired - unless a human being is not the same thing as a human body, of course. Is that the point? Right, a human body is not the same thing as a human being. A human body is still a body after the human ceases being. Not because there is an immaterial spirit, but because the entire universe is a nested experience and the body is more about experiences on the cellular and molecular level than it is about individual lifetimes. Now you've lost me. Is a nested experience anything like Max Tegmark's self-aware subsystems ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 7:30 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:59:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Oct 15, 2013, at 7:26 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Monday, October 14, 2013 4:37:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 10:54 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:08:01 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 4:52 PM, LizR liz...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: It's not that computers can't do what humans do, it's that they can't experience anything. Mozart could dig a hole as well as compose music, but that doesn't mean that a backhoe with a player piano on it is Mozart. It's a much deeper problem with how machines are conceptualized that has nothing at all to do with humans. So you think strong AI is wrong. OK. But why can't computers experience anything, in principle, given that people can, and assuming people are complicated machines? I think Craig would say he does think computers (and many/all other things) do experience something, You're half right. I would say: 1. All experiences correspond to some natural thing. 2. Not all things are natural things. Bugs Bunny has no independent experience, and neither does Pinocchio. 3. Computers are made of natural things but, like all machines, are ultimately assembled unnaturally. 4. The natural things that machines are made of would have to be very low level, i.e., not gears but the molecules that make up the gears. Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the only natural things which an experience would be associated with. They don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every atom of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some radically different time scale from ours. It's not really important - the main thing is to see how there is no substitute for experience and a machine which is assembled from unrelated parts has no experience and cannot gain new experience in an alien context. I think that a machine (or any inanimate object or symbol) can also serve as a vehicle for synchronicity. That's a completely different thing because it is the super-personal, holistic end of the sensible spectrum, not the sub-personal, granular end. The creepiness of a ventriloquist dummy is in our imagination, but that too is 'real' in an absolute sense. If your life takes you on a path which tempts you to believe that machines are conscious, then the super-personal lensing of your life will stack the deck just enough to let you jump to those conclusions. It's what we would call supernatural or coincidental, depending on which lens we use to define it.. http://s33light.org/post/62173912616http://s33light.org/post/ **62173**912616 (Don't you want to have a body?) After reading this ( http://marshallbrain.com/discard1.htm http://marshallbrain.com/**dis**card1.htm ) I am not so sure... just that it is necessarily different from what we experience. The reason for this has something to do with our history as biological organisms (according to his theory). Right, although not necessarily just biological history, it could be chemical too. We may have branched off from anything that could be made into a useful machine (servant to alien agendas) long before life on Earth. What if humanity left behind a nano-technology that eventually evolved into mechanical organisms like dogs and fish, would they have animal like experiences despite that they descended from unnatural things? The thing that makes sense to me is that the richness of sensation and intention are inversely proportionate to the degree to which a phenomenon can be controlled from the outside. If we put nano-tech extensions on some living organism, then sure, the organism could learn how to use those extensions and evolve a symbiotic post-biology. I don't think that project would be controllable though. They would not be machines in the sense that they would not necessarily be of service to those who created them. Craig, Thanks for your answer. That was not quite what I was asking though. Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living organism, but were some entirely autonomous, entirely artificial cell-like structures, which could find and utilize energy sources in the environment and reproduce themselves. Let's say after millions (or billions) of years, these self-replicating nanobots evolved into
For John Clark
(And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it comes to duplication.) I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter: I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the dilemma, since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory, only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will appear to be the case for observers. He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of observers, despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense* that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists, including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College: Everett: Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an observer making a sequence of results of observations on a number of, let's say, originally identical object systems. At the end of this sequence there is a large superposition of states, each element of which contains the observer as having recorded a particular definite sequence of the results of observation. I identify a single element as what we think of as an experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert that all of the elements simultaneously coexist. In any single element of the final superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently random sequence of events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost all of the elements of the final supeprosition the frequencies of the results of measurements will be in accord with what one predicts from the ordinary picture of quantum mechanics. That is very briefly it. Podolsky: Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or parallel worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much. Everett: Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition principle that each separate element of the superposition will obey the same laws independent of the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why insist on having certain selection of one of the elements as being real and all of the others somehow mysteriously vanishing? Furry: This means that each of us, you see, exists on a great many sheets or versions and it's only on this one right here that you have any particular remembrance of the past. In some other ones we perhaps didn't come here to Cincinnati. Everett: We simply do away with the reduction of the wave packet. Poldolsky: It's certainly consistent as far as we have heard it. Everett: All of the consistency of ordinary physics is preserved by the correlation structure of this state. Podolsky: It looks like we would have a non-denumberable infinity of worlds. Everett: Yes. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense* that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have *all*the available experiences. It's only after the measurement has been made that there is an *appearance* of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement. (However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have all the available experiences. That's the third person view. The view of the wavefunction's evolution. That is completely predictible. Whether or not you will measure the electron to be spin up or spin down you can't predict in advance. That is because you experience both but neither experiences it as being both spin up and spin down. It's only after the measurement has been made that there is an appearance of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement. (However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???) Apparently not. John refuses to accept that a fully deterministic process can lead to the subjective appearance of randomness when duplication is involved. (the third step of the UDA) Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 16 October 2013 16:58, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense*that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have *all * the available experiences. That's the third person view. The view of the wavefunction's evolution. That is completely predictible. Whether or not you will measure the electron to be spin up or spin down you can't predict in advance. That is because you experience both but neither experiences it as being both spin up and spin down. I don't see how that's different from what I said - *afterwards*, they will feel that they've experienced a probablistic event. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Oct 15, 2013, at 11:09 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:58, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have all the available experiences. That's the third person view. The view of the wavefunction's evolution. That is completely predictible. Whether or not you will measure the electron to be spin up or spin down you can't predict in advance. That is because you experience both but neither experiences it as being both spin up and spin down. I don't see how that's different from what I said - afterwards, they will feel that they've experienced a probablistic event. I agree with the text above. The part I was contesting was where you said that one can predict their next subjective experience. When you say that one could answer they will experience all perspectives, then you are no longer speaking of a subjective experience. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
