On 1 January 2018 at 19:34, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 1/1/2018 4:39 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01924/full
>
> This link
> could serve as quite
> an illuminating adjunct to the dreamless sleep thread. The a
On 4 January 2018 at 11:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On Jan 3, 2018, at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Now, i
On 3 January 2018 at 21:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
Now, it
could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but as you yourself
On 4 Jan 2018 18:16, "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On Jan 4, 2018, at 1:22 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 January 2018 at 11:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On Jan 3, 2018, at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marcha
On 4 Jan 2018 21:04, "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 1/4/2018 5:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 January 2018 at 21:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
&g
On 5 Jan 2018 03:22, "Bruce Kellett" wrote:
On 4/01/2018 11:59 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On Jan 4, 2018, at 12:50 PM, Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>> On 4/01/2018 12:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 29 Dec 2017, at 01:29, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
On 29/12/2017 10:14 am, Russell Standis
On 5 January 2018 at 14:06, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Friday, January 5, 2018, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5 Jan 2018 03:22, "Bruce Kellett" wrote:
>>
>> On 4/01/2018 11:59 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On Jan 4, 2018
On 5 Jan 2018 19:27, "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 4 Jan 2018, at 21:07, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 Jan 2018 18:16, "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On Jan 4, 2018, at 1:22 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 January 2018 at 11:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On Jan 3, 2018, at
On 5 January 2018 at 21:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 1/5/2018 6:48 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 5 January 2018 at 14:06, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 5, 2018, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5
On 5 January 2018 at 20:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 1/5/2018 4:00 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5 Jan 2018 03:22, "Bruce Kellett" wrote:
>
> On 4/01/2018 11:59 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 12:50 PM, Bruce Kellett
&
On 5 January 2018 at 22:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 1/5/2018 2:17 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> To take a more realistic example.
>>
>
> I do so love your appropriation of the terms 'real' and 'realistic' to
> your own theories.
>
>
>
On 5 Jan 2018 23:42, "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 1/5/2018 3:02 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 January 2018 at 22:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 1/5/2018 2:17 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> To take a more realistic example.
>>
>
> I do so love your a
On 4 Jan 2018 20:16, "Lawrence Crowell"
wrote:
On Thursday, January 4, 2018 at 1:44:26 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 4, 2018 at 8:11:28 AM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, January 4, 2018 at 8:26:33 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>>
>
On 6 Jan 2018 19:46, "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 5 Jan 2018, at 21:04, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 Jan 2018 19:27, "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 4 Jan 2018, at 21:07, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 Jan 2018 18:16, "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On Jan 4, 2018, at 1:22 PM, Dav
On 7 January 2018 at 09:52, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 6 Jan 2018, at 21:09, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6 Jan 2018 19:46, "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Jan 2018, at 21:04, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5 Jan 2018 19:27, "Bruno
On 10 Jan 2018 13:48, "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 7 Jan 2018, at 12:42, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 January 2018 at 09:52, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 6 Jan 2018, at 21:09, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6 Jan 2018 19:46, "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
>
>
&
On 10 January 2018 at 23:49, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 11/01/2018 9:09 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> On 1/10/2018 11:23 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> Searle makes his position even more vulnerable by arguing that not only
> are neural activity and the experience of perception the
On 11 Jan 2018 02:34, "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 1/10/2018 6:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:
If you read the rest of Tallis's piece you'll see that he criticises the
characterisation of the physical environment as encoding 'information'
independent of interpretation. Th
On 11 Jan 2018 04:02, "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 1/10/2018 6:56 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 Jan 2018 02:34, "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 1/10/2018 6:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:
If you read the rest of Tallis's piece you'll see that he criticises the
ch
On 12 Jan 2018 00:36, "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 1/11/2018 4:11 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 Jan 2018 04:02, "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 1/10/2018 6:56 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 Jan 2018 02:34, "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 1/10/2018 6:11 PM, David Nyman w
On 14 January 2018 at 11:48, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 10 Jan 2018, at 20:23, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10 Jan 2018 13:48, "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Jan 2018, at 12:42, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 7 January 2018 at 09:52, Bruno Marc
On 18 Jan 2018 00:42, "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 1/17/2018 2:10 PM, David Nyman wrote:
I agree. I didn't elaborate in the interests of being short, Nevertheless,
the evolutionary 'selection' argument must, necessarily, rest ultimately on
extrinsic or 3p behaviour
On 20 March 2017 at 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
That is why I say that, with or without computationalism, the physical
> reality cannot be emulated by a computer. The universe cannot be a program,
> if a program can sustain my consciousness.
>
Isn't the UD a program? Ah, but then you will say t
I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that
Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm
insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be intuitively
convincing for me. So I'
On 5 Apr 2017 9:54 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:
I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that
Bruno has given a technical refutation of this po
If Darwinism may be said to have shown how the illusion of design may exist
without need of a designer, we have still perhaps lacked an equivalently
powerful form of explication that might show how the illusion of creativity
could exist without need of invoking a creator. It has been claimed in som
On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:
I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that
Br
my best to
accommodate you.
David
On 6 Apr 2017 2:07 a.m., "John Clark" wrote:
On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 7:47 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> If Darwinism may be said to have shown how the illusion of design may
> exist without need of a designer, we have still perhaps lacked an
&g
il, or Goertzel, or Prisco, Hanson..etc. Less
> anti-religious jabber, Harari, and more, happy, dancing, robot friends, in
> your next book!
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: David Nyman
> To: everything-list
> Sent: Wed, Apr 5, 2017 9:37 pm
> Subject: Re: A littl
On 6 Apr 2017 8:28 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 05 Apr 2017, at 13:47, David Nyman wrote:
If Darwinism may be said to have shown how the illusion of design may exist
without need of a designer, we have still perhaps lacked an equivalently
powerful form of explication that might sh
On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:
I've been thinking about the
On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM
On 7 April 2017 at 11:24, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 07 Apr 2017, at 00:11, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "
On 7 Apr 2017 11:22 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 07 Apr 2017, at 14:21, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 April 2017 at 11:24, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 07 Apr 2017, at 00:11, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
>
On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from the
> outside by a two-part public/private encryption scheme. Whereas the public
> part is in principle entirely extrinsically inspect
On 8 Apr 2017 2:11 a.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 4/7/2017 5:12 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from the
> ou
I'd like to expand on some points abstracted from the most recent
discussions with Brent and Bruno, as they keep on recurring and I'd like to
be as clear as I can be about where I stand on them. I'm grateful to both
of these guys in particular for prodding me to exercise my poor brain to
its limite
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That all relies too much on the assumption that comp is true
At the risk of pointing out the stunningly obvious, *everything* in Bruno's
argument is premised on the truth of the comp thesis, summarised in the
claim that consciousness is invariant
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> I can define my own consciousness, at least to a level that is sufficient
> for me to operate successfully in the world. If my brain and body functions
> can be taken over by a general-purpose computer, then that computer could
> define its own
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or useful
> rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That means, of
> course, that we make mistakes, we are misled by imprecise interpretations
> of perceptions, and of ot
On 27 April 2015 at 19:24, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/27/2015 4:07 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
> Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or useful
>> rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most pur
On 30 April 2015 at 09:10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Platonia runs all possible CPU, and it is a certainty that all those
> computer and execution of computers exists in Platonia (which is a very
> little platonia compared to the one used in physics and analysis).
>
> On the contrary, some people migh
On 30 April 2015 at 17:01, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Here we are in a place where I think you type of argument can still be used
> to criticize comp itself. Comp explains matter, but someone can reason
> along your line and pretend that it still fail to explain entirely
> consciousness. It just push t
Spooky!
On 3 May 2015 at 12:03, LizR wrote:
> Michael Shermer is the publisher of "Skeptic" magazine, which I used to
> subscribe to - but I could only take so many debunkings, lectures on
> science, and so on, and eventually I cancelled the sub, reasonably well
> convinced that I had by now obt
On 13 May 2015 at 12:19, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The fact that coffee can change my mind, and that my mind can change my
> brain is part of evidence for comp, not for the primitive physical
> supervenience thesis, whose main weakness at the start is that it assumes
> physicalism, primary matter, whi
On 13 May 2015 at 13:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:
But the physical brain on which consciousness supervenes might well be
> itself a product of comp (and is, if you take the robust UD seriously). So
> you have shown that, either your whole theory is internally inconsistent,
> or else you have to aband
On 13 May 2015 at 14:53, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think it is a good summary, yes. Thanks!
>
Building on that then, would you say that bodies and brains (including of
course our own) fall within the class of embedded features of the machine's
generalised 'physical environment'? Their particular ro
On 13 May 2015 at 17:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
why should they predominate ? They should only have higher probability
> relatively to you.. you're in that class of observers, that certainly
> constrains what you can observe... there are many more insects than humans,
> yet, you're human... and s
Statements like this lead me to suspect that, when it comes down to it, you
don't really make any essential distinction between the 3p and 1p senses of
the term "consciousness". ISTM that the latter sense is probably what you
intend by "fundamental". Whereas consciousness in the former sense can
p
Recent discussions on the purported 'reversal' of the relation between
'machine psychology' and physics seem to be running, as ever, into the sand
over disagreements on the meaning and significance of rather complex
arguments like the MGA. I'd like to try another tack.
The computational theory of
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951
I'd be interested in a more technical analysis, but in my view one clear
weakness at the outset is the lack of a robust motivation to attribute
consciousness to *anything at all* in particular (which, to be fair,
Aaronson acknowledges). ISTM that a besetti
Read the rest of the sentence. It makes a difference.
On 23 Jun 2015 4:45 pm, "John Clark" wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 9:59 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> > In other words, any ToM that proceeds from physics as a given struggles
>> to explain precisely how a n
On 11 August 2015 at 07:09, 'scerir' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> BTW there is an amusing paper by (the manyworlder) Lev Vaidman.
> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9609006
Nice paper (from a while back). AFAICT his resolution of the indeterminacy
issue in MWI is
Is this a new sense in which one can have a "head cold"? Or possibly a
"head start"?
David
On 18 December 2014 at 17:56, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> Congratulations for taking that step. I've been tempted but haven't made
> the leap yet. What was the process like?
>
> I can sleep a little easier know
I've been reading some of the responses to the Edge 2015 question "What do
you think about machines that think?":
http://edge.org/contributors/q2015
Lee Smolin's contribution contains the following statement:
"So let us hypothesize that qualia are internal properties of some brain
processes. Whe
sees red he must suppose this to be, on his own
avowed naturalism, an (observable) consequence of physical causality alone.
How could further 'internal' properties be supposed to intervene in this
account?
David
On 17 Jan 2015 21:32, "meekerdb" wrote:
> On 1/17/2015 9:25 AM,
On 17 January 2015 at 23:39, meekerdb wrote:
I agree, with such a constraining definition of "internal" it would seem
> that no interaction with the world or other people is possible. It would
> only be consistent with a "brain in a vat, dreaming the world".
I don't see what difference that st
On 18 January 2015 at 14:42, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
What's wrong with "merely adventitious parallelism, on the lines of
> epiphenomenalism"? If it seems to leave the mystery untouched, that is
> because there is no logically possible solution to the hard problem of
> consciousness.
>
Before
On 18 January 2015 at 23:28, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, January 19, 2015, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 18 January 2015 at 14:42, Stathis Papaioannou
>> wrote:
>>
>> What's wrong with "merely adventitious parallelism, on the lines
On 19 January 2015 at 07:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, January 19, 2015, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 18 January 2015 at 23:28, Stathis Papaioannou
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 19, 2015, David Ny
On 19 January 2015 at 14:01, David Nyman wrote:
But if zombies were *logically* impossible, as I believe Dennett for
> example claims, then it would be analytically true, not a contingent fact.
I'd like to amplify here a little in light of my longer response to you
about comp and
On 19 January 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/19/2015 6:01 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> There's an effective riposte to this, I believe, but it might be a bit
>> subtle, so I ask you to bear with me. I think, in the first place, that
>> it's beside
On 19 January 2015 at 20:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/19/2015 9:31 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 19 January 2015 at 14:01, David Nyman wrote:
>
> But if zombies were *logically* impossible, as I believe Dennett for
>> example claims, then it would be analytically true, not
On 19 January 2015 at 23:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/19/2015 1:21 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 19 January 2015 at 20:42, meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 1/19/2015 9:31 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 19 January 2015 at 14:01, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> But if zombi
On 20 January 2015 at 05:42, meekerdb wrote:
What would that mean? If neuroscientists of the future develop brain
> monitoring instrumentation and software such that they scan watch processes
> in your brain and then say correctly, "You were seeing red and it reminded
> you of a dress your late
On 19 January 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb wrote:
conceptually disconnected from a base ontology that has no knowledge or
>> need of them. If we can accept consciousness as the model (in the
>> mathematicians sense) of such a truth level,
>>
>
> What does "truth level" mean? I don't see what the leve
On 20 January 2015 at 17:11, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> At this point, I'm somewhat persuaded that this broader sense of truth, in
> approximately Descartes' sense, is in fact highly relevant to what is
> special and, so to speak, non-negotiable about consciousness. It has the
> virtue that it now ma
On 20 January 2015 at 19:57, meekerdb wrote:
For the very reason that it is necessarily private I think the 'hard'
> problem will be regarded as solved, as solved as it can be, when one can
> read off veridical emotions, thoughts, perceptions from brain scans.
I know you do ;-)
David
--
You
On 22 January 2015 at 08:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Because with sufficiently big infinity in both mind and matter, you can a
> priori singularize the experience and the body in a way such that
> duplication is no more possible, and there is no more FPI, and we can use
> the old identity thesis bra
https://fauxphilnews.wordpress.com/2012/02/22/kripke-resigns-after-allegations-of-academic-fraud/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-l
On 29 January 2015 at 10:12, Samiya Illias wrote:
> Why not define God as the Creator and Sustainer of the Universe and
>> Everything Else that is or may exist?
>>
>> Very good, and common, definition. It is in most of my theological
>> dictionaries. Note that the Universe is itself among the thi
On 3 February 2015 at 20:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would explain
> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent behaviour,
> and was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
>
I still have no idea what you mean
On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon.
> The epiphenomenon has no separate causal efficacy of its own; if it
> did, then we could devise a test for consciousness. This, by the way,
> does not imply that consci
On 4 February 2015 at 05:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal
> > account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon
> > necessarily accompanies the phenomenon. In the case of consciousness
> it's
> > essen
On 5 February 2015 at 13:35, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:
On 4 February 2015 at 12:49, David Nyman wrote:
> > On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
> >
> >> An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon.
> >> The epi
On 4 February 2015 at 19:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/4/2015 9:02 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> On 4 February 2015 at 05:11, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>> > As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal
>> > account of the phenomeno
On 5 February 2015 at 21:42, meekerdb wrote:
This looks like dualism in name only to me. The "mental" is just a
> different model of the same process modeled physically. Just as
> thermodynamics is different model for statistical mechanics.
But you're not describing epiphenomenalism here. AFA
On 6 February 2015 at 01:01, meekerdb wrote:
You seem intent on defining terms in order to dimiss them. For example,
> why is taking "mental" to be re-description of the physical
> "elimininativism"? Does it eliminate the physical or the mental - or
> neither. If I describe heat as the average
On 6 February 2015 at 04:20, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/5/2015 5:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 6 February 2015 at 01:01, meekerdb wrote:
>
> You seem intent on defining terms in order to dimiss them. For example,
>> why is taking "mental" to be
On 13 February 2015 at 15:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The problem of terms like "epiphenomenalism" (and some other ...ism) is
> that they are defined implicitly only in the Aristotelian picture. They
> *can* acquire different meanings in the platonician picture.
Yes, I agree. In a previous discuss
On 16 February 2015 at 18:29, meekerdb wrote:
The faith step is assuming arithmetic.
It's always been clear that Bruno's work is effectively an enquiry into
whether something as apparently simple as first-order arithmetical
relations are nonetheless a sufficient ontological basis for the full r
Hi Stephen
Thanks for the link - very enjoyable talk. As far as I could follow
it, he seemed to be saying that the differentiation of decoherent
"worlds" is in the final analysis a "psychological" matter - i.e. that
quasi-classical "reality", as ordinarily experienced, is consequent on
the select
" are prerequisites for what is by then a
quasi-classically-informed functional or structural analysis of the
(conjecturally) basic micro-physical situation. That is to say, the
role of the "observer" continues to be indispensable to the decoherent
account.
David
> On 8/4/2011 9
On 9 August 2011 07:36, Roger wrote:
> I always like to distinguish between the
> mind's conception/perception of a thing and the thing itself. So, I'd
> say that a thing can exist even if its properties are unknown to us
> (ie, to our mind's conception of the thing) but those properties have
>
> non-existence itself and "what is present" is our mind's conception of
> non-existence. We're stuck having to do this because we exist, but
> non-existence itself, and not our mind's conception of non-existence"
> doesn't have this dependence.
>
;s conception of non-
> existence is of just plain "nothingness". But, non-existence itself
> is actually an existent state and can really therefore be called
> "something" instead of "nothing". This means that non-existence
> itself really does have a ref
ed in the paper at the website, to
> start building a model of the universe that is similar to ours and
> that contains a symmetry-asymmetry transition (symmetry-breaking), a
> big bang-like creation and expansion of space and a mechanical,
> natural reason for why there is energy in th
On 13 August 2011 03:03, meekerdb wrote:
> Are you the kind of person who knows math?
>
> http://videosift.com/video/Miss-USA-2011-Should-Math-Be-Taught-In-Schools
>
> Brent
Is it just me, or is there something about this that doesn't add up?
David
> Are you the kind of person who knows math?
Brent, thanks for this. If I've understood it at all, the idea is
that the "sum over histories" results in our witnessing the most
"probable" macroscopic outcome as our "present" observation. I
believe there is some controversy in interpreting how "probability"
should be understood in the context
This paper presents some intriguing ideas on consciousness, computation and
the MWI, including an argument against the possibility of consciousness
supervening on any single deterministic computer program (Bruno might find
this interesting). Any comments on its cogency?
http://arxiv.org/abs/gr
On 30 September 2011 16:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> They are ontologically primitive, in the sense that ontologically they are
> the only things which exist. even computations don't exist in that primitive
> sense. Computations already exists only relationally. I will keep saying
> that computatio
real: the analytic and the integrative, neither
of which can intelligibly be dispensed with. In any case, failure to
take considerations of this sort into account, leads, I think, to much
of the confusion that arises in these discussions about what "really
exists".
David
> On 9/30/2011
as having the consequence of radical reduction of the
remainder to some such arena of primitives and their relations,
independent of any metaphysical postulate of their fundamental nature.
Hence, such denial is unintelligible.
David
>
> On 01 Oct 2011, at 02:18, David Nyman wrote:
>
&
ms of the "real reality". To
make this theory coherent, the physicalist would have to accept that
"computation" additionally has just the kind of "ontological reality"
and distinctness you describe. But then, in the face of physicalism,
this would be, as you remark, frankly
larly self-reference);
and unless the basis of such reference is built into our foundational
assumptions, it seems to me that the possibility of recovering it
"later" (say, from the ramifications of a physicalist theory) is a
stark impossibility.
I hope this may help, or at least may
On 9 October 2011 14:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Can you find any number(s) flying around
>> that has any claim to an internal view right now?
>
> Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only
> to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have.
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish wrote:
>> >Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
>>
>> Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
>
> Its the only way to get inactive parts, and so force the absurdum. The
> assumption is not explicit in Maudlin's work, but its there.
a collection of experiences
supervening on a corresponding collection of individually trivial
"devices"? And if so, if his argument from triviality is persuasive
for one device, how is it less so for the collection?
David
> On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 01:06:45PM +, David Nyman wrote:
&g
On 23 December 2011 23:24, Russell Standish wrote:
> The argument cannot extend to an apparatus made of extended
> multiversal objects, as the "inactive" parts are no longer
> inactive. But it does require the supervenience to be extended across
> multiple multiverse branches in a way that hasn't
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish wrote:
>> I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
>>
>
> This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
> "primitiveness" is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
> argument is about regular supervenience
501 - 600 of 1187 matches
Mail list logo
