Re: Love and Free Will

[Stephen Paul King]

From: meekerdb 
Sent: Sunday, May 01, 2011 4:46 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Love and Free Will
On 5/1/2011 1:05 PM, John Mikes wrote:
> Observer: I generalize the term to anything getting into relational 
> connection with anything else,  not restricted to 'conscious' 
> (horribile dictu: "human"?) observers. So I would not call 'it' a 
> "he". My question was: can a mental object (thought?) be observing in 
> my sense? (That would be an extension to a 'physical' view).

"Relational connection" is very broad, so I'd say it's certainly 
possible for a mental object, a thought, to have a relational connection 
to another mental object (one thought follows another) or to a physical 
object (I thought of a chair).  When we speak of observing and observers 
there is usually an implication that others could also observe the 
'same' thing (allowing for points of view differences).  This is why 
Bohr emphasized the logical priority of the classical in empirical science.

Brent

Hi Brent,
What you are stating here is the first hint of the idea of diffeomorphism 
invariance that we are looking for! The fact that “others could also observe 
the 'same' thing” is the essence of the idea that we can stitch coordinate 
systems to each other to make space-time manifold quilts. The trick is to show 
OMs are like coordinate systems.

Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Love and Free Will

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi John,

I love your comments!

Onward!

Stephen

From: John Mikes 
Sent: Sunday, May 01, 2011 4:05 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Love and Free Will
Dear Bruno and Brent:
(not quite sure which 'open' par belongs to whom, since they are open in 
Bruno's text as well as in Brent's - but that is irrelevant at this moment: I 
don't intend to "argue")
I thank you for reflecting to my scribblings in a very professional spirit. I 
apologize for boring you by remarks (questions) derived from a different 
worldview (and vocabulary) from what you apply. I decided several times NOT to 
barge in, yet am fallible and in-disciplined. Sorry. 

To Bruno's "they work well": I use 'almost' because of flaws that occur 
occasionally.
Reason in my view: our so far learned (you may call it: observable, see below) 
'world' is a portion of the wholeness and the entire totality is in relational 
exchange with everything - including those items we already know about. The 
rest of the interference is 'surprising' (i.e. out of our rulely - knowable 
expectations: considerable as flaws). 
Observer: I generalize the term to anything getting into relational connection 
with anything else,  not restricted to 'conscious' (horribile dictu: "human"?) 
observers. So I would not call 'it' a "he". My question was: can a mental 
object (thought?) be observing in my sense? (That would be an extension to a 
'physical' view). 

I appreciate Brent's remark restricting the collapse etc. as part of the 
"DESCRIPTION".

And I loved the sweet fairy-tale: 
"God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days was for him 
just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;)"  by the bearded supernatural inventor, way 
before it was applicable to human-identified time concept. Thank you. 

Insanity: what is sanity?

I admit that your (and Brent's etc.) positions are the best available and 
decent, I am stubborn (maybe I learnt insufficient math-physics to join the 
choir) but look now from a perspective above my head into an unlimited 
complexity from which certain 'aspects' (maybe derived by the actual state of 
our understanding only) are composed into limited models for ourselves to think 
WITHIN. That is our perceived reality (just a word) and subject to relations 
from yonder. 
Your boss, the universal machine (yes, it is feminine in French, Latin and 
German) is THERE, beyond my imagination and I don't force my flimsy mind to 
identify it in MY terms. She may be more than I can fathom. So I sit in my own 
schizophrenia: live in a restricted pool of ideas and think about an 
unrestricted everything beyond my capabilities. 
I don't want to compromise, nor to accept what seems incomplete. 

I hope to bother you less with my nightmares in the future (but don't count on 
it). . 

John M
 


On Fri, Apr 29, 2011 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

  On 4/29/2011 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
Hi John, 


On 28 Apr 2011, at 21:40, John Mikes wrote:


  Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented and 
starting (JM):
  John


  On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:


  Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to 
suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

  Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?


It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the 
computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that QM 
is a universal theory.
  (JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false 
and QM being-NOT-a universal  theory?

In that case we must search for another theory in mind studies, and another 
theory in physics studies. But today, they work well, especially together, and 
the more we study them, the more astonishing they look. I like them, because I 
like to surprises. I like theories which shake my prejudices.







The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century 
and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum 
mechanics, nor by digital mechanism. 
  (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an 
'observer' reaistic as thought?

A theory can always be false. The problem of the collapse of the wave 
function is that it has to violate relativity, or physical realism or logic. 
Without collapse, an observer is at least as realistic than the objects of his 
study. The observer does not need a special status, he belongs to the world he 
is observing. 


  Note that is exactly contrary to some interpretations of QM, e.g. Bohr's

  http://arxiv.org/PS_c

Re: Love and Free Will

[meekerdb]

On 5/1/2011 1:05 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Observer: I generalize the term to anything getting into relational 
connection with anything else,  not restricted to 'conscious' 
(horribile dictu: "human"?) observers. So I would not call 'it' a 
"he". My question was: can a mental object (thought?) be observing in 
my sense? (That would be an extension to a 'physical' view).


"Relational connection" is very broad, so I'd say it's certainly 
possible for a mental object, a thought, to have a relational connection 
to another mental object (one thought follows another) or to a physical 
object (I thought of a chair).  When we speak of observing and observers 
there is usually an implication that others could also observe the 
'same' thing (allowing for points of view differences).  This is why 
Bohr emphasized the logical priority of the classical in empirical science.


Brent

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Re: Love and Free Will

[John Mikes]

Dear Bruno and Brent:
(not quite sure which 'open' par belongs to whom, since they are open in
Bruno's text as well as in Brent's - but that is irrelevant at this moment:
I don't intend to "argue")
I thank you for reflecting to my scribblings in a very professional spirit.
I apologize for boring you by remarks (questions) derived from a different
worldview (and vocabulary) from what you apply. I decided several times NOT
to barge in, yet am fallible and in-disciplined. Sorry.

To Bruno's "they work well": I use 'almost' because of flaws that occur
occasionally.
 Reason in my view: our so far learned (you may call it: observable, see
below) 'world' is a portion of the wholeness and the entire totality is in
relational exchange with everything - including those items we already know
about. The rest of the interference is 'surprising' (i.e. out of our rulely
- knowable expectations: considerable as flaws).
Observer: I generalize the term to anything getting into relational
connection with anything else,  not restricted to 'conscious' (horribile
dictu: "human"?) observers. So I would not call 'it' a "he". My question
was: can a mental object (thought?) be observing in my sense? (That would be
an extension to a 'physical' view).

I appreciate Brent's remark restricting the collapse etc. as part of the
"DESCRIPTION".

And I loved the sweet fairy-tale:
*"God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days was for
him just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;)"  *by the bearded supernatural
inventor, way before it was applicable to human-identified time concept.
Thank you.

Insanity: what is sanity?

I admit that your (and Brent's etc.) positions are the best available and
decent, I am stubborn (maybe I learnt insufficient math-physics to join the
choir) but look now from a perspective above my head into an unlimited
complexity from which certain 'aspects' (maybe derived by the actual state
of our understanding only) are composed into limited models for ourselves to
think WITHIN. That is our perceived reality (just a word) and subject to
relations from yonder.
Your boss, the universal machine (yes, it is feminine in French, Latin and
German) is THERE, beyond my imagination and I don't force my flimsy mind to
identify it in MY terms. She may be more than I can fathom. So I sit in my
own schizophrenia: live in a restricted pool of ideas and think about an
unrestricted everything beyond my capabilities.
I don't want to compromise, nor to accept what seems incomplete.

I hope to bother you less with my nightmares in the future (but don't count
on it). .

John M


On Fri, Apr 29, 2011 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 4/29/2011 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Hi John,
>
>
>  On 28 Apr 2011, at 21:40, John Mikes wrote:
>
>  Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented and
> starting (JM):
> John
>
> On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>>  On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>>  Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to
>> suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "
>>
>> Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?
>>
>>
>>
>> It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the
>> computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that
>> QM is a universal theory.
>>
> *(JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false
> and QM being-NOT-a universal  theory?*
>
>
> In that case we must search for another theory in mind studies, and another
> theory in physics studies. But today, they work well, especially together,
> and the more we study them, the more astonishing they look. I like them,
> because I like to surprises. I like theories which shake my prejudices.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century and
>> nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum
>> mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.
>>
> * (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an
> 'observer' reaistic as thought?*
>
>
> A theory can always be false. The problem of the collapse of the wave
> function is that it has to violate relativity, or physical realism or logic.
> Without collapse, an observer is at least as realistic than the objects of
> his study. The observer does not need a special status, he belongs to the
> world he is observing.
>
>
> Note that is exactly contrary to some interpretations of QM, e.g. Bohr's
>
> http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1009/1009.4072v1.pdf
>
> and more recently Asher Peres
>
> http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9711/9711003v1.pdf
>
> The "collapse" of the wave function is easily explained as an epistemic
> event in one's description of the system.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>   With comp also. This allows monism: the researcher is embedded in the
> field that he searches. No need of a cut between subject and object. No need
> for an ontological du

Re: Love and Free Will

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Apr 2011, at 21:57, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/29/2011 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Hi John,


On 28 Apr 2011, at 21:40, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?)  
indented and starting (JM):

John

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability  
to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the  
wave collapse), "


Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?



It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the  
computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the  
idea that QM is a universal theory.
(JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being  
false and QM being-NOT-a universal  theory?


In that case we must search for another theory in mind studies, and  
another theory in physics studies. But today, they work well,  
especially together, and the more we study them, the more  
astonishing they look. I like them, because I like to surprises. I  
like theories which shake my prejudices.








The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one  
century and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be  
described by quantum mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.
 (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function?  
is an 'observer' reaistic as thought?


A theory can always be false. The problem of the collapse of the  
wave function is that it has to violate relativity, or physical  
realism or logic. Without collapse, an observer is at least as  
realistic than the objects of his study. The observer does not need  
a special status, he belongs to the world he is observing.


Note that is exactly contrary to some interpretations of QM, e.g.  
Bohr's


Yes, I agree. It is the main critic we can do about Bohr's  
interpretation. But Bohr is unclear, and quite different before and  
after 1935 EPR.







http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1009/1009.4072v1.pdf

and more recently Asher Peres

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9711/9711003v1.pdf

The "collapse" of the wave function is easily explained as an  
epistemic event in one's description of the system.


It seems to me that this is what Everett illustrates. And of course,  
you can proceed like Omnès, who defend Everett theory, but eventually  
conclude that we have to be irrational (he says "anti-cartesian") at  
the end, so that we can eliminate the other realities.


Personally I take QM without collapse and quantum MW as equivalent  
theory. I just define a world as any set of events closed for  
interaction. Then the "other worlds" exist in the same way "our world"  
exist. So we don't need to really define what a world is, or to decide  
if worlds "really" exist ontologically or epistemologically. If I make  
a quantum choice, QM predicts that I will be in a superposition state,  
and whatever I touch will differentiate with me. That might be  
consciousness differentiating along orthogonal dream, or splitting of  
realties. Such distinction don't make much sense for me. Of course  
Asher Peres has never been too friendly with MW, and he belongs, if I  
remember well, to those who can reject both the collapse and the MW,  
but this does not make sense for me, given the informal way we are  
using the word "world". Ontologically I am not sure that there is  
anything more than true and false statements on numbers. A world is  
really a convenient fiction. MW just means that all computational  
number relation are realized in an infinity of number relations. The  
UD, like the Mandelbrot set, is intrinsically ultra-redundant.


Bruno






Brent


With comp also. This allows monism: the researcher is embedded in  
the field that he searches. No need of a cut between subject and  
object. No need for an ontological dualism.






But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a  
bit like the idea that God made the creation in six days some  
millennia ago. We can't contradict such a statement, but it  
necessitates a very complex theory with many "corrective  
principles" which will be seen as ad hoc.
(JM): how were the "SIX DAYS" measured before OUR time- 
frame was 'created???


God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days  
was for him just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;)




In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no  
certainties.
(JM): conventional science, that is. We cannot speak for  
the future.


We can, accepting a theory. With comp we can explain that science  
will never know for sure, and that knowing anything for sure,  
except one own consciousness, is a case of insanity.
Of course comp might be false, in which case you might be right.  
Note also that there are many futures, both on the first person  
plane (hell, heaven, the Tibetan intermediate realms, etc.) and on  
the third person plane, 

Re: Love and Free Will

[meekerdb]

On 4/29/2011 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi John,


On 28 Apr 2011, at 21:40, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented 
and starting (JM):

John

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:



On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability
to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the
wave collapse), "
Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?



It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the
computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the
idea that QM is a universal theory.

/(JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false and QM 
being-NOT-a universal  theory?/


In that case we must search for another theory in mind studies, and 
another theory in physics studies. But today, they work well, 
especially together, and the more we study them, the more astonishing 
they look. I like them, because I like to surprises. I like theories 
which shake my prejudices.








The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one
century and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be
described by quantum mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.

/ (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an 
'observer' reaistic as thought?/


A theory can always be false. The problem of the collapse of the wave 
function is that it has to violate relativity, or physical realism or 
logic. Without collapse, an observer is at least as realistic than the 
objects of his study. The observer does not need a special status, he 
belongs to the world he is observing.


Note that is exactly contrary to some interpretations of QM, e.g. Bohr's

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1009/1009.4072v1.pdf

and more recently Asher Peres

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9711/9711003v1.pdf

The "collapse" of the wave function is easily explained as an epistemic 
event in one's description of the system.


Brent


With comp also. This allows monism: the researcher is embedded in the 
field that he searches. No need of a cut between subject and object. 
No need for an ontological dualism.






But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible,
a bit like the idea that God made the creation in six days some
millennia ago. We can't contradict such a statement, but it
necessitates a very complex theory with many "corrective
principles" which will be seen as ad hoc.
/(JM): how were the "SIX DAYS" measured before OUR time-frame was
'created???/



God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days was 
for him just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;)





In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no
certainties.
/(JM): conventional science, that is. We cannot speak for the
future/.



We can, accepting a theory. With comp we can explain that science will 
never know for sure, and that knowing anything for sure, except one 
own consciousness, is a case of insanity.
Of course comp might be false, in which case you might be right. Note 
also that there are many futures, both on the first person plane 
(hell, heaven, the Tibetan intermediate realms, etc.) and on the third 
person plane, as described by the wave function. All this by 
*conjecturing* comp and/or QM.






With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of
consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own
incompleteness, and a complete explanation (although not yet
completed, to be sure) of the origin of the appearance of
physical reality (both the quanta and the qualia).

To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other
computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a
problem much more complex for unclear reason.

But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp
is true, it has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in
arithmetic entails the possibility of its refutation, and should
never been taken as an axiom, just a meta-axiom, or an act of
faith. If not, we become inconsistent.

/ (JM): thanks, Bruno, for the wisdom./


You can thank the universal machine. I am just her messenger ;)





My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN
physics is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I
don't pretend this is obvious.

I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both
comp, the hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream
consequences.

Bruno

/(John)/


Have a good day, John,

Bruno









Richard

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

Richard,

On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,
If DM results in a cosmic consciousn

Re: Love and Free Will

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,


On 28 Apr 2011, at 21:40, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented  
and starting (JM):

John

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to  
suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave  
collapse), "


Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?



It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the  
computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the  
idea that QM is a universal theory.
(JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being  
false and QM being-NOT-a universal  theory?


In that case we must search for another theory in mind studies, and  
another theory in physics studies. But today, they work well,  
especially together, and the more we study them, the more astonishing  
they look. I like them, because I like to surprises. I like theories  
which shake my prejudices.








The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century  
and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by  
quantum mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.
 (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is  
an 'observer' reaistic as thought?


A theory can always be false. The problem of the collapse of the wave  
function is that it has to violate relativity, or physical realism or  
logic. Without collapse, an observer is at least as realistic than the  
objects of his study. The observer does not need a special status, he  
belongs to the world he is observing. With comp also. This allows  
monism: the researcher is embedded in the field that he searches. No  
need of a cut between subject and object. No need for an ontological  
dualism.






But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a  
bit like the idea that God made the creation in six days some  
millennia ago. We can't contradict such a statement, but it  
necessitates a very complex theory with many "corrective principles"  
which will be seen as ad hoc.
(JM): how were the "SIX DAYS" measured before OUR time-frame  
was 'created???


God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days was  
for him just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;)





In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no certainties.
(JM): conventional science, that is. We cannot speak for the  
future.


We can, accepting a theory. With comp we can explain that science will  
never know for sure, and that knowing anything for sure, except one  
own consciousness, is a case of insanity.
Of course comp might be false, in which case you might be right. Note  
also that there are many futures, both on the first person plane  
(hell, heaven, the Tibetan intermediate realms, etc.) and on the third  
person plane, as described by the wave function. All this by  
*conjecturing* comp and/or QM.





With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of  
consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own  
incompleteness, and a complete explanation (although not yet  
completed, to be sure) of the origin of the appearance of physical  
reality (both the quanta and the qualia).


To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other  
computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a problem  
much more complex for unclear reason.


But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp is  
true, it has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in  
arithmetic entails the possibility of its refutation, and should  
never been taken as an axiom, just a meta-axiom, or an act of faith.  
If not, we become inconsistent.

 (JM): thanks, Bruno, for the wisdom.


You can thank the universal machine. I am just her messenger ;)






My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN  
physics is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I  
don't pretend this is obvious.


I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both  
comp, the hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream  
consequences.


Bruno
 (John)


Have a good day, John,

Bruno









Richard

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

Richard,

On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,
could not it choose to select a single world from the many  
possible worlds?

Richard Ruquist


Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted  
in W and M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select  
M, in M. Both happenings will happen, if I can say.


You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication  
+  killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution  
to be done in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding  
to 

Re: Love and Free Will

[John Mikes]

Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented and
starting (JM):
John

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>  On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>  Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to
> suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "
>
> Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?
>
>
>
> It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the
> computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that
> QM is a universal theory.
>
*(JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false
and QM being-NOT- a universal  theory?*

>
> The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century and
> nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum
> mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.
>
* (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an
'observer' reaistic as thought?*

>
> But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a bit like
> the idea that God made the creation in six days some millennia ago. We can't
> contradict such a statement, but it necessitates a very complex theory with
> many "corrective principles" which will be seen as ad hoc.
> *(JM): how were the "SIX DAYS" measured before OUR time-frame was
> 'created???*
> In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no certainties.
> *(JM): conventional science, that is. We cannot speak for the
> future*.
>
  With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of
> consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own incompleteness, and
> a complete explanation (although not yet completed, to be sure) of the
> origin of the appearance of physical reality (both the quanta and the
> qualia).
>
> To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other
> computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a problem much more
> complex for unclear reason.
>
> But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp is true, it
> has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in arithmetic entails the
> possibility of its refutation, and should never been taken as an axiom, just
> a meta-axiom, or an act of faith. If not, we become inconsistent.
>
* (JM): thanks, Bruno, for the wisdom.*

>
>


>  My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN physics
> is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I don't pretend this
> is obvious.
>
> I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both comp, the
> hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream consequences.
>
> Bruno
>
 *(John)*

>
>
>
>  Richard
>
> On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> Richard,
>>
>>  On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>>  Bruno,
>>
>> If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,
>> could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible
>> worlds?
>> Richard Ruquist
>>
>>
>> Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted in W
>> and M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select M, in M. Both
>> happenings will happen, if I can say.
>>
>> You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication +
>>  killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution to be done
>> in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to "not take a plane
>> for W, nor for any other places". That is why a choice is possible in the
>> MW, through a notion of normal world (or most probable relative world) that
>> you can influence by the usual "determinist" means. If not you would give to
>> consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse
>> (like with the wave collapse), or even less plausible, to suppress the
>> existence of computations in the arithmetical world, which is as impossible
>> as suppressing the existence of a number.
>> So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the cosmic
>> consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else. It can, or has
>> to be both.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>> On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
>
> On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):
>>
>>  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know",
>> Chaos is: "I don't know" andstochastic is sort of a 
>> random.
>> ..."
>>
>> BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and
>> include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the 
>> result of
>> ignorance of some deeper level?
>>
>
> OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, an

Re: Love and Free Will

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Breuno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to  
suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave  
collapse), "


Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?



It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the  
computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea  
that QM is a universal theory.


The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century  
and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by  
quantum mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.


But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a bit  
like the idea that God made the creation in six days some millennia  
ago. We can't contradict such a statement, but it necessitates a very  
complex theory with many "corrective principles" which will be seen as  
ad hoc.


In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no certainties.

With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of  
consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own  
incompleteness, and a complete explanation (although not yet  
completed, to be sure) of the origin of the appearance of physical  
reality (both the quanta and the qualia).


To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other  
computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a problem  
much more complex for unclear reason.


But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp is  
true, it has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in arithmetic  
entails the possibility of its refutation, and should never been taken  
as an axiom, just a meta-axiom, or an act of faith. If not, we become  
inconsistent.


My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN  
physics is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I don't  
pretend this is obvious.


I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both comp,  
the hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream consequences.


Bruno




Richard

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

Richard,

On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,
could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible  
worlds?

Richard Ruquist


Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted  
in W and M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select  
M, in M. Both happenings will happen, if I can say.


You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication  
+  killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution  
to be done in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to  
"not take a plane for W, nor for any other places". That is why a  
choice is possible in the MW, through a notion of normal world (or  
most probable relative world) that you can influence by the usual  
"determinist" means. If not you would give to consciousness the  
ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with  
the wave collapse), or even less plausible, to suppress the  
existence of computations in the arithmetical world, which is as  
impossible as suppressing the existence of a number.
So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the  
cosmic consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else.  
It can, or has to be both.


Bruno








On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:

Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

 (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know",  
Chaos is: "I don't know" andstochastic is sort of a  
random. ..."


BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and  
include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the  
result of ignorance of some deeper level?


OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and  
a perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct  
consequence of determinism in the computer science. That is what is  
illustrated by the iteration of self-multiplication. Most  
observers, being repeatedly duplicated into W and M, will have not  
only random history (like WWMMMWMMMWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority  
will have incompressible experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self- 
duplication gives an example of abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to  
other long term determinist chaotic behavior).


In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of  
the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look  
below our computationalist subtitution level , our computations  
(our sub-level computations) are random.


This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a  
consequence of unitary evolution of the wf

Re: Love and Free Will

[Richard Ruquist]

Breuno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to
suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?
Richard

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Richard,
>
>  On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>  Bruno,
>
> If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,
> could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible worlds?
> Richard Ruquist
>
>
> Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted in W and
> M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select M, in M. Both
> happenings will happen, if I can say.
>
> You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication +
>  killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution to be done
> in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to "not take a plane
> for W, nor for any other places". That is why a choice is possible in the
> MW, through a notion of normal world (or most probable relative world) that
> you can influence by the usual "determinist" means. If not you would give to
> consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse
> (like with the wave collapse), or even less plausible, to suppress the
> existence of computations in the arithmetical world, which is as impossible
> as suppressing the existence of a number.
> So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the cosmic
> consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else. It can, or has
> to be both.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>> On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>


 On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:

 Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):
>
>  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos
> is: "I don't know" andstochastic is sort of a random. ..."
>
> BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and
> include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result 
> of
> ignorance of some deeper level?
>

 OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a
 perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence of
 determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by the
 iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly
 duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like
 WWMMMWMMMWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible
 experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example of
 abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic
 behavior).

 In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of the
 most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below our
 computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub-level
 computations) are random.

>>>
>>> This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a
>>> consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the
>>> deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of
>>> conscious experience.
>>>
>>
>> This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption, through
>> self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation of comp.
>> Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital
>> mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are obvious in
>> digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM). Indeed DM entails first
>> person indeterminacy, first person plural indeterminacy (many worlds), first
>> person non locality, and it is an "easy" exercise to show that it entials
>> non cloning of matter, and non emulability of matter (and thus the falsity
>> of digital physics a priori).
>>
>> It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it should
>> if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is already there,
>> because the logic of arithmetical observability by machine/numbers is indeed
>> a quantum logic. Comp can be said to already implies that the bottom
>> physicalness is symmetrical and non clonable. The arithmetical qubit cannot
>> be cloned nor erased (nor emulated by a digital machine, and this is perhaps
>> not confirmed by QM!).
>>
>> Bruno Marchal
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: Love and Free Will

[Bruno Marchal]

Richard,

On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,
could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible  
worlds?

Richard Ruquist


Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted in  
W and M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select M, in  
M. Both happenings will happen, if I can say.


You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication +   
killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution to be  
done in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to "not  
take a plane for W, nor for any other places". That is why a choice is  
possible in the MW, through a notion of normal world (or most probable  
relative world) that you can influence by the usual "determinist"  
means. If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress  
branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), or  
even less plausible, to suppress the existence of computations in the  
arithmetical world, which is as impossible as suppressing the  
existence of a number.
So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the  
cosmic consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else.  
It can, or has to be both.


Bruno








On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:

Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

 (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know",  
Chaos is: "I don't know" andstochastic is sort of a  
random. ..."


BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and  
include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the  
result of ignorance of some deeper level?


OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a  
perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence  
of determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated  
by the iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being  
repeatedly duplicated into W and M, will have not only random  
history (like WWMMMWMMMWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have  
incompressible experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication  
gives an example of abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long  
term determinist chaotic behavior).


In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of  
the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look  
below our computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our  
sub-level computations) are random.


This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a  
consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the  
deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the  
level of conscious experience.


This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption,  
through self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation  
of comp.
Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital  
mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are  
obvious in digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM).  
Indeed DM entails first person indeterminacy, first person plural  
indeterminacy (many worlds), first person non locality, and it is an  
"easy" exercise to show that it entials non cloning of matter, and  
non emulability of matter (and thus the falsity of digital physics a  
priori).


It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it  
should if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is  
already there, because the logic of arithmetical observability by  
machine/numbers is indeed a quantum logic. Comp can be said to  
already implies that the bottom physicalness is symmetrical and non  
clonable. The arithmetical qubit cannot be cloned nor erased (nor  
emulated by a digital machine, and this is perhaps not confirmed by  
QM!).


Bruno Marchal

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Love and Free Will

[meekerdb]

On 4/26/2011 12:50 PM, John Mikes wrote:
I am sure you write very smart things. I am not so familiar with the 
letters used as abbreviations (wf, DM and more) so I just listen to 
the music.

One thing though I am sure:
all you include is included within our yesterdays knowledge-base what 
is for sure *_more_* than the knowledge base way back /_before 
yesterday_/ - and *_LESS than it will be tomorrow_* (or say 1000 years 
from now).


One would hope so, although our knowledge may go to zero along with out 
numbers in less than 1000yrs.


I formulate my 'opinions'  (oh, not arguments, for heaven's sake) in 
my agnosticism about such adages in the future invalidating some "nice 
and acceptable" TRUTH we pamper in our present thinking.
If there is 'random' in your worldview, how is it restricted in a way 
not to interfere with those "LAWS" conventional sciences formulated 
before such random changes occurred?


I'm surprised you would appeal to "conventional sciences" since you 
express such agnosticism about their validity.  There was no prior, 
deterministic law dictating the decay of radioactive nuclei or the 
chemical reaction of two molecules.  But they were thought to obey 
stochastic laws that defined the probabilities of different possible 
events.  Quantum mechanics proved capable of calculating these 
stochastic laws from more fundamental variables.  The same QM predicts 
that some other events will occur with virtual certainty and some not at 
all; and that's what restricts 'random'.


Also: it may be my imperfection in my vocabulary, but erasing 'random' 
- making every change in relations based on some 'originating' factor 
- shows a */DETERMINISTIC/*  and not some indeterministic view.


I think that is the standard meaning.

We may not clearly identify all those originating factors (e.g. in the 
so far not detected parts of the totality), but so works my agnosticism.


Certainly deterministic does not imply predictable.  Even if we possess 
a deterministic law, our ability to predict is limited by our knowledge 
of initial states and our ability to calculate.



The PHYSICAL WORLD is a nice figment and we can live with it for now.


But how can you know that unless you know the reality of which it's a 
figment?


Brent

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Re: Love and Free Will

[John Mikes]

I am sure you write very smart things. I am not so familiar with the letters
used as abbreviations (wf, DM and more) so I just listen to the music.
One thing though I am sure:

all you include is included within our yesterdays knowledge-base what is for
sure *more* than the knowledge base way back *before yesterday* - and *LESS
than it will be tomorrow* (or say 1000 years from now). I formulate my
'opinions'  (oh, not arguments, for heaven's sake) in my agnosticism about
such adages in the future invalidating some "nice and acceptable" TRUTH we
pamper in our present thinking.

If there is 'random' in your worldview, how is it restricted in a way not to
interfere with those "LAWS" conventional sciences formulated before such
random changes occurred?
Also: it may be my imperfection in my vocabulary, but erasing 'random' -
making every change in relations based on some 'originating' factor - shows
a *DETERMINISTIC*  and not some indeterministic view. We may not clearly
identify all those originating factors (e.g. in the so far not detected
parts of the totality), but so works my agnosticism.

The PHYSICAL WORLD is a nice figment and we can live with it for now.

John



On Mon, Apr 25, 2011 at 1:50 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):
>
> *  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos
> is: "I don't know" andstochastic is sort of a random. ..."
> *
>
> *BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and
> include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of
> ignorance of some deeper level? *
>
>
> OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a
> perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence of
> determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by the
> iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly
> duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like
> WWMMMWMMMWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible
> experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example of
> abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic
> behavior).
>
> In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of the
> most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below our
> computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub-level
> computations) are random.
>
>
> This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a
> consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the
> deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of
> conscious experience.
>
> Brent
>
>
>  With comp, determinism entaills first person and first person plural
> intrinsic randomness existence.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> --
>  You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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Re: Love and Free Will

[Richard Ruquist]

Bruno,

If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,
could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible worlds?
Richard Ruquist

On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:
>>>
>>> Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos
 is: "I don't know" andstochastic is sort of a random. ..."

 BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and
 include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result 
 of
 ignorance of some deeper level?

>>>
>>> OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a
>>> perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence of
>>> determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by the
>>> iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly
>>> duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like
>>> WWMMMWMMMWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible
>>> experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example of
>>> abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic
>>> behavior).
>>>
>>> In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of the
>>> most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below our
>>> computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub-level
>>> computations) are random.
>>>
>>
>> This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a
>> consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the
>> deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of
>> conscious experience.
>>
>
> This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption, through
> self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation of comp.
> Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital
> mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are obvious in
> digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM). Indeed DM entails first
> person indeterminacy, first person plural indeterminacy (many worlds), first
> person non locality, and it is an "easy" exercise to show that it entials
> non cloning of matter, and non emulability of matter (and thus the falsity
> of digital physics a priori).
>
> It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it should if
> both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is already there,
> because the logic of arithmetical observability by machine/numbers is indeed
> a quantum logic. Comp can be said to already implies that the bottom
> physicalness is symmetrical and non clonable. The arithmetical qubit cannot
> be cloned nor erased (nor emulated by a digital machine, and this is perhaps
> not confirmed by QM!).
>
> Bruno Marchal
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>

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Re: Love and Free Will

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:


Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know",  
Chaos is: "I don't know" andstochastic is sort of  
a random. ..."


BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and  
include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the  
result of ignorance of some deeper level?


OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and  
a perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct  
consequence of determinism in the computer science. That is what is  
illustrated by the iteration of self-multiplication. Most  
observers, being repeatedly duplicated into W and M, will have not  
only random history (like WWMMMWMMMWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority  
will have incompressible experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self- 
duplication gives an example of abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to  
other long term determinist chaotic behavior).


In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of  
the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look  
below our computationalist subtitution level , our computations  
(our sub-level computations) are random.


This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a  
consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the  
deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the  
level of conscious experience.


This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption, through  
self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation of comp.
Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital  
mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are obvious  
in digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM). Indeed DM  
entails first person indeterminacy, first person plural indeterminacy  
(many worlds), first person non locality, and it is an "easy" exercise  
to show that it entials non cloning of matter, and non emulability of  
matter (and thus the falsity of digital physics a priori).


It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it  
should if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is  
already there, because the logic of arithmetical observability by  
machine/numbers is indeed a quantum logic. Comp can be said to already  
implies that the bottom physicalness is symmetrical and non clonable.  
The arithmetical qubit cannot be cloned nor erased (nor emulated by a  
digital machine, and this is perhaps not confirmed by QM!).


Bruno Marchal

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Love and Free Will

[meekerdb]

On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:


Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):
/  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I 
don't know" andstochastic is sort of a random. ..."/


*BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and 
include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the 
result of ignorance of some deeper level? *


OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a 
perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence 
of determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by 
the iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly 
duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like 
WWMMMWMMMWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible 
experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example 
of abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist 
chaotic behavior).


In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of 
the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below 
our computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our 
sub-level computations) are random.


This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a 
consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the 
deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of 
conscious experience.


Brent

With comp, determinism entaills first person and first person plural 
intrinsic randomness existence.


Bruno


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Re: Love and Free Will

[meekerdb]

On 4/24/2011 8:32 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Apr 23, 4:26 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
   

Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

 *  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos
is: "I don't know" andstochastic is sort of a random. ..."*

*BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include
the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of
ignorance of some deeper level? *
**
Please consider first my - * 'in such view' * - furthermore may I remind you
of all those "natural law" based (physical and other) conventional
scientific tenets that (in our science) we can and do rely on? No
haphazardly emerging counter-facts disturb the "scientific" picture by a
'random' input of the unexpect/ed/able.
 


Maybe not beyond what has already been marshalled under stochastic
laws.

   

I am not an expert in 'random': my mother tongue (not Indo-European) does
not include such term (word) - we used earlier: the 'exbeliebig' translated
(from Latino-German: as 'liked'). Now even in this language they apply the
word "RANDOM" because 'we may not LIKE it.
 

If you can understand what determinism means, you can understand what
indeterminism means.
   
   

Russell S - if I remember well - spoke about some 'small?' random,
identified within a topic - please correct me if I am wrong. I am talking
about the "absolute?" random, having no math - or natural limitations.
Like: 'out of a blue'.

*BM: But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent with
all our current knowledge.  So to assert that the world is deterministic is
only presumption.

*Brent, your slip is showing: *"all our current knowledge"* is restricted
to our present  conventional sciences based on what I call
*  JM: "...imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in our limited
knowledge." *
 


This makes a false constrast between models and out current knowledge.  
Our current knowledge, so called, is just embodied in our models which 
we rely on, pending further discoveries.  To recognize that the 
intrinsic randomness of QM is just an element of our current model no 
more justifies asserting that real reality must be deterministic than 
noting that our current model of the Earth as a bumpy ellipsoid is 
subject of refinement, justifies asserting the Earth is flat.  It's is 
fine, and scientific, to criticize our current knowledge - but it needs 
to be supported by more than just the fact that our knowledge is 
provisional, because it will *always* be provisional.



I would call QM a brilliant adage within our *present model-view* *(the
physical world figment*).
And YES, I agree that "deterministic" is a presumption. (So far it did not
pop off from my image). Agnosticism can take it
With my (yes, I am human) logic I need some rules instead of the total
'randomness' we happen to live in.


I think this bespeaks a common misconception; perhaps related to the 
indeterminism=not-determinism Peter points to above.  Random doesn't 
mean "anything can happen" or "nothing can be predicted".  It can be 
used to model something that is deterministic, but not worth the effort 
to determine, or something that is not determined.  But it may be very 
constrained.  Something may be random, but within a very small range.  
And they may be very well described by know distributions - as is the 
case for coin tosses and nuclear decays.


Brent


Some origin - beyond my present
knowledge-based imagination - and some course of the Everything - who knows
where? - at a certain point of which we 'exist' and view the World as well
as our capabilities allow.

John M
 


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Re: Love and Free Will

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:


Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know",  
Chaos is: "I don't know" andstochastic is sort of a  
random. ..."


BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and  
include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the  
result of ignorance of some deeper level?


OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a  
perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence  
of determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by  
the iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly  
duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like  
WWMMMWMMMWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible  
experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example  
of abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist  
chaotic behavior).


In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of  
the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below  
our computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub- 
level computations) are random. With comp, determinism entaills first  
person and first person plural intrinsic randomness existence.


Bruno




Please consider first my -  'in such view'  - furthermore may I  
remind you of all those "natural law" based (physical and other)  
conventional scientific tenets that (in our science) we can and do  
rely on? No haphazardly emerging counter-facts disturb the  
"scientific" picture by a 'random' input of the unexpect/ed/able.
I am not an expert in 'random': my mother tongue (not Indo-European)  
does not include such term (word) - we used earlier: the  
'exbeliebig' translated (from Latino-German: as 'liked'). Now even  
in this language they apply the word "RANDOM" because 'we may not  
LIKE it.
Russell S - if I remember well - spoke about some 'small?' random,  
identified within a topic - please correct me if I am wrong. I am  
talking about the "absolute?" random, having no math - or natural  
limitations.  Like: 'out of a blue'.


BM: But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent  
with all our current knowledge.  So to assert that the world is  
deterministic is only presumption.


Brent, your slip is showing: "all our current knowledge" is  
restricted to our present  conventional sciences based on what I call
  JM: "...imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in our  
limited knowledge."


I would call QM a brilliant adage within our present model-view (the  
physical world figment).
And YES, I agree that "deterministic" is a presumption. (So far it  
did not pop off from my image). Agnosticism can take it
With my (yes, I am human) logic I need some rules instead of the  
total 'randomness' we happen to live in. Some origin - beyond my  
present knowledge-based imagination - and some course of the  
Everything - who knows where? - at a certain point of which we  
'exist' and view the World as well as our capabilities allow.


John M


On Fri, Apr 22, 2011 at 4:36 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 4/22/2011 1:23 PM, John Mikes wrote:


Peter,
if we 'free-up' our minds to think wider than our conventional  
sciences based 'unconventionality' (as applied on this list  
frequently) and recognize the unlimited Everything in the  
complexity of the wholeness we end up in (my?) agnosticism:
We know only part of the total, visualize WITHIN our mind- 
restricted imaging and formulate 'models' of the already known  
world (already: because it widened by newer input historically as  
we 'learn'). The totality's inter influenceing results in changing  
relations - partly followable - acknowledged by the part of our  
'then' knowledge.
In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know"  
and stochastic is sort of a random.


Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and  
include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the  
result of ignorance of some deeper level?



What conventional science does is a compromise into the "almost":  
our technology is "almost perfect", some planes fall off from the  
sky, some sicknesses/wars break out, some genetic mishaps occur,  
some theories fail, etc. etc. Compromising means to invent cute  
factors that enhance a match (at least mathematically) in cases of  
trouble. Presumptions make assumptions and vice versa, in endless  
series and at the end it is believed as a fact.


Deterministic? there is SOME order that keeps the world churning,  
applying ALL relational changes in the wholeness including ALL  
ingredients of the Everything. We don't know what
are such 'ingredients' only the imagined 'model-substitutions' we  
use in our limited knowledge.


But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent  
with all our current knowledge.  So to a

Re: Love and Free Will

[1Z]

On Apr 23, 4:26 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):
>
>                 *  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos
> is: "I don't know" and                stochastic is sort of a random. ..."*
>
> *BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include
> the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of
> ignorance of some deeper level? *
> **
> Please consider first my - * 'in such view' * - furthermore may I remind you
> of all those "natural law" based (physical and other) conventional
> scientific tenets that (in our science) we can and do rely on? No
> haphazardly emerging counter-facts disturb the "scientific" picture by a
> 'random' input of the unexpect/ed/able.


Maybe not beyond what has already been marshalled under stochastic
laws.

> I am not an expert in 'random': my mother tongue (not Indo-European) does
> not include such term (word) - we used earlier: the 'exbeliebig' translated
> (from Latino-German: as 'liked'). Now even in this language they apply the
> word "RANDOM" because 'we may not LIKE it.

If you can understand what determinism means, you can understand what
indeterminism means.

> Russell S - if I remember well - spoke about some 'small?' random,
> identified within a topic - please correct me if I am wrong. I am talking
> about the "absolute?" random, having no math - or natural limitations.
> Like: 'out of a blue'.
>
> *BM: But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent with
> all our current knowledge.  So to assert that the world is deterministic is
> only presumption.
>
> *Brent, your slip is showing: *"all our current knowledge"* is restricted
> to our present  conventional sciences based on what I call
> *              JM: "...imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in our limited
> knowledge." *
>
> I would call QM a brilliant adage within our *present model-view* *(the
> physical world figment*).
> And YES, I agree that "deterministic" is a presumption. (So far it did not
> pop off from my image). Agnosticism can take it
> With my (yes, I am human) logic I need some rules instead of the total
> 'randomness' we happen to live in. Some origin - beyond my present
> knowledge-based imagination - and some course of the Everything - who knows
> where? - at a certain point of which we 'exist' and view the World as well
> as our capabilities allow.
>
> John M
>
> On Fri, Apr 22, 2011 at 4:36 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> >  On 4/22/2011 1:23 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>
> > Peter,
> > if we 'free-up' our minds to think wider than our conventional sciences
> > based 'unconventionality' (as applied on this list frequently) and recognize
> > the unlimited Everything in the complexity of the wholeness we end up in
> > (my?) agnosticism:
> > We know only part of the total, visualize WITHIN our mind-restricted
> > imaging and formulate 'models' of the already known world (already: because
> > it widened by newer input historically as we 'learn'). The totality's inter
> > influenceing results in changing relations - partly followable -
> > acknowledged by the part of our 'then' knowledge.
> > In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and
> > stochastic is sort of a random.
>
> > Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include the
> > thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of ignorance
> > of some deeper level?
>
> >  What conventional science does is a compromise into the "almost": our
> > technology is "almost perfect", some planes fall off from the sky, some
> > sicknesses/wars break out, some genetic mishaps occur, some theories fail,
> > etc. etc. Compromising means to invent cute factors that enhance a match (at
> > least mathematically) in cases of trouble. Presumptions make assumptions and
> > vice versa, in endless series and at the end it is believed as a fact.
>
> > Deterministic? there is SOME order that keeps the world churning, applying
> > ALL relational changes in the wholeness including ALL ingredients of the
> > Everything. We don't know what
> > are such 'ingredients' only the imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in
> > our limited knowledge.
>
> > But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent with all
> > our current knowledge.  So to assert that the world is deterministic is only
> > presumption.
>
> > Brent
>
> >   We don't know what kind of alterations the relations in the unlimited
> > totality may undergo, we
> > only experience SOME and interpret them within our figment (physical
> > world). Presumably -
> > and now I use this word as well  - there is an order in the wholeness
> > and this encompasses all the totality in the alterations of the
> > relationships - so I feel justified to use
> > the word 'deterministic'. Not to "understand" it, though. In limbo - you
> > say: be my guest.
>
> > We cannot overstep our capabilities and think only within our models. By
> > human logic, whi

Re: Love and Free Will

[John Mikes]

Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

*  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos
is: "I don't know" andstochastic is sort of a random. ..."*

*BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include
the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of
ignorance of some deeper level? *
**
Please consider first my - * 'in such view' * - furthermore may I remind you
of all those "natural law" based (physical and other) conventional
scientific tenets that (in our science) we can and do rely on? No
haphazardly emerging counter-facts disturb the "scientific" picture by a
'random' input of the unexpect/ed/able.
I am not an expert in 'random': my mother tongue (not Indo-European) does
not include such term (word) - we used earlier: the 'exbeliebig' translated
(from Latino-German: as 'liked'). Now even in this language they apply the
word "RANDOM" because 'we may not LIKE it.
Russell S - if I remember well - spoke about some 'small?' random,
identified within a topic - please correct me if I am wrong. I am talking
about the "absolute?" random, having no math - or natural limitations.
Like: 'out of a blue'.

*BM: But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent with
all our current knowledge.  So to assert that the world is deterministic is
only presumption.

*Brent, your slip is showing: *"all our current knowledge"* is restricted
to our present  conventional sciences based on what I call
*  JM: "...imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in our limited
knowledge." *

I would call QM a brilliant adage within our *present model-view* *(the
physical world figment*).
And YES, I agree that "deterministic" is a presumption. (So far it did not
pop off from my image). Agnosticism can take it
With my (yes, I am human) logic I need some rules instead of the total
'randomness' we happen to live in. Some origin - beyond my present
knowledge-based imagination - and some course of the Everything - who knows
where? - at a certain point of which we 'exist' and view the World as well
as our capabilities allow.

John M


On Fri, Apr 22, 2011 at 4:36 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 4/22/2011 1:23 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Peter,
> if we 'free-up' our minds to think wider than our conventional sciences
> based 'unconventionality' (as applied on this list frequently) and recognize
> the unlimited Everything in the complexity of the wholeness we end up in
> (my?) agnosticism:
> We know only part of the total, visualize WITHIN our mind-restricted
> imaging and formulate 'models' of the already known world (already: because
> it widened by newer input historically as we 'learn'). The totality's inter
> influenceing results in changing relations - partly followable -
> acknowledged by the part of our 'then' knowledge.
> In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and
> stochastic is sort of a random.
>
>
> Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include the
> thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of ignorance
> of some deeper level?
>
>
>  What conventional science does is a compromise into the "almost": our
> technology is "almost perfect", some planes fall off from the sky, some
> sicknesses/wars break out, some genetic mishaps occur, some theories fail,
> etc. etc. Compromising means to invent cute factors that enhance a match (at
> least mathematically) in cases of trouble. Presumptions make assumptions and
> vice versa, in endless series and at the end it is believed as a fact.
>
> Deterministic? there is SOME order that keeps the world churning, applying
> ALL relational changes in the wholeness including ALL ingredients of the
> Everything. We don't know what
> are such 'ingredients' only the imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in
> our limited knowledge.
>
>
> But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent with all
> our current knowledge.  So to assert that the world is deterministic is only
> presumption.
>
> Brent
>
>   We don't know what kind of alterations the relations in the unlimited
> totality may undergo, we
> only experience SOME and interpret them within our figment (physical
> world). Presumably -
> and now I use this word as well  - there is an order in the wholeness
> and this encompasses all the totality in the alterations of the
> relationships - so I feel justified to use
> the word 'deterministic'. Not to "understand" it, though. In limbo - you
> say: be my guest.
>
> We cannot overstep our capabilities and think only within our models. By
> human logic, which has no claim to be the general characteristic of nature
> (the totality). We think human. Me, too.
> A bit stepping further seems to be allowed in 'anticipation' what I just
> study how to get to it,
> on the bases of Robert Rosen and Mihai Nadin. I am not there yet.
>
> Rules, mathematical formula, quantum science, physics, other conventional
> sciences: all
> fi

Re: Love and Free Will

[1Z]

On Apr 22, 9:23 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> Peter,
> if we 'free-up' our minds to think wider than our conventional sciences
> based 'unconventionality' (as applied on this list frequently) and recognize
> the unlimited Everything in the complexity of the wholeness we end up in
> (my?) agnosticism:
> We know only part of the total, visualize WITHIN our mind-restricted imaging
> and formulate 'models' of the already known world (already: because it
> widened by newer input historically as we 'learn'). The totality's inter
> influenceing results in changing relations - partly followable -
> acknowledged by the part of our 'then' knowledge.
> In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and
> stochastic is sort of a random.

Don't known what? The HIdden Variables that mean apparent
indeterminism
actually stems from determinism. Your position is completely
inconsistent. You
are saying we can't know or understand things we can see, they are
mere "models",
but we can know that there is this  underlying determinism which we
can't see..

>What conventional science does is a
> compromise into the "almost": our technology is "almost perfect", some
> planes fall off from the sky, some sicknesses/wars break out, some genetic
> mishaps occur, some theories fail, etc. etc. Compromising means to invent
> cute factors that enhance a match (at least mathematically) in cases of
> trouble. Presumptions make assumptions and vice versa, in endless series and
> at the end it is believed as a fact.
>
> Deterministic? there is SOME order that keeps the world churning,

Yep. And "some order" means "stochastic", not deteministic.

> applying
> ALL relational changes in the wholeness including ALL ingredients of the
> Everything. We don't know what
> are such 'ingredients' only the imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in our
> limited knowledge.
> We don't know what kind of alterations the relations in the unlimited
> totality may undergo, we
> only experience SOME and interpret them within our figment (physical world).
> Presumably -
> and now I use this word as well  - there is an order in the wholeness and
> this encompasses all the totality in the alterations of the relationships -
> so I feel justified to use
> the word 'deterministic'. Not to "understand" it, though. In limbo - you
> say: be my guest.
>
> We cannot overstep our capabilities and think only within our models. By
> human logic, which has no claim to be the general characteristic of nature
> (the totality). We think human. Me, too.
> A bit stepping further seems to be allowed in 'anticipation' what I just
> study how to get to it,
> on the bases of Robert Rosen and Mihai Nadin. I am not there yet.
>
> Rules, mathematical formula, quantum science, physics, other conventional
> sciences: all
> figments of the human mind how to explain the partial phenomena we
> 'accepted' over the time of our existence here on Earth.
>
> One more obstacle: users of different vocabularies cannot effectively argue
> with each other,
> the meaning of the words is different. Bruno has a vocabulary, conventional
> sciences use another one, my concepts are differently identified, religions
> have their own versions, every
> one understands arguments within their own vocabulary - the rest is
> 'stupid'.
>
> Regards
> John
>

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Re: Love and Free Will

[meekerdb]

On 4/22/2011 1:23 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Peter,
if we 'free-up' our minds to think wider than our conventional 
sciences based 'unconventionality' (as applied on this list 
frequently) and recognize the unlimited Everything in the complexity 
of the wholeness we end up in (my?) agnosticism:
We know only part of the total, visualize WITHIN our mind-restricted 
imaging and formulate 'models' of the already known world (already: 
because it widened by newer input historically as we 'learn'). The 
totality's inter influenceing results in changing relations - partly 
followable - acknowledged by the part of our 'then' knowledge.
In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and 
stochastic is sort of a random.


Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include 
the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of 
ignorance of some deeper level?


What conventional science does is a compromise into the "almost": our 
technology is "almost perfect", some planes fall off from the sky, 
some sicknesses/wars break out, some genetic mishaps occur, some 
theories fail, etc. etc. Compromising means to invent cute factors 
that enhance a match (at least mathematically) in cases of trouble. 
Presumptions make assumptions and vice versa, in endless series and at 
the end it is believed as a fact.
Deterministic? there is SOME order that keeps the world churning, 
applying ALL relational changes in the wholeness including ALL 
ingredients of the Everything. We don't know what
are such 'ingredients' only the imagined 'model-substitutions' we use 
in our limited knowledge.


But we do know that the intrinsic randomness of QM is consistent with 
all our current knowledge.  So to assert that the world is deterministic 
is only presumption.


Brent

We don't know what kind of alterations the relations in the unlimited 
totality may undergo, we
only experience SOME and interpret them within our figment (physical 
world). Presumably -
and now I use this word as well  - there is an order in the 
wholeness and this encompasses all the totality in the alterations of 
the relationships - so I feel justified to use
the word 'deterministic'. Not to "understand" it, though. In limbo - 
you say: be my guest.
We cannot overstep our capabilities and think only within our models. 
By human logic, which has no claim to be the general characteristic of 
nature (the totality). We think human. Me, too.
A bit stepping further seems to be allowed in 'anticipation' what I 
just study how to get to it,

on the bases of Robert Rosen and Mihai Nadin. I am not there yet.
Rules, mathematical formula, quantum science, physics, other 
conventional sciences: all
figments of the human mind how to explain the partial phenomena we 
'accepted' over the time of our existence here on Earth.
One more obstacle: users of different vocabularies cannot effectively 
argue with each other,
the meaning of the words is different. Bruno has a vocabulary, 
conventional sciences use another one, my concepts are differently 
identified, religions have their own versions, every
one understands arguments within their own vocabulary - the rest is 
'stupid'.

Regards
John

n Thu, Apr 21, 2011 at 11:33 AM, 1Z > wrote:




On Apr 20, 8:53 pm, John Mikes mailto:jami...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> IZ wrote:
>
> *"Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the
appearance
> of order emerges from randomness"*.
>
> 'Stochastic is no more than not assignable to our KNOWN rules of
choice.

It's still rules. If there are no known rules BECAUSE the actual rules
"out there"
are not deterministic, science can still function with the sort of
rules it still
functions with. In you previous comment, ou sounded like you were
deriving the conclusion "everything
is deterministic" from the premise "science works on rules", and that
does not
in fact follow. Now you seem to be deriving "everything is
deterministic" from itself.

> This is a natural outcome within the view I discribed.
> And the 'order' tha '*emerges'* from randomness? maybe it is only a
> mathematical formula - just describing the experience,

Maybe a deterministic law "is just a mathematical formula". The point
is
whether we should have respect for the fact that these things work,
and whether we should do so in a biased or an even-handed way.
The determinist is impressed by Newton's deterministic laws,and happy
to reify them,
 but not by the Law of Large Numbers, which shows how apparent
order can emerge from chaos. Yet both work. So it looks like
the determinist is running on bias.

> *or *- by additional
> input - the missing part that 'made' the "randomness" in the
first place,
> dissipates by our knowledge being expanded (enriched).
> I appreciate ONE true randomness (in math): "Take ANY number...

Re: Love and Free Will

[John Mikes]

Peter,
if we 'free-up' our minds to think wider than our conventional sciences
based 'unconventionality' (as applied on this list frequently) and recognize
the unlimited Everything in the complexity of the wholeness we end up in
(my?) agnosticism:
We know only part of the total, visualize WITHIN our mind-restricted imaging
and formulate 'models' of the already known world (already: because it
widened by newer input historically as we 'learn'). The totality's inter
influenceing results in changing relations - partly followable -
acknowledged by the part of our 'then' knowledge.
In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and
stochastic is sort of a random. What conventional science does is a
compromise into the "almost": our technology is "almost perfect", some
planes fall off from the sky, some sicknesses/wars break out, some genetic
mishaps occur, some theories fail, etc. etc. Compromising means to invent
cute factors that enhance a match (at least mathematically) in cases of
trouble. Presumptions make assumptions and vice versa, in endless series and
at the end it is believed as a fact.

Deterministic? there is SOME order that keeps the world churning, applying
ALL relational changes in the wholeness including ALL ingredients of the
Everything. We don't know what
are such 'ingredients' only the imagined 'model-substitutions' we use in our
limited knowledge.
We don't know what kind of alterations the relations in the unlimited
totality may undergo, we
only experience SOME and interpret them within our figment (physical world).
Presumably -
and now I use this word as well  - there is an order in the wholeness and
this encompasses all the totality in the alterations of the relationships -
so I feel justified to use
the word 'deterministic'. Not to "understand" it, though. In limbo - you
say: be my guest.

We cannot overstep our capabilities and think only within our models. By
human logic, which has no claim to be the general characteristic of nature
(the totality). We think human. Me, too.
A bit stepping further seems to be allowed in 'anticipation' what I just
study how to get to it,
on the bases of Robert Rosen and Mihai Nadin. I am not there yet.

Rules, mathematical formula, quantum science, physics, other conventional
sciences: all
figments of the human mind how to explain the partial phenomena we
'accepted' over the time of our existence here on Earth.

One more obstacle: users of different vocabularies cannot effectively argue
with each other,
the meaning of the words is different. Bruno has a vocabulary, conventional
sciences use another one, my concepts are differently identified, religions
have their own versions, every
one understands arguments within their own vocabulary - the rest is
'stupid'.

Regards
John

n Thu, Apr 21, 2011 at 11:33 AM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Apr 20, 8:53 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> > IZ wrote:
> >
> > *"Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the appearance
> > of order emerges from randomness"*.
> >
> > 'Stochastic is no more than not assignable to our KNOWN rules of choice.
>
> It's still rules. If there are no known rules BECAUSE the actual rules
> "out there"
> are not deterministic, science can still function with the sort of
> rules it still
> functions with. In you previous comment, ou sounded like you were
> deriving the conclusion "everything
> is deterministic" from the premise "science works on rules", and that
> does not
> in fact follow. Now you seem to be deriving "everything is
> deterministic" from itself.
>
> > This is a natural outcome within the view I discribed.
> > And the 'order' tha '*emerges'* from randomness? maybe it is only a
> > mathematical formula - just describing the experience,
>
> Maybe a deterministic law "is just a mathematical formula". The point
> is
> whether we should have respect for the fact that these things work,
> and whether we should do so in a biased or an even-handed way.
> The determinist is impressed by Newton's deterministic laws,and happy
> to reify them,
>  but not by the Law of Large Numbers, which shows how apparent
> order can emerge from chaos. Yet both work. So it looks like
> the determinist is running on bias.
>
> > *or *- by additional
> > input - the missing part that 'made' the "randomness" in the first place,
> > dissipates by our knowledge being expanded (enriched).
> > I appreciate ONE true randomness (in math): "Take ANY number..."
> (puzzles).
> >
>  > On Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 7:04 PM, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > On Apr 19, 9:39 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> > > > *Brent wrote:*
> >
> > > > **
> > > > *"I would point out that "indeterminism" can have two different
> sources.
> > > > One is internal, due to the occasional quantum random event that gets
> > > > amplified to quasi-classical action.  The other, much more common, is
> the
> > > > unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic) external event that
> > > influences
> > > > one through perception.  I don't think this affects the ab

Re: Love and Free Will

[1Z]

On Apr 20, 8:53 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> IZ wrote:
>
> *"Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the appearance
> of order emerges from randomness"*.
>
> 'Stochastic is no more than not assignable to our KNOWN rules of choice.

It's still rules. If there are no known rules BECAUSE the actual rules
"out there"
are not deterministic, science can still function with the sort of
rules it still
functions with. In you previous comment, ou sounded like you were
deriving the conclusion "everything
is deterministic" from the premise "science works on rules", and that
does not
in fact follow. Now you seem to be deriving "everything is
deterministic" from itself.

> This is a natural outcome within the view I discribed.
> And the 'order' tha '*emerges'* from randomness? maybe it is only a
> mathematical formula - just describing the experience,

Maybe a deterministic law "is just a mathematical formula". The point
is
whether we should have respect for the fact that these things work,
and whether we should do so in a biased or an even-handed way.
The determinist is impressed by Newton's deterministic laws,and happy
to reify them,
 but not by the Law of Large Numbers, which shows how apparent
order can emerge from chaos. Yet both work. So it looks like
the determinist is running on bias.

> *or *- by additional
> input - the missing part that 'made' the "randomness" in the first place,
> dissipates by our knowledge being expanded (enriched).
> I appreciate ONE true randomness (in math): "Take ANY number..." (puzzles).
>
> On Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 7:04 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > On Apr 19, 9:39 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> > > *Brent wrote:*
>
> > > **
> > > *"I would point out that "indeterminism" can have two different sources.
> > > One is internal, due to the occasional quantum random event that gets
> > > amplified to quasi-classical action.  The other, much more common, is the
> > > unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic) external event that
> > influences
> > > one through perception.  I don't think this affects the above analysis
> > > except to qualify the idea that external indeterminism is justly
> > considered
> > > enslavement*."
>
> > > An enlightened Hungarian king wrote a royal order in the 13th c. (King
> > > Coloman, the bookworm) "De Strigiis quae non sunt..." i.e. "About the
> > >  sorcerers that do NOT exist..." - yet 1/2 millennium later they still
> > burnt
> > > witches the World over. So is it with the ominous
> > > Fre-Will, and many more atavistically developed meme-stuff. Especially in
> > > the theocratic religion chapters, but conventional science not exempted
> > > either. As much as I like Brent's remark, I point out the (conventional
> > > science) figment of the Physical World and its domains like a 'quantum
> > > random event' - which would make all our 'ordered' world (view)
> > irrelevant
> > > and haphazardously changing, instead of following those 'oganized'
> > physics-
> > > (and other scientific)- rules we 'beleive in" and apply.
>
> > Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the appearance
> > of
> > order emerges from randomness.
>
> >  Even Brent's
> > > "quasi-classical action" is part of our scientific figment. Those
> > "possibly
> > > deterministic" EXTERNAL events are within our 'model' of the so far known
> > > part we carry (in pesonalized adjustment) in our 'mind' - outside that
> > SELF
> > > in our mini-solipsism. Part of our *perceived reality.*
>
> > > I like* * "*the unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic)*'
> >  distinction
> > > as pointing to the influences upon (our known) topics WITHIN the limited
> > > model of our perceived reality by the 'beyond model' infinite complexity
> > of
> > > the everything. We have no way to learn what that infinite rest of the
> > world
> > > may be, yet it influences the part we got access to so it is
> > deterministic
> > > in our indeterministic - unpredictable  world.
> > > "Enslavement" is a term I would be careful to use in such discussion
> > because
> > > of its historic - societal general meaning. We - in my opinion - are not
> > > slaves in the unlimited everything: we are part of it.Embedded into and
> > > influenced by all of it.
>
> > > We just do not see beyond our limitations - my agnosticism.
>
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> > "Everything List" group.
> > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> > For more options, visit this group at
> >http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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Re: Love and Free Will

[John Mikes]

IZ wrote:

*"Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the appearance
of order emerges from randomness"*.

'Stochastic is no more than not assignable to our KNOWN rules of choice.
This is a natural outcome within the view I discribed.
And the 'order' tha '*emerges'* from randomness? maybe it is only a
mathematical formula - just describing the experience, *or *- by additional
input - the missing part that 'made' the "randomness" in the first place,
dissipates by our knowledge being expanded (enriched).
I appreciate ONE true randomness (in math): "Take ANY number..." (puzzles).


On Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 7:04 PM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Apr 19, 9:39 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> > *Brent wrote:*
> >
> > **
> > *"I would point out that "indeterminism" can have two different sources.
> > One is internal, due to the occasional quantum random event that gets
> > amplified to quasi-classical action.  The other, much more common, is the
> > unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic) external event that
> influences
> > one through perception.  I don't think this affects the above analysis
> > except to qualify the idea that external indeterminism is justly
> considered
> > enslavement*."
> >
> > An enlightened Hungarian king wrote a royal order in the 13th c. (King
> > Coloman, the bookworm) "De Strigiis quae non sunt..." i.e. "About the
> >  sorcerers that do NOT exist..." - yet 1/2 millennium later they still
> burnt
> > witches the World over. So is it with the ominous
> > Fre-Will, and many more atavistically developed meme-stuff. Especially in
> > the theocratic religion chapters, but conventional science not exempted
> > either. As much as I like Brent's remark, I point out the (conventional
> > science) figment of the Physical World and its domains like a 'quantum
> > random event' - which would make all our 'ordered' world (view)
> irrelevant
> > and haphazardously changing, instead of following those 'oganized'
> physics-
> > (and other scientific)- rules we 'beleive in" and apply.
>
> Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the appearance
> of
> order emerges from randomness.
>
>  Even Brent's
> > "quasi-classical action" is part of our scientific figment. Those
> "possibly
> > deterministic" EXTERNAL events are within our 'model' of the so far known
> > part we carry (in pesonalized adjustment) in our 'mind' - outside that
> SELF
> > in our mini-solipsism. Part of our *perceived reality.*
> >
> > I like* * "*the unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic)*'
>  distinction
> > as pointing to the influences upon (our known) topics WITHIN the limited
> > model of our perceived reality by the 'beyond model' infinite complexity
> of
> > the everything. We have no way to learn what that infinite rest of the
> world
> > may be, yet it influences the part we got access to so it is
> deterministic
> > in our indeterministic - unpredictable  world.
> > "Enslavement" is a term I would be careful to use in such discussion
> because
> > of its historic - societal general meaning. We - in my opinion - are not
> > slaves in the unlimited everything: we are part of it.Embedded into and
> > influenced by all of it.
> >
> > We just do not see beyond our limitations - my agnosticism.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>

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Re: Love and Free Will

[1Z]

On Apr 19, 9:39 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> *Brent wrote:*
>
> **
> *"I would point out that "indeterminism" can have two different sources.
> One is internal, due to the occasional quantum random event that gets
> amplified to quasi-classical action.  The other, much more common, is the
> unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic) external event that influences
> one through perception.  I don't think this affects the above analysis
> except to qualify the idea that external indeterminism is justly considered
> enslavement*."
>
> An enlightened Hungarian king wrote a royal order in the 13th c. (King
> Coloman, the bookworm) "De Strigiis quae non sunt..." i.e. "About the
>  sorcerers that do NOT exist..." - yet 1/2 millennium later they still burnt
> witches the World over. So is it with the ominous
> Fre-Will, and many more atavistically developed meme-stuff. Especially in
> the theocratic religion chapters, but conventional science not exempted
> either. As much as I like Brent's remark, I point out the (conventional
> science) figment of the Physical World and its domains like a 'quantum
> random event' - which would make all our 'ordered' world (view) irrelevant
> and haphazardously changing, instead of following those 'oganized' physics-
> (and other scientific)- rules we 'beleive in" and apply.

Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the appearance
of
order emerges from randomness.

 Even Brent's
> "quasi-classical action" is part of our scientific figment. Those "possibly
> deterministic" EXTERNAL events are within our 'model' of the so far known
> part we carry (in pesonalized adjustment) in our 'mind' - outside that SELF
> in our mini-solipsism. Part of our *perceived reality.*
>
> I like* * "*the unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic)*'  distinction
> as pointing to the influences upon (our known) topics WITHIN the limited
> model of our perceived reality by the 'beyond model' infinite complexity of
> the everything. We have no way to learn what that infinite rest of the world
> may be, yet it influences the part we got access to so it is deterministic
> in our indeterministic - unpredictable  world.
> "Enslavement" is a term I would be careful to use in such discussion because
> of its historic - societal general meaning. We - in my opinion - are not
> slaves in the unlimited everything: we are part of it.Embedded into and
> influenced by all of it.
>
> We just do not see beyond our limitations - my agnosticism.

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Re: Love and Free Will

[John Mikes]

*Brent wrote:*
**
*"I would point out that "indeterminism" can have two different sources.
One is internal, due to the occasional quantum random event that gets
amplified to quasi-classical action.  The other, much more common, is the
unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic) external event that influences
one through perception.  I don't think this affects the above analysis
except to qualify the idea that external indeterminism is justly considered
enslavement*."

An enlightened Hungarian king wrote a royal order in the 13th c. (King
Coloman, the bookworm) "De Strigiis quae non sunt..." i.e. "About the
 sorcerers that do NOT exist..." - yet 1/2 millennium later they still burnt
witches the World over. So is it with the ominous
Fre-Will, and many more atavistically developed meme-stuff. Especially in
the theocratic religion chapters, but conventional science not exempted
either. As much as I like Brent's remark, I point out the (conventional
science) figment of the Physical World and its domains like a 'quantum
random event' - which would make all our 'ordered' world (view) irrelevant
and haphazardously changing, instead of following those 'oganized' physics-
(and other scientific)- rules we 'beleive in" and apply. Even Brent's
"quasi-classical action" is part of our scientific figment. Those "possibly
deterministic" EXTERNAL events are within our 'model' of the so far known
part we carry (in pesonalized adjustment) in our 'mind' - outside that SELF
in our mini-solipsism. Part of our *perceived reality.*

I like* * "*the unpredictable (but possibly determinisitic)*'  distinction
as pointing to the influences upon (our known) topics WITHIN the limited
model of our perceived reality by the 'beyond model' infinite complexity of
the everything. We have no way to learn what that infinite rest of the world
may be, yet it influences the part we got access to so it is deterministic
in our indeterministic - unpredictable  world.
"Enslavement" is a term I would be careful to use in such discussion because
of its historic - societal general meaning. We - in my opinion - are not
slaves in the unlimited everything: we are part of it.Embedded into and
influenced by all of it.

We just do not see beyond our limitations - my agnosticism.

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Re: Love and free will

[1Z]

On Apr 19, 7:28 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 19 Apr 2011, at 07:38, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 1:24 AM, Rex Allen   
> > wrote:
> >> On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 12:24 PM, Bruno Marchal   
> >> wrote:
>
> >>> Th fact that you say that compatibilist free will is "faux will"  
> >>> or worst
> >>> "subjective will" means that you *do* believe in incompatibilist  
> >>> free will.
>
> > Ah, I see what you're saying.
>
> > I've mentioned this before.  I think that libertarians are referring
> > to *something* when they use "free will".  It's just something that
> > doesn't exist.  Like unicorns, or the bibilical Triune God.
>
> Yeah, but we agree. That's the incompatibilist free-will.
>
> Since then, Artificial Intelligence Research is born, and Mechanist  
> theories have gone through the Gödel, and the Church-Turing  
> "revolution". Now many are open to the idea that machine can be  
> conscious, and it is not far stretched to defend the idea that they  
> can have a sort of free will similar to our own.

Or that it  would be an incompatibilist Free Will!

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Re: Love and free will

[meekerdb]

On 4/19/2011 10:35 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Apr 19, 6:38 am, Rex Allen  wrote:
   

On Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 1:24 AM, Rex Allen  wrote:
 

On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 12:24 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
   
 

Th fact that you say that compatibilist free will is "faux will" or worst
"subjective will" means that you *do* believe in incompatibilist free will.
 

Ah, I see what you're saying.

I've mentioned this before.  I think that libertarians are referring
to *something* when they use "free will".  It's just something that
doesn't exist.  Like unicorns, or the bibilical Triune God.

They are referring to an imaginary ability to make decisions that are
neither caused nor random - but instead are something else, something
that can't be clearly conceived of or described but which somehow
gives them ultimate responsibility for their actions.

It isn't a coherent concept, or rational...but that's people for you.

Rex
 

III.1.i The Basicness Assumption.
A popular argument against free will has it that free will is
incompatible with causal determinism (because of lack of Alternative
Possibilities or "elbow room") and with indeterminism (because will is
not "mere randomness"). This seems to neglect the alternative the free
will is a judicious mixture of the determinism and indeterminism —
after all, we cannot infer "salt is not sodium chloride" from "salt is
not sodium" and "salt is not chlorine", true as both those statements
are.

Or perhaps there it is more than that ? Perhaps the determinist is
making the assumption that free will is a basic ingredient to the
universe, and using that as a reason to exclude the possibility that
it is a composite, emergent phenomenon. This would certainly explains
why Gordon Orloff says things like:- "if so, how and why doesn't
everything in the universe — atoms, cells, dogs, cars — possess this
unnatural quality? [free will]" Why should they ? If free will is an
outcome of the engineering of the brain, we would not expect to find
it in the absence of any other mental faculties. We would hardly
expect to find thought in the absence of memory, for instance. If free
will is looked at as a psychological phenomenon, it depends on other
psychological phenomena. we have specific reason to think it is
dependent on other mental faculties, because, we need the ingredient
of rationality to distinguish free will from "mere caprice". If we
adopt the hypothesis that free will is indeed and outcome of a complex
combination of causal determinism and indeterminism, we have further
reason not to ascribe it to systems with the wrong engineering:
systems like sticks and stones, or deterministic computers.

This does not add up to chauvinism, by the way. Non-humans could have
the appropriate engineering, and appropriate equivalents of the
accompanying mental faculties. Even a convincing artificial
intelligence could have free will — if it had genuine rationality and
genuine indeterminism. The basicness assumption seems to provide a
justification for the supernatural assumption: causal determinism and
indeterminism seem to be the only logical options for basic features
of the world, so if free will is a third basic feature, it must be
supernatural. But, we contend, it is a third option which is natural
but non-basic.
The Separate Self Assumption.
Another argument against free will states: "If the universe is
deterministic, you are a slave to causal determinism; if the universe
is indeterministic, you are a slave to indeterminism". I would like to
ask who this "you" or "self" is ? You cannot be a slave to yourself.
If you are constituted by deterministic processes, you cannot also be
a slave to them. This line of argument often seeks to portray
indeterminism as some sort of external force that overrides your own
will. But my hypothesis is that the indeterminism relevant to free
will is internal to people. If some external source of indeterminism,
something outside your body, controlled your actions, you could justly
complain that you were "enslaved" to it; but the same could be said of
deterministic processes external to you; the relevant factor is the
externalness, not the indeterminism.
III.1.ii The Buridan's Ass Assumption
According to a mediaeval argument, Buridan's Ass, which for the
purposes of the story, has no free will, is placed at an equal
distance between two bales of hay, and starves to death because it is
unable to make up its mind which of the two bales it should eat.

We do not need to make a Supernatural Assumption about the free will
in this case; indeterminism would do just as well in allowing the Ass
to decide.

This approach does indeed indicate that free will is inimical to
rational decision making..up to a point. The Ass has no rational
reason to prefer one bale over the other. It's decision to go for, say
the left bale, is therefore irrational. But how much more irrational
to starve to death! One of the morals of the story is that there is
more to rationality — of

Re: Love and free will

[meekerdb]

On 4/19/2011 10:18 AM, 1Z wrote:

When we do some dioscovery it is better to adapt our word instead of
>  throwing the baby with the bath water.
 

Always? So we should have adapted the meanings of "phlogiston" and
"epicylce"?

   


Of course not always.  "Epicycle" still means what it did; we just don't 
use it to describe planetary orbits (although we could).  We dropped 
"phlogiston" as not referring to anything.  "Heat" originally was 
thought to refer to a kind of fluid; we kept and adapted it.


Brent

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Re: Love and free will

[1Z]

On Apr 19, 6:24 am, Rex Allen  wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 12:24 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> > On 15 Apr 2011, at 21:16, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> >> On Fri, Apr 15, 2011 at 3:45 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> >>> On 14 Apr 2011, at 22:25, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>  Hence Rex might well be right that the discussion here continues because
>  we do not have free will.
>
> >>> This shows only that we don't have free-will in the absolute
> >>> incompatibilist
> >>> sense, but there are  compatibilist theories, which explains well the
> >>> correctness of a relative (to the subject) incompatibilist feature of
> >>> free
> >>> will.
>
> >> The free will that we don't have in the "absolute incompatibilist
> >> sense" is the free will that most people believe in.
>
> > How can you know that?
>
> “In a massive survey of people in 36 countries, more than 70% agreed
> with the statement that their fate is in their own hands
> (International Social Survey Programme, 1998).”
>
> Okay, so that rules out incompatibilism for “most people”.

Surely you mean it rules out determinism for most people.

> How many
> of that 70% do you think answered that question in the affirmative as
> compatibilists?
>
> I’ve met a lot of people who are libertarians on free will, and I’ve
> met a few who are incompatibilists,


Incompatibilist determinists, you mean?

>but I’ve never actually met a
> compatibilist in person.

Nonetheless, it is  a popular position amongst proffessional
philosophers.


> BUT...maybe compatibilists don’t want to make things clear?  Maybe
> they welcome the confusion that reusing the older term causes amongst
> the layman?
>
> > Th fact that you say that compatibilist free will is "faux will" or worst
> > "subjective will" means that you *do* believe in incompatibilist free will.
>
> Huh?
>
> > You act like atheist who defends a very particular definition so as to
> > better mock the concept.
>
> Libertarian free will deserves to be mocked.

Because...? You have a proof of determinism?


> The damage is done, and there’s no undoing it.  The question should be
> how best to repair the system and its parts, and to make improvements
> so as to minimize recurrences.
>
> And this is where “free will” and “moral responsibility” do their
> damage, in that they distract people from these practical concerns.
> They whet the appetite for punishment and retribution instead of
> repair and improvement.

Is that the argument against libertarianism, then? That you don't
like what you take to be its consequences? But if determinism
is true, that doesn't mean we will change. We might carry on being
punitive libertarians. We might change into non-punitive determinists.
We might become *punitive* determinists. We will do as we are
determined to.

> They focus too much attention on the individual, and not enough on the
> system that produced the individual.
>
> As I said, rewarding bad behavior will get you more bad behavior, but
> the question is why did the bad behavior manifest in the first place?
> To declare yourself yourself uninterested in that question, to be so
> eager to just chalk it up to “free will” - that is...peculiar.

So 100% of libertarians have 0% belief in environmental
influences and causesthat is obviously a straw man.
LIbertarianism means people have some non-zero level
of freedom, not that they float free of all causation.

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Re: Love and free will

[1Z]

On Apr 19, 7:26 am, Rex Allen  wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 1:26 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > On 4/18/2011 9:55 AM, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> >> If there are commonalities in individuals who manifest certain
> >> behaviors, then it makes sense to look at those commonalities as
> >> causal (especially once a plausible mechanism can be identified), and
> >> to no longer treat those behaviors as "free".
>
> >> In most situations it doesn't make sense to look at each individual as
> >> unique and "free"...instead it makes sense to look at what is common
> >> accross individuals and assume the existence of a mechanism that
> >> accounts for those commonalities.
>
> > So if almost everyone is deterred from committing crimes by community
> > approbation and fear of punishment, the person who does commit a crime
> > should be treated as "free"?
>
> If we consider the case of this person, and are unable to see any
> plausible explanation that could account for their behavior - no
> commonalities with other cases, nothing that matches against any other
> statistics, no plausible mechanisms from sociology, neurology,
> psychiatry, medicine, biology, genetics, chemistry, or physics...then
> sure, treat him as “free”.
>
> That was exactly the situation we were in a thousand years ago.  And
> it was justifiable - in that the approach does “work” to some extent,
> and they didn’t know of any better way to go about it.
>
> I just think that there are better ways to go about it now.
>
> It would be odd if we have access to all of the above information, and
> all of the productivity and wealth of the modern world  - and yet we
> can’t really come up with any significantly better approaches to
> ordering society than “Getting Tough on Crime” or “Three Strikes”
> laws.

You keep trying to link by sheer repetition ideas that are logically
distinct:
whether libertarian FW is meaningful and true; and whether a punitive
approach
to crime is right. The 70% of people in 36 countries will  include a
lot who
live under justice regimes considerably more liberal than that of the
US.

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Re: Love and free will

[1Z]

On Apr 18, 5:24 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Apr 2011, at 21:16, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Fri, Apr 15, 2011 at 3:45 AM, Bruno Marchal   
> > wrote:
>
> >> On 14 Apr 2011, at 22:25, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
> >>> Hence Rex might well be right that the discussion here continues  
> >>> because
> >>> we do not have free will.
>
> >> This shows only that we don't have free-will in the absolute  
> >> incompatibilist
> >> sense, but there are  compatibilist theories, which explains well the
> >> correctness of a relative (to the subject) incompatibilist feature  
> >> of free
> >> will.
>
> > The free will that we don't have in the "absolute incompatibilist
> > sense" is the free will that most people believe in.
>
> How can you know that?


If most people did believe it  historically, there would never have
been a problem of FW.

> > Compatibilist free will should be called "faux will".  Or more
> > charitably, "subjective will".
>
> Then earth does not exist. Because most people was think that earth is  
> a flat object

> When we do some dioscovery it is better to adapt our word instead of  
> throwing the baby with the bath water.

Always? So we should have adapted the meanings of "phlogiston" and
"epicylce"?

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Re: Love and free will

[1Z]

On Apr 19, 6:38 am, Rex Allen  wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 1:24 AM, Rex Allen  wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 12:24 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> >> Th fact that you say that compatibilist free will is "faux will" or worst
> >> "subjective will" means that you *do* believe in incompatibilist free will.
>
> Ah, I see what you're saying.
>
> I've mentioned this before.  I think that libertarians are referring
> to *something* when they use "free will".  It's just something that
> doesn't exist.  Like unicorns, or the bibilical Triune God.
>
> They are referring to an imaginary ability to make decisions that are
> neither caused nor random - but instead are something else, something
> that can't be clearly conceived of or described but which somehow
> gives them ultimate responsibility for their actions.
>
> It isn't a coherent concept, or rational...but that's people for you.
>
> Rex

III.1.i The Basicness Assumption.
A popular argument against free will has it that free will is
incompatible with causal determinism (because of lack of Alternative
Possibilities or "elbow room") and with indeterminism (because will is
not "mere randomness"). This seems to neglect the alternative the free
will is a judicious mixture of the determinism and indeterminism —
after all, we cannot infer "salt is not sodium chloride" from "salt is
not sodium" and "salt is not chlorine", true as both those statements
are.

Or perhaps there it is more than that ? Perhaps the determinist is
making the assumption that free will is a basic ingredient to the
universe, and using that as a reason to exclude the possibility that
it is a composite, emergent phenomenon. This would certainly explains
why Gordon Orloff says things like:- "if so, how and why doesn't
everything in the universe — atoms, cells, dogs, cars — possess this
unnatural quality? [free will]" Why should they ? If free will is an
outcome of the engineering of the brain, we would not expect to find
it in the absence of any other mental faculties. We would hardly
expect to find thought in the absence of memory, for instance. If free
will is looked at as a psychological phenomenon, it depends on other
psychological phenomena. we have specific reason to think it is
dependent on other mental faculties, because, we need the ingredient
of rationality to distinguish free will from "mere caprice". If we
adopt the hypothesis that free will is indeed and outcome of a complex
combination of causal determinism and indeterminism, we have further
reason not to ascribe it to systems with the wrong engineering:
systems like sticks and stones, or deterministic computers.

This does not add up to chauvinism, by the way. Non-humans could have
the appropriate engineering, and appropriate equivalents of the
accompanying mental faculties. Even a convincing artificial
intelligence could have free will — if it had genuine rationality and
genuine indeterminism. The basicness assumption seems to provide a
justification for the supernatural assumption: causal determinism and
indeterminism seem to be the only logical options for basic features
of the world, so if free will is a third basic feature, it must be
supernatural. But, we contend, it is a third option which is natural
but non-basic.
The Separate Self Assumption.
Another argument against free will states: "If the universe is
deterministic, you are a slave to causal determinism; if the universe
is indeterministic, you are a slave to indeterminism". I would like to
ask who this "you" or "self" is ? You cannot be a slave to yourself.
If you are constituted by deterministic processes, you cannot also be
a slave to them. This line of argument often seeks to portray
indeterminism as some sort of external force that overrides your own
will. But my hypothesis is that the indeterminism relevant to free
will is internal to people. If some external source of indeterminism,
something outside your body, controlled your actions, you could justly
complain that you were "enslaved" to it; but the same could be said of
deterministic processes external to you; the relevant factor is the
externalness, not the indeterminism.
III.1.ii The Buridan's Ass Assumption
According to a mediaeval argument, Buridan's Ass, which for the
purposes of the story, has no free will, is placed at an equal
distance between two bales of hay, and starves to death because it is
unable to make up its mind which of the two bales it should eat.

We do not need to make a Supernatural Assumption about the free will
in this case; indeterminism would do just as well in allowing the Ass
to decide.

This approach does indeed indicate that free will is inimical to
rational decision making..up to a point. The Ass has no rational
reason to prefer one bale over the other. It's decision to go for, say
the left bale, is therefore irrational. But how much more irrational
to starve to death! One of the morals of the story is that there is
more to rationality — of a kind worth having — than being 

Re: Love and free will

[1Z]

On Apr 17, 11:32 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> Rex, Evgeniy and List:
>
> Are we speaking about a mysterious 'free will' that is unrelated to the rest
> of the world and depends only "how we like it"? In my view our 'likings' and
> 'not' depend on the concerning experience and genetic built in our mentality
> (whatever THAT is composed of) in limitations of the perceived reality - the
> basis for our mini-solipsism. We cannot slip out of our shoes and 'like'
> something unrelated

We can gradually learn to  change our tastes over time.

- or, horribile dictu: opposing the stuff that
> penetrated our mindset.
> The idea of a Free Will was a good intimidating factor for religious
> punishment of sins, means to ensure the rule of the church over the
> gullible. Or for the courts in fault-finding.
> We are 'rpoducts' of the world around us, not independent 'gods' (Bruno's
> word).

Can't we be products of the world *and* our own choices?

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