The trouble with this whole area is that it's so incredibly easy to
not-quite understand each other without quite realising it. It's like that
Wilde quote: "England and America are two countries separated by a common
language."
I think I understand you, though
As regards the crystal, I think
Redface - ME!
Michael, you picked my careless statement and I want to correct it:
"...You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts..."
should refer to THOSE parts we know of, observe, include, select, handle, -
not ALL of the (unlimited, incl. potential) parts (simple or not). Fr
"You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts"
That would be the case if we were trying to reconstruct an arbitrary
universe, but you were talking about 'the totality'. My take is that the
whole caboodle is not arbitrary - it's totally specified by its requirement
to be complete.
Qhentin wrote:
"...It sounds like a bit like 'we can't know what is the ultimate real
(truth ?) at all',..."
- - - RIGHT - - -
We have a *partial* info of the - what could be called - *reality,* even
that in our own interpretation (fitting our mental capabilities) what I call
(after Colin Hales'
Hi,
2008/8/20 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Brent wrote:
> "...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these simpler
> domains, so much the better that they are simple"
>
> Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with
> mountains, river, people, anima
John Mikes wrote:
> Brent wrote:
> "...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these
> simpler domains, so much the better that they are simple"
>
> Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with
> mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call t
Brent wrote:
"...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these simpler
domains, so much the better that they are simple"
Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with
mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call that 'the totality'
and *select th
John Mikes wrote:
> Isn't logical inconsistency = insanity? (Depends how we formulate the
> state of being "sane".)
As Bertrand Russell pointed out, if you are perfectly consistent you are either
100% right or 100% wrong. Human fallibility being what it is, don't bet on
being 100% right. :-)
Isn't logical inconsistency = insanity? (Depends how we formulate the state
of being "sane".)
Simplicity in my vocabulary of the 'totality-view' means mainly to "cut" our
model of observation narrower and narrower to eliminate more and more from
the "rest of the world" (which only would complicate
On 18 Aug 2008, at 03:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Sorry. I quite agree with you. I regard logic and mathematics as our
> inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we
> place on how we
> think and talk about the world. We can change them as in para-
> consistent logics.
Brent,
thanx for the agreement, - however
"INVENTIONS"?
I feel more open than that, MAYBE (considering unlimited openness) there IS
something in the reality (which is not accessible to our feeble mentality)
that in some mental simplifying and planifying (? like digitalization) way
could lead to
John Mikes wrote:
> Brent M,
> please spare me the arithmetic class.
> I scribbled an example which may be wrong. So noted and I am ashamed.
> I was referring to the concept of (our) /'axioms'/ - products of human
> thinking to make our edifice of the cognitive inventory we carry *-
> VALID*. I
Brent M,
please spare me the arithmetic class.
I scribbled an example which may be wrong. So noted and I am ashamed.
I was referring to the concept of (our) *'axioms'* - products of human
thinking to make our edifice of the cognitive inventory we carry *- VALID*.
I opened the possibility that a qu
1Z wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Aug, 20:12, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> As for 1Z's axioms:
>> In my vocabulary axioms are artifacts invented to make our theories
>> workable. If 1 + 1 is NOT 2,
>
> How would that turn out the case?
>
>> you can say goodby to math.
We define arithmeti
Peter,
do you really expect from me upon one tiny sideline remark to redesign the
world? I just wanted to provide an idea why we have 'axioms' which we
(scinece) consider the sacrosanct cornerstones of the existence.
Ask the Zarathustrans in Cohen-Stewart: Collapse of Chaos.
John
On Sat, Aug 16, 2
On 15 Aug, 20:12, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> As for 1Z's axioms:
> In my vocabulary axioms are artifacts invented to make our theories
> workable. If 1 + 1 is NOT 2,
How would that turn out the case?
> you can say goodby to math.
> Furthermore I dislike the use of the word 'inf
G.G. wrote:
1Z wrote:
> It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
> cosmology accepts
> that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
> unaccountable boundary conditions.
GüGr:
"Well, actually these strangely "contingent" conditions are what lea
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>> But that assumes there can be a computation independent of any material
>> realization - a computation that never has an error. Real computations
>> are realized by quantum mechanical devices. Of course they may b
On 15 Aug, 14:05, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> If I
> know that there are two copies of my mind being implemented on two
> adjacent computers,
You don't know that. That is the whole problem.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message b
2008/8/15 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> The possibility that someone might be duplicated at some indeterminate
> point in the future leads to no indeminacy affecting me now.
The indeterminacy works the same way across time as across space. If I
know that there are two copies of my mind being impleme
2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> But that assumes there can be a computation independent of any material
> realization - a computation that never has an error. Real computations
> are realized by quantum mechanical devices. Of course they may be so
> large and hot that they are to
On 15 Aug, 01:37, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> > But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't
> > diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning
> > theorem. I realize that's proba
> But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't
> diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning
> theorem. I realize that's probably not the case since it would require
> that computation of the complexity to produce consciousness must include
> s
2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> If mind is a computation, we can copy it. Computation is numbers to
>> numbers in finite "time" and deterministic rules. I've put "time" in
>> quotes because time can be a rule and not something inherent to
>> computation.
>>
>> Computation can only d
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>> But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't
>> diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning
>> theorem. I realize that's probably not the case since it would require
>>
2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't
> diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning
> theorem. I realize that's probably not the case since it would require
> that computation of the complexit
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>>
>> On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>>>
Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
not claim or pretend or
On 14 Aug, 01:31, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> In principle we could create and artificial environment for two copies of the
> AI
> and keep them identical. But then it's a metaphysical question as to whether
> there are two separate consciousness. If co
On 14 Aug, 13:15, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/14 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> > In principle we could create and artificial environment for two copies of
> > the AI
> > and keep them identical. But then it's a metaphysical question as to
> > whether
> >
On 14 Aug, 17:56, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 1Z wrote:
> > It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
> > cosmology accepts
> > that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
> > unaccountable boundary conditions.
>
> We
Hi,
1Z wrote:
> It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
> cosmology accepts
> that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
> unaccountable boundary conditions.
Well, actually these strangely "contingent" conditions are what leads to
discus
2008/8/14 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> In principle we could create and artificial environment for two copies of the
> AI
> and keep them identical. But then it's a metaphysical question as to whether
> there are two separate consciousness. If consciousness is computation then
> "same c
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2008/8/13 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> I've been following this back-and-forth with interest. The above leads to an
>> interesting question which I will raise after a couple of background points.
>> First, I don't think a conscious AI can exist independent of some
2008/8/13 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> I've been following this back-and-forth with interest. The above leads to an
> interesting question which I will raise after a couple of background points.
> First, I don't think a conscious AI can exist independent of some environment
> of
> which i
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
...
> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> ontologically primary.
That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
argue for it.
>>> I do not assume them.
On 13 Aug, 21:47, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> When the universe will end is '17 is prime' still true ?
>
> Me winning the lotery is a WR event... I play lotery, I do not win
> therefore no one wins... It's basically your argument about WR.
>
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
When the universe will end is '17 is prime' still true ?
Me winning the lotery is a WR event... I play lotery, I do not win
therefore no one wins... It's basically your argument about WR.
2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
> On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >> Sure, why one then ?
>
> > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts.
>
> Which facts ?
The observed ones.
> >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it
2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> Sure, why one then ?
>
> It would be the smallest number that fits the facts.
Which facts ?
>> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
>> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>>
>> >> >> Yes but I see 'real s
On 13 Aug, 20:38, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >> >> > Then you had better say what the problem is.
>
> >> >> Why one ?
>
> >> > The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all-
> >> > there-is?
>
> >> Well you're playing
2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> >> > Then you had better say what the problem is.
>>
>> >> Why one ?
>>
>> > The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all-
>> > there-is?
>>
>> Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving.
>
> I am not saying there is one univ
On 13 Aug, 18:58, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> Hi,
>
> >> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >> > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
> On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>> > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
>> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an
>> > ontolo
On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an
> > ontologically
> > parsimonious explanation that match
Hi,
2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
> On 12 Aug, 22:50, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> 2008/8/12 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Quentin Anciaux"
>> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> >> 1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler
On 12 Aug, 22:50, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 2008/8/12 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
>
>
> > --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Quentin Anciaux"
> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >> 1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?
>
> >> 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter nec
Hi,
2008/8/12 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
> --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Quentin Anciaux"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> 1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?
>>
>> 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by
>> looking at it in a first sight that it would means
I appreciate. I am not sure this will convince people, like Peter
Jones, who assume the existence of a primary material world, and
insists that a material implementation has to exist at some level for
a computation to exist. I agree this is a poorly convincing sort of
magical hand waving
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