Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 20:43, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 1:38 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: both the W *and* the M guy are the H guy Yes. the question bear on probability of expectation for the H guy when he press the button... If that is the question then the answer will be of zero help in understanding the nature of personal identity But as Quentin just said, that is not the object of the inquiry. because neither probability nor expectations have anything to do with consciousness or of a continuous feeling of self. OK, but expectations is the object of the inquiry. Bruno You feel like Quentin Anciaux today for one reason only, because you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday; it's true that if Everett was correct then there are other things that remember that too, but how something feels or what they do can have no effect on you because neither you nor I will ever interact with them nor they with us. And for that reason pronouns like I and you and them and us cause Everett no trouble, but in Bruno's thought experiment they produce endless problems. Everett wanted to explain why the predictions made by Quantum Mechanics were so weird and so accurate, and he wanted to explain it without introducing the very nebulous concept of the observer, and I think he was pretty successful in accomplishing his goal. Bruno wanted to do something different, he wanted to explain how personal identity and a continuous feeling of self worked, and in that he failed. please state where you disagree. Please? You're saying please now? What happened, did you lose you're copy of The Giant Book Of Insults? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-14 16:49 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 21:12, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 21:05 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 18:07 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it. I guess you mean any measurement I made is geographical. I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography, but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the modal logic brought by the intensional variants. Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all geographies, and that is what I call physical laws, as the rest will be sort of contingencies. You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? Ok... but it is no more comp. The we are at the base level of physics is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient. Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be tested, except trivially by being conscious, as all virtual being not implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This makes Peter Jones realness neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake). But in our case, that realness (defined by the satisfiability of comp + theaetetus + non-dream) is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an (higher order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation. If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't mess with my virtual brain so that I stay correct) then I can conclude that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation). As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim a discrepancy... you can't do that... I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to the physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still derive the correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation. If my environment does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial simulation. That's not something you can measure, please be specific, what do you see as experiment we could do to prove or disprove comp, what measurement would be able to falsify comp, please be precise. But we cannot measure a physical laws. We can only postulate it, and see if our measurement confirms it or not. Or we can derive laws, from a theory which is postulated. So from QM, we can derive that the observable obeys a quantum logic. From comp, we can derive that the observable obeys to some non boolean logic. Then we can compare the two logics. Let me give you a specific example. let us take Bell's inequality. A simple form is (A B) / (A C) V (B ~C) (/ = we can deduce, I use / because it is simpler, you can verify that with - in place of /, we get a tautology, and so that rule is valid in classical logic, by modus ponens). See my appendices on QM where it is shown how to build Stern Gerlach or polarizers setting showing that this is booean tautology is statistically violated by QM (and nature, even when A and B are quite apart and should be independent). That tautology is not a tautology for quantum logic. QL does not prove, and nature provides counter-example. Now QL proves a logical formula if and only if the modal logic B proves the quantization of that formula. The quantization is a recursive transformation, where you translate p (in QL) into []p in B, and ~p is translated into []~p. So what I say above can be expressed by the quantization of (A B) - (A C) V (B ~C) is not a theorem of the modal
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 17:11, David Nyman wrote: On 14 February 2014 15:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of computations. Do you mean fooled? I guess you are right. I thought failed was english. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 18:06, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: snip It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy). So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. I guess you mean cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp. No, I meant something stronger than that. I meant that what we observe cannot count in favor of comp. According to Deustch, nothing can count in favor of any theory. We could only refute a theory, but positive confirmation does not lake sense, according to him. I am not sanguine about this, and I can make sense that a non-refutation can add credence to a theory, but not that much. Anyway, as we get a quantum logic, and many-worlds, what we observe today can count as much in favor of comp than of QM. Then you have the empirical reason in favor of comp, like the intuition provided by molecular biology. The real point is that what we observe might refute comp, like it might refute QM. Bruno Brent Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the same as the fact that we can know that we dream (lucidity), but that we cannot know we are awake. This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or of Theaetetus. Not just comp. But comp confirms this. (Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm definitively *any* theory about reality). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 21:12, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? Because you work in first-order analysis, where you can add and multiply real numbers, but still cannot differentiate 1, 00100100111... and 1. Another way to see that slides rules are not universal is in trying to define a compiler FORTRAN-- slides rules. In that case, ... well I don't know, if you have the sin, you might be able to find the natural numbers, by solving sin(2pi*x) = 0, but you will get analogical natural numbers, and not clear digital 0, 1, 2, ... May be slide rule + your moves + infinitely good eye sight might be Turing universal. May be slides rules can be Turing Universal in a ring, in the sense of Blum, Shub and Smale. I am not sure. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 21:32, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale? Yes, you can sum up in that way. Formally you can relate that to the fact that the first order theory of the real is not Turing complete (indeed it is decidable). In analysis, if you get a sequence like 0.9, 0.99, 0.999, ..., and you know that it converge, but you don't know that it converge toward 1 (it might converge toward 0, ...9998), you still know that your problem admits a solution (and indeed Newton or Sturm Liouville provided algorithm to find those solutions when they exist). But the digital world is more demanding, as it needs, not just better and better approximations, but it needs exact solutions. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 Feb 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 2:17 PM, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 10:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 12:32 PM, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale? Yes, of course a real slide rule can't encode arbitrarily large integers because it only has finitely many distinguisable locations for the the cursor. But since a Turing machine is allowed an infinite tape, suppose my slide rule (Sliding Machine?) is allowed to expand the number of distinct positions arbitrarily? So you don't think the analogue/digital thing matters? I suppose a person using a slide rule could be trusted to correct for small errorsor could they? I think it matters because the power of arithmetic to encode proofs depends on it having arbitrarily long strings of digits. But just as Turing idealized infinite tapes, I can idealize arbitrarily large slide rules to get arbitrarily high precision. Not sure this works (despite my allusion to infinitely good eyesight). You might need actual-infinite eye sight, because arbitrary good eye sight might still ask you for an infinite analogical task. You zoom and zoom and zoom ... and after each finite of time, you still don't know if you get 1, or 1+ 0.001, for example, where digital program could, for some reason, find the exact result. You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch): - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an exponential with such polynomials) - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage
On 14 Feb 2014, at 21:36, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 08:47, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Some members of the list have expressed fondness or interest for cuttlefish, which is why I post this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgdVVU8tBTQ The documentary is a bit sensational/over the top at times, but I'm not bothered as I just care about the footage. They used to be prominent at a beach I had access to as a kid and they've been a favorite member of our fauna to me ever since. I don't think I have to spell out in too much detail why this might be relevant or fun and refer to: it thinks itself into different form, skin structure, color etc. Why are our bodies, nervous systems, and skin so dull in comparison? We're all worm and slug descendants on some level right? Why did we pass up such useful and amazing features? Stupid nature/evolution... I want that feature. No, really: I want that! Can anybody hook me up? PGC I find cuttlefish fascinating. They are social, relatively intelligent, can communicate, able to grasp and manipulate things. It seems like they were all set to become the dominant large life form (instead of humans). Give them time. According to the IPCC (and the Doomsday argument) humans are already on the skids, and doing nothing to change course. We will return into the sea, like the dolphins. We should never have left it! (perhaps). Yes, the cuttlefishes are cute and amazing. I love all animals, except those having bones. They easily stand up and become arrogant. They feel superior. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 22:35, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 04:19, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 06:07:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. ... Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). ... The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result from the interference below the subst. level. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it will looks dreamy to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see the discrepancy. F=ma is more of a definition actually, than a logical constraint. It is how we define (and operationally measure) force. No problem with that, and that is why a answered with F = KmM/r^2, but that was not much relevant. If you have a copy of Vic Stenger's Comprehensible Cosmos, he discusses this from page 48. No problem. I appreciate the argument. I read it online, and it was taught by some physicists. Actually, the correct relativistic form is F=dp/dt, where p is the 3 momentum of the object under consideration. F=ma is its low velocity approximation. Sure. Even F = dp/dt is a classical approximation deducible from Feynman integral. So I would be surprised if COMP fails to prove Newton's second law - it would mean someone was using terminology inconsistently. F= ma is like H phi = E phi. All is in F, or H. Those equality should be laws indeed, and deducible from deeper laws. It might be more doubtful for F or H, except that the Turing universality of the vacuum suggest some H = 0, à-la Dewitt-Wheeler. But we are not yet there .. But this seems to point to a deeper problem. If we elaborate H and E as operators and psi as a ray in a Hilbert space and if we further define the Hilbert space, we will still have a symbolic expression which we can related ostensively to some apparatus. But we will never get down to an arithmetical computation. That would not make sense. In the (comp) physical reality, we can only get down physically, on something physical. Comp does not make matter into something made of number or computations. it is only a point of view, or an internal angle of arithmetic seen from inside. If we get H psi = E psi, we will have the same ostensive relation with apparatus in comp. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage
On 14 Feb 2014, at 20:47, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Some members of the list have expressed fondness or interest for cuttlefish, which is why I post this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgdVVU8tBTQ The documentary is a bit sensational/over the top at times, but I'm not bothered as I just care about the footage. They used to be prominent at a beach I had access to as a kid and they've been a favorite member of our fauna to me ever since. I don't think I have to spell out in too much detail why this might be relevant or fun and refer to: it thinks itself into different form, skin structure, color etc. Why are our bodies, nervous systems, and skin so dull in comparison? We're all worm and slug descendants on some level right? Why did we pass up such useful and amazing features? Stupid nature/ evolution... I want that feature. No, really: I want that! Can anybody hook me up? PGC I find cuttlefish fascinating. They are social, relatively intelligent, can communicate, able to grasp and manipulate things. It seems like they were all set to become the dominant large life form (instead of humans). A mystery: they don't live a long time. Usually intelligence go with a rather long life, but cuttlefishes live one or two years. Hard for them to dominate, also, as they have few protections, no shelter, and are edible for many predators, including humans. They survive by hiding and fooling. They can hunt with hypnosis (as you can see in the video). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 14 Feb 2014, at 21:41, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 07:55, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 01:38, LizR wrote: On 14 February 2014 13:33, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 12:14:18PM +1300, LizR wrote: It seems to me that the situation summarises as follows. Craig disagrees with the axioms of comp, in particular with Yes Doctor and hence parts company with Bruno at step 0. Edgar agrees with Yes Doctor (because in his view consciousness is the product of a computation) and hence, if he is going to disagree with comp, needs to find a flaw in Bruno's other axioms or his logical chain of inferences. I suspect the weak link to attack here *might* be Peano arithmetic... I don't see why - with the Church thesis, Peano arithmetic is just as good as any other system capable of universal computation. That comment isn't my opinion, it was intended for Edgar. Since he thinks human maths is different to reality maths, it seems like the obvious starting point (for him) if he's going to disagree with comp. That explains why he seems unable to define what he meant by computational space. Yes. I was speaking purely within my attempts to understand Edgar's ontology although I don't have anything like the patience and fortitude of Jesse, who has politely and meticulously deconstructed everything Edgar has claimed. I believe he may even be eligible for a Bruno - the everything list's award for anyone who can continue to be cool and rational against extraordinary odds. Jesse is very patient indeed. Stathis is not so bad too. But Quentin might be right, like with Clark, sometimes you feel the people will not change their mind, as they make typical opportunist remarks, which distracts from the main point, and avoid the discussion. Do they act like that purposefully, or unconsciously? That is what I try to figure out. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 15 February 2014 23:15, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: But Quentin might be right, like with Clark, sometimes you feel the people will not change their mind, as they make typical opportunist remarks, which distracts from the main point, and avoid the discussion. Do they act like that purposefully, or unconsciously? That is what I try to figure out. Yes, I wonder that. I generally assume people arguing on a forum like this are rational (ish) and hence that they intend what they say and when they keep avoiding questions it's because they don't want to answer them, and when they're rude and arrogant it's intentional, and so on. But sometimes I think they can't be conscious of what they're doing, that surely no one would want to be like that deliberately, at least no one interersted in truth and science - maybe money and politics. It's a mystery, to me at least. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 14 Feb 2014, at 23:27, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What's the definition of G*? G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + the axiom: []A - A But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that is impossible). This entails that G* has no Kripke semantics. But it has some semantics in term of infinite sequence of G-multiverse. By Solovay second theorem, G* axiomatizes what is true on the machine. Not just what is provable by the machine. G* minus G is not empty (it contains t, t, t, ... for example), and it axiomatizes the true but non provable modal (provability) sentences. It seems that the notation is inadequate since it depends on the accesibility relation: For example if the accessibility relation is T (for teleportation) then TM and TW may be false in Helsinki Why. Because teleportation isn't possible (so far as we know). ? Comp implies the possibility in principle of classical teleportation, (UDA step 1). We don't need more. I was merely using teleportation as an example to illustrate that possible is a relative concept depending on the accessiblity relation. OK. But with comp we define the box through computer science, and isolate the accessibility relation from the math of the boxes, as UDA shows it is the only way to do, given that we cannot look at nature in that approach (cf the treachery). That is an original and subtle points that perhaps some people are still missing. What does possible in principle mean? But this was in UDA. It means that if the brain is some machine, we can survive by substituting an equivalent one, at some level. I assume teleportation being practical, in step 1-6, but this assumption is eliminated in steps 7 and 8. Does it only mean not self contradictory? No, it means that to make this absolutely impossible in theory, you need non-comp type of assumption. Does it mean consistent with our best understanding of physics? No, it means consistent with our best understanding of cognition, life, brains and the notion of computation. Lawrence Krauss discusses the possibility in his book The Physics of Star Trek. He estimates that it would take more energy than available in the Milky Way just to obtain the information to teleport a human being. Classically or quantum mechanically? Of course putting that much mass/energy in the vicinity of the human being would create a black hole. So what does possible really mean? The possibility of classical teleportation It is a way to explain what is meant by saying that the brain is a machine. Nothing else. Then in AUDA, there come 8 notion of possibility, defined in arithmetical terms, all based on the math of self-reference. Like Jean-Paul Delahaye wrote, you can compare such thought experience with Einstein or Maxwell thought experiences to justify relativity or electro-magnetism, before doing the math. To move along with a photon is also hard to do in practice. Bruno Brent Which brings up another point that bothers me: We are using [] as an operator necessary, and as possible as just symbols with a defined syntax, but in application we must say what they mean. What is necessary and what is possible are dependent on context; just as above you casually assume that teleportation is possible - even though you well know it isn't - just because you can write T. This is similar to my complaint about arithmetical realism; it is a sort of logical realism. I use [] and usually when I explain modal logic, through many examples of different modal systems. In the translation of UDA in arithmetic, all modalities are defined in term of the provability predicate, that is the Gödel's Beweisbar. What is necessary or possible depends on the worlds, yes, that is what Kripke is all about. All I explain is based on the fact that teleportation is possible *theoretically*. Yes. That it is hard to do in practice is not relevant. You could stop at step 0, because the artificial brain is also impossible in practice today. But it is not relevant. We assume comp. They are both true, as H T M and H T W, if teleportation is the accessibility relation. while using F (for flying) would make FM and FW true. OK, but it is the same with T. No it's not. I can fly to Moscow. By definition of the protocol in step three. If not you should have made such remark at step 0, and just say no to the doctor. You just say non-comp (even in theory). The practicality of teleportation is not relevant for the theoretical proof. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 15 Feb 2014, at 03:09, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 4:24 PM, Kim Jones wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 3:42 pm, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: What about the CMBR? When it was created there were (presumably) no observers in existence in the universe. Are you saying it wouldn't exist if we hadn't evolved to detect it (e.g. if humans hadn't evolved, or if we had never invented radio telescopes) ? Yes - exactly. A direct consequence of The Reversal. First comes Mind. Physics and matter and the 3D holographic farmyard are a long way down the road. I hope no one is assuming that it requires something as weird as a human to implement consciousness. Something as basic as a Boltzmann brain would be in principle, instantly possible in any universe, surely. Of course Boltzmann brains are notoriously transient, so we're to think of the universe (or at least pieces of past light cones) blinking in and out of existence. Or does that take a Boltzmann brain plus optic nerves and eyes and a Boltzmann telescope? Yes, not sure why a Boltzmann brain can be said to be basic. Just a brain, or any computer, or any relative universal will do. A Boltzmann brain do with a probability near to 0 what UD, or arithmetic do with a probability one. BTW, can someone refer to a paper given a reasonably serious definition of a Boltzmann brain? Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
;) From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following phases: 1- enter with an apparently bright idea 2- is exposed to comp bombardment 3- comp seduction 4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That means nothing) 5- comp aversion (too much comp, every discussion ends in a single alternative: comp) 6- comp resignation (maybe there is something more that I do not manage to catch from comp. Occasionally there is some room for what he really like. Normally the first five or ten comments of a thread) finally a three alternative multiverse appears: 7 comp nirvana : He enter in the mysticism of machine dreams, comp soteriology and comp theogony while he look at modal logic expressions and smoke a pipe of marihuana or 7' - comp Hell: the Yang of the comp: He is lost in the fifteen line of a modal logic formula for an Eternity. Later on, he discover that it was something trivial, but it was obfuscated and intimidated by the formulas. or 7''- teleportation to another list with a certain substitution level. 2014-02-14 21:39 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 14 Feb 2014, at 12:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or emergent from 0 and 1's. ? So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis. ? -Why people make apparently weird distincitions? it does not matter: comp says nothing about it. it depends on FPI - Why they believe in God? God is the universal machine. the Man is the universal machine. God is not a machine, not even the inner God, except perhaps only in the eyes of God. I think you are writing anything going through your mind, is it? - Yes but why people distinguish between god is the universal machine and blah blah blah. That is akin to a comp blaspheme! -Yes, but why people... . that is FPI as i said before - Yes but... I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI are very nice ideas and so on You can dislike a theory, but you must grasp it correctly first. Bruno 2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all). On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote: On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote: You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-) (Sorry!) I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently... I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM. I said apparently because I have no idea how he does it. I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is the bet of saying yes to the doctor. With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated. But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it. Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical; It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical. So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness. But I think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover. With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover is in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is to distracted it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to us, notably by sending us interesting data on mars. The consciousness of Mars Rover is a 1-view, and it is more a product of the infinity of computations going through its state in the arithmetical reality) than with a single
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 15 February 2014 10:25, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, I wonder that. I generally assume people arguing on a forum like this are rational (ish) and hence that they intend what they say and when they keep avoiding questions it's because they don't want to answer them, and when they're rude and arrogant it's intentional, and so on. But sometimes I think they can't be conscious of what they're doing, that surely no one would want to be like that deliberately, at least no one interersted in truth and science - maybe money and politics. It's a mystery, to me at least. Galen Strawson recently quoted some remarks of Herbert Feigl that, mutatis mutandis, might well apply more generally: Philosophers are hypersensitive .. in their repressed perplexities. A puzzle which does not resolve itself within a given favored philosophical frame is repressed very much in the manner in which unresolved intrapersonal conflicts are repressed. I surmise that psychologically the first kind may be subsumed under the second. Scholars cathect certain ideas so strongly and their outlook becomes so ego involved that they erect elaborate barricades of defenses, merely to protect their pet ideas from the blows (or the slower corrosive effects) of criticism. No one can be sure that he is not doing this sort of thing in a particular case, and I claim no exception for myself. (The Mental and the Physical). And Sam Harris, in his reply to Dan Dennett in their recent debate on free will, remarks that he's .. begun to doubt whether any smart person retains the ability to change his mind. Of course one might well wonder how applicable the term smart would be if this were indeed the case (leave alone the question of how free or otherwise we are to change our minds!). David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 15 Feb 2014, at 12:14, Alberto G. Corona wrote: ;) From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following phases: 1- enter with an apparently bright idea 2- is exposed to comp bombardment 3- comp seduction 4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That means nothing) 5- comp aversion (too much comp, every discussion ends in a single alternative: comp) If there is no flaws, the real alternative is more between Aristotle's theology (like materialism, naturalism) and Plato's theology (where the physical reality is a product of something non physical). 6- comp resignation (maybe there is something more that I do not manage to catch from comp. Occasionally there is some room for what he really like. Normally the first five or ten comments of a thread) finally a three alternative multiverse appears: 7 comp nirvana : He enter in the mysticism of machine dreams, comp soteriology and comp theogony while he look at modal logic expressions and smoke a pipe of marihuana or 7' - comp Hell: the Yang of the comp: He is lost in the fifteen line of a modal logic formula for an Eternity. Later on, he discover that it was something trivial, but it was obfuscated and intimidated by the formulas. or 7''- teleportation to another list with a certain substitution level. Well, that is very bad philosophy, but at least it is funny. Bruno 2014-02-14 21:39 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 14 Feb 2014, at 12:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or emergent from 0 and 1's. ? So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis. ? -Why people make apparently weird distincitions? it does not matter: comp says nothing about it. it depends on FPI - Why they believe in God? God is the universal machine. the Man is the universal machine. God is not a machine, not even the inner God, except perhaps only in the eyes of God. I think you are writing anything going through your mind, is it? - Yes but why people distinguish between god is the universal machine and blah blah blah. That is akin to a comp blaspheme! -Yes, but why people... . that is FPI as i said before - Yes but... I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI are very nice ideas and so on You can dislike a theory, but you must grasp it correctly first. Bruno 2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all). On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote: On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote: You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-) (Sorry!) I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently... I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM. I said apparently because I have no idea how he does it. I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is the bet of saying yes to the doctor. With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated. But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it. Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical; It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical. So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness. But I think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover. With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover is in Heaven,
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-15 10:01 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I don't beg the question, I don't see a problem generating a virtual world where F=ma does not hold true... that world exists in an infinity of versions in the UD deployment as our own reality... You have no point proving our own reality could not be a dream in that sense... The only thing that should render our own reality more real, is that it certainly requires less rules than a reality where F=ma is false... Not at all. By the invariance of the first person, the number of rules and the complexity of the explanations/programs is not relevant. If not I would have solve the measure problem by an appeal to Kolmogorov or Chaitin complexity. But this cannot work. It is only in the self-multiplication factors that the laws of physics can become stable. nature use linearity, and the discovery of arithmetical quantum logic confirms up to now that fact. It makes the Everett multiplication of populations (the first person plural) protecting comp from solipsism. All pieces of dreams are consistent with the actual state of a sentient being. That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of computations. UDA made the laws of physics in a probability calculus, assuming the measure exist: that is: a law of physics is what multiplies the normal histories again the aberrant one. Yes but you don't have that measure nor a way to calculate it, I do. That's what Z1* Co. are supposed to provide. It is technically complex to do, but everything is explained here. the rest are pure open problem in math. you don't know it and you can't know that our reality does win the measure battle. I make this testable, of course I need definitions (of belief, knowledge, observation, in the ideal case of the self-referentially correct machine needed to extract the correct physics). Anyway the fact that almost anything is possible (with different proportion as a measure is assumed), means that *no* measure can invalidate computationalism... Then no measure can invalidate Everett QM for the same reason. Comp and QM makes both physics into a statistics. I don't think MWI is falsifiable either... computationalism is a metaphysical stands and up to now in your argumentation I see nothing that could falsify comp... You always say to compare physics to comp physics, but it's a dead end, no contradiction can be inferred from that. I cannot make sense of that. That opinion was widely hold before 1991, as X1* and Z1* was believed to collapse the modal logic, due to the fact that the p and p-[]p seemed to impose simultaneously antisymmetry and symmetry, but the nuances brought eventually by incompleteness eventually refuted, amazingly enough, that collapse. That is important as it makes comp distinguishing clearly comp physical laws from comp possible geographies. What are comp physical laws then ? if it is an open problem because calculus is intractable... then comp is not falsifiable, you can't use falsifiability argument if such falsification is intractable. And I still don't understand how comp can sort geographical laws from deeper laws. This can be translated in computer science/arithmetic, and the case of probability one can be studied by its logic. This, all Löbian machine can understand by introspection (self-reference) and so the physics is derivable from self-reference only, and then tested with the observation. Then the result is that a physical (lawful) physical reality does exist, with a fundamental logic which is already enough quantum-like to let us hope to have an equivalent of Gleason theorem, and in that case the white rabbit problem is solved *only* by the quantum logic we observe. The infinity of computational consistent relative state obeys the same logic in an artificial simulation and in the physics, emerging (or not) from the sum on UD*. That one is determined by computer science. The case of the probability one logic is given by the arithmetical quantization. so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or comp is false. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, How would it proves that ? By showing that Z1* gives the good type of quantum logic, enough to assure Gleason theorem, and derive the measure from some canonical (Hilbertian) semantics. Z1* is already able to decide if the Hilbert space is finitely dimension, or infinitely dimensional. Then dimension is related to the probability calculus (by works by many quantum logicians), and normally, arithmetic add infinitely many constraints at the first order modal logic level. It might be hard, but I do thing that qZ1* is able to decide if F=ma is valid or not in the worlds of the comp multiverses. Nobody said it was simple, especially that such
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 15 February 2014 02:45, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: If that is so (and I agree that it is, since I am not a physical eliminativist) it is still consistent with the physical processes still being *sufficient* to produce consciousness. It would only not be sufficient if some further ingredient were necessary beyond the matter in the right configuration. I've been reflecting on our exchange on the subject of reference. The assumption that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of physics would entail, I suppose, that we shouldn't think of physics itself as referring to anything at all. The idea is that we can always give a fully sufficient and closed account of any sequence of events in fully-reduced physical-causal terms. One could make an analogy, for example, with watching a movie on an LCD screen, in terms of which the dramatic events must always be fully reducible to some sequence of illumination of the screen pixels (so that the drama is an epiphenomenon of the pixel-physics). For this analogy to be transferable to the mind body problem, we must further assume that the dramatic interpretation which, in the case of the the movie must be provided externally, is somehow internal to the epiphenomenal causal logic and the physics on which it supervenes. If this is granted, the epiphenomenal dramatis personae then have access to a logic of reference that somehow travels on the underlying ontology, but is ineffective in it. As in the movie analogy, there is a dramatic logic that supervenes on the physical level, but is no more effective in physical terms than we would expect the characters in a movie to be in changing the underlying pixel-physics. If the foregoing is to make any sense, we are forced to the view that all references to such dramatis personae are, in the end, merely a manner of speaking, and that consequently *all* such gross or macroscopic references are, strictly speaking, epistemological (i.e. they are all internal references to epiphenomena of some fully-reduced physical ontology). Funnily enough, I recently heard Jaron Lanier expressing just such a view (at least as a possibility). Do you agree that your views imply that reality is in some sense like this? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 15 Feb 2014, at 12:58, David Nyman wrote: On 15 February 2014 10:25, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, I wonder that. I generally assume people arguing on a forum like this are rational (ish) and hence that they intend what they say and when they keep avoiding questions it's because they don't want to answer them, and when they're rude and arrogant it's intentional, and so on. But sometimes I think they can't be conscious of what they're doing, that surely no one would want to be like that deliberately, at least no one interersted in truth and science - maybe money and politics. It's a mystery, to me at least. Galen Strawson recently quoted some remarks of Herbert Feigl that, mutatis mutandis, might well apply more generally: Philosophers are hypersensitive .. in their repressed perplexities. A puzzle which does not resolve itself within a given favored philosophical frame is repressed very much in the manner in which unresolved intrapersonal conflicts are repressed. I surmise that psychologically the first kind may be subsumed under the second. Scholars cathect certain ideas so strongly and their outlook becomes so ego involved that they erect elaborate barricades of defenses, merely to protect their pet ideas from the blows (or the slower corrosive effects) of criticism. No one can be sure that he is not doing this sort of thing in a particular case, and I claim no exception for myself. (The Mental and the Physical). Once I accepted to be present at an introduction to logic made by a psychoanalyst, which was a sort of guru, to an audience of psychoanalysts. The first half was rather good, but then he made a simple mistake in a truth table, and someone mention it. A normal mathematician would have just say sorry, and fix it in the second and proceed. But the guy was a guru, and apparently cannot be false, so that the second half was a delirious justification of why he changed the truth table, and this did not make an atom of sense. The more people laugh at that move, the more he became insulting and the more he insists on his delirium. It was just impossible to change his mind, and all this for what I took to be just a typo without any importance. On another occasion, the same guy seemed to be able to change his mind. The only difference was the lack of women in the (small) audience. May be all this is related to mating. Man hates to lost face in front of women, perhaps. We might be programmed for this. You know the universal laws: 1) The boss is right, 2) even when the boss is false, 1) still applies, 3) especially when the boss is false, 1) still applies. And Sam Harris, in his reply to Dan Dennett in their recent debate on free will, remarks that he's .. begun to doubt whether any smart person retains the ability to change his mind. I have another theory of intelligence, which is that kids are intelligent (= can change their mind and learn), and adults are stupid (= can no more change their minds). Of course one might well wonder how applicable the term smart would be if this were indeed the case (leave alone the question of how free or otherwise we are to change our minds!). ... something which could restart all threads of the list :) Bruno David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 15 February 2014 13:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I have another theory of intelligence, which is that kids are intelligent (= can change their mind and learn), and adults are stupid (= can no more change their minds). Yes, and indeed I have noticed that there is a great deal of social and professional pressure on adults *not* to change their minds. I had a boss many years ago (for whom unfortunately I didn't have a great deal of respect, at least professionally). During a work appraisal she said to me David, I wonder whether perhaps you lack confidence because I notice that when we meet you often succeed in convincing me that you are absolutely right about some course of action but then the next time we meet you tell me you have reconsidered it.. I was struck by her comment and reflected on it. The next time we met I told her I've been thinking about your remark and I realise that it's because the fact that you happen to be convinced that I am right matters less to me than my worry that I might actually be wrong.. Unfortunately it wasn't until some time later that I realised that in being quite so frank I had very probably offended her! David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 February 2014 09:03, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: LizR: but WHO is the observer? The one great advantage that Many Worlds has over other quantum interpretations is that Everett doesn't need to answer that question. That's the reason I like it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/15/2014 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 18:06, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: snip It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy). So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. I guess you mean cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp. No, I meant something stronger than that. I meant that what we observe cannot count in favor of comp. According to Deustch, nothing can count in favor of any theory. We could only refute a theory, but positive confirmation does not lake sense, according to him. I am not sanguine about this, and I can make sense that a non-refutation can add credence to a theory, but not that much. What most adds credence is a surprising prediction that is empirically confirmed. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How does acceleration curve space? Can anyone provide an answer?
On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 3:49 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Einstein couldn't be classed as witless He claimed atoms were the littlelest When they did a bit of splittin' em It scared everybody shitless. A Quantum Mechanic's vacation Left his colleagues in dire consternation Though tests had shown His speed was well known His position was pure speculation John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch): - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an exponential with such polynomials) - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals. That is astonishing. Where can I read a proof (without having to learn too much background)? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
Isn't quantum mechanics based on the reals? On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 12:20 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch): - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an exponential with such polynomials) - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals. That is astonishing. Where can I read a proof (without having to learn too much background)? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 2/15/2014 5:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And Sam Harris, in his reply to Dan Dennett in their recent debate on free will, remarks that he's .. begun to doubt whether any smart person retains the ability to change his mind. I have another theory of intelligence, which is that kids are intelligent (= can change their mind and learn), and adults are stupid (= can no more change their minds). The best defense against becoming stuck with a wrong opinion is don't make up your mind in the first place. However, this means accepting the burden of acting under uncertainty. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The 3-1 view is the 3p view on the 1p views, note the plural, after the duplication. That is far more convoluted than it need to be, it's really not all that complicated. After the duplication both the Washington Man and the Moscow Man agree that they were both the Helsinki Man at one time. A third party observer would also agree with this. After the duplication both the Washington Man and the Moscow Man agree that they are no longer each other. A third party observer would agree with this too. So unlike Einstein's thought experiments in this one everybody involved is in agreement about everything that happened, which is why we can learn nothing from it. A typical observation will be the diary of the guy in W assess that he is in W, and (perhaps) that he could not have predicted that, That is incorrect, the Helsinki Man could have successfully predicted that the Washington diary will be written by the guy in Washington. and that the diary of the guy in M assess that he is in M and (perhaps) that he could not have predicted that. And the Helsinki Man could have successfully predicted that the Moscow diary will be written by the guy in Moscow. But of course if you're trying to ascertain the nature of personal identity none of this matters, it doesn't matter if the predictions were correct or not. So the prediction you have often made, and never clearly retracted, that you will find yourself in W and M, is a correct prediction for the 3-1 view, Yes, after it was all over and the smoke had cleared away a third party observer will say that John Clark is in Moscow and John Clark is in Washington. but that is not what is asked in Helsinki, which concerns the 1-views, or as I said the 1-1-views (the 1-view on the 1-view). If that is the question then the only answer the Helsinki Man can give is my first person view is of Helsinki. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 Feb 2014, at 14:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-15 10:01 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I don't beg the question, I don't see a problem generating a virtual world where F=ma does not hold true... that world exists in an infinity of versions in the UD deployment as our own reality... You have no point proving our own reality could not be a dream in that sense... The only thing that should render our own reality more real, is that it certainly requires less rules than a reality where F=ma is false... Not at all. By the invariance of the first person, the number of rules and the complexity of the explanations/programs is not relevant. If not I would have solve the measure problem by an appeal to Kolmogorov or Chaitin complexity. But this cannot work. It is only in the self-multiplication factors that the laws of physics can become stable. nature use linearity, and the discovery of arithmetical quantum logic confirms up to now that fact. It makes the Everett multiplication of populations (the first person plural) protecting comp from solipsism. All pieces of dreams are consistent with the actual state of a sentient being. That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of computations. UDA made the laws of physics in a probability calculus, assuming the measure exist: that is: a law of physics is what multiplies the normal histories again the aberrant one. Yes but you don't have that measure nor a way to calculate it, I do. That's what Z1* Co. are supposed to provide. It is technically complex to do, but everything is explained here. the rest are pure open problem in math. you don't know it and you can't know that our reality does win the measure battle. I make this testable, of course I need definitions (of belief, knowledge, observation, in the ideal case of the self-referentially correct machine needed to extract the correct physics). Anyway the fact that almost anything is possible (with different proportion as a measure is assumed), means that *no* measure can invalidate computationalism... Then no measure can invalidate Everett QM for the same reason. Comp and QM makes both physics into a statistics. I don't think MWI is falsifiable either... Of course. We can only falsifies the statistics. computationalism is a metaphysical stands and up to now in your argumentation I see nothing that could falsify comp... You always say to compare physics to comp physics, but it's a dead end, no contradiction can be inferred from that. I cannot make sense of that. That opinion was widely hold before 1991, as X1* and Z1* was believed to collapse the modal logic, due to the fact that the p and p-[]p seemed to impose simultaneously antisymmetry and symmetry, but the nuances brought eventually by incompleteness eventually refuted, amazingly enough, that collapse. That is important as it makes comp distinguishing clearly comp physical laws from comp possible geographies. What are comp physical laws then ? if it is an open problem because calculus is intractable... then comp is not falsifiable, you can't use falsifiability argument if such falsification is intractable. The comp + theatetus comp theory of observable is Z1*. A quantum logic has already been derived. A theorem prover has been implemented. And I still don't understand how comp can sort geographical laws from deeper laws. The FPI makes consciousness differentiating on the infinite computations existing in arithmetic. Geography is the not materialist necessity, or the materialist contingency. In arithmetic this correspond to the diamond of some of the material hypostases defined by the intensional variant []p p, or []p t. This can be translated in computer science/arithmetic, and the case of probability one can be studied by its logic. This, all Löbian machine can understand by introspection (self-reference) and so the physics is derivable from self-reference only, and then tested with the observation. Then the result is that a physical (lawful) physical reality does exist, with a fundamental logic which is already enough quantum-like to let us hope to have an equivalent of Gleason theorem, and in that case the white rabbit problem is solved *only* by the quantum logic we observe. The infinity of computational consistent relative state obeys the same logic in an artificial simulation and in the physics, emerging (or not) from the sum on UD*. That one is determined by computer science. The case of the probability one logic is given by the arithmetical quantization. so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or comp is false. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, How would it proves that ? By
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Friday, February 14, 2014 9:45:34 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On 13 February 2014 19:19, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 9:30:25 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On 12 February 2014 23:47, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I don't think that my experience can be replaced with a copy though. So how would you know you were a copy? It has nothing to do with whether or not I would know, it's because in my understanding, copying is not primitively real, but rather is a consequence of low level insensitivity. As awareness approaches the limits of its sensitivity, everything seems more and more the same. From an absolute perspective, awareness cannot be substituted, because substitution is the antithesis of awareness. That's your theory of why you don't think your experience could be replaced with a copy, but you haven't explained what you think would happen. It depends on what method was being used to try to copy my experience. The common theme would be that the copy would fall short aesthetically and functionally from the outside view, and that it would have no inside view. Here you are today, incredulous about the story of your destruction last night, but we produce witnesses and videotapes and whatever other proof you need. What are you going to say to that? Your question is If you were wrong about awareness being non-transferable, would you still think you were right?. I'm not even sure what that fallacy is called...a loaded non-question? No, it's a simple question. You could answer something like, If I were replaced by a copy last night then my copy would tell you today that he is not Craig Weinberg. I don't have a problem with the logic that once you accept the false premise of copyable experience, then the copy would be unable to detect that they were a copy (although even that makes unscientific assumptions about the limits of sense). The problem is that being replaced by a copy is like a circle and square becoming the same thing. Reject the premise of a copyable experience: the copy then does not have the experience of the original, but it has the delusional belief that it has a continuation of the experience of the original. No, the copy of the experience has no belief or experience at all. The reflection of the fire doesn't burn anything. Given that a person with a delusion by definition lacks insight into the fact that he is deluded, how do you know that you are not a copy? You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll. The physical differences are only encoded as software if there is a human user who is interpreting it as meaningful. Without the user who cares about the difference, and for whom the software is designed to interface with, there is only unencoded physical differences in the computer. The same goes for the brain. Without us, the brain is just a complex piece of coral, storing and repeating meaningless configurations of electrical, molecular, and cellular interactions that have nothing to do with human consciousness. If the meaningless configurations of of electrical, molecular and cellular interactions occur then consciousness also occurs, and they aren't meaningless any more. That is, we know that these physical processes are *sufficient* for consciousness, since we know that (a) we are conscious, and (b) as far as we know there is no additional ingredient other than these physical processes. That's circular. We do not know that the physical processes are sufficient, because we can describe them exhaustively without having to describe consciousness at all. Consciousness, therefore, to paraphrase Chalmers, must be a further fact about the world. If that is so (and I agree that it is, since I am not a physical eliminativist) it is still consistent with the physical processes still being *sufficient* to produce consciousness. It would only not be sufficient if some further ingredient were necessary beyond the matter in the right configuration. It's not a further ingredient any more than a canvas and an artist are further ingredients required in paint to make it a painting. Consciousness is the Absolute frame of all possibilities, even theoretical possibilities, even the theoretical possibility of theory. Craig http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fmultisenserealism.files.wordpress.com%2F2013%2F08%2Ftelicdynamic.jpgsa=Dsntz=1usg=AFQjCNFfLKL0czF6If6DTdFS2Iw8Uy6lIQYou are only looking at it from the Retrospective view of consciousness, the modus tollens view where consciousness is assumed to be attached to physics instead of
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 15 Feb 2014, at 14:36, David Nyman wrote: On 15 February 2014 13:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I have another theory of intelligence, which is that kids are intelligent (= can change their mind and learn), and adults are stupid (= can no more change their minds). Yes, and indeed I have noticed that there is a great deal of social and professional pressure on adults *not* to change their minds. I had a boss many years ago (for whom unfortunately I didn't have a great deal of respect, at least professionally). During a work appraisal she said to me David, I wonder whether perhaps you lack confidence because I notice that when we meet you often succeed in convincing me that you are absolutely right about some course of action but then the next time we meet you tell me you have reconsidered it.. I was struck by her comment and reflected on it. The next time we met I told her I've been thinking about your remark and I realise that it's because the fact that you happen to be convinced that I am right matters less to me than my worry that I might actually be wrong.. Unfortunately it wasn't until some time later that I realised that in being quite so frank I had very probably offended her! That's why the wise man and the universal machine remain silent in case like that. Oops. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
To extend your metaphor, in my view, since the characters in a drama can build an LCD screen as part of the show, but an LCD screen can't build a show as part of its function, it makes more sense that the drama is fundamental and that from an absolute perspective, it is the pixels which are the epiphenomenal show. The reason why it is reversed for us locally is that our show is nested several times within other shows which are both larger and smaller in scope and slower and faster in frequency. The most 'other' of these shows is the one which appears most mechanical, as it includes the fastest, slowest, largest, and smallest experiences relative to our own - the polar opposite of our own native scope, which is by definition middle-range from our perspective. On Saturday, February 15, 2014 8:14:31 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 15 February 2014 02:45, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: If that is so (and I agree that it is, since I am not a physical eliminativist) it is still consistent with the physical processes still being *sufficient* to produce consciousness. It would only not be sufficient if some further ingredient were necessary beyond the matter in the right configuration. I've been reflecting on our exchange on the subject of reference. The assumption that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of physics would entail, I suppose, that we shouldn't think of physics itself as referring to anything at all. The idea is that we can always give a fully sufficient and closed account of any sequence of events in fully-reduced physical-causal terms. One could make an analogy, for example, with watching a movie on an LCD screen, in terms of which the dramatic events must always be fully reducible to some sequence of illumination of the screen pixels (so that the drama is an epiphenomenon of the pixel-physics). For this analogy to be transferable to the mind body problem, we must further assume that the dramatic interpretation which, in the case of the the movie must be provided externally, is somehow internal to the epiphenomenal causal logic and the physics on which it supervenes. If this is granted, the epiphenomenal dramatis personae then have access to a logic of reference that somehow travels on the underlying ontology, but is ineffective in it. As in the movie analogy, there is a dramatic logic that supervenes on the physical level, but is no more effective in physical terms than we would expect the characters in a movie to be in changing the underlying pixel-physics. If the foregoing is to make any sense, we are forced to the view that all references to such dramatis personae are, in the end, merely a manner of speaking, and that consequently *all* such gross or macroscopic references are, strictly speaking, epistemological (i.e. they are all internal references to epiphenomena of some fully-reduced physical ontology). Funnily enough, I recently heard Jaron Lanier expressing just such a view (at least as a possibility). Do you agree that your views imply that reality is in some sense like this? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 Feb 2014, at 17:55, John Clark wrote: On 15 February 2014 09:03, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: LizR: but WHO is the observer? The one great advantage that Many Worlds has over other quantum interpretations is that Everett doesn't need to answer that question. That's the reason I like it. Everett needs a machine able to memorize succession of measurement results. He needs comp or some weakening of it. Yes, that is what I like in Everett too. But then comp forces us to push Everett's logic farer, on the arithmetical spectrum. You miss this because you confuse the unique 1p with the 3-1p. If I explain with the equivalent unique 1-1-p, you throw back the non unique 3-1-1 p, endlessly. You might not listen to yourself, nor to your many selves (after duplications experiences). The 3 1 p distinction makes all uses of the pronouns unambiguous as far as they need for the reasoning to proceed. You seem to add the noise to make obscure something which is actually very simple and clear, in 3p sharable notions. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 Feb 2014, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote: On 2/15/2014 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 18:06, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: snip It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy). So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. I guess you mean cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp. No, I meant something stronger than that. I meant that what we observe cannot count in favor of comp. According to Deustch, nothing can count in favor of any theory. We could only refute a theory, but positive confirmation does not lake sense, according to him. I am not sanguine about this, and I can make sense that a non-refutation can add credence to a theory, but not that much. What most adds credence is a surprising prediction that is empirically confirmed. That is not my task. I translate a problem that anyone assuming comp has to solve. In a sense, I refute physicalism, in the comp theory. I search the truth, not to impress colleague. In passing I show a rationalist conception of reality which is Plotinian and Non Aristotelician. All what I described could have been found before QM, and the quantum aspect of nature could have been seen as a surprising prediction. Well, actually, the comparison is not yet finished. Z1* is somehow a generator of surprising predictions, as it might depart from the quantum prediction. Don't ask to much, the machine/number theological science is in its infacy, to say the least. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 16 February 2014 06:48, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/15/2014 5:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And Sam Harris, in his reply to Dan Dennett in their recent debate on free will, remarks that he's .. begun to doubt whether any smart person retains the ability to change his mind. I have another theory of intelligence, which is that kids are intelligent (= can change their mind and learn), and adults are stupid (= can no more change their minds). The best defense against becoming stuck with a wrong opinion is don't make up your mind in the first place. However, this means accepting the burden of acting under uncertainty. Are you sure about that? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 16 February 2014 00:14, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: ;) From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following phases: 1- enter with an apparently bright idea 2- is exposed to comp bombardment 3- comp seduction 4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That means nothing) 5- comp aversion (too much comp, every discussion ends in a single alternative: comp) 6- comp resignation (maybe there is something more that I do not manage to catch from comp. Occasionally there is some room for what he really like. Normally the first five or ten comments of a thread) finally a three alternative multiverse appears: 7 comp nirvana : He enter in the mysticism of machine dreams, comp soteriology and comp theogony while he look at modal logic expressions and smoke a pipe of marihuana or 7' - comp Hell: the Yang of the comp: He is lost in the fifteen line of a modal logic formula for an Eternity. Later on, he discover that it was something trivial, but it was obfuscated and intimidated by the formulas. or 7''- teleportation to another list with a certain substitution level. Teehee. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How does acceleration curve space? Can anyone provide an answer?
On 16 February 2014 06:07, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 3:49 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Einstein couldn't be classed as witless He claimed atoms were the littlelest When they did a bit of splittin' em It scared everybody shitless. A Quantum Mechanic's vacation Left his colleagues in dire consternation Though tests had shown His speed was well known His position was pure speculation There ain't half been some clever bastards Probably got help from their mum There ain't half been some clever bastards Now that we've had some Let's hope that there's lots more to come. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 15 February 2014 18:41, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: To extend your metaphor, in my view, since the characters in a drama can build an LCD screen as part of the show, but an LCD screen can't build a show as part of its function, it makes more sense that the drama is fundamental and that from an absolute perspective, it is the pixels which are the epiphenomenal show. The reason why it is reversed for us locally is that our show is nested several times within other shows which are both larger and smaller in scope and slower and faster in frequency. The most 'other' of these shows is the one which appears most mechanical, as it includes the fastest, slowest, largest, and smallest experiences relative to our own - the polar opposite of our own native scope, which is by definition middle-range from our perspective. Well, I was just using the metaphor to illustrate what I see as the consequence of Stathis's views (it remains to be seen whether he concurs). However, even if we grant this view, it seems to me that we can be too easily befuddled by words like fundamental or epiphenomenal. By his own admission, Stathis is not an eliminativist about consciousness, so in labelling it as epiphenomenal ISTM, in the first instance, that he is hardly saying more than that whatever is picked out by the term isn't merely some more coarse-grained structuring of a fully-reduced physical ontology (as, for example, in the case of chemistry). If it were, it would simply be no more than physics. The contention that consciousness *supervenes* on physics is then no more than a gesture towards yet-to-be-elucidated psycho-physical principles, in terms of which we would expect each level, in the final analysis, to be mutually co-variant. But consciousness has a logic of its own, evidently quite distinct in kind from that of the physical causal level, and frankly I don't what would motivate one to consider it any less fundamental (in Stathis's model, that is) since a complete account of things *must include both*. Indeed, just as the LCD pixels comprise just that infrastructure that is required to underpin all possible dramas at the level of the movie, the fully-reduced physical ontology comprises just that infrastructure that is required to underpin all possible dramas at the epistemological level (precisely how and why this is the case being other questions). So, to paraphrase Einstein, consciousness without physics would be lame, physics without consciousness would be blind. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 15 February 2014 18:32, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll. Does that then entail that if a conscious amoeba were to fission, the resulting two amoebae would be unconscious? Or only one of them? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage
On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 11:08:07AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 20:47, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: I find cuttlefish fascinating. They are social, relatively intelligent, can communicate, able to grasp and manipulate things. It seems like they were all set to become the dominant large life form (instead of humans). A mystery: they don't live a long time. Usually intelligence go with a rather long life, but cuttlefishes live one or two years. Yes - I find that surprising also. Hard for them to dominate, also, as they have few protections, no shelter, and are edible for many predators, including humans. One could say the same about early home 2 millions years ago. The invention of the throwable spear changed all that. They survive by hiding and fooling. They can hunt with hypnosis (as you can see in the video). I feel privileged that these wonderful animals (giant cuttlefish) can be found less than 200 metres from my house. I have often observed them when snorkling or scuba diving. I had to laugh at the Texan prof's comment that they are as least as smart as fish. I do have a habit of underestimating fish intelligence, but IMHO their intelligence equals that of some mammals or birds, and clearly outclasses fish. I think I mentioned the anecdote which convinced me they exhibit a second order theory of the mind, which may well be sufficient for consciousness. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage
On 2/15/2014 2:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 11:08:07AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 20:47, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: I find cuttlefish fascinating. They are social, relatively intelligent, can communicate, able to grasp and manipulate things. It seems like they were all set to become the dominant large life form (instead of humans). A mystery: they don't live a long time. Usually intelligence go with a rather long life, but cuttlefishes live one or two years. Yes - I find that surprising also. Which is not doubt related to having only one clutch of young. But I wonder what is the evolutionary and physiological reason for that? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How does acceleration curve space? Can anyone provide an answer?
On 16 February 2014 09:35, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Limericks? No, I just put a quote at the end of my post... Seems I can't do anything without starting a trend. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 15 February 2014 18:32, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll. Who thinks maths is hard. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage
Living a long time (relatively) is something to do with the same stuff that causes gout, I believe. I also believe there are two reproductive strategies, and we've gone in for the caring for the young version with a vengeance. Apart from some blokes, of course... On 16 February 2014 11:16, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/15/2014 2:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 11:08:07AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 20:47, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: I find cuttlefish fascinating. They are social, relatively intelligent, can communicate, able to grasp and manipulate things. It seems like they were all set to become the dominant large life form (instead of humans). A mystery: they don't live a long time. Usually intelligence go with a rather long life, but cuttlefishes live one or two years. Yes - I find that surprising also. Which is not doubt related to having only one clutch of young. But I wonder what is the evolutionary and physiological reason for that? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 15, 2014 3:43:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 15 February 2014 18:32, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll. Does that then entail that if a conscious amoeba were to fission, the resulting two amoebae would be unconscious? Or only one of them? That's not a copy of an amoeba, reproducing its body is part of what an amoeba does. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 15, 2014 5:48:12 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 15 February 2014 18:32, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll. Who thinks maths is hard. Dolls don't think at all, and dolls which seem like they think from the outside don't care about the difference between 'hard' and 'easy'. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Fwd: Better Than the Chinese Room
-- Forwarded message -- From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com Date: 15 February 2014 23:45 Subject: RE: Better Than the Chinese Room To: Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com Can you give me a principled distinction between reproducing and copying? David Sent from my Windows Phone -- From: Craig Weinberg Sent: 15/02/2014 23:06 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Cc: da...@davidnyman.com Subject: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room On Saturday, February 15, 2014 3:43:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 15 February 2014 18:32, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll. Does that then entail that if a conscious amoeba were to fission, the resulting two amoebae would be unconscious? Or only one of them? That's not a copy of an amoeba, reproducing its body is part of what an amoeba does. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 15 Feb 2014, at 10:58 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 15 February 2014 10:25, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, I wonder that. I generally assume people arguing on a forum like this are rational (ish) and hence that they intend what they say and when they keep avoiding questions it's because they don't want to answer them, and when they're rude and arrogant it's intentional, and so on. But sometimes I think they can't be conscious of what they're doing, that surely no one would want to be like that deliberately, at least no one interersted in truth and science - maybe money and politics. It's a mystery, to me at least. Galen Strawson recently quoted some remarks of Herbert Feigl that, mutatis mutandis, might well apply more generally: Philosophers are hypersensitive .. in their repressed perplexities. A puzzle which does not resolve itself within a given favored philosophical frame is repressed very much in the manner in which unresolved intrapersonal conflicts are repressed. I surmise that psychologically the first kind may be subsumed under the second. Scholars cathect certain ideas so strongly and their outlook becomes so ego involved that they erect elaborate barricades of defenses, merely to protect their pet ideas from the blows (or the slower corrosive effects) of criticism. No one can be sure that he is not doing this sort of thing in a particular case, and I claim no exception for myself. (The Mental and the Physical). And Sam Harris, in his reply to Dan Dennett in their recent debate on free will, remarks that he's .. begun to doubt whether any smart person retains the ability to change his mind. Of course one might well wonder how applicable the term smart would be if this were indeed the case (leave alone the question of how free or otherwise we are to change our minds!). David In the case of Edgar it is so screamingly obvious that his continued appearance on this list is an expression of deep personal need to be appreciated as the genius he indubitably considers himself to be. It's actually quite instructive to see how this plays out in his posts. He has revealed a few personal tidbits about his past that lend weight to this - no need to repeat them here, but his agenda is indeed ego-driven and thus anti-rational, although he has not the slightest intention of acknowledging this since people have clearly been taking exception to his arrogant personal style for most of his life. Which is almost certainly why he has landed here, where he can simply bleat-away without fear of real reprisal. All of his thinking is messy and derivative and shot-through with lacunae and selective reasoning. This boy has never truly learnt how to think. I repeat again that the only effective way to deal with bullies and thickheads is to ignore their posts. Every post by Edgar is essentially an invitation to cross swords with his out-of-control ego, desperate for attention. The continued refusal to answer questions concerning his fundamental assumptions would have him thrown out of any science academy worth the name. You can of course, get away with any shit you want over the Internet. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 16 Feb 2014, at 7:09 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The best defense against becoming stuck with a wrong opinion is don't make up your mind in the first place. However, this means accepting the burden of acting under uncertainty. Are you sure about that? I'd be fairly certain about that. Humans have to get used to the very high level of uncertainty that accompanies any authentic action. By authentic action I mean action that is not the clone of some other action or tried and tested process, but the honest attempt to design a way forward with limited knowledge and no guarantee of success. Interestingly, humans never do get used to the enormous uncertainty surrounding their existence. Humans crave certainty before acting but reality, by it's very nature denies them this luxury. The choice to have a chicken burger may indeed be complicated by salmonella but there is no fail safe way of knowing beforehand. Kim Kim Jones B. Mus. GDTL Email: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au kmjco...@icloud.com Mobile: 0450 963 719 Phone: 02 93894239 Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Fwd: Better Than the Chinese Room
Reproducing (especially WRT self-reproduction) involves development: executing a program that describes the thing being copied to create a copy of that thing. Whereas copying merely looks at the original object, and recreates it. The program (if it can be called a program) doesn't contain any information about the thing being copied. To clarify this - consider a JPEG image of the Mandelbrot set. _Reproducing_ the mandelbrot set image involves executing the equation z=z^2+c for each pixel c considered as a point in the complex plane, and counting the number of iterations until z escapes the disk |z|=2, and then generating the image from that information, whereas _copying_ the image involves reading the pixels (even just bits) of the JPEG file and creating a new one (eg via the cp command). Cheers On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 12:02:21AM +, David Nyman wrote: -- Forwarded message -- From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com Date: 15 February 2014 23:45 Subject: RE: Better Than the Chinese Room To: Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com Can you give me a principled distinction between reproducing and copying? David Sent from my Windows Phone -- From: Craig Weinberg Sent: 15/02/2014 23:06 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Cc: da...@davidnyman.com Subject: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room On Saturday, February 15, 2014 3:43:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 15 February 2014 18:32, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll. Does that then entail that if a conscious amoeba were to fission, the resulting two amoebae would be unconscious? Or only one of them? That's not a copy of an amoeba, reproducing its body is part of what an amoeba does. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 05:40, Russell Standish wrote: thesis. This doesn't bother me - if you ever bothered to read my thesis (not that I'm recommending you do so), you would find it consists of two faily different topics, with only the most tenuous connection between them. Oopsa-daisy! All for the lack of an r. For the record, I didn't fail my PhD :). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 09:30:52PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 05:42, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 8:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where you describe your work that you published since your thesis. I can sort of see you saying something a bit like the above on page 11 Now DU [sic - should be UD in English] is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable. That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs of all true Sigma 1 sentences, but I think what you are trying to say that all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true Sigma 1 sentence. Is that obvious? I didn't get that when I read the SANE paper originally, only got it in context of your statements above. How can that be? Many programs executed by the UD are non-halting, just loops. Can they be considered to correspond to a proof? Yes, like a failed proof. Like searching the first even prime number bigger than 2. The search for ExP(x) when Ax~P(x), but you don't know that. But for the probability calculus, you can limit yourself on the finite pieces of computations, as the first person will glue the infinities of them to experience their consistent infinite union. Bruno I suspect its a little more subtle. Solomonoff's original formulation of the universal prior failed the axioms of probability theory, because it included all computation, even non-halting ones. This was fixed by Levin, who restricted the sum to range over halting computations only. I think this point needs further thought, as presumably the consistent computations passing through my state will be dominated by non-halting ones. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 09:20:43AM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch): - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an exponential with such polynomials) - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals. That is astonishing. Where can I read a proof (without having to learn too much background)? You could try your luck with Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diophantine_equations http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matiyasevich's_theorem#Matiyasevich.27s_theorem Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 15, 2014 7:02:21 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: -- Forwarded message -- From: David Nyman david...@gmail.com javascript: Date: 15 February 2014 23:45 Subject: RE: Better Than the Chinese Room To: Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: Can you give me a principled distinction between reproducing and copying? Biological reproduction is a branching of the original organism in which the organism is literally recapitulated. Copying is metaphorical reproduction in which a limited sampling of sense impressions of the original are substituted for purposes of multiplying the locations of an object. Awareness isn't an object so it can only reproduce through the consequences of its own subjective intentions. The Baudrillard treatment of simulacra is relevant: Simulacra and Simulation breaks the sign-order into 4 stages: 1. The first stage is a faithful image/copy, where we believe, and it may even be correct, that a sign is a reflection of a profound reality (pg 6), this is a good appearance, in what Baudrillard called the sacramental order. 2. The second stage is perversion of reality, this is where we come to believe the sign to be an unfaithful copy, which masks and denatures reality as an evil appearance—it is of the order of maleficence. Here, signs and images do not faithfully reveal reality to us, but can hint at the existence of an obscure reality which the sign itself is incapable of encapsulating. 3. The third stage masks the absence of a profound reality, where the simulacrum *pretends* to be a faithful copy, but it is a copy with no original. Signs and images claim to represent something real, but no representation is taking place and arbitrary images are merely suggested as things which they have no relationship to. Baudrillard calls this the order of sorcery, a regime of semantichttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semanticsalgebra where all human meaning is conjured artificially to appear as a reference to the (increasingly) hermetic truth. 4. The fourth stage is pure simulation, in which the simulacrum has no relationship to any reality whatsoever. Here, signs merely reflect other signs and any claim to reality on the part of images or signs is only of the order of other such claims. This is a regime of total equivalency, where cultural products need no longer even pretend to be real in a naïve sense, because the experiences of consumers' lives are so predominantly artificial that even claims to reality are expected to be phrased in artificial, hyperreal terms. Any naïve pretension to reality as such is perceived as bereft of critical self-awareness, and thus as oversentimental. Awareness is zero level. It cannot be copied because awareness is ontologically identical with authenticity and genuine originality. Every instantiation of awareness is an unrepeatable local containment of the pansensitive/metaphenomenal substrate. Even identical twins are not copies, but separate, rhyming instances of irreducible originality. Craig David Sent from my Windows Phone -- From: Craig Weinberg Sent: 15/02/2014 23:06 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: Cc: da...@davidnyman.com javascript: Subject: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room On Saturday, February 15, 2014 3:43:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 15 February 2014 18:32, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll. Does that then entail that if a conscious amoeba were to fission, the resulting two amoebae would be unconscious? Or only one of them? That's not a copy of an amoeba, reproducing its body is part of what an amoeba does. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On Friday, February 14, 2014 10:23:35 PM UTC-5, Kim Jones wrote: On 15 Feb 2014, at 1:09 pm, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net javascript: wrote: On 2/14/2014 4:24 PM, Kim Jones wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 3:42 pm, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: wrote: What about the CMBR? When it was created there were (presumably) no observers in existence in the universe. Are you saying it wouldn't exist if we hadn't evolved to detect it (e.g. if humans hadn't evolved, or if we had never invented radio telescopes) ? Yes - exactly. A direct consequence of The Reversal. First comes Mind. Physics and matter and the 3D holographic farmyard are a long way down the road. I hope no one is assuming that it requires something as weird as a “human” to implement consciousness. Something as basic as a Boltzmann brain would be in principle, instantly possible in any universe, surely. Of course Boltzmann brains are notoriously transient, so we're to think of the universe (or at least pieces of past light cones) blinking in and out of existence. Or does that take a Boltzmann brain plus optic nerves and eyes and a Boltzmann telescope? Brent A mind without a hosting apparatus is the entity I am struggling to describe. I have no trouble with the notion that consciousness can simply exist with no extra qualifiers whatsoever. We are talking about that which simply exists - when it exists, where it exists, its characteristics etc. are another story. I don't know whether such questions are even relevant. Kim Existence, when, where, and characteristics would all be conditions within the primordial capacity for experience. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 15 February 2014 20:14, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 15 February 2014 02:45, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: If that is so (and I agree that it is, since I am not a physical eliminativist) it is still consistent with the physical processes still being *sufficient* to produce consciousness. It would only not be sufficient if some further ingredient were necessary beyond the matter in the right configuration. I've been reflecting on our exchange on the subject of reference. The assumption that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of physics would entail, I suppose, that we shouldn't think of physics itself as referring to anything at all. The idea is that we can always give a fully sufficient and closed account of any sequence of events in fully-reduced physical-causal terms. One could make an analogy, for example, with watching a movie on an LCD screen, in terms of which the dramatic events must always be fully reducible to some sequence of illumination of the screen pixels (so that the drama is an epiphenomenon of the pixel-physics). For this analogy to be transferable to the mind body problem, we must further assume that the dramatic interpretation which, in the case of the the movie must be provided externally, is somehow internal to the epiphenomenal causal logic and the physics on which it supervenes. If this is granted, the epiphenomenal dramatis personae then have access to a logic of reference that somehow travels on the underlying ontology, but is ineffective in it. As in the movie analogy, there is a dramatic logic that supervenes on the physical level, but is no more effective in physical terms than we would expect the characters in a movie to be in changing the underlying pixel-physics. If the foregoing is to make any sense, we are forced to the view that all references to such dramatis personae are, in the end, merely a manner of speaking, and that consequently *all* such gross or macroscopic references are, strictly speaking, epistemological (i.e. they are all internal references to epiphenomena of some fully-reduced physical ontology). Funnily enough, I recently heard Jaron Lanier expressing just such a view (at least as a possibility). Do you agree that your views imply that reality is in some sense like this? Yes. Quick answer, I'm traveling. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 15 February 2014 20:14, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 15 February 2014 02:45, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: If that is so (and I agree that it is, since I am not a physical eliminativist) it is still consistent with the physical processes still being *sufficient* to produce consciousness. It would only not be sufficient if some further ingredient were necessary beyond the matter in the right configuration. I've been reflecting on our exchange on the subject of reference. The assumption that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of physics would entail, I suppose, that we shouldn't think of physics itself as referring to anything at all. The idea is that we can always give a fully sufficient and closed account of any sequence of events in fully-reduced physical-causal terms. One could make an analogy, for example, with watching a movie on an LCD screen, in terms of which the dramatic events must always be fully reducible to some sequence of illumination of the screen pixels (so that the drama is an epiphenomenon of the pixel-physics). For this analogy to be transferable to the mind body problem, we must further assume that the dramatic interpretation which, in the case of the the movie must be provided externally, is somehow internal to the epiphenomenal causal logic and the physics on which it supervenes. If this is granted, the epiphenomenal dramatis personae then have access to a logic of reference that somehow travels on the underlying ontology, but is ineffective in it. As in the movie analogy, there is a dramatic logic that supervenes on the physical level, but is no more effective in physical terms than we would expect the characters in a movie to be in changing the underlying pixel-physics. If the foregoing is to make any sense, we are forced to the view that all references to such dramatis personae are, in the end, merely a manner of speaking, and that consequently *all* such gross or macroscopic references are, strictly speaking, epistemological (i.e. they are all internal references to epiphenomena of some fully-reduced physical ontology). Funnily enough, I recently heard Jaron Lanier expressing just such a view (at least as a possibility). Do you agree that your views imply that reality is in some sense like this? The difference between the movie and the conscious entity is that the movie has meaning to an external observer, while the conscious entity creates its own observer and hence its own meaning. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 16 February 2014 01:41, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: To extend your metaphor, in my view, since the characters in a drama can build an LCD screen as part of the show, but an LCD screen can't build a show as part of its function, it makes more sense that the drama is fundamental and that from an absolute perspective, it is the pixels which are the epiphenomenal show. The reason why it is reversed for us locally is that our show is nested several times within other shows which are both larger and smaller in scope and slower and faster in frequency. The most 'other' of these shows is the one which appears most mechanical, as it includes the fastest, slowest, largest, and smallest experiences relative to our own - the polar opposite of our own native scope, which is by definition middle-range from our perspective. As per my answer to David, the movie has meaning only to a conscious entity. If a computer is a conscious entity it will create meaning for itself, as humans do. You don't think a computer could do this but that's just prejudice. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 16 February 2014 01:32, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: No, the copy of the experience has no belief or experience at all. The reflection of the fire doesn't burn anything. Are you saying that the copy will be dead? A pathologist would examine it and declare that it cannot possibly be dead, everything is normal. It not only looks like Craig, it also has skin, bones, internal organs, blood, the histological structure of the organs is all normal, biochemical analysis is normal, everything is normal. If it's all normal by every objective test but it is dead, that would be a miracle. Given that a person with a delusion by definition lacks insight into the fact that he is deluded, how do you know that you are not a copy? You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll. A doll as in dead, or some other kind of doll? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 15, 2014 10:40:17 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On 16 February 2014 01:41, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: To extend your metaphor, in my view, since the characters in a drama can build an LCD screen as part of the show, but an LCD screen can't build a show as part of its function, it makes more sense that the drama is fundamental and that from an absolute perspective, it is the pixels which are the epiphenomenal show. The reason why it is reversed for us locally is that our show is nested several times within other shows which are both larger and smaller in scope and slower and faster in frequency. The most 'other' of these shows is the one which appears most mechanical, as it includes the fastest, slowest, largest, and smallest experiences relative to our own - the polar opposite of our own native scope, which is by definition middle-range from our perspective. As per my answer to David, the movie has meaning only to a conscious entity. If a computer is a conscious entity it will create meaning for itself, as humans do. You don't think a computer could do this but that's just prejudice. It's not prejudice, it's clarity. It's not that I think that a computer could not create meaning, it's that I understand why computation is meaningless by definition. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 15, 2014 10:49:56 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On 16 February 2014 01:32, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: No, the copy of the experience has no belief or experience at all. The reflection of the fire doesn't burn anything. Are you saying that the copy will be dead? I'm saying that the copy was never alive to begin with. A pathologist would examine it and declare that it cannot possibly be dead, everything is normal. It not only looks like Craig, it also has skin, bones, internal organs, blood, the histological structure of the organs is all normal, biochemical analysis is normal, everything is normal. You are assuming that is possible, but it isn't. All you can do is clone me, which is no better than a twin brother as far as being a copy. No other kind of reproduction will work, any more than a flame could be made out of pixels. If it's all normal by every objective test but it is dead, that would be a miracle. It won't be normal by every objective test. You keep thinking of a zombie, but I am talking about a doll. There are no zombies, just as there is no way to turn lead into gold by a chemical transformation. Given that a person with a delusion by definition lacks insight into the fact that he is deluded, how do you know that you are not a copy? You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll. A doll as in dead, or some other kind of doll? A doll as in never alive - as in a sculpture, an artifice, a facade... Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 16 Feb 2014, at 2:06 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, February 14, 2014 10:23:35 PM UTC-5, Kim Jones wrote: On 15 Feb 2014, at 1:09 pm, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 4:24 PM, Kim Jones wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 3:42 pm, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: What about the CMBR? When it was created there were (presumably) no observers in existence in the universe. Are you saying it wouldn't exist if we hadn't evolved to detect it (e.g. if humans hadn't evolved, or if we had never invented radio telescopes) ? Yes - exactly. A direct consequence of The Reversal. First comes Mind. Physics and matter and the 3D holographic farmyard are a long way down the road. I hope no one is assuming that it requires something as weird as a “human” to implement consciousness. Something as basic as a Boltzmann brain would be in principle, instantly possible in any universe, surely. Of course Boltzmann brains are notoriously transient, so we're to think of the universe (or at least pieces of past light cones) blinking in and out of existence. Or does that take a Boltzmann brain plus optic nerves and eyes and a Boltzmann telescope? Brent A mind without a hosting apparatus is the entity I am struggling to describe. I have no trouble with the notion that consciousness can simply exist with no extra qualifiers whatsoever. We are talking about that which simply exists - when it exists, where it exists, its characteristics etc. are another story. I don't know whether such questions are even relevant. Kim Existence, when, where, and characteristics would all be conditions within the primordial capacity for experience. Craig OK - so Hameroff and Penrose's conjecture that consciousness was a property of the primordial universe has legs then? These two are physicalists though; if I read Russell correctly he is saying this. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
