Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., List:

Thank you, this is very helpful.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 11:54 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon A.S., Clark, list,
>
> I started writing this note several days ago, but I got sidetracked
> with other commitments.
>
> My main interest (at the moment) is in the following slides, which
> I presented in 2015, and which I am now developing into a longer
> article:  http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf
>
> The issues in those slides are the focus of what I was trying to say.
>
> Jon
>
>> As I understand it, diagrams are icons, at least predominantly;
>> but rather than its object's qualities, a diagram embodies
>> the significant relations among its parts.
>>
>
> That's fine.  I don't object to that way of talking about them.
> What I wanted to distinguish are icons derived from sensations
> and icons (or diagrams) constructed (or imagined) by further
> processing.
>
> Jon
>
>> In a sense, then, one can abstract a diagram from an image by
>> ignoring the singular determinations of the latter that have
>> no bearing on whatever general properties of the former are
>> significant for one's purposes.
>>
>
> I agree that is one way of deriving a diagram in imagination.
>
> Clark
>
>> I think John’s point was largely orthogonal to the issue of
>> realism/nominalism.
>>
>
> Yes.  I prefer realism, but my ppe.pdf slides avoid that distinction.
>
> JFS
>
>> Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram,
>>> and every particular is something we classify by relating it
>>> to some diagram ...
>>>
>>
> MG Murphey
>
>> Mr. Arthur Burks has termed the icon a "specific universal" since it
>> is a specific thing which can stand for any member of a class ...
>> For in constructing the icon, we do not construct one particular case
>> under the hypothesis, we rather construct any particular case under
>> the hypothesis.
>>
>
> Jon
>
>> Would you mind elaborating, perhaps including some specific examples?
>>
>
> There are many examples in the ppe.pdf slides:  Slides 9 & 10 for
> icons and diagrams.  Slide 20 to 31 show Euclid's diagrams (unchanged)
> used as diagrams in existential graphs.  Slide 39 for the role that
> icons play in generalized existential graphs.
>
> I don't really like the terms 'universal' and 'particular', which
> are not Peircean terms.  I discussed that issue in the article
> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
>
> But following is my rationale for using those words in that note:
>
>  1. In a generalized existential graph, a diagram with appropriate
> indexicals (links to lines of identities) can serve as the
> definition of a relation.
>
>  2. since relations are often used to represent universals, an icon
> with N attached links (indexicals) can be considered as a
> representation of an N-adic relation.
>
>  3. A very simple icon, such as a patch of red, when attached
> to a line of identity in an existential graph, may be used
> to represent a monadic predicate named 'is-red'.
>
>  4. In generalized existential graphs (as I define them in ppe.pdf),
> an icon (or diagram or image or whatever you want to call it)
> together with N "pegs" (connections to lines of identity) may be
> used anywhere that an N-adic relation may be used.
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[John F Sowa]

Jon A.S., Clark, list,

I started writing this note several days ago, but I got sidetracked
with other commitments.

My main interest (at the moment) is in the following slides, which
I presented in 2015, and which I am now developing into a longer
article:  http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

The issues in those slides are the focus of what I was trying to say.

Jon

As I understand it, diagrams are icons, at least predominantly;
but rather than its object's qualities, a diagram embodies
the significant relations among its parts.


That's fine.  I don't object to that way of talking about them.
What I wanted to distinguish are icons derived from sensations
and icons (or diagrams) constructed (or imagined) by further
processing.

Jon

In a sense, then, one can abstract a diagram from an image by
ignoring the singular determinations of the latter that have
no bearing on whatever general properties of the former are
significant for one's purposes.


I agree that is one way of deriving a diagram in imagination.

Clark

I think John’s point was largely orthogonal to the issue of realism/nominalism.


Yes.  I prefer realism, but my ppe.pdf slides avoid that distinction.

JFS

Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram,
and every particular is something we classify by relating it
to some diagram ...


MG Murphey

Mr. Arthur Burks has termed the icon a "specific universal" since it
is a specific thing which can stand for any member of a class ...
For in constructing the icon, we do not construct one particular case
under the hypothesis, we rather construct any particular case under
the hypothesis.


Jon

Would you mind elaborating, perhaps including some specific examples?


There are many examples in the ppe.pdf slides:  Slides 9 & 10 for
icons and diagrams.  Slide 20 to 31 show Euclid's diagrams (unchanged)
used as diagrams in existential graphs.  Slide 39 for the role that
icons play in generalized existential graphs.

I don't really like the terms 'universal' and 'particular', which
are not Peircean terms.  I discussed that issue in the article
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf

But following is my rationale for using those words in that note:

 1. In a generalized existential graph, a diagram with appropriate
indexicals (links to lines of identities) can serve as the
definition of a relation.

 2. since relations are often used to represent universals, an icon
with N attached links (indexicals) can be considered as a
representation of an N-adic relation.

 3. A very simple icon, such as a patch of red, when attached
to a line of identity in an existential graph, may be used
to represent a monadic predicate named 'is-red'.

 4. In generalized existential graphs (as I define them in ppe.pdf),
an icon (or diagram or image or whatever you want to call it)
together with N "pegs" (connections to lines of identity) may be
used anywhere that an N-adic relation may be used.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon, Clark, List:


> On Mar 27, 2017, at 8:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal 
> "lion"?  How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular 
> lion, to such a diagram?
> 
With regard to the “differences that make a difference” between modes of 
representation of signs and restricting this intervention to a domain of 
discourse of the four terms used by CSP:
1. icon,
2. index
3. symbol
4. diagram
it is useful to note that the meanings can overlap as CSP pointed out. 

But, for me, the meanings can also be well separated when describing particular 
sinsigns.

In the mathematically relevant case, the concept of a diagram, deeper insight 
can be gained by recognizing that diagrams are not only written / drawn, they 
are purposeful expressions of the author’s beliefs and intent. 
Often, this implies a purpose for drawing the diagram as a design or plan for 
an object to be constructed. 
This construction can include a vast array of facts that are synthesized 
together to create a whole from its parts. Such constructions of diagrams 
(“blueprints”) can stretch across multiple disciplines, as you are well aware. 
It may be future oriented.

Thus, the intent of an diagram can be remote from the simpler concept of an 
index, a mere listing. A listing presupposes some categorical rule for ordering 
the contents of the list.  An index can be used in propositions to indicate 
“truth”. Often, an index is an indicator of the past.

In modern discourse, we often speak of symbol systems for particular sinsigns, 
such as the experience of electricity (in all it’s manifestations - physical as 
well a psychic.)  Such symbol systems require an internal coherency in order to 
give consistent meaning within the community of knowledgable users of the 
symbol system. 

One reason for communicating these highly abstract notions it that CSP appears 
to have been cursed by not acknowledging the special assets enclosed within the 
symbols of chemical table of elements.  In the chemical sciences, the chemical 
symbols can serve as index of the past, a diagram for design of future objects 
or both!

Cheers

Jerry 





.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[kirstima]

John,

I wish to draw your attention to this part in you mail:

JFS: ... a theory expressed in discrete signs...

This statement presupposes that even signs acting as symbols, are 
discrete. Written statements are put down in the form of discrete parts. 
But it does not follow that the proposition the statements attept to 
convey, consist of such discrete parts.


Propositions convey meaning. A theory attempts to convey meaning. Even 
any mathemathical formula (to my mind) attepts to convey meaning. - Just 
remember Wittgenstein (in the beginning of Philosophical 
Investigations)stating something like this: Does the meaning of "Give me 
a broom" get any clearer if I say: Give me a stick with (well something, 
you know, hairy) attached to it".


As I have understood your messages, you agree with the general idea. - 
Or have I misunderstood you?


This all comes down to the question how do the two formulations of the 
pragmatic maxim relate to each other.


Carl-Otto Apel ends his most interesting book on CSP by saying that if 
he were to begin his work all over again, he would choose to start with 
the question of meaning at the outset. - Well, he did not.


To my mind, Apel misinterprets CSP in many respects. But he succeeds in 
somethings mainstream Peirceans concistently and continuously seem to 
miss. Even the best of them.


The most valuable insights by Apel have to do with connecting the 
Peircean view with the Continental tradition stemming from hermeneutics. 
Therein lie his mistakes, too.


Perhaps I should not just but in a discussion without having been 
following it as I should. - But perhaps this may be of some interest.


So hopes Kirsti













John F Sowa kirjoitti 16.3.2017 20:49:

On 3/16/2017 11:20 AM, Clark Goble wrote:

The way I usually think about it is that there are many continuous
equations such that the limit as x → ∞ y → 0.


But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
a countable number of theories.

But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
to describe a continuous aspect of the world:

 1. Let the variables range over a continuous domain.

 2. Let the symbols (predicates) have a continuous mapping
to the world.  For example, 'circle' could describe any
of a continuous range of circular aspects of the world.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Mar 29, 2017, at 1:58 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> J.A.S., your post quoting “New Elements” makes much more sense that the other 
> Jon’s claim that “icons and indices are species under the genus” of symbol, 
> which I’m pretty sure Peirce would never say. The point that Peirce makes in 
> his “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” and elsewhere is that 
> symbols can involve indices, and indices can involve icons — indeed symbols 
> must involve both icons and indices in order to convey any information — but 
> icons do not involve indices nor do indices involve symbols, and this is what 
> makes them “degenerate” relative to the symbol. They are certainly not 
> species of the genus symbol. TRI again, Jon A.
>  
> As for which type of sign is logically “primordial,” I think the key to the 
> Peircean answer to that question is in his assertion that “a symbol alone is 
> indeterminate.” Now, any symbol which has a real object has been determined 
> by that object, to some extent, so clearly the “primordial” symbol is not one 
> of those. So the time before time is also prior to any information or 
> transformation. But that’s as far as I’m prepared to go into cosmology or the 
> universe of pre-reality.
> 

I wish I’d had the ability to put it that clearly Gary. Thanks for that. I’m 
marking this so I can quote you in future.

As you say, the primordial issue or cosmological issue is really the issue of 
moving for indeterminacy to determinacy. For practical symbols in semiotics you 
need indices and icons.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Tom:

Exactly right, good point.

Jon

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 11:42 AM, Tom Gollier  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> For what it's worth, I think you're right on.
>
> I would just add that a "diagram" in Peirce's sense (i.e. distinguished
> from both images and metaphors) not only would require relations between
> the parts (indices) but also those relationships should be such that we can
> derive new relationships from them within the diagram.  "Diagrams" of
> things like sales year to year are more like images than diagrams in
> Peirce's sense.
>
> Tom
>
> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 8:08 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Tom:
>>
>> A simple list of color *names *does not seem to qualify as a diagram in
>> Peirce's terminology, because it does not embody any relations among its
>> parts.  A depiction of the visible spectrum is probably a better example,
>> whether it is a simple color wheel or the discrete (but dense) version that
>> you can pull up on your computer monitor to display two million different
>> shades.
>>
>> I would suggest that the object of such a diagram is a range of
>> qualities; i.e., real possibilities.  Which particular diagram is suitable
>> depends mainly on the purpose for which someone is using it.  To teach
>> primary and secondary colors to a child, the color wheel with only six
>> varieties is adequate.  Early video games and personal computers made do
>> with a palette of just 16 colors.  An artist might not want to be limited
>> to any finite collection of hues, and thus will freely smear together
>> different paints until the result is just right.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 9:24 AM, Tom Gollier  wrote:
>>
>>> Jon,
>>>
>>> I don't know, but your questions as to the parts of a diagram of the
>>> possibilities of "color" and the relationships between those parts don't
>>> seem all that problematic to me.  Such a diagram might be rudimentary
>>> categories — black, blue, brown, green, orange, purple, red, yellow, and
>>> white — or it might be extended categories of colors — such as my computer
>>> can display.  Or, the diagram might be infinitely divisible into sequential
>>> wavelengths within a certain range. Or, it might be the artist's palette
>>> with different colors and various combinations smeared together. All of
>>> these allow us to identify, distinguish, and/or produce colors.
>>>
>>> The trouble comes with your question about the object. If we mean
>>> "object" in the sense of what is this thing "color" which all these
>>> diagrams ostensibly refer, the question becomes either what is this
>>> thing-in-itself, i.e. the reality, or which of these diagrams is right,
>>> i.e. the reality.  Peirce, via the scientific community, seems to be on the
>>> side of evolving diagrams, but personally, I wonder why we bother. Aren't
>>> these particular diagrams useful, real and general enough, for us?  Do we
>>> really need to know the thing "color" directly or an absolute,
>>> one-size-fits-all universal diagram?
>>>
>>> Tom
>>>
>>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Tom Gollier]

Jon,

For what it's worth, I think you're right on.

I would just add that a "diagram" in Peirce's sense (i.e. distinguished
from both images and metaphors) not only would require relations between
the parts (indices) but also those relationships should be such that we can
derive new relationships from them within the diagram.  "Diagrams" of
things like sales year to year are more like images than diagrams in
Peirce's sense.

Tom

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 8:08 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Tom:
>
> A simple list of color *names *does not seem to qualify as a diagram in
> Peirce's terminology, because it does not embody any relations among its
> parts.  A depiction of the visible spectrum is probably a better example,
> whether it is a simple color wheel or the discrete (but dense) version that
> you can pull up on your computer monitor to display two million different
> shades.
>
> I would suggest that the object of such a diagram is a range of qualities;
> i.e., real possibilities.  Which particular diagram is suitable depends
> mainly on the purpose for which someone is using it.  To teach primary and
> secondary colors to a child, the color wheel with only six varieties is
> adequate.  Early video games and personal computers made do with a palette
> of just 16 colors.  An artist might not want to be limited to any finite
> collection of hues, and thus will freely smear together different paints
> until the result is just right.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 9:24 AM, Tom Gollier  wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> I don't know, but your questions as to the parts of a diagram of the
>> possibilities of "color" and the relationships between those parts don't
>> seem all that problematic to me.  Such a diagram might be rudimentary
>> categories — black, blue, brown, green, orange, purple, red, yellow, and
>> white — or it might be extended categories of colors — such as my computer
>> can display.  Or, the diagram might be infinitely divisible into sequential
>> wavelengths within a certain range. Or, it might be the artist's palette
>> with different colors and various combinations smeared together. All of
>> these allow us to identify, distinguish, and/or produce colors.
>>
>> The trouble comes with your question about the object. If we mean
>> "object" in the sense of what is this thing "color" which all these
>> diagrams ostensibly refer, the question becomes either what is this
>> thing-in-itself, i.e. the reality, or which of these diagrams is right,
>> i.e. the reality.  Peirce, via the scientific community, seems to be on the
>> side of evolving diagrams, but personally, I wonder why we bother. Aren't
>> these particular diagrams useful, real and general enough, for us?  Do we
>> really need to know the thing "color" directly or an absolute,
>> one-size-fits-all universal diagram?
>>
>> Tom
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Tom:

A simple list of color *names *does not seem to qualify as a diagram in
Peirce's terminology, because it does not embody any relations among its
parts.  A depiction of the visible spectrum is probably a better example,
whether it is a simple color wheel or the discrete (but dense) version that
you can pull up on your computer monitor to display two million different
shades.

I would suggest that the object of such a diagram is a range of qualities;
i.e., real possibilities.  Which particular diagram is suitable depends
mainly on the purpose for which someone is using it.  To teach primary and
secondary colors to a child, the color wheel with only six varieties is
adequate.  Early video games and personal computers made do with a palette
of just 16 colors.  An artist might not want to be limited to any finite
collection of hues, and thus will freely smear together different paints
until the result is just right.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 9:24 AM, Tom Gollier  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> I don't know, but your questions as to the parts of a diagram of the
> possibilities of "color" and the relationships between those parts don't
> seem all that problematic to me.  Such a diagram might be rudimentary
> categories — black, blue, brown, green, orange, purple, red, yellow, and
> white — or it might be extended categories of colors — such as my computer
> can display.  Or, the diagram might be infinitely divisible into sequential
> wavelengths within a certain range. Or, it might be the artist's palette
> with different colors and various combinations smeared together. All of
> these allow us to identify, distinguish, and/or produce colors.
>
> The trouble comes with your question about the object. If we mean "object"
> in the sense of what is this thing "color" which all these diagrams
> ostensibly refer, the question becomes either what is this thing-in-itself,
> i.e. the reality, or which of these diagrams is right, i.e. the reality.
> Peirce, via the scientific community, seems to be on the side of evolving
> diagrams, but personally, I wonder why we bother. Aren't these particular
> diagrams useful, real and general enough, for us?  Do we really need to
> know the thing "color" directly or an absolute, one-size-fits-all universal
> diagram?
>
> Tom
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Tom Gollier]

Jon,

I don't know, but your questions as to the parts of a diagram of the
possibilities of "color" and the relationships between those parts don't
seem all that problematic to me.  Such a diagram might be rudimentary
categories — black, blue, brown, green, orange, purple, red, yellow, and
white — or it might be extended categories of colors — such as my computer
can display.  Or, the diagram might be infinitely divisible into sequential
wavelengths within a certain range. Or, it might be the artist's palette
with different colors and various combinations smeared together. All of
these allow us to identify, distinguish, and/or produce colors.

The trouble comes with your question about the object. If we mean "object"
in the sense of what is this thing "color" which all these diagrams
ostensibly refer, the question becomes either what is this thing-in-itself,
i.e. the reality, or which of these diagrams is right, i.e. the reality.
Peirce, via the scientific community, seems to be on the side of evolving
diagrams, but personally, I wonder why we bother. Aren't these particular
diagrams useful, real and general enough, for us?  Do we really need to
know the thing "color" directly or an absolute, one-size-fits-all universal
diagram?

Tom

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 8:31 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Tom, List:
>
> It is no intrusion at all, I welcome your input!
>
> I think that both "red" and "color" are universals, or rather generals as
> Peirce typically preferred to call them.  Each names a continuum of
> possible instantiations, and the one for red is part of the one for color,
> consistent with his definition of a continuum as "that which has parts, all
> of which have parts of the same kind."  Both 1ns and 3ns are general, but
> in different ways; Peirce called them "negative" and "positive" generality,
> respectively.
>
> I would appreciate it if you could elaborate on your suggestion that a
> concept is "a diagram of possibilities."  What is the object of such a
> diagram?  What are its parts?  What are the significant relations among
> them that the diagram embodies?  How does such a diagram mediate between
> red things and the consequences of being red, such as primarily reflecting
> broad-spectrum light at a wavelength between 620 and 750 nm?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Awbrey]

List,

I will be occupied with other business for a while,
with no more than bits and snatches of time on line,
so I will continue this discussion later next month.

I added a few links to the blog version of my last post
on behalf of the extensional view of sign relations that
one needs to make contact with real-world empirical and
computational applications.

Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • 12
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/28/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-12/

Semeiotic:
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Semeiotic

Sign Relation:
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Sign_relation

Semiotic Information:
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Semiotic_Information

I may change the word “primordial” to “primitive” or something else
if it continues to convey the wrong idea, as I meant it more in the
sense of logical primitives or mathematical irreducibles than any
kind of physical or temporal genesis.

Regards,

Jon

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Mar 28, 2017, at 5:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> I agree - there isn't a Mind. And yes, 'semiosis itself is determinative of 
> mind' - though I would also say that mind, understood not as A Mind, but as 
> the process of Being Mind determines 
> semiosis-which-determines-Mind-which...and so on.
> 
Definitely agree although ultimately it’s just signs which is mind.

> My focus in Peircean semiosis is the process. I find that a lot of attention 
> on this list seems to focus on specific and particular definitions of terms - 
> and I have to say, I'm not terribly interested in that area

In this case I think there are some important philosophical issues that beset 
much of 20th century philosophy at play. Just thinking through my frustration 
at saying the right thing due to ambiguities in most terms perhaps makes me a 
little more focused on the language. It’s not so much that I care about the 
definitions as such since to me they’re more descriptions than definitions. But 
there are some subtle distinctions that are difficult to make yet end up 
counting for a lot.

I recognize though that you find the applied issues more interesting than the 
philosophical ones. I find both interesting myself, although my background is 
much more the philosophical side of things. 
>  It seems to me at least, mechanical and static.  I'm interested in the 
> process of transforming one morphological form of matter/concept into another 
> morphological form - which is done by semiosis. So, the process of 
> transforming one cell to another cell; the process of transforming 
> information of a Dynamic Object to a Dynamic Interpretant - which 
> Interpretant can also function as a Dynamic Object for another Dynamic 
> Interpretant and as well, transform into the habits-of-form that are vested 
> within the Representamen.  Those are the areas where I feel Peircean semiosis 
> has a LOT to say.
> 
Well I’m not sure I’d say static and definitely not mechanical. But how things 
transform is interesting as well.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Mar 28, 2017, at 6:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> CG:  Don’t we here have to distinguish between the mark and the sign?
> 
> I know what you mean, but I am not sure that "mark" is the right word here, 
> especially since Peirce used that term in some later writings as a synonym 
> for "qualisign."  I just had in mind the "thing" (also not the best word for 
> it) that acts as a sign.
> 

Yeah, the terminology can get tricky. Especially since it’s signs all the way 
down.

> CG:  Two signs can’t be the same sign unless they also have the same 
> interpretant and object, can they?
> 
> I seem to recall that T. L. Short took this position in Peirce's Theory of 
> Signs, but consistent with that book's reputation overall, I do not know 
> whether it truly reflects Peirce's view or just his own.  Besides, given that 
> semeiosis is continuous, is it even legitimate to "count" signs as distinct 
> individuals at all?

I don’t think it’s just Short’s. I’m not sure how else to conceive of equating 
signs. In some sense we must be able to do so. 

> CG:  Does the icon have its character really or merely as interpreted? That’s 
> the very question that divides nominalism from realism.
> 
> Yes, and I think that the icon really has its character regardless; but the 
> question is whether merely having that character makes it an icon, apart from 
> anyone or anything interpreting it as such.  Again, is it sufficient for 
> something to have only an Immediate Interpretant--"its peculiar 
> interpretability"--in order to "qualify" as a sign, or is that "status" only 
> achieved once it has a Dynamic Interpretant?

Hopefully my later post clarified that a bit. I confess I’m reaching for proper 
language because most terms are ambiguous about the distinction I’m trying to 
raise. Realism vs. nominalism is probably the best way to think of it I’ve 
decided.






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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

CG:  Don’t we here have to distinguish between the mark and the sign?


I know what you mean, but I am not sure that "mark" is the right word here,
especially since Peirce used that term in some later writings as a synonym
for "qualisign."  I just had in mind the "thing" (also not the best word
for it) that acts as a sign.

CG:  Two signs can’t be the same sign unless they also have the same
interpretant and object, can they?


I seem to recall that T. L. Short took this position in *Peirce's Theory of
Signs*, but consistent with that book's reputation overall, I do not know
whether it truly reflects Peirce's view or just his own.  Besides, given
that semeiosis is continuous, is it even legitimate to "count" signs as
distinct individuals at all?

CG:  Does the icon have its character really or merely as interpreted?
That’s the very question that divides nominalism from realism.


Yes, and I think that the icon really *has *its character regardless; but
the question is whether *merely *having that character *makes *it an icon,
apart from anyone or anything *interpreting *it as such.  Again, is it
sufficient for something to have only an Immediate Interpretant--"its
peculiar interpretability"--in order to "qualify" as a sign, or is that
"status" only achieved once it has a Dynamic Interpretant?

CG:  I think the idea (and this goes to his cosmology as well) is that
we’re talking about habits not choices of interpretations. Thus the icon
functions as an icon because of a habit with the habit tied to resemblance
along some character. But the resemblance for that habit to function in an
iconic form has to be real. It’s not just a free judgment of a human mind
but a real regularity.


I agree with all of this, and I have long wondered exactly where "habits of
interpretation" fit within semeiotic.  The object determines the sign to
determine the interpretant, but in some sense any Dynamic Interpretant is
also (at least partially) determined by the habits of interpretation of the
one doing the interpreting.  To me, this helps explain why the very same
sign can produce different Dynamic Interpretants within the range of
possibilities that constitutes its Immediate Interpretant.  My working
theory right now is that Final Interpretants are habits of feeling, action,
or thought--i.e., habits of interpretation tending to determine Dynamic
Interpretants that are emotional, energetic, or logical, respectively.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Mar 28, 2017, at 3:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> My initial response is that we do need to distinguish between the sign
> itself and the character by virtue of which it represents its object.
> After all, it seems plausible that the same sign can serve as an icon,
> *and *as an index, *and *as a symbol--all at the same time, and perhaps
> even to the same interpretant--by virtue of the *different *characters
> that it possesses.
>
> Don’t we here have to distinguish between the mark and the sign? Two signs
> can’t be the same sign unless they also have the same interpretant and
> object, can they? Now it’s true that any sign can typically be broken up
> into constituent signs which may be symbols, icons or indexes. Likewise the
> same mark can function in a sign that’s an icon or symbol. Indeed that’s
> fairly common.
>
> The real question is the the question of realism here I think. Does the
> icon have its character really or merely as interpreted? That’s the very
> question that divides nominalism from realism. While I tend to agree that
> it’s not a substantial difference functionally most of the time, it is I
> think key for understanding Peirce here.
>
> On the other hand, can something truly be a sign--rather than just a
> *potential *sign--if it is never *actually *interpreted as such?  In
> other words, it has an Immediate Interpretant, a range of *possible 
> *interpretations,
> but no Dynamic Interpretant.  This is a sincere question; I am likewise
> curious as to what you and others think.
>
> This gets at the language problem. What do we mean by “interpreted as
> such” versus having an interpretant. Again this may be where I’m just plain
> wrong. So I hope others chime in.
>
> My sense is that Peirce’s concern is with volition. It’s the old joke of
> someone saying don’t think of blue. You immediately think of blue in some
> sense. What I think Peirce is after in his semiotics is a determinative
> function where signs aren’t fully volitional. Thus the emphasis on the
> object determining. In most philosophy you have judgments as
> interpretations made volitionally in some sense.
>
> CP 2.435 “The Short Logic” is useful here.
>
> A judgment is an act of consciousness in which we recognize a belief, and
> a belief is an intelligent habit from which we 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Clark Goble]

> On Mar 28, 2017, at 3:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> My initial response is that we do need to distinguish between the sign itself 
> and the character by virtue of which it represents its object.  After all, it 
> seems plausible that the same sign can serve as an icon, and as an index, and 
> as a symbol--all at the same time, and perhaps even to the same 
> interpretant--by virtue of the different characters that it possesses.

Don’t we here have to distinguish between the mark and the sign? Two signs 
can’t be the same sign unless they also have the same interpretant and object, 
can they? Now it’s true that any sign can typically be broken up into 
constituent signs which may be symbols, icons or indexes. Likewise the same 
mark can function in a sign that’s an icon or symbol. Indeed that’s fairly 
common.

The real question is the the question of realism here I think. Does the icon 
have its character really or merely as interpreted? That’s the very question 
that divides nominalism from realism. While I tend to agree that it’s not a 
substantial difference functionally most of the time, it is I think key for 
understanding Peirce here.

> On the other hand, can something truly be a sign--rather than just a 
> potential sign--if it is never actually interpreted as such?  In other words, 
> it has an Immediate Interpretant, a range of possible interpretations, but no 
> Dynamic Interpretant.  This is a sincere question; I am likewise curious as 
> to what you and others think.

This gets at the language problem. What do we mean by “interpreted as such” 
versus having an interpretant. Again this may be where I’m just plain wrong. So 
I hope others chime in.

My sense is that Peirce’s concern is with volition. It’s the old joke of 
someone saying don’t think of blue. You immediately think of blue in some 
sense. What I think Peirce is after in his semiotics is a determinative 
function where signs aren’t fully volitional. Thus the emphasis on the object 
determining. In most philosophy you have judgments as interpretations made 
volitionally in some sense.

CP 2.435 “The Short Logic” is useful here. 

A judgment is an act of consciousness in which we recognize a belief, and a 
belief is an intelligent habit from which we shall act when occasion presents 
itself. Of what nature is that recognition? It may come very near action. The 
muscles may twitch and we may restrain ourselves only by considering that the 
proper occasion has not arisen. But, in general, we virtually resolve upon a 
certain occasion to act as if certain imagined circumstances were perceived. 
This act which amounts to such a resolve, is a peculiar act of the will whereby 
we cause an image, or icon, to be associated, in a peculiarly strenuous way, 
with an object represented to us by an index. This act itself is represented in 
the proposition by a symbol, and the consciousness of it fulfills the function 
of a symbol in the judgment. Suppose, for example, I detect a person with whom 
I have to deal in an act of dishonesty. I have in my mind something like a 
"composite photograph" of all the persons that I have known and read of that 
have had that character, and at the instant I make the discovery concerning 
that person, who is distinguished from others for me by certain indications, 
upon that index at that moment down goes the stamp of RASCAL, to remain 
indefinitely.

I think the idea (and this goes to his cosmology as well) is that we’re talking 
about habits not choices of interpretations. Thus the icon functions as an icon 
because of a habit with the habit tied to resemblance along some character. But 
the resemblance for that habit to function in an iconic form has to be real. 
It’s not just a free judgment of a human mind but a real regularity.

This definitely is a subtle point and language runs us aground when we talk 
about interpret. Since of course for a sign to be a sign it has to have an 
interpretant and an interpretant typically implies an interpretation.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

My initial response is that we do need to distinguish between the sign
itself and the character by virtue of which it represents its object.
After all, it seems plausible that the same sign can serve as an icon, *and
*as an index, *and *as a symbol--all at the same time, and perhaps even to
the same interpretant--by virtue of the *different *characters that it
possesses.

On the other hand, can something truly be a sign--rather than just a *potential
*sign--if it is never *actually *interpreted as such?  In other words, it
has an Immediate Interpretant, a range of *possible *interpretations, but
no Dynamic Interpretant.  This is a sincere question; I am likewise curious
as to what you and others think.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:37 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Mar 28, 2017, at 2:04 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
> I realize that iconolatry -- just one of many forms of dyadic reductionism
> --
> runs too deep at present for most folks to appreciate this, but it happens
> to be one of the consequences of Triadic Relation Irreducibility (TRI) that
> symbols, signs that denote their objects solely by virtue of the fact that
> they are interpreted to do so, are the genus of all signs, while icons and
> indices are species under that genus.  An icon is an icon only because it
> is interpreted as an icon, by virtue of some property that is singled out
> from all the possible properties that it may share with a denoted object.
>
> Is an icon only an icon because it’s interpreted as such? I’m here
> thinking of natural signs in which the interpretant isn’t necessarily a
> human mind.
>
> This isn’t a small matter. This connection between icons & indices to
> symbols has huge philosophical implications. It’s why, for instance, some
> disagree with Derrida’s use of Peirce in *On Grammatology. *In particular
> the relations of difference and repetition (and what gets repeated) are
> pretty crucial in a lot of contexts.
>
> I ask because one of the more interesting facets of Peirce’s thought is
> his focus on objects in signs/logic rather than the interpreter as is most
> common. So when he speaks of signs he talks of the object determining an
> interpretant through a sign. The semiotics moves in a way more similar to
> traditional conceptions of causation rather than interpretation.
>
> This also seems important when thinking about information conveyed in a
> sign. What is conserved? What is lost? What is transformed?
>
> I recognize there’s a problem of language here. After all we could simply
> say an icon is an icon if it *could* be so interpreted rather than *it
> being interpreted*. Perhaps and I think some of the early texts of Peirce
> can move one in that direction. However in his more mature phase it seems
> he explicitly rejects this.
>
> A sign is a thing which is the representative, or deputy, of another thing
> for the purpose of affecting mind. Signs are of three kinds,
>
> 1st, the icon, which represents its object by virtue of a character which *it
> would equally possess did the object and the interpreting mind not exist*;
>
> 2nd, the index, which represents its object by virtue of a character which
> it would not possess did the object not exist, but which it would equally
> possess did the interpreting mind not operate;
>
> 3rd, the symbol, which represents its object by virtue of a character
> which is conferred upon it by an operation of the mind.
>
> (Peirce, MS 142.3–6   circa 1899-1900  Notes on Topical Geometry, emphasis
> mine)
>
> Now again this can be read in different ways. I’m clearly reading it to
> imply a mind-independent quality. But one could distinguish between the
> icon and this character of the icon. We’d then say the character would
> still be there whether it were an icon or not with the interpreting mind
> making it an icon. I think this quote though is attempting to distinguish
> the icon or index from the symbol in a way in which the “operation of the
> mind” is not king.
>
> Of course I may be completely wrong in this. So I’m curious as to what
> others say. It seems to me though that Peirce is considering these from a
> purely functional position. What’s key is that the symbol is arbitrary in a
> way icons and indices aren’t. Although of course, as with language, a
> symbol may act in an iconic or indexical function that still hinges on a
> certain arbitrariness of the sign.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Clark Goble]

> On Mar 28, 2017, at 2:04 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> I realize that iconolatry -- just one of many forms of dyadic reductionism --
> runs too deep at present for most folks to appreciate this, but it happens
> to be one of the consequences of Triadic Relation Irreducibility (TRI) that
> symbols, signs that denote their objects solely by virtue of the fact that
> they are interpreted to do so, are the genus of all signs, while icons and
> indices are species under that genus.  An icon is an icon only because it
> is interpreted as an icon, by virtue of some property that is singled out
> from all the possible properties that it may share with a denoted object.

Is an icon only an icon because it’s interpreted as such? I’m here thinking of 
natural signs in which the interpretant isn’t necessarily a human mind.

This isn’t a small matter. This connection between icons & indices to symbols 
has huge philosophical implications. It’s why, for instance, some disagree with 
Derrida’s use of Peirce in On Grammatology. In particular the relations of 
difference and repetition (and what gets repeated) are pretty crucial in a lot 
of contexts. 

I ask because one of the more interesting facets of Peirce’s thought is his 
focus on objects in signs/logic rather than the interpreter as is most common. 
So when he speaks of signs he talks of the object determining an interpretant 
through a sign. The semiotics moves in a way more similar to traditional 
conceptions of causation rather than interpretation.

This also seems important when thinking about information conveyed in a sign. 
What is conserved? What is lost? What is transformed?

I recognize there’s a problem of language here. After all we could simply say 
an icon is an icon if it could be so interpreted rather than it being 
interpreted. Perhaps and I think some of the early texts of Peirce can move one 
in that direction. However in his more mature phase it seems he explicitly 
rejects this.

A sign is a thing which is the representative, or deputy, of another thing for 
the purpose of affecting mind. Signs are of three kinds, 

1st, the icon, which represents its object by virtue of a character which it 
would equally possess did the object and the interpreting mind not exist;

2nd, the index, which represents its object by virtue of a character which it 
would not possess did the object not exist, but which it would equally possess 
did the interpreting mind not operate;

3rd, the symbol, which represents its object by virtue of a character which is 
conferred upon it by an operation of the mind.

(Peirce, MS 142.3–6   circa 1899-1900  Notes on Topical Geometry, emphasis mine)

Now again this can be read in different ways. I’m clearly reading it to imply a 
mind-independent quality. But one could distinguish between the icon and this 
character of the icon. We’d then say the character would still be there whether 
it were an icon or not with the interpreting mind making it an icon. I think 
this quote though is attempting to distinguish the icon or index from the 
symbol in a way in which the “operation of the mind” is not king.

Of course I may be completely wrong in this. So I’m curious as to what others 
say. It seems to me though that Peirce is considering these from a purely 
functional position. What’s key is that the symbol is arbitrary in a way icons 
and indices aren’t. Although of course, as with language, a symbol may act in 
an iconic or indexical function that still hinges on a certain arbitrariness of 
the sign.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Tom, List:

It is no intrusion at all, I welcome your input!

I think that both "red" and "color" are universals, or rather generals as
Peirce typically preferred to call them.  Each names a continuum of
possible instantiations, and the one for red is part of the one for color,
consistent with his definition of a continuum as "that which has parts, all
of which have parts of the same kind."  Both 1ns and 3ns are general, but
in different ways; Peirce called them "negative" and "positive" generality,
respectively.

I would appreciate it if you could elaborate on your suggestion that a
concept is "a diagram of possibilities."  What is the object of such a
diagram?  What are its parts?  What are the significant relations among
them that the diagram embodies?  How does such a diagram mediate between
red things and the consequences of being red, such as primarily reflecting
broad-spectrum light at a wavelength between 620 and 750 nm?

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 9:29 AM, Tom Gollier  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Pardon me from barging in, but I've been vaguely following this thread,
> and your question:
>
> "How are we relating a stop sign to a diagram when we call it red …?"
>
> kind of broke through the haze.
>
> I don't think the universal of Peirce's realism in this case would be the
> "red" as an attribute of stop signs.  Rather the concept, or diagram of
> possibilities, would be "color," a universal that mediates between "things"
> in general and some things, like stop signs, that are "red" rather than
> some other color.  We apply the concept of color, to the extent we
> comprehend that diagram of possibilities, to things and some of those
> things come out more red than others.  Peirce's contention, as I understand
> him, is that such a mediating concept or universal is real.
>
> In general, I would argue that Peirce's notion of "universal" needs to be
> associated with thirdness rather than firstness.  Thus, for a quality like
> "red" itself to be taken as a universal it would have to be seen, not as an
> attribute, but as a diagram of possibilities mediating between "red things"
> and the consequences, whatever might be, of "being red". It's a little
> harder for me to envision a diagram of that sort, but I'm guessing Philip
> Morris employed some such concept (universal?) in deciding on a red package
> for their cigarettes.
>
> Anyway, I'd be interested in your take on this approach.
>
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 5:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Clark, John S., List:
>>
>> But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the
>> universal "red" is *not *defined by the collection of all red things,
>> and the universal "lion" is *not* defined by the collection of all
>> lions.  Rather, each universal/general is a *continuum *that encompasses
>> all *possible *reds or all *possible* lions.  Between any two *actual *reds
>> or *actual *lions, there is an inexhaustible supply of *potential *reds
>> or *potential *lions that would be intermediate between them.  What kind
>> of diagram does each of these universals/generals specify accordingly?
>> What significant relations does it embody?  How are we relating a stop sign
>> to a diagram when we call it red, or an animal at the zoo to a diagram when
>> we call it a lion?
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 9:16 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:
>>
>>> On Mar 27, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John
>>> Sowa--but I still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he
>>> meant by this.
>>>
>>> JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
>>> every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
>>> ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
>>> you interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
>>> law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?
>>>
>>>
>>> What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal
>>> "lion"?  How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular
>>> lion, to such a diagram?
>>>
>>>
>>> I can’t speak for John, but I’d assume a theoretical diagram would be a
>>> specification of the locations of all red things.
>>>
>>> This is an other reason why I think the appeal to diagrams isn’t quite
>>> what it’s portrayed to be since a diagram for any robust universal would
>>> seem to require an infinite space.
>>>
>>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

In Peirce's terminology, a diagram is a certain *type *of icon--one that
"resembles" its object by embodying the significant *relations *among its
parts.  The notion of *significant *relations (rather than *all *relations)
is where your point about "more and less" comes into play.  As you
suggested, I wonder if the diagram specified by the universal "red" is
simply the continuous spectrum of colors that correspond to electromagnetic
wavelengths between 620 and 750 nm, or if John S. has something else in
mind.  Either way, I suspect that the diagram specified by the universal
"lion" is much more difficult to characterize.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 9:29 AM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:

> On Mar 28, 2017, at 6:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the universal
> "red" is *not *defined by the collection of all red things, and the
> universal "lion" is *not* defined by the collection of all lions.
> Rather, each universal/general is a *continuum *that encompasses all
> *possible *reds or all *possible* lions.  Between any two *actual *reds or
>  *actual *lions, there is an inexhaustible supply of *potential *reds or
> *potential *lions that would be intermediate between them.  What kind of
> diagram does each of these universals/generals specify accordingly?  What
> significant relations does it embody?  How are we relating a stop sign to a
> diagram when we call it red, or an animal at the zoo to a diagram when we
> call it a lion?
>
> I’m curious as to John’s response. My own would be that different diagrams
> can get at different aspects of the universal but not necessarily represent
> it fully. As Icons there would typically be lost data. So you might have a
> graph of red things to represent the general of redness without necessarily
> arguing that the general arises out of red things (as with say Armstrong
> Universals). You might have a graph that specifies the range of colors
> represented by the general red (as some linguists do to compare color signs
> between cultures) and so forth.
>
> The nature of an icon is to resemble the object but that usually means
> that there’s a matter of ‘more and less.’ That is there are additions that
> aren’t part of the original object and aspects that are missing.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Tom Gollier]

Jon,

Pardon me from barging in, but I've been vaguely following this thread, and
your question:

"How are we relating a stop sign to a diagram when we call it red …?"

kind of broke through the haze.

I don't think the universal of Peirce's realism in this case would be the
"red" as an attribute of stop signs.  Rather the concept, or diagram of
possibilities, would be "color," a universal that mediates between "things"
in general and some things, like stop signs, that are "red" rather than
some other color.  We apply the concept of color, to the extent we
comprehend that diagram of possibilities, to things and some of those
things come out more red than others.  Peirce's contention, as I understand
him, is that such a mediating concept or universal is real.

In general, I would argue that Peirce's notion of "universal" needs to be
associated with thirdness rather than firstness.  Thus, for a quality like
"red" itself to be taken as a universal it would have to be seen, not as an
attribute, but as a diagram of possibilities mediating between "red things"
and the consequences, whatever might be, of "being red". It's a little
harder for me to envision a diagram of that sort, but I'm guessing Philip
Morris employed some such concept (universal?) in deciding on a red package
for their cigarettes.

Anyway, I'd be interested in your take on this approach.

Thanks,
Tom

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 5:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Clark, John S., List:
>
> But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the universal
> "red" is *not *defined by the collection of all red things, and the
> universal "lion" is *not* defined by the collection of all lions.
> Rather, each universal/general is a *continuum *that encompasses all *possible
> *reds or all *possible* lions.  Between any two *actual *reds or *actual 
> *lions,
> there is an inexhaustible supply of *potential *reds or *potential *lions
> that would be intermediate between them.  What kind of diagram does each of
> these universals/generals specify accordingly?  What significant relations
> does it embody?  How are we relating a stop sign to a diagram when we call
> it red, or an animal at the zoo to a diagram when we call it a lion?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 9:16 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:
>
>> On Mar 27, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but
>> I still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this.
>>
>> JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
>> every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
>> ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
>> you interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
>> law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?
>>
>>
>> What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal
>> "lion"?  How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular
>> lion, to such a diagram?
>>
>>
>> I can’t speak for John, but I’d assume a theoretical diagram would be a
>> specification of the locations of all red things.
>>
>> This is an other reason why I think the appeal to diagrams isn’t quite
>> what it’s portrayed to be since a diagram for any robust universal would
>> seem to require an infinite space.
>>
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Mar 28, 2017, at 6:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the universal 
> "red" is not defined by the collection of all red things, and the universal 
> "lion" is not defined by the collection of all lions.  Rather, each 
> universal/general is a continuum that encompasses all possible reds or all 
> possible lions.  Between any two actual reds or actual lions, there is an 
> inexhaustible supply of potential reds or potential lions that would be 
> intermediate between them.  What kind of diagram does each of these 
> universals/generals specify accordingly?  What significant relations does it 
> embody?  How are we relating a stop sign to a diagram when we call it red, or 
> an animal at the zoo to a diagram when we call it a lion?

I’m curious as to John’s response. My own would be that different diagrams can 
get at different aspects of the universal but not necessarily represent it 
fully. As Icons there would typically be lost data. So you might have a graph 
of red things to represent the general of redness without necessarily arguing 
that the general arises out of red things (as with say Armstrong Universals). 
You might have a graph that specifies the range of colors represented by the 
general red (as some linguists do to compare color signs between cultures) and 
so forth.

The nature of an icon is to resemble the object but that usually means that 
there’s a matter of ‘more and less.’ That is there are additions that aren’t 
part of the original object and aspects that are missing.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, John S., List:

But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the universal
"red" is *not *defined by the collection of all red things, and the
universal "lion" is *not* defined by the collection of all lions.  Rather,
each universal/general is a *continuum *that encompasses all *possible *reds
or all *possible* lions.  Between any two *actual *reds or *actual *lions,
there is an inexhaustible supply of *potential *reds or *potential *lions
that would be intermediate between them.  What kind of diagram does each of
these universals/generals specify accordingly?  What significant relations
does it embody?  How are we relating a stop sign to a diagram when we call
it red, or an animal at the zoo to a diagram when we call it a lion?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 9:16 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but
> I still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this.
>
> JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
> every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
> ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
> you interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
> law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?
>
>
> What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal
> "lion"?  How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular
> lion, to such a diagram?
>
>
> I can’t speak for John, but I’d assume a theoretical diagram would be a
> specification of the locations of all red things.
>
> This is an other reason why I think the appeal to diagrams isn’t quite
> what it’s portrayed to be since a diagram for any robust universal would
> seem to require an infinite space.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

":--*O wonderful being, and to what are you looking?

I hope not to red...

On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 9:16 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:

>
> On Mar 27, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but
> I still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this.
>
> JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
> every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
> ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
> you interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
> law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?
>
>
> What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal
> "lion"?  How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular
> lion, to such a diagram?
>
>
> I can’t speak for John, but I’d assume a theoretical diagram would be a
> specification of the locations of all red things.
>
> This is an other reason why I think the appeal to diagrams isn’t quite
> what it’s portrayed to be since a diagram for any robust universal would
> seem to require an infinite space.
>
>
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but I 
> still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this.
> 
> JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and every 
> particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram ... Then 
> the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way you interpret 
> the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a law of nature 
> that is independent of anything we may say?
> 
> What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal 
> "lion"?  How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular 
> lion, to such a diagram?

I can’t speak for John, but I’d assume a theoretical diagram would be a 
specification of the locations of all red things.

This is an other reason why I think the appeal to diagrams isn’t quite what 
it’s portrayed to be since a diagram for any robust universal would seem to 
require an infinite space.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but I
still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this.

JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
you interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?


What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal
"lion"?  How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular
lion, to such a diagram?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 5:25 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Mar 27, 2017, at 4:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> CG:  To my eyes the main issue is the realism vs. nominalism issue both in
> terms of the nature of possibilities as well as the relationship of
> individuals to generals.
>
>
> Is there a way to connect this with John Sowa's earlier comment, which I
> am still pondering?
>
> I think John’s point was largely orthogonal to the issue of
> realism/nominalism.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Clark Goble]

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 4:20 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> As long as Peirce was writing for readers with relevant backgrounds
> in the practice of math and science it wasn't really necessary and
> would even have been considered impertinent for him to waste words
> on points that everyone in that audience would regard as routine.
> 
> Does that have any bearing on questions about the reality of generals?
> It's hard to say.  I guess it's bound up with the reasons I think the
> only real realists I know and the only practicing pragmatists I know
> are all mathematicians, or at least scientists who use mathematics,
> for the moments they are immersed in doing so.

Mathematics certainly biases one towards realism, especially in physics. While 
physicists are infamous for inconsistency in foundations by and large I think 
most have the idea that the universe in mathematical. While there’s still 
strong empiricist and instrumentalist tendencies there’s also a traditionally 
strong realism towards at least the foundational laws of physics. Where things 
get more tricky is whether the laws/structures that aren’t foundational are 
real. I think Peirce says yes, but many would find that problematic.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Clark Goble]

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 4:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> CG:  To my eyes the main issue is the realism vs. nominalism issue both in 
> terms of the nature of possibilities as well as the relationship of 
> individuals to generals. 
> 
> Is there a way to connect this with John Sowa's earlier comment, which I am 
> still pondering?
> 

I think John’s point was largely orthogonal to the issue of realism/nominalism.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear all,

haha, I know the answer to this.  but you won't believe me because it is my
*phantasia*...

what is this?... this is what?... what is this?... this is what?...  what
is...

“There are several senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, as we
pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words;’ for in
one sense the ‘being’ meant is ‘what a thing is’ or a ‘this’, and in
another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things
that are predicated as these are.



While ‘being’ has all these senses, obviously that which ‘is’ primarily is
the ‘what’, which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of
what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or bad, not that it is
three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do
not say ‘white’ or ‘hot’ or ‘three cubits long’, but ‘a man’ or ‘a ‘god’.”
~*Metaphysics*

one two three...
sign object interpretant...  object sign interpretant...  icon index symbol.

Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 5:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Clark, List:
>
> CG:  To my eyes the main issue is the realism vs. nominalism issue both in
> terms of the nature of possibilities as well as the relationship of
> individuals to generals.
>
>
> Is there a way to connect this with John Sowa's earlier comment, which I
> am still pondering?
>
> JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
> every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
> ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
> you interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
> law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?
>
>
> I am still hoping that he will elaborate on it and provide examples.  In
> the meantime, while casting about online for anything that would help me
> explore this notion further, I came across the following remarks by Murray
> G. Murphey.
>
> MGM:  A diagram is not a *pure *icon, but it is *chiefly *an icon and it
> is this fact which accounts for its importance in mathematics ... Mr.
> Arthur Burks has termed the icon a "specific universal" since it is a 
> *specific
> *thing which can stand for *any* member of a class ... For in
> constructing the icon, we do not construct *one *particular case under
> the hypothesis, we rather construct *any *particular case under the
> hypothesis.  And it is only because of this fact that the mathematician can
> afford to neglect such *individual *characters of his constructs as the
> color of the ink ... The analogy to induction consists in the fact that we
> do deal with *the *particular case; the difference is that we deal with *any
> *particular case. (*The Development of Peirce's Thought*, pp. 234-235,
> emphases added)
>
>
> Interestingly, on the previous page, Murphey quotes a 1908 letter to
> Francis Russell in which Peirce seemed to abandon his careful 1902
> distinction between images and diagrams.
>
> CSP:  ... every deductive inference is performed, and can only be
> performed, by imagining an instance in which the premisses are true and
> *observing* by contemplation of the image that the conclusion is true.
> The image, as *singular*, must of course have determinations that the
> premisses as *general*, have nothing to do with.  But we satisfy
> ourselves that the particular determinations of the image chosen, so far as
> they go beyond the premisses, could make no difference. (p. 233, emphases
> in original)
>
>
> In a sense, then, one can *abstract *a diagram from an image by ignoring
> the *singular *determinations of the latter that have no bearing on
> whatever *general *properties of the former are significant *for one's
> purposes*.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>> On Mar 27, 2017, at 11:37 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
>> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>>
>> This idea of the mathematics and forms of possibility was articulated
>> already by Francis Bacon 1561-1626.  see the writings of Graham Rees.
>>  (Including Marriage of Physics and Mathematics.)
>>
>> Right, it’s not that uncommon an idea.
>>
>> To my eyes the main issue is the realism vs. nominalism issue both in
>> terms of the nature of possibilities as well as the relationship of
>> individuals to generals.
>>
>> That’s why that Fraser review from 1871 is interesting as he does get
>> right at the nominalist/realist issues.
>>
>> Now going back to our discussion of realism a few months ago it’s worth
>> asking what the cash value or realism vs. nominalism is. Despite it being
>> such a focus for Peirce I’m not sure it entails that much difference -
>> particularly with possibilities.
>>
>> Where it does matter is more in Peirce’s cosmology where you have
>> possibilities becoming actualities

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

CG:  To my eyes the main issue is the realism vs. nominalism issue both in
terms of the nature of possibilities as well as the relationship of
individuals to generals.


Is there a way to connect this with John Sowa's earlier comment, which I am
still pondering?

JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
you interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?


I am still hoping that he will elaborate on it and provide examples.  In
the meantime, while casting about online for anything that would help me
explore this notion further, I came across the following remarks by Murray
G. Murphey.

MGM:  A diagram is not a *pure *icon, but it is *chiefly *an icon and it is
this fact which accounts for its importance in mathematics ... Mr. Arthur
Burks has termed the icon a "specific universal" since it is a *specific *thing
which can stand for *any* member of a class ... For in constructing the
icon, we do not construct *one *particular case under the hypothesis, we
rather construct *any *particular case under the hypothesis.  And it is
only because of this fact that the mathematician can afford to neglect
such *individual
*characters of his constructs as the color of the ink ... The analogy to
induction consists in the fact that we do deal with *the *particular case;
the difference is that we deal with *any *particular case. (*The
Development of Peirce's Thought*, pp. 234-235, emphases added)


Interestingly, on the previous page, Murphey quotes a 1908 letter to
Francis Russell in which Peirce seemed to abandon his careful 1902
distinction between images and diagrams.

CSP:  ... every deductive inference is performed, and can only be
performed, by imagining an instance in which the premisses are true and
*observing* by contemplation of the image that the conclusion is true.  The
image, as *singular*, must of course have determinations that the premisses
as *general*, have nothing to do with.  But we satisfy ourselves that the
particular determinations of the image chosen, so far as they go beyond the
premisses, could make no difference. (p. 233, emphases in original)


In a sense, then, one can *abstract *a diagram from an image by ignoring
the *singular *determinations of the latter that have no bearing on
whatever *general *properties of the former are significant *for one's
purposes*.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 11:37 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
> This idea of the mathematics and forms of possibility was articulated
> already by Francis Bacon 1561-1626.  see the writings of Graham Rees.
>  (Including Marriage of Physics and Mathematics.)
>
> Right, it’s not that uncommon an idea.
>
> To my eyes the main issue is the realism vs. nominalism issue both in
> terms of the nature of possibilities as well as the relationship of
> individuals to generals.
>
> That’s why that Fraser review from 1871 is interesting as he does get
> right at the nominalist/realist issues.
>
> Now going back to our discussion of realism a few months ago it’s worth
> asking what the cash value or realism vs. nominalism is. Despite it being
> such a focus for Peirce I’m not sure it entails that much difference -
> particularly with possibilities.
>
> Where it does matter is more in Peirce’s cosmology where you have
> possibilities becoming actualities along more or less neoplatonic lines.
> That is the issue ultimately is one of a thoroughgoing modal realism more
> like platonism than even Hegelianism. (Despite that it’s often to Hegel
> that Peirce is compared and contrasted)
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Clark Goble]

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 11:37 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>  wrote:
> 
> This idea of the mathematics and forms of possibility was articulated already 
> by Francis Bacon 1561-1626.  see the writings of Graham Rees.  (Including 
> Marriage of Physics and Mathematics.)

Right, it’s not that uncommon an idea.

To my eyes the main issue is the realism vs. nominalism issue both in terms of 
the nature of possibilities as well as the relationship of individuals to 
generals. 

That’s why that Fraser review from 1871 is interesting as he does get right at 
the nominalist/realist issues.

Now going back to our discussion of realism a few months ago it’s worth asking 
what the cash value or realism vs. nominalism is. Despite it being such a focus 
for Peirce I’m not sure it entails that much difference - particularly with 
possibilities. 

Where it does matter is more in Peirce’s cosmology where you have possibilities 
becoming actualities along more or less neoplatonic lines. That is the issue 
ultimately is one of a thoroughgoing modal realism more like platonism than 
even Hegelianism. (Despite that it’s often to Hegel that Peirce is compared and 
contrasted) 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Clark:

> On Mar 26, 2017, at 4:52 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Mar 26, 2017, at 1:45 PM, Jon Awbrey > > wrote:
>> 
>> So, yes, I would have to say that Peirce was a realist about
>> possibilities, and patterns of possibilities, from the start.
>> That much is simply implicit in his mathematical approach to
>> logic, probability, and information.
> 
> Yes, from fairly early on he see mathematics as possibilities. I’m not sure 
> the date on the earliest he makes that explicit. (Sorry - no time to look it 
> up right now)
> 

Clark:

This idea of the mathematics and forms of possibility was articulated already 
by Francis Bacon 1561-1626.  see the writings of Graham Rees.  (Including 
Marriage of Physics and Mathematics.)

Bacon recognized the possibility of the role of identities in the elective 
affinities that was later the topic of the novel by Goethe by that name.  Note 
also that this idea is also intrinsic to Leibniz’s notion of calculations of 
“arguments” by assigning values to ideas.  

These writings express facets of the basic tensions between the universal 
concept of mass (as identity of all matter) and the concept of matter based on 
the chemical elements as the source of identity of all matter.  The latter 
infers valence, a local and contextual attribute of of chemical elements where 
the assumption is matter combines by compositions of relationships among pairs 
of elements.  (Example:  H2O (water) and H2O2, (hydrogen peroxide)). 
Historically, realists separated the concepts of Aristotelian  “atomism” from 
the concept of identities of matter as atomic numbers..  

This logical tension between “mass” and “valence” persists today and is the 
source of massive mis-communications among the disciplines, in part because the 
concept of mass is based on continuity and the concept of valence is based on 
integer units.  

See my earlier comments on Bosovich and CSP logic of a few weeks ago. 

Cheers

Jerry






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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Clark Goble]

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 9:59 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we can
> imagine, and mathematics can analyze anything we can imagine.
> (This point is independent of the nominalist-realist debate.)

There’s a bit to unpack there - most particularly who the “we” is in that 
sentence. I think Peirce rejects the idea of the unknowable with his rejection 
of Kant’s thing-in-itself. Yet he also ties this to the ideal community of 
inquirers rather than any particular person. Put simply while the universe is 
knowable and therefore imaginable it doesn’t follow that it is imaginable for 
any finite group of people.

As you note this is also separate from the nominalist debate since a nominalist 
can agree with this. 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Clark, List:

Your post touches on several issues which may overlap with some of our previous 
interventions on the pragmatic differentiation of CSP's scientific philosophy 
and its relations to modern physical conjectures about the nature of “truth” in 
its many linguistic descriptors (coherence, correspondence, consistency, 
concordance, …)   (I published a paper on this topic about the turn of the 
Century. I will look for the reference.)


> On Mar 24, 2017, at 9:34 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:
> It seems to me the starting point for thinking about truth for Peirce ought 
> be externalism.

I concur. And add that the externalism is necessary to unfold the historical 
development of his philosophy in parallel to the historical development of 
chemistry in the second half of the 19 th Century.

A priori, externalism infers part-whole relations and ampliative logical 
operations, does it not?.

This is a major differentiation from mathematic physics, which prides itself on 
the virginity of its abstractions and the infallibility of continuous 
mathematics.
Obviously, I fully concur with this abstract description of the logical terms 
of qualisign, sinsign and legisign as three of the many possible descriptors of 
the external. In the long-range context, the external dynamics was in motion 
before man arrived on the scene.   My reading of John Sowa and Frederick 
Sjernfelt’s writings is that the notion of the natural logics of external 
truths is not foundational in the sense that you propose. 

I believe that CSP’s central perspective of realism originates in externalism 
and chemical analysis of external objects and enumerable relations among 
external chemical objects.


> That is are we talking about a knower who is roughly a human individual at a 
> specific time or are we talking about truth in semiotic broader than any one 
> individual. While Peirce occasionally talks of epistemology along a more 
> traditional Cartesian conception by and large when he speaks of truth he’s 
> speaking of this broader conception. Unless we keep that in mind I think 
> we’ll always go astray.

I concur. Naturalism is one of the foundations of CSP’s “universal” ordering of 
arguments that depend on the discrete mapping of terms from icons to rhema in 
relation to indices. (Chemical indices include the molecular formula of a 
chemical sin-sign).
> 
> An individual then ‘has’ truth to the degree that the sign within them is the 
> same as this final interpretant. 

In this context, is the final interpretant a legi-sign?
> 
> The next thing to keep in mind is that Peirce still maintains the traditional 
> conception of proposition or statement as carriers of truth. By which he 
> means they are signs that signify this interpretant. As the quotes Jon put up 
> on wikipedia indicate we thus have a sort of correspondence but not a 
> Cartesian sort. It’s not the correspondence of an internal image with an 
> external object. Rather it’s the correspondence of the object signified 
> through a sign with an interpretant that is the same as the final 
> interpretant. The odd feature of Peirce’s conception of truth is that this 
> sign need not be in a particular knowing subject. (I’m not sure of the 
> implications of that since it gets into the question of intentionality in 
> Peircean semiotics)
> 
> The biggest difference between Peirce and more traditional conceptions of 
> truth in the loose Cartesian tradition (including Kant) would be that truth 
> is essentially wrapped up with signs.

Does it go beyond this?
Do the Cartesian coordinates become axis for mathematical terms representing 
physical units representing signs?
 
> It is triadic whereas for most philosophy correspondence and even coherence 
> is merely dualistic.
Does the Cartesian correspondence constrain signs to three dimensions?
> 
> I’ve been thinking of my original question I posed a month or two ago. That 
> is what is the status of truth. To the degree an object signifies a stable 
> interpretant it seems to me that truth is fated or necessary regardless of 
> whether one adopts modal realism.

In chemical logic, the constraints of the table of elements, physical 
electro-neutrality (valence), and mereology (molecular weight, molecular 
formula, molecular structure) are necessarily “parts of the logical whole”. 
> I’ve come around to the idea that fundamentally what’s at stake with my 
> question is less the question of truth than the question of time.

I disagree. A chemical sentence usually is written a-temporally under the 
conservative laws of physics (for mass and electricity).  
Simple example: Hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water.  The temporal 
dimension has further dependencies on the thermodynamic context in a specific 
EXTERNAL context.
> That is to ask if truth exists is to ask when a sign is complete.
I disagree. Physically, mathematically and chemically, the completeness of a 
chemical sentence is a very different (linguistic?) issue.
Inde

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Clark Goble]

Catching up on my reading - apologies for not responding much the past week or 
two.

It seems to me the starting point for thinking about truth for Peirce ought be 
externalism. That is are we talking about a knower who is roughly a human 
individual at a specific time or are we talking about truth in semiotic broader 
than any one individual. While Peirce occasionally talks of epistemology along 
a more traditional Cartesian conception by and large when he speaks of truth 
he’s speaking of this broader conception. Unless we keep that in mind I think 
we’ll always go astray.

An individual then ‘has’ truth to the degree that the sign within them is the 
same as this final interpretant. 

The next thing to keep in mind is that Peirce still maintains the traditional 
conception of proposition or statement as carriers of truth. By which he means 
they are signs that signify this interpretant. As the quotes Jon put up on 
wikipedia indicate we thus have a sort of correspondence but not a Cartesian 
sort. It’s not the correspondence of an internal image with an external object. 
Rather it’s the correspondence of the object signified through a sign with an 
interpretant that is the same as the final interpretant. The odd feature of 
Peirce’s conception of truth is that this sign need not be in a particular 
knowing subject. (I’m not sure of the implications of that since it gets into 
the question of intentionality in Peircean semiotics)

The biggest difference between Peirce and more traditional conceptions of truth 
in the loose Cartesian tradition (including Kant) would be that truth is 
essentially wrapped up with signs. It is triadic whereas for most philosophy 
correspondence and even coherence is merely dualistic.

I’ve been thinking of my original question I posed a month or two ago. That is 
what is the status of truth. To the degree an object signifies a stable 
interpretant it seems to me that truth is fated or necessary regardless of 
whether one adopts modal realism. I’ve come around to the idea that 
fundamentally what’s at stake with my question is less the question of truth 
than the question of time. That is to ask if truth exists is to ask when a sign 
is complete. If one adopts presentism or some related ontological conception of 
time then this seems to play havoc with Peirce’s semiotic. (Maybe others will 
disagree with me there)  The way out of this problem is either to embrace a 
four dimensional theory of time in which case there is already a truth about 
the future or else to embrace the later Peirce’s modal realism and simply talk 
about truth as those signs that are in all possible universes. That is to 
embrace the kind of robust talk of possibilities we see in contemporary modal 
realism.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[E Valentine Daniel]

Hi Jon,
Sorry to get back to you as late this on a question as pertinent as that. I've 
been on the road.
I should have mentioned "coherence" as, indeed it is, the foundation of 
nominalism's theory of truth. As I read Peirce, if find  "concordance"  
subsuming coherence but exceeds mere coherence (the 'ungrounded' symbolic) and 
includes the assent of what we loosely call signs of nature, predominantly 
constituted of indexical signs.  This is a preliminary attempt on my part to 
make the distinction between mere coherence (achievable nay and in language 
alone) and concordance (which includes the extra-linguistic and meta;inguistic 
aspects of our work as well.
val

> On Mar 13, 2017, at 4:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C.:  I am a bit puzzled by your questions, since there was no mention 
> of "order," "index," or "inferring" in the preceding posts by Jon A. and Val. 
>  Which three concepts are you seeking to bind together?
> 
> Val:  Besides consensus and correspondence, you left out the coherence and 
> pragmatic/instrumental theories of truth as espoused by nominalists.  Again, 
> I am inclined to agree with Forster that Peirce's realist approach satisfies 
> all of these, rather than reducing truth to only one of them.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> List:
> 
> I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion.
> 
> Concordance?
> “Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics?
> “Index" as a categorization?
> 
> Are propositions inferred by “concordances”?
> 
> Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together?
> Can anyone expand on this proposal?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> > On Mar 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, E Valentine Daniel  > > wrote:
> >
> > Dear Jon and Peirces,
> > I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories of 
> > truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by 
> > "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence").
> > val daniel
> >
> > E. Valentine Daniel
> > Professor of Anthropology
> > 958 Schermerhorn Ext.,
> > Columbia University
> > New York, 10027
> >
> > (917) 741-7764 
> > e...@columbia.edu 
> >
> >> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> Peircers,
> >>
> >> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me
> >> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging,
> >> so I started a blog series for attempting that:
> >>
> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/
> >>  
> >> 
> >>
> >> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by ignoring 
> >> [Peirce]”
> >> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a 
> >> “Procrustian bed
> >> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more to 
> >> say
> >> in that regard if I can get to it.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Jon
> >>
> >> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> >>> Peircers,
> >>>
> >>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
> >>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
> >>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
> >>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
> >>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
> >>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
> >>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
> >>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
> >>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
> >>> name for a triadic relation.
> >>>
> >>> Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
> >>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
> >>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.
> >>>
> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth 
> >>> 
> >>>
> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_theory_of_truth 
> >>> 
> >>>
> >>> Regards,
> >>>
> >>> Jon
> >>
> >> --
> >>
> >> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ 
> >> 
> >> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey 
> >> 
> >> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey 
> >> 
> >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA 
> >> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Clark, list:



I have to say, I really like this sentence:

“Peirce’s notion largely comes out of the idea that for a difference to be
a difference it must make a difference and that those differences over time
act on inquirers.”



But this one leaves me uneasy:

“Peirce gets the idea of habit right but I’m not sure he’s thought through
the implications of erratic patterns of repetition and its implication for
knowledge.”



For I think we ought to consider whether we have not thought through the
implications before we start to think Peirce had not thought through the
implications; especially those matters relating to thinking and man's
nature.



Matthew 26:34-35

 "Truly I tell you," Jesus answered, "this very night, before the rooster
crows, you will disown me three times.



"No!" Peter insisted. "Even if I have to die with you, I will never deny
you!" And all the other disciples vowed the same.



The surprising fact, C, is observed;

But if A were true…



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 1:36 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Mar 19, 2017, at 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
> Re: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth
>
> I have been giving another look at the InterSciWiki (ISW) article on the
> “Pragmatic Theory Of Truth” (PTOT) and I think it will be worth the time
> to clean it up and develop it further.  The plan that usually works best
> from me is to revise the content on the wiki and serialize it on my blog.
>
> The PTOT article derives from the last Wikipedia revision I edited:
>
>
> I think one thing that has to be kept clear is well made in that link.
> Dewey’s Warranted Assertability simply is different from what Peirce does.
> Of course this idea of warrant becomes important for Putnam as well. I’ll
> leave James out of the discussion because he just seems pretty inconsistent
> sometimes adopting a very Peircean conception and sometimes a much more
> short term functional conception of truth.
>
> Peirce’s notion largely comes out of the idea that for a difference to be
> a difference it must make a difference and that those differences over time
> act on inquirers.
>
> The problem, that many brought up over the past few days, is the issue of
> information loss. That is Peirce’s faith really seems to presuppose a lot
> about both how signs act but also the persistence of the information of a
> sign. The problem is this is of course the problem of repetition being so
> important for effects and knowledge. Peirce gets the idea of habit right
> but I’m not sure he’s thought through the implications of erratic patterns
> of repetition and its implication for knowledge.
>
>
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Clark Goble]

> On Mar 19, 2017, at 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> Re: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth 
> 
> 
> I have been giving another look at the InterSciWiki (ISW) article on the
> “Pragmatic Theory Of Truth” (PTOT) and I think it will be worth the time
> to clean it up and develop it further.  The plan that usually works best
> from me is to revise the content on the wiki and serialize it on my blog.
> 
> The PTOT article derives from the last Wikipedia revision I edited:

I think one thing that has to be kept clear is well made in that link. Dewey’s 
Warranted Assertability simply is different from what Peirce does. Of course 
this idea of warrant becomes important for Putnam as well. I’ll leave James out 
of the discussion because he just seems pretty inconsistent sometimes adopting 
a very Peircean conception and sometimes a much more short term functional 
conception of truth.

Peirce’s notion largely comes out of the idea that for a difference to be a 
difference it must make a difference and that those differences over time act 
on inquirers. 

The problem, that many brought up over the past few days, is the issue of 
information loss. That is Peirce’s faith really seems to presuppose a lot about 
both how signs act but also the persistence of the information of a sign. The 
problem is this is of course the problem of repetition being so important for 
effects and knowledge. Peirce gets the idea of habit right but I’m not sure 
he’s thought through the implications of erratic patterns of repetition and its 
implication for knowledge.



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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List

Now I have had a look at the Commens Dictionary: Ok, to say that the immediate object is inside, and the dynamical object outside of the sign, is not exctly how Peirce wrote it. He rather wrote, that the immediate object is the object as represented in the sign, and the dynamical object is independent of the sign. To call "as represented" "inside", and "independent" "outside" of the sign would be already an interpretation.

 

About the Bayes part: Maybe I was wrong. I wrote about what I had remembered from a thread about Bayesianism long ago at this list. Wasnt it about reversibility in the way, that an event has different outcome possibilities with different probabilities, but the whole of all that results from the event, in reality, at any time, carries the informations about the event along with it, so the event (the truth about the event) can theoretically be reconstructed? But I better should look it up, but he problem is, I do not understand the mathematic symbols.

Best,

Helmut

 

19. März 2017 um 22:16 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
 


Helmut, John, List:
 

Thank you for the interesting post. It raises some questions in my mind.
 


On Mar 17, 2017, at 3:20 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 





Dear List Members,

I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and the dynamical object, achieved in the infinite future, and this similarity will be perfect (after indefinite time), when the only aspect, that tells it (the similarity) from sameness, is, that the immediate object is still inside the sign, whilst the dynamical one is remaining outside of it.

Is that so, or somehow like that?






 
I really do not know how to parse this phrase.

Pragmatically, this appears to an impossibility.  Perhaps you can amplify the meaning?

I do not think of signs having an interior or exterior or an interior and exterior.

 





Anyway, I guess, that the origins, the histories of both the immediate and the dynamical object ly in the past, not in the future. So truth, I think, is a matter of the past, not of the future.

And, if one thinks, that the past and it´s truth may, or even will be uncovered in the (be it infinite) future, then I would say, that this belief is a Bayesian one.

Because, as far as I have understood Bayesianism, I think that Bayesianists believe that the past can be mathematically reconstructed from the present (no information is completely lost).






Bayesian mathematics is restricted to analysis of probability propositions where the antecedent and consequences are given, that is, [0,1].

What is the purpose of introducing “information” into this context?

The nature of truth is already compromised by introducing the concept of probability into a proposition. Why further dilute both the semantics and the syntaxes?

 
 





 So is it ok to say, that Peirce had a belief similar to what later was called Bayesianism?




Thomas Bayes, 1702-1761. 





 

Cheers




 
jerry 

 




 

17. März 2017 um 16:42 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler"  wrote:
 

John, List

> On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
> the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
> a countable number of theories.
>
> But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
> to describe a continuous aspect of the world:

Yes, there are two ways, so your assertion is reasonable.
But, is this assertion logically complete pragmatically?

Can you relate either of your theoretical ways to modes of description or modes of explanation of genetic material or cellular metabolism, both of which express discrete signs?

The number of ways to express discrete signs is limited by the pre-suppositions about the foundations of mathematics and the illations to modes of description and modes of explanation.

Thus, in my mind, the question arises ,
“How do the two ways you list relate to categorial modes of description and functorial modes of explanation?”

CSP’s “nine-fold way” of creating cyclic arguments to generate legisigns succeeds in this challenge, does it not?

I would further suggest that CSP’s nine-fold way succeeds because of the constraints it places on the meaning of symbols.

Cheers

Jerry


> John
>
> -
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Helmut, John, List:

Thank you for the interesting post. It raises some questions in my mind.

> On Mar 17, 2017, at 3:20 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Dear List Members,
> I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and 
> the dynamical object, achieved in the infinite future, and this similarity 
> will be perfect (after indefinite time), when the only aspect, that tells it 
> (the similarity) from sameness, is, that the immediate object is still inside 
> the sign, whilst the dynamical one is remaining outside of it.
> Is that so, or somehow like that?

I really do not know how to parse this phrase.
Pragmatically, this appears to an impossibility.  Perhaps you can amplify the 
meaning?
I do not think of signs having an interior or exterior or an interior and 
exterior.

> Anyway, I guess, that the origins, the histories of both the immediate and 
> the dynamical object ly in the past, not in the future. So truth, I think, is 
> a matter of the past, not of the future.
> And, if one thinks, that the past and it´s truth may, or even will be 
> uncovered in the (be it infinite) future, then I would say, that this belief 
> is a Bayesian one.
> Because, as far as I have understood Bayesianism, I think that Bayesianists 
> believe that the past can be mathematically reconstructed from the present 
> (no information is completely lost).
Bayesian mathematics is restricted to analysis of probability propositions 
where the antecedent and consequences are given, that is, [0,1].
What is the purpose of introducing “information” into this context?
The nature of truth is already compromised by introducing the concept of 
probability into a proposition. Why further dilute both the semantics and the 
syntaxes?


>  So is it ok to say, that Peirce had a belief similar to what later was 
> called Bayesianism?
Thomas Bayes, 1702-1761. 
> 
> Cheers

jerry 

>  
> 17. März 2017 um 16:42 Uhr
>  "Jerry LR Chandler"  wrote:
>  
> John, List
> 
> > On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> >
> > But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
> > the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
> > a countable number of theories.
> >
> > But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
> > to describe a continuous aspect of the world:
> 
> Yes, there are two ways, so your assertion is reasonable.
> But, is this assertion logically complete pragmatically?
> 
> Can you relate either of your theoretical ways to modes of description or 
> modes of explanation of genetic material or cellular metabolism, both of 
> which express discrete signs?
> 
> The number of ways to express discrete signs is limited by the 
> pre-suppositions about the foundations of mathematics and the illations to 
> modes of description and modes of explanation.
> 
> Thus, in my mind, the question arises ,
> “How do the two ways you list relate to categorial modes of description and 
> functorial modes of explanation?”
> 
> CSP’s “nine-fold way” of creating cyclic arguments to generate legisigns 
> succeeds in this challenge, does it not?
> 
> I would further suggest that CSP’s nine-fold way succeeds because of the 
> constraints it places on the meaning of symbols.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> 
> > John
> >
> > -
> > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
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> > of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm 
> >  .
> >
> >
> >
> >
> 
> 
> -
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>  .
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
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> 
> 
> 


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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear List Members,

I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and the dynamical object, achieved in the infinite future, and this similarity will be perfect (after indefinite time), when the only aspect, that tells it (the similarity) from sameness, is, that the immediate object is still inside the sign, whilst the dynamical one is remaining outside of it.

Is that so, or somehow like that?

Anyway, I guess, that the origins, the histories of both the immediate and the dynamical object ly in the past, not in the future. So truth, I think, is a matter of the past, not of the future.

And, if one thinks, that the past and it´s truth may, or even will be uncovered in the (be it infinite) future, then I would say, that this belief is a Bayesian one.

Because, as far as I have understood Bayesianism, I think that Bayesianists believe that the past can be mathematically reconstructed from the present (no information is completely lost).

But isn´t it rather so, that there is loss of information? And documentation is always incomplete?

That would mean, that truth in the sense of "It had happened like this" can never be achieved.

But truth in the sense of truth about the nature of nature can, if you believe that the nature of nature (that would be the natural laws) does not change (at least not undocumented, but who or what should do the documentation?)

Now, Peirce did not even believe this (see: Tychism). But he did believe in the truth being a function of future time (with truth being an asymptote). So is it ok to say, that Peirce had a belief similar to what later was called Bayesianism?

Best,

Helmut

 

17. März 2017 um 16:42 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler"  wrote:
 

John, List

> On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
> the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
> a countable number of theories.
>
> But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
> to describe a continuous aspect of the world:

Yes, there are two ways, so your assertion is reasonable.
But, is this assertion logically complete pragmatically?

Can you relate either of your theoretical ways to modes of description or modes of explanation of genetic material or cellular metabolism, both of which express discrete signs?

The number of ways to express discrete signs is limited by the pre-suppositions about the foundations of mathematics and the illations to modes of description and modes of explanation.

Thus, in my mind, the question arises ,
“How do the two ways you list relate to categorial modes of description and functorial modes of explanation?”

CSP’s “nine-fold way” of creating cyclic arguments to generate legisigns succeeds in this challenge, does it not?

I would further suggest that CSP’s nine-fold way succeeds because of the constraints it places on the meaning of symbols.

Cheers

Jerry


> John
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>
>
>
>


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John, List

> On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
> the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
> a countable number of theories.
> 
> But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
> to describe a continuous aspect of the world:

Yes, there are two ways, so your assertion is reasonable.
But, is this assertion logically complete pragmatically?

Can you relate either of your theoretical ways to modes of description or modes 
of explanation of genetic material or cellular metabolism, both of which 
express discrete signs?

The number of ways to express discrete signs is limited by the pre-suppositions 
about the foundations of mathematics and the illations to modes of description 
and modes of explanation. 

Thus, in my mind, the question arises , 
“How do the two ways you list relate to categorial modes of description and 
functorial modes of explanation?” 

CSP’s “nine-fold way” of creating cyclic arguments to generate legisigns 
succeeds in this challenge, does it not?

I would further suggest that CSP’s nine-fold way succeeds because of the 
constraints it places on the meaning of symbols.

Cheers

Jerry


> John
> 
> -
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Clark, John, list:



If you’re talking about convergence to an ultimate end, you should be clear
on what part esthetics plays and the thing that is the object of perceptual
judgment.  If that is not specified, how will you decide whether the limit
is local from global?



As to whether Peirce is committed to a “view of convergence in the
scientific realism of that era”, it would help if you clear up that
statement to mean whether he believed others believed that view or whether
he claimed that view himself.



For, there are many places where interpreters take what he says regarding
an “aim should be immutable under all circumstances” quite literally.



Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 3/16/2017 11:20 AM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
>> The way I usually think about it is that there are many continuous
>> equations such that the limit as x → ∞ y → 0.
>>
>
> But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
> the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
> a countable number of theories.
>
> But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
> to describe a continuous aspect of the world:
>
>  1. Let the variables range over a continuous domain.
>
>  2. Let the symbols (predicates) have a continuous mapping
> to the world.  For example, 'circle' could describe any
> of a continuous range of circular aspects of the world.
>
> John
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[John F Sowa]

On 3/16/2017 11:20 AM, Clark Goble wrote:

The way I usually think about it is that there are many continuous
equations such that the limit as x → ∞ y → 0.


But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
a countable number of theories.

But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
to describe a continuous aspect of the world:

 1. Let the variables range over a continuous domain.

 2. Let the symbols (predicates) have a continuous mapping
to the world.  For example, 'circle' could describe any
of a continuous range of circular aspects of the world.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Clark Goble]

> On Mar 16, 2017, at 7:48 AM, John F Sowa  > wrote:
> 
> To formalize the idea of convergence, I combined a Lindenbaum
> lattice with methods of belief (or theory) revision.  The lattice
> contains all possible theories expressible within a given logic,
> and the AGM operators for belief revision give a measure of how
> close one theory is to another.
> 
> I discuss this measure and relate it to Peirce and some critics
> (including Quine) in the signproc.pdf article.  (Excerpt below)

I’ve not read that yet John (hope to at lunch). But a quick thought. It seems 
to me Peirce isn’t committed to the view of convergence in the scientific 
realism of that era. The idea we’re getting closer and closer to the truth. 
Rather it would seem Peirce’s commitments entail that we might get close and 
then far so long as at infinity it reaches the truth. That means that as useful 
as short term notions of convergence are, they really don’t guarantee much. 

The way I usually think about it is that there are many continuous equations 
such that the limit as x → ∞ y → 0.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Clark Goble]

> On Mar 16, 2017, at 6:44 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> The key word there is “investigate”.  We can read that loosely
> as any method of fixing belief, but we know that Peirce ranked
> methods of fixing belief in order of their malleability to the
> impressions of reality, their aptness to let what is permanent,
> persistent, “something upon which our thinking has no effect”
> settle the matter once and for all.

This is where Peirce’s epistemology or perhaps more accurately different focus 
on inquiry gets interesting and complex. While he focuses in on inquiry and 
fixation of belief, clearly he thinks all ways to fix belief are not equal. It 
would thus seem epistemology can thus be useful to the degree it gives us 
stable beliefs about general principles of justification. We demonstrate those 
beliefs by acting on them: i.e. disbelieving where epistemology tells us we 
should.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[John F Sowa]

On 3/16/2017 8:44 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

This is the question of “convergence”, a question that mathematicians,
physicists, systems theorists, etc. have investigated in great detail.
As a rule we find that some methods of procedure, of stepping through
a sequence of states, will eventually converge on a settled or stable
state while others will not.


To formalize the idea of convergence, I combined a Lindenbaum
lattice with methods of belief (or theory) revision.  The lattice
contains all possible theories expressible within a given logic,
and the AGM operators for belief revision give a measure of how
close one theory is to another.

I discuss this measure and relate it to Peirce and some critics
(including Quine) in the signproc.pdf article.  (Excerpt below)

John
___

From page 33 of http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

Peirce’s definition of truth and his logic of pragmatism, which supports 
that definition, are an elegant generalization of the practices of 
working scientists. Yet many philosophers who seized upon one brief 
quotation have failed to appreciate the full ramifications. In a survey 
of various theories of truth, Kirkham (1992) said



Peirce’s theory of truth is plausible only because it is parasitic
on another, hidden theory of truth: truth as correspondence with
reality.  So why doesn’t Peirce simply offer the latter as his theory
of truth? (p. 83)


If he had read more of Peirce’s writings, Kirkham might have found the 
answer to his question:



That truth is the correspondence of a representation with its object
is, as Kant says [1787, A58, B82], merely the nominal definition of it.
Truth belongs exclusively to propositions. A proposition has a subject
(or set of subjects) and a predicate. The subject is a sign; the
predicate is a sign; and the proposition is a sign that the predicate
is a sign of that of which the subject is a sign. If it be so, it is
true. But what does this correspondence, or reference of the sign to
its object, consist in? The pragmaticist answers this question as
follows... if we can find out the right method of thinking and can
follow it out, — the right method of transforming signs, — then truth
can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the
following out of this method would ultimately carry us. (EP 2.379-380)


Quine (1960) is more subtle, but he hadn’t read much more of Peirce’s 
writings than Kirkham:



But there is a lot wrong with Peirce’s notion, besides its assumption
of a final organon of scientific method and its appeal to an infinite
process. There is a faulty use of numerical analogy in speaking of a
limit of theories, since the notion of limit depends on that of “nearer
than,” which is defined for numbers and not for theories. And even if
we by-pass such troubles by identifying truth somewhat fancifully with
the ideal result of applying scientific method outright to the whole
future totality of surface irritations, still there is trouble in the
imputation of uniqueness (“the ideal result“) It seems likelier, if
only on account of symmetries or dualities, that countless alternative
theories would be tied for first place. (p. 23)


Quine’s objection has three parts, each of which requires a separate answer:

 1. Peirce made no “assumption of a final organon of scientific 
method,” other than the repeated and unfettered cycles of induction, 
abduction, deduction, and testing illustrated in Figure 7. In rejecting 
Kant’s claim that there is anything that could be inherently unknowable, 
Peirce maintained that for any question that science might ask, there 
exists a discoverable theory that could answer it. He admitted that 
discovering such a theory might take an indefinitely long time, but the 
existence of a theory in the infinite lattice does not depend on the 
method of search, its duration, or the nature of the minds that do the 
search.


 2. The lattice of all possible theories provides a notion of “nearer 
than”: a theory T1 is nearer to a theory T2 than it is to T3 iff fewer 
belief revision steps (contraction, expansion, and analogy) are needed 
to convert T1 to T2 than to convert T1 to T3.


 3. Peirce was well aware of the infinite number of symmetries, 
dualities, and other transformations that can change a statement’s form 
without making any change in its implications. They can all be 
accommodated by grouping theories in equivalence classes (Sowa 2000). 
The ultimate goal of science is not a particular statement of a theory, 
but any statement within the equivalence class.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jon A., List:

It is also important to recognize that Peirce deliberately revised his
formulation over time from the indicative to the subjunctive conditional;
again, "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal
limit
towards which endless investigation *would *tend to bring scientific
belief" (CP 5.565, emphasis added; 1901).  Or as he later wrote, "I call
'truth' the predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that
which *would
*ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that
particular direction" (EP 2:457, emphasis in original; 1911).  Or as
Cornelius de Waal put it in *Peirce:  A Guide for the Perplexed*, "Peirce
stops talking about the final opinion as something we are *fated* to reach,
maintaining instead that whenever we engage in inquiry we do so with the
*hope* that it will lead to a final opinion ... Proposition *P* is true if
and only if, had all the facts necessary for establishing *P* been inquired
into indefinitely by a sufficiently large community of investigators, this
inquiry would have resulted in the permanently settled belief that *P*"
(pp. 132-135, emphases in original).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 7:44 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Thread:
> JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg00098.html
> JR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg00104.html
>
> Jerry, List,
>
> The key word there is “investigate”.  We can read that loosely
> as any method of fixing belief, but we know that Peirce ranked
> methods of fixing belief in order of their malleability to the
> impressions of reality, their aptness to let what is permanent,
> persistent, “something upon which our thinking has no effect”
> settle the matter once and for all.
>
> Tenacity, Authority, Plausibility, Inquiry
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/01/15/tenacity-authority
> -plausibility-inquiry/
>
> This is the question of “convergence”, a question that mathematicians,
> physicists, systems theorists, etc. have investigated in great detail.
> As a rule we find that some methods of procedure, of stepping through
> a sequence of states, will eventually converge on a settled or stable
> state while others will not.  All that is relative, of course, to the
> mathematical model or theory we have in hand for describing states of
> information in time.  So we never quite escape the question of how to
> tell whether a model is good and succeeds in its purpose of giving us
> information about its object or whether it falls short of that object.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 3/13/2017 4:14 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>
>> ... and there you have it.
>>
>> Only *everybody* can know the truth.
>>
>> The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to
>> by *all who investigate*, is what we mean by the truth,
>>
>> and the object represented in this opinion is the real.
>>
>> The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatization,
>> but to do it intelligently.
>>
>
> --
>
> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Awbrey]

Thread:
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg00098.html
JR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg00104.html

Jerry, List,

The key word there is “investigate”.  We can read that loosely
as any method of fixing belief, but we know that Peirce ranked
methods of fixing belief in order of their malleability to the
impressions of reality, their aptness to let what is permanent,
persistent, “something upon which our thinking has no effect”
settle the matter once and for all.

Tenacity, Authority, Plausibility, Inquiry
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/01/15/tenacity-authority-plausibility-inquiry/

This is the question of “convergence”, a question that mathematicians,
physicists, systems theorists, etc. have investigated in great detail.
As a rule we find that some methods of procedure, of stepping through
a sequence of states, will eventually converge on a settled or stable
state while others will not.  All that is relative, of course, to the
mathematical model or theory we have in hand for describing states of
information in time.  So we never quite escape the question of how to
tell whether a model is good and succeeds in its purpose of giving us
information about its object or whether it falls short of that object.

Regards,

Jon

On 3/13/2017 4:14 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:

... and there you have it.

Only *everybody* can know the truth.

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to
by *all who investigate*, is what we mean by the truth,

and the object represented in this opinion is the real.

The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatization,
but to do it intelligently.



--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Mar 13, 2017, at 7:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  > wrote:
> 
> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by ignoring 
> [Peirce]”
> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a “Procrustian 
> bed
> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more to say
> in that regard if I can get to it.

I think so too, but I think we should make explicit what other doctrines Peirce 
held that was different from the mainstream of philosophy lead to these 
differences. Off the top of my head I think you have to mention the following:

  scholastic realism vs. nominalism
  modal realism vs. actualism (primarily for the late Peirce although with the 
 pragmatic maxim he moved to counterfactuals reasonably early)
  externalism vs. internalism
  signs vs. thoughts in a mind (i.e. the interpretant need not be a human mind)
  verification as meaning vs. verification as truth

There’s probably some others but those five see the key differences that make 
terms like correspondence or coherence misleading at best.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

As Val and Jon A. were perhaps fully aware, Peirce himself used
"concordance" when discussing truth in his article, "Truth and Falsity and
Error," for Baldwin's 1901 *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (CP
5.565, 568-570).

Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit
towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief,
which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the
confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an
essential ingredient of truth. A further explanation of what this
concordance consists in will be given below ...

To say that a proposition is true is to say that every interpretation of it
is true. Two propositions are equivalent when either might have been an
interpretant of the other ... When we speak of truth and falsity, we refer
to the possibility of the proposition being refuted; and this refutation
(roughly speaking) takes place in but one way. Namely, an interpretant of
the proposition would, if believed, produce the expectation of a certain
description of percept on a certain occasion. The occasion arrives: the
percept forced upon us is different. This constitutes the falsity of every
proposition of which the disappointing prediction was the interpretant.

Thus, a false proposition is a proposition of which some interpretant
represents that, on an occasion which it indicates, a percept will have a
certain character, while the immediate perceptual judgment on that occasion
is that the percept has not that character. A true proposition is a
proposition belief in which would never lead to such disappointment so long
as the proposition is not understood otherwise than it was intended.

All the above relates to *complex truth*, or the truth of propositions.
This is divided into many varieties, among which may be mentioned *ethical
truth*, or the conformity of an assertion to the speaker's or writer's
belief, otherwise called *veracity*, and *logical truth*, that is, the
concordance of a proposition with reality, in such way as is above defined.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Signs are logical arguments...except when they aren't.  The issue is
whether Signs correspond to real.

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by *all who
investigate*, is what we mean by the truth,

and the object represented in this opinion is the real.


Best, Jerry



On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 4:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jerry C., List:
>
> Again, Val invoked consensus and correspondence, not coherence and
> correspondence.  Frankly, I am not sure exactly what to make of "truth by
> concordance"; I am hoping that Val and/or Jon A. will elaborate on what
> they meant by that suggestion.  I now see that perhaps you were proposing
> "order" and "index" as two possible synonyms for "concordance."  I took
> them to be invoking it more as "agreement," given the reference to "triple
> correspondence" in a triadic relation; i.e., consistency of the sign,
> object, and interpretant.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 4:03 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon:
>>
>> the phrase:
>>
>> "by adding, Truth by "concordance” "
>>
>> What is your interpretation of this phrase?
>>
>> (Within philosophical writings, the two principle theories of truth are
>> referred to as “coherence” and “correspondence”.  In my view, CSP focused
>> his logic on correspondence between signs and logical arguments.)
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>> On Mar 13, 2017, at 3:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Jerry C.:  I am a bit puzzled by your questions, since there was no
>> mention of "order," "index," or "inferring" in the preceding posts by Jon
>> A. and Val.  Which three concepts are you seeking to bind together?
>>
>> Val:  Besides consensus and correspondence, you left out the coherence
>> and pragmatic/instrumental theories of truth as espoused by nominalists.
>> Again, I am inclined to agree with Forster that Peirce's realist approach
>> satisfies all of these, rather than reducing truth to only one of them.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
>> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>>
>>> List:
>>>
>>> I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion.
>>>
>>> Concordance?
>>> “Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics?
>>> “Index" as a categorization?
>>>
>>> Are propositions inferred by “concordances”?
>>>
>>> Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together?
>>> Can anyone expand on this proposal?
>>>
>>> Cheers
>>>
>>> Jerry
>>>
>>> > On Mar 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, E Valentine Daniel 
>>> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > Dear Jon and Peirces,
>>> > I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories
>>> of truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by
>>> "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence").
>>> > val daniel
>>> >
>>> > E. Valentine Daniel
>>> > Professor of Anthropology
>>> > 958 Schermerhorn Ext.,
>>> > Columbia University
>>> > New York, 10027
>>> >
>>> > (917) 741-7764
>>> > e...@columbia.edu
>>> >
>>> >> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> Peircers,
>>> >>
>>> >> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me
>>> >> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging,
>>> >> so I started a blog series for attempting that:
>>> >>
>>> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-o
>>> f-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/
>>> >>
>>> >> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by
>>> ignoring [Peirce]”
>>> >> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a
>>> “Procrustian bed
>>> >> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have
>>> more to say
>>> >> in that regard if I can get to it.
>>> >>
>>> >> Regards,
>>> >>
>>> >> Jon
>>> >>
>>> >> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>>> >>> Peircers,
>>> >>>
>>> >>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
>>> >>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
>>> >>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
>>> >>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
>>> >>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
>>> >>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
>>> >>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
>>> >>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
>>> >>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
>>> >>> name for a triadic relation.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
>>> >>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
>>> >>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth
>>> >>>
>>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

Again, Val invoked consensus and correspondence, not coherence and
correspondence.  Frankly, I am not sure exactly what to make of "truth by
concordance"; I am hoping that Val and/or Jon A. will elaborate on what
they meant by that suggestion.  I now see that perhaps you were proposing
"order" and "index" as two possible synonyms for "concordance."  I took
them to be invoking it more as "agreement," given the reference to "triple
correspondence" in a triadic relation; i.e., consistency of the sign,
object, and interpretant.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 4:03 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Jon:
>
> the phrase:
>
> "by adding, Truth by "concordance” "
>
> What is your interpretation of this phrase?
>
> (Within philosophical writings, the two principle theories of truth are
> referred to as “coherence” and “correspondence”.  In my view, CSP focused
> his logic on correspondence between signs and logical arguments.)
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
> On Mar 13, 2017, at 3:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry C.:  I am a bit puzzled by your questions, since there was no
> mention of "order," "index," or "inferring" in the preceding posts by Jon
> A. and Val.  Which three concepts are you seeking to bind together?
>
> Val:  Besides consensus and correspondence, you left out the coherence and
> pragmatic/instrumental theories of truth as espoused by nominalists.
> Again, I am inclined to agree with Forster that Peirce's realist approach
> satisfies all of these, rather than reducing truth to only one of them.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion.
>>
>> Concordance?
>> “Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics?
>> “Index" as a categorization?
>>
>> Are propositions inferred by “concordances”?
>>
>> Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together?
>> Can anyone expand on this proposal?
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>> > On Mar 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, E Valentine Daniel 
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > Dear Jon and Peirces,
>> > I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories
>> of truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by
>> "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence").
>> > val daniel
>> >
>> > E. Valentine Daniel
>> > Professor of Anthropology
>> > 958 Schermerhorn Ext.,
>> > Columbia University
>> > New York, 10027
>> >
>> > (917) 741-7764
>> > e...@columbia.edu
>> >
>> >> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Peircers,
>> >>
>> >> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me
>> >> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging,
>> >> so I started a blog series for attempting that:
>> >>
>> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-o
>> f-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/
>> >>
>> >> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by
>> ignoring [Peirce]”
>> >> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a
>> “Procrustian bed
>> >> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more
>> to say
>> >> in that regard if I can get to it.
>> >>
>> >> Regards,
>> >>
>> >> Jon
>> >>
>> >> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>> >>> Peircers,
>> >>>
>> >>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
>> >>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
>> >>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
>> >>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
>> >>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
>> >>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
>> >>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
>> >>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
>> >>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
>> >>> name for a triadic relation.
>> >>>
>> >>> Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
>> >>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
>> >>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.
>> >>>
>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth
>> >>>
>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_the
>> ory_of_truth
>> >>>
>> >>> Regards,
>> >>>
>> >>> Jon
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >>
>> >> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>> >> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>> >> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>> >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
>> >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>>
>

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to t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:

the phrase:

"by adding, Truth by "concordance” "

What is your interpretation of this phrase?

(Within philosophical writings, the two principle theories of truth are 
referred to as “coherence” and “correspondence”.  In my view, CSP focused his 
logic on correspondence between signs and logical arguments.)

Cheers

Jerry
> On Mar 13, 2017, at 3:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C.:  I am a bit puzzled by your questions, since there was no mention 
> of "order," "index," or "inferring" in the preceding posts by Jon A. and Val. 
>  Which three concepts are you seeking to bind together?
> 
> Val:  Besides consensus and correspondence, you left out the coherence and 
> pragmatic/instrumental theories of truth as espoused by nominalists.  Again, 
> I am inclined to agree with Forster that Peirce's realist approach satisfies 
> all of these, rather than reducing truth to only one of them.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> List:
> 
> I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion.
> 
> Concordance?
> “Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics?
> “Index" as a categorization?
> 
> Are propositions inferred by “concordances”?
> 
> Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together?
> Can anyone expand on this proposal?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> > On Mar 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, E Valentine Daniel  > > wrote:
> >
> > Dear Jon and Peirces,
> > I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories of 
> > truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by 
> > "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence").
> > val daniel
> >
> > E. Valentine Daniel
> > Professor of Anthropology
> > 958 Schermerhorn Ext.,
> > Columbia University
> > New York, 10027
> >
> > (917) 741-7764 
> > e...@columbia.edu 
> >
> >> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> Peircers,
> >>
> >> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me
> >> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging,
> >> so I started a blog series for attempting that:
> >>
> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/
> >>  
> >> 
> >>
> >> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by ignoring 
> >> [Peirce]”
> >> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a 
> >> “Procrustian bed
> >> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more to 
> >> say
> >> in that regard if I can get to it.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Jon
> >>
> >> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> >>> Peircers,
> >>>
> >>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
> >>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
> >>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
> >>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
> >>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
> >>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
> >>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
> >>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
> >>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
> >>> name for a triadic relation.
> >>>
> >>> Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
> >>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
> >>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.
> >>>
> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth 
> >>> 
> >>>
> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_theory_of_truth 
> >>> 
> >>>
> >>> Regards,
> >>>
> >>> Jon
> >>
> >> --
> >>
> >> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ 
> >> 
> >> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey 
> >> 
> >> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey 
> >> 
> >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA 
> >> 
> >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache 
> >> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

That the concept of truth requires order, index and inferring is not
obvious to all.



In other words;

that order, index and inferring is contained in truth requires awareness
through collateral experience.



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 3:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jerry C.:  I am a bit puzzled by your questions, since there was no
> mention of "order," "index," or "inferring" in the preceding posts by Jon
> A. and Val.  Which three concepts are you seeking to bind together?
>
> Val:  Besides consensus and correspondence, you left out the coherence and
> pragmatic/instrumental theories of truth as espoused by nominalists.
> Again, I am inclined to agree with Forster that Peirce's realist approach
> satisfies all of these, rather than reducing truth to only one of them.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion.
>>
>> Concordance?
>> “Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics?
>> “Index" as a categorization?
>>
>> Are propositions inferred by “concordances”?
>>
>> Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together?
>> Can anyone expand on this proposal?
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>> > On Mar 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, E Valentine Daniel 
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > Dear Jon and Peirces,
>> > I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories
>> of truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by
>> "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence").
>> > val daniel
>> >
>> > E. Valentine Daniel
>> > Professor of Anthropology
>> > 958 Schermerhorn Ext.,
>> > Columbia University
>> > New York, 10027
>> >
>> > (917) 741-7764
>> > e...@columbia.edu
>> >
>> >> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Peircers,
>> >>
>> >> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me
>> >> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging,
>> >> so I started a blog series for attempting that:
>> >>
>> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-o
>> f-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/
>> >>
>> >> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by
>> ignoring [Peirce]”
>> >> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a
>> “Procrustian bed
>> >> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more
>> to say
>> >> in that regard if I can get to it.
>> >>
>> >> Regards,
>> >>
>> >> Jon
>> >>
>> >> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>> >>> Peircers,
>> >>>
>> >>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
>> >>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
>> >>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
>> >>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
>> >>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
>> >>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
>> >>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
>> >>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
>> >>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
>> >>> name for a triadic relation.
>> >>>
>> >>> Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
>> >>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
>> >>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.
>> >>>
>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth
>> >>>
>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_the
>> ory_of_truth
>> >>>
>> >>> Regards,
>> >>>
>> >>> Jon
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >>
>> >> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>> >> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>> >> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>> >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
>> >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C.:  I am a bit puzzled by your questions, since there was no mention
of "order," "index," or "inferring" in the preceding posts by Jon A. and
Val.  Which three concepts are you seeking to bind together?

Val:  Besides consensus and correspondence, you left out the coherence and
pragmatic/instrumental theories of truth as espoused by nominalists.
Again, I am inclined to agree with Forster that Peirce's realist approach
satisfies all of these, rather than reducing truth to only one of them.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List:
>
> I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion.
>
> Concordance?
> “Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics?
> “Index" as a categorization?
>
> Are propositions inferred by “concordances”?
>
> Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together?
> Can anyone expand on this proposal?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
> > On Mar 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, E Valentine Daniel 
> wrote:
> >
> > Dear Jon and Peirces,
> > I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories of
> truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by
> "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence").
> > val daniel
> >
> > E. Valentine Daniel
> > Professor of Anthropology
> > 958 Schermerhorn Ext.,
> > Columbia University
> > New York, 10027
> >
> > (917) 741-7764
> > e...@columbia.edu
> >
> >> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> >>
> >> Peircers,
> >>
> >> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me
> >> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging,
> >> so I started a blog series for attempting that:
> >>
> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-
> of-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/
> >>
> >> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by
> ignoring [Peirce]”
> >> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a
> “Procrustian bed
> >> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more
> to say
> >> in that regard if I can get to it.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Jon
> >>
> >> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> >>> Peircers,
> >>>
> >>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
> >>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
> >>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
> >>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
> >>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
> >>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
> >>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
> >>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
> >>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
> >>> name for a triadic relation.
> >>>
> >>> Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
> >>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
> >>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.
> >>>
> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth
> >>>
> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_the
> ory_of_truth
> >>>
> >>> Regards,
> >>>
> >>> Jon
> >>
> >> --
> >>
> >> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> >> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> >> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

...and there you have it.

Only *everybody* can know the truth.

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by *all who
investigate*, is what we mean by the truth,

and the object represented in this opinion is the real.


The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatization, but to do it
intelligently.


Hth,

Jerry R


On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List:
>
> I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion.
>
> Concordance?
> “Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics?
> “Index" as a categorization?
>
> Are propositions inferred by “concordances”?
>
> Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together?
> Can anyone expand on this proposal?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
> > On Mar 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, E Valentine Daniel 
> wrote:
> >
> > Dear Jon and Peirces,
> > I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories of
> truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by
> "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence").
> > val daniel
> >
> > E. Valentine Daniel
> > Professor of Anthropology
> > 958 Schermerhorn Ext.,
> > Columbia University
> > New York, 10027
> >
> > (917) 741-7764
> > e...@columbia.edu
> >
> >> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> >>
> >> Peircers,
> >>
> >> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me
> >> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging,
> >> so I started a blog series for attempting that:
> >>
> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-
> theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/
> >>
> >> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by
> ignoring [Peirce]”
> >> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a
> “Procrustian bed
> >> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more
> to say
> >> in that regard if I can get to it.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Jon
> >>
> >> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> >>> Peircers,
> >>>
> >>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
> >>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
> >>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
> >>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
> >>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
> >>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
> >>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
> >>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
> >>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
> >>> name for a triadic relation.
> >>>
> >>> Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
> >>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
> >>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.
> >>>
> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth
> >>>
> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_
> theory_of_truth
> >>>
> >>> Regards,
> >>>
> >>> Jon
> >>>
> >>
> >> --
> >>
> >> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> >> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> >> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
> >>
> >> -
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> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion.

Concordance?  
“Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics?
“Index" as a categorization?

Are propositions inferred by “concordances”?

Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together?
Can anyone expand on this proposal?

Cheers

Jerry 


> On Mar 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, E Valentine Daniel  wrote:
> 
> Dear Jon and Peirces,
> I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories of 
> truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by 
> "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence").
> val daniel
> 
> E. Valentine Daniel
> Professor of Anthropology
> 958 Schermerhorn Ext.,
> Columbia University
> New York, 10027
> 
> (917) 741-7764
> e...@columbia.edu
> 
>> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>> 
>> Peircers,
>> 
>> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me
>> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging,
>> so I started a blog series for attempting that:
>> 
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/
>> 
>> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by ignoring 
>> [Peirce]”
>> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a “Procrustian 
>> bed
>> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more to say
>> in that regard if I can get to it.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon
>> 
>> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>>> Peircers,
>>> 
>>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
>>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
>>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
>>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
>>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
>>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
>>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
>>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
>>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
>>> name for a triadic relation.
>>> 
>>> Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
>>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
>>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.
>>> 
>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth
>>> 
>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_theory_of_truth
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jon
>>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> 
>> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>> 
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>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[E Valentine Daniel]

Dear Jon and Peirces,
I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories of truth, 
viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by "concordance" 
(what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence").
val daniel

E. Valentine Daniel
Professor of Anthropology
958 Schermerhorn Ext.,
Columbia University
New York, 10027

(917) 741-7764
e...@columbia.edu

> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> Peircers,
> 
> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me
> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging,
> so I started a blog series for attempting that:
> 
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/
> 
> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by ignoring 
> [Peirce]”
> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a “Procrustian 
> bed
> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more to say
> in that regard if I can get to it.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>> Peircers,
>> 
>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
>> name for a triadic relation.
>> 
>> Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.
>> 
>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth
>> 
>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_theory_of_truth
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon
>> 
> 
> -- 
> 
> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
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> 
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[PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
“triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
name for a triadic relation.

Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
of 13 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_theory_of_truth

Regards,

Jon

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