From: Adam A. Ford
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 7:30 PM
To: Wei Dai
Subject: H+ Summit @Melbourne 25-26th of June 2011 (Australia)
Hi Wei Dai,
I saw your everything list, and wanted to post an event there, but I am not a
member, and even if I became one would just be a newbie.
So if you feel
Recently I heard the news that Max Tegmark has joined the Advisory Board of
SIAI (The Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, see
http://www.singinst.org/blog/2010/03/03/mit-professor-and-cosmologist-max-tegmark-joins-siai-advisory-board/).
This news was surprising to me, but in
I've placed a compressed mbox file at
http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/everything-archive/. Add everything.bz2 to
this path for the full URL. (I'm trying not to post the full URL directly so
the email addresses inside won't get harvested by web robots.) It should be
complete as of now. I'll
Jack Mallah wrote:
They might not, but I'm sure most would; maybe not exactly that U, but a
lot closer to it.
Can you explain why you believe that?
No. In U = Sum_i M_i Q_i, you sum over all the i's, not just the ones
that are similar to you. Of course your Q_i (which is _your_ utility
No. First, I don't agree that the real question is what the utility
function is or should be. The real question is whether the measure, M, is
conserved or whether it decreases. It's just that a lot of people don't
understand what that means.
I agree that a lot of people don't
Jack, welcome back. I no longer read every post here, but I read this post
and found your positions pretty close to my own. This one, especially, I
totally agree with:
The important thing to realize is that _definitions don't matter_!
Predictions, decisions, appropriate emotions to a
: Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics
to: Wei Dai:
Please:
How can I find your 'Everything-Questionnaire'? (Not that I have the
answers...)
John Mikes
On Thu, Jul 3, 2008 at 4:51 AM, Brian Tenneson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Why is the universe a subset
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If Wei Dai agree, I could send it online: it is a 1,5 Mega QuickTime
document attachment. I guess it is a bit too big. Some day I will put
them on my web page. It does illustrate some points. The problem is
that my all complex plane software does no more run on current
Rolf Nelson wrote:
In the (3) I gave, you're indexed so that the thermal fluctuation
doesn't dissolve until November 1, so your actions still have
consequences.
Still not a problem: the space-time region that I can affect in (3) is too
small (i.e., its measure is too small, complexity too
Rolf Nelson wrote:
On Oct 25, 7:59 am, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't care
about (1) and (3) because those universes are too arbitrary or random,
and I
can defend that by pointing to their high algorithmic complexities.
In (3) the universe doesn't have a high aIgorithmic
Rolf Nelson wrote:
Wei, your examples are convincing, although other decision models have
similar problems. If your two examples were the only problems that
UDASSA had, I would have few qualms about adopting it over the other
decision models I've seen. Note that even if you adopt a decision
Brent Meeker wrote:
That's a good argument assuming some laws of physics. But as I understood
it, the measure problem was to explain the law-like evolution of the
universe as a opposed to a chaotic/random/white-rabbit universe. Is it
your interpretation that, among all possible worlds,
Rolf Nelson wrote:
In standard decision theory, odds (subjective probabilities) are
separated from utilities. Is how much you care about the consequences
of your actions isomorphic to odds, or is there some subtlety I'm
missing here?
Your question shows that someone finally understand what
Rolf Nelson wrote:
Your observations to date are consistent with all three models. What
are the odds that you live in (2) but not (1) or (3)? Surely the
answer is extremely high, but how do we justify it *mathematically*
(and philosophically)?
My current position is, forget the odds. Let's
Rolf Nelson wrote:
1. Provides a possible explanation for the Measure Problem of why we
shouldn't be extremely surprised to find we live in a lawful
universe, rather than an extremely chaotic universe, or a homogeneous
cloud of gas.
One thing I still don't understand, is in what sense
Russell Standish wrote:
This is actually the SSSA, as originally defined by Bostrom. The ASSA
is the SSSA applied to next observer moments.
I guess there is a bit of confusing on these terms. I did some searching in
the mailing list archives to find out how they were originally defined.
Youness Ayaita wrote:
Directly speaking: Since all observers must expect to get their next
observer moments out of the same ensemble of observer moments, there
is no reason to insist on different preferences.
Youness, ASSA does not mean what you think, that all observers must expect
to get
I promised to summarize why I moved away from the philosophical position
that Hal Finney calls UD+ASSA. Here's part 1, where I argue against ASSA.
Part 2 will cover UD.
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose your brain has been
destructively scanned and uploaded into a computer by a
In part one I argued against ASSA. Here I first summarize my
argument against UD, then against the general possibility of any single
objective measure.
1. There is an infinite number of universal Turing machines, so there
is an infinite number of UD. If we want to use one UD as an objective
Hal Finney wrote:
This is an interesting experiment, but I have two comments. First,
you could tighten the dilemma by having the mad scientist flip a biased
coin with say a 70% chance of coming up heads, but then he duplicates
you if it comes up tails. Now you have it that the different
Here's my comment on David Wallace's 2005 paper, Quantum Probability from
Subjective Likelihood:
improving on Deutsch's proof of the probability rule available at
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/2302/. I think this is probably
one of the main works referred to in the New Scientist
Hal wrote:
Yes, as you note later this is very similar to the concept I called
UD+ASSA or just UDASSA and described in a series of postings to this
list back in 2005. It was not original with me but actually was based
on an idea of Wei Dai, who founded this last way back in 1998. I
Jason wrote:
I have seen two main justifications on this list for the everything
ensemble, the first comes from information theory which says the
information content of everything is zero (or close to zero). The
other is mathematicalism/arithmatical realism which suggests
mathematical truth
A year ago or so Wei Dai put an end to religious discussions on the list.
I don't remember if I did that a year ago or not, but I certainly think the
current discussion is off-topic. This mailing list is based on the premise
that all possible universes exist. Unless someone can think
I just remembered that Google Groups also has a file uploading/hosting
feature. You can find it at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/files. It's already enabled,
so please go ahead and use it as an alternative, or for any files that don't
belong on Jason's wiki.
- Original
On Feb 13, 3:28 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You don't need an emailer that understands HTML to look at an attached
jpeg, like the one I attach to this. :-) On the avoid-l mailing list the
rule is to keep attachements under 500kb. Perhaps Wei Dai would like to
adopt
Jason, I think there may be some incorrect assumptions behind your argument.
Let me state the facts as I understand them and you can check them against
your assumptions or correct me if I'm wrong.
The only reason we need reversible computation to do an infinite number of
computations is that
Jason wrote:
If that is true then my underlying assumptions were flawed. My
argument assumed that a non-reversible universe could not be simulated
by a computer with bounded memory and using only reversible
computations. The way I arrived at this assumption was imagining a
non-reversible
Jason wrote:
I assumed bounded memory due to the limited amount of matter and energy
available to build the computer. For instance I've seen it said that the
total information content of this universe is about 10^90 bits. If a
civilization gathered all the mass and energy available in their
Your posts have been coming through. You can check
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en yourself to see if your
posts have been received by the group.
- Original Message -
From: John Mikes
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com ; Wei Dai
Sent: Thursday, December 21
Sorry, John. I set your subscription to no email thinking you wanted to
unsubscribe. I've changed it back now. For future reference you can check your
subscription status at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/subscribe.
- Original Message -
From: Kim Jones
To:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
As for the question of why we live in a universe that apparently has this
property, I don't think there's an anthropic explanation for it, I'd see
it
as part of the larger question of why we live in a universe whose
fundamental laws seem to be so elegant and posess so
Ti Bo wrote:
On reversibility, there is the observation (I think acredittable to Tom
Toffoli)
that most/all irreversible systems have a reversible subsystem and the
dynamics arrive in that
subsystem after some (finite) time. Thus any system that we observe a
while
after it has started
Saibal Mitra wrote:
How would an observer know he is living in a universe in which information
is lost? Information loss means that time evolution can map two different
initial states to the same final state. The observer in the final state
thus
cannot know that information really has been
Jesse Mazer:
I have a vague memory that there was some result showing the algorithmic
complexity of a string shouldn't depend too strongly on the details of the
Turing machine--that it would only differ by some constant amount for any
two different machines, maybe? Does this ring a bell with
If we consider our observable universe as a computation, it's rather
atypical in that it doesn't seem to make use of the erase operation (or
other any operation that irreversibly erases information). The second law of
thermodynamics is a consequence of this. In order to forget anything
Is there a difference between physical existence and mathematical existence?
I suggest thinking about this problem from a different angle.
Consider a mathematical substructure as a rational decision maker. It seems
to me that making a decision ideally would consist of the following steps:
1.
Brent Meeker wrote:
This seems to assume a dualism in which you are both a mathematical
structure
and at also stand outside the structure caring and making decisions.
What makes you say stand outside the structure? I'd say instead that I am
a mathematical structure that cares and makes
The list move is now complete. Please start sending your posts to the new
address: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Also, the list will now be
archived at both http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list and
http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/.
For those of you using Procmail to
ng machine in algorithmic information theory. Our aesthetic
choices can therefore be encoded into this free parameter.
- Original Message -
From:
Kim
Jones
To: Wei Dai
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 10:40
PM
Subject: Re: Multivers
Hal wrote:
I also get the impression that Susskind's
attempts to bring "disreputable" multiverse models into "holy" string
theory is more likely to kill string theory than to rehabilitate
multiverses. Perhaps I am getting a biased view by only reading
this one blog, which opposes string
I'm not sure what's going on with escribe.com, but there's a second archive
at http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list%40eskimo.com/.
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 9:14 PM
Subject: archive?
Hal Finney wrote:
No doubt this is true. But there are still two somewhat-related problems.
One is, you can go back in time to the first replicator on earth, and
think of its evolution over the ages as a learning process. During this
time it learned this intuitive physics, i.e. mathematics and
Couple of comments to the post below.
1. P=?NP is a purely mathematical problem, whereas the existence of an HPO
box is an emperical matter. If we had access to a purported HPO box while
P=?NP is still unsolved, we can use the box to exhaustively search for
proofs of either P=NP or PNP.
2. I
Correct me if wrong, but isn't the halting
problem only undecidable when the length of the program is
unbounded? Wouldn't the AI assign non-zero probability to a machine
that solved the halting problem for programs up to size S? (S is the
number of stars in the sky, grains of sand, atoms
On Tue, Apr 20, 2004 at 12:42:16PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
One thing I've never understood about this approach is exactly how a
computation is considered to be a set. Take a 1D cellular automaton
for example as a simple computational model, with a specified set of
rules and particular
This is an imaginary conversation between me and a Bayesian. His answers
are in parenthesis. Do you find this line of argument convincing?
Consider all possible worlds consistent with your memories and current
experiences. In other words, all possible worlds that contain at least one
On Tue, Feb 03, 2004 at 02:55:53PM -0800, Pete Carlton wrote:
But even this goes way out in front of what we can possibly know. You
say we have no idea what these feelings are like to experience--but why
should we assume we even are entitled to ask this question?
Here's my basic philosophy:
On Thu, Jan 29, 2004 at 11:33:15AM -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
What about arguments that attempt to estimate the fraction of observers
who are in simulations versus in base realities, such as Nick Bostrom's
Simulation Argument, www.simulation-argument.com?
Are you saying that such arguments are
On Sat, Jan 24, 2004 at 11:49:09PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
But measures aren't just about making decisions about what to *do*, the main
argument for a single objective measure is that such a measure could make
predictions about what we *see*, like why we see regular laws of physics and
On Sun, Jan 25, 2004 at 09:51:47AM -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
But we can solve this conundrum while retaining symmetry. Rationality
should demand allegience to the observed measure. It is irrational to
cling to a measure which has been rejected repeatedly by observations.
If classical
On Sun, Jan 25, 2004 at 03:41:55AM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Do you think that by choosing a
different measure, you could change the actual first-person probabilities of
different experiences? Or do you reject the idea of continuity of
consciousness and first-person probabilities in the
On Fri, Jan 23, 2004 at 09:04:20PM -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
Do you think it would come out differently with a universal distribution?
There are an infinite number of universal distributions. Some of them
assign greater probability to even integers, some of them assign greater
probability to
These books have been mentioned on the list before, but I'm recommending
them again because a lot of new members have joined since we last talked
about them. To motivate you to read these books, I've given some questions
that each book helps answer or provide the necessary background knowledge
to
I have to say that I sympathize with Caesar, but my position is slightly
different. I think there is a possibility that that objective morality
does exist, but we're simply too stupid to realize what it is. Therefore
we should try to improve our intelligence, through intelligence
amplication, or
On Sun, Jan 25, 2004 at 01:01:42AM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If I stop with (a) above, I am simply
saying that this is how I feel about suffering, and this feeling is not
contingent on the state of affairs in any actual or possible world [there, I
got it in!].
(a) as stated is ill
On Sat, Jan 24, 2004 at 12:21:40PM -0800, Eric Hawthorne wrote:
Can you explain briefly why the choice of measure is subjective? I
haven't read any of the
books you mentioned (will try to get to them) but am familiar with
computability theory
and decision theory.
Since you do not mention
The latter two papers can be found on JSTOR. I've placed copies at
http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/Many_Minds.pdf
http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/Many_Minds_Replies.pdf
The first paper doesn't seem to be online anywhere. There's an online
archive for Synthese at
On Sun, Jan 11, 2004 at 09:57:18AM -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
[...] That is
(turning to the Schmidhuber interpretation) it must be much simpler
to write a program that just barely allows for the possibility of life
than to write one which makes it easy. This is a prediction of the AUH,
and
On Tue, Jan 06, 2004 at 05:32:05PM +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
Many other way of simulating the universe could be considered like
for instance a 4D mesh (if we simplify by considering only general
relativity; there is no reason for the approach not being possible in
an even more general way)
On Wed, Nov 12, 2003 at 04:34:27AM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Applied to quantum immortality, this anticipatory idea suggests it would
not be as if the universe is allowing events to go any which way right up
until something is about to kill me, and then it steps in with some
miraculous
Apparenly the mailing list software does not like unsubscribe in the
subject field. It thinks you're mistakenly sending an unsubscribe request
to the list address instead of the request address.
Thanks for pointing out the typo on the web page. I've fixed it now.
- Forwarded message -
But in fact, the only thing that privileges the set of all
computational operations that we see in nature, is that they are instantiated by
the laws of physics.
I would dispute this. The set of computable operations may also be
privileged in that only a universe with laws of physics that
On Wed, Jan 08, 2003 at 04:07:47PM -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
How could we go about modelling a universe like this?
A mathematical model should be straightforward. For a computational model,
consider a program that takes an infinitely long string as input, which it
interprets as the description
On Tue, Jan 14, 2003 at 02:45:15PM -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
Another angle on this argument takes an even broader view. Let us
consider all observer-moments in the multiverse. By eliminating those
observer-moments which have a negative quality of life, we improve
On Tue, Jan 14, 2003 at 11:20:26AM -0800, Tim May wrote:
The point here is that rational decision makers should choose actions
on the basis of their _efficacy in bringing out desirable results_
rather than their auspiciousness as harbingers of these results.
(p. 150, The Foundations of
On Fri, Jan 10, 2003 at 08:54:38PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
But in this, the only universe I will ever, ever have contact with, I
optimize as best I can. And I assume all the myriad mes are doing the
same in their universes, forever disconnected from mine.
You're taking the question too
Continuing with my last post...
On Fri, Jan 10, 2003 at 08:54:38PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
Why would there be any reason to try to maximize the utility of this
big picture?
For those of us who don't even strive for the greatest good for the
greatest number in a single-branch universe, why
This is a test. Duraid, please allow this post to go through to your
subscribers. Once I confirm this works, I'll update the everything-list
web page to add a link to your list page.
To clarify, this list is not being moderated. Every post sent by a
subscriber to [EMAIL PROTECTED] will go through and be reflected
to all subscribers. It will then be forwarded to Duraid's lotsofthings
mailing list, where Duraid will select the ones he considers of high
quality and send them
On Fri, Jan 03, 2003 at 04:48:03PM +1100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Everyone: Why am I posting _this_ rant to the list, I hear you ask? To
advertise another list, lotsofthings. It's intended to be a moderated
everything-list. Please visit
http://list.infiniteloop.ca/listinfo/lotsofthings for
On Thu, Dec 26, 2002 at 08:21:38PM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Forgive me if my writting gave you that opinion. I meant to imply that
any mind, including that of a bat, is quantum mechanical and not classical
in its nature. My ideas follow the implications of Hitoshi Kitada's theory
of
On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 04:00:07PM +0100, Marchal Bruno wrote:
Have you read the revisited paper by Wallace on Everett/decision
theory? Quite interesting imo, and relevant for some discussion,
about MWI and decision theory we have had on this list.
On Fri, Sep 27, 2002 at 11:53:10PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
After discussing the idea of QS with their dear friend Mercutio, Romeo
and Juliet decide to go ahead with the project. Mercutio design the
machine and under his instruction, Balthasar, Romeo's loyal servant,
builds a QS
On Thu, Sep 26, 2002 at 02:58:57PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Originally the passage from the first person to the first person plural was
done in reaction to my ex-boss wanting an explanation of the comp
indeterminacy in term of betting games.
What do you mean by this? Explanation or
On Tue, Sep 24, 2002 at 12:18:36PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You are right. But this is a reason for not considering classical *second*
order logic as logic. Higher order logic remains logic when some
constructive assumption are made, like working in intuitionist logic.
A second order
On Tue, Sep 24, 2002 at 03:20:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I mentioned Deutsch for his account of time in term of parallel universes.
I don't remember if Deutsch deduced this explicitly from relativity.
(I lend his book so I cannot verify now).
I was just doing the following caricatural
On Wed, Sep 25, 2002 at 12:02:20PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just to tell you that the Joyce book you refer to us is indeed
interesting and could motivate for mathematical tools common in decision
theory, philosophical logic, and theories related to the machine interview
I am engaged in.
I
On Sat, Sep 21, 2002 at 11:50:20PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
I was not aware that 2nd-order logic precluded independent
propositions. Is this true whatever the axioms and rules of
inference?
It depends on the axioms, and the semantic rules (not rules of inference
which is a deductive
On Sat, Sep 21, 2002 at 09:20:26PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
For those of you who are familiar with Max Tegmark's TOE, could someone tell
me whether Georg Cantor's Absolute Infinity, Absolute Maximum or Absolute
Infinite Collections represent mathematical structures and, therefore
On Sat, Sep 21, 2002 at 10:26:45PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't see how this follows. If you have a set of axioms, and
rules of inference, then (per Godel) there are undecidable
propositions. One of these may be added as an axiom and the
system will still be consistent. This will
On Thu, Sep 05, 2002 at 12:08:39PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This comes from the fact that MWI is explained most of the time
in the context of non relativistic QM (which assumes time and space).
But this problem disappear once you take into account the
space time structure of relativistic
On Thu, Sep 05, 2002 at 07:32:49PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
This was an interesting paper but unfortunately the key point seemed
to pass by without proof. On page 5, the proposal is to use entangled
particles to try to send a signal by measuring at one end in a sequence
of different bases
On Mon, Sep 02, 2002 at 12:51:09PM +1000, Russell Standish wrote:
This set of all descriptions is the Schmidhuber approach, although he
later muddies the water a bit by postulating that this set is generated
by a machine with resource constraints (we could call this Schmidhuber
II :). This
On Wed, Sep 04, 2002 at 10:48:38AM -0700, Tim May wrote:
And, putting in a plug for modal/topos logic, the essence of nearly
every interpretation, whether MWI or Copenhagen or even Newtonian, is
that observers at time t are faced with unknowable and branching
futures.
How useful is modal
Thank you for the explanation on S4, IL, and CL. I'm interested in
more details, but rather than bombarding you with endless questions, can
you suggest a book on this topic? Something that talks about
what you just did, but in more detail?
Unfortunately I'm still not able to understand much
On Sat, Aug 17, 2002 at 04:55:59PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think what the paper says is that when matter/energy have
thinned out enough so that we have essentially empty space
again, a de Sitter universe, a vacuum fluctuation can start
a new universe.
You're not understanding the paper
I don't know why Nick hasn't told us about his new book. I just found out
about it on his web site:
Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy
Nick Bostrom, Routledge, New York, July 2002
There are some free sample chapters at
- Forwarded message from Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2002 13:28:43 -0700
From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Nature Article
On Thu, Aug 15, 2002 at 12:45:17AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Dyson, L., Kleban, M. Susskind, L. Disturbing
On Thu, Aug 15, 2002 at 11:28:28PM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:
I think that the difference is that invoking the SIA does not affect the
conclusion of the paper.
Why do you say that? I think SIA affects the conclusion of the paper the
same way it affects the Doomsday argument.
It's kind of
On Fri, Aug 16, 2002 at 12:26:10AM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:
I haven't read the paper in detail, so I could be wrong. Consider the two
alternatives:
1) true cosmological constant
2) no true cosmological constant
We also assume SIA. Is it the case that there are much fewer observers in
On Wed, Aug 14, 2002 at 04:38:45PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Your general question was Why using modal logic when
quantifying on worlds is enough. My basic answer was
that Kripke's possible world semantics works only on a
subset of the possible modal logics.
Let me generalize my question
Tim, I think I'm starting to understand what you're saying. However, it
still seems that anything you can do with intuitionistic logic, toposes,
etc., can also be done with classical logic and set theory. (I'm not
confident about this, but see my previous post in reponse to Bruno.) Maybe
it's not
On Tue, Aug 13, 2002 at 10:08:50AM -0700, Tim May wrote:
* Because toposes are essentially mathematical universes in which
various bits and pieces of mathematics can be assumed. A topos in which
Euclid's Fifth Postulate is true, and many in which it is not. A topos
where all functions are
On Tue, Aug 13, 2002 at 03:51:49PM -0700, Tim May wrote:
I also don't know what your goals are, despite reading many of your
posts. If, for example, you are looking for tools to understand a
possible multiverse, or how multiverses in general might be constructed,
I'm not at all sure any
According to possible world semantics, it's necessary that P means that
P is true in all worlds accessible from this one. Different modal logics
correspond to different restrictions on the accessibility relation. Before
the invention of possible world semantics, people argued about which modal
Tim, I'm afraid I still don't understand you.
On Mon, Aug 12, 2002 at 06:00:26PM -0700, Tim May wrote:
It is possible that WWIII will happen before the end of this year. In
one possible world, A, many things are one way...burned, melted,
destroyed, etc. In another possible world, B, things
On Sun, Jul 07, 2002 at 11:25:28AM -0700, Tim May wrote:
http://www.math.uu.se/~palmgren/topos-eng.html
Topos Theory, spring term 1999
A graduate course (6 course points) in mathematical logic.
Topos theory grew
Here's my response to the rest of your post. I think you're right that
with two identical deterministic computations, there is no
need to apply game theory. I think in that case you should consider
yourself to be both of them. It would not work to think there's 50% chance
you're one and 50%
On Tue, Jul 16, 2002 at 06:58:50PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
I am confused about the relation of S to A and B. Did S go into a
copying machine and get two copies, A and B made, in addition to S?
And now A and B are deciding what S will win?
Yes, and yes.
Why should they care? If S gets a
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