Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: > >>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >> >>>Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... >>> >>>A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient >>>to explain the world. QED. > > > This has to be a non-mathematical property because it is contingent, > and all mathematical > truth is necessary. It is necessairly true *given the axioms*. Suppose there is an axiom that picks out some worlds as real. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Georges Quénot wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > >> What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object > >> real and others abstract... > > > > A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient > > to explain the world. QED. This has to be a non-mathematical property because it is contingent, and all mathematical truth is necessary. > This looks *very* similar to; > > ]] What properties of the mind/brain would render only one (type of) > ]] material object conscious and others not... > ] > ] A non-material property. Hence matter alone is not sufficient > ] to explain the mind. QED. That is assumed arbitrarily. > Georges --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Brent Meeker wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > ... > > Errmm..but if the universe is the set of all real > > things, then they all share the "property" of realness. > > Perhaps you mean: what is the difference between real > > things and unreal things? Well, the difference is that > > real things have properties and unreal things don't. > > Thus existence is not an ordinary propery, but what > > follows from the existence of any other property. > > This doesn't help much though because "property" is no better defined than > "real". Does 7 have the property of being prime? Does that make 7 "real"? > If > definitions are to identify what is "real" then I think they need to be > grounded > ostensively or operationally - logic can only impose consistency on concepts; > it > can't create things out of words. Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and unreal things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness then is not a real property. > Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Georges Quénot wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is > > mathematical, > > I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that > you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to > respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-) > adopt it either. > > But can you make a difference between adopting it and > being able to consider that it might make sense (whether > it is true or not) and conduct (or follow) reflections > in a context in which it would be conjectured as true? I don't think Mathematical Monism makes sense (to be precise it is either incoherent, in asserting that only some mathematical objects exist, or inconsistent with observation in asserting that they all do).. > > [...] Maps are isomorphic to > > territories, but are not territories. > > Well. Territories *are* maps. Just a very specific type > of map but maps anyway. err...no they are not. You can't grow potatoes in a map of a farm. > Identity is just an isomorphism > among possibly many others. All identity relations are isomorphisms as well. Not all isomporhisms are identity relations. > The territory can be the map > and indeed vice versa. You can't fold up the farm and put it in your pocket. > Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... > Errmm..but if the universe is the set of all real > things, then they all share the "property" of realness. > Perhaps you mean: what is the difference between real > things and unreal things? Well, the difference is that > real things have properties and unreal things don't. > Thus existence is not an ordinary propery, but what > follows from the existence of any other property. This doesn't help much though because "property" is no better defined than "real". Does 7 have the property of being prime? Does that make 7 "real"? If definitions are to identify what is "real" then I think they need to be grounded ostensively or operationally - logic can only impose consistency on concepts; it can't create things out of words. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
John M wrote: > > [...] > Don't be a sourpus, I was not attacking YOU. Well. I do not know exactly why I felt concerned. I probably missed your point. > [...] > By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such things > into my mind after my decade under nazis and two under > commis, now 3+ in the (hypocritical) US 'free' speach! Well. OK Again. But what was your point then? Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is > mathematical, I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-) adopt it either. But can you make a difference between adopting it and being able to consider that it might make sense (whether it is true or not) and conduct (or follow) reflections in a context in which it would be conjectured as true? > [...] Maps are isomorphic to > territories, but are not territories. Well. Territories *are* maps. Just a very specific type of map but maps anyway. Identity is just an isomorphism among possibly many others. The territory can be the map and indeed vice versa. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Georges Quénot wrote: > >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >>> Georges Quenot wrote: >>> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract." is what I called a dualist view. >>> Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances. >>> Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical >>> realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism. >> This *splits* "things" into "realness" and "abstractedness". > > No abstract "objects" aren't real things at all. Well... I am not sure I should insist. I do not want to force you to believe or consider something you are not willing to believe or consider. The question is not whether they are real things or not. It is whether they are things or not. Once they are things, you have to decide how many types of things there must be. You might well feel otherwise but, for me, *they are not nothing*. Just tell me: do you consider "natural numbers" as something, as nothing, as "something" that would neither be something nor nothing, or as "anything else" (please explain)? Please answer without considering whether they are "real" or not, just whether thet are something, nothing, ... *Then* we can discuss *which type of* "thing" (or whatever) they might be. > There is only > one kind of existing thing, ie real, physical things. You should clarify: do you mean existing, real or physical? Which is which and on which ground which is a specific of (or identical to) which? How do you define any of them? >> It postulates "material substance" > > yes, but only material substance. Hence it is monism, not dualism. No, this is "material substance" besides "abstract objetcs". You do split things between "material" and "immaterial". >> just as classical dualism >> postulates a "spiritual substance" > > as well as a material substance. Yes and you do oppose material (real) things to immaterial (abstract) ones. >> (and just as once vitalism >> postulated a "living substance"). >> >> Last but not least: you are unable to explain what you mean >> bt "real" except by a tautology or via a reference to common >> sense that no longer appears to be consensual. > > I am not sure what you mean by "non-consensual". Everyone believes > that sticks and stones and what they had for breakfast are real. Not everyone believe that and that is not a joke. But the main point is that not everybody gives the same meaning to "real". I guarantee you that there are people (including me) that do not feel things as you do in this matters (not to say that something must be wrong either way, only that several distinct and incompatible views actually coexist). Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that when saying "This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical object." Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while when saying "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract." >>> Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you >>> ever seen the number 3? >> Have you ever seen a single photon? Or even an electron? > > They can be detected by apropriate instrumentation. This might be more complicated. Looking at "them" can significantly change them. They might also be an abstraction. They can hardly be "objects" in the common sense of the word. >> Do you descend from the ape by your father or by your mother? >> :-) > >> You may find the monist idea crazy or a nonsense but it does >> not (completely) appear as such to everybody. > > The Devil is in the details. I await mathematical-monist accounts of > consciousness, causality and time. Don't be so impatient. Mankind has been awaiting for thousands of years an account of how living beings can have appeared in an inert world and though the account is now about a century and a half old it still did not make it to a significant portion of mankind (if not the majority). I am also awaiting for a physical-monist account of how consciousness can arise in living beings. This might take a few centuries to come. What is astounding is that it could emerge just through matter activity. Going from matter to consciousness is the hardest part for me. Once given, going from mathematics to physics is a fascinating idea but it does not make more or less mysterious the emergence of consciousness. Causality and time in a physical-monist view do not appear so mysterious to me. It does not appear more mysterious in a mathematical-monist view. I once suggested that what could make our universe special and "exist more" than others is that it can be *chosen* among a set of universe following the same set of rules by adding one specific rule that would specify that the block universe (ie seen as a spatiotemporal object) is the one which is as "more ordered on one (temporal) side
Fw: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > "Hal Finney" wrote:> The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem.> When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7.> But they are not really typical of numbers. Even restricting ourselves to> the integers, the information content of the "average" number is enormous;> by some reasoning, infinite. Most numbers are a lot bigger than 2 or 7!> They are big enough to hold all of the information in our whole universe;> indeed, all of the information in virtually every possible variant of our> universe. A single number can (in some sense) hold this much information.How ? Surely this claim needs justification! ~ The single number can be of infinite length, with infinite digits, and can therefore contain unlimited information. One could compare the single number to a tape to a Universal Turing Machine. Granted, the UTM needs a head and a program to read the tape, so the tape by itself is not sufficient to hold information. Norman ` --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
--- Georges Quenot <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > John M a écrit : > > > > to more recent posts: > > > > 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? > > I am not sure to understand what you mean by "REAL" > hereSKIP... Arguments are just arguments. (See my post to Bruno: I don't hold Wittgenstein higher than Bruno.) > > > 2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive > for > > ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession? > > Certainly not. I am not sure that "reasonable or > rational > thinking" is something very well defined either. Try the opposite: unreasonable and irrational, then you may have an idea what I aimed at. > On my side, I often mention that I am considering and > presenting > *conjectures* or *speculations*. I do not require > anybody > to believe them or even to find sense in them (I > find sense > in them but I am not sure I need to believe them > anyway). We agree. > > > or is it an elitist heaughtiness to look down to > all, > > who do not share such obsession? How about vice > versa? > > I certainly do not think that my way of thinking or > of seeing/understanding things is superior ... Don't be a sourpus, I swas not attacking YOU. > > > 3. Suppose the 'numbers based' worldview gains > > universal approval (by ~3006?) > > I would say "nope". Even by 3006. And I don't worry > at > all about that. > > > -what will that help in the betterment of the > world? > > I don't know. In case it would not, are you > suggesting we'd > better refrain using our freedom of thinking and > freedom of > expression when it comes to such speculations? (that > must be > what I meant when I mentionned that a few people are > likely to consider such way of thinking asdangerous). > > > or even in the betterment of human thinking? > > I can't figure on which groud one could say that > some human thinking would be better than another. > > > Or even of more civil general life- conditions? > > Again I don't know and again, in case it would not, > are you > suggesting we'd better refrain using our freedom of > thinking > and freedom of expression when it comes to such > speculations? By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such things into my mind after my decade under nazis and two under commis, now 3+ in the (hypocritical) US 'free' speach! > > Georges. > John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
--- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Le 17-mars-06, à 13:42, John M a écrit : > > > > > to more recent posts: > > > > 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? > >(Our stupidity may allow also all the bad things > >that "happen".) > > There is no REAL argument against solipsism. > Nevertheless it is false, imo. In my opinion, too, but it is irrelevant. If I really CANNOT know, how can I trust my opinion or even yours, who may be only the figment of my solipsism? "Nevertheless" is no better argument than "I think...". Worthless. > > So solipsism is false but irrefutable, like > "inconsistency" in Pean > Arithmetic. By this I mean you can add, to > consistent formal theory of > number as new axiom the axiom saying that the theory > is inconsistent. Peano was a wise man, for sure, I don't know much about him or his math. BUT I dislike axioms, which are the epitomes of our ignorance - like dogmata - to believe. > > By Godel you will get a consistent theory. but that > new theory will be > unsound, it will proves the false proposition that > the older theory is > inconsistant, which it is not (by definition here). > > Amazing. Yes. Godel, lob's theorem are amazing. They > show that in all > number theories, there are plenty of non provable > truth and irrefutable falsities. I would not be so happy with Goedel and Loeb for such characterization. It may point to their weaknesses. Of course their worshipers assign those to their glory as "amazing" rather than "questionable weak points". The inconsistencies and uncertainties do not strengthen the believability of a theory in my scrutinizing opinion. > > > > > 2.Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for > > ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession? > > or is it an elitist heaughtiness to look down to > > all others, who do not share such obsession? - How > > about vice versa? > > > > 3. Suppose the 'numbers based' worldview gains > > universal approval (by ~3006?) - what will that > help > > in the betterment of the world? or even in the > > betterment of human thinking? Or even of more > > civil general life- conditions? > > > My hope is that the humans will be able to preserve > earth for the > non-computationalist people. A sort of carbon-life > museum. > The "number obsessive" people will spread everywhere > else, in the > multimultimulti ... verse. > > But maybe a thorough computationalist (a la > Plotinus) will know such a > spreading is vain. A buddhist could perhaps be right > by thinking that > "artificial immortality" is just a way to perpetuate > the Samsara, that > is our terrestrial conditions, and that would let us > never getting [into?] the Nirvana! Bruno, you used an expression lately, which is instrumental in my "narrative" world-view to make the 'origin' of this universe compatible to human logic: you said "Inside View" (of this universe). I made this a major point: the qualia of the 'knot' in the invariant, infinitely symmetrical plenitude - which promted this unverse - control the quality of it, with the ideas that can evolve: space/time/logic/life/etc. So I would not 'bank' on 'spreading' definitely human features into other universes with different qualia to observe. "My" multiverse is multifaceted, (maybe?) of different ideational compositions. I am with your Buddhist friends, not necessarily 'terrestrial', but our universe bound (not exclusive) exclusivity. I still consider numbers and math (although did not get any hint on 'math construct' vs. 'math theories') a way of human thinking, not eclusively universal - maybe not universally exclusive. No opposition here, I am just agnostic. I don't close my possibilities before I reach omniscience. (Not before next weekend's philosophy). > > Bruno > Thanks for the reflection: John > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 17-mars-06, à 01:31, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > >>>Hmmm... okay, so last questions what is an abstract thing ? what does >>>it means >>>to be abstract ? what render a thing real ? what does it means for it >>>to be >>>real ? what does it means to be real ? >> >>If you kick it, it kicks back. >> --- Vic Stenger, after Samuel Johnson > > > But, as David Deutsch explains in its FOR book, mathematical reality > kicks back too. How so?...only figuratively? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > To brent... (sorry I do not have the mail in my mailbox to reply to it). > > So reality is what kicks back... Ok, but that was not the question (really), > I > want to know what distinction you do between abstract thing and real thing ? > > You would say "real things are things when throw at you, hurt you ?" or > something similar ;) but I'd say (even for the kicks back) I remember dream > where I was hurt and remember clearly feeling pain when it happened in my > dream, I could still feel a remembered pain when I woke up, would you say my > dream was real then ? > > Regards, > > Quentin No. Although, I don't necessarily agree with Vic. My point was that "real" is an adjective we invented to describe things. We don't always use it consistently, but it's our concept. Vic makes a model of the world and in his model he calls "real" that which kicks back when you kick it. You can't kick your dream, so even if it kicked you it's not real...in Vic's model. I don't think there's any sense in asking, "What's *really* real?" It's a question of models and how well they explain and predict our experience. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Solipsism (was: Numbers)
--- Hal Finney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > John M writes: > > 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? > > Let me express how solipsism can be analyzed in the > model where physical > reality is part of mathematical reality. > > Let us adopt Bruno's UDA perspective: the Universal > Dovetailer (UD) > is an abstract machine that runs all possible > computer programs. And so on, a beautiful essay I would mostly agree with if I hadn't asked the above question. I do not expand into the "if not" (if 'reality' (whatever it is) is NOT part of mathematical reality (whatever THAT may be, any one of the two subsytems of the other). I just asked to 'verify' Bruno, the ideas, you, me, beyond a solipstick (OOPS wrong spelling) imagination. Once you are WITHIN my solipsism, you can say anything you are still in it. Iimagine UDA, the possible or not computer programs, etc. I asked how can such a craze be broken? (Not circularly, from inside the craze - of course). So my question stands in spite of your brilliant reply. John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Solipsism (was: Numbers)
John M writes: > 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? Let me express how solipsism can be analyzed in the model where physical reality is part of mathematical reality. Let us adopt Bruno's UDA perspective: the Universal Dovetailer (UD) is an abstract machine that runs all possible computer programs. In this way it creates all possible universes, and more... it creates all possible information objects: all of mathematics, logic, all written texts, everything. In particular it creates the information patterns of conscious entities like you and me. Let us assume that this in fact represents the reality of the multiverse, that what we perceive and experience is all caused by the operation of the UD, when it creates information patterns that correspond to those experienes. I know that many people here reject this hypothesis, but let us follow it forward to see what it can say about solipsism. The first thing to notice is that within the UD, each person exists more than once. There are many programs that include a particular information pattern in their output, in fact an infinite number of programs. Some of those programs will look much like the kind of model a physicist might construct for a "theory of everything". It would include the physical laws and initial conditions that define our universe. Running that program forward would create the entire history of our universe, including the experiences of all of its inhabitants. However there are other kinds of programs that would also create the patterns of our conscious experiences. Some might do it purely by random chance: they might produce enormous outputs and somewhere buried in there will be the pattern that corresponds to a portion of our experience. Others would include bizarre universes such as one inhabited by aliens who create computer simulations of other kinds of beings, and who have created us. Yet another example would be a universe composed only of one person, with all that is outside of him being supplied by the computer program, perhaps from some kind of table of sensory impressions, so that only he is real within that universe. Solipsism is the doctrine that only I exist, that everything else is an illusion. In the context of the platonic multiverse, it would correspond to that last case: a portion of the UD program where only the one person is in his universe, and nothing else in the universe is real. So this raises the question: given that I exist multiple times within the UD structure, and given that in some of them the universe I see around me is real and in some of them it is an illusion, which is the reality for me? In which one do I actually exist? I believe Bruno argues, and I agree, that this is a meaningless question. You exist in all of them. There is no single instance of your information pattern which is "really you". Your consciousness spans all of the places in the UD where it is instantiated. However, there is a related question which is relevant: what will happen next? If some of your consciousness is in the real universe, and some of it is in universes where you are an alien simulation, some in a universe where it is a random fluctuation, and some in a universe where you are all there is, how can you make a prediction about the future? In the random universe you would expect to disintegrate into chaos. In the aliens, they might open up the simulation and start talking to you. In the solipsism case, various bizarre things might happen. And in the "plain vanilla" universe, you would expect things to go along pretty much as you remember them. Here is where I may depart from Bruno, although I am not sure. I argue that you can in fact set up a probability distribution over all of the places in the UD where your mind exists, and it is based roughly on the size of the part of the UD program that creates that information pattern. Recall that the UD in effect runs all programs at once. But some programs are shorter than others. I use the notion of algorithmic complexity and the associated measure, which is called the Universal Distribution (an unfortunate collision of the UD acronym). Basically this says that the measure of the output of a given UD program of n bits is 1/2^n. This gives us a probability distribution over all the places our minds are implemented, such that the shortest program(s) get the bulk of the probability. This has relationships to such traditional notions as Occam's Razor, as Russell Standish has emphasized. Just as we say that the simplest explanation for our observations is likely to be correct, so we can say that the simplest program which creates our experiences is likely to be the one that governs what will happen next. In principle, it should become possible eventually to turn this reasoning into at least rough quantitative form. We will eventually have a complete model for our physical universe, so we can compute its measure and determine how big a contribu
Re: Numbers
Georges Quénot wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Georges Quenot wrote:
> >> Norman Samish wrote:
> >
> >>> Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could call
> >>> it "God." I can think of no possibility other than "It was always
> >>> there,"
> >>> and eternal existence is a concept I can't imagine. Are there any other
> >>> possibilities?
> >> I think there is another possibility. I tried to explain it
> >> in my exchanges with John. It relies on several speculations
> >> or conjectures:
> >>
> >> - Mathematical objects exist by themeslves ("They were
> >>(or: are, intemporal) always there"),
> >> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
> >> - Perception of existence is an internal property of the
> >>multiverse (mind emerges from matter activity),
> >
> > Given your commitment below, you also need to suppose
> > that perception is an internal property of maths.
>
> This logically comes with, yes. If consciousness is reduced
> (via biology and chemistry) to physics (monism 1) and physics
> is reduced to mathematics (monism 2), indeed consciousness
> is reduced to mathematics.
>
> >> - Mathematical existence and physical existence are the
> >>same ("there is no need that something special be inside
> >>particles", the contrary is an unnecessary and useless
> >>dualism, "the fire *is* in the equations").
> >
> > That can only be the case if the multiverse is isomporphic to
> > *every* mathematical object and not just one.
>
> Yes. The basic idea is that there is no difference between
> mathematical existence and physical existence. And this is
> indeed not specific to any particular mathematical object.
>
> > If it is only
> > isomorphic to some mathematical objects, that *is* the difference
> > between physical and mathematical existence.
>
> No. The idea is that *every* class of objects isomorph one
> to each other also have physical existence. Some have
> perception as an internal property and some have not (this
> does not need to be binary nor even one-dimensional).
>
> >> Some details and some (weak) arguments can be found in my
> >> recent posts to this group. Some papers from Max Tegmark
> >> are also relevant:
> >>
> >>http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe_frames.html
> >>http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.pdf
> >>http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/multiverse.pdf
> >>
> >> Georges.
>
> > [...]
> > Georges Quenot wrote:
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> [...]
> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
> >>> What do you mean? I guess this: The multiverse is not a mathematical
> >>> object, but still is describable by a mathematical object.
> >> No. I mean that there is a one to one correspondance between
> >> the "components" of the multiverse and those of a particular
> >> mathematical object and that this correspondance also maps the
> >> "internal structures" of the multiverse with those of this
> >> mathematical object. "Components" and "internal structures"
> >> should not be understood here as atoms or people or the like
> >> but only "at the most primitive level".
> >
> > That is the standard meaning of isomorphic.
>
> Yes. I explained it because this did not seem consistent
> with what Bruno said.
>
> > And if A isomorphic
> > to B, that does not mean that A is the same thing as B or
> > even the same kind of thing.
>
> Yes and no. For instance, natural numbers as seen as a
> subset of real numbers may be considered as different
> to "basic" natural numbers (for instance, considering
> the way real numbers are "built" from natural numbers).
> But as long as only the properties of natural numbers
> are considered they cannot be distinguished (and one
> could even "build" a new set of real numbers from them
> and that set would be the set of real numbers as long
> as the properties of real numbers wil be considered).
Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
mathematical, I am no going to be persuaded that what
is true of mathematical isomorphism. Maps are isomorphic to
territories, but are not territories.
> Many sets of natural numbers (and of real numbers) can
> be thought of but what "really are" natural numbers
> or (real numbers) has nothing to do with the details
> that could make them appear different. These details
> are completely irrelevant to (and have no effect at all
> on) the way they "behave" as natural numbers. In order
> to identify or exhibit any difference between the
> elements of the class, we need to look at properties
> that are not shared in the class. Now, if we consider
> the universe/multiverse as a part of such a class, we
> would also have to look at properties outside of the
> class. But no such properties can be accessed from the
> inside of the universe.
No properties of actually existing things can be
accesed from our universe. However that may
just mean that there are no actually existing things
outside our universe; what is special
Re: Numbers
Le 17-mars-06, à 13:42, John M a écrit : > > to more recent posts: > > 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our > stupidity may allow also all the bad things that > "happen".) There is no REAL argument against solipsism. Nevertheless it is false, imo. So solipsism is false but irrefutable, like "inconsistency" in Pean Arithmetic. By this I mean you can add, to consistent formal theory of number as new axiom the axiom saying that the theory is inconsistent. By Godel you will get a consistent theory. but that new theory will be unsound, it will proves the false proposition that the older theory is inconsistant, which it is not (by definition here). Amazing. Yes. Godel, lob's theorem are amazing. They show that in all number theories, there are plenty of non provable truth and irrefutable falsities. > > 2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for > ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession? > or is it an elitist heaughtiness to look down to all, > who do not share such obsession? How about vice versa? > > 3. Suppose the 'numbers based' worldview gains > universal approval (by ~3006?) - what will that help > in the betterment of the world? or even in the > betterment of human thinking? Or even of more civil > general life- conditions? My hope is that the humans will be able to preserve earth for the non-computationalist people. A sort of carbon-life museum. The "number obsessive" people will spread everywhere else, in the multimultimulti ... verse. But maybe a thorough computationalist (a la Plotinus) will know such a spreading is vain. A buddhist could perhaps be right by thinking that "artificial immortality" is just a way to perpetuate the Samsara, that is our terrestrial conditions, and that would let us never getting the Nirvana! Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 17-mars-06, à 06:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Yes, I was assuming that the descriptions "lose information", or generalize, just as "mammal" is a generalization, and just as Bruno's duplication loses information. Otherwise, I would call it a re-representation of *ALL* the details of something, *as seen from a certain perspective*, into another form. I don't think this is possible with physical things in our universe. This is what I was trying to get at. But what is a physical things? Are assuming such things exist at the outset? If we are limiting our discussion to numbers to begin with, then we would have to assume at the outset that the universe is totally representable (not just describable) by numbers in order for the discussion to have any bearing on the final true nature of the universe. I don't assume that. What do you mean by limiting the discussion to numbers? We know today that the realm of numbers (I mean natural numbers) contains many things which is already not representable in term of numbers. For example the notion of true proposition (bearing on numbers) cannot be represented arithmetically. I would say that Godel's theorems demolish all "reductionist" interpretation of what the numbers are capable of. The UDA shows also that if I can be locally coded by a number, then necessarily my observable universe, which emerges from all my possible continuations, will be full of entities which are not codable by numbers. After Godel we know that even if we limit ourselves to numbers at the outset, there is just no complete finite TOE capable of describing all the truth (about numbers). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
"Hal Finney" wrote: > The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem. > When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7. > But they are not really typical of numbers. Even restricting ourselves to > the integers, the information content of the "average" number is enormous; > by some reasoning, infinite. Most numbers are a lot bigger than 2 or 7! > They are big enough to hold all of the information in our whole universe; > indeed, all of the information in virtually every possible variant of our > universe. A single number can (in some sense) hold this much information. How ? Surely this claim needs justification! > On the one hand, we know that the universe is dynamic and ever-changing. > On the other, the four-dimensional block universe is a static object. > The apparent dynamism is seen as something of an illusion. There is > no actual passage of time, rather all moments coexist. The future and > the past are merely relative directions like north or south, relative > to some observer. > > The block universe (or spacetime) is not the only way to look at things, > but it is one valid way, I don't see why it should be *as* valid as views that account for dynamisn, even as a subjective phenomenon. The more a theory explains, the better it is. > and it illustrates that even within a static > object (the block universe) there may be the perception of dynamism from > the inside. How? No-one ever explains this. > The point is, then, that conceivably a seemingly "static" > number of sufficient complexity could have similar internal dynamism. How ? Why should piling on more static structure lead to dynamism ? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: reductionism: please explain
Le 17-mars-06, à 06:47, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal writes: > >> Le 11-mars-06, à 10:59, Georges Quénot wrote (to John): >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Yes also and indeed, the way of thinking I presented >>> fits within a reductionist framework. Nobody is required >>> to adhere to such a framework (and therefore to the way >>> of thinking I presented). If one rejects the reductionist >>> approach, all I can say isn't even worth reading it for >>> him. And, again, all of this is pure speculation. >> >> >> Personally I disagree with any reductionist approach. But, given that >> I >> agree with many of your statement, perhaps we have a "vocabulary" >> problem. >> I do even believe that a thoroughly "scientific attitude" is >> automatically anti-reductionnist, whatever theories are used. Science, >> being modest, just cannot be reductionist(*). >> Even the numbers are nowadays no more completely reductible to any >> "unifying theory". >> Only pseudo-scientist (or some scientist during the week-end) can be >> reductionist. > > I'm afraid I don't understand the version of reductionism to which you > so > strongly object. I guess I react strongly because the comp theory is sometimes confused with reductionist interpretation of it. > Are you perhaps referring to the mistake of trying to > explain too much with too little? Not necessarily. Perhaps. It is more the error of explaining *away*, at the level of the interpretation of some theory. > Or are you referring to what Daniel > Dennett has called "greedy reductionism": where something is not so > much > explained in terms of what it reduces to as dismissed or explained > away, > like saying there is no such thing as mental states because it's all > just > neurophysiology? Ah, you say it! That is certainly a form of reductionism. > Well, it is "all just neurophysiology", in that the > neurophysiology is necessary and sufficient for the mental states. Honestly, I find the expression "neurophysiology is necessary and sufficient for the mental states" rather ambiguous. It can be reductionist (example are given in the writing of Patricia Churchland). John Searle would say the same sentence in a much less reductionist spirit, except that he has some reductionist notion of matter in the background. > The > mental states in this sense can be said to reduce to the underlying > brain > states. OK, but saying is not explaining. According to the explanation given, we could decide if we are lead to a reductionist conception of the mind/brain relation. > But this is not the same as saying that the mental states therefore > do not exist, or are not important. Saying that mental state does not exist is not just a reductionist position, I think it is just wrong. Saying that mental states exist and are "just" brain states is a form of reductionism. It is hard to define "reductionism", but I would say it consists in explaining away problems by imposing some univocal interpretation of a theory. In "consciousness explained" Dennett explains *away* not only consciousness but mainly matter. But his general view on consciousness is not necessarily reductionist per se. Its notion of matter is very reductionist, and from this follows a sort of reductionism in his approach of the whole the mind-body question. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: > This means you miss the point. The only assumption is "comp" by which I > mean the "yes doctor" hypothesis together with Church's thesis and a > minimal amount of arithmetical realism (AR: just the idea that > elementary arithmetical truth is independent of me, you ...This is > different from AR+ which says that only numbers exists). > The assumptions you are mentioning are part of the consequences. We can > try later to isolate the precise step where you think I make those > assumptions. I agree the UDA is not so simple: I introduce > supplementary hypotheses to make the argument simple and modular, and > then, later on, I eliminate those supplementary assumptions. I don't agree. I think you slip from "minds can be implemented on more than one kind of hardware" to "minds do not need any kind of hardware". --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 17-mars-06, à 00:10, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > > Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances. > > This is Descartes' dualism between mind and body. > > > Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical > > realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism. > > > > Well, it is not Descartes' dualism, but it is sometimes called Plato's > dualism, between the observable world and the invisible reality. No it isn't: Plato thought the physical and mathematical realms are both real, and the mathematical is the more real of the two. > Like you I prefer to keep the term of "dualism" for the cartesian one, > especially in the comp-or-weaker frame where the two notions interfere. > > > > > >> Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that > >> when saying "This has to be saying simply that the multiverse > >> IS a mathematical object." Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends > >> the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while > >> when saying "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed > >> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract." > > > > Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you > > ever seen the number 3? > > > Have you ever seen something material? Of course you can tell me: "oh > yes I have just seen a cup of coffee this morning". What makes you so > sure it is material? It is tangible, massive, etc. > We "see" only immaterial pictures, like in dream. No, we see things. We are not a little homunculus sitting inside our own heads. No such being has been detected. > We *infer* "matter", and today both reasonable theories (QM, comp) and > experiments (Aspect for example) put difficulties on the aristotelian > (stuffy) conception of matter. > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Georges Quénot wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > Georges Quenot wrote: > >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > >>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Georges wrote: > > - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, > This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical > object. > Otherwise it is nonsense. > >>> No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects > >>> exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only > >>> isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed > >>> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. > >> That is the question. > >> > >> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the > >> other mathematical objects which are only abstract." is what > >> I called a dualist view. > > > > Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances. > > Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical > > realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism. > > This *splits* "things" into "realness" and "abstractedness". No abstract "objects" aren't real things at all. There is only one kind of existing thing, ie real, physical things. > It postulates "material substance" yes, but only material substance. Hence it is monism, not dualism. > just as classical dualism > postulates a "spiritual substance" as well as a material substance. > (and just as once vitalism > postulated a "living substance"). > > Last but not least: you are unable to explain what you mean > bt "real" except by a tautology or via a reference to common > sense that no longer appears to be consensual. I am not sure what you mean by "non-consensual". Everyone believes that sticks and stones and what they had for breakfast are real. > >> Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that > >> when saying "This has to be saying simply that the multiverse > >> IS a mathematical object." Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends > >> the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while > >> when saying "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed > >> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract." > > > > Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you > > ever seen the number 3? > > Have you ever seen a single photon? Or even an electron? They can be detected by apropriate instrumentation. > Do you descend from the ape by your father or by your mother? > :-) > You may find the monist idea crazy or a nonsense but it does > not (completely) appear as such to everybody. The Devil is in the details. I await mathematical-monist accounts of consciousness, causality and time. > Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 16-mars-06, à 22:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > > Is isomorphism or a one-to-one correspondence a mathematical concept or > > a metamathematical (or metaphysical? another complication in the > > discussion) concept? I take them as mathematical concepts, so that > > speculating about isomorphisms of things like the multiverse is in > > itself assuming that the multiverse is mathematical. I don't think we > > can use the one-to-one correspondence when it comes to metamathematical > > questions like the multiverse (or philosophy of everything), but this > > is simply because I assume that the multiverse (or "everything") is > > metamathematical. > > Metamathematics is a branch of mathematics. It think he meant something outside of mathematics, like Aristotelean matter, rather than metamathematics in the sense of Godel etc. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 16-mars-06, à 23:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > > is it ? we might be able to ground meaning in causal interactions, > > for instance, but can we ground causal interactions in the > > timeless world of maths ? > > I think Hal Finney just gave a nice answer through the notion of block > universe. > I do think physics, in great part, does try (at least) to ground causal > interactions in the timeless world of maths. Well, that is the only tools at its disposal. Arguably, it does not do a good job of capturing the passingness, the dynamism of time. Some would urge us that the timeless Block-Universe is the reality, and our sense of passing time is an illusion. However, if we are to believe in physics then we must believe that consciousness is unmagically generated by a physical brain -- which is as timeless as anything else, if the Block Universe is true. > "Causality" is a very hard and fuzzy notion. It has a very large range > of applications from physics to human responsability. It makes no sense > to take it as primitive. If we can't reduce it to anything else, we have no choice. It may be fuzzy with regard to the tools we are using, but that may be the fault of the tools. > In logic notion of causality can be > axiomatized by some modal correction of material implication: like B(p > -> q), i.e. p implies q in all possible universes. Then we can say > roughly that there are as many causality notion than there are modal > logics. On the other hand it may be 1) a fundamentally mathematical notion.. 2) ...which is nonetheless intrinsic to the world... 3) ...meaning the world is not essentially mathematical. > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 16-mars-06, à 23:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > is it ? we might be able to ground meaning in causal interactions, > for instance, but can we ground causal interactions in the > timeless world of maths ? I think Hal Finney just gave a nice answer through the notion of block universe. I do think physics, in great part, does try (at least) to ground causal interactions in the timeless world of maths. "Causality" is a very hard and fuzzy notion. It has a very large range of applications from physics to human responsability. It makes no sense to take it as primitive. In logic notion of causality can be axiomatized by some modal correction of material implication: like B(p -> q), i.e. p implies q in all possible universes. Then we can say roughly that there are as many causality notion than there are modal logics. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
John M wrote: > > to more recent posts: > > 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our > stupidity may allow also all the bad things that > "happen".) > > 2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for > ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession? > or is it an elitist heaughtiness to look down to all, > who do not share such obsession? How about vice versa? > > 3. Suppose the 'numbers based' worldview gains > universal approval (by ~3006?) - what will that help > in the betterment of the world? or even in the > betterment of human thinking? Or even of more civil > general life- conditions? Just another comment: whether Descates' dualism is true or not and whether Plato's dualism is true or not (I adopt the way Bruno refers to them), this will have no effect at all on the way I will behave with other people. As far as my ethics is concerned, this is completely neutral. I understand that this might not be the case for other people (what they think about these dualisms might bias their ethics) but I do not see how or why one should be more dangerous than the other. Finally I am currently agnostic about both and, for both, my common sense says "dualism" while my Okham's razor says "monism" (and I am not an integrist of Okham's razor). Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 16-mars-06, à 22:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > Is isomorphism or a one-to-one correspondence a mathematical concept or > a metamathematical (or metaphysical? another complication in the > discussion) concept? I take them as mathematical concepts, so that > speculating about isomorphisms of things like the multiverse is in > itself assuming that the multiverse is mathematical. I don't think we > can use the one-to-one correspondence when it comes to metamathematical > questions like the multiverse (or philosophy of everything), but this > is simply because I assume that the multiverse (or "everything") is > metamathematical. Metamathematics is a branch of mathematics. It is the mathematical study of mathematical reasoning, proof, theories, models, etc. It is a part of mathematical logics. It can be identified with recursion theory, computability theory and evn with abstract theoretical computer science. This is of course unlike "metaphysics" which can belongs to physics only with supplementary metaphysical assumptions. I do think there can be isomorphism between a physical structure (if that exists) and a mathematical object. I think, for example, that even a physicalist could say that the quantum physical multiverse is isomorphic (or homomorphic) to the vector space of the solution to the SWE. Also something can be mathematical does not imply that there is a mathematical object associated to it. The simplest example is the whole of mathematics. This is arguably mathematical, but there is no mathematical object capable of representing it. There is only mathematical approximations. Some philosophical assumption can add nuances. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
John M a écrit : > > to more recent posts: > > 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? I am not sure to understand what you mean by "REAL" here. There are arguments against solipsism. Wittgenstein for instance produced some. None of them is lilkey to be decisive. They may work with some people and not with other people. Like any argument about anything if one digs enough I think. Like all the arguments I produced in this discussion. Arguments are just arguments. > 2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for > ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession? Certainly not. I am not sure that "reasonable or rational thinking" is something very well defined either. On my side, I often mention that I am considering and presenting *conjectures* or *speculations*. I do not require anybody to believe them or even to find sense in them (I find sense in them but I am not sure I need to believe them anyway). > or is it an elitist heaughtiness to look down to all, > who do not share such obsession? How about vice versa? I certainly do not think that my way of thinking or of seeing/understanding things is superior in any way to the one or other people. I do not feel obsessed by numbers by the way. I am just considering seriously (I just mean as possibly making sense) the four conjectures I mentionned as well as the associated developments I made. I am very well aware of the fact that all this is likely to appear highly ridiculous to most people and even dangerous to a few people. > 3. Suppose the 'numbers based' worldview gains > universal approval (by ~3006?) I would say "nope". Even by 3006. And I don't worry at all about that. > -what will that help in the betterment of the world? I don't know. In case it would not, are you suggesting we'd better refrain using our freedom of thinking and freedom of expression when it comes to such speculations? (that must be what I meant when I mentionned that a few people are likely to consider such way of thinking as dangerous). > or even in the betterment of human thinking? I can't figure on which groud one could say that some human thinking would be better than another. > Or even of more civil general life- conditions? Again I don't know and again, in case it would not, are you suggesting we'd better refrain using our freedom of thinking and freedom of expression when it comes to such speculations? Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: reductionism: please explain
--- Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Bruno Marchal writes: > > > >Le 11-mars-06, à 10:59, Georges Quénot wrote (to > John): > > > > > > > > > > Yes also and indeed, the way of thinking I > presented > > > fits within a reductionist framework. Nobody is > required > > > to adhere to such a framework (and therefore to > the way > > > of thinking I presented). If one rejects the > reductionist > > > approach, all I can say isn't even worth reading > it for > > > him. And, again, all of this is pure speculation. > > > > > >Personally I disagree with any reductionist > approach. But, given that I > >agree with many of your statement, perhaps we have > a "vocabulary" problem. > >I do even believe that a thoroughly "scientific > attitude" is > >automatically anti-reductionnist, whatever theories > are used. Science, > >being modest, just cannot be reductionist(*). > >Even the numbers are nowadays no more completely > reductible to any "unifying theory". > >Only pseudo-scientist (or some scientist during the > week-end) can be reductionist. > > I'm afraid I don't understand the version of > reductionism to which you so > strongly object. Are you perhaps referring to the > mistake of trying to > explain too much with too little? Or are you > referring to what Daniel > Dennett has called "greedy reductionism": where > something is not so much > explained in terms of what it reduces to as > dismissed or explained away, > like saying there is no such thing as mental states > because it's all just > neurophysiology? Well, it is "all just > neurophysiology", in that the > neurophysiology is necessary and sufficient for the > mental states. The > mental states in this sense can be said to reduce to > the underlying brain > states. But this is not the same as saying that the > mental states therefore > do not exist, or are not important. > > Stathis Papaioannou > I feel compelled to address this point since I use the 'reductionist' denomination a lot lately and got lots of different aspects to it. The sense I USE the term stems from my wholistic view, to consider the totality interconnected and in unison. Our present mind-level cannot compose all of that into its activity (performed by the tool of a limited brain) so as a modus vivendi we consider parts as unit models. Such limited models can be topical, ideational, or functional, they are REDUCED from the totality for our comfort. This is the way humans can think and this is the way conventional sciences apply their cut domains. For that reason I disagree with Bruno when he wrote:"...that a thoroughly "scientific attitude" is automatically anti- reductionnist". It would be vague if not restricted to its domain. However: reductionist science (model-wise observation) gave us our knowledge of the world (no judgement on its quality) and our technology we enjoy. I find it objectionable when those model-restricted observations serve for beyond-model conclusions, when the explanations turn universal from select percepts. There are many (and different) identifications for the term, mine is the practical restriction for my own use. I don't want to sell it, just explain how I use it. Your 'mental states' are figments of the model you use as neural physiology. You reduce the 'mental' into a physiological cut in brainfunction-model and visualize conclusions 'without' based on observations 'within'. I leave it open, because our epistemy is incomplete as far as thinking is concerned. The neurological model in reductionism is important in its practical uses. When Georges calls the universe and the numbers-based concept 'isomorh' he speaks about a match in two models both in the 'number-type' restriction. Infinite totality cannot be 'isomorph'. Not even with "another" infinite totality. John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
to more recent posts: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our stupidity may allow also all the bad things that "happen".) 2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession? or is it an elitist heaughtiness to look down to all, who do not share such obsession? How about vice versa? 3. Suppose the 'numbers based' worldview gains universal approval (by ~3006?) - what will that help in the betterment of the world? or even in the betterment of human thinking? Or even of more civil general life- conditions? John M --- Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > To brent... (sorry I do not have the mail in my > mailbox to reply to it). > > So reality is what kicks back... Ok, but that was > not the question (really), I > want to know what distinction you do between > abstract thing and real thing ? > > You would say "real things are things when throw at > you, hurt you ?" or > something similar ;) but I'd say (even for the kicks > back) I remember dream > where I was hurt and remember clearly feeling pain > when it happened in my > dream, I could still feel a remembered pain when I > woke up, would you say my > dream was real then ? > > Regards, > > Quentin > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 17-mars-06, à 01:31, Brent Meeker a écrit : >> Hmmm... okay, so last questions what is an abstract thing ? what does >> it means >> to be abstract ? what render a thing real ? what does it means for it >> to be >> real ? what does it means to be real ? > > If you kick it, it kicks back. > --- Vic Stenger, after Samuel Johnson But, as David Deutsch explains in its FOR book, mathematical reality kicks back too. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 17-mars-06, à 00:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > The argument does not show the "the > physical universe" can only emerge on an infinity of "overlapping > computations", as such. It might show this given a series of > assumptions-- that we are nothing but hardwareless computations, > that the "physical universe" is a solipsistic illusion, and so on. This means you miss the point. The only assumption is "comp" by which I mean the "yes doctor" hypothesis together with Church's thesis and a minimal amount of arithmetical realism (AR: just the idea that elementary arithmetical truth is independent of me, you ...This is different from AR+ which says that only numbers exists). The assumptions you are mentioning are part of the consequences. We can try later to isolate the precise step where you think I make those assumptions. I agree the UDA is not so simple: I introduce supplementary hypotheses to make the argument simple and modular, and then, later on, I eliminate those supplementary assumptions. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
To brent... (sorry I do not have the mail in my mailbox to reply to it). So reality is what kicks back... Ok, but that was not the question (really), I want to know what distinction you do between abstract thing and real thing ? You would say "real things are things when throw at you, hurt you ?" or something similar ;) but I'd say (even for the kicks back) I remember dream where I was hurt and remember clearly feeling pain when it happened in my dream, I could still feel a remembered pain when I woke up, would you say my dream was real then ? Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 17-mars-06, à 00:10, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances. This is Descartes' dualism between mind and body. > Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical > realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism. Well, it is not Descartes' dualism, but it is sometimes called Plato's dualism, between the observable world and the invisible reality. Like you I prefer to keep the term of "dualism" for the cartesian one, especially in the comp-or-weaker frame where the two notions interfere. > >> Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that >> when saying "This has to be saying simply that the multiverse >> IS a mathematical object." Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends >> the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while >> when saying "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed >> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract." > > Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you > ever seen the number 3? Have you ever seen something material? Of course you can tell me: "oh yes I have just seen a cup of coffee this morning". What makes you so sure it is material? We "see" only immaterial pictures, like in dream. We *infer* "matter", and today both reasonable theories (QM, comp) and experiments (Aspect for example) put difficulties on the aristotelian (stuffy) conception of matter. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA
Hi Brent, This is quite amazing! I got only "nothing" there (due to the fact that ESCRIBE does no more work I guess). The step by step presentation to Joel Dobrzelewski seems to be here: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg01274.html See also for the sequel: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_frm/thread/c730c7246737da9a which I don't find on the first archive (!?). Hope this will help. Best Bruno Le 16-mars-06, à 20:06, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno, I thought I should review your UDA argument, so I went to your website and clicked on it. I was taken to this http://apps5.oingo.com/apps/domainpark/domainpark.cgi?client=netw8744&s=ESCRIBE.COM which sells DVDs of TV shows. ?? Brent Meeker http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> Norman Samish wrote:
>
>>> Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could call
>>> it "God." I can think of no possibility other than "It was always there,"
>>> and eternal existence is a concept I can't imagine. Are there any other
>>> possibilities?
>> I think there is another possibility. I tried to explain it
>> in my exchanges with John. It relies on several speculations
>> or conjectures:
>>
>> - Mathematical objects exist by themeslves ("They were
>>(or: are, intemporal) always there"),
>> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
>> - Perception of existence is an internal property of the
>>multiverse (mind emerges from matter activity),
>
> Given your commitment below, you also need to suppose
> that perception is an internal property of maths.
This logically comes with, yes. If consciousness is reduced
(via biology and chemistry) to physics (monism 1) and physics
is reduced to mathematics (monism 2), indeed consciousness
is reduced to mathematics.
>> - Mathematical existence and physical existence are the
>>same ("there is no need that something special be inside
>>particles", the contrary is an unnecessary and useless
>>dualism, "the fire *is* in the equations").
>
> That can only be the case if the multiverse is isomporphic to
> *every* mathematical object and not just one.
Yes. The basic idea is that there is no difference between
mathematical existence and physical existence. And this is
indeed not specific to any particular mathematical object.
> If it is only
> isomorphic to some mathematical objects, that *is* the difference
> between physical and mathematical existence.
No. The idea is that *every* class of objects isomorph one
to each other also have physical existence. Some have
perception as an internal property and some have not (this
does not need to be binary nor even one-dimensional).
>> Some details and some (weak) arguments can be found in my
>> recent posts to this group. Some papers from Max Tegmark
>> are also relevant:
>>
>>http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe_frames.html
>>http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.pdf
>>http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/multiverse.pdf
>>
>> Georges.
> [...]
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
[...]
- The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
>>> What do you mean? I guess this: The multiverse is not a mathematical
>>> object, but still is describable by a mathematical object.
>> No. I mean that there is a one to one correspondance between
>> the "components" of the multiverse and those of a particular
>> mathematical object and that this correspondance also maps the
>> "internal structures" of the multiverse with those of this
>> mathematical object. "Components" and "internal structures"
>> should not be understood here as atoms or people or the like
>> but only "at the most primitive level".
>
> That is the standard meaning of isomorphic.
Yes. I explained it because this did not seem consistent
with what Bruno said.
> And if A isomorphic
> to B, that does not mean that A is the same thing as B or
> even the same kind of thing.
Yes and no. For instance, natural numbers as seen as a
subset of real numbers may be considered as different
to "basic" natural numbers (for instance, considering
the way real numbers are "built" from natural numbers).
But as long as only the properties of natural numbers
are considered they cannot be distinguished (and one
could even "build" a new set of real numbers from them
and that set would be the set of real numbers as long
as the properties of real numbers wil be considered).
Many sets of natural numbers (and of real numbers) can
be thought of but what "really are" natural numbers
or (real numbers) has nothing to do with the details
that could make them appear different. These details
are completely irrelevant to (and have no effect at all
on) the way they "behave" as natural numbers. In order
to identify or exhibit any difference between the
elements of the class, we need to look at properties
that are not shared in the class. Now, if we consider
the universe/multiverse as a part of such a class, we
would also have to look at properties outside of the
class. But no such properties can be accessed from the
inside of the universe. All we can access to from the
inside of the universe is the shared properties of the
elements in the class. In other words: if there was
anything special inside the particle that would make
them "real", not only we would not have any access to
it but whatever that might be and whatever there is
actually something or not will not make any difference
on the way we see these particle behave (including
their mass, charge, interaction rules, ...).
Finally, what makes differences between the different
versions of the sets of natural numbers is not only
accidental and neutral from the point of view of the
structur
