Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
2012/10/7 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On Saturday, October 6, 2012 1:56:33 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: I'm openly saying that a high school kid can make a robot that behaves sensibly with just a few transistors. Only because he lives in a universe in which the possibility of teleology is fully supported from the start. We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it but we know for a fact that it can be done. Absolutely not. We know no such thing. Quite the opposite, we know with relative certainty that what we understand of physics provides He did not say that... He is absolutely true, and I agree with him because *I* am (or he from his POV) the fact he is talking about, I am conscious therefore it is true that the physical laws of this universe wathever they are allow for the creation of consciousness, at least they allowed mine. He didn't say the laws *we know*, he said the physical laws of this universe allow Regards, Quentin no possibility of anything other than more physics. There is no hint of any kind that these laws should lead to any such thing as an 'experience' or awareness of any kind. You beg the question 100% and are 100% incapable of seeing that you are doing it. So how on Earth does that indicate that a conscious computer is not possible? Because it doesn't fart? Computers which have been programmed thus far don't have conscious experiences. Would you agree that is a fact? I sympathize with the promise that someday we could have them, but I understand that the capacity to have a conscious experience is inversely proportionate to the capacity fro that experience to be controlled from the outside. You don't understand that and are not interested in why, so you will go on assuming that someday your iPhone will bring you to the airport and put its finger up your GI port and call its friends. you have erroneously assumed that intelligence is possible without sense experience. No, I am assuming the exact OPPOSITE! In fact I'm not even assuming, I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITHOUT consciousness confers a Evolutionary advantage, Which fact is that? Which intelligent behavior do you know that you can be certain exists without any subjective experience associated with it? and I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITH consciousness confers no additional Evolutionary advantage (and if you disagree with that point then you must believe that the Turing Test works for consciousness too and not just intelligence). Yet you think that consciousness must have evolved. No contradiction there? You think that every behavior in biology exists purely because of evolution - except consciousness, which you have no explanation for whatsoever, yet you know that mine is wrong and that physics will eventually get it right. And in spite of all this I know for a fact that Evolution DID produce consciousness at least once, therefore the only conclusion is that consciousness is a byproduct of intellagence. A byproduct that does what??? Adenine and Thymine don't have purpose in seeking to bind with each other? I don't even know what a question like that means, who's purpose do you expect Adenine and Thymine to serve? The purpose of their attraction to each other. How do you know? I know because I have intelligence and Adenine and Thymine do not know because they have none, they only have cause and effect. Where do you think your intelligence to know this comes from? Surely it is the result in large part of Adenine and Thymine's contribution to the intelligence of DNA. How is it different from our purpose in staying in close proximity to places to eat and sleep? And to think that some people berated me for anthropomorphizing future supercomputers and here you are anthropomorphizing simple chemicals. I'm not saying that molecular purpose has the same depth as human purpose. You are saying instead, that purpose arises spontaneously at some level of description...some fuzzy area between firing patterns of neurons and hereditary patterns of evolution. Why is everything aware, why isn't everything not aware? Because then we wouldn't be aware of having this conversation. And we are aware of having this conversation because everything is aware, except of course for computers. The substances that make up the parts of our computers are primitively aware, just not aware of the human level mappings and interpretations of their activities. Unless you think that your computer is following the discussion? Shall we test your theory? Yoo hoo! Computers of the interwebz! Is this thing on? What say ye? (space intentionally left blank for the supercomputers of the future to come back in
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On 08/10/2012, at 3:07 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Absolutely not. We know no such thing. Quite the opposite, we know with relative certainty that what we understand of physics provides no possibility of anything other than more physics. There is no hint of any kind that these laws should lead to any such thing as an 'experience' or awareness of any kind. You beg the question 100% and are 100% incapable of seeing that you are doing it. Well, if it's not the laws of physics then it's something supernatural, isn't it? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Zuckerman's paper
On 07 Oct 2012, at 21:39, Stephen P. King wrote: In my thinking, a physical world = a reality = that which is incontrovertible (free of contradictions = Boolean Satisfiable) Many logic are consistent without being boolean. for some finite collection of observers, where observers are defined as bundles of computations. ? Physical worlds are not actual in the absence of observers. I also stipulate that there are an infinite (uncountable) number of physical worlds. What are all your stipulation? A listing would help. This demands that there exists an uncountable infinity of observers = an infinite number of bundles of computations. Please recall how I define exist; it is *necessary possibility*. For all logicians necessity and possibility is much more vague than exists. Kripkean modal logic exist for each possible notion of accessibility. You define something which is precise and standard by what is complex and extremely variate. between S4 and S4Grz there are uncountably many different modal logics (and thus different notion of possibility and necessity). Comp and classical theory of knowledge fix the choice of the modal logic? Why not use them? You like the modal logical explanatory model, This is not correct. I just model belief by the instantional manner, à-la Dennet. One day I might be able to recall your terminology exactly. ;-) ? A machine believes p if the machine assert p, which makes sense as I limit myself to machine talking first order language, ideally arithmetically sound, and being able to believe the logical consequences of its beliefs in arithmetic. Then modal logic just happens to describe completely, at the propositional level, the logic of provability of such machine, thanks to the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and others). I have never choose to use modal logic, I use only machine self- reference, where a very special modality imposes itself (G). Sure, you use that is necessitated by non-contradiction principle. ;-) so there we might think of observers as bundles of computations. OK. That's nice, but what is a computation? A computation is *any transformation of information*. Thanks to the CT thesis, computation is one, and the unique, epistemic notion having a precise and absolute definition. Information is fuzzy and admit many different and confusing interpretation. Information = any difference between two that makes a difference to a third. It is interesting that this definition demand that there exists at least three entities or processes or whatever for information and thus computation to exist. I have not considered the further consequences of this idea so far. It might be completely fallacious. It is not quite clear to say the least. I home you have no propblem with my francness. (Very buzy days so I don't try diplomacy, which actually never really work in science). Your preceding post were using a notion of physical computation, which would not cut the regress. I disagree. I am arguing that only if we retain a connection between computation as a platonic abstraction and the requirement of physical resources We are back to my early question. What do you mean by physical. we will have a viable cut off for the regress. A computer that can only process a finite number of recursions or iterations of self- modeling will not have an infinite regress for obvious reasons. What I am trying to do to make this a more formal statement is to tie together the Kolmogorov complexity of a description a system, abstract or physical, with the physical degrees of freedom of a physical system (for example the dimensions of its Hilbert space or Hamiltonian). That might be interesting. In this way we have a way to define a physical system as a bounded bundle of computations. This would be a lower bound on the necessary physical resources required to implement an arbitrary computations. Following this idea we can see that it implies that physical systems that require infinite computations to be exactly simulated only can exist is very special circumstances! ? But as I answered you can take the original definition of computation (by Post, Turing Co.), in which case you can assume only arithmetic, and the regression is cut, by defining the bundle of computations with the first person indeterminacy. Then you are back to sane04, and you describe the comp theory. This is where I agree with comp. I only disagree with your step 8: But where in step 8 do you disagree. Search MGA on this list. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe? Up to this stage, we can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding reasoning steps, by postulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ and is too little in
Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic
Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the New System of Nature (1695), the second from the Reply to Bayle (1702), are revealing in this regard: Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which corresponds to what is called the I in us; such a thing could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organized it may be. But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the consciousness which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures and movements [of materials]. Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness must be truly one, a single I properly regarded as one conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so cannot be regarded as a single I, capable of being the subject of a unified mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated definition of perception as the representation in the simple of the compound, or of that which is outside. (Principles of Nature and Grace, sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that In natural perception and sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity. If perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a representation of a variety of content in a simple, indivisible I then we may construct Leibniz's argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true unity. Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. Whatever is divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Hence, matter cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be identical with, give rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be identical to, give rise to) perception, then materialism is false. Hence, materialism is false. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
experiences vs descriptions of experiences
Hi Bruno,
There are two different things,
1) a description of a living experience (publicly available to any persons)
and
2) the living experience itself (only available personally, that is, to a
particular person.)
It is easy to get these confused and I no doubt have sometimes confused them
myself.
Computers can deal with descriptions of experience (2), but not an experience
itself (1),
because
a) as Leibniz says, perception of any kind must be a unity of the many in
the one, just as in Plato's All.
b) anything in code or symbolic form is a description, not an experience.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-07, 09:11:29
Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring ofbottom-up
sensory info
2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal
On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Hi Roger:
... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary
psychology (that study the software or mind)?ssert?hat this is true.
Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still
does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body
issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be shown
contradictory(*).
The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is crucial for
the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and phenomena
with the timeless, reversible, ?athematical ?ature of ?he laws of physics that
by the way, according with M Theory, have also dualities between the entire
universe and the interior of a brane on the planck scale (we can not know if we
live in such a small brane).?
OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at least)
direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the neoplatonists
already did.
I don? assume either if ?his mathematical nature is or not the ultimate nature
or reality
Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp frame.
For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. Arithmetic
viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe completely.
This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of what being
conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano Arithmetic. In a
sense such theories are like new person, and it put only more mess in
Platonia.
Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind along
the line of life in space-time) make ?se a sort of duality in category theory
between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as Stephen told me and he
can explain you) .?
Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and matter
are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more that matter
is an iceberg tip of reality.
Even ?f matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if ?matter? ?o we can
know about it this submerged computational nature? which phenomena produce the
submerged part of this iceberg in the one that we perceive?. Multiverse
hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs, but this is a way to
avoid God and to continue with the speculative business. What the computational
nature of reality tries to explain or to avoid? . May be you answered this
questions a number of times, ( even to me and I did not realize it)
By the way, Bruno, you try to demolish physicalism from below by proposing a
computational theory of ultimate reality. I try to demolish ?t from above, by
proposing that perceptions are the effect of computation in living beings for
survival . I assume, and I make use of it, that the comp hypothesis can also be
applied at a level above phisical reality instead of below: a substitution at
the axon firing level could be used to substitute a part of the brain by
computer chips (by making the chips to inject axonic signals) + perhaps some
hormonal control. This substitution level Matrix-style can produce the same
first person indeterminacy and still the computation is made within this
reality, by real computers made of ordinary matter.
This is enough for a discussion.
?
Eventually matter emerge from dreams coherence conditions. Dreams are just the
first person view on the relevant computations which exists by elementary
arithmetic.
For the perception of time or for the ordering of past events in time since
future events are unknown due to the increasing entropy, the mind would make
use of another mathematical structure with a relation of order.
I agree, and N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... } is quite enough, at least with the
addition and multiplication laws. You can define the order by the order
relation x y, that you can define for example by Ez(x + z =
consciousness, order out of chaos = the collapsed quantum wave (?)
1) Anything written in words or code cannot be a living experience.
2) One reason for this is that words are multiple, but
an experience (such as in the reading of the words) is unitary,
is the meaning of the many words as one. I now see
that this is what I meant by saying that consciousness
producesorder out of chaos. It collapses the many into the one,
perhaps as Penrose envisions consciousness to be, the
collapse of the quantum form of the brain states into one
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-07, 09:21:46
Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring ofbottom-up
sensory info
With??by real computers made of ordinary matter. I mean that the computers
are structures within the mathematical manifold that describe the physical
reality (or the tip of the iceberg).
2012/10/7 Alberto G. Corona
2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal
On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Hi Roger:
... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary
psychology (that study the software or mind)?ssert?hat this is true.
Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still
does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body
issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be shown
contradictory(*).
The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is crucial for
the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and phenomena
with the timeless, reversible, ?athematical ?ature of ?he laws of physics that
by the way, according with M Theory, have also dualities between the entire
universe and the interior of a brane on the planck scale (we can not know if we
live in such a small brane).?
OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at least)
direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the neoplatonists
already did.
I don? assume either if ?his mathematical nature is or not the ultimate nature
or reality
Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp frame.
For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. Arithmetic
viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe completely.
This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of what being
conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano Arithmetic. In a
sense such theories are like new person, and it put only more mess in
Platonia.
Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind along
the line of life in space-time) make ?se a sort of duality in category theory
between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as Stephen told me and he
can explain you) .?
Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and matter
are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more that matter
is an iceberg tip of reality.
Even ?f matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if ?matter? ?o we can
know about it this submerged computational nature? which phenomena produce the
submerged part of this iceberg in the one that we perceive?. Multiverse
hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs, but this is a way to
avoid God and to continue with the speculative business. What the computational
nature of reality tries to explain or to avoid? . May be you answered this
questions a number of times, ( even to me and I did not realize it)
By the way, Bruno, you try to demolish physicalism from below by proposing a
computational theory of ultimate reality. I try to demolish ?t from above, by
proposing that perceptions are the effect of computation in living beings for
survival . I assume, and I make use of it, that the comp hypothesis can also be
applied at a level above phisical reality instead of below: a substitution at
the axon firing level could be used to substitute a part of the brain by
computer chips (by making the chips to inject axonic signals) + perhaps some
hormonal control. This substitution level Matrix-style can produce the same
first person indeterminacy and still the computation is made within this
reality, by real computers made of ordinary matter.
This is enough for a discussion.
?
Eventually matter emerge from dreams coherence conditions. Dreams are just the
first person view on the relevant computations which exists by elementary
arithmetic.
For the perception of time or for the ordering of past events in time since
future events are unknown due to the increasing entropy, the mind would make
use of another mathematical structure with a relation of order.
I agree, and N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... } is quite enough, at least with the
addition and multiplication
Re: Re: Subjectivity is no longer a dirty word! A nicevideodiscussingthedual aspect theory
Hi Bruno Marchal I was just trying to formulate my view of subjectivity into terms you use, like 1p, but I only seem to have confused things. Apparently 1p is not the state of living subjectivity, at best it is a description of that. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 10:08:58 Subject: Re: Subjectivity is no longer a dirty word! A nicevideodiscussingthedual aspect theory Hi Roger Clough, Hi Bruno Marchal 1) That's not subjectivity. That's objectivity. Wrong perspective. Subjectivity is the view from within, looking out, not the view from outside objectively looking in. 1p does refer to a particular person, although indeterminately, but from outside, objectively. What do you mean by that? I think you confuse the third person point of view on some first person view, like when we attribute consciousness to some other, with the consciousness of the subject itself. The first person indeterminacy needs the second of those option, and corresponds to what you call the subjectivity. Then the math shows that such subjectivity has no objective correspondent, making it irreducibibly subjective. When you say yes to the doctor, it is NOT because the doctor will make a working copy of you, it is because YOU believe that YOU will subjectively survive in the usual sense. If that is not clear at step 0, 1 or even 2, it has to be cleared up at the step 3 in the sane04 paper, to get the first person indeterminacy. Please read this carefully, you were far too quick. Tell me when you understand the step 3, which is the step proving the existence of a necessary subjective indeterminacy, in a purely objective and determinate setting, once we assume comp. I found and published this more than 30 years ago, and got a price for that a bit later, but it is still ignored, a bit like Everett in QM (which use a similar idea). All the UDA reversal between physics and number theology is built on that notion. Bruno sub?ec?ive (sb-jktv) adj. 1. a. Proceeding from or taking place in a person's mind rather than the external world: a subjective decision. b. Particular to a given person; personal: subjective experience. 2. Moodily introspective 1a means that the issue does not take place in the external world, it takes place inside a person's mind. 1b means that the issue is personal, not publicly available. 2) Were the physical laws there before the universe was created ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-06, 15:19:35 Subject: Re: Subjectivity is no longer a dirty word! A nice videodiscussingthedual aspect theory Hi Roger Clough, On 06 Oct 2012, at 16:47, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal How does comp include subjectivity ? As I said, comp is a bet on a form of reincarnation, as you accept to change your body for a new (digital) one. Comp, by definition, at least the one I gave, is the bet that your subjectivity is invariant for some change made in the local universe. It presupposes subjectivity at the start. You might read: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Hi Stathis Papaioannou Don't avoid my question please. Where do the laws of physics come from ? I will answer this, of course Stathis can comment. The laws of physics comes from the arithmetical truth, actually a tiny part of it. They are the way the intensional or relative universal numbers see themselves in a persistent (symmetrical, with probability close to one) manner. Physics is what stabilize consciousness in the number realm. The details on this are what we are aligned on, so I refer to the posts, and to the paper above to see the link with comp and arithmetic). But you can ask question (I cannot sum up the thing in one sentence). You must get the technical point that arithmetical truth emulates all computations. Then everything follows from comp, the dreams, and the indeterminacy on them. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-06, 08:48:04 Subject: Re: Subjectivity is no longer a dirty word! A nice video discussingthedual aspect theory Hi Roger Clough, On 06 Oct 2012, at 12:46, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I understand that comp does not include subjectivity, but that's just explicitly. ? Comp is defined by the invariance of subjectivity for
Re: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
Hi Bruno Marchal True, I may not be able to prove that the computer is not conscious. For I certainly cannot be sure if another person is conscious. For the computer, I can say however, that it would need a self to be consciousness, a singular unitary entity into which the many can be experienced as one. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 10:12:50 Subject: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On 07 Oct 2012, at 14:17, Roger Clough wrote: Hi John Clark Unless computers can deal with inextended objects such as mind and experience, they cannot be conscious. Consciousness is direct experience, computers can only deal in descriptions of experience. Everything that a computer does is, to my knowledge, at least in principle publicly available, since it uses publicly available symbols or code. Consciousness is direct experience, which cannot be put down in code any more than life can be put down in code. It is personal and not publicly available. I agree with this, about consciousness, but how do you know that your neighbor is conscious? You can see only his brain or his body, not his soul. You cannot know that: it is a bet. Why could'n we make that bet for a computer. You are just postulating that computer cannot think, but that is begging the question. Of course it is not the computer-body which is conscious, but the (possible) person associated to the computation done by the computer. same for the brain: a brain is not conscious. Only person are conscious. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-06, 13:56:30 Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: ?I'm openly saying that a high school kid can make a robot that behaves sensibly with just a few transistors.? ? Only because he lives in a universe in which the possibility of teleology is fully supported from the start. We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it but we know for a fact that it can be done. So how on Earth does that indicate that a conscious computer is not possible? Because it doesn't fart?? ? you have erroneously assumed that intelligence is possible without sense experience. No, I am assuming the exact OPPOSITE! In fact I'm not even assuming, I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITHOUT consciousness confers a Evolutionary advantage, and I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITH consciousness confers no additional Evolutionary advantage (and if you disagree with that point then you must believe that the Turing Test works for consciousness too and not just intelligence). And in spite of all this I know for a fact that Evolution DID produce consciousness at least once, therefore the only conclusion is that consciousness is a byproduct of intellagence. Adenine and Thymine don't have purpose in seeking to bind with each other? I don't even know what a question like that means, who's purpose do you expect Adenine and Thymine to serve? How do you know? I know because I have intelligence and Adenine and Thymine do not know because they have none, they only have cause and effect. How is it different from our purpose in staying in close proximity to places to eat and sleep? And to think that some people berated me for anthropomorphizing future supercomputers and here you are ? anthropomorphizing simple chemicals. Why is everything aware, why isn't everything not aware? Because then we wouldn't be aware of having this conversation. And we are aware of having this conversation because everything is aware, except of course for computers. ? Robots are something? No, they aren't something. That is just a little too silly to argue. ? Everything is awareness Are you certain, I thought everything is klogknee, or maybe its everything is 42. evolution requires that something be alive to begin with. Evolution requires something that can reproduce itself, there is no universally agreed on definition of life so if you want to say that viruses and RNA strings and crystals and clay patterns and Von Neumann Machines are alive I won't argue with you and will agree that Evolution requires that something be alive to get started. ? John K Clark ? -- You received this message because you
Re: Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic
Hi Roger, We now know that matter is not infinitely divisible. So the argument of Leibniz is falsified. In appreciation, Richard On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 6:50 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the New System of Nature (1695), the second from the Reply to Bayle (1702), are revealing in this regard: Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which corresponds to what is called the I in us; such a thing could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organized it may be. But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the consciousness which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures and movements [of materials]. Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness must be truly one, a single I properly regarded as one conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so cannot be regarded as a single I, capable of being the subject of a unified mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated definition of perception as the representation in the simple of the compound, or of that which is outside. (Principles of Nature and Grace, sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that In natural perception and sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity. If perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a representation of a variety of content in a simple, indivisible I then we may construct Leibniz's argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true unity. Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. Whatever is divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Hence, matter cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be identical with, give rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be identical to, give rise to) perception, then materialism is false. Hence, materialism is false. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
inside and outside of spacetime
On 07 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Evgenii Rudnyi I know that, but his theory of electromagnetism is a physical theory, even if it's hard to pin down the extension property. Physical theories can tell us nothing about philosophy or mind or God, since they cannot deal with meaning. Physics is meaningless. BRUNO: This is not necessarily the case, as physics is Turing universal. The problem is that physics has to be derived from comp. Bruno SNIP ROGER: You might be able to derive physics from comp. But physics can only deal with the extended (objects in spacetime) and anything extended cannot deal with meaning, mind or philosophy or thought, since these are outside of spacetime, because inextended. Anything extended is an object, can only be treated objectively. Because anything extended is in spacetime, while consciousnes and mind, being inextended must be subjective (are outside of spacetime), .In short: extended= objective = in spacetime= contingent= cannot be necessary inextended = subjective = outside of spacetime= can be sometimes necessary, sometimes contingent Also, however, now I see that Universal Turing machines can simulate consciousness-- which all that you want. But it is impossible to prove that anything that simulates consciousness is actually conscious. ignorance. - Roger -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: experiences vs descriptions of experiences
a) as Leibniz says, perception of any kind must be a unity of the many in the one, just as in Plato's All. The spherical CYM monads of string theory each maps the entire universe into its 1000 Planck-length diameter with unity of all directions achieved at the point of its center. So despite being extended each CYM has the perception of a Leibniz monad. Richard On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 7:19 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Bruno, There are two different things, 1) a description of a living experience (publicly available to any persons) and 2) the living experience itself (only available personally, that is, to a particular person.) It is easy to get these confused and I no doubt have sometimes confused them myself. Computers can deal with descriptions of experience (2), but not an experience itself (1), because a) as Leibniz says, perception of any kind must be a unity of the many in the one, just as in Plato's All. The spherical CYM monads of string theory each maps the entire universe into its 1000 Planck-length diameter with unity of all directions achieved at the point of its center. So despite being extended each CYM has the perception of a Leibniz monad. Richard b) anything in code or symbolic form is a description, not an experience. Deacon would claim that code and/or symbols are 'constraints' that provide the means for future experience. http://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/3/3/290/htm Richard Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 09:11:29 Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring ofbottom-up sensory info 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Hi Roger: ... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary psychology (that study the software or mind)?ssert?hat this is true. Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be shown contradictory(*). The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, ?athematical ?ature of ?he laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane).? OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the neoplatonists already did. I don? assume either if ?his mathematical nature is or not the ultimate nature or reality Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like new person, and it put only more mess in Platonia. Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind along the line of life in space-time) make ?se a sort of duality in category theory between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as Stephen told me and he can explain you) .? Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and matter are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more that matter is an iceberg tip of reality. Even ?f matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if ?matter? ?o we can know about it this submerged computational nature? which phenomena produce the submerged part of this iceberg in the one that we perceive?. Multiverse hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs, but this is a way to avoid God and to continue with the speculative business. What the computational nature of reality tries to explain or to avoid? . May be you answered this questions a number of times, ( even to me and I did not realize it) By the way, Bruno, you try to demolish physicalism from below by proposing a computational theory of ultimate reality. I try to demolish ?t from above, by proposing that perceptions are the effect of computation in living beings for survival . I assume, and I make use of it, that the comp hypothesis can also be applied at a level above phisical reality instead of below: a substitution at the axon firing level could be used to substitute a part of the brain by computer chips (by making
Re: Re: Maxwell on Metaphysics and Theology
Hi Evgenii Rudnyi Yes. But alone, the equations have no human meaning. Each individual will invent that for himself. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Evgenii Rudnyi Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 09:14:18 Subject: Re: Maxwell on Metaphysics and Theology On 07.10.2012 14:44 Roger Clough said the following: Hi Evgenii Rudnyi I know that, but his theory of electromagnetism is a physical theory, even if it's hard to pin down the extension property. Physical theories can tell us nothing about philosophy or mind or God, since they cannot deal with meaning. Physics is meaningless. I am working with engineers and they simulate Maxwell equations to develop even better products. Hence physics brings meaning to minds of engineers. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations
Hi Stathis Papaioannou Computation can give you letters on a page. Are they conscious ? There's no way that I can think of however, to prove or disprove that objects are conscious or not, only that they may simulate consciousness. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 10:45:10 Subject: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 1:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: One theory is that existence of platonic entities such as numbers is not ontologically distinct from actual existence. In that case, all possible universes necessarily exist, and the one that has the laws of physics allowing observers is the one the observers observe. That is Tegmark error. It cannot work. First it is obvious that numbers have a distinct existence than, say, this table or that chair, and secondly, once you accept comp, whatever meaning you give to the existence of numbers as long as you agree that 2+2=4 is independent of you, the global indeterminacy on arithmetic, or on the UD, has to be taken into account, and physics has to be explained in term of *all* computation. That is what Tegmark and Schmidhuber have missed, and which I have explained when entering on this mailing list. Even in the case one (little program), like DeWitt-Wheeler equation for example, would be correct, so that indeed there would be only one computation allowing consciousness, such a fact has to be justified in term of the measure taken on *all* computation. I thought you did grasp this sometime ago. Step 8 is not really needed here. Computation necessarily exists, computation is enough to generate consciousness and physics, therefore no need for a separate physical reality. Can you explain the subtlety I've missed? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
Hi Richard Ruquist I may have given that impression, sorry, but a monad can only make what's inside do what it can do. Human and animal monads can both feel, so they can be conscious. But a rock is at best unconscious as it cannot feel or think.\ There's no way to tell what faculties a computer has. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 11:06:17 Subject: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment Roger, If human consciousness comes from attached monads, as I think you have claimed, then why could not these monads attach to sufficiently complex computers as well. Richard On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi John Clark Unless computers can deal with inextended objects such as mind and experience, they cannot be conscious. Consciousness is direct experience, computers can only deal in descriptions of experience. Everything that a computer does is, to my knowledge, at least in principle publicly available, since it uses publicly available symbols or code. Consciousness is direct experience, which cannot be put down in code any more than life can be put down in code. It is personal and not publicly available. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-06, 13:56:30 Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: ?I'm openly saying that a high school kid can make a robot that behaves sensibly with just a few transistors.? ? Only because he lives in a universe in which the possibility of teleology is fully supported from the start. We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it but we know for a fact that it can be done. So how on Earth does that indicate that a conscious computer is not possible? Because it doesn't fart?? ? you have erroneously assumed that intelligence is possible without sense experience. No, I am assuming the exact OPPOSITE! In fact I'm not even assuming, I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITHOUT consciousness confers a Evolutionary advantage, and I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITH consciousness confers no additional Evolutionary advantage (and if you disagree with that point then you must believe that the Turing Test works for consciousness too and not just intelligence). And in spite of all this I know for a fact that Evolution DID produce consciousness at least once, therefore the only conclusion is that consciousness is a byproduct of intellagence. Adenine and Thymine don't have purpose in seeking to bind with each other? I don't even know what a question like that means, who's purpose do you expect Adenine and Thymine to serve? How do you know? I know because I have intelligence and Adenine and Thymine do not know because they have none, they only have cause and effect. How is it different from our purpose in staying in close proximity to places to eat and sleep? And to think that some people berated me for anthropomorphizing future supercomputers and here you are ? anthropomorphizing simple chemicals. Why is everything aware, why isn't everything not aware? Because then we wouldn't be aware of having this conversation. And we are aware of having this conversation because everything is aware, except of course for computers. ? Robots are something? No, they aren't something. That is just a little too silly to argue. ? Everything is awareness Are you certain, I thought everything is klogknee, or maybe its everything is 42. evolution requires that something be alive to begin with. Evolution requires something that can reproduce itself, there is no universally agreed on definition of life so if you want to say that viruses and RNA strings and crystals and clay patterns and Von Neumann Machines are alive I won't argue with you and will agree that Evolution requires that something be alive to get started. ? John K Clark ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations
Hi Richard Ruquist Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 11:17:19 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations Then where do the CYMs and their properties come from ? Nature, or god- samething. There may be a programmer that initiated the chain of universes. But that programmer is far removed from us. The god or cosmic consciousness that relates to us and life in general in this universe is manifested by the CYMs who were created during the big bang according to string theory.. Richard On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 8:34 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Then where do the CYMs and their properties come from ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-06, 10:39:34 Subject: Re: Re: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations Roger, In string theory the laws and constants of physics and chemistry come from the 6-d Calabi-Yau Compact Manifolds which are like the Leibnitz monads and/or the Indra Pearls of Buddhism. They number about 10^90/cc through out the universe, whereas there are about 10^90 particles in the visible universe, an interesting coincidence. Richard On Sat, Oct 6, 2012 at 8:06 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou Where did the laws of physics and chemistry come from that enable it to work ? The Tooth Fairy ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-05, 19:41:44 Subject: Re: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 9:13 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou You left out the guy who puts together the pieces. So if the pieces just happened to fall into the right place spontaneously the car would not work? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations
Hi Richard Ruquist Fine, except I think that intelligence, since it was needed for the Big Bang, had to be there beforehand, where time did not yet exist. But intelligence is beyond spacetime anyway, so it always was. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 11:17:19 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations Then where do the CYMs and their properties come from ? Nature, or god- samething. There may be a programmer that initiated the chain of universes. But that programmer is far removed from us. The god or cosmic consciousness that relates to us and life in general in this universe is manifested by the CYMs who were created during the big bang according to string theory.. Richard On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Then where do the CYMs and their properties come from ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-06, 10:39:34 Subject: Re: Re: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations Roger, In string theory the laws and constants of physics and chemistry come from the 6-d Calabi-Yau Compact Manifolds which are like the Leibnitz monads and/or the Indra Pearls of Buddhism. They number about 10^90/cc through out the universe, whereas there are about 10^90 particles in the visible universe, an interesting coincidence. Richard On Sat, Oct 6, 2012 at 8:06 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou Where did the laws of physics and chemistry come from that enable it to work ? The Tooth Fairy ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-05, 19:41:44 Subject: Re: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 9:13 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou You left out the guy who puts together the pieces. So if the pieces just happened to fall into the right place spontaneously the car would not work? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: experiences vs descriptions of experiences
On 08 Oct 2012, at 13:19, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno, There are two different things, 1) a description of a living experience (publicly available to any persons) and 2) the living experience itself (only available personally, that is, to a particular person.) No problem with this. The first person indeterminacy is missed by people missing that distinction. To feel being in Washington instead of Moscow has to be a purely personal living experience, only available by the copy in Washington, as from outside the person is in both Washington, and Moscow. It is easy to get these confused and I no doubt have sometimes confused them myself. Computers can deal with descriptions of experience (2), but not an experience itself (1), Only if you consider the reductive view of what is the computer. because a) as Leibniz says, perception of any kind must be a unity of the many in the one, just as in Plato's All. No problem with this. b) anything in code or symbolic form is a description, not an experience. Absolutely true. But irrelevant to claim that a computer cannot be conscious. In the math part: this becomes a theorem, as the soul of the machine is defined formally by the conjunction between the belief of the machine, which admit a symbolic code, with truth, which is provably not describable in the language of the machine, and it is shown that the machine can be aware of this, and will also believe that she is not a machine for that reason and experience, making comp necessarily counter-intuitive for her, and seemingly false from the machine point of view. I think you have just decide that a machine cannot have a soul, as *you* are confalting the amchine experience, and what happen in the computer. Yet, with the simplest definition of Soul (from Theaetetus, Plotinus and the mystics) machine have souls, and can have spiritual and non communicable mystical experience, indeed and consciousness, by comp, is the simplest of those experience. Also, the step 8 explicitly forbid to conflate the experience with anything (be it mathematical or physical) third person describable. So in many ways, the UDA and the AUDA illustrates the conflation mistake. But machine can understand exactly that, and so your argument against comp is not valid. 1) Anything written in words or code cannot be a living experience. I agree completely. 2) One reason for this is that words are multiple, but an experience (such as in the reading of the words) is unitary, is the meaning of the many words as one. I now see that this is what I meant by saying that consciousness producesorder out of chaos. It collapses the many into the one, perhaps as Penrose envisions consciousness to be, the collapse of the quantum form of the brain states into one I agree, except Penrose believe that this is special to QM, but comp shows it to be banal and explainable without the quantum. I was just trying to formulate my view of subjectivity into terms you use, like 1p, but I only seem to have confused things. Apparently 1p is not the state of living subjectivity, at best it is a description of that. 1p is *associated* (not identified!) to the personal memory. In UDA it takes the form of the personal diary, which is annihilated together with the candidate of teleportation. The 1p itself is then proved to be impossible to have *any* description. So we agree, except that you seem to decide that computers cannot manifest those non describable things. On the contrary computer science explain why computer are confronted to such things all the time. True, I may not be able to prove that the computer is not conscious. For I certainly cannot be sure if another person is conscious. For the computer, I can say however, that it would need a self to be consciousness, a singular unitary entity into which the many can be experienced as one. Yes it needs a self, and then as I told you the computer can have a self (by the Dx = xx, of by non foundation axioms in set theory if you want make things more complex). But this give a third person notion of self only. That is why the Theaetetus definition is a tour de force in knowledge theory, and then Gödel's incompleteness justify entirely that such a definition makes sense for the machine, and by the machine. This makes the computer mystic as it realizes that it cannot define his first person self, which is indeed nothing describable in any first person way. So we agree, and we agree with the ideally correct self-referential universal machine. BRUNO: This is not necessarily the case, as physics is Turing universal. The problem is that physics has to be derived from comp. Bruno SNIP ROGER: You might be able to derive physics from comp. I can derive the comp-physics (the physics when redefined through the UD Argument). This is complex to do, but technical, and then we can test
intelligence and the improbable
Hi Stathis Papaioannou Certainly all possible universes can or may exist, I leave open that possibility. But I personally believe that God actually made only one, selecting the best possible one. It isn't more than a plausibility proof, but the fine-tuning numbers, that our current universe is excessively improbable, but that improbability is what is necessary for life to exist, although it is a very slight proof, is still better than no proof that other universes exist. I would add that if something is improbable naturally, it would need some sort of intelligence in its creation, not just random chance. So it would seem that our current universe was created by some humungous intelligence. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 08:56:15 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 12:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou Don't avoid my question please. Where do the laws of physics come from ? One theory is that existence of platonic entities such as numbers is not ontologically distinct from actual existence. In that case, all possible universes necessarily exist, and the one that has the laws of physics allowing observers is the one the observers observe. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Maxwell on Metaphysics and Theology
Hi Stathis Papaioannou An atheist with any intelligence would agree with me because it's just logic. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 08:58:22 Subject: Re: Re: Maxwell on Metaphysics and Theology On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 11:44 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Evgenii Rudnyi I know that, but his theory of electromagnetism is a physical theory, even if it's hard to pin down the extension property. Physical theories can tell us nothing about philosophy or mind or God, since they cannot deal with meaning. Physics is meaningless. You are ideologically committed to say this. Another position is that physics is the source of mind and hence all meaning. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
Hi Stathis Papaioannou I would put it that mind is superphysical. Beyond spacetime. Supernatural as a word carries too much baggage. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-10-08, 03:14:29 Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On 08/10/2012, at 3:07 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Absolutely not. We know no such thing. Quite the opposite, we know with relative certainty that what we understand of physics provides no possibility of anything other than more physics. There is no hint of any kind that these laws should lead to any such thing as an 'experience' or awareness of any kind. You beg the question 100% and are 100% incapable of seeing that you are doing it. Well, if it's not the laws of physics then it's something supernatural, isn't it? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
Hi Roger, On 08 Oct 2012, at 16:14, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou I would put it that mind is superphysical. Beyond spacetime. Supernatural as a word carries too much baggage. With comp, the natural numbers are supernatural enough. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-10-08, 03:14:29 Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On 08/10/2012, at 3:07 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Absolutely not. We know no such thing. Quite the opposite, we know with relative certainty that what we understand of physics provides no possibility of anything other than more physics. There is no hint of any kind that these laws should lead to any such thing as an 'experience' or awareness of any kind. You beg the question 100% and are 100% incapable of seeing that you are doing it. Well, if it's not the laws of physics then it's something supernatural, isn't it? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Heisenberg and Leibniz
Hi Richard Ruquist Leibniz's point in the divisibility argument is that you cannot call matter a substance, because if it is infinitely divisible, there can be no there there, nothing that couldn't be cut in two. IMHO Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle achieves the same intended result, because there can never be some final cutting event, even though the fundamental particles cannot be divided. There's no there there. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-08, 08:03:22 Subject: Re: Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic Hi Roger, We now know that matter is not infinitely divisible. So the argument of Leibniz is falsified. In appreciation, Richard On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 6:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the New System of Nature (1695), the second from the Reply to Bayle (1702), are revealing in this regard: Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which corresponds to what is called the I in us; such a thing could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organized it may be. But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the consciousness which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures and movements [of materials]. Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness must be truly one, a single I properly regarded as one conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so cannot be regarded as a single I, capable of being the subject of a unified mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated definition of perception as the representation in the simple of the compound, or of that which is outside. (Principles of Nature and Grace, sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that In natural perception and sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity. If perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a representation of a variety of content in a simple, indivisible I then we may construct Leibniz's argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true unity. Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. Whatever is divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Hence, matter cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be identical with, give rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be identical to, give rise to) perception, then materialism is false. Hence, materialism is false. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: experiences vs descriptions of experiences
Hi Richard Ruquist True, but to be a monad, you have to be inextended. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-08, 08:14:23 Subject: Re: experiences vs descriptions of experiences a) as Leibniz says, perception of any kind must be a unity of the many in the one, just as in Plato's All. The spherical CYM monads of string theory each maps the entire universe into its 1000 Planck-length diameter with unity of all directions achieved at the point of its center. So despite being extended each CYM has the perception of a Leibniz monad. Richard On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 7:19 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno, There are two different things, 1) a description of a living experience (publicly available to any persons) and 2) the living experience itself (only available personally, that is, to a particular person.) It is easy to get these confused and I no doubt have sometimes confused them myself. Computers can deal with descriptions of experience (2), but not an experience itself (1), because a) as Leibniz says, perception of any kind must be a unity of the many in the one, just as in Plato's All. The spherical CYM monads of string theory each maps the entire universe into its 1000 Planck-length diameter with unity of all directions achieved at the point of its center. So despite being extended each CYM has the perception of a Leibniz monad. Richard b) anything in code or symbolic form is a description, not an experience. Deacon would claim that code and/or symbols are 'constraints' that provide the means for future experience. http://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/3/3/290/htm Richard Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 09:11:29 Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring ofbottom-up sensory info 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Hi Roger: ... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary psychology (that study the software or mind)?ssert?hat this is true. Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be shown contradictory(*). The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, ?athematical ?ature of ?he laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane).? OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the neoplatonists already did. I don? assume either if ?his mathematical nature is or not the ultimate nature or reality Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like new person, and it put only more mess in Platonia. Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind along the line of life in space-time) make ?se a sort of duality in category theory between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as Stephen told me and he can explain you) .? Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and matter are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more that matter is an iceberg tip of reality. Even ?f matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if ?matter? ?o we can know about it this submerged computational nature? which phenomena produce the submerged part of this iceberg in the one that we perceive?. Multiverse hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs, but this is a way to avoid God and to continue with the speculative business. What the computational nature of reality tries to explain or to avoid? . May be you answered this questions a number of times, ( even to me and I did not realize it) By the way, Bruno, you try to
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:06:42 AM UTC-4, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/7 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: On Saturday, October 6, 2012 1:56:33 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: I'm openly saying that a high school kid can make a robot that behaves sensibly with just a few transistors. Only because he lives in a universe in which the possibility of teleology is fully supported from the start. We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it but we know for a fact that it can be done. Absolutely not. We know no such thing. Quite the opposite, we know with relative certainty that what we understand of physics provides He did not say that... He is absolutely true, and I agree with him because *I* am (or he from his POV) the fact he is talking about, I am conscious therefore it is true that the physical laws of this universe wathever they are allow for the creation of consciousness, at least they allowed mine. You are agreeing with me: Only because he lives in a universe in which the possibility of teleology is fully supported from the start. When you and I say the Laws of Physics in this context, we mean physics in an open ended way which includes 'whatever it takes' to make consciousness. When John Clark says the Laws of Physics, I think that he means the laws which he understands as being the constraining principles of 20th century Physics, such that any notion of consciousness which cannot be explained in the those terms must be nonsense. He didn't say the laws *we know*, he said the physical laws of this universe allow I think that he assumes that the laws of physics are set as we understand them now and no new interpretations which modify them significantly can contradict them. Craig Regards, Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/8uMkGGEpYpwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:14:36 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 08/10/2012, at 3:07 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Absolutely not. We know no such thing. Quite the opposite, we know with relative certainty that what we understand of physics provides no possibility of anything other than more physics. There is no hint of any kind that these laws should lead to any such thing as an 'experience' or awareness of any kind. You beg the question 100% and are 100% incapable of seeing that you are doing it. Well, if it's not the laws of physics then it's something supernatural, isn't it? Not unless you assume that physics is complete. To me, if we have no idea how anything detects anything then we haven't completely understood physics. I assume that nothing can be supernatural. There is nothing that is not nature. This conversation is nature. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/RnMaWeLKvjEJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Maxwell on Metaphysics and Theology
On Sunday, October 7, 2012 8:58:53 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 11:44 PM, Roger Clough rcl...@verizon.netjavascript: wrote: Hi Evgenii Rudnyi I know that, but his theory of electromagnetism is a physical theory, even if it's hard to pin down the extension property. Physical theories can tell us nothing about philosophy or mind or God, since they cannot deal with meaning. Physics is meaningless. You are ideologically committed to say this. Another position is that physics is the source of mind and hence all meaning. To me the obvious solution is that the capacity to discern between subjective and objective sense is clearly more primitive than either physics or God. Physics or Arithmetic alone has no reason to make a mind, and God alone has no manifestation without some manner of experiencing his own awareness and will. Maxwell was right, he just was ahead of his time. His quote ‘*There is action and reaction between body and soul, but it is not of a kind in which energy passes from the one to the other,—as when a man pulls a trigger it is the gunpowder that projects the bullet, or when a pointsman shunts a train it is the rails that bear the thrust*.’ Is precisely, and I mean exactly what my model suggests. *not of a kind in which energy passes from the one to the other*. What he was reaching for here, I am certain, is what I have found in the anomalous symmetry of sense modalities. Electromagnetism is the extended view from the outside in - public orientation which is indirect, while sensorimotor phenomenology is the intended view from the inside out - private orientation which is direct. To understand how subjectivity and objectivity work together, we have to work both from the outside in and the inside out, starting from the middle, which is the event horizon where time 'folds' into space and the personal folds into the impersonal. Perception. The obstacles to this are that we mistake the impersonal (functions of bodies in space, cells, molecules) for the personal (feelings, experiences, qualia) so that we are compelled to explain one in terms of the other rather than seeing them as the simultaneous juxtapositions of each other. We conflate our lack of awareness of sub-personal experiences with the complexity of micro-impersonal functions. We think that the cell is producing the qualia that we see, or that the ideal of the qualia is meaninglessly represented by the functions of the cell, but the truth is that qualia is not produced, it is experienced. We aren't the experience of our brain any more than these words are the experience of your screen pixels. We are the experience *through *the human brain, body, family, species, planet, cells, molecules, etc. It's a completely other side of the universe and it works in exactly the opposite way of 'physics' or mathematics but at the same time physics and mathematics are only the impersonal, extended version of it. Physics and mathematics are logical, generic, universal, mechanistic, public, spatiotemporal. Subjectivity is trans-rational, signifying, proprietary, animistic, private. Can't anyone see that they are clearly juxtaposed as perpendicular conjugates? Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/9oz63FSY-5sJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it but we know for a fact that it can be done. Absolutely not. We know no such thing. We do unless we abandon reason and pretend that the non answers that religion provides actually explain something, or that your Fart Philosophy explains something when it says that consciousness exists because consciousness exists. Computers which have been programmed thus far don't have conscious experiences. Would you agree that is a fact? No, I most certainly do NOT agree that it is a fact that computers are not conscious, nor is it a fact that Craig Weinberg has conscious experiences; it is only a fact that sometimes both behave intelligently. I understand that the capacity to have a conscious experience is inversely proportionate to the capacity fro that experience to be controlled from the outside. So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside environment the less conscious you become. Huh? I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITHOUT consciousness confers a Evolutionary advantage Which fact is that? That intelligent behavior WITHOUT consciousness confers a Evolutionary advantage. Having difficulty with your reading comprehension? Which intelligent behavior do you know that you can be certain exists without any subjective experience associated with it? I am aware of no such behavior. The only intelligent behavior I know with certainty that is always associated with subjective experience is my own. But I know with certainty there are 2 possibilities: 1) Intelligent behavior is always associated with subjective experience, if so then if a computer beats you at any intellectual pursuit then it has a subjective experience, assuming of course that you yourself are intelligent. And I'll let you pick the particular intellectual pursuit for the contest. 2) Intelligent behavior is NOT associated with subjective experience, in which case there is no reason for Evolution to produce consciousness and I have no explanation for why I am here, and I have reason to believe that I am the only conscious being in the universe. I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITH consciousness confers no additional Evolutionary advantage (and if you disagree with that point then you must believe that the Turing Test works for consciousness too and not just intelligence). Yet you think that consciousness must have evolved. Yes. No contradiction there? No contradiction there if consciousness is a byproduct of intelligence, a massive contradiction if it is not; so massive that human beings could not be conscious, and yet I am, and perhaps you are too. You think that every behavior in biology exists purely because of evolution Yes. except consciousness, which you have no explanation for My explanation is that intelligence produces consciousness, I don't know exactly how but if Evolution is true then there is a proof that it does. I know for a fact that Evolution DID produce consciousness at least once, therefore the only conclusion is that consciousness is a byproduct of intelligence. A byproduct that does what??? A byproduct that produces consciousness. Having difficulty with your reading comprehension? who's purpose do you expect Adenine and Thymine to serve? The purpose of their attraction to each other. That's nice, but I repeat, who's purpose do you expect Adenine and Thymine to serve? Where do you think your intelligence to know this comes from? Surely it is the result in large part of Adenine and Thymine's contribution to the intelligence of DNA. If everything (except for some reason computers!) is intelligent, if even simple molecules are intelligent then the word has no meaning and is equivalent to nothing is intelligent or everything is klogknee or nothing is klogknee. Robots are something No, they aren't something. That is just a little too silly to argue. You think that a picture of a pipe is a pipe, so you think that a machine made of things is also a thing. You are incorrect. I think that a picture of a pipe is something, you don't and you are not just incorrect you are silly. I don't experience anything other than awareness So you say. However you won't believe that a computer is conscious regardless of how brilliantly it behaves or how vehemently it insists that it is, so why should I believe you when you claim to be conscious? space intentionally left blank for the supercomputers of the future to come back in time with their super conscious intelligence and join the conversation I don't see the point of that, no matter what they did no matter how brilliantly or nobly they conversed you'd still insist they were not conscious because you think that the elements in their brain
Re: On Zuckerman's paper
Hi Stephen, Bruno, and Jason, Do I understand correctly that comp requires a relative measure on the set of all partial computable functions and that for Steven Both abstractions, such as numbers and their truths, and physical worlds must emerge together from a primitive ground which is neutral in that it has no innate properties at all other that necessary possibility. It merely exists. If so, naively I ask then: Why is beauty, in the imho non-chimeric sense posed by Plotinus in Ennead I.6 On Beauty, not a candidate for approximating that set, or for describing that which has no innate properties? Here the translation from Steven MacKenna: http://eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/beauty.htm Because, what drew me to Zuckerman was just a chance find on youtube... and seeing Infinite descending chains, decorations, self-reference etc. all tied together in a set theory context, I didn't think Wow, that's true but simply hmm, that's nice, maybe they'll elaborate a more precise frame. I know, people want to keep separate art and science. But I am agnostic on this as composing and playing music just bled into engineering and mathematical problems and solutions, as well as programming and the computer on their own. I apologize in advance, if this is off-topic as I find the discussion here fascinating and hate interrupting it. Mark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Conjoined Twins
Have a look at the first few minutes of this show with conjoined twins Abby and Brittany: http://tlc.howstuffworks.com/tv/abby-and-brittany/videos/big-moves.htm You can see that although they do not share the same brain they clearly share aspects of the same mind. They often speak in unison but they can disagree with each other. This can be interpreted to mean that they are similar machines and therefore are able to generate the same functions simultaneously, but then how can they voluntarily disagree? To me, this shows how fundamentally different subjectivity and will is from computation, information, or even physics. Even though I think subjectivity is physical, it's because physics is subjective, and the way that happens is via intention through time, rather than extension across space. The words they say are not being transmitted from inside one skull to another, even though Brittany seems to be echoing Abby in the sense that she is in a more subservient role in expressing what they are saying, the echo is not meaningfully delayed - she is not listening to Abby's words with her ears and then imitating her, she is feeling the meaning of what is being said at nearly the same time. I think that Bruno would say that this illustrates the nonlocality of arithmetic as each person is a universal machine who is processing similar data with similar mechanisms, but I see real-time Quorum Mechanics. They are speaking more or less 'in concert'. Were they machines, I would expect that they could get out of synch. One could just start repeating the other five seconds later, or they could lapse into an infinite regress of echoing. Surely the circuitry of such a rare instrument would not and could not evolve rock solid error corrective anticipation for this. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/TGERtHlMkLIJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
Roger, Monads are everywhere, inside computers as well as humans, rocks and free space. Whatever allows monads to connect to physical objects may be operative for inanimates as well as animates. So the first step is to identify the connecting mechanism. For physical consciousness I conjecture the connection is based on BECs (Bose-Einstein Condensates) in the monadic mind entangled with BECs in the brain. It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs of disparate substances can still be entangled. So once a computer is designed with BECs as in the human brain then it may be capable of consciousness. Richard On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 9:25 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist I may have given that impression, sorry, but a monad can only make what's inside do what it can do. Human and animal monads can both feel, so they can be conscious. But a rock is at best unconscious as it cannot feel or think.\ There's no way to tell what faculties a computer has. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-07, 11:06:17 Subject: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment Roger, If human consciousness comes from attached monads, as I think you have claimed, then why could not these monads attach to sufficiently complex computers as well. Richard On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi John Clark Unless computers can deal with inextended objects such as mind and experience, they cannot be conscious. Consciousness is direct experience, computers can only deal in descriptions of experience. Everything that a computer does is, to my knowledge, at least in principle publicly available, since it uses publicly available symbols or code. Consciousness is direct experience, which cannot be put down in code any more than life can be put down in code. It is personal and not publicly available. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-06, 13:56:30 Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: ?I'm openly saying that a high school kid can make a robot that behaves sensibly with just a few transistors.? ? Only because he lives in a universe in which the possibility of teleology is fully supported from the start. We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it but we know for a fact that it can be done. So how on Earth does that indicate that a conscious computer is not possible? Because it doesn't fart?? ? you have erroneously assumed that intelligence is possible without sense experience. No, I am assuming the exact OPPOSITE! In fact I'm not even assuming, I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITHOUT consciousness confers a Evolutionary advantage, and I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITH consciousness confers no additional Evolutionary advantage (and if you disagree with that point then you must believe that the Turing Test works for consciousness too and not just intelligence). And in spite of all this I know for a fact that Evolution DID produce consciousness at least once, therefore the only conclusion is that consciousness is a byproduct of intellagence. Adenine and Thymine don't have purpose in seeking to bind with each other? I don't even know what a question like that means, who's purpose do you expect Adenine and Thymine to serve? How do you know? I know because I have intelligence and Adenine and Thymine do not know because they have none, they only have cause and effect. How is it different from our purpose in staying in close proximity to places to eat and sleep? And to think that some people berated me for anthropomorphizing future supercomputers and here you are ? anthropomorphizing simple chemicals. Why is everything aware, why isn't everything not aware? Because then we wouldn't be aware of having this conversation. And we are aware of having this conversation because everything is aware, except of course for computers. ? Robots are something? No, they aren't something. That is just a little too silly to argue. ? Everything is awareness Are you certain, I thought everything is klogknee, or maybe its everything is 42. evolution requires that something be alive to begin with. Evolution requires something that can reproduce itself, there is no universally agreed on definition of life so if you want to say that viruses and RNA strings and crystals and clay patterns and Von Neumann
Re: Conjoined Twins
May I suggest that entangled BECs in their brains may allow for more or less instant communication of thoughts, but that one or the other may be able to disentangle and have independent thoughts, or have independent thoughts that are instantly communicated and disagreed with. Just a shot in the dark. Richard On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 12:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Have a look at the first few minutes of this show with conjoined twins Abby and Brittany: http://tlc.howstuffworks.com/tv/abby-and-brittany/videos/big-moves.htm You can see that although they do not share the same brain they clearly share aspects of the same mind. They often speak in unison but they can disagree with each other. This can be interpreted to mean that they are similar machines and therefore are able to generate the same functions simultaneously, but then how can they voluntarily disagree? To me, this shows how fundamentally different subjectivity and will is from computation, information, or even physics. Even though I think subjectivity is physical, it's because physics is subjective, and the way that happens is via intention through time, rather than extension across space. The words they say are not being transmitted from inside one skull to another, even though Brittany seems to be echoing Abby in the sense that she is in a more subservient role in expressing what they are saying, the echo is not meaningfully delayed - she is not listening to Abby's words with her ears and then imitating her, she is feeling the meaning of what is being said at nearly the same time. I think that Bruno would say that this illustrates the nonlocality of arithmetic as each person is a universal machine who is processing similar data with similar mechanisms, but I see real-time Quorum Mechanics. They are speaking more or less 'in concert'. Were they machines, I would expect that they could get out of synch. One could just start repeating the other five seconds later, or they could lapse into an infinite regress of echoing. Surely the circuitry of such a rare instrument would not and could not evolve rock solid error corrective anticipation for this. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/TGERtHlMkLIJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet A response to David Deutsch’s recent article on AGI October 8, 2012 by Ben Goertzel (Credit: iStockphoto) As we noted in a recent post, physicist David Deutsch said the field of “artificial general intelligence” or AGI has made “no progress whatever during the entire six decades of its existence.” We asked Dr. Ben Goertzel, who introduced the term AGI and founded the AGI conference series, to respond. — Ed. Like so many others, I’ve been extremely impressed and fascinated by physicist David Deutsch’s work on quantum computation — a field that he helped found and shape. I also encountered Deutsch’s thinking once in a totally different context — while researching approaches to home schooling my children, I noticed his major role in the Taking Children Seriously movement, which advocates radical unschooling, and generally rates all coercion used against children as immoral. In short, I have frequently admired Deutsch as a creative, gutsy, rational and intriguing thinker. So when I saw he had written an article entitled “Creative blocks: The very laws of physics imply that artificial intelligence must be possible. What’s holding us up?,” I was eager to read it and get his thoughts on my own main area of specialty, artificial general intelligence. Oops. I was curious what Deutsch would have to say about AGI and quantum computing. But he quickly dismisses Penrose and others who think human intelligence relies on neural quantum computing, quantum gravity computing, and what-not. Instead, his article begins with a long, detailed review of the well-known early history of computing, and then argues that the “long record of failure” of the AI field AGI-wise can only be remedied via a breakthrough in epistemology following on from the work of Karl Popper. This bold, eccentric view of AGI is clearly presented in the article, but is not really argued for. This is understandable since we’re talking about a journalistic opinion piece here rather than a journal article or a monograph. But it makes it difficult to respond to Deutsch’s opinions other than by saying “Well, er, no” and then pointing out the stronger arguments that exist in favor of alternative perspectives more commonly held within the AGI research community. I salute David Deutsch’s boldness, in writing and thinking about a field where he obviously doesn’t have much practical grounding. Sometimes the views of outsiders with very different backgrounds can yield surprising insights. But I don’t think this is one of those times. In fact, I think Deutsch’s perspective on AGI is badly mistaken, and if widely adopted, would slow down progress toward AGI dramatically. The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet, I believe, have nothing to do with Popperian philosophy, and everything to do with: The weakness of current computer hardware (rapidly being remedied via exponential technological growth!) The relatively minimal funding allocated to AGI research (which, I agree with Deutsch, should be distinguished from “narrow AI” research on highly purpose-specific AI systems like IBM’s Jeopardy!-playing AI or Google’s self-driving cars). The integration bottleneck: the difficulty of integrating multiple complex components together to make a complex dynamical software system, in cases where the behavior of the integrated system depends sensitively on every one of the components. Assorted nitpicks, quibbles and major criticisms I’ll begin here by pointing out some of the odd and/or erroneous positions that Deutsch maintains in his article. After that, I’ll briefly summarize my own alternative perspective on why we don’t have human-level AGI yet, as alluded to in the above three bullet points. Deutsch begins by bemoaning the AI field’s “long record of failure” at creating AGI — without seriously considering the common counterargument that this record of failure isn’t very surprising, given the weakness of current computers relative to the human brain, and the far greater weakness of the computers available to earlier AI researchers. I actually agree with his statement that the AI field has generally misunderstood the nature of general intelligence. But I don’t think the rate of progress in the AI field, so far, is a very good argument in favor of this statement. There are too many other factors underlying this rate of progress, such as the nature of the available hardware. He also makes a rather strange statement regarding the recent emergence of the AGI movement: The field used to be called “AI” — artificial intelligence. But “AI” was gradually appropriated to describe all sorts of unrelated computer programs such as game players, search engines and chatbots, until the G for ‘general’ was added to make it possible to refer to the real thing again, but now with the implication that an AGI is just a smarter species of chatbot. As the one who introduced the term AGI and founded the AGI conference series, I am perplexed by
Re: Conjoined Twins
On 10/8/2012 12:58 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: May I suggest that entangled BECs in their brains may allow for more or less instant communication of thoughts, but that one or the other may be able to disentangle and have independent thoughts, or have independent thoughts that are instantly communicated and disagreed with. Just a shot in the dark. Hi Richard, You are considered what Stuart Hammeroff has been investigating. ;-) Richard On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 12:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Have a look at the first few minutes of this show with conjoined twins Abby and Brittany: http://tlc.howstuffworks.com/tv/abby-and-brittany/videos/big-moves.htm You can see that although they do not share the same brain they clearly share aspects of the same mind. They often speak in unison but they can disagree with each other. This can be interpreted to mean that they are similar machines and therefore are able to generate the same functions simultaneously, but then how can they voluntarily disagree? To me, this shows how fundamentally different subjectivity and will is from computation, information, or even physics. Even though I think subjectivity is physical, it's because physics is subjective, and the way that happens is via intention through time, rather than extension across space. The words they say are not being transmitted from inside one skull to another, even though Brittany seems to be echoing Abby in the sense that she is in a more subservient role in expressing what they are saying, the echo is not meaningfully delayed - she is not listening to Abby's words with her ears and then imitating her, she is feeling the meaning of what is being said at nearly the same time. I think that Bruno would say that this illustrates the nonlocality of arithmetic as each person is a universal machine who is processing similar data with similar mechanisms, but I see real-time Quorum Mechanics. They are speaking more or less 'in concert'. Were they machines, I would expect that they could get out of synch. One could just start repeating the other five seconds later, or they could lapse into an infinite regress of echoing. Surely the circuitry of such a rare instrument would not and could not evolve rock solid error corrective anticipation for this. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/TGERtHlMkLIJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Monday, October 8, 2012 11:42:02 AM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it but we know for a fact that it can be done. Absolutely not. We know no such thing. We do unless we abandon reason and pretend that the non answers that religion provides actually explain something, or that your Fart Philosophy explains something when it says that consciousness exists because consciousness exists. Computers which have been programmed thus far don't have conscious experiences. Would you agree that is a fact? No, I most certainly do NOT agree that it is a fact that computers are not conscious, nor is it a fact that Craig Weinberg has conscious experiences; it is only a fact that sometimes both behave intelligently. Ok, which computers do you think have conscious experiences? Windows laptops? Deep Blue? Cable TV boxes? Is it a fact that you have conscious experiences? I understand that the capacity to have a conscious experience is inversely proportionate to the capacity fro that experience to be controlled from the outside. So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside environment the less conscious you become. Huh? Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the outside environment does not control you. I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITHOUT consciousness confers a Evolutionary advantage Which fact is that? That intelligent behavior WITHOUT consciousness confers a Evolutionary advantage. Having difficulty with your reading comprehension? I heard that you claim that there is such a fact, but what example or law are you basing this on? Who says this is a fact other than you? Who claims to know that intelligence without consciousness exists? Which intelligent behavior do you know that you can be certain exists without any subjective experience associated with it? I am aware of no such behavior. The only intelligent behavior I know with certainty that is always associated with subjective experience is my own. But I know with certainty there are 2 possibilities: 1) Intelligent behavior is always associated with subjective experience, if so then if a computer beats you at any intellectual pursuit then it has a subjective experience, assuming of course that you yourself are intelligent. And I'll let you pick the particular intellectual pursuit for the contest. 2) Intelligent behavior is NOT associated with subjective experience, in which case there is no reason for Evolution to produce consciousness and I have no explanation for why I am here, and I have reason to believe that I am the only conscious being in the universe. I choose 3) The existence of intelligent behavior is contingent upon recognition and interpretation by a conscious agent. Behavior can be misinterpreted by a conscious agent as having a higher than actual quality of subjectivity when it doesn't (puppets, cartoons, interactive movies and computer programs) and can be misinterpreted as having a lower than actual quality of subjectivity (dropping bombs on foreign cities, thinking people you don't like are less than human, etc). I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITH consciousness confers no additional Evolutionary advantage (and if you disagree with that point then you must believe that the Turing Test works for consciousness too and not just intelligence). Yet you think that consciousness must have evolved. Yes. No contradiction there? No contradiction there if consciousness is a byproduct of intelligence, a massive contradiction if it is not; so massive that human beings could not be conscious, and yet I am, and perhaps you are too. No being that we know of has become conscious by means of intelligence alone. Every conscious being develops sensorimotor and emotional awareness before any cognitive intelligence arises. Babies cry before they talk. Crying intelligent, as it would be much more intelligent to communicate intelligently about what their discomfort is. You think that every behavior in biology exists purely because of evolution Yes. except consciousness, which you have no explanation for My explanation is that intelligence produces consciousness, I don't know exactly how but if Evolution is true then there is a proof that it does. It's begging the question. You assume the cart pushes the horse, and that you don't know how, but that if the cart gets us places then it must be proof that it is true. I know for a fact that Evolution DID produce consciousness at least once, therefore the only conclusion is that consciousness is a byproduct of intelligence. A byproduct that does what??? A byproduct
Re: Conjoined Twins
On Monday, October 8, 2012 12:58:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: May I suggest that entangled BECs in their brains may allow for more or less instant communication of thoughts, but that one or the other may be able to disentangle and have independent thoughts, or have independent thoughts that are instantly communicated and disagreed with. Just a shot in the dark. Richard If that were the case though, then why have a brain? Even twins who are not conjoined speak in unison sometimes. The mind would be much safer entangling it's BECs in the skull or the knee cap, or in the stratosphere somewhere. Craig On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 12:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Have a look at the first few minutes of this show with conjoined twins Abby and Brittany: http://tlc.howstuffworks.com/tv/abby-and-brittany/videos/big-moves.htm You can see that although they do not share the same brain they clearly share aspects of the same mind. They often speak in unison but they can disagree with each other. This can be interpreted to mean that they are similar machines and therefore are able to generate the same functions simultaneously, but then how can they voluntarily disagree? To me, this shows how fundamentally different subjectivity and will is from computation, information, or even physics. Even though I think subjectivity is physical, it's because physics is subjective, and the way that happens is via intention through time, rather than extension across space. The words they say are not being transmitted from inside one skull to another, even though Brittany seems to be echoing Abby in the sense that she is in a more subservient role in expressing what they are saying, the echo is not meaningfully delayed - she is not listening to Abby's words with her ears and then imitating her, she is feeling the meaning of what is being said at nearly the same time. I think that Bruno would say that this illustrates the nonlocality of arithmetic as each person is a universal machine who is processing similar data with similar mechanisms, but I see real-time Quorum Mechanics. They are speaking more or less 'in concert'. Were they machines, I would expect that they could get out of synch. One could just start repeating the other five seconds later, or they could lapse into an infinite regress of echoing. Surely the circuitry of such a rare instrument would not and could not evolve rock solid error corrective anticipation for this. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/TGERtHlMkLIJ. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript:. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/BnFdcSddGqEJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
How David Deutsch can watch a computer beat the 2 best human Jeopardy! players on planet Earth and then say that AI has made “no progress whatever during the entire six decades of its existence” is a complete mystery to me. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On 10/8/2012 8:42 AM, John Clark wrote: 2) Intelligent behavior is NOT associated with subjective experience, in which case there is no reason for Evolution to produce consciousness and I have no explanation for why I am here, and I have reason to believe that I am the only conscious being in the universe. There's a third possibility: Intelligent behavior is sometimes associated with subjective experience and sometimes not. Evolution may have produced consciousness as a spandrel, an accident of the particular developmental path that evolution happened upon. Or it may be that consciousness is necessarily associated with only certain kinds of intelligent behavior, e.g. those related to language. Bretn -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside environment the less conscious you become. Huh? Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the outside environment does not control you. How could you possibly know that, considering that John has accumulated many years of stimulation? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
On 10/8/2012 1:13 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: except from /The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet/ A response to David Deutsch’s recent article on AGI October 8, 2012 by Ben Goertzel So in this view, the main missing ingredient in AGI so far is “cognitive synergy”: the fitting-together of different intelligent components into an appropriate cognitive architecture, in such a way that the components richly and dynamically support and assist each other, interrelating very closely in a similar manner to the components of the brain or body and thus giving rise to appropriate emergent structures and dynamics. The reason this sort of intimate integration has not yet been explored much is that it’s difficult on multiple levels, requiring the design of an architecture and its component algorithms with a view toward the structures and dynamics that will arise in the system once it is coupled with an appropriate environment. Typically, the AI algorithms and structures corresponding to different cognitive functions have been developed based on divergent theoretical principles, by disparate communities of researchers, and have been tuned for effective performance on different tasks in different environments. Making such diverse components work together in a truly synergetic and cooperative way is a tall order, yet my own suspicion is that this — rather than some particular algorithm, structure or architectural principle — is the “secret sauce” needed to create human-level AGI based on technologies available today. Achieving this sort of cognitive-synergetic integration of AGI components is the focus of the OpenCog AGI project that I co-founded several years ago. We’re a long way from human adult level AGI yet, but we have a detailed design and codebase and roadmap for getting there. Wish us luck! Hi Richard, My suspicion is that what is needed here, if we can put on our programmer hats, is the programer's version of a BEC, Bose-Einstein Condensate, where every part is an integrated reflection of the whole. My own idea is that some form of algebraic and/or topological closure is required to achieve this as inspired by the Brouwer Fixed point theorem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brouwer_fixed-point_theorem. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Monday, October 8, 2012 1:35:31 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 8:42 AM, John Clark wrote: 2) Intelligent behavior is NOT associated with subjective experience, in which case there is no reason for Evolution to produce consciousness and I have no explanation for why I am here, and I have reason to believe that I am the only conscious being in the universe. There's a third possibility: Intelligent behavior is sometimes associated with subjective experience and sometimes not. Evolution may have produced consciousness as a spandrel, an accident of the particular developmental path that evolution happened upon. Or it may be that consciousness is necessarily associated with only certain kinds of intelligent behavior, e.g. those related to language. You are almost right but have it upside down. When someone gets knocked unconscious, can they continue to behave intelligently? Can a baby wake up from a nap and become conscious before they learn language? What would lead us to presume that consciousness itself could supervene on intelligence except if we were holding on to a functionalist metaphysics? Clearly human intelligence in each individual supervenes on their consciousness and clearly supercomputers can't feel any pain or show any signs of fatigue that would suggest a state of physical awareness despite their appearances of 'intelligence'. If you flip it over though, you are right. Everything is conscious to some extent, but not everything is intelligent in a cognitive sense. The assumption of strong AI is that we can take the low hanging fruit of primitive consciousness and attach it to the tree tops of anthropological quality intelligence and it will grow a new tree into outer space. Craig Bretn -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ij3bVaKTduQJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside environment the less conscious you become. Huh? Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the outside environment does not control you. How could you possibly know that, considering that John has accumulated many years of stimulation? Just look at the Conjoined Twins video I posted. Those two people are genetically identical, occupy the same body, experience stimulation that is very similar, yet they *routinely* disagree. Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/D6i59u2_rdEJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
Deutsch is right about the need to advance in Popperian epistemology, which ultimately is evolutionary epistemology. How evolution makes a portion of matter ascertain what is truth in virtue of what and for what purpose. The idea of intelligence need a knowledge of what is truth but also a motive for acting and therefore using this intelligence. if there is no purpose there is no acting, if no act, no selection of intelligent behaviours if no evolution, no intelligence. Not only intelligence is made for acting accoding with arbitrary purpose: It has evolved from the selection of resulting behaviours for precise purposes. an ordinary purpose is non separable from other purposes that are coordinated for a particular superior purpose, but the chain of reasoning and actng means tthat a designed intelligent robot also need an ultimate purpose. otherwise it would be a sequencer and achiever of disconnected goals at a certain level where the goals would never have coordination, that is it would be not intelligent. This is somewhat different ffom humans, because much of our goals are hardcoded and non accessible to introspection, although we can use evolutionary reasoning for obtaining falsable hypothesis about apparently irrational behaviour, like love, anger aestetics, pleasure and so on. However men are from time to time asking themselves for the deep meaning of what he does. specially when a whole chain of goals have failed, so he is a in a bottleneck. Because this is the right thing to do for intelligent beings. A true intelligent being therefore has existential, moral and belief problems. If an artificial intelligent being has these problems, the designed as solved the problem of AGI to the most deeper level. An AGI designed has no such core engine of impulses and perceptions that drive, in the first place, intelligence to action: curiosity, fame and respect, power, social navigation instimcts. It has to start from scratch. Concerning perceptions, a man has hardwired perceptions that create meaning: There is part of brain circuitry at various levels that make it feel that a person in front of him is another person. But really it is its evolved circuitry what makes the impression that that is a person and that this is true, instead of a bunch of moving atoms. Popperian Evoluitionary epistemology build from this. All of this link computer science with philosophy at the deeper level. Another comment concerning design: The evolutionary designs are different from rational designs. The modularity in rartional design arises from the fact that reason can not reason with many variables at the same time. Reason uses divide an conquer. Object oriented design, modual architecture and so on are a consequence of that limitation. These design are understandable by other humans, but they are not the most effcient. In contrast, modularity in evolution is functional. That means that if a brain structure is near other in the brain forming a greater structuture it is for reasons of efficiency, not for reasons of modularity. the interfaces between modules are not discrete, but pervasive. This makes essentially a reverse engineering of the brain inpossible. 2012/10/8 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com How David Deutsch can watch a computer beat the 2 best human Jeopardy! players on planet Earth and then say that AI has made “no progress whatever during the entire six decades of its existence” is a complete mystery to me. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
Deutsch is right. Searle is right. Genuine AGI can only come when thoughts are driven by feeling and will rather than programmatic logic. It's a fundamental misunderstanding to assume that feeling can be generated by equipment which is incapable of caring about itself. Without personal investment, there is no drive to develop right hemisphere awareness - to look around for enemies and friends, to be vigilant. These kinds of capacities cannot be burned into ROM, they have to be discovered through unscripted participation. They have to be able to lie and have a reason to do so. I'm not sure about Deutsch's purported Popper fetish, but if that's true, I can see why that would be the case. My hunch is that although Ben Goertzel is being fair to Deutsch, he may be distorting Deutsch's position somewhat as far as I question that he is suggesting that we invest in developing Philosophy instead of technology. Maybe he is, but it seems like an exaggeration. It seems to me that Deutsch is advocating the very reasonable position that we evaluate our progress with AGI before doubling down on the same strategy for the next 60 years. Nobody whats to cut off AGI funding - certainly not me, I just think that the approach has become unscientific and sentimental like alchemists with their dream of turning lead into gold. Start playing with biology and maybe you'll have something. It will be a little messier though, since with biology and unlike with silicon computers, when you start getting close to something with human like intelligence, people tend to object when you leave twitching half-persons moaning around the laboratory. You will know you have real AGI because there will be a lot of people screaming. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/-iG7-y2ddXsJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring of bottom-up sensory info
Bruno: It could be that the indeterminacy in the I means that everything else is not a machine, but supposedly, an hallucination. But this hallucination has a well defined set of mathematical properties that are communicable to other hallucinated expectators. This means that something is keeping the picture coherent. If that something is not computation or computations, what is the nature of this well behaving hallucination according with your point of view? 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 07 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Hi Roger: ... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary psychology (that study the software or mind) assert that this is true. Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be shown contradictory(*). The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, mathematical nature of the laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane). OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the neoplatonists already did. I don´t assume either if this mathematical nature is or not the ultimate nature or reality Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like new person, and it put only more mess in Platonia. Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind along the line of life in space-time) make use a sort of duality in category theory between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as Stephen told me and he can explain you) . Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and matter are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more that matter is an iceberg tip of reality. Even if matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if matter? Without the rest (water), there would be no iceberg and no tip! do we can know about it this submerged computational nature? In science we never know. But we can bet on comp, and then, we can know relatively to that bet-theory. So with comp we know that the rest is the external and internal math structures in arithmetic. which phenomena produce the submerged part of this iceberg in the one that we perceive?. Arithmetic gives the submerged part. The UD complete execution gives it too. The emerged part is given by the first person indeterminacy. Multiverse hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs, but this is a way to avoid God and to continue with the speculative business. What the computational nature of reality tries to explain or to avoid? . May be you answered this questions a number of times, ( even to me and I did not realize it) Careful. Comp makes the observable reality of physics, and the non observable reality of the mind, NON computational. Indeed it needs a God (arithmetical truth). It explains also why God is NOT arithmetical truth as we usually defined it (it is only an approximation). By the way, Bruno, you try to demolish physicalism from below by proposing a computational theory of ultimate reality. Not at all. many are confuse about this. This is the confusion between comp and digital physics. Comp is just the bet that I am a machine. Not that reality is computational. Comp makes reality ultra-non-computational, like arithmetical truth is already ultra-non-computational. The computational = Sigma_1 complete. Above it is not computational, and arithmetical truth is the union of all sigma_i (Sigma_0 U Sigma_1 Sigma_3 U Sigma_4 U Sigma_5 U Sigma_6 U Sigma_7 U ...). Digital physics, although perhaps useful, is contradictory at the start, as it implies comp, but if you get the UDA, you can understand that comp entails non digital physics. By transitivity, this shows that Digital physics entails non-digital physics, and so digital physics is refuted (with or without comp). I try to demolish it from above, by proposing that perceptions are the effect of computation in living beings for survival . OK.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside environment the less conscious you become. Huh? Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the outside environment does not control you. How could you possibly know that, considering that John has accumulated many years of stimulation? Just look at the Conjoined Twins video I posted. Those two people are genetically identical, occupy the same body, experience stimulation that is very similar, yet they *routinely* disagree. Similar isn't the same. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations
*RS:I'm not sure how that comment is restricted to anything???* JM: I think it is: to practicality. I allowed myself to be in the ivory tower. J On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 8:09 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Fri, Oct 05, 2012 at 03:58:13PM -0400, John Mikes wrote: Russell, you seem to be restricted by OUR model-items, so far discovered. I call 'magic' the so far undiscovered, which - however - may become known later on. Then it is not magic. It would be the last thing to engage with you in discussing AL, but it seems you consider a limited one: *RS: (ALife researcher at least have the liberty of researching any interesting emergent phenomenon without having any particular emergent phenomenon in mind).* Restricted to the so far emerged ones? or those not showing up in our limited search (fantasy)? John M What I meant by this, is if you assemble some system, and produce (or discover) some emergent phenomenon, then that would be a legitimate ALife study. Particularly, if there is some vague working analogy with life. By contrast, if you assemble an ecomomy of agents, but the emergent economy doesn't behave in the slightest like the economy your trying to model, then you can hardly claim to be doing economics. I'm not sure how that comment is restricted to anything??? -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:38:42 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside environment the less conscious you become. Huh? Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the outside environment does not control you. How could you possibly know that, considering that John has accumulated many years of stimulation? Just look at the Conjoined Twins video I posted. Those two people are genetically identical, occupy the same body, experience stimulation that is very similar, yet they *routinely* disagree. Similar isn't the same. But the behavior varies in similarity while their stimulation does not. Clearly they are each controlling their own behavior separately, even though the degree to which their stimulation from the outside world does not vary separately. If the internal conditions were sufficient to allow their control strategies to diverge, then they should not re-synchronize again and again constantly. Each difference should build on each other, like two slightly different fractal kernels wouldn't weave in and out of perfect synch all the time, they would follow completely anomalous paths. The fractals might look like the are exploring different patterns (if even that) but it seems like they would not keep going back to isomorphic patterns at the same time. Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/thWJvtDb6ugJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
On 10/8/2012 11:45 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Deutsch is right about the need to advance in Popperian epistemology, which ultimately is evolutionary epistemology. How evolution makes a portion of matter ascertain what is truth in virtue of what and for what purpose. The idea of intelligence need a knowledge of what is truth but also a motive for acting and therefore using this intelligence. if there is no purpose there is no acting, if no act, no selection of intelligent behaviours if no evolution, no intelligence. Not only intelligence is made for acting accoding with arbitrary purpose: It has evolved from the selection of resulting behaviours for precise purposes. an ordinary purpose is non separable from other purposes that are coordinated for a particular superior purpose, but the chain of reasoning and actng means tthat a designed intelligent robot also need an ultimate purpose. otherwise it would be a sequencer and achiever of disconnected goals at a certain level where the goals would never have coordination, that is it would be not intelligent. I agree that intelligence cannot be separated from purpose. I think that's why projects aimed at creating AGI flounder - a general purpose tends to be no purpose at all. But I'm not so sure about an ultimate goal, at least not in the sense of a single goal. I can imagine an intelligent robot who has several high-level goals that are to be satisfied by not necessarily summed or otherwise combined into a single goal. This is somewhat different ffom humans, because much of our goals are hardcoded and non accessible to introspection, although we can use evolutionary reasoning for obtaining falsable hypothesis about apparently irrational behaviour, like love, anger aestetics, pleasure and so on. There's no reason to give a Mars Rover introspective knowledge of its hardcoded goals. A robot would only need introspective knowledge of goals if there were the possibility of changing them - i.e. not hardcoded. However men are from time to time asking themselves for the deep meaning of what he does. specially when a whole chain of goals have failed, so he is a in a bottleneck. Because this is the right thing to do for intelligent beings. A true intelligent being therefore has existential, moral and belief problems. If an artificial intelligent being has these problems, the designed as solved the problem of AGI to the most deeper level. I think it's a matter of depth. A human is generally more complex and has hierarchy of goals. A dead end in trying to satisfy some goal occasions reflection on how that goal relates to some higher goal; how to back track. So a Mars Rover may find itself in a box canyon so that it has to back track and this makes its journey to the objective too far to reach before winter and so it has to select a secondary objective point to reach. But it can't reflect on whether gathering data an transmitting it is good or not. An AGI designed has no such core engine of impulses and perceptions that drive, in the first place, intelligence to action: curiosity, fame and respect, power, social navigation instimcts. It has to start from scratch. Concerning perceptions, a man has hardwired perceptions that create meaning: There is part of brain circuitry at various levels that make it feel that a person in front of him is another person. But really it is its evolved circuitry what makes the impression that that is a person and that this is true, instead of a bunch of moving atoms. Popperian Evoluitionary epistemology build from this. All of this link computer science with philosophy at the deeper level. And because man evolved as a social animal he is hard wired to want to exchange knowledge with other humans. Another comment concerning design: The evolutionary designs are different from rational designs. The modularity in rartional design arises from the fact that reason can not reason with many variables at the same time. Reason uses divide an conquer. Object oriented design, modual architecture and so on are a consequence of that limitation. These design are understandable by other humans, but they are not the most effcient. In contrast, modularity in evolution is functional. That means that if a brain structure is near other in the brain forming a greater structuture it is for reasons of efficiency, Are saying spatial modularity implies functional modularity? not for reasons of modularity. No it may be for reasons of adaptability. Evolution has no way to reason about efficiency or even a measure of efficiency. It can only try random variations and copy ones that work. the interfaces between modules are not discrete, but pervasive. This makes essentially a reverse engineering of the brain inpossible. And not even desirable. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
Universe on a Chip
If the universe were a simulation, would the constant speed of light correspond to the clock speed driving the simulation? In other words, the “CPU speed?” As we are “inside” the simulation, all attempts to measure the speed of the simulation appear as a constant value. Light “executes” (what we call “movement”) at one instruction per cycle. Any device we built to attempt to measure the speed of light is also inside the simulation, so even though the “outside” CPU clock could be changing speed, we will always see it as the same constant value. A “cycle” is how long it takes all the information in the universe to update itself relative to each other. That is all the speed of light really is. The speed of information updating in the universe… (more herehttp://www.quora.com/Physics/If-the-universe-were-a-simulation-would-the-constant-speed-of-light-correspond-to-the-clock-speed-driving-the-simulation-In-other-words-the-CPU-speed?__snids__=6179http://www.quora.com/Physics/If-the-universe-were-a-simulation-would-the-constant-speed-of-light-correspond-to-the-clock-speed-driving-the-simulation-In-other-words-the-CPU-speed?) I can make the leap from CPU clock frequency to the speed of light in a vacuum if I view light as an experienced event or energy state which occurs local to matter rather than literally traveling through space. With this view, the correlation between distance and latency is an organizational one, governing sequence and priority of processing rather than the presumed literal existence of racing light bodies (photons). This would be consistent with your model of Matrix-universe on a meta-universal CPU in that light speed is simply the frequency at which the computer processes raw bits. The change of light speed when propagating through matter or gravitational fields etc wouldn’t be especially consistent with this model…why would the ghost of a supernova slow down the cosmic computer in one area of memory, etc? The model that I have been developing suggests however that the CPU model would not lead to realism or significance though, and could only generate unconscious data manipulations. In order to have symbol grounding in genuine awareness, I think that instead of a CPU cranking away rendering the entire cosmos over and over as a bulwark against nothingness, I think that the cosmos must be rooted in stasis. Silence. Solitude. This is not nothingness however, it is everythingness. A universal inertial frame which loses nothing but rather continuously expands within itself by taking no action at all. The universe doesn’t need to be racing to mechanically redraw the cosmos over and over because what it has drawn already has no place to disappear to. It can only seem to disappear through… … … … latency. The universe as we know it then arises out of nested latencies. A meta-diffraction of symmetrically juxtaposed latency-generating methodologies. Size, scale, distance, mass, and density on the public side, richness, depth, significance, and complexity on the private side. Through these complications, the cosmic CPU is cast as a theoretical shadow, when the deeper reality is that rather than zillions of cycles per second, the real mainframe is the slowest possible computer. It can never complete even one cycle. How can it, when it has all of these subroutines that need to complete their cycles first? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/KR2n8we7P6wJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On 10/8/2012 1:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:38:42 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside environment the less conscious you become. Huh? Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the outside environment does not control you. How could you possibly know that, considering that John has accumulated many years of stimulation? Just look at the Conjoined Twins video I posted. Those two people are genetically identical, occupy the same body, experience stimulation that is very similar, yet they *routinely* disagree. Similar isn't the same. But the behavior varies in similarity while their stimulation does not. Sure it does. They are not in exactly the same place. Haven't you heard of chaotic dynamics. Even perfectly identical systems can diverge in behavior due to infinitesimal differences in stimulation. Clearly they are each controlling their own behavior separately, even though the degree to which their stimulation from the outside world does not vary separately. But you don't know that. You are just looking at the current stimulation. Yet their behavior, even their internal structure, has been molded by different stimulations since they were embryos. If the internal conditions were sufficient to allow their control strategies to diverge, then they should not re-synchronize again and again constantly. Each difference should build on each other, like two slightly different fractal kernels wouldn't weave in and out of perfect synch all the time, they would follow completely anomalous paths. The fractals might look like the are exploring different patterns (if even that) but it seems like they would not keep going back to isomorphic patterns at the same time. Why not? Seems like is just your intuition. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Monday, October 8, 2012 4:57:08 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 1:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:38:42 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside environment the less conscious you become. Huh? Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the outside environment does not control you. How could you possibly know that, considering that John has accumulated many years of stimulation? Just look at the Conjoined Twins video I posted. Those two people are genetically identical, occupy the same body, experience stimulation that is very similar, yet they *routinely* disagree. Similar isn't the same. But the behavior varies in similarity while their stimulation does not. Sure it does. They are not in exactly the same place. That's true but irrelevant. If they move to the left two feet so that Brittany is in Abby's position, Brittany doesn't become Abby. We are talking about two people in the same body who act the same sometimes and completely different other times. This is not the result in air pressure differences in the room or the angle of incidence on their retina. Haven't you heard of chaotic dynamics. Even perfectly identical systems can diverge in behavior due to infinitesimal differences in stimulation. Sure, but do they then converge again and again? Clearly they are each controlling their own behavior separately, even though the degree to which their stimulation from the outside world does not vary separately. But you don't know that. You are just looking at the current stimulation. Yet their behavior, even their internal structure, has been molded by different stimulations since they were embryos. I agree, they are different. How do they know how to speak in unison sometimes and they argue with each other at other times? If the internal conditions were sufficient to allow their control strategies to diverge, then they should not re-synchronize again and again constantly. Each difference should build on each other, like two slightly different fractal kernels wouldn't weave in and out of perfect synch all the time, they would follow completely anomalous paths. The fractals might look like the are exploring different patterns (if even that) but it seems like they would not keep going back to isomorphic patterns at the same time. Why not? Seems like is just your intuition. So is consciousness. Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/QcLTYOpzxjwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On 10/8/2012 2:10 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 4:57:08 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 1:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:38:42 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside environment the less conscious you become. Huh? Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the outside environment does not control you. How could you possibly know that, considering that John has accumulated many years of stimulation? Just look at the Conjoined Twins video I posted. Those two people are genetically identical, occupy the same body, experience stimulation that is very similar, yet they *routinely* disagree. Similar isn't the same. But the behavior varies in similarity while their stimulation does not. Sure it does. They are not in exactly the same place. That's true but irrelevant. If they move to the left two feet so that Brittany is in Abby's position, Brittany doesn't become Abby. Because they're not in the same place in SPACETIME. We are talking about two people in the same body who act the same sometimes and completely different other times. This is not the result in air pressure differences in the room or the angle of incidence on their retina. How do you know that? There are differences and differences can be amplified. Even K_40 decays in their brain could trigger different thoughts. Haven't you heard of chaotic dynamics. Even perfectly identical systems can diverge in behavior due to infinitesimal differences in stimulation. Sure, but do they then converge again and again? Clearly they are each controlling their own behavior separately, even though the degree to which their stimulation from the outside world does not vary separately. But you don't know that. You are just looking at the current stimulation. Yet their behavior, even their internal structure, has been molded by different stimulations since they were embryos. I agree, they are different. How do they know how to speak in unison sometimes and they argue with each other at other times? The brain is modular. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 01:13:35PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet A response to David Deutsch’s recent article on AGI October 8, 2012 by Ben Goertzel Thanks for posting this, Richard. I was thinking of writing my own detailed response to David Deutsch's op ed, but Ben Goertzel has done such a good job, I now don't have to! My response, similar to Ben's is that David does not convincingly explain why Popperian epistemology is the secret sauce. In fact, it is not even at all obvious how to practically apply Popperian epistemology to the task at hand. Until some more detailed practical proposal is put forward, the best I can say is, meh, I'll believe it when it happens. The problem that exercises me (when I get a chance to exercise it) is that of creativity. David Deutsch correctly identifies that this is one of the main impediments to AGI. Yet biological evolution is a creative process, one for which epistemology apparently has no role at all. Continuous, open-ended creativity in evolution is considered the main problem in Artificial Life (and perhaps other fields). Solving it may be the work of a single moment of inspiration (I wish), but more likely it will involve incremental advances in topics such as information, complexity, emergence and other such partly philosophical topics before we even understand what it means for something to be open-ended creative. Popperian epistemology, to the extent it has a role, will come much further down the track. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Monday, October 8, 2012 5:19:03 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 2:10 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 4:57:08 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 1:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 3:38:42 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 11:25 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 8, 2012 2:19:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/8/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So the more stimulation you get through your senses of the outside environment the less conscious you become. Huh? Stimulation that you get thorough your senses of the outside environment does not control you. How could you possibly know that, considering that John has accumulated many years of stimulation? Just look at the Conjoined Twins video I posted. Those two people are genetically identical, occupy the same body, experience stimulation that is very similar, yet they *routinely* disagree. Similar isn't the same. But the behavior varies in similarity while their stimulation does not. Sure it does. They are not in exactly the same place. That's true but irrelevant. If they move to the left two feet so that Brittany is in Abby's position, Brittany doesn't become Abby. Because they're not in the same place in SPACETIME. That doesn't stop them from thinking and speaking in unison. We are talking about two people in the same body who act the same sometimes and completely different other times. This is not the result in air pressure differences in the room or the angle of incidence on their retina. How do you know that? There are differences and differences can be amplified. Even K_40 decays in their brain could trigger different thoughts. It's absurd. It's like saying that you would become your twin brother for a half hour if you got too close to a microwave. Identity is incredibly resilient and incredibly flexible. The toy model of identity you are operating from does not fit the reality of what you can see with your own eyes. They are just who they appear to be. They are not experiencing slightly different stimulations which cause them to be in complete agreement sometimes and opposition at other times. Look at how they act. Each is generating their own opinions and tastes. Could their personalities be shaped by their different positions relative to their torso? Sure, but that would only make them more utterly separate from each other. Haven't you heard of chaotic dynamics. Even perfectly identical systems can diverge in behavior due to infinitesimal differences in stimulation. Sure, but do they then converge again and again? :) Clearly they are each controlling their own behavior separately, even though the degree to which their stimulation from the outside world does not vary separately. But you don't know that. You are just looking at the current stimulation. Yet their behavior, even their internal structure, has been molded by different stimulations since they were embryos. I agree, they are different. How do they know how to speak in unison sometimes and they argue with each other at other times? The brain is modular. That's your intuition. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=a-new-phrenology http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10932482 Even if it were, arguing and and speaking in unison would surely involve the same modules or modules which are stimulated in the same way. Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/LRUg1suobEIJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 1:39 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Well, if it's not the laws of physics then it's something supernatural, isn't it? Not unless you assume that physics is complete. To me, if we have no idea how anything detects anything then we haven't completely understood physics. I assume that nothing can be supernatural. There is nothing that is not nature. This conversation is nature. There is no assumption that our knowledge of physics is complete; in fact if there were that assumption there would be no point in being a physicist, would there? As a matter of fact I believe that the basic physics of the brain has been understood for a long time and I challenge you to point out one thing that has been discovered in neuroscience which would surprise a chemist from the middle of last century. But that is not relevant to this discussion. The question is whether the physics of the brain, known or unknown, is computable. If it is, then in theory a computer could be just as intelligent as a human. If it isn't, then a computer would always have some deficit compared to a human. Maybe it would never be able to play the violin, cut your hair or write a book as well as a human. This is apparently what you think, but you have not presented any evidence for this non-computable physics. It's just an assumption you make. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: [foar] Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
On 10/8/2012 5:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 01:13:35PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet A response to David Deutsch’s recent article on AGI October 8, 2012 by Ben Goertzel Thanks for posting this, Richard. I was thinking of writing my own detailed response to David Deutsch's op ed, but Ben Goertzel has done such a good job, I now don't have to! My response, similar to Ben's is that David does not convincingly explain why Popperian epistemology is the secret sauce. In fact, it is not even at all obvious how to practically apply Popperian epistemology to the task at hand. Until some more detailed practical proposal is put forward, the best I can say is, meh, I'll believe it when it happens. The problem that exercises me (when I get a chance to exercise it) is that of creativity. David Deutsch correctly identifies that this is one of the main impediments to AGI. Yet biological evolution is a creative process, one for which epistemology apparently has no role at all. Continuous, open-ended creativity in evolution is considered the main problem in Artificial Life (and perhaps other fields). Solving it may be the work of a single moment of inspiration (I wish), but more likely it will involve incremental advances in topics such as information, complexity, emergence and other such partly philosophical topics before we even understand what it means for something to be open-ended creative. Popperian epistemology, to the extent it has a role, will come much further down the track. Cheers Hi Russell, Question: Why has little if any thought been given in AGI to self-modeling and some capacity to track the model of self under the evolutionary transformations? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: [foar] Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 06:49:12PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Russell, Question: Why has little if any thought been given in AGI to self-modeling and some capacity to track the model of self under the evolutionary transformations? Its not my field - general evolutionary processes are not self-aware, or self- anything, in general. But Hod Lipson has developed some (rather crude IMHO) self-aware robots (in the shape of a starfish, for some strange reason). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Monday, October 8, 2012 5:51:56 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 1:39 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Well, if it's not the laws of physics then it's something supernatural, isn't it? Not unless you assume that physics is complete. To me, if we have no idea how anything detects anything then we haven't completely understood physics. I assume that nothing can be supernatural. There is nothing that is not nature. This conversation is nature. There is no assumption that our knowledge of physics is complete; in fact if there were that assumption there would be no point in being a physicist, would there? As a matter of fact I believe that the basic physics of the brain has been understood for a long time and I challenge you to point out one thing that has been discovered in neuroscience which would surprise a chemist from the middle of last century. What you are saying is 'nobody thinks physics is complete', followed by 'everybody knows that the physics of the brain has been complete for a long time'. This not only supports my point, but it brings up the more important point - the blindness of robustly left-hemisphere thinkers to identify their own capacity for denial. For me it's like a split brained experiment. I say 'the problem is that people think physics is complete' and you say 'no they don't. You can't show me any signs that physics of the brain isn't complete.' Total disconnect. You'll keep denying it too. Not your fault either, apparently, that's just the way a lot of intelligent people are wired. I have no idea if it's possible for people to consciously overcome that tendency...it would be like glimpsing yourself in the mirror before your image actually turned around. But that is not relevant to this discussion. The question is whether the physics of the brain, known or unknown, is computable. If it is, If the physics of the brain is incomplete, then how could we say whether it is computable or not? To me, the color red is physical, so that any computation of the brain has to arrive at a computational result that is [the experience of seeing red]. I don't think that is remotely possible. then in theory a computer could be just as intelligent as a human. If it isn't, then a computer would always have some deficit compared to a human. Maybe it would never be able to play the violin, cut your hair or write a book as well as a human. The deficiency is that it couldn't feel. It could impersonate a violin player, but it would lack character and passion, gravitas, presence. Just like whirling CGI graphics of pseudo-metallic transparent reflecty crap. It's empty and weightless. Can't you tell? Can't you see that? Again, I should not expect everyone to be able to see that. I guess I can only understand that I see that and know that you can see a lot of things that I can't as well. In your mind there is no reason that we can't eat broken glass for breakfast if we install synthetic stomach lining that doesn't know the difference between food and glass. Nothing I can say will give you pause or question your reasoning, because indeed, the reasoning is internally consistent. This is apparently what you think, but you have not presented any evidence for this non-computable physics. It's just an assumption you make. We are the evidence. Our own consciousness is an assumption that we have no choice but to make. The capacity to judge evidence supervenes on the assumption of consciousness, of the color red, of self and other, symmetry, etc. Evidence is wa down the list of derivative effects. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/UJOZq77HVMsJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: [foar] Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
On 10/8/2012 7:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 06:49:12PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Russell, Question: Why has little if any thought been given in AGI to self-modeling and some capacity to track the model of self under the evolutionary transformations? Its not my field - general evolutionary processes are not self-aware, or self- anything, in general. But Hod Lipson has developed some (rather crude IMHO) self-aware robots (in the shape of a starfish, for some strange reason). Cheers But would that not make an AGI just a glorified calculator? I am very interested in Lipson's work! I cannot find his latest research... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Zuckerman's paper
On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 10:58 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Stephen, Bruno, and Jason, Do I understand correctly that comp requires a relative measure on the set of all partial computable functions and that for Steven Both abstractions, such as numbers and their truths, and physical worlds must emerge together from a primitive ground which is neutral in that it has no innate properties at all other that necessary possibility. It merely exists. If so, naively I ask then: Why is beauty, in the imho non-chimeric sense posed by Plotinus in Ennead I.6 On Beauty, not a candidate for approximating that set, or for describing that which has no innate properties? Here the translation from Steven MacKenna: http://eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/beauty.htm Because, what drew me to Zuckerman was just a chance find on youtube... and seeing Infinite descending chains, decorations, self-reference etc. all tied together in a set theory context, I didn't think Wow, that's true but simply hmm, that's nice, maybe they'll elaborate a more precise frame. I know, people want to keep separate art and science. But I am agnostic on this as composing and playing music just bled into engineering and mathematical problems and solutions, as well as programming and the computer on their own. I apologize in advance, if this is off-topic as I find the discussion here fascinating and hate interrupting it. Mark Mark, To what extent does beauty exist in the mind of the beholder? As Dennet points out ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TzN-uIVkfjgt=3m29s ) what we find sweet, beautiful, or cute, we do so because our brains are wired in a particular way. Some find certain properties of scientific theories or mathematical proofs to be particularly beautiful. When they are short, surprising, elegant, deep, etc. These may or not be attributes of the true TOE. If they are, then we some might say that which is the ground for all existence is beautiful, and some others might take it further and say beauty is is the ground of existence. Whether or not we could ever take it beyond that metaphor, I am less certain. It may require a rigorous and objective definition of beauty first. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Zuckerman's paper
On 10/8/2012 10:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 10:58 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com mailto:multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Stephen, Bruno, and Jason, Do I understand correctly that comp requires a relative measure on the set of all partial computable functions and that for Steven Both abstractions, such as numbers and their truths, and physical worlds must emerge together from a primitive ground which is neutral in that it has no innate properties at all other that necessary possibility. It merely exists. If so, naively I ask then: Why is beauty, in the imho non-chimeric sense posed by Plotinus in Ennead I.6 On Beauty, not a candidate for approximating that set, or for describing that which has no innate properties? Here the translation from Steven MacKenna: http://eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/beauty.htm Hi Mark, Only a compound can be beautiful, never anything devoid of parts; and only a whole; the several parts will have beauty, not in themselves, but only as working together to give a comely total. Because, what drew me to Zuckerman was just a chance find on youtube... and seeing Infinite descending chains, decorations, self-reference etc. all tied together in a set theory context, I didn't think Wow, that's true but simply hmm, that's nice, maybe they'll elaborate a more precise frame. I know, people want to keep separate art and science. But I am agnostic on this as composing and playing music just bled into engineering and mathematical problems and solutions, as well as programming and the computer on their own. I apologize in advance, if this is off-topic as I find the discussion here fascinating and hate interrupting it. Did you watch all 9 parts? Mark Mark, To what extent does beauty exist in the mind of the beholder? As Dennet points out ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TzN-uIVkfjgt=3m29s ) what we find sweet, beautiful, or cute, we do so because our brains are wired in a particular way. Some find certain properties of scientific theories or mathematical proofs to be particularly beautiful. When they are short, surprising, elegant, deep, etc. These may or not be attributes of the true TOE. If they are, then we some might say that which is the ground for all existence is beautiful, and some others might take it further and say beauty is is the ground of existence. Whether or not we could ever take it beyond that metaphor, I am less certain. It may require a rigorous and objective definition of beauty first. Jason -- Please consider exactly what a rigorous and objective definition entails! Does not beauty contain a kernel of irony, of unexpectedness; something that cannot be reduced to a rigorous definition! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
Please, please read Edward de Bono's book The Mechanism of Mind for some genuine insights into creativity and how this comes about in mind. Russell if you can't track down a copy I'll lend you mine but it's a treasured object, not least because of the fact that the author autographed it! On 09/10/2012, at 8:39 AM, Russell Standish wrote: The problem that exercises me (when I get a chance to exercise it) is that of creativity. David Deutsch correctly identifies that this is one of the main impediments to AGI. Yet biological evolution is a creative process, one for which epistemology apparently has no role at all. Continuous, open-ended creativity in evolution is considered the main problem in Artificial Life (and perhaps other fields). Solving it may be the work of a single moment of inspiration (I wish), but more likely it will involve incremental advances in topics such as information, complexity, emergence and other such partly philosophical topics before we even understand what it means for something to be open-ended creative. Popperian epistemology, to the extent it has a role, will come much further down the track. Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
