On 11 May 2015 at 15:04, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> Hmmm. He does present a graph, but looking at the weather over 20 plus
> years, climate catastrophe as they now call it, is not happening. The cause
> and effect preached by the progressive intelli
On 12 May 2015 at 14:14, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> Why would we assume that it wouldn't make a difference? That has never
> been made clear.
>
> For the same reason the calculator repeats the same calculation given the
same starting state and inputs. This is surely inherent in the nature of
com
On 11 May 2015 at 19:40, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, May 10, 2015 at 11:55 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>> I believe satellites and weather stations give a lot of samples of
>> atmospheric temperature (and other properties, I assume).
>>
>
> Yes, I am not questi
On 11 May 2015 at 14:23, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 01:43:07PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> >
> > How can the environment be different if all the inputs are recorded and
> > replayed?
> >
> > Maybe I've completely missed the point here.
> &
On 11 May 2015 at 19:14, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 07 May 2015, at 14:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> ..
>>> Now, having read this many times, and looked at the other summaries of
>>> the MGA, I still feel that something crucial is missing. We go from the
>>> situati
On 11 May 2015 at 03:47, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 09 May 2015, at 04:59, LizR wrote:
>
> If the computation isn't classical, and can't be made classical, then comp
> fails at step 0
>
>
> But the concept of computation is classical. We need classical logic to
&
On 11 May 2015 at 13:40, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 01:14:45PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> > >
> > > That leads to why counterfactual correctness is important. If a
> > > conscious program were not counterfactually correct about it's
>
But Brent just posted a graph showing that the hockey stick is alive and
well.
Although the phrase hockey stick, like "Big Bang' and "Cubism" was invented
in an attempt to deride the subject - but unfortunately the deriders have
been more or less forgotten (except as the author of some great SF an
On 11 May 2015 at 12:56, Russell Standish wrote:
> ISTM that the environment _is_ important, but that it can be simulated
> or replayed so long as the conscious entity's inputs remain unchanged.
>
Sorry, that's what I meant. I don't seem to be expressing myself very well.
I was trying to say tha
Yes, I can't see any point in continuing to deny the science, attack the
people, etc. Maybe it was reasonable in the 80s or 90s but the evidence is
overwhelming now. No one (or very few people) do it with the LHC, so why
the IPCC? - unless, of course, there are some vested interests involved,
which
I believe satellites and weather stations give a lot of samples of
atmospheric temperature (and other properties, I assume). Why is it hard to
believe that we can make an estimate of mean global temperatures based on
such measurements plus observations of phenomena like shoreline erosion,
glacier r
It still seems to me that the environment is irrelevant, in that given comp
the brain or computer can be cut off and inputs (in principle) mimicked -
even if those inputs are due to quantum entanglement. Hence the MGA at
leasts starts on a sound footing, with the entire computation including
inputs
On 11 May 2015 at 05:49, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, May 9, 2015 at 10:41 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> Before I get started I want to remind people that I'm playing devil's
> advocate here, maybe mathematics really is more fundamental than physics
> but I've been taking t
On 11 May 2015 at 04:24, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> You make me say something ridiculous, when I just use a theorem in
> elementary computer science.
>
> It's called a straw man argument. It's often a lot easier to attack a
position you don't hold than the one you do, so people often put words into
On 9 May 2015 at 17:57, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Sat, May 09, 2015 at 01:39:43PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> > >
> >
> > It's map and territory, like the finger and the Moon. The finger points
> to
> > the Moon to indicate it, but isn't itself the Moon.
On 9 May 2015 at 17:59, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Sat, May 09, 2015 at 01:41:46PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> > On 9 May 2015 at 13:07, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> > > On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 09:02:29AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > >
> > > > I
On 10 May 2015 at 12:08, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, May 9, 2015 Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
>> > including abstract systems. It is an abstract concept after all.
>>
>
> No it is not! Computation is a physical process just like any other that
> uses energy, takes time, and creates entropy.
>
> W
On 9 May 2015 at 18:08, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Sat, May 09, 2015 at 01:23:57PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> > On 9 May 2015 at 11:59, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> > > On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 12:43:32PM +1200, LizR wrote:> Assuming a
> > > recording *ca
I'm not so keen to read (or watch) stuff online that takes more than a few
minutes, but I will almost certainly read that in full when my handy
go-anywhere, random access information storage system (also known as the
paper copy of "Scientific American") arrives in the post. In the meantime
the bits
On 9 May 2015 at 14:58, Russell Standish wrote:
> But to really draw that conclusion requires accepting the absurdity of
> noncounterfactual program instantiating consciousness. I think more
> work is actually needed here, as we're talking about very large
> recordings, something like 1e14 bits p
e
the red dot nerve signals with green dot ones. But then you have to change
the memories to be of the relevant colour, and any thoughts to reflect that
fact...
And this is from looking at a dot. Hmm.
On 9 May 2015 at 14:59, LizR wrote:
> On 9 May 2015 at 10:37, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
On 9 May 2015 at 10:37, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 08:33:43PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> >
> >
> > But comp is based on the assumption that consciousness is the result of
> > classical computation. If that assumption's wrong then comp fails, of
&
Quite clearly the Chinese Room's instruction manual (whether a computer
programme or a lookup table) is of finite size under most reasonable
assumptions, while the UD should have an infinite output. So the CR is
indeed not nearly as big as the UD.
On 9 May 2015 at 12:52, Russell Standish wrote:
On 9 May 2015 at 13:07, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 09:02:29AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > In 1987, when I present the argument, in the room some come up with
> > similar idea, and I answered. But some told me after that when
> > people come up with idea like a recor
On 9 May 2015 at 11:28, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/8/2015 3:24 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 08:47:22AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> It is only a new recent fashion on this list to take seriously that
>>> a recording can be conscious, because for a logician, that
On 9 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/8/2015 2:58 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> On 9 May 2015 at 09:02, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 5/8/2015 1:33 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 8 May 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> On 07 May 2015, at 14:45, Bruc
On 9 May 2015 at 10:48, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Sat, May 09, 2015 at 09:58:47AM +1200, LizR wrote:
> >
> > Plus, assuming no quantum entanglement with the environment is involved
> in
> > consciousness (as seems likely given the decoherence times of neurons
> et
Indeed.
On 9 May 2015 at 12:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, May 9, 2015, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 12:43:32PM +1200, LizR wrote:
>> > On 8 May 2015 at 05:14, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >
>> > >
On 9 May 2015 at 11:59, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 12:43:32PM +1200, LizR wrote:> Assuming a
> recording *can* be conscious (i.e. that the MGA's conclusion
> > isn't absurd) then of course it can be.
> >
>
> But such a recording is
On 9 May 2015 at 09:02, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/8/2015 1:33 AM, LizR wrote:
>
> On 8 May 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 07 May 2015, at 14:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> We can use an original biological brain, or an equivalent digita
Neat!
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googl
On 8 May 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb wrote:
> On 07 May 2015, at 14:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>>
>> We can use an original biological brain, or an equivalent digital
>>> replacement -- it does not make any significant difference to the argument.
>>> The first point is that in some conscious experie
On 8 May 2015 at 18:24, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 08 May 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote:
>
> Nicely summarised. I may have comments once I've had a chance to digest
> your summary (and any subsequent comments).
>
> In the meantime, if you aren't familiar with Maudlin
On 8 May 2015 at 19:14, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 08 May 2015, at 02:35, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> This is why I draw the comparison with the Chinese room. If all the
>> intelligence is encoded in a book, then intuition says that book
>> cannot be conscious. This intuition is undoubtedly rig
On 6 May 2015 at 14:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 10:45:29AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have
>>> pointed out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming
>>> that it sti
On 8 May 2015 at 15:14, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> Better yet, assume some of its true, and move to solar. The only way to
> move to solar is to create superb storage technology, for night and winter
> times. Otherwise solar fails. Any demands for r
On 8 May 2015 at 15:25, PGC wrote:
> On Friday, May 8, 2015 at 4:56:54 AM UTC+2, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> On 8 May 2015 at 14:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Which was rather my conclusion. Since the MGA is not a rigorous
>>> argument, it was always of very limited utility -- it certainly is
>>> i
On 8 May 2015 at 15:40, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 01:21:10PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> > >
> > > Another possibility - suppose we develop AIs, and they boostrap
> themselves
> > > into benig vastly cleverer than us - might they not design cons
On 8 May 2015 at 14:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> Which was rather my conclusion. Since the MGA is not a rigorous argument,
> it was always of very limited utility -- it certainly is insufficient to
> carry the weight of the conclusion that the physical substrate is
> unnecessary for consciousness
On 8 May 2015 at 13:51, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> Let's say I have no objection to anything technical done to remediate AGW
> except regulation aka serfdom.
>
> So you wouldn't be in favour of the government providing subsidies to help
renewable or
On 8 May 2015 at 11:59, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> Color me deeply suspicious. A engineer named Vannevar Bush said, "the
> validity of a science was its ability to predict." Bush also thought that
> guided missiles carrying hydrogen bombs were decad
On 8 May 2015 at 13:05, LizR wrote:
> On 8 May 2015 at 12:14, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 03:14:42AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >
>> > Why can't playing the equivalent of a recording made de novo (i.e. there
>> >
On 8 May 2015 at 12:14, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 03:14:42AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > Why can't playing the equivalent of a recording made de novo (i.e. there
> > was no original) instantiate the conscious moment for the first time?
> >
>
> That is such a
On 8 May 2015 at 12:10, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> Hardly - that is the result at step 7, nothing to do with your
> so-called "blunders". IMHO, one can go there directly
> in one step
>
> I can see no reason why not. The rest of Bruno's argument is just to make
the audience more receptive to the
On 8 May 2015 at 07:59, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, May 7, 2015 Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
>> >> When a recording of consciousness is played back does the
>>> consciousness exist during the playback or just when the computer
>>> was actually making calculations? If computationalism is true, an
On 8 May 2015 at 05:14, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> All computational supervenience gets you is that two counterfactually
>> equivalent programs will generate the same conscious state. All bets
>> are off with counterfactually inequivale
To summarise the summary...
Hypothetically, we have some computing machine that generates a conscious
experience. Since computation is deterministic, this will create the *same*
conscious experience if we re-run it duplicating the same initial state and
inputs. (For example, each run might give ri
Nicely summarised. I may have comments once I've had a chance to digest
your summary (and any subsequent comments).
In the meantime, if you aren't familiar with Maudlin's "Olimpia" argument
that is also (possibly) relevant. It uses a similar form of argument to the
MGA to arrive at a different con
On 7 May 2015 at 19:47, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> There are two things.
>>
>> 1) the mathematical facts, well known by the experts (who even asked me
>> to suppress any explanation on that as it is trivial for anybody having
>> grasp the ten first hours of course in that
So all these hottest years on record we keep getting are made up?
Just curious.
Admittedly this is from 2010, maybe the trend has reversed in last 5 years?
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group an
This appears to fit in with Huw Price's suggestion that we take the time
reversibility of physics seriously.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to e
On 7 May 2015 at 13:12, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> Whether it was Stapledon, Clarke, Kaku, or Wilzcek, its go to be a
> spectacular view!
>
> "Godlike", I imagine.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Ever
With profound and sincere apologies to Bruno, some people distinguish these
two items, so I thought it might be worthwhile trying to marshall the
arguments in one place, and give them simple names as per the objections to
the Chinese Room I seem to recall seeing in one of DRH's books - "The
Systems
Can we see the original version he's quoting from? I am probably being
stupid but I couldn't find a link.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to ever
"Such “expanded identities” will be able to comprehend the kingdoms of
substance and force on their own quantum terms, as the mind itself merges
with space and time."
That's straight out of Arthur C Clark - or Olaf Stapledon, if you prefer
the original.
--
You received this message because you a
The time travel stuff only refers to a computer visiting its OWN past
mental states, as far as I can tell - he is not envisioning that we will
have a TARDIS any time soon.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from th
"*Self-assembling, self-reproducing, and autonomously creative machines
will be developed."*
Or people, as we call them at the moment.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails f
On 7 May 2015 at 09:08, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, May 6, 2015 at 2:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> >> It seems to me that the first thing to do when starting a Reductio ad
>>> absurdum proof is to make sure the conclusion really is absurd, and this
>>> one isn't
>>>
>>
>> > It may not be absurd,
On 6 May 2015 at 22:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I am astonished that you make that comp1/comp2 suggestion, in this list,
> where precisely in this list, we can see that the argument that comp1 does
> not imply comp2 are flawed---and usually you, like others, you did see the
> flaws and mention the
To be fair, in the last 10 years the everything list has at least
influenced one genuine proper scientist, namely Max Tegmark. (There may be
others of whom I am ignorant, but Mr T acknowledges the influece of the EL
in his book "Our Mathematical Universe". I would add Bruno as a second
example, but
On 6 May 2015 at 14:34, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> Much of the nobel committees even for physics and chemistry seem biased,
> and subjective. Templeton, is for scientists with intellectual and
> spiritual leanings, Nobel is best left to academic sci
On 6 May 2015 at 13:49, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> Respectability? You must mean what a majority or a self appointed peer
> group like in Oslo decide what is acceptable. By the way, how's those 100
> degree Fahrenheit summers you have been having fo
>
> It also appears to me that the computing entity would not be conscious for
> the same reason computed flight physics is not flight.
>
I don't have the benefit of thinking about this for ten years, but it does
seem that there is a map/territory confusion here. Comp* is the idea that a
computer
On 6 May 2015 at 08:38, John Mikes wrote:
> Quadratic, or not there are two things about voting:
>
> 1. The 'pre-WWII' Hungarian system (I am far from suggesting Hungary as a
> good political pattern) with 2 lists per party: one of the districts and
> one latent national for the leading names in
On 5 May 2015 at 11:12, meekerdb wrote:
> Where does the money go once it's bought votes?
>
>
> It's redistributed. So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the
> next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get
> back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a sha
On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb wrote:
>
> It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that "comp" is used for
> idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital
> device and preserve ones consciousness. That's a fairly widely held
> opinion. But then "comp" is a
On 6 May 2015 at 11:10, meekerdb wrote:
>
> Right. And we identify them as the same person based on the continuity of
> their physical being - even if they are not conscious.
>
Specifically because physical continuity ensures continuity of memory
(normally). Should it become possible to copy mem
Thank you! :-)
(Possibly too much so in some...)
On 6 May 2015 at 11:19, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> Thanks Liz! You're awesome in every dimension :)
>
> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, LizR wrote:
>
>> ana and kata if I remember correctly.
>>
>> --
>> You receive
ana and kata if I remember correctly.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, sen
It's a question to which the answer could be
"yes, I would be the man in the box or the man in the prestige" (believes
only one is the original, and the other is a copy that doesn't preserve the
original's consciousness)
or
"yes, I will be the man in the box and the man in the prestige" (believe
On 5 May 2015 at 19:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for
> computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that
> just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It
> would go no distance towards esta
On 5 May 2015 at 16:15, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 5/4/2015 8:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> We have evidence of the sort you mention that quantum superpositions of
>>> the type need for a quantum computer decohere rapidly in the brain
>>> environment. But decoherence
On 5 May 2015 at 12:01, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/4/2015 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 04 May 2015, at 15:08, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and
On 5 May 2015 at 11:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> LizR wrote:
>
>> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb >
>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first
>> person indeterminancy. FPI requires that you know there is a
>>
On 5 May 2015 at 11:01, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/4/2015 2:50 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>> 2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>>>
>>>
On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>> Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay
>> for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally
>> distrib
>
> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> 2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>>
>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
>
> The initial point that we were making was t
On 5 May 2015 at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of
>> experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's
>> impossible that you find yourself on some dista
On 5 May 2015 at 06:09, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> OK. I guess you mean only that it means there is no true randomness
> playing a role in a physical law.
>
> Yes, that is exactly what I was trying to say. I see my original was
embarrassingly badly phrased...
--
You received this message because
Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay
for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally
distributed "voting capital" or something similar? So people can spend
their voting power on whatever they're concerned about?
On 4 May 2015 at 20:50,
By the way you might particularly like 29 across :)
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to t
On 4 May 2015 at 06:12, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> My external hard drive is named "The Book of Sand" :)
Ooh!!
Mine is "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" !
I also constructed a cryptic crossword themed around Borges (insofar as
cryptic crosswords can be themed). For your possible amusement, it is
here..
That looks like a game I wouldn't play even if I played computer games...!
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googleg
On 4 May 2015 at 19:06, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 4 May 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett >
>>>
>>>
>>> What is the point of two identical quantum states if you don't know which
>>> two are identical? It seems to me that copying at will is what is
>>> required.
>>> We a
Step 3 just shows that duplication leads to first person uncertainty, the
same thing Everett showed (although there is some argument over how, or if,
this works in cases where the probability is represented by a real number).
The duplication can be in any of the available types of multiverse, or vi
On 4 May 2015 at 18:28, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/3/2015 11:02 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>> meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Also "yes doctor" assumes that consciousness is retained when something
>>> computationally equivalent is substituted; which is why Olympia and the MG
>>> need to be counterfactual
On 4 May 2015 at 17:40, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR wrote:
>
> > Yes. I've mentioned occasionally that if the substitution level is
> quantum,
> > then no-cloning may be a problem, at least in principle. The usual
> answer is
> >
On 4 May 2015 at 15:43, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> Ohhh, were talking about philosopher-physicist Spinozoan God. Hmmm wasn't
> this thread originally about how the word "God" muddies the waters...
>
Well yes, in my opinion your comment about God and the natural numbers was
indeed a teensy bit of wate
On 4 May 2015 at 15:34, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/3/2015 8:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Sun, May 03, 2015 at 10:41:54PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>> That is what is suggested to be the physical world.
>
Maybe. Or maybe it's just the opposite and the physical world made
>>> math
On 4 May 2015 at 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I saw your responses but they beg the question. The problem is that if
> faith is a valid way of arriving at truth, then everyone's faith is
> equally valid.
>
> It also indicates that dogs know far more truth than humans.
(Actually Raymond
On 4 May 2015 at 09:41, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> Err "God created the natural numbers" is a rather meaningless proposition
> in my mind. What does that even mean? God just decided that there were such
> things as numbers? The existence of numbers depends on the whim of God?
I think Bruno was (mis)
On 4 May 2015 at 06:45, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even
> mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that
> current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.
>
> That would just mean the terminology isn't
Michael Shermer is the publisher of "Skeptic" magazine, which I used to
subscribe to - but I could only take so many debunkings, lectures on
science, and so on, and eventually I cancelled the sub, reasonably well
convinced that I had by now obtained all the wherewithal I was ever going
to need to g
On 3 May 2015 at 15:08, Russell Standish wrote:
> Eg Swift's advocation of eating Irish children...
>
Damn, you can't trust anyone. Guess I'll have to change my evening meal
plans.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubsc
On 3 May 2015 at 03:22, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> Is that seawater flooding your basement yet? Me, neither.
>
You could try moving to a pacific island.
Pita Meanke, of Betio village, stands beside a tree as he watches the 'king
tides' crash thro
nd when YOU(!) arrive
> here, you can accept my condolescence.
>
> JM
>
> On Sat, May 2, 2015 at 12:34 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>> This looks very E.E. (Doc) Smith-like (penner of the immortal line
>> "relativity is only a theory" when he wrote the Lensman series wit
d-with-bad-science-7a9318dd1ae6
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/outthere/2014/08/06/nasa-validate-imposible-space-drive-word/#.VUSJJSGqpHz
On 2 May 2015 at 16:34, LizR wrote:
> This looks very E.E. (Doc) Smith-like (penner of the immortal line
> "relativity is only a theory" when h
This looks very E.E. (Doc) Smith-like (penner of the immortal line
"relativity is only a theory" when he wrote the Lensman series with its
famous "intertialess drive" back in the 1920s or 30s).
http://science.slashdot.org/story/15/05/01/1929200/new-test-supports-nasas-controversial-em-drive
Or in
On 1 May 2015 at 12:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> LizR wrote:
>
>> On 30 April 2015 at 16:32, Bruce Kellett > <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
>>
>> So where are the space and time dimensions of Platonia? Not to
>> mention the necessity o
On 30 April 2015 at 18:47, Kim Jones wrote:
> On 30 Apr 2015, at 2:29 pm, LizR wrote:
>
> I was told at school that 'a sentence which does not contain a verb is not
>> a sentence' which I gather was meant to imply 'you have not managed to say
>> anythi
201 - 300 of 4155 matches
Mail list logo
