Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou):
No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over
more bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to
imagine some scenarios where you survive indefinitely wit
John Mikes wrote:
>"...whether I would like something to
> be true or not has no bearing whatsoever
>on whether in fact it *is* true.<
What "is" true?
IMO: true is MY 1st person mindset based upon the 3rd person mindsets I
have
received from others and have put in the "objective" chapter, whic
Brent Meeker wrote:
>I feel that I am the same person as I was five years ago even though
hardly
>any of the atoms in my body are the same now as then. The body and brain
of
>the younger me have disintegrated as completely as if I had died and been
>cremated. Certainly, the change has been gradua
>-Original Message-
>From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Monday, April 18, 2005 1:28 PM
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>
>
>Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> >-Original Message-
>>
Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2005 9:28 PM
Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer writes:
> >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney")
> >Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a
> >single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind
> >will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a
> >significa
Jesse Mazer writes:
Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou):
No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more
bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine
some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your friends,
for
Le 18-avr.-05, à 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable; that even
given
infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
"complete" world. This suggests
Le 18-avr.-05, à 09:04, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
I was asking the question in the context of Tegmark's UE (by which all
and
only structures that exist mathematically exist physically), and
whether it
has relevance to the existence of all possible things. Frankly I'm not
sure
that Godel is relev
>Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>
>>Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
>>consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable;
>that even
>>given infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to
>>generate a "complete" world. This suggests to me that
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou):
No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more
bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine
some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your frien
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney")
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2005 15:27:25 -0700 (PDT)
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single
universe
> that you would to
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
>>I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
>>concurrently.
>>
>>If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for
>immortality
>>is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility
>>inherent in that branch.
>
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable; that even
given
infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
"complete" world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the
John Mikes wrote:
I did not follow this thread, because immortality is a nono for my mostly
common sense thinking: who wants to 'in eternity' wake up with arthritic
pains and struggle with failing memory? Or is immortality understood for an
earlier (perfect? when is it?) stage of life, let us say w
>Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
>>I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
>>concurrently.
>>
>>If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for
>immortality
>>is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility
>>inherent in that branch.
>
>Stathis: I don't
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
concurrently.
If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality is
to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in
that branch.
I don't see why this should be so. Yo
JC: >>That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is
>>a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far
>>from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden.
>
>Jesse Mazer: So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only
>illegal according to the ru
Hal wrote:
>Consider a 2-D cellular automaton world like Conway's Life.
>Every cell is either occupied or unoccupied. It has one of
>two states. Now let us consider such a world in which one
>cell holds much more than one bit of information. Suppose it
>holds a million bits. This one cel
>> Bruno:In general worlds are not effective (computable) objects: we cannot
>> mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world.<
>
>JC: Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how
>can they be
>said to be "instantiated"? If we extend this to Tegmark, this
>i
See please after Hal's message
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2005 10:51 AM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
> I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
> c
hemtic math we apply. If we talk about more
than just human, we should think in terms of more than just human.
Well, this does not sound too constructive, but alas, so are considetrations
on shaky grounds (and their conclusions) as well. Excuse my intrusion
John Mikes
- Original Message -
F
I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
concurrently.
If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality is
to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in
that branch.
Hal Ruhl
I agree with Brent's comment:
> I essentially agree. If we say, "2+2=5" then we have failed to describe
> anything because we have contradicted our own semantics. Logic is not a
> constraint on the world, but only on our use of language to describe it. But
> that doesn't mean that any world for
Johnathan Colvin:
That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is a-priori
illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far from obvious
what
is allowed and what is forbidden.
So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only illegal according
to the rules of ches
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Saturday, April 16, 2005 9:46 PM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
> In general worlds are not effective (computable) objects: we cannot
> mechanically (even allowing infini
>>Stathis: OK, I agree with your reasoning. But, just for fun, can you
>>think of an example of a physical reality which is clearly a priori
>>contradictory?
>
>Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position
that
>is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so co
>Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>
>> >>Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically
>impossible
>> >>(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk
>about) a world
>> >>where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be
>> >>logically impossible for any existing entity A t
>>Jonathan Colvin At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't
there a
>> problem?
>> If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal
>systems (as in
>> Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie.
>> worlds
>> that are never instantiated). This seems
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>>Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible
>>(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world
>>where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically
>>impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have
>
>>Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible
>>(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world
>>where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically
>>impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have
>property X
>>and
Le 16-avr.-05, à 01:21, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't there a
problem?
If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal systems (as in
Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie.
worlds
that are never instantiate
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible
(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world where
entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically impossible
for any existing entity A to simultaneously have property
Hal Finney writes:
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single
universe
> that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider
the
> thought-experiment I suggested in my post at
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html --
Gen
>-Original Message-
>From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 7:58 AM
>To: Brent Meeker
>Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
>
>
>
>Le 14-avr.-05, à 13:53, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>> Before drawing dra
>>Jonathan Colvin writes:
>>
>>>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I
>think it is by
>>>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does
>>>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes
>>>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their enti
ying or suicide.
Saibal
-
Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan:
Verzonden: Saturday, April 16, 2005 12:27 AM
Onderwe
>-Original Message-
>From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 7:02 AM
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
>Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>
>
>Jonathan Colvin writes:
>
>>While I&#x
>Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>
>> >>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think
>> >it is by
>> >>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does
>> >>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes
>> >>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends thei
>Jonathan Colvin writes:
>> I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to
>> exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically
>> impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does
>not mean
>> that it is logically possible.
>
>Hal wrote: It's impo
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe
> that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the
> thought-experiment I suggested in my post at
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html --
Generally, I don't thi
Saibal Mitra wrote:
I more or less agree with Jesse. But I would say that the measure of
similarity should also be an absolute measure that multiplied with the
absolute measure defines a new effective absolute measure for a given
observer.
Given the absolute measure you can define effective conditi
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to exist; I
> said that it *might* be that such a world is logically impossible. Just
> because we can talk about such a world does not mean that it is logically
> possible.
It's important to understand that
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think
>it is by
>>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does
>>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes
>>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life
>dresse
>>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think
>it is by
>>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does
>>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes
>>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life
>dressed in a pink rabbi
Jonathan Colvin writes:
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no
means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there
will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for
ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pi
Jim Coons writes:
I see no reason why consciousness must necessarily be sequential in
time, maybe once you begin to die your consciousness decreases till it
matches some other being. I don't see why that couldn't just as well be
earlier in time as later. Maybe consciousness just flows in a cycle. I
Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou):
No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more
bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine
some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your friends,
for example implemented
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2005 7:38 PM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no
means clear that just because
>Stathias:
>Yes, everything that can happen, does happen, somewhere in the
>multiverse.
>There will certainly be a world where you get smarter and
>smarter, and ultimately you know everything. But at any point
>in the development of the multiverse, you are (1) certain to
>find yourself alive
I see no reason why consciousness must necessarily be sequential in
time, maybe once you begin to die your consciousness decreases till it
matches some other being. I don't see why that couldn't just as well be
earlier in time as later. Maybe consciousness just flows in a cycle. In
fact if our cons
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the
only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is
this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI
is true, your consciousness
Danny Mayes writes:
Isn't the inverse also true? Wouldn't there always be an outcome where you
were born a little earlier, or were transported back in time through some
means so that there are "universes" where your consciousness exists at the
very beginning? I don't really believe this, but t
Jesse Mazer writes:
I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the
only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is
this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI
is true, your consciousness will survive until the end
Isn't the inverse also true? Wouldn't there always be an outcome where
you were born a little earlier, or were transported back in time through
some means so that there are "universes" where your consciousness exists
at the very beginning? I don't really believe this, but the logic seems
to a
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 23:39:21 +1000
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Su
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 04:04:48 -0400
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Su
Spam-Websites:
http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan:
Verzonden: Thursday, April 14, 2005 10:20 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
> >>
Le 14-avr.-05, à 09:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Alas, you are right. Immortality is not all fun and games, and in some
worlds you may experience a drawn out fizzling out, reduced to the
consciousness of an infant, then a fish, then an amoeba. I believe Max
Tegmark aknowledged this in a com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> QM or QTI do not imply
> that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never
> *experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you
wake
> up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. i
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 04:04:48 -0400
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Su
Le 14-avr.-05, à 01:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
Nick Prince writes:
If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal
but
also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so
since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we
live on - the conclusion
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 17:22:34 +1000
Jesse Mazer wrote:
You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to b
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> QM or QTI do not imply
> that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never
> *experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you
wake
> up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if you
die
> in your sleep -
Jesse Mazer wrote:
You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be
the last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter
side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which
even the most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentien
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> QM or QTI do not imply
> that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never
> *experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you wake
> up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if you die
> in your sleep
Saibal Mitra wrote:
If you encounter a ''branching'' in which one of the possibilities is
death, that
branch cannot be said to be nonexistent relative to you. Quantum
mechanics
doesn't
imply that you can never become unconscious, otherwise you could never
fall
asleep!
This latter statement se
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the
last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter
side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which
even the most sociable amongst us may well tire of
You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the
last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter side,
we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which even the
most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentient company!
The lis
Nick Prince wrote:
My apologies to the group for bringing up questions which may have
been covererd before but I cannot find an answer to the following
query and I am new to the group.
I have a question to put to anyone who has some ideas as follows:
If the MW immortality is correct then would we
Hi Nick,
I asked a question in a thread "Quantum accident survivor" some time ago
where, at least in my mind, it was concluded that we can indeed be removed
from loved ones each time we survive a situation that was clearly deadly in
most cases and that one's consciousness is "nudged" away from t
I don't think that the MW immortality is correct at all! In a certain sense
we are
immortal, because the enseble of all possible worlds is a fixed static
entity. So,
you ''always'' find yourselve alive in one state or another. However, you
won't
experience youself evolving in the infinite far f
I don't beleive QTI implies this at all. It does imply that your
experienced reality will get rather weird, as strange coincidences
will start happening to keep you alive. It also implies that friends
will be temporary, as you will see them all die off eventually - but
many people change lifestyle,
Nick Prince writes:
> If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal but
> also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so
> since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we
> live on - the conclusion seems inescapable
>
> Can anyone f
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