Le 04-sept.-06, à 16:12, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 04-sept.-06, à 02:56, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> Why should a belief in other minds (which I do not directly
>>> experience)
>>> be more reasonable thant a belief in unexperienced primary matter ?
>>> It's a question of consist
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 04-sept.-06, à 02:56, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> > Why should a belief in other minds (which I do not directly experience)
> > be more reasonable thant a belief in unexperienced primary matter ?
> > It's a question of consistency.
>
> Attributing mind to others explains many t
Le 04-sept.-06, à 02:56, 1Z a écrit :
>
> Why should a belief in other minds (which I do not directly experience)
> be more reasonable thant a belief in unexperienced primary matter ?
> It's a question of consistency.
Attributing mind to others explains many things. There are rich (albeit
vagu
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 30-août-06, à 21:26, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) a écrit :
>
>
> > How do you escape solipsism without embracing materialism ?
>
>
>
>
> You can escape solipsism by embracing *any* kind of *objective*
> idealism (inspired by mathematical structures or not).
Why should a belief
Le 30-août-06, à 21:26, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) a écrit :
> How do you escape solipsism without embracing materialism ?
You can escape solipsism by embracing *any* kind of *objective*
idealism (inspired by mathematical structures or not).
Objective idealisms are not in fashion today, I know,
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Wednesday 30 Août 2006 21:26, 1Z a écrit :
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > > > > > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain
> > > > > > > properties is just a working assumption to facilitate thinking
> > > > > > > abou
Le Wednesday 30 Août 2006 21:26, 1Z a écrit :
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> > > > > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain
> > > > > > properties is just a working assumption to facilitate thinking
> > > > > > about the real world. It may turn out th
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain
> > > > > properties is just a working
> > > > > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn
> > > > > out that if we dig into
> > > > > quarks very d
Peter Jones writes:
> > > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties
> > > > is just a working
> > > > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > > > that if we dig into
> > > > quarks very deeply there is nothing "substantial" ther
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Peter Jones writes:
>>>
>>>
>>>
By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
solipsism.
I choose metaphsyics.
We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
>>>
>>>
>>>Solipsi
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> >
> >>By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
> >>solipsism.
> >>I choose metaphsyics.
> >>We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
> >
> >
> > Solipsism is a metaphysical p
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
>>solipsism.
>>I choose metaphsyics.
>>We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
>
>
> Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
>
>
>>(BTW: it it is wrong
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>>Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
>>>just a working
>>>assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that
>>>if we dig into
>>>quarks very deeply there is nothing "substant
Le 27-août-06, à 21:41, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I put "working assumption" in scare quotes because I think the fact
> that we can
> create models of the world that are successful over a wide domain of
> phenomena is
> evidence for an underlying reality. It's not conclusive evidence, but
> r
Le 27-août-06, à 19:41, 1Z a écrit :
> But you don't really address the existence question. You just loosely
> assume it is the
> same thing as truth.
I just assume that the "existence of a number" is equivalent with the
intended truth of an existential
proposition written in a theory about
Le 27-août-06, à 19:36, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>> I understand Peters objection to regarding a "mere bundle" of
>>> properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
>>> propertyless
>>> substrate. Why not jus
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> There is good reason to believe that there is some sort of reality out there
> as opposed to the
> solipsistic alternative, but there is less reason to believe that there is
> some basic material substrate
> on which the various properties of physical objects are h
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
> > solipsism.
> > I choose metaphsyics.
> > We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
>
> Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
A minimal one, that refuses
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > > just a working
> > > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > > that if we dig into
> > > quarks very deeply there is nothi
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >
> >
> >>>Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> >>>just a working
> >>>assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> >>>that if we dig into
> >>>quarks very deeply ther
Peter Jones writes:
> By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
> solipsism.
> I choose metaphsyics.
> We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
> (BTW: it it is wrong to posit an unobserved substrate, why is it
>
Peter Jones writes:
> > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > just a working
> > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > that if we dig into
> > quarks very deeply there is nothing "substantial" there at all, but solid
1Z wrote:
> > > AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
> > > not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
> > > of the UD.
> >
> >
> > It is you who come up with a notion of real existence.
>
> I am starting with the reality my own existence.
>
> That is
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Brent Meeker"
Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 7:52 AM
Subject: RE: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes:
> > Saying that there is a material substrate which
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
>>>just a working
>>>assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that
>>>if we dig into
>>>quarks very deeply there is nothing "subst
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
> > not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
> > of the UD.
>
>
> It is you who come up with a notion of real existence.
I am starting with the r
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> > I understand Peters objection to regarding a "mere bundle" of
> > properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
> > propertyless
> > substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are
> >
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > > just a working
> > > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > > that if we dig into
> > > quarks very deeply there is noth
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
> > > But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
> > > wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it
> > > up,
> > > tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
>
Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I understand Peters objection to regarding a "mere bundle" of
> properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
> propertyless
> substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are
> instantiated and
> some aren't.
Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
> AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
> not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
> of the UD.
It is you who come up with a notion of real existence. You are reifying
I don't know which theory.
>
> AR as a
Brent Meeker writes:
> > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > just a working
> > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > that if we dig into
> > quarks very deeply there is nothing "substantial" there at all, but sol
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
>>>But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
>>>wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it up,
>>>tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
>>>then mayb
Brent meeker writes:
> > But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
> > wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it
> > up,
> > tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
> > then maybe it is just an illusion.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
>>may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
>>dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
>>matter add to a merely a
Peter Jones writes:
> Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
> may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
> dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
> matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The ans
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 21-août-06, à 16:23, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
> >>
> >>
> >>> If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
> >>
> >>
> >> I can hardly not agree with that.
> >>
> >>
> >>>
> >>> If numbers do not expl
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 7:56 AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 22-août-06, à 18:06, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> So where is the "key" to transl
Le 22-août-06, à 18:06, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> So where is the "key" to translate number-monsters into
> "thought-monsters"?
In front of you. Computer or universal machine, or universal numbers.
More explanation in the posts.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~---
Le 21-août-06, à 16:23, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>
>>> If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
>>
>>
>> I can hardly not agree with that.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
>>> how a strucuture
- Original Message -
From:
Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, August 22, 2006 6:10
AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet
really...
Le 22-août-06, à 05:32, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit
:
- Original
Message --
Le 22-août-06, à 05:32, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, August 21, 2006 6:39 AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
skip
I already told you that I interpret
There ex
- Original Message -
From:
Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, August 21, 2006 6:39
AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet
really...
skip
I already told you that I interpretThere exists a prime
number "in
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> > If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
>
>
> I can hardly not agree with that.
>
>
> >
> > If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
> > how a strucuture like a physial world would emerge from
> > a UD if a
Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
> If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
I can hardly not agree with that.
>
> If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
> how a strucuture like a physial world would emerge from
> a UD if a UD existed does not explain my *existenc
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 20-août-06, à 21:09, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > If minds are made of Platonically existing comptutations
> > or numbers, they don't need to be made of matter as
> > well. In that sense matter would we without purpose.
> >
> > But that depends on the assumption that there is such
Le 20-août-06, à 21:09, 1Z a écrit :
If minds are made of Platonically existing comptutations
or numbers, they don't need to be made of matter as
well. In that sense matter would we without purpose.
But that depends on the assumption that there is such
a thing as Platonic existence in the first
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Peter,
>
> I am no more sure you read the post, nor am I sure you really search
> understanding.
>
>
> >> Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
> >>
> >>> That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
> >>> The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can cla
Hi Peter,
I am no more sure you read the post, nor am I sure you really search
understanding.
>> Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>> That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
>>> The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
>>> the truth of mathematical
Le 18-août-06, à 19:01, 1Z a écrit :
> That is quite different from conjuring up existential conclusions
> from non-existential premises.
I believe there exist numbers, prime numbers, even numbers, etc. and in
relative universal numbers, ... (with Church Thesis "universal" need
not to be acco
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 17-août-06, à 17:30, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > The argument has to assume the necessary existence of the UD.
> > (If it is possible that the UD doesn't exist, it is possible
> > that physics is emerging from semething else)
> > It is difficult to see what would entail that exc
Le 17-août-06, à 17:30, 1Z a écrit :
> The argument has to assume the necessary existence of the UD.
> (If it is possible that the UD doesn't exist, it is possible
> that physics is emerging from semething else)
> It is difficult to see what would entail that except Platonism.
I agree, but I p
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> Note that if you understand the whole UDA, you should realize that the
> >> price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related
> >> with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you
> >> (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not tu
Brent Meeker wrote:
> But the only reason for axiomatizing a physical theory is to see if it
> has some
> hidden inconsistency.
I don't think so. Except Bunge, I don't know about physicist attempt to
axiomatize physics. Physical theories are always to fuzzy as to be
formalised. But they rely
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