Well, then make a testable prediction about something in the mind that is
not otherwise known.
On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 15 Apr 2013, at 19:59, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known to
> science before
On 15 Apr 2013, at 19:59, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known
to science before hand.
I suggest that comp has to do that otherwise it will remain a
curious metaphysics
but not accepted as knowledge.
Why? Here we have a theory of how
Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known to
science before hand.
I suggest that comp has to do that otherwise it will remain a curious
metaphysics
but not accepted as knowledge.
On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richa
On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote:
But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science,
how do we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this
problem
We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive facts,
and verify them. If the facts
But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do
we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem
On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> Could you explain by example how
On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?
This is more or less planned for the FOAR list.
In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth (about
consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" =
Bruno,
Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?
That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science?
What comes to my mind is consciousness.
Richard
On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wr
On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.
Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and
in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a
On Thursday, April 11, 2013 8:47:49 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:01 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> > So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery
> >> > pays
> >> > off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm
On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> > So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery
>> > pays
>> > off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm and
>> > be
>> > right every time?
>>
>> The lottery pays off unpredictably to an out
On Thursday, April 11, 2013 2:23:06 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 10:55 PM, Craig Weinberg
> wrote:
>
> >> >> Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from
> >> >> conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres
> follow
> >> >>
On Thursday, April 11, 2013 2:57:39 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 1:40 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:03:51 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
> >>
> >> On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> >>
On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 1:40 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:03:51 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological
>> >> events
>> >> follow deter
On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:03:51 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological
> events
> >> follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow
> >
On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological events
>> follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow
>> deterministic or probabilistic rules.
>
>
> That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I
On Thursday, April 4, 2013 12:55:44 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 3:32 AM, Craig Weinberg
>
> > wrote:
>
> There are, of course, undiscovered scientific facts. If scientists did not
>>> believe that they would give up science. But Craig is not saying that there
>>
On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 3:32 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
There are, of course, undiscovered scientific facts. If scientists did not
>> believe that they would give up science. But Craig is not saying that there
>> are processes inside cells that are controlled by as yet undiscovered
>> physical effec
On 4/3/2013 7:33 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Not only is the function of the artificial peptides the same, the patient also feels the
same. Wouldn't you expect them to feel a bit different?
How do you know? Maybe they became zombies.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subs
On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 3:04:50 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Mikes
> > wrote:
>
>> Dear Stathis,
>> your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in
>> all facets so here is a condensed opinion:
>>
>
> Yes, these posts are pro
On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 10:59:35 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 4/2/2013 6:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 8:07:48 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>>
>> Dear Stathis,
>> your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Mikes wrote:
> Dear Stathis,
> your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in
> all facets so here is a condensed opinion:
>
Yes, these posts are probably getting a bit too long.
> Your position about the 'material' world (atoms,
On 4/2/2013 6:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 8:07:48 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Dear Stathis,
your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in
all
facets so here is a condensed opinion:
Y
On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 8:07:48 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Dear Stathis,
> your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in
> all facets so here is a condensed opinion:
>
> Your position about the 'material' world (atoms,
On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Dear Stathis,
your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in all facets so
here is a condensed opinion:
Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit mechanistic: like us,
the (call it:) inanimates are also
Dear Stathis,
your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in
all facets so here is a condensed opinion:
Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit
mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no
matter how identical we think
On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 5:04 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> I find it difficult to understand how you could be thinking about
>> these things. If I put atoms in the configuration of a duck but as you
>> claim I don't get a duck, I must have missed something out.
>
>
> Because a duck's life is made
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> If the right atoms are placed in the right configuration then life or
>> consciousness occurs.
>
>
> You don't know that, you just assume it. It's like saying that if the right
> cars are placed in the right configuration around the right
On Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:37:43 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:
> everyth...@googlegroups.com ] *On Behalf Of *Stathis
> Papaioannou
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:04 AM
> *To:* everyth...@googlegroups.com
> *Subject:* Lo
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stathis Papaioannou
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:04 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Losing Control
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote:
>> If a person
On Sun, Mar 24, 2013 at 5:49 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> Yes, the potential for consciousness must be present in matter, and it
>> is realised when it is arranged in an appropriate way.
>
>
> Why would it be? What does arranging have to do with the possibility of
> experiencing?
If a person is
On Saturday, March 23, 2013 7:05:59 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sat, Mar 23, 2013 at 12:06 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> It is obviously possible that intentional comes from non-intentional,
> >> since that is what actually happened.
> >
> >
> > It could not have happened unl
On Sat, Mar 23, 2013 at 12:06 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> It is obviously possible that intentional comes from non-intentional,
>> since that is what actually happened.
>
>
> It could not have happened unless the potential for intention was inherently
> present from the start. The cosmic recipe
On Friday, March 22, 2013 4:08:10 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 1:19 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> There is surely a difference between living and non-living, but
> >> nevertheless it is possible to get living from non-living.
> >
> >
> > Not without the po
On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 1:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> There is surely a difference between living and non-living, but
>> nevertheless it is possible to get living from non-living.
>
>
> Not without the potential for life already present in the universe. If there
> was a universe which contain
On Thursday, March 21, 2013 9:06:51 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 12:03 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> > To recap then, the difference between non-living and living is only
> visible
> > to the living. Biological units are vastly larger and slower, more
> > vuln
On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 12:03 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> To recap then, the difference between non-living and living is only visible
> to the living. Biological units are vastly larger and slower, more
> vulnerable in a thousand ways than molecular units, but they are a sign of a
> nested relati
On Thursday, March 21, 2013 2:44:16 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> How could something non-living lead to something living?
> >
> >
> > Non-living and living are just different qualities of experience. Living
> > systems a
On Wednesday, March 20, 2013 11:42:38 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> At least you now agree that the atoms in my body could be replaced and
> >> I would feel the same. What if the atoms were replaced by a person:
> >> would
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> How could something non-living lead to something living?
>
>
> Non-living and living are just different qualities of experience. Living
> systems are nested non-living systems, which gives rise to mortality and
> condenses an eternal perc
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> At least you now agree that the atoms in my body could be replaced and
>> I would feel the same. What if the atoms were replaced by a person:
>> would I still have free will or would I, as you claim for a computer,
>> only have the will o
On Wednesday, March 20, 2013 7:32:11 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:51 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> You say "it doesn't make sense" that intentional could come from
> >> unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to
> >> have an insigh
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:51 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> You say "it doesn't make sense" that intentional could come from
>> unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to
>> have an insight that other people don't have.
>
>
> Lots of people have had this insight. You say th
On Wednesday, March 20, 2013 4:03:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 12:04 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not
> >> already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion
> >> through argume
On 20 Mar 2013, at 00:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote:
I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.
My terms are:
Super-Personal Intentional
(Intui
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 12:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not
>> already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion
>> through argument. If I "intend" to do something I do it because I want
>> to do it. On the face of i
On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 8:09:47 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 10:01 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 6:19:22 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
> >>
> >> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> >> I'l
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 10:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 6:19:22 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.
>> >
>> >
>> > My terms are:
>> >
>> >
On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 7:14:14 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg
> > >
> wrote:
> >
> >>> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.
> >>
> >> My terms are:
> >>
> >>
On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.
My terms are:
Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition)
On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 6:19:22 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.
> >
> >
> > My terms are:
> >
> > Super-Personal Intentional (In
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.
>
>
> My terms are:
>
> Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition)
> |
>
On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 5:37:34 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 3:11 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at
> >> all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an "alien"
> >> is a bein
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 3:11 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at
>> all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an "alien"
>> is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree on the
>> facts, but we need to a
On Monday, March 18, 2013 9:05:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are
> >> an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try
> >> to make
On 19.03.2013 02:05 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Craig Weinberg
wrote:
If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you
are an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why
do you try to make the discussion difficult by r
On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are
>> an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try
>> to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology?
>
>
> Because the ter
On Monday, March 18, 2013 7:34:59 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 3:18 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts
> >> of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter
> >> of definit
On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 3:18 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts
>> of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter
>> of definition. The argument is then over which definition is most
>> commonly used or which d
On Monday, March 18, 2013 2:28:34 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 11:25 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> As I said, a common definition of "control" is the ability to
> >> determine something's behaviour according to your wishes. That you
> >> have wishes is indep
On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 11:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> As I said, a common definition of "control" is the ability to
>> determine something's behaviour according to your wishes. That you
>> have wishes is independent of whether you have free will, whatever the
>> definition of free will.
>
>
On Sunday, March 17, 2013 3:16:15 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> You insist that "free will" is incompatible with determinism or
> >> randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible.
> >> "Control" can b
On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> You insist that "free will" is incompatible with determinism or
>> randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible.
>> "Control" can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if
>> free will is impossible.
>
>
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 8:54:35 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 7:38 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> "Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". I
> >> control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my
> >> wishes.
> >
>
On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 7:38 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> "Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". I
>> control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my
>> wishes.
>
>
> What do you see as being the difference between free will and the ability to
> determi
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:15:58 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> You persist in saying that if the components of the system are
> >> mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the
> >> way the phrase
On 16 Mar 2013, at 08:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg
wrote:
You persist in saying that if the components of the system are
mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not
the
way the phrase is normally used.
What do yo
On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> You persist in saying that if the components of the system are
>> mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the
>> way the phrase is normally used.
>
>
> What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it?
"Control"
On Friday, March 15, 2013 8:16:37 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>
> Again the shorcomings of nominamism/positivism. The greeks would laugh at
> these questions. It can be explained if we abandon the monomaniatic
> reductionistic physicalism and think in terms of just what we are: rational
Again the shorcomings of nominamism/positivism. The greeks would laugh at
these questions. It can be explained if we abandon the monomaniatic
reductionistic physicalism and think in terms of just what we are: rational
beings:
I think that the notion of "lost control of something" in an intelligent
On Friday, March 15, 2013 2:06:50 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>
> Apparently the legacy view negates free will.
>
I think it does in many people's minds - or it would if they took their own
beliefs seriously.
Craig
>
> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
> > What d
On Friday, March 15, 2013 4:11:28 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 5:00 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
> > What does it mean to 'lose control' of something?
> >
> > Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler...
> >
> > What are the broad physical princ
On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 5:00 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> What does it mean to 'lose control' of something?
>
> Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler...
>
> What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about
> when we refer to this, and why is it somethi
Apparently the legacy view negates free will.
On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> What does it mean to 'lose control' of something?
>
> Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler...
>
> What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about
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