Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, Clark, List,

Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards
repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most
active participants.

I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos *pre*-the Big
Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't
really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I
used the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language
*do* we have to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last
lecture of the 1898 *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* from *this,
our,* existential
one?) *contra* a more Aristotelian cosmos once there *exists* a, shall we
say, *particular* three category semiosic universe might be helpful in
 moving this discussion forward. So, my question: Are these two different?
If so, how so? If not, why not?

One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and others
make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, as I
interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic
universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many, possible
universe(s) to arise*. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay, there is no
explicit mention of God here, and Peirce seems to be making a purely
scientific hypothesis. So, perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a moment,
what is Peirce attempting in RLT?

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical
> battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to
> be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought.  I once again
> leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has
> demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in
>> terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical
>> with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.
>>
>> My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function
>> within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the  sense of it being a
>> generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does
>> *exist* as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling,
>> an openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, entire in itself*,
>> and as such, it *exists* within that experience of its fullness. There
>> is no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! Since it is a *state of
>> experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 'complete', so to
>> speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction.
>>
>> You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an
>> understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'.
>>
>> I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the absence
>> of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, but i
>> don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, therefore,
>> where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy,
>> in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411.  My reading of that,
>> is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or Secondness in this
>> 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. Nothing.
>>
>> Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
>> Cosmology)
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's.
>> Firstness is real, but does not exist.  It has no Relations, because any
>> Relation requires Secondness.  "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and
>> Secondness in the absence of Thirdness.  Accepting any matter of fact--such
>> as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable,
>> because it blocks the way of inquiry.  Nothing new here, so I will leave it
>> at that.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different
>>> actions.
>>>
>>> With regard to Firstness, I see it,  as a spontaneous *state* *of
>>> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the
>>> 'fullness of this state'. The point of all 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical
battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to
be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought.  I once again
leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has
demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in
> terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical
> with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.
>
> My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function
> within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the  sense of it being a
> generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does *exist*
> as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, an
> openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, entire in itself*,
> and as such, it *exists* within that experience of its fullness. There is
> no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! Since it is a *state of
> experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 'complete', so to
> speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction.
>
> You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an
> understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'.
>
> I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the absence
> of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, but i
> don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, therefore,
> where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy,
> in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411.  My reading of that,
> is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or Secondness in this
> 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. Nothing.
>
> Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's.
> Firstness is real, but does not exist.  It has no Relations, because any
> Relation requires Secondness.  "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and
> Secondness in the absence of Thirdness.  Accepting any matter of fact--such
> as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable,
> because it blocks the way of inquiry.  Nothing new here, so I will leave it
> at that.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different
>> actions.
>>
>> With regard to Firstness, I see it,  as a spontaneous *state* *of
>> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness
>> of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they operate within
>> Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that 
>> *spontaneous
>> state of existence* [which might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't
>> *bond/relate* to another entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.
>>
>>  For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted by
>> other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, *might
>> not*  be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.
>>
>> Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop and
>> might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might
>> disappear in a month.
>>
>> The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir
>> provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect
>> changes in the larger system.
>>
>> Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer
>> to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as
>> a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the
>> pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness,
>> Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].
>>
>> Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and
>> 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is
>> no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one -
>> certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist,
>> then, I'm not going to offer a  self-organized belief in god as having been
>> First Cause. I simply don't know.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *To:* Clark Goble 
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in 
terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical with 
that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.

My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function within 
Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the  sense of it being a generality [ie., 
the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does exist as a state of 
'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, an openness, BUT, this state is 
itself an experience, entire in itself, and as such, it exists within that 
experience of its fullness. There is no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! 
Since it is a state of experience, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 
'complete', so to speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction.

You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an 
understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'. 

I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the absence of 
Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, but i don't see 
this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, therefore, where there 
was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which 
nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411.  My reading of that, is that there 
was no matter in a mode of Firstness or Secondness in this 'original chaos' - 
no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. Nothing.

Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


  Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's.  
Firstness is real, but does not exist.  It has no Relations, because any 
Relation requires Secondness.  "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and 
Secondness in the absence of Thirdness.  Accepting any matter of fact--such as 
the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable, because 
it blocks the way of inquiry.  Nothing new here, so I will leave it at that.


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different actions.

With regard to Firstness, I see it,  as a spontaneous state of existence 
which might then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness of this state'. The 
point of all the categories is that they operate within Relations; they are not 
isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that spontaneous state of existence [which 
might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't bond/relate to another 
entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.

 For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell might be accepted by other 
cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, might not  be 
accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.

Or, a novel mode of transportation [Uber] might suddenly develop and might 
spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might disappear in 
a month.

The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir provides 
has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect changes in the 
larger system. 

Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer to 
1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as a 
transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the 
pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].

Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and 
'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is no 
explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one - 
certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, then, 
I'm not going to offer a  self-organized belief in god as having been First 
Cause. I simply don't know. 

Edwina 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Clark, List: 


  Your points, as usual, are well-taken.  Is it helpful at all to refer to 
"actualization," rather than "cause"?  Edwina's position, as I understand it, 
is that our existing universe is not only self-organizing but also 
self-generating or self-originating; as Houser put it in his introduction to EP 
1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is self-actualizing." 
 This is the crucial transition from Firstness (possibility) to Secondness 
(actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects the fact that Houser's attempt to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's.
Firstness is real, but does not exist.  It has no Relations, because any
Relation requires Secondness.  "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and
Secondness in the absence of Thirdness.  Accepting any matter of fact--such
as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable,
because it blocks the way of inquiry.  Nothing new here, so I will leave it
at that.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different
> actions.
>
> With regard to Firstness, I see it,  as a spontaneous *state* *of
> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness
> of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they operate within
> Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that *spontaneous
> state of existence* [which might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't
> *bond/relate* to another entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.
>
>  For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted by
> other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, *might
> not*  be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.
>
> Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop and
> might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might
> disappear in a month.
>
> The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir
> provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect
> changes in the larger system.
>
> Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer
> to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as
> a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the
> pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness,
> Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].
>
> Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and
> 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is
> no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one -
> certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist,
> then, I'm not going to offer a  self-organized belief in god as having been
> First Cause. I simply don't know.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Clark Goble 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Clark, List:
>
> Your points, as usual, are well-taken.  Is it helpful at all to refer to
> "actualization," rather than "cause"?  Edwina's position, as I understand
> it, is that our existing universe is not only self-*organizing *but also
> self-*generating *or self-*originating*; as Houser put it in his
> introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the
> chaos is self-actualizing."  This is the crucial transition from Firstness
> (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects
> the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively
> leaves this step unexplained.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> ET:  Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the
>> term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of
>> habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him
>> to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a
>> causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
>>
>> No, I understood exactly what you meant.  My disagreement is that I take
>> "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than
>> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could
>> ever be "a causal force."  I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but
>> you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad
>> thing!
>>
>> Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over
>> the term ‘cause.’  In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t
>> causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its
>> own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of causality at all
>> when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined is
>> problematic.
>>
>> I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too. For
>> instance in terms of physics we 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 5:01 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
> I agree that Pierce claims that to do science you must have faith in the 
> possibility of finding truth and that knowing is connected to thirdness. I 
> wonder if it has anything to do with agapism?

I think in the places he uses faith he means something closer to hope. (Which 
is one of the strong senses of faith) Of course course 1 Cor 13:10-13 is 
relevant here:

But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be 
done away. When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I 
thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things. For 
now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; 
but then shall I know even as also I am known. And now abideth faith, hope, 
charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.

> We know that Peirce’s view is influenced by “a Schelling-fashioned idealism 
> which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind.

And Schelling was himself influenced by the Platonists who held those views. 
I’ve not read it (and I don’t even know if it’s in a translation since I don’t 
read German) but apparently he had a well regarded commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus which is relevant to all these. Some see Schelling’s philosophy as a 
mixture or even conflation of Plato and Kant. Which is interesting since in 
many ways that describes Peirce as well.

I know John Sallis’ commentary on the Timaeus (very Continental styled 
philosophy so I suspect many here wouldn’t like it) grapples with Schelling 
there quite a bit. I really liked that little book of Sallis’ and think it 
quite relevant. While Kelly Parker never brings it up, the earlier Peirce’s use 
of substance fits quite closely to Schelling as represented by Sallis. (Again 
I’ve not read Schelling here so I can’t speak to the actual text itself)

> CP 6.102, so Emerson and his over-soul may also have some influence, but I 
> have only found him twice in SP. I agree that Peirce avoids the concept of 
> demiurge and thereby all the discussions of the good and evil of that concept.
> 

That wasn’t what I said. Quite the opposite. I was saying that Peirce’s process 
God in many ways is Plato’s demiurge. It’s not God as this origin but God as 
these creative principle that brings form to receptacle. That’s also why it has 
to be real but not actual given the logic of the Timaeus.

In Christianity likely due to gnosticism the demiurge had a rather bad 
reputation. With Spinoza due to his Jewish background you don’t see that. 
Admittedly ‘Nature’ as Spinoza’s demiurge lacks the agent/choice aspects that 
the demiurge has. There’s also arguably in most readings the elimination of 
teleology. Both those elements are brought back by Peirce although the swerve 
as chance but also choice is perhaps a bit more ambiguous.

> Hartshorne has analyzed the concept of Good in many religious philosophies. I 
> wonder why his interpretations do not come up in these discussion. He is a 
> highly recognized theologian and Peirce scholar.
>  


Hartshorne did have some odd views on Peirce though. He thought Peirce’s 
secondness was wrong for instance as I recall. I have some of Hartshorne’s 
works in my library but I confess I was not enamored of him. I have some 
friends who absolutely love him though. I just find the places he breaks from 
Peirce as problematic as Peirce found James’ breaks.

> One other way to understand Peirce’s concept of God is that the ‘farther’ or 
> ‘Godhead’ is the type and the ‘son’ is the token and the sign process is the 
> ‘holy spirit’, but I have never seen that in any of his writings.

Yes and that would line up with how he uses the Trinity. But I don’t recall it 
explicit in anyplace. As I said there was this weird ambiguity between son as 
mediator and spirit as mediator. Although to be fair this difference between 
son and holy ghost in its more platonic conception was a key break between the 
eastern Church and western Church notions of the Trinity. At least as I recall. 
Again this isn’t my area of specialty.








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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 3:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Is it helpful at all to refer to "actualization," rather than "cause"?  
> Edwina's position, as I understand it, is that our existing universe is not 
> only self-organizing but also self-generating or self-originating; as Houser 
> put it in his introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality 
> of the chaos is self-actualizing."  This is the crucial transition from 
> Firstness (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" 
> reflects the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology 
> effectively leaves this step unexplained.

Well I tend to agree with Edwina there with regards to Peirce’s position. 
Although I’m not sure actualization works. Usually I see that term being used 
to distinguish from a plan or a possibility versus the realization of that plan 
in actual matter. The problem is that our language really isn’t up to the task 
of these things. Which is why the Platonists tend to use explicit metaphor more 
regularly. It really does avoid a lot of problems for all the ridicule it might 
generate at times. This is also partially why in classic education Plato was 
left until last because it was considered so difficult to deal with. It’s 
interesting that these days we start with Plato in introductory classes and 
typically never return to him unless one is specializing in ancient philosophy 
or classics.

Regarding firstness as possibility to secondness as actuality I think it 
illustrates the problem if we quote the relevant Peirce. While he’ll frequently 
talk of it as possibility and uncaused he’ll also talk of it as spontaneous 
occurrence. The problem is that occurrence again is nearly as problematic a 
term as cause is. After all to occur requires a brute appearance that is more 
secondness. So the language in these divisions can mislead somewhat if we don’t 
keep the categories numerical aspect front and center.


I do not mean that potentiality immediately results in actuality. Mediately 
perhaps it does; but what immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality 
became potentiality of this or that sort -- that is, of some quality.
Thus the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into the unit 
of some quality. (CP 6.220)

Again here we see running up against the same problem of language. This 
‘zeroth’ category is a kind of possibility too. But he has to distinguish it 
from firstness as possibility. We might call it the possibility of possibility 
or simply this difference between possibility as such versus a particular 
possibility. Again the Platonists had these exact same problems with language 
and Peirce is almost certainly familiar with the language they used. You can 
see these a few pages earlier when he adopts explicitly platonic language.

The evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has for an early stage of it, a 
vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a continuum of forms 
having a multitude of dimensions too great for the individual dimensions to be 
distinct. It must be by a contraction of the vagueness of that potentiality of 
everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that the world of forms 
comes about. (CP 6.196)

Really the process Peirce is after is the continuum between the completely 
unlimited to the completely limited. This is the three universes but within 
each universe there is its own continuum. This really is traditional 
neplatonism of late antiquity minus some of the more annoying metaphors like 
breaking of vessels. Although Peirce does use the womb metaphor albeit in a 
somewhat reversal of how the Timaeus does.

Again I’m not sure I buy Peirce here in the least. Particularly I find the 
emanation theory he gives in CP 1.412 to be problematic for a few reasons. But 
that is his cosmology.









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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different actions.

With regard to Firstness, I see it,  as a spontaneous state of existence which 
might then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness of this state'. The point 
of all the categories is that they operate within Relations; they are not 
isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that spontaneous state of existence [which 
might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't bond/relate to another 
entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.

 For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell might be accepted by other cells 
and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, might not  be accepted and 
its energy-content would dissipate.

Or, a novel mode of transportation [Uber] might suddenly develop and might 
spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might disappear in 
a month.

The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir provides has on 
other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect changes in the larger 
system. 

Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer to 
1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as a 
transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the 
pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].

Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and 'something' is 
not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is no explanation, 
does not mean that I can or even should come up with one - certainly, science 
hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, then, I'm not going to 
offer a  self-organized belief in god as having been First Cause. I simply 
don't know. 

Edwina

 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Clark, List:


  Your points, as usual, are well-taken.  Is it helpful at all to refer to 
"actualization," rather than "cause"?  Edwina's position, as I understand it, 
is that our existing universe is not only self-organizing but also 
self-generating or self-originating; as Houser put it in his introduction to EP 
1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is self-actualizing." 
 This is the crucial transition from Firstness (possibility) to Secondness 
(actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects the fact that Houser's attempt to 
summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively leaves this step unexplained.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

  On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
wrote:

  ET:  Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the 
term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of 
habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to 
such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a causal force 
- and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.

  No, I understood exactly what you meant.  My disagreement is that I take 
"chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than 
randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could 
ever be "a causal force."  I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but you 
refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad thing!

Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over the 
term ‘cause.’  In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t causal and 
in an other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its own unmoved 
mover. The problem is that making sense of causality at all when little is 
necessary and most things are underdetermined is problematic. 

I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too. For 
instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian formulation 
of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian 
forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically quite conceptually 
different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the wave function (what in 
quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger equation) and it’s hard to 
make sense of causality in terms of it.

Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments against 
causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended argument I 
linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign can be divided 
it’s worth asking if we have causality at all.

Despite these problems of causality we all use the term 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:

with apologies...

I meant "from the start no better than a vegetable".

Best,
Jerry R



On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:28 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Jon, list:
>
> Thank you for that earnest answer.
> Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
> That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
> possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
> based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
>
> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
> vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
> interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods at
> our disposal.
>
> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
> investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?
>
> Thank you for your comments,
> Jerry R
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
>> Jerry, List,
>>
>> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
>> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
>> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
>> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
>> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
>> principles can be improved almost indefinitely.
>>
>> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
>> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>> > Jon, list:
>> >
>> > How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
>> >
>> > | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."
>> >
>> > | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief
>>
>> > | that the believer is the only existing person.  Were anybody to adopt
>> > | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it.  But when
>> > | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of
>> > | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical
>> > | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
>> > | ~ Peirce
>> >
>> > Best,
>> > Jerry R
>> >
>> > On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>> >
>> >> Peircers,
>> >>
>> >> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
>> >> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
>> >> some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
>> >> understand them, they all say essentially the same
>> >> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
>> >> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
>> >> or occasion.
>> >>
>> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
>> >>
>> >> Regards,
>> >>
>> >> Jon
>> >>
>> >> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> List:
>> >>>
>> >>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
>> >>> to a new thread topic.  I would appreciate it if others
>> >>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
>> >>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
>> >>> besides Peirce's cosmology.
>> >>>
>> >>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
>> >>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
>> >>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim,"
>> >>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can
>> tell.
>> >>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
>> >>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best*
>> >>> pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established recently in another
>> >>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
>> >>> falls under logical *critic*.  *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
>> >>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
>> >>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
>> >>> those that are not.
>> >>>
>> >>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
>> >>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>> >>>
>> >>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
>> >>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
>> >>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
>> >>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as
>> >>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all*
>> >>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do,
>> >>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
>> >>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology.
>> >>> | (CP 5.196; 1903)
>> >>>
>> >>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>> >>>
>> >>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have
>> >>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second
>> >>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other
>> >>> | conceptions and intentions, it 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> ET:  Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term 
> of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of habit. 
> Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to such 
> conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a causal force - 
> and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
> 
> No, I understood exactly what you meant.  My disagreement is that I take 
> "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than 
> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could 
> ever be "a causal force."  I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but you 
> refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad thing!
> 

Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over the term 
‘cause.’  In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t causal and in an 
other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its own unmoved mover. 
The problem is that making sense of causality at all when little is necessary 
and most things are underdetermined is problematic. 

I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too. For 
instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian formulation 
of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian 
forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically quite conceptually 
different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the wave function (what in 
quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger equation) and it’s hard to 
make sense of causality in terms of it.

Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments against 
causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended argument I 
linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign can be divided 
it’s worth asking if we have causality at all.

Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality.

> He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his very first 
> draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other comments about 
> it that are relevant to this discussion.
> 
> CSP:  I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all 
> experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my 
> original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations of 
> single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming ... 
> But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first 
> suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features of 
> the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others and 
> have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my 
> theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and Professor 
> Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original tendency to 
> take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis; while I myself 
> was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in 
> time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single events; since an 
> event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added)

I think this might be better read as there being no cause for firstness not 
that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re talking past 
one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an element in a triadic 
sign more or less entails a certain sense of causation. (Although I prefer 
Peirce’s term determination although that too has the genealogy in problematic 
metaphysical understanding)

I should add that this problem of language for this foundational event isn’t 
new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over whether the platonic One is 
one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. While I’ll confess to 
finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical reason for the 
analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels could dance on a 
pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds in medieval 
scholasticism)






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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jerry Rhee]

Jon, list:

Thank you for that earnest answer.
Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
based on our valuation for likeness between terms?

And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods at
our disposal.

So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?

Thank you for your comments,
Jerry R

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Jerry, List,
>
> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
> principles can be improved almost indefinitely.
>
> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> > Jon, list:
> >
> > How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
> >
> > | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."
> >
> > | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief
>
> > | that the believer is the only existing person.  Were anybody to adopt
> > | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it.  But when
> > | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of
> > | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical
> > | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
> > | ~ Peirce
> >
> > Best,
> > Jerry R
> >
> > On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> >
> >> Peircers,
> >>
> >> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
> >> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
> >> some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
> >> understand them, they all say essentially the same
> >> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
> >> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
> >> or occasion.
> >>
> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Jon
> >>
> >> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> >>
> >>> List:
> >>>
> >>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
> >>> to a new thread topic.  I would appreciate it if others
> >>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
> >>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
> >>> besides Peirce's cosmology.
> >>>
> >>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
> >>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
> >>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim,"
> >>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.
> >>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
> >>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best*
> >>> pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established recently in another
> >>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
> >>> falls under logical *critic*.  *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
> >>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
> >>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
> >>> those that are not.
> >>>
> >>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
> >>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
> >>>
> >>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
> >>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
> >>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
> >>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as
> >>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all*
> >>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do,
> >>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
> >>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology.
> >>> | (CP 5.196; 1903)
> >>>
> >>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
> >>>
> >>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have
> >>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second
> >>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other
> >>> | conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our
> >>> | practical conduct differently from that second conception.
> >>>
> >>> Regards,
> >>>
> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> >>>

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jon Awbrey]

Jerry, List,

I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
principles can be improved almost indefinitely.

I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.

Regards,

Jon

On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> Jon, list:
>
> How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
>
> | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."
>
> | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief
> | that the believer is the only existing person.  Were anybody to adopt
> | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it.  But when
> | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of
> | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical
> | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
> | ~ Peirce
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
>> Peircers,
>>
>> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
>> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
>> some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
>> understand them, they all say essentially the same
>> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
>> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
>> or occasion.
>>
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>
>>> List:
>>>
>>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
>>> to a new thread topic.  I would appreciate it if others
>>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
>>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
>>> besides Peirce's cosmology.
>>>
>>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
>>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
>>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim,"
>>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.
>>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
>>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best*
>>> pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established recently in another
>>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
>>> falls under logical *critic*.  *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
>>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
>>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
>>> those that are not.
>>>
>>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
>>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>>>
>>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
>>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
>>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
>>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as
>>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all*
>>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do,
>>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
>>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology.
>>> | (CP 5.196; 1903)
>>>
>>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>>>
>>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have
>>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second
>>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other
>>> | conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our
>>> | practical conduct differently from that second conception.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:

What gets lost in all this is the ultimate aim of this conversation for all
who investigate.  So, what is it?

I don't suspect that it is to bring us to *gether*.
It is not to promote growth of concrete reasonableness, for how can you
love what you cannot trust?

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 2:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, Clark, List:
>
> ET:  Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the
> term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of
> habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him
> to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a
> causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
>
>
> No, I understood exactly what you meant.  My disagreement is that I take
> "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than
> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could
> ever be "a causal force."  I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but
> you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad
> thing!
>
> ET:  But I don't agree with Jon's comment that Firstness is 'pure nothing'
> in the absence of continuity or Thirdness. Nothing-is-nothing, and none of
> the categories can be applicable to it.
>
>
> In 1905, Peirce stated that Firstness and Secondness together were "pure
> nothing" in the absence of Thirdness, and even attributed this view to his
> considerably earlier (1891-1893) series of articles in *The Monist*.
>
> CSP:  Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and
> synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early
> volumes of *The Monist* ever been written, it would have appeared how,
> with thorough consistency, that theory involved the recognition that 
> *continuity
> is an indispensable element of reality*, and that continuity is simply
> what generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like
> generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the
> essence of thought. Yet even in its truncated condition, an
> extra-intelligent reader might discern that *the theory of those
> cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more than
> feeling and action could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where
> those two elements were present, was explicitly shown to be pure nothing*.
> Now, the motive for alluding to that theory just here is, that in this way
> one can put in a strong light a position which the pragmaticist holds and
> must hold, whether that cosmological theory be ultimately sustained or
> exploded, namely, that *the third category--the category of thought,
> representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness
> as such--is an essential ingredient of reality*, yet does not by itself
> constitute reality, since this category (which in that cosmology appears as
> the element of habit) can have no concrete being without action, as a
> separate object on which to work its government, just as action cannot
> exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to act.  (CP 5.436,
> EP 2.345, emphasis added)
>
>
> He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his very
> first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other comments
> about it that are relevant to this discussion.
>
> CSP:  I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all
> experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my
> original hypothesis,) developments out of *utterly causeless
> determinations of single events*, under a certain universal tendency
> toward habit-forming ... But during the long years which have elapsed since
> the hypothesis first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed
> that *faulty features of the original hypothesis have been brought [to]
> my attention by others and have struck me in my own meditations*. Dr.
> Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory was not so much *evolutionary *as
> it was *emanational*; and Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that *there
> must have been some original tendency to take habits which did not arise
> according to my hypothesis*; while I myself was most struck by the
> difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time, if I proposed to
> make all laws develope from single events; since an event already supposes
> Time. (R 842, emphasis added)
>
>
> This passage provides clear evidence that Peirce did, in fact, come to
> find certain "features of the original hypothesis" to be "faulty," not only
> because of feedback from others, but also due to his "own meditations" in
> the interim.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Clark, List:

ET:  Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term
of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of
habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him
to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a
causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.


No, I understood exactly what you meant.  My disagreement is that I take
"chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than
randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could
ever be "a causal force."  I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but
you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad
thing!

ET:  But I don't agree with Jon's comment that Firstness is 'pure nothing'
in the absence of continuity or Thirdness. Nothing-is-nothing, and none of
the categories can be applicable to it.


In 1905, Peirce stated that Firstness and Secondness together were "pure
nothing" in the absence of Thirdness, and even attributed this view to his
considerably earlier (1891-1893) series of articles in *The Monist*.

CSP:  Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and
synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early
volumes of *The Monist* ever been written, it would have appeared how, with
thorough consistency, that theory involved the recognition that *continuity
is an indispensable element of reality*, and that continuity is simply what
generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like generality,
and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of
thought. Yet even in its truncated condition, an extra-intelligent reader
might discern that *the theory of those cosmological articles made reality
to consist in something more than feeling and action could supply, inasmuch
as the primeval chaos, where those two elements were present, was
explicitly shown to be pure nothing*. Now, the motive for alluding to that
theory just here is, that in this way one can put in a strong light a
position which the pragmaticist holds and must hold, whether that
cosmological theory be ultimately sustained or exploded, namely, that *the
third category--the category of thought, representation, triadic relation,
mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness as such--is an essential ingredient
of reality*, yet does not by itself constitute reality, since this category
(which in that cosmology appears as the element of habit) can have no
concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to work its
government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of
feeling on which to act.  (CP 5.436, EP 2.345, emphasis added)


He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his very
first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other comments
about it that are relevant to this discussion.

CSP:  I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all
experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my
original hypothesis,) developments out of *utterly causeless determinations
of single events*, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming
... But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first
suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that *faulty features
of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others
and have struck me in my own meditations*. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked
that my theory was not so much *evolutionary *as it was *emanational*; and
Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that *there must have been some original
tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis*;
while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law
of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single
events; since an event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added)


This passage provides clear evidence that Peirce did, in fact, come to find
certain "features of the original hypothesis" to be "faulty," not only
because of feedback from others, but also due to his "own meditations" in
the interim.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> 1) Clark - yes, thank you for your comment on my comment:
>
> ET: The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence
> and evolution of matter/mind ...
>
> Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term of
> 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of habit.
> Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to such
> conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a *causal
> force* - and there's plenty of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

1) Clark - yes, thank you for your comment on my comment:

ET: The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and 
evolution of matter/mind ...

Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term of 
'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of habit. 
Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to such 
conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a causal force - 
and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.

2) But I don't agree with Jon's comment that Firstness is 'pure nothing' in the 
absence of continuity or Thirdness. Nothing-is-nothing, and none of the 
categories can be applicable to it. 

Firstness is a mode of organization of matter/mind that is novel, spontaneous - 
and thus, has no habits. BUT, it is not 'nothing', for otherwise matter would 
never evolve its new habits. Matter only evolves these new habits when 
Firstness introduces a novel form [which is not 'nothing' but a novel form] 
..and this novel form can then persist within its taking on of habits/Thirdness.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 2:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)




On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
wrote:


While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree 
with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a process 
theology perspective.  Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or 
necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God as 
First Cause in the specific sense of Ens necessarium, since he said so 
explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the associated 
manuscript drafts.


  It’s worth noting that Peirce’s notions of vagueness in ontology (as opposed 
to epistemology/logic) combined with his ontology of chance tend to 
significantly change the meaning of both causation and ens necessarium. 
Especially relative to how most thought even in the 19th century.




  ET:  The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence 
and evolution of matter/mind ...


I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or Firstness, 
when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute reaction or 
Secondness--it is pure nothing in the absence of continuity or Thirdness.


  I suspect there’s some talking past one an other here. Given Peirce’s 
semiotic realism rather than a more traditional substance ontology (or even 
monads of process such as in Leibniz and perhaps Spinoza) it’s worth asking 
what ‘agent’ means. 


  Without speaking for Edwina I suspect she means by agent something different 
from how you may be taking her.


  I think due to the nature of Peirce’s idea of continuity in his semiotics and 
ontology any ‘agent’ can always be further analyzed as made up of ‘smaller’ 
bits of firstness, secondness, and thirdness.






--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

1) This is getting ridiculous.  I never said or implied that the only
alternative to Peirce writing what he meant and meaning what he wrote is
that he was *lying*.  My point pertains to us as readers, rather than him
as a writer--quite simply, in the absence of good reasons to do otherwise,
we should take his written words at face value.  Your inability to
reconcile the 1908 writings with the earlier cosmological writings is not,
by itself, a good reason to do otherwise.  My "quite literal and theist
reading" is the plain sense of the text.  Your "metaphorical" reading
requires the dubious assumption that Peirce was up to something other than
what he actually said.  As I have pointed out before, the title of the
article is "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," so the higher
burden of proof is squarely on anyone who wants to claim that Peirce was *not
really *arguing for the Reality of God.

2) Again, to defend a metaphorical interpretation, you would need to
identify evidence *in the later texts* that Peirce intended them to be
understood that way, rather than literally; and then you would need to
explain what that actually means.  What are the metaphors, and what do they
represent?  I think that it makes a lot more sense to take the definitions
literally, and then see whether and how they can be reconciled with the
earlier writings.  I have made my case for why and how I think they can,
but if they cannot, then the most reasonable conclusion is that Peirce
changed his mind in the interim.  Why do you resist that explanation so
strenuously?

3) Peirce did not divide the ten semeiotic trichotomies by Categories in
the 23 December 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby; instead, he divided them
by Universes (Possibles, Existents, Necessitants).  If the Universes do not
correspond to the Categories, then we should *never *discuss the later
28-sign and 66-sign classifications in terms of Categories; we should *only
*discuss them in terms of Universes, since that was Peirce's own
terminology.

4) More absurdity.  The principle of charity cannot justify *any
*interpretation,
it merely seeks to reconcile different writings by the same author *wherever
possible*.  I already indicated my concurrence with the caveats that Clark
has raised.

5) Back to dismissive rhetoric and name-calling, I see.  Your example
betrays not only a misunderstanding of the pragmaticist maxim, but also
confusion of a triadic relation (X murders Y) with a dyadic one (Y dies).
We are not talking here about statistical judgments by populations, but
singular judgments by individuals.

6) I merely expressed a *suspicion *that you are in the minority, and did
not argue or even suggest that this by itself invalidates your opinion.  If
not "the emergence and evolution of matter/mind," what do *you *think that
Peirce was writing about in CP 6.490?

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, List
>
> 1) An IF-THEN argument, as you have set it up, removes the conditional and
> interpretive factor inherent in an *IF*-THEN argument. That's because you
> have inserted a moral condition, that suggests that IF one doesn't accept
> the  THEN assertions in the list you provided, THEN, it suggests that
> Peirce's comments were lies. But the NA paper still has to be interpreted,
> - something you reject - and I do not interpret the term 'God' as you do -
> with your quite literal and theist reading.
>
> 2) I repeat: the definitions, if taken literally,  in the 1908 NA paper do
> not correlate with Peirce's earlier writings on the emergence of Mind and
> Matter; the role of chance; the role of habit-formation. That is why I
> introduce the suggestion of metaphor -
>
> 3) Your 'substitution' of 'universes' for 'categories' made no sense, as I
> originally tried to explain to you - and failed, since you rarely accept
> any of my comments as having any validity. And I don't agree with your new
> view - that the universes are 'phenomenological and/or metaphysical
> manifestations of the Categories'.  The Categories stand quite well on
> their own in a phenomenological and metaphysical manner.
>
> 4) No- we don't agree on the 'principle of charity' since it seems, to me
> at least, empty because it can serve, incorrectly, to justify any
> interpretation.
>
> 5) I totally and absolutely reject your view that 'not judging is itself a
> judgment'. That's pure semantic sophistry.
>
> You are essentially saying that, for example, there is no difference
> between: 'murdering a man, and that same man dying naturally in his bed'.
> After all, to you, there is no *practical* difference [since that man is
> dead in both instances] and therefore, for you, there is no *conceptual*
> difference. I don't agree.
>
> In addition, you reject the statistical reality of neutrality - which
> would foul up a LOT of scientific evaluations! In X-case, a population
> makes a decision about Y. ...based on a scale of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:

The pragmatic maxim:

If good because useful, then not useful because we do not even look to it.
Therefore, not useful.

Best,
Jerry R



On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 1:44 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:23 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
>
> Quantum filed theory seems to have arrived at such a foundational
> ur-continuity.
>
>
> I’m not sure that’s right. There’s certainly a type of continuity in
> quantum field theory but it’s unlike Peirce’s ur-continutiy because QFT
> pretty well assumes space/time are in some sense well defined. As soon as
> you start trying to deal with space/time more critically you end up having
> problems which is of course why string theory and other models like loop
> quantum gravity arose.
>
> Peirce’s ur-continuity largely is following a platonic emanation model and
> thus is logically *before* space and time. (Even space in the Timaeus is
> a much more abstract notion of receptacle even if it clearly is
> metaphorically tied to our experience of space) I think it’s therefore
> misleading to apply QFT to Peirce here.
>
> What fascinates me with this interpretation is that it changes the
> conception of God from the  person creator  we are used in standard
> Christianity and many other religions to a general process ontology…
>
>
> I’m not sure the creator in standard Christianity is a person-creator. At
> least as I understand most of the theology. I think the typical lay belief
> about creation is much more a bearded man making everything but that’s
> simply not what you encounter in Augustine, Aquinas, Duns Scotus or others.
> This gets into my comment last week between God as Being or source of Being
> versus God as intervening being.
>
> The process view that I think comes closest to Peirce is a kind of halfway
> point between the two views in traditional Christianity. It’s not really
> being or ground but neither is it really an intervening being. (That’s
> especially true in Peirce’s real but not existing view)
>
> An other way of putting this is to look at the various forms of
> Christian/Platonism that were less traditional. So gnosticism had the
> Platonic One as God and also had Jesus but had Plato’s demiurge as a kind
> of evil in between being. (Often associated by them with the God of the Old
> Testament for various reasons) You get similar ideas in a more positive way
> in Kabbalism with the En Sof as the platonic One and Adam Kadmon being
> similar to the demiurge. The logic of God that Peirce seems focused on is
> the demiurge even though he breaks it into three components. Although again
> that’s not without precedence. The various gnostic groups often got
> complicated in their emanation theories. The 12th century Kabbalisms tied
> Adam Kadmon to the Sefiroth or a set of 10 complicated emanations.
>
> building on phenomenology in its metaphysics and thus allows for the
> qualitative sciences in a sort of non-reductive view of all the sciences
> that is not fundamentally opposing as spiritual world view and it makes a
> lot of theory of meditation plausible, which we have not between able to
> handle physiologically or psychologically  so far.
>
>
> Not quite sure what you mean here.
>
> Thus it allows a dialog between science and spirituality and leaves the
> theist religions to faith, as I think they should. The subjective relation
> with the divine should in  my view be a personal  thing. The possibility of
> it not.
>
>
> I’m not sure I agree here. I think faith has a complicated role in Peirce.
> I think Peirce’s view of the theistic religions, especially Christianity,
> was that it shouldn’t be left to faith typically. That is there’s a
> functional faith tied to inquiry and evolution Peirce saw as valuable.
> There’s an other type of faith that cuts off inquiry that Peirce would see
> as closer to accepting dogmatism and far from praiseworthy.
>
>
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:23 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
> Quantum filed theory seems to have arrived at such a foundational 
> ur-continuity. 

I’m not sure that’s right. There’s certainly a type of continuity in quantum 
field theory but it’s unlike Peirce’s ur-continutiy because QFT pretty well 
assumes space/time are in some sense well defined. As soon as you start trying 
to deal with space/time more critically you end up having problems which is of 
course why string theory and other models like loop quantum gravity arose.

Peirce’s ur-continuity largely is following a platonic emanation model and thus 
is logically before space and time. (Even space in the Timaeus is a much more 
abstract notion of receptacle even if it clearly is metaphorically tied to our 
experience of space) I think it’s therefore misleading to apply QFT to Peirce 
here.

> What fascinates me with this interpretation is that it changes the conception 
> of God from the  person creator  we are used in standard Christianity and 
> many other religions to a general process ontology…

I’m not sure the creator in standard Christianity is a person-creator. At least 
as I understand most of the theology. I think the typical lay belief about 
creation is much more a bearded man making everything but that’s simply not 
what you encounter in Augustine, Aquinas, Duns Scotus or others. This gets into 
my comment last week between God as Being or source of Being versus God as 
intervening being.

The process view that I think comes closest to Peirce is a kind of halfway 
point between the two views in traditional Christianity. It’s not really being 
or ground but neither is it really an intervening being. (That’s especially 
true in Peirce’s real but not existing view)

An other way of putting this is to look at the various forms of 
Christian/Platonism that were less traditional. So gnosticism had the Platonic 
One as God and also had Jesus but had Plato’s demiurge as a kind of evil in 
between being. (Often associated by them with the God of the Old Testament for 
various reasons) You get similar ideas in a more positive way in Kabbalism with 
the En Sof as the platonic One and Adam Kadmon being similar to the demiurge. 
The logic of God that Peirce seems focused on is the demiurge even though he 
breaks it into three components. Although again that’s not without precedence. 
The various gnostic groups often got complicated in their emanation theories. 
The 12th century Kabbalisms tied Adam Kadmon to the Sefiroth or a set of 10 
complicated emanations.

> building on phenomenology in its metaphysics and thus allows for the 
> qualitative sciences in a sort of non-reductive view of all the sciences that 
> is not fundamentally opposing as spiritual world view and it makes a lot of 
> theory of meditation plausible, which we have not between able to handle 
> physiologically or psychologically  so far. 

Not quite sure what you mean here.

> Thus it allows a dialog between science and spirituality and leaves the 
> theist religions to faith, as I think they should. The subjective relation 
> with the divine should in  my view be a personal  thing. The possibility of 
> it not.

I’m not sure I agree here. I think faith has a complicated role in Peirce. I 
think Peirce’s view of the theistic religions, especially Christianity, was 
that it shouldn’t be left to faith typically. That is there’s a functional 
faith tied to inquiry and evolution Peirce saw as valuable. There’s an other 
type of faith that cuts off inquiry that Peirce would see as closer to 
accepting dogmatism and far from praiseworthy.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, List

1) An IF-THEN argument, as you have set it up, removes the conditional and 
interpretive factor inherent in an IF-THEN argument. That's because you have 
inserted a moral condition, that suggests that IF one doesn't accept the  THEN 
assertions in the list you provided, THEN, it suggests that Peirce's comments 
were lies. But the NA paper still has to be interpreted, - something you reject 
- and I do not interpret the term 'God' as you do - with your quite literal and 
theist reading.

2) I repeat: the definitions, if taken literally,  in the 1908 NA paper do not 
correlate with Peirce's earlier writings on the emergence of Mind and Matter; 
the role of chance; the role of habit-formation. That is why I introduce the 
suggestion of metaphor - 

3) Your 'substitution' of 'universes' for 'categories' made no sense, as I 
originally tried to explain to you - and failed, since you rarely accept any of 
my comments as having any validity. And I don't agree with your new view - that 
the universes are 'phenomenological and/or metaphysical manifestations of the 
Categories'.  The Categories stand quite well on their own in a 
phenomenological and metaphysical manner.

4) No- we don't agree on the 'principle of charity' since it seems, to me at 
least, empty because it can serve, incorrectly, to justify any interpretation.

5) I totally and absolutely reject your view that 'not judging is itself a 
judgment'. That's pure semantic sophistry. 

You are essentially saying that, for example, there is no difference between: 
'murdering a man, and that same man dying naturally in his bed'. After all, to 
you, there is no practical difference [since that man is dead in both 
instances] and therefore, for you, there is no conceptual difference. I don't 
agree.

In addition, you reject the statistical reality of neutrality - which would 
foul up a LOT of scientific evaluations! In X-case, a population makes a 
decision about Y. ...based on a scale of 1 to 5. The value of '3' is NEUTRAL 
and is a valid statistic, suggestion NO JUDGMENT. Your one-dimenstional 
binarism rejects neutrality.  For you - everything MUST be a judgment; you 
either accept or reject. I don't agree with this.

6) As for your conclusion that I'm in the  minority - well, that's another 
statistical flaw since of course, you don't know - and the 'well-chosen 
average' is not always right.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:42 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


  1) What?  I never said anything about "what [I interpret as his meaning]"; 
those are your words, which you inserted into my conditional comment--IF Peirce 
wrote what he meant and meant what he wrote, THEN it is incontrovertible that 
in 1908 he believed that God as Ens necessarium was the Creator of all three 
Universes of Experience and all of their contents, without exception.  His 
words to this effect are quite plain and unambiguous in all four of the quotes 
that I provided.  By claiming that they are somehow "metaphorical," you have 
effectively conceded that your view is that Peirce DID NOT write what he meant 
or mean what he wrote.


  2) With all due respect, this is very poor argumentation on your part.  You 
cannot correlate the four 1908 statements with Peirce's earlier cosmological 
writings, so they simply must be "metaphorical"; i.e., pertaining to "the 
experience of life" (whatever that means) rather than the origin and order of 
our existing universe, despite explicitly calling God the Creator of everything 
in all three Universes.  And you simply assert this, without offering any 
justification from the texts whatsoever.


  To set the record straight, I never used the word "rejection" or "rejected" 
with respect to the three Categories; I speculated that Peirce had substituted 
"Universes" for "Categories" in his late writings, asked the List community for 
help in evaluating this hypothesis, and ultimately withdrew it when confronted 
with the fact that Peirce continued to write at length about the Categories in 
the 1907 drafts of "Pragmatism."  My revised view--which just goes to show that 
some of us are willing and able to change our minds based on the discussions 
here--is that the Universes are phenomenological and/or metaphysical 
manifestations of the Categories.  That makes sense not only in "A Neglected 
Argument," but also in the 23 December 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby, where 
Peirce similarly defined three Universes and then assigned his ten semeiotic 
trichotomies to them as Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants.  You cannot 
have it both ways--if the Universes have nothing to do with the Categories, 
then neither do these divisions of signs and their relations.


  3) Okay, we disagree on the principle that later writings should generally be 
given priority over 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree 
> with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a process 
> theology perspective.  Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or 
> necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God 
> as First Cause in the specific sense of Ens necessarium, since he said so 
> explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the associated 
> manuscript drafts.

It’s worth noting that Peirce’s notions of vagueness in ontology (as opposed to 
epistemology/logic) combined with his ontology of chance tend to significantly 
change the meaning of both causation and ens necessarium. Especially relative 
to how most thought even in the 19th century.

> 
> ET:  The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and 
> evolution of matter/mind ...
> 
> I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or Firstness, 
> when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute reaction or 
> Secondness--it is pure nothing in the absence of continuity or Thirdness.

I suspect there’s some talking past one an other here. Given Peirce’s semiotic 
realism rather than a more traditional substance ontology (or even monads of 
process such as in Leibniz and perhaps Spinoza) it’s worth asking what ‘agent’ 
means. 

Without speaking for Edwina I suspect she means by agent something different 
from how you may be taking her.

I think due to the nature of Peirce’s idea of continuity in his semiotics and 
ontology any ‘agent’ can always be further analyzed as made up of ‘smaller’ 
bits of firstness, secondness, and thirdness.



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

Gary, list

Quantum filed theory seems to have arrived at such a foundational 
ur-continuity. What fascinates me with this interpretation is that it changes 
the conception of God from the  person creator  we are used in standard 
Christianity and many other religions to a general process ontology that is 
compatible with  a semiotically informed science og which biosemiotics is one, 
and at the same time it integrates the “normative” sciences  building on 
phenomenology in its metaphysics and thus allows for the qualitative sciences 
in a sort of non-reductive view of all the sciences that is not fundamentally 
opposing as spiritual world view and it makes a lot of theory of meditation 
plausible, which we have not between able to handle physiologically or 
psychologically  so far. Thus it allows a dialog between science and 
spirituality and leaves the theist religions to faith, as I think they should. 
The subjective relation with the divine should in  my view be a personal  
thing. The possibility of it not.

   Best
  Søren

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 3. november 2016 05:05
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Soren, Jon, List.

Soren wrote:
​
But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the 
tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero. . .

Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following the 
creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely speak) is 
*not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by the black 
board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It seems to me that much hinges 
on whether or not one sees our Universe as presupposing this ur-continuity 
(nothing in particular but everything in general, with yet a tendency toward 
habit-taking because of this ur-continuity, otherwise termed the zero of pure 
potential, which is, for Peirce, certainly not "nothing at all").

It has further been noted that Peirce suggests that the Creator is, or in some 
way participates, in this ur-continuity. Once *this* Universe is "in effect," 
then, yes, all that you and Stjernfelt argue may follow (although, I remain, as 
was Peirce, I firmly believe, a theist and not a panentheist, so I tend to 
reject that part of your argumentation, at least in consideration of the early 
cosmos).

Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 7:41 PM, Søren Brier 
> wrote:
Jon, List

​​
But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the 
tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero, why should its 
self-organization not match Eckhart’s idea of Jesus consciousness born in every 
man, if  “the father” is pure Zero and the holy spirit or ghost  is thirdness 
as self-organization, meaning that human consciousness as the aware man  is the 
living conscious realization in the flesh of the origin of our  being? Peirce’s 
naturalization encompassed pure Zero as the transcendental a part of nature and 
us. It fits a form of Gnostic panentheism, is my abduction. It fits with his 
mystical experience. It is esoterical  pure mysticism encompassing rationality 
and science without a  conscious personal creator. The basic postulate is that 
we can have access to the Godhead through a developed consciousness. This is 
basically what Bhakti Vedanta and much of Buddhism – and in my view Meister 
Eckhart in Christianity – say, and why he was excommunicated from the Catholic 
church, because he was – as many scholars has pointed out – too close to Adi 
Shankara’s thinking. It is pretty much Suzuki’s point of view too 
http://terebess.hu/zen/mesterek/d-t-suzuki-mysticism-christian-and-buddhist.pdf 
and he was hired by Paul Carus the editor of the Monist. Of cause we here have 
Emerson and the trandscendentalist’s view too.

  Best
  Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 2. november 2016 22:43
To: John F Sowa
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

John, List:

The question still arises of what to make of the statement in John's Gospel 
that "the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us."  Neither nature nor its laws 
can be substituted for Logos in this case.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

All good points, thanks.

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 1:15 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 10:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> CG:  As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the
> historic ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical
> ones (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending
> arguments beyond where Peirce took them).
>
>
> I agree, and I have tried to stick to the first issue in these discussions.
>
> CG:  As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor a charitable reading
> doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable readings transform a
> philosopher’s arguments into something other than they intended in order to
> make it function better. I tend to think that while we must read with a
> hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic of suspicion.
> Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful
> eliminating them without justification.
>
>
> I agree with this, as well, although it is probably quite evident by now
> that when in doubt I am inclined to err on the side of charity.  I would
> not be surprised if there is an argument to be made that Peirce's
> cosmological views significantly *changed* sometime between 1888 and
> 1908; the problem is that no one has even tried to make that case yet.  I
> might still disagree--again, like Parker, I see the later writings as
> *continuous *with the earlier ones, reflecting further development and
> clarification of Peirce's ideas--but I could then at least recognize it as a
>  *defensible *position, unlike "no comment."
>
> I confess I tend to favor keeping open a plurality of readings. Likewise
> when it seems the strength of argument is weaker (as is especially the case
> with metaphysical arguments) I think we have to acknowledge that. We might
> say something is the best reading yet still a weak one. This is important
> in some places such as say Higher Criticism where frankly the data out of
> which arguments are made is quite weak. (I bring that up given your quote
> about Peirce and Higher Criticism this morning)
>
> So to me erring on the side of charity is problematic if it reduces the
> number of defensible readings too much. (Keeping defensible somewhat vague
> since that’s usually a matter of debate in any particular set of readings)
>
> I think there is an argument that Peirce’s cosmology changed between 1888
> and 1908. His adoption of modal realism during the later 1890’s is the
> clearest part of that. I think that a pretty significant change to his
> cosmology. But despite thinking that even if he didn’t adopt a full
> throated modal realism I think elements of it are in the logic of his
> arguments well before 1895-6. That is if we take many of his arguments as
> carefully vague in key parts then the adoption modal realism can help
> determine them.
>
> An other way of putting my concern here really is in taking Peirce’s logic
> of vagueness seriously when considering charity. My experience especially
> with people in the analytic tradition such as Davidson is that they don’t
> pay sufficient attention to these elements of vagueness in terms of meaning
> and intentionality. This becomes important when part of a reading/argument
> is tied to reference to real things where we can peel back the vagueness.
> So any author in their intents because they can refer can have the meaning
> of their arguments be fuller than their understanding of their arguments.
> Again this is due to the nature of reference and vagueness.
>
> I think this is pretty important relative to Peirce’s fundamental ontology
> and cosmology. I was actually critical for a long time of some elements of
> Kelly Parker’s argument that I’ve since rethought due to this logic of
> vagueness. A good example might be his appeal in the early Peirce (the
> pre-1880 writings) to Kant’s categories and Being and Substance being the
> unthinkable limits of the categories. I initially thought it was
> inappropriate to take those early writings and tie them to later writings.
> Now I’m not so sure and think Kant informs Peirce quite a bit more than I
> was willing to concede.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I would expect Jon S to disagree.


While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree
with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a
process theology perspective.  Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or
necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God
as First Cause in the specific sense of *Ens necessarium*, since he said so
explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the associated
manuscript drafts.

ET:  The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence
and evolution of matter/mind ...


I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or Firstness,
when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute reaction or
Secondness--it is *pure nothing* in the absence of continuity or Thirdness.

CSP:  Thus, when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical term to
express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity. Permit
me further to say that I object to having my metaphysical system as a whole
called Tychism. For although tychism does enter into it, it only enters as
subsidiary to that which is really, as I regard it, the characteristic of
my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness,
and, in order to secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find
it indispensable fully [to] recognize that it is a third, and that
Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other
elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have
anything upon which to operate. Accordingly, I like to call my theory
Synechism, because it rests on the study of continuity. (CP 6.201-202; 1898)

CSP:  We start, then, with nothing, pure zero … It is the germinal nothing,
in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is
absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility—boundless possibility. There
is no compulsion and no law … Now the question arises, what necessarily
resulted from that state of things? But the only sane answer is that where
freedom was boundless nothing in particular necessarily resulted. (CP
6.217-218; 1898)


Chance as Firstness is "freedom or spontaneity," rather than randomness or
inexplicability; and it is something upon which, along with Brute reaction
as Secondness, continuity as Thirdness operates in exercising "its really
commanding function."  I thus equate it with *divine* freedom or
spontaneity--but I do not insist that this is the *only *viable
interpretation.

CSP:  Those who express the idea to themselves by saying that the Divine
Creator determined so and so may be incautiously clothing the idea in a
garb that is open to criticism, but it is, after all, substantially the
only philosophical answer to the problem. (CP 6.199; 1898)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Clark, list:
>
> Agreed, that the term of 'god' in Peirce, at least in my interpretation,
> is more akin to the god-in-process 'theology' [or I prefer
> Nature-in-process'] rather than a priori determinism or First Cause. I
> would expect Jon S to disagree.
>
> The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and
> evolution of matter/mind - and of Thirdness as a process of habit formation
> - and of complexity of interactions within the triadic semiosic network
> can't be overlooked.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 10:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> CG:  As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the 
> historic ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical 
> ones (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments 
> beyond where Peirce took them).
> 
> I agree, and I have tried to stick to the first issue in these discussions.
> 
> CG:  As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor a charitable reading doesn’t 
> guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable readings transform a 
> philosopher’s arguments into something other than they intended in order to 
> make it function better. I tend to think that while we must read with a 
> hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic of suspicion. 
> Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful eliminating 
> them without justification.
> 
> I agree with this, as well, although it is probably quite evident by now that 
> when in doubt I am inclined to err on the side of charity.  I would not be 
> surprised if there is an argument to be made that Peirce's cosmological views 
> significantly changed sometime between 1888 and 1908; the problem is that no 
> one has even tried to make that case yet.  I might still disagree--again, 
> like Parker, I see the later writings as continuous with the earlier ones, 
> reflecting further development and clarification of Peirce's ideas--but I 
> could then at least recognize it as a defensible position, unlike "no 
> comment."

I confess I tend to favor keeping open a plurality of readings. Likewise when 
it seems the strength of argument is weaker (as is especially the case with 
metaphysical arguments) I think we have to acknowledge that. We might say 
something is the best reading yet still a weak one. This is important in some 
places such as say Higher Criticism where frankly the data out of which 
arguments are made is quite weak. (I bring that up given your quote about 
Peirce and Higher Criticism this morning)

So to me erring on the side of charity is problematic if it reduces the number 
of defensible readings too much. (Keeping defensible somewhat vague since 
that’s usually a matter of debate in any particular set of readings)

I think there is an argument that Peirce’s cosmology changed between 1888 and 
1908. His adoption of modal realism during the later 1890’s is the clearest 
part of that. I think that a pretty significant change to his cosmology. But 
despite thinking that even if he didn’t adopt a full throated modal realism I 
think elements of it are in the logic of his arguments well before 1895-6. That 
is if we take many of his arguments as carefully vague in key parts then the 
adoption modal realism can help determine them.

An other way of putting my concern here really is in taking Peirce’s logic of 
vagueness seriously when considering charity. My experience especially with 
people in the analytic tradition such as Davidson is that they don’t pay 
sufficient attention to these elements of vagueness in terms of meaning and 
intentionality. This becomes important when part of a reading/argument is tied 
to reference to real things where we can peel back the vagueness. So any author 
in their intents because they can refer can have the meaning of their arguments 
be fuller than their understanding of their arguments. Again this is due to the 
nature of reference and vagueness.

I think this is pretty important relative to Peirce’s fundamental ontology and 
cosmology. I was actually critical for a long time of some elements of Kelly 
Parker’s argument that I’ve since rethought due to this logic of vagueness. A 
good example might be his appeal in the early Peirce (the pre-1880 writings) to 
Kant’s categories and Being and Substance being the unthinkable limits of the 
categories. I initially thought it was inappropriate to take those early 
writings and tie them to later writings. Now I’m not so sure and think Kant 
informs Peirce quite a bit more than I was willing to concede.



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[PEIRCE-L] Tartu Summer School of Semiotic 2017: Generalising Gently - CFP

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Some here might be interested in this CALL FOR PAPERS

Best,

Gary R


We are happy to announce the call for papers for the next Tartu Summer
School of Semiotics taking place *August 15-18 2017* in Tartu. The topic of
TSSS 2017 is “*Generalising Gently*”, which addresses the central and
problematic nature of generalisations in semiotic and semiosic processes.

Semiotics relies on generalisations both at the level of knowledge
production and at the level of its research objects. As a metadiscipline,
semiotics provides the tools of translation between different scientific
languages, exemplifying the complementarity of different kinds of knowledge
in our understanding of reality. Semiotics as a discipline provides
specific conceptual generalisations while modelling the semiotic
constitution of reality. Besides the production of generalised knowledge,
the processes that semiotics studies are themselves built on
generalisation, such as perceptual categorisation and schematisation, the
formation of behaviour patterns, language based modelling, cultural
rituals, and habits. We invite submission of papers to the summer school
that discuss the particularities of semiotic knowledge as a form of
generalised knowledge as well as papers that focus on the role and
functioning of different types of signs, sign systems and languages of
culture as means of generalisation.

While trying to provide generalised knowledge of different semiosic
phenomena, a tension between the semiosic existence of the objects of study
and the semiotic attempts at knowledge production is revealed. All
generalisations decontextualise knowledge and yet, the objects of semiotic
research (from organisms to cultures) are in principle contextual
phenomena. Generalised knowledge also strives towards atemporality—a claim
for applicability to the past (the capacity of reconstruction) just as much
as to the future (the capacity of predictions). Yet the generalisations and
predictions face the necessary unpredictability of semiotic systems.
Generalisation is indispensible to cognition, but too often are the
particulars of experience eclipsed by bad totalities. Uncareful
generalisations can harm studied subjects and communities. Hence the
necessity to conduct scientific generalisations in a responsible and gentle
manner.

Deadline for 300-600 word abstracts for individual papers is *February
15th, 2017*. The abstracts should be sent to the address semiot...@ut.ee.

Registration will open in *February 2017*.

This event has been supported by the University of Tartu's ASTRA project
PER ASPERA (European Union, European Regional Development Fund).

Kind regards,
TSSS Team
[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Jon, Edwina, list:



I would like to recommend a method to help you clarify your meaning.  To
ascertain the meaning of your current intellectual conception, one should
consider what practical consequences might result from the truth of that
conception—and the sum of these consequences constitute the entire meaning
of that conception.

That is, I recommend a method of reflexion which is guided by constantly
holding in view its purpose and the purpose of the ideas it analyzes,
whether these ends be of the nature and uses of action or of thought.



Here it is:



Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings
*you* conceive
the object of *your* conception to have: then the general mental habit that
consists in the production of these effects is the whole meaning of *your*
concept.



Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings,
*we* conceive
the object of *our* conception to have. Then, *our* conception of these
effects is the whole of *our *conception of the object.



Note that in these three lines one finds, “conceivably,” “conceive,”
“conception,” “conception,” “*conception*.” Now I find there are many
people who detect the authorship of my unsigned screeds; and I doubt not
that one of the marks of my style by which they do so is my inordinate
reluctance to repeat a word. This employment five times over of derivates
of concipere must then have had a purpose.



So now…that settles it, eh?

Let us do well and fare well.



Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Clark, list:
>
> Agreed, that the term of 'god' in Peirce, at least in my interpretation,
> is more akin to the god-in-process 'theology' [or I prefer
> Nature-in-process'] rather than a priori determinism or First Cause. I
> would expect Jon S to disagree.
>
> The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and
> evolution of matter/mind - and of Thirdness as a process of habit formation
> - and of complexity of interactions within the triadic semiosic network
> can't be overlooked.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Clark Goble 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:26 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of
> 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang
> Thirdness.
>
> But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we
> are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal
> beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching
> for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.
>
>
> I tend to think we’re getting to the limits of Peirce here although I
> think there is considerable textual evidence in Peirce for an
> ur-continuity. Again Kelly Parker has pretty compelling arguments here for
> Peirce’s beliefs. Peirce speaks of a creator in numerous places but clearly
> he means something different from the first cause of Duns Scotus or
> Aristotle due to the place of chance in his ontology. As we’ve discussed
> over the past weeks his creator is more akin to the God in process theology
> or perhaps a process reading of Spinoza.
>
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I cannot
> interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his earlier
> writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except as
> * metaphoric*, with his earlier writings.
>
>
> I think accepting a break between the early works and later works is fine
> when we can’t reconcile them. However I think the NA is quite reconcilable
> with most of his work from what era of say 1896 forward. At least I don’t
> see the contradictions. We may not like what he says, but I confess I don’t
> quite understand the treating it as metaphoric. That seems a bit of a dodge.
>
> As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the historic
> ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical ones
> (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments
> beyond where Peirce took them). I’ll confess I find the more platonic
> aspects of Peirce a little harder to accept and the arguments certainly
> weaker than his main doctrines. But I have to concede the arguments for
> Peirce having held them are quite strong and hard for me to disbelieve.
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"?  It is not a
> "sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark, list:

Agreed, that the term of 'god' in Peirce, at least in my interpretation, is 
more akin to the god-in-process 'theology' [or I prefer Nature-in-process'] 
rather than a priori determinism or First Cause. I would expect Jon S to 
disagree.

The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and 
evolution of matter/mind - and of Thirdness as a process of habit formation - 
and of complexity of interactions within the triadic semiosic network can't be 
overlooked.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:26 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)




On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of 
'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 'ur-continuity'. 
Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang Thirdness.

But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we 
are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal beliefs 
about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching for and 
'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.


  I tend to think we’re getting to the limits of Peirce here although I think 
there is considerable textual evidence in Peirce for an ur-continuity. Again 
Kelly Parker has pretty compelling arguments here for Peirce’s beliefs. Peirce 
speaks of a creator in numerous places but clearly he means something different 
from the first cause of Duns Scotus or Aristotle due to the place of chance in 
his ontology. As we’ve discussed over the past weeks his creator is more akin 
to the God in process theology or perhaps a process reading of Spinoza.




On Nov 3, 2016, at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I cannot 
interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his earlier 
writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except as 
metaphoric, with his earlier writings.


  I think accepting a break between the early works and later works is fine 
when we can’t reconcile them. However I think the NA is quite reconcilable with 
most of his work from what era of say 1896 forward. At least I don’t see the 
contradictions. We may not like what he says, but I confess I don’t quite 
understand the treating it as metaphoric. That seems a bit of a dodge.



  As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the historic 
ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical ones (whether 
particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments beyond where 
Peirce took them). I’ll confess I find the more platonic aspects of Peirce a 
little harder to accept and the arguments certainly weaker than his main 
doctrines. But I have to concede the arguments for Peirce having held them are 
quite strong and hard for me to disbelieve.


On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
wrote:


Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"?  It is not a 
"sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate, well-established, 
and widely endorsed method of interpretation.  Per Wikipedia, "In philosophy 
and rhetoric, the principle of charity requires interpreting a speaker's 
statements to be rational and, in the case of any argument, considering its 
best, strongest possible interpretation."  As Donald Davidson put it, "We make 
maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way 
that optimises agreement."  So we assume that "A Neglected Argument," for 
example, is fully consistent with everything else that Peirce wrote--unless and 
until the evidence compels us to conclude otherwise.


  I think we have to be careful here. As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s 
razor a charitable reading doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often 
charitable readings transform a philosopher’s arguments into something other 
than they intended in order to make it function better. I tend to think that 
while we must read with a hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a 
hermeneutic of suspicion. Typically multiple readings are possible and we 
should be careful eliminating them without justification.




--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Religious Views (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

I think that your comments here hit the nail on the head.

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 11:31 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> The first paragraph tells us that Peirce's approach to Scripture was that
> of "modern Biblical criticism," and he expected "the liberal parties" to
> triumph accordingly.  This is not surprising; I also discovered that he
> wrote in R 851 (1911) that "the reader will find me a scientific man to the
> core; and the early Christians did not exhibit a more thorough abhorrence
> for the impurities of the paganism of their childhood, than I entertain for
> utterances I used to hear from the pulpit about the 'plenary inspiration'
> of the Bible, etc."  He apparently had a particular beef with "the
> Calvinistic theology," which as a Lutheran I tend to share.
>
> The key insight from the second paragraph is that Peirce considered "the
> doctrine of love and of the Sermon on the Mount" to be "the fundamental
> proposition of christian philosophy."  In other words, consistent with some
> of his other relevant writings, he focused entirely on the *teachings *of
> Jesus, rather than matters pertaining to his divinity, death, and
> resurrection.  From my Lutheran perspective, that is an obvious confusion
> of Law (what we do and fail to do) and Gospel (what God has done for us);
> our love for God and other people is the *result *of our salvation,
> rather than its cause or its content.  There is considerable historical
> truth in Peirce's comments about the origin of creeds, but unfortunately he
> seems to want to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
>
> Given Peirce’s emphasis on a type of empiricism rather than trusting
> accounts one couldn’t confirm this is hardly surprising. While tied to
> Christianity his seems a religion more determined by what he can test.
> (Hardly surprising given the work his pragmatic maxim does) Clearly he
> still has a lot of tradition in his thought so this process isn’t complete.
>
> To Calvinism given the place of tychism in his thought it’s not surprising
> he rejects it and sees it as so inherently problematic.
>
> Those were quite interesting quotes though that I’d not seen before.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

CG:  As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the
historic ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical
ones (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending
arguments beyond where Peirce took them).


I agree, and I have tried to stick to the first issue in these discussions.

CG:  As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor a charitable reading
doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable readings transform a
philosopher’s arguments into something other than they intended in order to
make it function better. I tend to think that while we must read with a
hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic of suspicion.
Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful
eliminating them without justification.


I agree with this, as well, although it is probably quite evident by now
that when in doubt I am inclined to err on the side of charity.  I would
not be surprised if there is an argument to be made that Peirce's
cosmological views significantly *changed* sometime between 1888 and 1908;
the problem is that no one has even tried to make that case yet.  I might
still disagree--again, like Parker, I see the later writings as *continuous
*with the earlier ones, reflecting further development and clarification of
Peirce's ideas--but I could then at least recognize it as a
*defensible *position,
unlike "no comment."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 11:26 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of
> 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang
> Thirdness.
>
> But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we
> are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal
> beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching
> for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.
>
> I tend to think we’re getting to the limits of Peirce here although I
> think there is considerable textual evidence in Peirce for an
> ur-continuity. Again Kelly Parker has pretty compelling arguments here for
> Peirce’s beliefs. Peirce speaks of a creator in numerous places but clearly
> he means something different from the first cause of Duns Scotus or
> Aristotle due to the place of chance in his ontology. As we’ve discussed
> over the past weeks his creator is more akin to the God in process theology
> or perhaps a process reading of Spinoza.
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I cannot
> interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his earlier
> writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except as
> * metaphoric*, with his earlier writings.
>
> I think accepting a break between the early works and later works is fine
> when we can’t reconcile them. However I think the NA is quite reconcilable
> with most of his work from what era of say 1896 forward. At least I don’t
> see the contradictions. We may not like what he says, but I confess I don’t
> quite understand the treating it as metaphoric. That seems a bit of a dodge.
>
> As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the historic
> ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical ones
> (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments
> beyond where Peirce took them). I’ll confess I find the more platonic
> aspects of Peirce a little harder to accept and the arguments certainly
> weaker than his main doctrines. But I have to concede the arguments for
> Peirce having held them are quite strong and hard for me to disbelieve.
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"?  It is not a
> "sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate,
> well-established, and widely endorsed method of interpretation.  Per
> Wikipedia, "In philosophy and rhetoric, the principle of charity requires
> interpreting a speaker's statements to be rational and, in the case of any
> argument, considering its best, strongest possible interpretation."  As
> Donald Davidson put it, "We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of
> others when we interpret in a way that optimises agreement."  So we assume
> that "A Neglected Argument," for example, is *fully consistent* with 
> *everything
> else* that Peirce wrote--unless and until the evidence *compels* us to
> conclude otherwise.
>
> I think we have to be careful here. As 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

1) What?  I never said anything about "what [I interpret as his meaning]";
those are *your *words, which you inserted into my *conditional *comment--IF
Peirce wrote what he meant and meant what he wrote, THEN it is
incontrovertible that in 1908 he believed that God as *Ens necessarium *was
the Creator of all three Universes of Experience and all of their contents,
without exception.  His words to this effect are quite plain and
unambiguous in all four of the quotes that I provided.  By claiming that
they are somehow "metaphorical," you have effectively conceded that your
view is that Peirce DID NOT write what he meant or mean what he wrote.

2) With all due respect, this is very poor argumentation on your part.  You
cannot correlate the four 1908 statements with Peirce's earlier
cosmological writings, so they simply *must *be "metaphorical"; i.e.,
pertaining to "the experience of life" (whatever that means) rather than
the origin and order of our existing universe, despite explicitly calling
God the Creator of everything in all three Universes.  And you simply
assert this, without offering any justification from the texts whatsoever.

To set the record straight, I never used the word "rejection" or "rejected"
with respect to the three Categories; I *speculated *that Peirce had
*substituted
*"Universes" for "Categories" in his late writings, asked the List
community for help in evaluating this hypothesis, and ultimately withdrew
it when confronted with the fact that Peirce continued to write at length
about the Categories in the 1907 drafts of "Pragmatism."  My revised
view--which just goes to show that some of us are willing and able to
change our minds based on the discussions here--is that the Universes are
phenomenological and/or metaphysical manifestations of the Categories.
That makes sense not only in "A Neglected Argument," but also in the 23
December 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby, where Peirce similarly defined
three Universes and then assigned his ten semeiotic trichotomies to them as
Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants.  You cannot have it both ways--if
the Universes have nothing to do with the Categories, then neither do these
divisions of signs and their relations.

3) Okay, we disagree on the principle that later writings should generally
be given priority over earlier writings; I suspected that (and said so) a
long time ago.  Do we at least agree on the principle of charity now?

4) The decision not to judge is itself a judgment.  You choose not to take
"A Neglected Argument" into account, which implies that you do not consider
it to be relevant--i.e., you *reject *it when seeking to identify and
understand Peirce's cosmological views.  There is no *practical *difference
between "rejection" and "no comment," so there is no *conceptual *
difference.

5) Then I suspect that you are in a very small minority of Peirce
scholars.  For one thing, what else could plausibly be the subject matter
of CP 6.490?

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 10:44 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - again, you are lifting words/phrases and inserting your own meanings.
>
> 1) To now claim that your statement that either a writer 'means what he
> says or doesn't' is a *'common-sense assumption* is not the same as
> 'either he meant what [I interpret as his meaning] or he did not' - is not
> logical evidence - but almost a threat'. You are leaving out *''what I
> interpret as his meaning'*.
>
> 2) Again, the definitions given in the NA do not, in my view, correlate
> with the emergence-evolution outlines of the universe given elsewhere in
> Peirce's works [not only 1.412, but the outlines of tychasm and agapasm and
> synechism]. Therefore, I can only conclude that they are metaphors for *the
> experience of life*. Not for the analysis of the triadic semiosic
> evolution of life. I therefore do not comment on them.
>
>  I am aware that you tried, very hard, to suggest that the 'three
> universes of experience' were advanced analyses by Peirce [because written
> at a later date] and thus included the rejection of the Three Categories.
> My suggestion that the Three Universes of  Experience had nothing to do
> with the Three Categories, which were not rejected by Peirce [as you were
> trying to claim] was denied by you - but- eventually, you were persuaded by
> others [not by me] to  abandon this claim.
>
> Beyond my suggestion that the NA is about the 'experience of life' - I
> have no comment as, yet again, I see no correlation with Peirce's arguments
> about the emergence and evolution of matter/mind in the universe. You
> attempt to correlate them; I don't see this interpretation as valid.
>
> 3) i do NOT acknowledge that what I wrote yesterday 'more accurately
> reflects my considered views'. All it does it reflect what i wrote
> yesterday.  To insert 'more accurately' suggests a mechanical process of
> Mind where the words are supposed to 'accurately match' the Mind's

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Religious Views (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

[Clark Goble]

> The first paragraph tells us that Peirce's approach to Scripture was that of 
> "modern Biblical criticism," and he expected "the liberal parties" to triumph 
> accordingly.  This is not surprising; I also discovered that he wrote in R 
> 851 (1911) that "the reader will find me a scientific man to the core; and 
> the early Christians did not exhibit a more thorough abhorrence for the 
> impurities of the paganism of their childhood, than I entertain for 
> utterances I used to hear from the pulpit about the 'plenary inspiration' of 
> the Bible, etc."  He apparently had a particular beef with "the Calvinistic 
> theology," which as a Lutheran I tend to share.
> 
> The key insight from the second paragraph is that Peirce considered "the 
> doctrine of love and of the Sermon on the Mount" to be "the fundamental 
> proposition of christian philosophy."  In other words, consistent with some 
> of his other relevant writings, he focused entirely on the teachings of 
> Jesus, rather than matters pertaining to his divinity, death, and 
> resurrection.  From my Lutheran perspective, that is an obvious confusion of 
> Law (what we do and fail to do) and Gospel (what God has done for us); our 
> love for God and other people is the result of our salvation, rather than its 
> cause or its content.  There is considerable historical truth in Peirce's 
> comments about the origin of creeds, but unfortunately he seems to want to 
> throw the baby out with the bathwater.

Given Peirce’s emphasis on a type of empiricism rather than trusting accounts 
one couldn’t confirm this is hardly surprising. While tied to Christianity his 
seems a religion more determined by what he can test. (Hardly surprising given 
the work his pragmatic maxim does) Clearly he still has a lot of tradition in 
his thought so this process isn’t complete.

To Calvinism given the place of tychism in his thought it’s not surprising he 
rejects it and sees it as so inherently problematic. 

Those were quite interesting quotes though that I’d not seen before.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of 
> 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang 
> Thirdness.
>  
> But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we are 
> moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal beliefs 
> about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching for and 
> 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.

I tend to think we’re getting to the limits of Peirce here although I think 
there is considerable textual evidence in Peirce for an ur-continuity. Again 
Kelly Parker has pretty compelling arguments here for Peirce’s beliefs. Peirce 
speaks of a creator in numerous places but clearly he means something different 
from the first cause of Duns Scotus or Aristotle due to the place of chance in 
his ontology. As we’ve discussed over the past weeks his creator is more akin 
to the God in process theology or perhaps a process reading of Spinoza.


> On Nov 3, 2016, at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I cannot 
> interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his earlier 
> writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except as 
> metaphoric, with his earlier writings.

I think accepting a break between the early works and later works is fine when 
we can’t reconcile them. However I think the NA is quite reconcilable with most 
of his work from what era of say 1896 forward. At least I don’t see the 
contradictions. We may not like what he says, but I confess I don’t quite 
understand the treating it as metaphoric. That seems a bit of a dodge.

As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the historic ones 
(what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical ones (whether 
particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments beyond where 
Peirce took them). I’ll confess I find the more platonic aspects of Peirce a 
little harder to accept and the arguments certainly weaker than his main 
doctrines. But I have to concede the arguments for Peirce having held them are 
quite strong and hard for me to disbelieve.

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"?  It is not a 
> "sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate, well-established, 
> and widely endorsed method of interpretation.  Per Wikipedia, "In philosophy 
> and rhetoric, the principle of charity requires interpreting a speaker's 
> statements to be rational and, in the case of any argument, considering its 
> best, strongest possible interpretation."  As Donald Davidson put it, "We 
> make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a 
> way that optimises agreement."  So we assume that "A Neglected Argument," for 
> example, is fully consistent with everything else that Peirce wrote--unless 
> and until the evidence compels us to conclude otherwise.


I think we have to be careful here. As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor 
a charitable reading doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable 
readings transform a philosopher’s arguments into something other than they 
intended in order to make it function better. I tend to think that while we 
must read with a hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic 
of suspicion. Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful 
eliminating them without justification.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark, List

yes, I'd agree; even now we can't be sure that 'the Big Bang' is an 'absolute 
beginning' and as you note - we still haven't figured out the notion of time.

I'd also agree with your "the universe in its role as a sign is developing 
simultaneously historically and logically.". And a requirement of  that 
semiosic development is the role of the Three Categories - which includes 
totally novel chance events as well as habits of organization.

Yes - I'd add that we can't say that our 'Mind' and its analyses over time is 
'an essentially ordered series' or includes 'accidental' influences which may 
or may not move into habits of thought. That means that one cannot declare that 
a 'later work' 'more accurately reflects my analytic research' than an earlier 
work. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:51 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)




On Nov 2, 2016, at 10:05 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:


Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following 
the creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely 
speak) is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by 
the black board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It seems to me that 
much hinges on whether or not one sees our Universe as presupposing this 
ur-continuity (nothing in particular but everything in general, with yet a 
tendency toward habit-taking because of this ur-continuity, otherwise termed 
the zero of pure potential, which is, for Peirce, certainly not "nothing at 
all").



  I’m not sure I’d agree about injecting the big bang into this. It seems to me 
Peirce’s at best ambiguous about a beginning to the universe. Admittedly he’s 
living before most of the interesting physical discoveries of the 20th century. 
But even among physicists these days the common view is that the big bang isn’t 
an absolute beginning.


  That said I do think we should distinguish, as the ancient platonists did, 
between logical relations in emanations and historic development. Of course 
this distinction blurs a bit given his semiotics is his logic yet the universe 
in its role as a sign is developing simultaneously historically and logically.


  I find Peirce’s fundamental ontology and cosmology the most problematic of 
his views (and perhaps the most separable). However if we take it as a logical 
analysis rather than a cosmological/temporal one then it is far more fruitful. 
As soon as you inject chance as an inherent ontological component of ones logic 
then that has a lot of implications I think Peirce traced out quite well. Most 
of the controversial aspects of his thought are natural consequences of holding 
to tychism and synechism.


  Fundamentally it leads to the problem of time which is a traditionally thorny 
issue. I’m not sure physics has figured it out despite the mathematics of 
general relativity. We really don’t understand the arrow of time and a lot 
else. The understanding of time Peirce had available to him was limited. There 
are a lot of thorny difficult problems here and it’s probably a place Peirce is 
less trustworthy in his analysis. 


  Interestingly there’s a famous argument by Duns Scotus against causes going 
backwards infinitely in time. I don’t know if Peirce mentions this although I’d 
assume he’d read it.


  
http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_I/D2/Q2B


  I should I don’t buy the argument although it is quite a good argument. 
However it hinges on the distinction between an essentially ordered series and 
accidental series.


--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 2, 2016, at 10:05 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following the 
> creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely speak) 
> is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by the 
> black board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It seems to me that 
> much hinges on whether or not one sees our Universe as presupposing this 
> ur-continuity (nothing in particular but everything in general, with yet a 
> tendency toward habit-taking because of this ur-continuity, otherwise termed 
> the zero of pure potential, which is, for Peirce, certainly not "nothing at 
> all").

I’m not sure I’d agree about injecting the big bang into this. It seems to me 
Peirce’s at best ambiguous about a beginning to the universe. Admittedly he’s 
living before most of the interesting physical discoveries of the 20th century. 
But even among physicists these days the common view is that the big bang isn’t 
an absolute beginning.

That said I do think we should distinguish, as the ancient platonists did, 
between logical relations in emanations and historic development. Of course 
this distinction blurs a bit given his semiotics is his logic yet the universe 
in its role as a sign is developing simultaneously historically and logically.

I find Peirce’s fundamental ontology and cosmology the most problematic of his 
views (and perhaps the most separable). However if we take it as a logical 
analysis rather than a cosmological/temporal one then it is far more fruitful. 
As soon as you inject chance as an inherent ontological component of ones logic 
then that has a lot of implications I think Peirce traced out quite well. Most 
of the controversial aspects of his thought are natural consequences of holding 
to tychism and synechism.

Fundamentally it leads to the problem of time which is a traditionally thorny 
issue. I’m not sure physics has figured it out despite the mathematics of 
general relativity. We really don’t understand the arrow of time and a lot 
else. The understanding of time Peirce had available to him was limited. There 
are a lot of thorny difficult problems here and it’s probably a place Peirce is 
less trustworthy in his analysis. 

Interestingly there’s a famous argument by Duns Scotus against causes going 
backwards infinitely in time. I don’t know if Peirce mentions this although I’d 
assume he’d read it.

http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_I/D2/Q2B
 


I should I don’t buy the argument although it is quite a good argument. However 
it hinges on the distinction between an essentially ordered series and 
accidental series.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon - again, you are lifting words/phrases and inserting your own meanings.

1) To now claim that your statement that either a writer 'means what he says or 
doesn't' is a 'common-sense assumption is not the same as  'either he meant 
what [I interpret as his meaning] or he did not' - is not logical evidence - 
but almost a threat'. You are leaving out ''what I interpret as his meaning'.

2) Again, the definitions given in the NA do not, in my view, correlate with 
the emergence-evolution outlines of the universe given elsewhere in Peirce's 
works [not only 1.412, but the outlines of tychasm and agapasm and synechism]. 
Therefore, I can only conclude that they are metaphors for the experience of 
life. Not for the analysis of the triadic semiosic evolution of life. I 
therefore do not comment on them.

 I am aware that you tried, very hard, to suggest that the 'three universes of 
experience' were advanced analyses by Peirce [because written at a later date] 
and thus included the rejection of the Three Categories. My suggestion that the 
Three Universes of  Experience had nothing to do with the Three Categories, 
which were not rejected by Peirce [as you were trying to claim] was denied by 
you - but- eventually, you were persuaded by others [not by me] to  abandon 
this claim.

Beyond my suggestion that the NA is about the 'experience of life' - I have no 
comment as, yet again, I see no correlation with Peirce's arguments about the 
emergence and evolution of matter/mind in the universe. You attempt to 
correlate them; I don't see this interpretation as valid.

3) i do NOT acknowledge that what I wrote yesterday 'more accurately reflects 
my considered views'. All it does it reflect what i wrote yesterday.  To insert 
'more accurately' suggests a mechanical process of Mind where the words are 
supposed to 'accurately match' the Mind's content!!!. I don't see Mind 
operating that  way. As I said, I am quite able to fritter nonsense today - 
while my work of 20 years ago - might have been functional. There is NO 
EVIDENCE of a linear progression of anyone's Mind or work. 

I don't subscribe to your theory that the content of my mind is 'set'; I can 
change my mind. I can evolve a theory; I can reject a perspective.  And this 
doesn't involve 'harmonization'.

4) The difference between 'rejection' and 'no comment' is obvious. The former 
is an action of deliberate rejection of content, it is a JUDGMENT. The latter 
is - no action and no judgment.

5) I don't consider that the NA has anything to do with Peirce's long analyses 
of the emergence and evolution of matter/mind. 

And as I said - in my statement that this type of argument goes nowhere and has 
little to do with Peirce - that's exactly what is happening now.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:18 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


  1) How does expressing a common-sense assumption about any author's writings 
constitute "almost a threat"?


  2) How do you "metaphorically" interpret these rather straightforward 
statements by Peirce, all written in 1908 (emphases in original)?
1.. The word 'God,' so 'capitalized' (as we Americans say), is the 
definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really creator 
of all three Universes of Experience.

2.. I do not mean, then, a "soul of the World" or an intelligence is 
"immanent" in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds, of 
matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them.

3.. Indeed, meaning by "God," as throughout this paper will be meant, the 
Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, 
omniscience, omnipotence, infinite benignity, a Being not "immanent in" the 
Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of 
them without exception ...

4.. But I had better add that I do not mean by God a being merely "immanent 
in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every content of the world of 
ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and the world of all 
minds, without any exception whatever.
  3) Okay, but you also have not shown that "A Neglected Argument" is 
irreconcilable with Peirce's earlier cosmological writings.



  4) Acknowledging that something you wrote yesterday more accurately presents 
your considered views does not nullify what you wrote twenty years ago--unless 
you changed your mind during the intervening two decades.  As I have said 
before, that is one viable explanation that would be consistent with your view 
on this matter--Peirce changed his mind sometime between 1887-1888 and 1908.  
All I have tried to show is that such an explanation is not necessary; i.e., it 
is possible to harmonize everything that Peirce wrote about the origin and 
order of our existing 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

If Peirce wrote what he meant and meant what he wrote, then it is
incontrovertible that in 1908 he believed that God as *Ens necessarium *was
the Creator of all three Universes of Experience and all of their contents,
without exception.  By what valid method of interpretation can anyone
plausibly deny this?

You have admitted that your response to "A Neglected Argument" is to *ignore
*it, because you cannot explain it; it does not and cannot align with your
favored interpretation of Peirce's earlier cosmological writings.  I, on
the other hand, do not *reject* the latter, as you keep (wrongly) alleging;
on the contrary, as I have said before, I seek to *harmonize *them with his
later writings, under the principle of charity--we should assume *consistency
*between two passages, unless there is no viable way to reconcile them.  At
the same time, I do believe that later writings should generally be given
priority over earlier ones, in accordance with the presupposition that they
reflect additional contemplation and refinement of the ideas discussed.
Again, which more accurately presents your considered views--something that
you wrote twenty years ago, or something that you wrote yesterday?

I hope you realize that the sword you are now wielding cuts both ways.  The
FACT that you, yourself, are a firm non-believer in such a 'pre-existent
Creator' seems to me, to encourage you to declare that Peirce, without
proof, rejected his later writings.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - and that's my point. You insist that 'there is really no
> debating whether he (at least eventually) believed that there is a
> non-immanent Creator involved; he said so explicitly, in "A Neglected
> Argument" and its manuscript drafts. "
>
> But there IS a debate. You choose to ignore his other arguments against
> such a pre-existent Creator  as 'irrelevant' because you declare, without
> proof,  that since he wrote such views earlier in his life that he thus,
> according to you, 'evolved' out of them. The FACT that you, yourself, are a
> firm believer in such a 'pre-existent Creator' seems to me, to encourage
> you to declare that Peirce, without proof, rejected his earlier writings.
> You insert the same focus in other areas, such as the notion of a pre-world
> 'ur-Thirdness' - since you, yourself, firmly  believe in a prior Force.
>
> And since you tend to immediately reject any attempts to suggest that your
> interpretations of Peirce's beliefs and yours are not identical - then,
> this thread moves away from discussion to circularity with you insisting
> that you have 'proved your case' and 'there is no debate'. But - I don't
> see such finality.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond  ; Peirce-L
> 
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 9:33 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang
> universe' of 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang
> Thirdness.
>
>
> Gary R. and I have laid out our reasons for seeing all of that in Peirce.
> In particular, there is really no debating whether he (at least eventually)
> believed that there is a non-immanent Creator involved; he said so
> explicitly, in "A Neglected Argument" and its manuscript drafts.  One can
> argue that he was *wrong *about that, but not that he *himself *was an
> atheist, even though atheists can certainly gain many valuable insights
> from him; ditto for pantheists and panentheists.
>
> ET:  It seems to me that we are moving into a discussion based around our
> own firmly-held personal beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and
> are using Peirce, searching for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support
> our own personal beliefs.
>
>
> There is *always *a danger--a likelihood, even--that our own personal
> biases will influence our "readings" of someone else's writings; but that
> extends to *all *aspects of Peirce's thought, not just these particular
> metaphysical matters.  By discussing them in a forum like this, we are
> giving others the opportunity to help us recognize when we fall into such
> patterns and adjust our thinking accordingly.  Some of us have even changed
> our minds as a result of these conversations.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe'
>> of 'ur-continuity' nor that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

1) How does expressing a common-sense assumption about any author's
writings constitute "almost a threat"?

2) How do you "metaphorically" interpret these rather straightforward
statements by Peirce, all written in 1908 (emphases in original)?

   1. The word 'God,' so 'capitalized' (as we Americans say), is the
   definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really
   creator of all three Universes of Experience.
   2. I do *not *mean, then, a "soul of the World" or an intelligence is
   "immanent" in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds,
   of matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them.
   3. Indeed, meaning by "God," as throughout this paper will be meant, the
   Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him,
   omniscience, omnipotence, infinite benignity, a Being *not *"immanent
   in" the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every
   content of them without exception ...
   4. But I had better add that I do *not *mean by God a being merely
   "immanent in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every content
   of the world of ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and
   the world of all minds, without any exception whatever.

3) Okay, but you also have not shown that "A Neglected Argument" is
*irreconcilable
*with Peirce's earlier cosmological writings.

4) Acknowledging that something you wrote yesterday more accurately
presents your considered views does not *nullify *what you wrote twenty
years ago--unless you *changed your mind* during the intervening two
decades.  As I have said before, that is one viable explanation that would
be consistent with your view on this matter--Peirce *changed his mind*
sometime between 1887-1888 and 1908.  All I have tried to show is that such
an explanation is not *necessary*; i.e., it is *possible *to harmonize
*everything
*that Peirce wrote about the origin and order of our existing universe--and
therefore *preferable* to do so, rather than positing a *discontinuity* in
the development of his thought (more below).

5) Previously you stated, "I admit that I can't explain the NA - and I
don't even attempt to do so."  You also stated, "I said, and repeat, that I
have *no comment* on the NA, since I don't find that it fits in with the
emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in Peirce."  I then
asked what *practical *effects are different between "rejection" and "no
comment," besides the words that we use for them; but I never got an
answer.  Now you are claiming that you interpret "A Neglected Argument"
*metaphorically*, whatever that means (see above).

Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"?  It is not a
"sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate,
well-established, and widely endorsed method of interpretation.  Per
Wikipedia, "In philosophy and rhetoric, the principle of charity requires
interpreting a speaker's statements to be rational and, in the case of any
argument, considering its best, strongest possible interpretation."  As
Donald Davidson put it, "We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of
others when we interpret in a way that optimises agreement."  So we assume
that "A Neglected Argument," for example, is *fully consistent* with
*everything
else* that Peirce wrote--unless and until the evidence *compels* us to
conclude otherwise.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 9:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list -
>
> 1) Your insistence that an interpretation of Peirce is bonded to 'either
> he meant what [I interpret as his meaning] or he did not' - is not logical
> evidence - but almost a threat.
>
> 2) My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I
> cannot interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his
> earlier writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except
> as* metaphoric*, with his earlier writings.
>
> 3) Your claim that you have indeed correlated the NA with his earlier
> writings remains your claim - you haven't  convinced me of your having done
> so.
>
> 4) Your claim that IF I declare that my current writings 'more accurately
> reflect' my 'considered' views [And what does 'considered views' mean?]
> THEN, this nullifies my previous views is illogical. My current views [I
> don't know what 'considered views' means] are based on and grounded in my
> previous work. I don't subscribe to an axiom that 'a later view is a more
> accurate view' for such a mechanical perspective has nothing to do with how
> the mind works - which is not the same as the mechanical design process.
> Indeed, my later views might well be weakened by a current inaccurate 'fad'
> attachment on my part; there is no evidence that I am less susceptible to
> such emotions as I age.
>
> 5) Nor do I declare, anywhere,  that Peirce rejected his later writings.
> Would you please provide me with *evidence* for 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list - and that's my point. You insist that 'there is really no debating 
whether he (at least eventually) believed that there is a non-immanent Creator 
involved; he said so explicitly, in "A Neglected Argument" and its manuscript 
drafts. "

But there IS a debate. You choose to ignore his other arguments against such a 
pre-existent Creator  as 'irrelevant' because you declare, without proof,  that 
since he wrote such views earlier in his life that he thus, according to you, 
'evolved' out of them. The FACT that you, yourself, are a firm believer in such 
a 'pre-existent Creator' seems to me, to encourage you to declare that Peirce, 
without proof, rejected his earlier writings. You insert the same focus in 
other areas, such as the notion of a pre-world 'ur-Thirdness' - since you, 
yourself, firmly  believe in a prior Force.

And since you tend to immediately reject any attempts to suggest that your 
interpretations of Peirce's beliefs and yours are not identical - then, this 
thread moves away from discussion to circularity with you insisting that you 
have 'proved your case' and 'there is no debate'. But - I don't see such 
finality.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 9:33 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


ET:  I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang 
universe' of 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 
'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang Thirdness.


  Gary R. and I have laid out our reasons for seeing all of that in Peirce.  In 
particular, there is really no debating whether he (at least eventually) 
believed that there is a non-immanent Creator involved; he said so explicitly, 
in "A Neglected Argument" and its manuscript drafts.  One can argue that he was 
wrong about that, but not that he himself was an atheist, even though atheists 
can certainly gain many valuable insights from him; ditto for pantheists and 
panentheists.


ET:  It seems to me that we are moving into a discussion based around our 
own firmly-held personal beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and are 
using Peirce, searching for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own 
personal beliefs.


  There is always a danger--a likelihood, even--that our own personal biases 
will influence our "readings" of someone else's writings; but that extends to 
all aspects of Peirce's thought, not just these particular metaphysical 
matters.  By discussing them in a forum like this, we are giving others the 
opportunity to help us recognize when we fall into such patterns and adjust our 
thinking accordingly.  Some of us have even changed our minds as a result of 
these conversations.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of 
'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 'ur-continuity'. 
Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang Thirdness.

But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we 
are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal beliefs 
about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching for and 
'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs. 

I don't see the point of such a discussion.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:05 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Soren, Jon, List. 


  Soren wrote:
​
But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or 
the tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero. . .


  Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following 
the creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely 
speak) is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by 
the black board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It seems to me that 
much hinges on whether or not one sees our Universe as presupposing this 
ur-continuity (nothing in particular but everything in general, with yet a 
tendency toward habit-taking because of this ur-continuity, otherwise termed 
the zero of pure potential, which is, for Peirce, certainly not "nothing at 
all").



  It has further been noted that Peirce 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang
universe' of 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this
'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang
Thirdness.


Gary R. and I have laid out our reasons for seeing all of that in Peirce.
In particular, there is really no debating whether he (at least eventually)
believed that there is a non-immanent Creator involved; he said so
explicitly, in "A Neglected Argument" and its manuscript drafts.  One can
argue that he was *wrong *about that, but not that he *himself *was an
atheist, even though atheists can certainly gain many valuable insights
from him; ditto for pantheists and panentheists.

ET:  It seems to me that we are moving into a discussion based around our
own firmly-held personal beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and
are using Peirce, searching for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support
our own personal beliefs.


There is *always *a danger--a likelihood, even--that our own personal
biases will influence our "readings" of someone else's writings; but that
extends to *all *aspects of Peirce's thought, not just these particular
metaphysical matters.  By discussing them in a forum like this, we are
giving others the opportunity to help us recognize when we fall into such
patterns and adjust our thinking accordingly.  Some of us have even changed
our minds as a result of these conversations.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of
> 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang
> Thirdness.
>
> But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we
> are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal
> beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching
> for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.
>
> I don't see the point of such a discussion.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:05 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Soren, Jon, List.
>
> Soren wrote:
>
> ​
>
> But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the
> tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so
> Well in *Natural propositions* and feeling is present in all matter
> (Hylozoism) and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero. . .
>
>
> Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges"
> *following* the creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang,
> so to loosely speak) is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the *ur*-continuity
> represented by the black board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It
> seems to me that much hinges on whether or not one sees our Universe as
> presupposing this ur-continuity (nothing in particular but everything in
> general, with yet a tendency toward habit-taking *because *of this
> ur-continuity, otherwise termed the zero of pure potential, which is, for
> Peirce, certainly not "nothing at all").
>
> It has further been noted that Peirce suggests that the Creator is, or in
> some way participates, in this ur-continuity. *Once* *this* Universe is
> "in effect," then, yes, all that you and Stjernfelt argue may follow
> (although, I remain, as was Peirce, I firmly believe, a theist and not a
> panentheist, so I tend to reject that part of your argumentation, at least
> in consideration of the early cosmos).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of 
'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 'ur-continuity'. 
Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang Thirdness.

But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we are 
moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal beliefs 
about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching for and 
'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs. 

I don't see the point of such a discussion.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:05 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Soren, Jon, List. 


  Soren wrote:
​
But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the 
tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero. . .


  Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following the 
creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely speak) is 
*not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by the black 
board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It seems to me that much hinges 
on whether or not one sees our Universe as presupposing this ur-continuity 
(nothing in particular but everything in general, with yet a tendency toward 
habit-taking because of this ur-continuity, otherwise termed the zero of pure 
potential, which is, for Peirce, certainly not "nothing at all").



  It has further been noted that Peirce suggests that the Creator is, or in 
some way participates, in this ur-continuity. Once *this* Universe is "in 
effect," then, yes, all that you and Stjernfelt argue may follow (although, I 
remain, as was Peirce, I firmly believe, a theist and not a panentheist, so I 
tend to reject that part of your argumentation, at least in consideration of 
the early cosmos).


  Best,


  Gary R






  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 7:41 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:

Jon, List




​​But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or 
the tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero, why should its 
self-organization not match Eckhart’s idea of Jesus consciousness born in every 
man, if  “the father” is pure Zero and the holy spirit or ghost  is thirdness 
as self-organization, meaning that human consciousness as the aware man  is the 
living conscious realization in the flesh of the origin of our  being? Peirce’s 
naturalization encompassed pure Zero as the transcendental a part of nature and 
us. It fits a form of Gnostic panentheism, is my abduction. It fits with his 
mystical experience. It is esoterical  pure mysticism encompassing rationality 
and science without a  conscious personal creator. The basic postulate is that 
we can have access to the Godhead through a developed consciousness. This is 
basically what Bhakti Vedanta and much of Buddhism – and in my view Meister 
Eckhart in Christianity – say, and why he was excommunicated from the Catholic 
church, because he was – as many scholars has pointed out – too close to Adi 
Shankara’s thinking. It is pretty much Suzuki’s point of view too 
http://terebess.hu/zen/mesterek/d-t-suzuki-mysticism-christian-and-buddhist.pdf 
and he was hired by Paul Carus the editor of the Monist. Of cause we here have 
Emerson and the trandscendentalist’s view too.



  Best

  Søren



From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 2. november 2016 22:43
To: John F Sowa
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)



John, List:



The question still arises of what to make of the statement in John's Gospel 
that "the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us."  Neither nature nor its laws 
can be substituted for Logos in this case.



Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt



On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:02 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

On 11/2/2016 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

His favorite Gospel was that of John, but did he ever quote its
first chapter?  "In the beginning was the Word [logos] ...


Since his father taught him Greek at a very early age, I'm sure
that New