Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non- computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state. Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution. This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level lower, for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum system. What you say would be true if a quantum computer was not Turing emulable, but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-down, but the UD does not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot be aware of the delays. Bruno This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire universes in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of immortality via digital uploading. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 5:42 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock doesn't know what time it is. A clock has no self-referential ability. How do you know? By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self- reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a universal machine. By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they know it yet. Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby clock. Level confusion. You reason like that: no animals can fly, because pigs cannot fly. You mistake my common sense reductio for shortsighted prejudice. I would say that your reasoning is that if we take a pig on a plane, we can't rule out the possibility that it has become a bird. No. You were saying that computer cannot think, because clock cannot thing. This is another variation on the Chinese Room. The pig can walk around at 30,000 feet and we can ask it questions about the view from up there, but the pig has not, in fact learned to fly or become a bird. Neither has the plane, for that matter. Your analogy is confusing. I would say that the pig in the plane does fly, but this is out of the topic. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test
On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:23, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 10:46 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: When we are dreaming we are in a higher level relative emulation (all UMs can do that). That's confusing. I find it hard to believe a bacteria can dream. The UM implemented by a bacteria could *potentially* run any program, but it is *actually* running the bacteria program. To suggest that bacteria (e.g. one of the class of all UMs) can dream by virtue of being definable as a UM generates more confusion than clarity. Put another way, if a particularly instantiated UM possesses the ability to dream (to imagine), then that says something non-trivial about the constitution of that UM's cognitive architecture. Terren Hi Terren, If a bacterium is a physical system capable of implementing a universal Turing machine aka the particular bacteria's program, then Bruno's argument shows that it will necessarily be able to dream, for what are dreams if not alternative TMs running on the same hardware via dovetailing? This does not follow. A bacteria is universal does not mean it has been program to dovetail, or to make dream. Still less to know that she can dream. Universal does not imply Löbianity, notably. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test
On 28 Feb 2012, at 21:35, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 2:23 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/28/2012 10:46 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: When we are dreaming we are in a higher level relative emulation (all UMs can do that). That's confusing. I find it hard to believe a bacteria can dream. The UM implemented by a bacteria could *potentially* run any program, but it is *actually* running the bacteria program. To suggest that bacteria (e.g. one of the class of all UMs) can dream by virtue of being definable as a UM generates more confusion than clarity. Put another way, if a particularly instantiated UM possesses the ability to dream (to imagine), then that says something non-trivial about the constitution of that UM's cognitive architecture. Terren Hi Terren, If a bacterium is a physical system capable of implementing a universal Turing machine aka the particular bacteria's program, then Bruno's argument shows that it will necessarily be able to dream, for what are dreams if not alternative TMs running on the same hardware via dovetailing? Onward! Stephen Dreaming in the context of Bruno's remark means that the running of a single program could result in alternate 1p realities being constructed... not that multiple programs could be run in the UM. At least, that's how I interpret it. That's correct. A bacteria is a universal machine in that it can potentially run any program. However, bacteria as they appear to us run specific programs (as selected by evolution). Yes. Their instantiation as such is a stable measure relative to us - the shared 1p plural reality. Bacteria that run programs capable of dreaming (as above), while possible, would probably count as white rabbits. ... or as stable human beings. After all a human is a sort of bacteria organization, but of course you need many bacteria. Just one bacteria is most probably not enough. The genome is not big enough to handle memories of the type occurring in reasonable notion of dreams. So yes, that occurs only in white rabbit realities. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 28 Feb 2012, at 21:41, meekerdb wrote: On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain. What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A off? Disembodied consciousness is silly. Craig The implication of Comp is that there is no you. You are an abstraction, a fiction, just another element in a model of the world. OK, but I would avoid the word fiction, because people are used to believe that fiction are not real. yet people believe that prime number are real, not fiction (except in extravagant non standard philosophy of math). I bet that Craig will jump on this little gift you offer to him! The type of fiction, or better, as you said abstraction are real concept, causally efficacious thanks to the laws of addition and multiplication. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/2/28 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain. What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both copies yourself at once No OK. The question of Craig is a bit ambiguous though. and still not feel any difference? If not, and you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A off? Brain A and Brain B will feel has being a continuation of the you before substitution... they'll both be your future you and both feel it... the you before is no more. (even if you keep your current body... it's just adding a brain C... and same reasonning). Disembodied consciousness is silly. I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an environment... without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not something about disembodiment. I have to say that I would have answer like here some years ago, but I am a bit less sure now. Strangely we can be conscious of nothing except of the fact that we are conscious. This seems to occur in some reports of salvia divinorum users (either as a blissful or terrorizing experience. It opens me to the idea that universal machine are conscious at the start. But you remain correct, in the sense that all universal machine needs a code, which plays somehow the role of a relative body. The continuations of such a machine is literally given by all possible experiences. For any memorizable experience a local and relative embodiement is unavoidable, and its corresponding primitive matter will be the usual sum on all continuations, which in the case of the virgin (non programmed) universal machine, is just all computations. I would say. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 27, 10:11 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 25, 10:50 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 25, 6:32 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 24, 8:22 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 23, 10:24 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You are thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation I don't know what you mean by subject to. They may well not be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all. Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the simulation. But they are wrong about all that, or there is no sense to the claim that they are sims ITFP They are right about that. If I am a sim running on a computer somewhere, it doesn't matter to me at all where that is because I can never get our of this sim here to get to the world of the computer out there. That certain things don'tn matter to you doesn't change any facts. That would be true if I were aware of the fact but didn't care, but in this case there is no possibility of my ever being aware of it. Facts outside of our own universe can't be considered as facts to us unless they impact us in some way. But you are already doing that. You are putting forward it's all a simulation as a fact that is just true and not necessarily knowable to us possible sims. That may be intended as some sort of reductio ad absurdum of the simulation hypothesis. I don't know if it is. That is one of the many things that aren't clear. If all of humanity died off and you are an ant crawling on a microwave oven, the 'fact' that it 'is' a microwave oven is not relevant. That doens't mean it isn't a fact. You are supposing it is in order to set up the scenario. It is consistent to say it is an objective, absolute facts that there are objective, absolute facts. It is not consistent to say there are no objective facts, everything is just true to of for a subject and offfer in support of that just such an objective fact. The world has lost the capacity to define that object in that way, and it now is a hard flat surface for ants to crawl on. I am not a sim to myself of course, but if someone can pause the program, put horns on my head and start it again, it is because to them, I am a simulation. But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic. You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and make their consciousness completely solipsistic. So? To in that simulated universe, lunacy would be truth. Luncacy might be believed. Not the same thing. Not if you take comp and simulation seriously. I don't, so I agree, truth is more than local simulation, but comp does not agree. Any fantasy which can be rendered arithmetically could be a valid universe to live in under comp. But Comp/SH doesn't have the implication that the nature of truth itself keeps changing. You can state Comp/SH by saying it is an objective fact that most subjective perceptions are of simulated worlds, and most subjects hold fasle beliefs. You are importing your own subjectivist epistemology into Comp/SH. It is not native to it. If you want to critique Comp, you need to show there is something wrong with *it's* claim, not yours! I recommend using publically accessble language to enhance communication, not to discover new facts. I would rather enhance the content of the communication than the form. If the form renders the content inaccessible, what's the point? Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions. That doesn't answer the question. You are proceding as if the meaning of a word *always* changes in different contexts. It does Says who? Why do you think it doesn't? Don't shift the burden. You are making the extraordinary claim. I'm not making an extraordinary claim, I'm pointing out that perception cannot be reproduced What has pecerption to do with it? We were discussing meaning. precisely since is is context dependent. If it were not the case, it would be possible to say the same word over and over forever and never grow tired of doing that. Boredom does not indicate shifts of meaning. Every moment of our lives has unique semantic content exclusive to us. That does not mean that individual words are always changing meaning. You can have constantly changing compounds of stable elements. No man ever steps in the same river twice. - Heraclitus Do you mean the same
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:19, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain. Hi Quentin, OK, but could you elaborate on this statement? It means an hypothetical you after mind uploading would feel as conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel *feel* and feel being you and conscious and all... Is the differentiation that one might feel, given the wrong substitution level, different from what might occur if a digital uploading procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete continuity? It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of continuity... it's not binary outcome. Yes. There are *many sense* in which we can survive with a wrong substitution. Those does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous and vague, IMHO. Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non- computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state. Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain structure? Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong... Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire universes in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of immortality via digital uploading. Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still compatible with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as if it was wrong... Not for the conceptual result. Physics remains a branch of digital machine's theory. But FAPP, you are right, except for the death or near death experiences. I think. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: the you before is no more. That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death. It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience. Well, that's make clear that you believe in zombie. Disembodied consciousness is silly. I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an environment... Wait, so we actually agree on something? I think we all agree on this. But comp explains the origin of the coupling brain/environment. They are not ontologically primitive, though. without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not something about disembodiment. Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams. By the MGA. But how can the substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What binds the experience of the program to the silicon? The relative proportion of computation going through your state in which silicon are observed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Entropy and information
On 29 Feb 2012, at 02:20, Alberto G.Corona wrote (to Stephen):
A thing that I often ask myself concerning MMH is the question about
what is mathematical and what is not?. The set of real numbers is a
mathematical structure, but also the set of real numbers plus the
point (1,1) in the plane is.
Sure. Now, with comp, that mathematical structure is more easily
handled in the mind of the universal machine. For the ontology we
can use arithmetic, on which everyone agree. It is absolutely
undecidable that there is more than that (with the comp assumption).
So for the math, comp invite to assume only what is called the
sharable part of intuitionist and classical mathematics.
The set of randomly chosen numbers { 1,4
3,4,.34, 3} is because it can be described with the same descriptive
language of math. But the first of these structures have properties
and the others do not. The first can be infinite but can be described
with a single equation while the last must be described
extensively. . At least some random universes (the finite ones) can be
described extensively, with the tools of mathematics but they don´t
count in the intuitive sense as mathematical.
Why? If they can be finitely described, then I don't see why they
would be non mathematical.
What is usually considered genuinely mathematical is any structure,
that can be described briefly.
Not at all. In classical math any particular real number is
mathematically real, even if it cannot be described briefly. Chaitin's
Omega cannot be described briefly, even if we can defined it briefly.
Also it must have good properties ,
operations, symmetries or isomorphisms with other structures so the
structure can be navigated and related with other structures and the
knowledge can be reused. These structures have a low kolmogorov
complexity, so they can be navigated with low computing resources.
But they are a tiny part of bigger mathematical structures. That's why
we use big mathematical universe, like the model of ZF, or Category
theory.
So the demand of computation in each living being forces to admit
that universes too random or too simple, wiith no lineal or
discontinuous macroscopic laws have no complex spatio-temporal
volutes (that may be the aspect of life as looked from outside of our
four-dimensional universe). The macroscopic laws are the macroscopic
effects of the underlying mathematical structures with which our
universe is isomorphic (or identical).
We need both, if only to make precise that very reasoning. Even in
comp, despite such kind of math is better seen as epistemological than
ontological.
And our very notion of what is intuitively considered mathematical:
something general simple and powerful enoughhas the hallmark of
scarcity of computation resources. (And absence of contradictions fits
in the notion of simplicity, because exception to rules have to be
memorized and dealt with extensively, one by one)
Perhaps not only is that way but even may be that the absence of
contradictions ( the main rule of simplicity) or -in computationa
terms- the rule of low kolmogorov complexity _creates_ itself the
mathematics.
Precisely not. Kolmogorov complexity is to shallow, and lacks the
needed redundancy, depth, etc. to allow reasonable solution to the
comp measure problem.
That is, for example, may be that the boolean logic for
example, is what it is not because it is consistent simpleand it´s
beatiful, but because it is the shortest logic in terms of the
lenght of the description of its operations, and this is the reason
because we perceive it as simple and beatiful and consistent.
It is not the shortest logic. It has the simplest semantics, at the
propositional level. Combinators logic is far simpler conceptually,
but have even more complex semantically.
But the main problem of the MHH is that nobody can define what it is,
and it is a priori too big to have a notion of first person
indeterminacy. Comp put *much* order into this, and needs no more math
than arithmetic, or elementary mathematical computer science at the
ontological level. tegmark seems unaware of the whole foundation-of-
math progress made by the logicians.
Bruno
.
Dear Albert,
One brief comment. In your Google paper you wrote, among other
interesting things, But life and natural selection demands a
mathematical universe
https://docs.google.com/Doc?docid=0AW-x2MmiuA32ZGQ1cm03cXFfMTk4YzR4cn...
somehow.
Could it be that this is just another implication of the MMH idea? If
the physical implementation of computation acts as a selective
pressure
on the multiverse, then it makes sense that we would find ourselves
in a
universe that is representable in terms of Boolean algebras with
their
nice and well behaved laws of bivalence (a or not-A), etc.
Very interesting ideas.
Onward!
Stephen
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Re: COMP test
On 29 Feb 2012, at 06:23, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 3:35 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 2:23 PM, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/28/2012 10:46 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: When we are dreaming we are in a higher level relative emulation (all UMs can do that). That's confusing. I find it hard to believe a bacteria can dream. The UM implemented by a bacteria could *potentially* run any program, but it is *actually* running the bacteria program. To suggest that bacteria (e.g. one of the class of all UMs) can dream by virtue of being definable as a UM generates more confusion than clarity. Put another way, if a particularly instantiated UM possesses the ability to dream (to imagine), then that says something non-trivial about the constitution of that UM's cognitive architecture. Terren Hi Terren, If a bacterium is a physical system capable of implementing a universal Turing machine aka the particular bacteria's program, then Bruno's argument shows that it will necessarily be able to dream, for what are dreams if not alternative TMs running on the same hardware via dovetailing? Onward! Stephen Dreaming in the context of Bruno's remark means that the running of a single program could result in alternate 1p realities being constructed... not that multiple programs could be run in the UM. At least, that's how I interpret it. Dear Terren, How does the running of a single program generate different content (in the sense that the program is equivalent to a virtual reality generator) The notion of virtual reality generator is nonsensical with comp, although it can be approximated by lowering down the substitution level. Deutsch needs a physicalist revision of Church Thesis, which makes no sense once we assume comp. unless it is a dovetailing of many programs? Is this how you get a many = one situation for programs? This makes no sense. AFAIK, 1 = 1, many = many. many =/= one. Or is my mathematical knowledge faulty? This is unclear. A bacteria is a universal machine in that it can potentially run any program. However, bacteria as they appear to us run specific programs (as selected by evolution). Their instantiation as such is a stable measure relative to us - the shared 1p plural reality. Bacteria that run programs capable of dreaming (as above), while possible, would probably count as white rabbits. Terren Could you tell me this explanation in your own words, particularly what the shared 1p plural reality is. I truly do not comprehend this concept as you are using it here. How is 1p content sharable by a plurality of entities? You need to duplicate population of machine. You need to make enter many candidate in the teleporting or duplicating devices. You can understand that they will share their first person indeterminacy. This is provided in QM by the tensorial structure of the quantum state(s). In comp, that tensor structure should be retrieved from the comp quantum logics. AFAIK, any experiencial content that is sharable by a plurality is 3p, Not at all. It looks like that, but it is first person plural. That's why physics is really reduced to epistemology. The quanta are particular case of qualia. The MWI confirms this, and save comp from solipsism. in other worlds content that we all agree on as being real and having such and such properties is the definition of objective reality. Only with the Aristotelian theology, which is not compatible with comp. The physical objective reality is a sharable subjective experience. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain. Hi Quentin, OK, but could you elaborate on this statement? It means an hypothetical you after mind uploading would feel as conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel *feel* and feel being you and conscious and all... Hi Quentin, We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. if there is no you, as Brent wrote yesterday, what is that which is invariant with respect to substitution? Is the differentiation that one _might_ feel, given the wrong substitution level, different from what _might_ occur if a digital uploading procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete continuity? It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of continuity... it's not binary outcome. At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has a fine grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am trying to nail down the details of this idea. Those does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous and vague, IMHO. Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state. Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain structure? Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong... AFAIK, it would only prevent the continuation of the idea that we are only that which is within our skin. We might finally escape from the modular clock world of gears and levers that the Parminidean and Newtonian world view entails. Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire universes in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of immortality via digital uploading. Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still compatible with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as if it was wrong... I am not so sure. I think that the way that QM systems are linear will still allow substitution, but not in the usual way of thinking. The problem that I see is the lack of understanding of QM's implications. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 2/29/2012 12:50 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/28/2012 9:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 3:41 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com wrote: Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain. What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A off? Disembodied consciousness is silly. Craig The implication of Comp is that there is no you. You are an abstraction, a fiction, just another element in a model of the world. Brent Hi, Just a question about the semantics. What difference is there between a you and an abstraction that is indistinguishable from it? The difference is that there isn't *a* you, there are arbitrarily many or at least there will be momentarily. The absraction is tracing just one of these. This is already a consequence of MWI in which quantum events cause you to split into orthogonal subspaces. To the extent consciousness is realized by classical processes the splitting only happens when the quantum events have classical level effects. Hi Brent, So we could say that the you is tied to a particular world. Would it be consistent to think of this notion of realized by classical processes as an abstraction of the same kind, i.e. a tracing of individual 1p content, each of which is generated by a potential infinity of computations? I am trying to tease out the relation of COMP's ontology picture with that of MWI. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Future Day (March 1), conceived by AI researcher Dr. Ben Goertzel
Future Day: a new global holiday March 1February 29, 2012 *[+]* http://www.kurzweilai.net/images/future_day.pngWhy are nearly all our holidays focused on celebrating the past, or the cyclical processes of nature? Why not celebrate the amazing future we are collectively creating? That’s the concept behind a new global holiday, Future Dayhttp://futureday.org/(March 1), conceived by AI researcher Dr. Ben Goertzel. Future Day 2012 gatherings http://futureday.org/events/ are scheduled in more than a dozen cities, as well as in Second Lifehttp://slurl.com/secondlife/Terasem/121/155/30/?img=http%3A//hplusmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/futuredaylogo.pngtitle=Future%20Day%20in%20Second%20Life%2C%20March%201%202012%206pm%20ESTmsg=Future%20Day%20in%20Second%20Life%2C%20March%201%202012%206pm%25 . “Celebrating and honoring the past and the cyclical processes of nature is a valuable thing,” says Goertzel. “But in these days of rapid technological acceleration, it is our future that needs more attention, not our past. My hope is that Future Day can serve as a tool for helping humanity focus its attention on figuring out what kind of future it wants, and striving to bring these visions to reality.” -- “The past is over; the present is fleeting; we live in the future.” — Ray Kurzweil re Future Day -- “Ray Kurzweil* *predicts that technological paradigm shifts will become increasingly common, leading to ‘technological change so rapid and profound it represents a rupture in the fabric of human history,’” says Goertzel. “Future Day is designed to center the impossible in the public mind once a year as a temptation too delicious to resist,” says Howard Bloom, author of *Global Brain.* “If all matter in the universe is comprised of patterns, let’s redesign what doesn’t work and form new methods for approaching the future with fluidity,” says designer Natasha Vita-More, Chair, Humanity+http://humanityplus.org/ . *Future Day events so far* Melbourne http://futureday2012.eventbrite.com/, 5:30 PM (1:30 AM EST) to 10:30 PM, moderated by Singularity Summit AU organizer Adam A. Ford and Australian ABC TV newscaster Josie Taylor, with Skype call-ins by Goertzel and Vita-More. Terasem Island, Second Life, 6 PM EST: a public eventhttp://opencog.org/2012/02/future-day-in-hong-kong-second-life-and-melbourne-australia/, where authors Howard Bloom and Martine Rothblatt and blogger Giulio Prisco will join Goertzel, Vita-More, and Adam A. Ford. Other events: Sydney, Berkeley, Edmonton, Houston, Sao Paulo, **Salt Lake City, Brussels, Paris, Los Angeles, Palo Alto, Washington DC, and Lehi (Utah). See http://futureday.org/events for updates. Starting your own event? List it here: i...@futureday.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Entropy and information
On 29 feb, 11:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 02:20, Alberto G.Corona wrote (to Stephen):
A thing that I often ask myself concerning MMH is the question about
what is mathematical and what is not?. The set of real numbers is a
mathematical structure, but also the set of real numbers plus the
point (1,1) in the plane is.
Sure. Now, with comp, that mathematical structure is more easily
handled in the mind of the universal machine. For the ontology we
can use arithmetic, on which everyone agree. It is absolutely
undecidable that there is more than that (with the comp assumption).
So for the math, comp invite to assume only what is called the
sharable part of intuitionist and classical mathematics.
I do not thing in computations in terms of minds of universal
machines in the abstract sense but in terms of the needs of
computability of living beings.
The set of randomly chosen numbers { 1,4
3,4,.34, 3} is because it can be described with the same descriptive
language of math. But the first of these structures have properties
and the others do not. The first can be infinite but can be described
with a single equation while the last must be described
extensively. . At least some random universes (the finite ones) can be
described extensively, with the tools of mathematics but they don´t
count in the intuitive sense as mathematical.
Why? If they can be finitely described, then I don't see why they
would be non mathematical.
It is not mathematical in the intuitive sense that the list of the
ponits of ramdomly folded paper is not. That intuitive sense , more
restrictive is what I use here.
What is usually considered genuinely mathematical is any structure,
that can be described briefly.
Not at all. In classical math any particular real number is
mathematically real, even if it cannot be described briefly. Chaitin's
Omega cannot be described briefly, even if we can defined it briefly.
a real number in the sense I said above is not mathematical. in the
sense I said above. In fact there is no mathematical theory about
paticular real numbers. the set of all the real numbers , in the
contrary, is.
Also it must have good properties ,
operations, symmetries or isomorphisms with other structures so the
structure can be navigated and related with other structures and the
knowledge can be reused. These structures have a low kolmogorov
complexity, so they can be navigated with low computing resources.
But they are a tiny part of bigger mathematical structures. That's why
we use big mathematical universe, like the model of ZF, or Category
theory.
If maths is all that can be described finitelly, then of course you
are right. but I´m intuitively sure that the ones that are interesting
can be defined briefly, using an evolutuionary sense of what is
interesting.
So the demand of computation in each living being forces to admit
that universes too random or too simple, wiith no lineal or
discontinuous macroscopic laws have no complex spatio-temporal
volutes (that may be the aspect of life as looked from outside of our
four-dimensional universe). The macroscopic laws are the macroscopic
effects of the underlying mathematical structures with which our
universe is isomorphic (or identical).
We need both, if only to make precise that very reasoning. Even in
comp, despite such kind of math is better seen as epistemological than
ontological.
There is a hole in the transition from certain mathematical
properties in macroscopic laws to simple mathematical theories of
everything . The fact that strange, but relatively simple
mathematical structure (M theory) include islands of macroscopic laws
that are warm for life. I do not know the necessity of this greed for
reduction. The macroscopic laws can reigh in a hubble sphere,
sustained by a gigant at the top of a turtle swimming in an ocean.
And our very notion of what is intuitively considered mathematical:
something general simple and powerful enough has the hallmark of
scarcity of computation resources. (And absence of contradictions fits
in the notion of simplicity, because exception to rules have to be
memorized and dealt with extensively, one by one)
Perhaps not only is that way but even may be that the absence of
contradictions ( the main rule of simplicity) or -in computationa
terms- the rule of low kolmogorov complexity _creates_ itself the
mathematics.
Precisely not. Kolmogorov complexity is to shallow, and lacks the
needed redundancy, depth, etc. to allow reasonable solution to the
comp measure problem.
I can not gasp from your terse definitions what the comp measure
problem is . What i know is that, kolmogorov complexity is critical
for life. if living beings compute inputs to create appropriate
outputs for survival. And they do it.
That is, for example, may be that the boolean logic for
example, is
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 29 Feb 2012, at 13:50, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain. Hi Quentin, OK, but could you elaborate on this statement? It means an hypothetical you after mind uploading would feel as conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel *feel* and feel being you and conscious and all... Hi Quentin, We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. if there is no you, as Brent wrote yesterday, what is that which is invariant with respect to substitution? As I said, Brent made a sort of pedagogical mistake, but a big one, which is often done, and which explains perhaps why some materialist becomes person eliminativist. The you is a construct of the brain. It is abstract. You can see it as an information pattern, but a real stable one which can exist in many representations. And you can build it for any machine by using Kleene's second diagonalization construction. It is the key of the whole thing. So let me explain again. You can certainly construct a program D capable of doing some simple duplication of an arbitrary object x and apply any transformation T that you want on that duplicated object, perhaps with some parameters: Dx gives T(, xx, ), Then applying D to itself, that is substituting x for D, leads to a self-referential program: DD gives T(, DD, ...). You might add quotes to prevent an infinite loop: Dx gives T(...'xx' ...) so that DD gives T(... 'DD'...). This is the trick used by Gödel, Kleene, Turing, Church, Post, ... in all incompleteness and insolubility result, but also, in abstract biology (see my paper amoeba, planaria, and dreaming machine. That define a relative you, trivially relative to you. It is the I of computer science. It allows you to write a program referring to its entire code/body in the course of its execution. In some programming language, like the object oriented Smalltalk, for example, it is a build in control structure called SELF. This gives, unfortunately only a third person notion of self. It is more my body than my soul, and that if why, to do the math, we have to use the conjunction of truth, with belief, to get a notion of first person. By the non definability of truth, this I cannot be defined by the machine concerned, but it still exist, even if doubly immaterial---because it is abstract, and in relation with the non definable (by the machine) truth. Both are invariant, by definition, when the comp substitution is done at the right level. It means that the reconstituted person will behave the same, and feel to be the same. Is the differentiation that one might feel, given the wrong substitution level, different from what might occur if a digital uploading procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete continuity? It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of continuity... it's not binary outcome. At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has a fine grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am trying to nail down the details of this idea. The details are in the mathematics of self-reference. Those does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous and vague, IMHO. Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non- computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state. Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain structure? Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong... AFAIK, it would only prevent the continuation of the idea that we are only that which is within our skin. We might finally escape from the modular clock world of gears and levers that the Parminidean and Newtonian world view entails. But comp escapes this. If I am a machine, then the reality, globally cannot be a machine, and from the point of view of any machine, his 1- I cannot be a machine either, even if it *is* a machine ... from God (Truth) point of view. Here there is a quite difficult idea, made simple by the self- reference logic, which is that: G* proves that Bp is extensionally equivalent to Bp p. (they prove the same arithmetical p), But G, and thus the machine, does
Re: Entropy and information
Of course they compute. Even a plant must read the imputs of temperature, humidity and sun radiation to decide when sping may arrive to launch the program of leaf growing and flour blossoming. This computation exist because, before that, the plants discovered cycles in the weather by random mutations and natural selection, so the plants with this computation could better optimize water and nutrient resources and outgrown those that do not. Without a predictable linear environment, computation and thus evolution and life is impossible. Alberto On 28 feb, 21:31, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: Alberto, I am thermodynamicist and I do not know exactly what is information and computation. You have written that living beings perform computations. Several questions in this respect. Are computations are limited to living beings only? Does a bacteria perform computations as well? If yes, then what is the difference between a ballcock in the toilet and bacteria (provided we exclude reproduction from consideration)? Evgenii On 27.02.2012 12:16 Alberto G.Corona said the following: Perhaps a more basic, and more pertinent question related with entrophy and information in the context of this list is the relation of computability, living beings , the arrow of time and entropy, What the paper (http://qi.ethz.ch/edu/qisemFS10/papers/ 81_Bennett_Thermodynamics_of_computation.pdf) that initiated the discussion suggest is that in practical terms it is necessary a driving force that avoids random reversibility to execute practical computations, this driving force implies dissipation of energy and thus an increase of entropy. This is so because most if not all practical computations are exponentually branched (Fig 10). And here comes the living beings. As the paper says in the introduction, living beings perform computations at the molecular level, and it must be said, at the neural level. Therefore given the said above, life must proceed from less to more entrophy and this defines the arrow of time. Besides the paper concentrates itself in what happens inside a computation some concepts can be used to dilucidate what happens with the interaction of a living being and its surrounding reality. The reality behaves like a form of ballistic computer at the microscopic level., with elemental particles ruled by the forces of nature instead of ellastic macroscopic collisions. At the macroscopic level, however, there is a destruction of information and irreversibility. However in the direction of entropy dissipation, it is possible to perform calculations in order to predict the future at the macroscopic level. That s a critical function of living beings. An extreme example of the difference between macro and micro computation is to predict the distrubution of water in a water collector after rain. It is not necessary to know the position and velocity of every water molecule, not even the position and velocity of each drop of water. is this erase of information that the increase of entropy perform at the macroscopic level (that indeed is the reason of the mere concept of macro-state in statistical mechanics) the process that permit economically feasible computations. Since computation is expensive and the process of discovery of the world by living beings trough natural selection very slow, (trough the aggregation of complexity and sophistication by natural selection is in the order of magnitude of the age of the universe : thousands of millions years) Then the macroscopic laws of nature must be simple enough, and there must be a privileged direction of easy computation for life to exist. The fact that evolution for intelligent life and age of the Universe are in the same magnitudes means that this universe is constrained to the maximum discoverable-by-evolution complexity in the computationally privileged direction of the arrow of time. This is my brief presentation about this: https://docs.google.com/present/view?id=dd5rm7qq_142d8djhvc8 This is my previous post in this group about entrophy arrow of time and life: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg15696... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test
On Wed, Feb 29, 2012 at 12:23 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/28/2012 3:35 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 2:23 PM, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/28/2012 10:46 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: When we are dreaming we are in a higher level relative emulation (all UMs can do that). That's confusing. I find it hard to believe a bacteria can dream. The UM implemented by a bacteria could *potentially* run any program, but it is *actually* running the bacteria program. To suggest that bacteria (e.g. one of the class of all UMs) can dream by virtue of being definable as a UM generates more confusion than clarity. Put another way, if a particularly instantiated UM possesses the ability to dream (to imagine), then that says something non-trivial about the constitution of that UM's cognitive architecture. Terren Hi Terren, If a bacterium is a physical system capable of implementing a universal Turing machine aka the particular bacteria's program, then Bruno's argument shows that it will necessarily be able to dream, for what are dreams if not alternative TMs running on the same hardware via dovetailing? Onward! Stephen Dreaming in the context of Bruno's remark means that the running of a single program could result in alternate 1p realities being constructed... not that multiple programs could be run in the UM. At least, that's how I interpret it. Dear Terren, How does the running of a single program generate different content (in the sense that the program is equivalent to a virtual reality generator) unless it is a dovetailing of many programs? Is this how you get a many = one situation for programs? This makes no sense. AFAIK, 1 = 1, many = many. many =/= one. Or is my mathematical knowledge faulty? I think first you have to answer how a single program generates a single 1p reality. There is no consensus yet on how to do this, although there are theories. But let's say you have a working theory of how a program can generate a 1p reality. Then you can modify that program to generate additional realities simultaneously. Check out this incredible story of a ragtime piano player named Bob Milne who can imagine up to four orchestras playing music at the same time. Neuroscientists verified his abilities. http://www.radiolab.org/blogs/radiolab-blog/2011/jul/26/4-track-mind/. This takes no effort for him and the music as it is playing in his head does not clash. A bacteria is a universal machine in that it can potentially run any program. However, bacteria as they appear to us run specific programs (as selected by evolution). Their instantiation as such is a stable measure relative to us - the shared 1p plural reality. Bacteria that run programs capable of dreaming (as above), while possible, would probably count as white rabbits. Terren Could you tell me this explanation in your own words, particularly what the shared 1p plural reality is. I truly do not comprehend this concept as you are using it here. How is 1p content sharable by a plurality of entities? AFAIK, any experiencial content that is sharable by a plurality is 3p, in other worlds content that we all agree on as being real and having such and such properties is the definition of objective reality. I know Bruno already answered this but I will attempt it too. The physics and in general the world we observe is the stable measure of realities generated by the UD that include the computational state we are currently in. Since each of these traces in the UD contains me, each me is sharing the experience of each reality. They are all 1p experiences, and yet they are all shared by each version of me being traced by the UD. When it comes to others, you are correct, that what is sharable must be negotiated through language. I don't think btw the result of that shared process is necessarily objective reality, I think a more accurate phrase would be either working objective reality (as in, we proceed *as if* there is an objective reality) or perhaps intersubjective reality. I'm guessing that is why you used scared quotes around it... Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Feb 29, 4:33 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 5:42 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock doesn't know what time it is. A clock has no self-referential ability. How do you know? By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self- reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a universal machine. Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference. By comp it should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears of the clock. By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they know it yet. Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby clock. Level confusion. A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches does it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what time it is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at all is arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines evolving in the first place? You reason like that: no animals can fly, because pigs cannot fly. You mistake my common sense reductio for shortsighted prejudice. I would say that your reasoning is that if we take a pig on a plane, we can't rule out the possibility that it has become a bird. No. You were saying that computer cannot think, because clock cannot thing. And I'm right. A brain can think because it's made of living cells which diverged from an organic syzygy in a single moment. A computer or clock cannot think because they are assembled artificially from unrelated components, none of which have the qualities of an organic molecule or living cell. This is another variation on the Chinese Room. The pig can walk around at 30,000 feet and we can ask it questions about the view from up there, but the pig has not, in fact learned to fly or become a bird. Neither has the plane, for that matter. Your analogy is confusing. I would say that the pig in the plane does fly, but this is out of the topic. It could be said that the pig is flying, but not that he has *learned to fly* (and especially not learned to fly like a bird - which would be the direct analogy for a computer simulating human consciousness). Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On Feb 29, 4:45 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 22:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 3:41 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The implication of Comp is that there is no you. You are an abstraction, a fiction, just another element in a model of the world. That's why I say comp has only a pseudo-1p conception of consciousness. It's not difficult to claim that the hard problem isn't so hard if you allow the hardness of it to be fictional. It is not fictional in the sense of unreal. But in the sense of abstract, or immaterial. You make my point to Brent already. How does this translate though into answering the very non-abstract question of 'Doctor, is this treatment any different from me swallowing the business end of a shotgun?'. If I indeed wake up from the procedure, it is not clear whether I am arbitrarily limited to one replacement brain at a time (which means what? that I can kill myself every day and get a restored brain every night?) or can I wake up as a massively redundant RAID of disposable brains, or a cluster of parallel processing identities spread out as identities all over the world where I would experience my new separate bodies something like fingers on my hands. I can't think of any plausible restriction against this in comp. Either you don't become a digital brain at all or you can become an army of simultaneous selves. This is really the core issue of the whole thing. Symbol grounding, primitive matter, the Explanatory Gap Hard Problem are all different aspects of this chain of custody issue. Who carries the ball of consciousness? Atoms? Computation? Cells? Persons? For human beings I think it has to be people. Just as you would not call someone who had been catastrophically disabled a non-person, we should not call a hypertrophied computer a non-machine. Even if the person is in a vegetative state, we still treat their body and legacy with human significance as opposed to scrapping it in the landfill. This isn't a justification based on sentiment, it is an observation of how these questions have been treated thus far in society. There would be no reason to treat a disabled computer with any dignity at all - no need to try to resuscitate it if we have another backup computer conveniently available. This is not the case with children and siblings. With comp, chain of custody is lost entirely. As was suggested, 'you' are reduced to an abstraction which is forever lost to the mysteries of arithmetic ether. Will we be summoned to incarnate as a 23rd century SmartToaster because we happen to have a popular 'toasty' voice? Will we be doomed to live in an eternity of toast monitoring because some programmer found the 100 exabyte eDVD of our identity in the bargain bin of the RIAA? Can nobody else see why these absurdities are unavoidable in comp? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On Feb 29, 5:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: the you before is no more. That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death. It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience. Well, that's make clear that you believe in zombie. No, I believe in puppets. Don't you? Disembodied consciousness is silly. I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an environment... Wait, so we actually agree on something? I think we all agree on this. But comp explains the origin of the coupling brain/environment. They are not ontologically primitive, though. I don't know that even physicists would say that matter is ontologically primitive these days, but comp goes a step further to say that matter is completely Turing emulable. without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not something about disembodiment. Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams. By the MGA. But how can the substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What binds the experience of the program to the silicon? The relative proportion of computation going through your state in which silicon are observed. ? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 2/29/2012 1:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state. Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution. This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level lower, for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum system. What you say would be true if a quantum computer was not Turing emulable, but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-down, but the UD does not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot be aware of the delays. An exponential slowdown may be OK if you're substituting for the whole world, but having a part of my brain running much slower would be a good reason to say no to the doctor. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 2/29/2012 5:47 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/29/2012 12:50 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/28/2012 9:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 3:41 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com wrote: Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain. What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A off? Disembodied consciousness is silly. Craig The implication of Comp is that there is no you. You are an abstraction, a fiction, just another element in a model of the world. Brent Hi, Just a question about the semantics. What difference is there between a you and an abstraction that is indistinguishable from it? The difference is that there isn't *a* you, there are arbitrarily many or at least there will be momentarily. The absraction is tracing just one of these. This is already a consequence of MWI in which quantum events cause you to split into orthogonal subspaces. To the extent consciousness is realized by classical processes the splitting only happens when the quantum events have classical level effects. Hi Brent, So we could say that the you is tied to a particular world. Would it be consistent to think of this notion of realized by classical processes as an abstraction of the same kind, i.e. a tracing of individual 1p content, each of which is generated by a potential infinity of computations? I am trying to tease out the relation of COMP's ontology picture with that of MWI. That's roughly the picture I have of how comp is supposed to work. For any given state of your consciousness there are infinitely many threads of different computations that go through that state. These have different continuations and these result in quantum uncertainty as to which future you experience. However, I'm not sure how classicality figures into this. The materialist view is that almost all microscopic quantum randomness has no effect on consciousness and so 'a conscious state' would correspond to a large number of similar computational states rather than just one. Brent Onward! Stephen No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4840 - Release Date: 02/28/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 2/29/2012 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 29, 4:45 am, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 22:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 3:41 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: The implication of Comp is that there is no you. You are an abstraction, a fiction, just another element in a model of the world. That's why I say comp has only a pseudo-1p conception of consciousness. It's not difficult to claim that the hard problem isn't so hard if you allow the hardness of it to be fictional. It is not fictional in the sense of unreal. But in the sense of abstract, or immaterial. You make my point to Brent already. How does this translate though into answering the very non-abstract question of 'Doctor, is this treatment any different from me swallowing the business end of a shotgun?'. If I indeed wake up from the procedure, it is not clear whether I am arbitrarily limited to one replacement brain at a time (which means what? that I can kill myself every day and get a restored brain every night?) or can I wake up as a massively redundant RAID of disposable brains, or a cluster of parallel processing identities spread out as identities all over the world where I would experience my new separate bodies something like fingers on my hands. I can't think of any plausible restriction against this in comp. Either you don't become a digital brain at all or you can become an army of simultaneous selves. As you suggest, you are already an army of simultaneous selves. At least that's Daniel Dennett's 'multiple drafts' model in Consciousness Explained. By that theory, the Borg just have more multiple drafts before they settle on what they think. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Entropy and information
On 29 Feb 2012, at 15:47, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
On 29 feb, 11:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 02:20, Alberto G.Corona wrote (to Stephen):
A thing that I often ask myself concerning MMH is the question
about
what is mathematical and what is not?. The set of real numbers is a
mathematical structure, but also the set of real numbers plus the
point (1,1) in the plane is.
Sure. Now, with comp, that mathematical structure is more easily
handled in the mind of the universal machine. For the ontology we
can use arithmetic, on which everyone agree. It is absolutely
undecidable that there is more than that (with the comp assumption).
So for the math, comp invite to assume only what is called the
sharable part of intuitionist and classical mathematics.
I do not thing in computations in terms of minds of universal
machines in the abstract sense but in terms of the needs of
computability of living beings.
I am not sure I understand what you mean by that.
What is your goal?
The goal by default here is to build, or isolate (by reasoning from
ideas that we can share) a theory of everything (a toe).
And by toe, most of us means a theory unifying the known forces,
without eliminating the person and consciousness.
The list advocates that 'everything' is simpler than 'something'. But
this leads to a measure problem.
It happens that the comp hypothesis gives crucial constraints on that
measure problem.
The set of randomly chosen numbers { 1,4
3,4,.34, 3} is because it can be described with the same
descriptive
language of math. But the first of these structures have properties
and the others do not. The first can be infinite but can be
described
with a single equation while the last must be described
extensively. . At least some random universes (the finite ones)
can be
described extensively, with the tools of mathematics but they don´t
count in the intuitive sense as mathematical.
Why? If they can be finitely described, then I don't see why they
would be non mathematical.
It is not mathematical in the intuitive sense that the list of the
ponits of ramdomly folded paper is not. That intuitive sense , more
restrictive is what I use here.
Ah?
OK.
What is usually considered genuinely mathematical is any
structure,
that can be described briefly.
Not at all. In classical math any particular real number is
mathematically real, even if it cannot be described briefly.
Chaitin's
Omega cannot be described briefly, even if we can defined it briefly.
a real number in the sense I said above is not mathematical. in the
sense I said above. In fact there is no mathematical theory about
paticular real numbers. the set of all the real numbers , in the
contrary, is.
OK. Even for Peano Arithmetic, in fact. Basically, because a
dovetailer on the reals is an arithmetical object.
It looks like you define math by the separable part of math on which
everybody agree. Me too, as far as ontology is concerned. But I can't
prevent the finite numbers to see infinities everywhere!
Also it must have good properties ,
operations, symmetries or isomorphisms with other structures so the
structure can be navigated and related with other structures and the
knowledge can be reused. These structures have a low kolmogorov
complexity, so they can be navigated with low computing resources.
But they are a tiny part of bigger mathematical structures. That's
why
we use big mathematical universe, like the model of ZF, or Category
theory.
If maths is all that can be described finitelly, then of course you
are right. but I´m intuitively sure that the ones that are interesting
can be defined briefly, using an evolutuionary sense of what is
interesting.
I agree with you. The little numbers are the real stars :)
But the fact is that quickly, *some* rather little numbers have
behaviors which we can't explain without referring to big numbers or
even infinities. A diophantine polynomial of degree 4, with 54
variables, perhaps less, is already Turing universal. There are
programs which does not halt, but you will need quite elaborate
transfinite mathematics to prove it is the case.
So the demand of computation in each living being forces to admit
that universes too random or too simple, wiith no lineal or
discontinuous macroscopic laws have no complex spatio-temporal
volutes (that may be the aspect of life as looked from outside of
our
four-dimensional universe). The macroscopic laws are the
macroscopic
effects of the underlying mathematical structures with which our
universe is isomorphic (or identical).
We need both, if only to make precise that very reasoning. Even in
comp, despite such kind of math is better seen as epistemological
than
ontological.
There is a hole in the transition from certain mathematical
properties in macroscopic laws to simple mathematical theories of
everything .
Sure.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 29, 4:56 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 27, 10:11 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You are thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation I don't know what you mean by subject to. They may well not be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all. Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the simulation. But they are wrong about all that, or there is no sense to the claim that they are sims ITFP They are right about that. If I am a sim running on a computer somewhere, it doesn't matter to me at all where that is because I can never get our of this sim here to get to the world of the computer out there. That certain things don'tn matter to you doesn't change any facts. That would be true if I were aware of the fact but didn't care, but in this case there is no possibility of my ever being aware of it. Facts outside of our own universe can't be considered as facts to us unless they impact us in some way. But you are already doing that. You are putting forward it's all a simulation as a fact that is just true and not necessarily knowable to us possible sims. Yes, the fact of it being a simulation is not true for the observers being simulated under comp. The reality that you simulate is their actual reality. That may be intended as some sort of reductio ad absurdum of the simulation hypothesis. I don't know if it is. That is one of the many things that aren't clear. Yes, it is. My point is that MWI is no less wishful thinking than Creationism. If all of humanity died off and you are an ant crawling on a microwave oven, the 'fact' that it 'is' a microwave oven is not relevant. That doens't mean it isn't a fact. It's not a fact to anyone who is alive. If you add the idea that only insects and plants will ever live anywhere, then it has no meaning to say it is a fact. You are supposing it is in order to set up the scenario. It is consistent to say it is an objective, absolute facts that there are objective, absolute facts. It is not consistent to say there are no objective facts, everything is just true to of for a subject and offfer in support of that just such an objective fact. I don't offer an objective fact, I offer a naturalistic scenario to point out that 'facts' are experiential invariance and nothing more. The world has lost the capacity to define that object in that way, and it now is a hard flat surface for ants to crawl on. I am not a sim to myself of course, but if someone can pause the program, put horns on my head and start it again, it is because to them, I am a simulation. But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic. You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and make their consciousness completely solipsistic. So? To in that simulated universe, lunacy would be truth. Luncacy might be believed. Not the same thing. Not if you take comp and simulation seriously. I don't, so I agree, truth is more than local simulation, but comp does not agree. Any fantasy which can be rendered arithmetically could be a valid universe to live in under comp. But Comp/SH doesn't have the implication that the nature of truth itself keeps changing. What is a simulation if not a matrix of internally consistent propositions that can be changed? You can state Comp/SH by saying it is an objective fact that most subjective perceptions are of simulated worlds, and most subjects hold fasle beliefs. You are importing your own subjectivist epistemology into Comp/SH. It is not native to it. If you want to critique Comp, you need to show there is something wrong with *it's* claim, not yours! No, because Comp has no capacity to understand what is wrong with its claim. Comp is inherently circular and can only prove itself regardless of any absurdities that arise from it in the real world. Comp exists in its own theoretical bubble which realism cannot penetrate. It is up to us living human beings to seize the reigns of sentience directly and not be seduced by this one narrow tradition of logical puzzle solving into forsaking the myriad of other channels of sense we have access to. Comp is like a black and white TV demanding that color be proved on its terms. I recommend using publically accessble language to enhance communication, not to discover new facts. I would rather enhance the content of the
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 29, 4:33 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 5:42 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock doesn't know what time it is. A clock has no self-referential ability. How do you know? By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self- reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a universal machine. Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference. That's what I said, and it makes my point. By comp it should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears of the clock. ? By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they know it yet. Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby clock. Level confusion. A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches does it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what time it is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at all is arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines evolving in the first place? They exist arithmetically, in many relative way, that is to universal numbers. Relative Evolution exists in higher level description of those relation. Evolution of species, presuppose arithmetic and even comp, plausibly. Genetics is already digital relatively to QM. You reason like that: no animals can fly, because pigs cannot fly. You mistake my common sense reductio for shortsighted prejudice. I would say that your reasoning is that if we take a pig on a plane, we can't rule out the possibility that it has become a bird. No. You were saying that computer cannot think, because clock cannot thing. And I'm right. A brain can think because it's made of living cells which diverged from an organic syzygy in a single moment. A computer or clock cannot think because they are assembled artificially from unrelated components, none of which have the qualities of an organic molecule or living cell. You reason like this. A little clock cannot think. To attach something which does not think, to something which cannot think, can still not think. So all assembly of clocks cannot think. But such an induction will not work, if you substitute think by is Turing universal, or has self-referential abilities, etc. A machine which can only add, cannot be universal. A machine which can only multiply cannot be universal. But a machine which can add and multiply is universal. The machine is a whole, its function belongs to none of its parts. When the components are unrelated, the machine does not work. The machine works well when its components are well assembled, be it artificially, naturally, virtually or arithmetically (that does not matter, and can't matter). All know theories in biology are known to be reducible to QM, which is Turing emulable. So your theory/opinion is that all known theories are false. You have to lower the comp level in the infinitely low, and introduce special infinities, not 1p machine recoverable to make comp false. This is another variation on the Chinese Room. The pig can walk around at 30,000 feet and we can ask it questions about the view from up there, but the pig has not, in fact learned to fly or become a bird. Neither has the plane, for that matter. Your analogy is confusing. I would say that the pig in the plane does fly, but this is out of the topic. It could be said that the pig is flying, but not that he has *learned to fly* (and especially not learned to fly like a bird - which would be the direct analogy for a computer simulating human consciousness). That why the flying analogy does not work. Consciousness concerns something unprovable for everone concerned, except oneself. May I ask you a question? Is a human with an artificial heart still a human? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:47, meekerdb wrote: On 2/29/2012 1:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state. Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution. This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level lower, for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum system. What you say would be true if a quantum computer was not Turing emulable, but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow- down, but the UD does not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot be aware of the delays. An exponential slowdown may be OK if you're substituting for the whole world, but having a part of my brain running much slower would be a good reason to say no to the doctor. In step seven you don't need no more to say yes to the doctor. You are in a universe with a running UD. It makes notably all the quantum computations leading to your current state, and their many continuations. And there, you can't be aware of the exponential slow down. Step seven eliminates the doctor, and replaced it by a robust universe. Step eight eliminates the robust universe. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 29, 4:45 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 22:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 3:41 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The implication of Comp is that there is no you. You are an abstraction, a fiction, just another element in a model of the world. That's why I say comp has only a pseudo-1p conception of consciousness. It's not difficult to claim that the hard problem isn't so hard if you allow the hardness of it to be fictional. It is not fictional in the sense of unreal. But in the sense of abstract, or immaterial. You make my point to Brent already. How does this translate though into answering the very non-abstract question of 'Doctor, is this treatment any different from me swallowing the business end of a shotgun?'. If I indeed wake up from the procedure, it is not clear whether I am arbitrarily limited to one replacement brain at a time (which means what? that I can kill myself every day and get a restored brain every night?) or can I wake up as a massively redundant RAID of disposable brains, or a cluster of parallel processing identities spread out as identities all over the world where I would experience my new separate bodies something like fingers on my hands. I can't think of any plausible restriction against this in comp. Either you don't become a digital brain at all or you can become an army of simultaneous selves. This is a bit ambiguous, but this is already the case with QM. Comp provides an explanation why that happens. This is really the core issue of the whole thing. Symbol grounding, primitive matter, the Explanatory Gap Hard Problem are all different aspects of this chain of custody issue. Who carries the ball of consciousness? Atoms? Computation? Cells? Persons? Persons. enough rich individuals (rich in cognitive abilities, but they are cheap). For human beings I think it has to be people. Just as you would not call someone who had been catastrophically disabled a non-person, we should not call a hypertrophied computer a non-machine. Even if the person is in a vegetative state, we still treat their body and legacy with human significance as opposed to scrapping it in the landfill. This isn't a justification based on sentiment, it is an observation of how these questions have been treated thus far in society. There would be no reason to treat a disabled computer with any dignity at all - no need to try to resuscitate it if we have another backup computer conveniently available. This is not the case with children and siblings. With comp, chain of custody is lost entirely. As was suggested, 'you' are reduced to an abstraction which is forever lost to the mysteries of arithmetic ether. Will we be summoned to incarnate as a 23rd century SmartToaster because we happen to have a popular 'toasty' voice? Will we be doomed to live in an eternity of toast monitoring because some programmer found the 100 exabyte eDVD of our identity in the bargain bin of the RIAA? Can nobody else see why these absurdities are unavoidable in comp? Absurdities is not contradiction. You have to compare with the QM absurdities and the alternatives. Science is not wishful thinking. I do not pretend that comp is true. Just that it make Plato closer to the truth than Aristotle, and this in a way which explains how to derive the laws of physics from comp, so that we might test it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 2/29/2012 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state. [SPK1] Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution. This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level lower, for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum system. What you say would be true if a quantum computer was not Turing emulable, but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-down, but the UD does not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot be aware of the delays. Bruno [SPK2] This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire universes in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of immortality via digital uploading. Dear Bruno, Did you not see this last comment [SPK2] that I wrote? We need to distinguish between the actions on and by physical systems, such as human brains, and the platonic level systems. Your remark seemed to be one that was considering my comment [SPK1] as if it where discussing the Platonic level aspect. This is just probably a confusion caused by our use of the same words for the two completely different levels. For example, a physical system is a UTM if it can implement any enumerable recursive algorithm, aka is programable in the Turing Thesis sense, but its actual behavior is limited by its resources, transition speeds, etc. An abstract Platonic Machine, such as what you consider in SANE04, does not have any such limits. I think that we should consider a formal way to describe these relations. Perhaps some one that is fluent in Category theory will come to help us in these discussions. We need a way to define the idea of the limit of the infinities of computations that go through a given consciousness state in a way that is more clear given that a given consciousness state is still a very ambiguous notion. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test
On 2/29/2012 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:23, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 10:46 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: When we are dreaming we are in a higher level relative emulation (all UMs can do that). That's confusing. I find it hard to believe a bacteria can dream. The UM implemented by a bacteria could *potentially* run any program, but it is *actually* running the bacteria program. To suggest that bacteria (e.g. one of the class of all UMs) can dream by virtue of being definable as a UM generates more confusion than clarity. Put another way, if a particularly instantiated UM possesses the ability to dream (to imagine), then that says something non-trivial about the constitution of that UM's cognitive architecture. Terren Hi Terren, If a bacterium is a physical system capable of implementing a universal Turing machine aka the particular bacteria's program, then Bruno's argument shows that it will necessarily be able to dream, for what are dreams if not alternative TMs running on the same hardware via dovetailing? This does not follow. A bacteria is universal does not mean it has been program to dovetail, or to make dream. Still less to know that she can dream. Universal does not imply Löbianity, notably. Bruno Dear Bruno, Is Löbianity required for bare consciousness, e.g. consciousness without self-awareness? It seems to me that our entire discussion seems to assume that consciousness is just the inside aspect of computation. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test
On 2/29/2012 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Feb 2012, at 21:35, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 2:23 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/28/2012 10:46 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: When we are dreaming we are in a higher level relative emulation (all UMs can do that). That's confusing. I find it hard to believe a bacteria can dream. The UM implemented by a bacteria could *potentially* run any program, but it is *actually* running the bacteria program. To suggest that bacteria (e.g. one of the class of all UMs) can dream by virtue of being definable as a UM generates more confusion than clarity. Put another way, if a particularly instantiated UM possesses the ability to dream (to imagine), then that says something non-trivial about the constitution of that UM's cognitive architecture. Terren Hi Terren, If a bacterium is a physical system capable of implementing a universal Turing machine aka the particular bacteria's program, then Bruno's argument shows that it will necessarily be able to dream, for what are dreams if not alternative TMs running on the same hardware via dovetailing? Onward! Stephen Dreaming in the context of Bruno's remark means that the running of a single program could result in alternate 1p realities being constructed... not that multiple programs could be run in the UM. At least, that's how I interpret it. That's correct. A bacteria is a universal machine in that it can potentially run any program. However, bacteria as they appear to us run specific programs (as selected by evolution). Yes. Their instantiation as such is a stable measure relative to us - the shared 1p plural reality. Bacteria that run programs capable of dreaming (as above), while possible, would probably count as white rabbits. ... or as stable human beings. After all a human is a sort of bacteria organization, but of course you need many bacteria. Just one bacteria is most probably not enough. The genome is not big enough to handle memories of the type occurring in reasonable notion of dreams. So yes, that occurs only in white rabbit realities. Bruno Dear Bruno, So White Rabbits would be the abstract equivalent of a Boltzmann Brain? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Future Day (March 1), conceived by AI researcher Dr. Ben Goertzel
Richard: a fine idea, just necessitates to look a bit into the future. I have another question in this compartment: Why are people celebrated only when they are dead? Somebody dies and the media goes out of it's way to eulogize in superlatives. Why did they not do this a dy before the person departed? Would have been nice to read about onesself all those ornamental epithetons... John Mikes On Wed, Feb 29, 2012 at 9:20 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Future Day: a new global holiday March 1 February 29, 2012 *[+]* http://www.kurzweilai.net/images/future_day.pngWhy are nearly all our holidays focused on celebrating the past, or the cyclical processes of nature? Why not celebrate the amazing future we are collectively creating? That’s the concept behind a new global holiday, Future Dayhttp://futureday.org/(March 1), conceived by AI researcher Dr. Ben Goertzel. Future Day 2012 gatherings http://futureday.org/events/ are scheduled in more than a dozen cities, as well as in Second Lifehttp://slurl.com/secondlife/Terasem/121/155/30/?img=http%3A//hplusmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/futuredaylogo.pngtitle=Future%20Day%20in%20Second%20Life%2C%20March%201%202012%206pm%20ESTmsg=Future%20Day%20in%20Second%20Life%2C%20March%201%202012%206pm%25 . “Celebrating and honoring the past and the cyclical processes of nature is a valuable thing,” says Goertzel. “But in these days of rapid technological acceleration, it is our future that needs more attention, not our past. My hope is that Future Day can serve as a tool for helping humanity focus its attention on figuring out what kind of future it wants, and striving to bring these visions to reality.” -- “The past is over; the present is fleeting; we live in the future.” — Ray Kurzweil re Future Day -- “Ray Kurzweil* *predicts that technological paradigm shifts will become increasingly common, leading to ‘technological change so rapid and profound it represents a rupture in the fabric of human history,’” says Goertzel. “Future Day is designed to center the impossible in the public mind once a year as a temptation too delicious to resist,” says Howard Bloom, author of *Global Brain.* “If all matter in the universe is comprised of patterns, let’s redesign what doesn’t work and form new methods for approaching the future with fluidity,” says designer Natasha Vita-More, Chair, Humanity+http://humanityplus.org/ . *Future Day events so far* Melbourne http://futureday2012.eventbrite.com/, 5:30 PM (1:30 AM EST) to 10:30 PM, moderated by Singularity Summit AU organizer Adam A. Ford and Australian ABC TV newscaster Josie Taylor, with Skype call-ins by Goertzel and Vita-More. Terasem Island, Second Life, 6 PM EST: a public eventhttp://opencog.org/2012/02/future-day-in-hong-kong-second-life-and-melbourne-australia/, where authors Howard Bloom and Martine Rothblatt and blogger Giulio Prisco will join Goertzel, Vita-More, and Adam A. Ford. Other events: Sydney, Berkeley, Edmonton, Houston, Sao Paulo, **Salt Lake City, Brussels, Paris, Los Angeles, Palo Alto, Washington DC, and Lehi (Utah). See http://futureday.org/events for updates. Starting your own event? List it here: i...@futureday.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely Turing emulable. But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Entropy and information
How would you define compute in the sentence a bacteria computes? Is this similar to what happens within a computer? Evgenii On 29.02.2012 15:58 Alberto G.Corona said the following: Of course they compute. Even a plant must read the imputs of temperature, humidity and sun radiation to decide when sping may arrive to launch the program of leaf growing and flour blossoming. This computation exist because, before that, the plants discovered cycles in the weather by random mutations and natural selection, so the plants with this computation could better optimize water and nutrient resources and outgrown those that do not. Without a predictable linear environment, computation and thus evolution and life is impossible. Alberto On 28 feb, 21:31, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote: Alberto, I am thermodynamicist and I do not know exactly what is information and computation. You have written that living beings perform computations. Several questions in this respect. Are computations are limited to living beings only? Does a bacteria perform computations as well? If yes, then what is the difference between a ballcock in the toilet and bacteria (provided we exclude reproduction from consideration)? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
2012/2/29 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely Turing emulable. But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it? The turing emulation is not of the matter but of the mind... Computationalism, is the theory that the mind is some sort of information processor... the brain made of matter is just an UTM... any UTM could do the job, the emulation is not of the brain made of matter but of the consciousness. Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Future Day (March 1), conceived by AI researcher Dr. Ben Goertzel
On 2/29/2012 11:42 AM, John Mikes wrote: Richard: a fine idea, just necessitates to look a bit into the future. I have another question in this compartment: Why are people celebrated only when they are dead? Because then you have more confidence that they're not going to do something stupid. :-) Somebody dies and the media goes out of it's way to eulogize in superlatives. Why did they not do this a dy before the person departed? Would have been nice to read about onesself all those ornamental epithetons... So send your obituary in the local paper. They won't check whether you're actually dead. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 2/29/2012 12:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/2/29 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely Turing emulable. But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it? The turing emulation is not of the matter but of the mind... Computationalism, is the theory that the mind is some sort of information processor... the brain made of matter is just an UTM... any UTM could do the job, the emulation is not of the brain made of matter but of the consciousness. But suppose I'm only replacing a small part of my brain. There's on reason to suppose that part, by itself, is conscious. Consciousness is supposed to be realized by the computation that the brain is doing. So the question becomes, at what level of fidelity must I emulate that piece of brain I'm going to replace. One answer would be at the lowest possible level, i.e. emulate the quarks and electrons and vacuum field fluctuations, then I'll be sure to survive with consciousness unchanged. But that's emulating the matter of that piece of my brain, which Bruno says is not completely emulable. If that can't be done, why should I believe there is any level that I should say 'yes' to? Brent Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4842 - Release Date: 02/29/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Feb 29, 1:30 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 28, 5:42 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock doesn't know what time it is. A clock has no self-referential ability. How do you know? By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self- reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a universal machine. Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference. That's what I said, and it makes my point. The difference between a clock knowing what time it is, Google knowing what you mean when you search for it, and an AI bot knowing how to have a conversation with someone is a matter of degree. If comp claims that certain kinds of processes have 1p experiences associated with them it has to explain why that should be the case. By comp it should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears of the clock. ? If the Chinese Room is intelligent, then why not gears? By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they know it yet. Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby clock. Level confusion. A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches does it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what time it is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at all is arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines evolving in the first place? They exist arithmetically, in many relative way, that is to universal numbers. Relative Evolution exists in higher level description of those relation. Evolution of species, presuppose arithmetic and even comp, plausibly. Genetics is already digital relatively to QM. My question though was how many watches does it take to make an intelligent watch? It doesn't really make sense to me if comp were true that there would be anything other than QM. Why go through the formality of genetics or cells? What would possibly be the point? If silicon makes just as good of a person as do living mammal cells, why not just make people out of quantum to begin with? You reason like that: no animals can fly, because pigs cannot fly. You mistake my common sense reductio for shortsighted prejudice. I would say that your reasoning is that if we take a pig on a plane, we can't rule out the possibility that it has become a bird. No. You were saying that computer cannot think, because clock cannot thing. And I'm right. A brain can think because it's made of living cells which diverged from an organic syzygy in a single moment. A computer or clock cannot think because they are assembled artificially from unrelated components, none of which have the qualities of an organic molecule or living cell. You reason like this. A little clock cannot think. To attach something which does not think, to something which cannot think, can still not think. So all assembly of clocks cannot think. But such an induction will not work, if you substitute think by is Turing universal, or has self-referential abilities, etc. That reframes the question though so that comp theory is taken for granted and natural phenomenology is put on the defensive. Suddenly we are proving what we already assume rather than probing experiential truth. A machine which can only add, cannot be universal. A machine which can only multiply cannot be universal. But a machine which can add and multiply is universal. A calculator can add and multiply. Will it know what time it is if I connect it to a clock? The machine is a whole, its function belongs to none of its parts. When the components are unrelated, the machine does not work. The machine works well when its components are well assembled, be it artificially, naturally, virtually or arithmetically (that does not matter, and can't matter). The machine isn't a whole though. Any number of parts can be replaced without irreversibly killing the machine. All know theories in biology are known to be reducible to QM, which is Turing emulable. So your theory/opinion is that all known theories are false. They aren't false, they are only catastrophically incomplete. Neither biology nor QM has any opinion on a purpose for awareness or living organisms to exist. You have to lower the comp level in the infinitely low, and introduce special infinities, not 1p machine recoverable to make comp false.
Re: Entropy and information
On 29 feb, 18:35, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 15:47, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
On 29 feb, 11:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 02:20, Alberto G.Corona wrote (to Stephen):
A thing that I often ask myself concerning MMH is the question
about
what is mathematical and what is not?. The set of real numbers is a
mathematical structure, but also the set of real numbers plus the
point (1,1) in the plane is.
Sure. Now, with comp, that mathematical structure is more easily
handled in the mind of the universal machine. For the ontology we
can use arithmetic, on which everyone agree. It is absolutely
undecidable that there is more than that (with the comp assumption).
So for the math, comp invite to assume only what is called the
sharable part of intuitionist and classical mathematics.
I do not thing in computations in terms of minds of universal
machines in the abstract sense but in terms of the needs of
computability of living beings.
I am not sure I understand what you mean by that.
What is your goal?
The goal by default here is to build, or isolate (by reasoning from
ideas that we can share) a theory of everything (a toe).
And by toe, most of us means a theory unifying the known forces,
without eliminating the person and consciousness.
My goal is the same. I start from the same COMP premises, but I do not
not see why the whole model of the universe has to be restricted to
being computable. I start from the idea of whathever model of an
universe that can localy evolve computers. A mathematical continuous
structure with infinite small substitution measure , and thus non
computable can evolve computers. well not just computers, but problem
adaptive systems, clearly separated from the environment, that respond
to external environment situations in order to preserve the internal
structures, to reproduce and so on.
The list advocates that 'everything' is simpler than 'something'. But
this leads to a measure problem.
It happens that the comp hypothesis gives crucial constraints on that
measure problem.
The set of randomly chosen numbers { 1,4
3,4,.34, 3} is because it can be described with the same
descriptive
language of math. But the first of these structures have properties
and the others do not. The first can be infinite but can be
described
with a single equation while the last must be described
extensively. . At least some random universes (the finite ones)
can be
described extensively, with the tools of mathematics but they don´t
count in the intuitive sense as mathematical.
Why? If they can be finitely described, then I don't see why they
would be non mathematical.
It is not mathematical in the intuitive sense that the list of the
ponits of ramdomly folded paper is not. That intuitive sense , more
restrictive is what I use here.
Ah?
OK.
What is usually considered genuinely mathematical is any
structure,
that can be described briefly.
Not at all. In classical math any particular real number is
mathematically real, even if it cannot be described briefly.
Chaitin's
Omega cannot be described briefly, even if we can defined it briefly.
a real number in the sense I said above is not mathematical. in the
sense I said above. In fact there is no mathematical theory about
paticular real numbers. the set of all the real numbers , in the
contrary, is.
OK. Even for Peano Arithmetic, in fact. Basically, because a
dovetailer on the reals is an arithmetical object.
It looks like you define math by the separable part of math on which
everybody agree. Me too, as far as ontology is concerned. But I can't
prevent the finite numbers to see infinities everywhere!
Also it must have good properties ,
operations, symmetries or isomorphisms with other structures so the
structure can be navigated and related with other structures and the
knowledge can be reused. These structures have a low kolmogorov
complexity, so they can be navigated with low computing resources.
But they are a tiny part of bigger mathematical structures. That's
why
we use big mathematical universe, like the model of ZF, or Category
theory.
If maths is all that can be described finitelly, then of course you
are right. but I´m intuitively sure that the ones that are interesting
can be defined briefly, using an evolutuionary sense of what is
interesting.
I agree with you. The little numbers are the real stars :)
But the fact is that quickly, *some* rather little numbers have
behaviors which we can't explain without referring to big numbers or
even infinities. A diophantine polynomial of degree 4, with 54
variables, perhaps less, is already Turing universal. There are
programs which does not halt, but you will need quite elaborate
transfinite mathematics to prove it is the case.
that is not a problem as long as
Re: Entropy and information
Hi Evgenii, Any biological activity involves many chemical reactions that produce intermediate results, These reactions involve molecules whose structure are coded in DNA, transceribed and build by RNA . The produced protein respond to some need of the bacteria as a result of an internal or external event. Perhaps some food has been engulfed in the citoplasma and there is need for protein breaking enzimes. If you see the sequence of reactions in a piece of paper, it has the form of an algoritm. It does nor matter if it is executed in paralell, and several steps are executed at different times in different locations, but this does not change the algorithmic nature of the process, with the memorized set of instructions, the input the execution machinery and the output produced. Alberto On 29 feb, 21:08, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: How would you define compute in the sentence a bacteria computes? Is this similar to what happens within a computer? Evgenii On 29.02.2012 15:58 Alberto G.Corona said the following: Of course they compute. Even a plant must read the imputs of temperature, humidity and sun radiation to decide when sping may arrive to launch the program of leaf growing and flour blossoming. This computation exist because, before that, the plants discovered cycles in the weather by random mutations and natural selection, so the plants with this computation could better optimize water and nutrient resources and outgrown those that do not. Without a predictable linear environment, computation and thus evolution and life is impossible. Alberto On 28 feb, 21:31, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote: Alberto, I am thermodynamicist and I do not know exactly what is information and computation. You have written that living beings perform computations. Several questions in this respect. Are computations are limited to living beings only? Does a bacteria perform computations as well? If yes, then what is the difference between a ballcock in the toilet and bacteria (provided we exclude reproduction from consideration)? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: the UD is not theoretical. It is easy to implement it, and an UD has been implemented in 1991, and run for one week. And it ran all possible computer programs? I doubt that. My point is that you cannot fly with nothing but the blueprints of a 747, you need to implement that information in matter and perhaps the same is true for your dovetail machine. In step seven, I suppose that we live in a sufficiently big universe running that UD, forever. Then you are assuming what you are trying to derive from nothing but pure numbers, you are assuming the existence of matter and enough of it to build your gigantic dovetail machine. You can make matter behave in any way relatively to virtual reality that you are building Yes, and that's exactly why I don't see how you could tell if you were in a simulation or not, the outcome of any experiment you perform would be consistent with being in a simulation. It is a consequence of the first person indeterminacy. It's not indeterminate it's just a silly question, the question you're really asking in this 1p 2p 3p stuff is If I change what is the probability I will remain the same?. Comp makes arithmetic a theory of everything. That could only be true if consciousness is everything because consciousness is what comp is all about, and that is a non trivial assumption. from your paper: The reason is that comp forbids to associate inner experiences with the physical processing related to the computations corresponding (with comp) to those experiences. That is not entirely correct, comp forbids to associate inner experiences with the particular type of physical processing going on, both intelligence and consciousness depend on the logical arrangement of the processors and it does not matter if the processing is electronic or mechanical or chemical or biological, but physical processing of some sort might still be necessary and if so then matter is just as fundamental as numbers. So maybe only numbers are fundamental and maybe both matter and numbers are fundamental; I think we both agree that matter alone can not be fundamental. intelligent behavior implies consciousness. I agree, but intelligent behavior is not something that you can defined. It is left to personal appreciation. Yes, there is no infallible test for intelligence much less for consciousness, so we must use the Turing Test because imperfect though it may be it is better than nothing. Just tell me how you predict what *you will feel to see* when you throw a dice in a universe running a universal dovetailer. If the John K Clark program is running on your universal dovetailed machine then there is no way I can make a incorrect prediction about what the John K Clark of this instant will see because he will see everything that there is to see, the machine runs all programs that can be, but of course once he sees something new he will no longer be the John K Clark of that instant. So there is a version of me where exactly one second after I type a period at the end of this sentence I will receive news that I've just been elected Pope. But...well, apparently not this version of John K Clark. surprising is subjective. And so is consciousness. if asked before the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. If he believes in comp he will predict that he will be in Washington and Moscow If he believes in comp he will predict that the (3p) will be in W and M, Yes, except you don't need that 3p caveat, he will predict he will be in W and M period. but he will predict also that he will feel to be in one and only one place Yes absolutely, he will predict he will feel to be in one and only one place, therefore if he believes in comp, that is to say if he is logical, he will predict there will be more than one he. Do you have a problem with that? I don't. You miss the 1p and 3p difference. The entire question makes no sense! You ask the Helsinki man to predict if he will go to Moscow or Washington, but the question is not well formed. You keep asking if you will be in Moscow or Washington and usually that's a question that can only have one answer because up to now there is only one chunk of matter that behaves in a Brunomarchalian way, but there is no law of logic or physics that demands that always be true, and in this thought experiment it is specifically stated that it is NOT true. So both the Washington and the Moscow man will remember being the Helsinki man, neither the Washington nor the Moscow man will remember being each other, and the probability the Helsinki man will remember being the Washington man but not the Moscow man is zero because the Helsinki man only remembers being the Helsinki man . I think at least part of the difficulty has to do with language, if duplicating chambers
