Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 11:04 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. Not really, he claims that zombies do not exist and if an entity (human, computer, whatever) behaves as if it has a mind, then it does have a mind. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Code length = probability distribution
On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 07:07:14PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/20/2012 5:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: A UD generates and executes all programs, many of which are equivalent. So some programs are represented more than others. The COMP measure is a function over all programs that captures this variation in program respresentation. Why should this be unique, independent of UD, or the universal Turing machine it runs on? Because the UD executes every other UD, as well as itself, the measure will be a limit over contributions from all UDs. Hi Russell, I worry a bit about the use of the word all in your remark. All is too big, usually, to have a single constructable measure! Why not consider some large enough but finite collections of programs, such as what would be captured by the idea of an equivalence class of programs that satisfy some arbitrary parameters (such as solving a finite NP-hard problem) given some large but finite quantity of resources? Of course this goes against the grain of Bruno's theology, but maybe that is what it required to solve the measure problem. :-) I find myself being won over by the finitists, such as Norman J. Wildberger! This may well turn out to be the case. Also Juergen Schmidhuber has investigated this under the rubrik of speed prior. I should have a chat with Norm about that sometime. Maybe if I see him at a Christmas party. I didn't realise he was a finitist. I knew he has an interesting take on how trigonometry should be done. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The atoms in my brain don't have to know how to read Chinese. They only need to know how to be carbon, nitrogen, oxygen etc. atoms. The complex behaviour which is reading Chinese comes from the interaction of billions of these atoms doing their simple thing. I don't think that is true. The other way around makes just as much sense of not more: Reading Chinese is a simple behavior which drives the behavior of billions of atoms to do a complex interaction. To me, it has to be both bottom-up and top-down. It seems completely arbitrary prejudice to presume one over the other just because we think that we understand the bottom-up so well. Once you can see how it is the case that it must be both bottom-up and top-down at the same time, the next step is to see that there is no possibility for it to be a cause-effect relationship, but rather a dual aspect ontological relation. Nothing is translating the functions of neurons into a Cartesian theater of experience - there is nowhere to put it in the tissue of the brain and there is no evidence of a translation from neural protocols to sensorimotive protocols - they are clearly the same thing. If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would constitute, for example, neurons firing when measurements of transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc. suggest that they should not. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of neurons and other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it has never been experimentally observed. Why? If the atoms in my brain were put into a Chinese-reading configuration, either through a lot of work learning the language or through direct manipulation, then I would be able to understand Chinese. It's understandable to assume that, but no I don't think it's like that. You can't transplant a language into a brain instantaneously because there is no personal history of association. Your understanding of language is not a lookup table in space, it is made out of you. It's like if you walked around with Google translator in your brain. You could enter words and phrases and turn them into you language, but you would never know the language first hand. The knowledge would be impersonal - accessible, but not woven into your proprietary sense. I don't mean putting an extra module into the brain, I mean putting the brain directly into the same configuration it is put into by learning the language in the normal way. I'm sorry, but this whole passage is a non sequitur as far as the fading qualia thought experiment goes. You have to explain what you think would happen if part of your brain were replaced with a functional equivalent. There is no functional equivalent. That's what I am saying. Functional equivalence when it comes to a person is a non-sequitur. Not only is every person unique, they are an expression of uniqueness itself. They define uniqueness in a never-before-experienced way. This is a completely new way of understanding consciousness and signal. Not as mechanism, but as animism-mechanism. A functional equivalent would stimulate the remaining neurons the same as the part that is replaced. No such thing. Does any imitation function identically to an original? In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the surrounding neurons in the same way as the original. We can even say that it does this miraculously. Would such a device *necessarily* replicate the consciousness along with the neural impulses, or could the two be separated? The original paper says this is a computer chip but this is not necessary to make the point: we could just say that it is any device, not being the normal biological neurons. If consciousness is substrate-dependent (as you claim) then the device could do its job of stimulating the neurons normally while lacking or differing in consciousness. Since it stimulates the neurons normally you would behave normally. If you didn't then it would be a miracle, since your muscles would have to contract normally. Do you at least see this point, or do you think that your muscles would do something different? I see the point completely. That's the problem is that you keep trying to explain to me what is obvious, while I am trying to explain to you something much more subtle and sophisticated. I can replace neurons which control my muscles because muscles are among the most distant and replaceable parts of 'me'. These nerves are outbound efferent nerves and the target muscle cells are for the most part willing servants. The same goes for amputating my arm. I can replace it in theory. What I am saying though is that amputating my head is not even theoretically possible. Wherever my head is, that is where I have to be. If I replace my brain with other parts, the more parts
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On 21.10.2012 10:05 Stathis Papaioannou said the following: On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: ... I don't think that is true. The other way around makes just as much sense of not more: Reading Chinese is a simple behavior which drives the behavior of billions of atoms to do a complex interaction. To me, it has to be both bottom-up and top-down. It seems completely arbitrary prejudice to presume one over the other just because we think that we understand the bottom-up so well. Once you can see how it is the case that it must be both bottom-up and top-down at the same time, the next step is to see that there is no possibility for it to be a cause-effect relationship, but rather a dual aspect ontological relation. Nothing is translating the functions of neurons into a Cartesian theater of experience - there is nowhere to put it in the tissue of the brain and there is no evidence of a translation from neural protocols to sensorimotive protocols - they are clearly the same thing. If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would Scientific evidence, in my view, is the existence of science. Do you mean that for example scientific books have assembled themselves from atoms according to the M-theory? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt
Hi Craig Weinberg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle ...the uncertainty principle is inherent in the properties of all wave-like systems Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-20, 15:10:09 Subject: Re: Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt On Thursday, October 18, 2012 11:19:46 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/18/2012 2:16 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Is anyone here aware of the following? http://www.tgdaily.com/general-sciences-features/66654-heisenbergs-uncertainty-principle-in-doubt Does it have implications for MW interpretations of quantum physics? I'd love to see comments about this. Cheers, Dan -- Hi Dan, This article is rubbish. The writer does not understand the subtleties involved and does not understand that nothing like the tittle was found to be true. I agree. I see what they were trying to get at: Measurement can cause uncertainty but not all of the uncertainty. They leave open the question of what does cause the uncertainty - i.e. perhaps the very nature of quantum is uncertain or immeasurable. The problem of course is in the assumption we're just going to make a *weak* measurement that won't have an effect on it. Sigh. I'll just stand in the bathroom with you...you won't even know I'm here. You can't fool the fabric of the universe. You can spoof it maybe, but you can't hide from it entirely. Craig -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/F1tDWoWhmDEJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2
CRAIG: Cool Roger, It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale. ROGER: It is not uncommon to find such objective/subjective dyslexia in the literature. This stuff is hard to get a hold of. CRAIG: To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia. Thinking is a meta-quale of feeling (which is a meta-quale of awarenessperceptionsensationsense) ROGER: Actually I have yet to find a clear or useful definition of thinking (how it works). In fact Wittgenstein at one point said that he does not know what thinking is (!). But I believe you have to think if you compare objects across an equals sign, so comparison (a dyad) seems to me to be a basic type of thinking. CRAIG: That puts the whole subjective enchilada as Firstness and leaves objects and substance to Secondness. This is Self-Body distinction. What you have is like Lower-Self/Higher- Self distinction but with objects kind of shoehorned in there. Once you see matter as a public extension and self as a private intention, then Thirdness arises as the spatiotemporal interaction of formation and information. ROGER: Yes, distinction is another form of basic thought. But that requires the ability to compare. CRAIG: That outlines one way of slicing the pizza. I don't know if you can see this but here: https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Xz8OmKGPEjE/UIL6EtVeBEI/AZ4/iBhuMxBj9oU/s1600/trio_sml_entropy.jpg That gives a better idea of the syzygy effect of the big picture, how they overlap in different ways and set each other off in a multi-sense way. The Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness relate respectively to the respective trios: I. Sense, Motive II. Matter, Energy, III. Space, Time ROGER: I could see it, but couldn't see how to interpret it, but's thats OK. The categories, like Hegel's dialectic, seem to be a basic take on existence, So no doubt there are many approaches to defining them, yours included. CRAIG: to get to morality, you have to look at the black and white: IV. Signal (escalating significance), Entropy aka Ent ntr rop opy (attenuating significance... fragmentation and redundancy obstructs discernment capacities... information entropy generates thermodynamic entropy through sense participation) I did a post on this today, but it's pretty intense: http://s33light.org/post/33951454539 ROGER: I welcome your thoughts on this. But as for myself, I try to keep things as simple as possible. The truth is that actually I had a serior moment when I wrote morality. I should have recalled a better term, Ethics. That has to do with law and doing, both typical of III. CRAIG: Craig On Thursday, October 18, 2012 9:18:50 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Hi Craig Thanks very much for your comments Craig. I still need to digest them. Meanwhile, a flood of new ideas came to me and I just want to set them down. There are no doubt mistakes, esp. with regard to subjective/objective. The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver.2 I Firstness object substance perception (quale) aesthetics beauty 1st person feeling subjective II Secondness sign monad thought logic truth 2nd person thinking subj/obj III Thirdness interprant supreme monad expression morality goodness 3rd person doing objective It appears that Peirce's three categories match the Leibniz monadic structures as follows: I. = object = Leibniz substance = quale II. Secondness = sign = monad representing that substance. In Peirce, the sign is a word for the experience of that object . In Leibniz, the monads are mental, which I think means subjective. III. Thirdness = interprant (meaning of I and II ) = by the monad of monads. In addition to this, Peirce says that his categories are predicates of predicates, where the first predicate (dog) is extensive and the second predicate (brown) is intensive. then the overall object might be animal--dog--brown. Leibniz says that a monad is a complete concept, meaning all of the possible predicates. I suggest that the first or extensive predicate (dog) is objective and the second predicate (brown) is qualitative or subjective. So that the object as per ceived is a quale or Firstness. Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
emulating life is possible now
Hi Russell Standish Thanks for that info. If you put reprap into the search window on youtube, you come up with a number of video clips. It's a stunning achievement. So I'm wrong, at least you can emulate life. The only thing that remains for it to emulate a plant would be to have it run by solar cells, which would be possible. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-20, 17:51:36 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Why self-organization programs cannot be alive On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 08:18:16AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish But the robot plants could not grow more robot structure for free nor produce seeds. Or produce beautiful sweet-smelling flowers. If they could produce more robot structure, we ought to use them to produce more manf capabilities (including producing more chips for free). All of which are irrelevant to the stated task of using sunlight to convert carbon dioxide to ocygen. Nvevertheless, self-reproducing robots exist as well, in case you're wondering. Take a look at the rep-rap project. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
Hi Stathis Papaioannou You say that if a person behaves as if he has a mind, then he does have a mind. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-21, 03:37:19 Subject: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 11:04 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. Not really, he claims that zombies do not exist and if an entity (human, computer, whatever) behaves as if it has a mind, then it does have a mind. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A test for solipsism
Hi Bruno Marchal You say No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like a human, or like a conscious entity. My problem is that the definition is an absurdity to begin with. If he has no mind, he could not know what a red light means. He could not know anything. So he could never behave as a real person would unless the response was instinctual. Note that you may be right, you could never know if you married a zombie, but that does not follow from the p-zombie definition. The definition is an absurdity. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-20, 10:11:25 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes brought by percepts, and supposed to be treated by the brain. And yes a zombie as no qualia, as a qualia needs consciousness. The mind then transforms what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red is what the body gives you, the sensation of red is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind also can recall past sensations of red to compare it with and give it a name red, which a real person can identify as eg a red traffic light and stop. A zombie would not stop No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like a human, or like a conscious entity. By definition, if you marry a zombie, your will never been aware of that, your whole life. (I am not allowing the fact that red and green lights are in different positions). That would be a test of zombieness. There exists already detector of colors, smells, capable of doing finer discrimination than human. I have heard about a machine testing old wine better than human experts. Machines evolve quickly. That is why the non-comp people are confronted with the idea that zombie might be logically possible for them. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes about the p-zombie. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you. But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists, without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is no solipsist. There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition, almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable, and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to some theory. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overlycomplexcomputations ? On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or above ?) the level of noncomputability. He just seems to say that intuiton does. But that just seems to be a conjecture of his. ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, IMHO, computability
Re: Re: a criticism of comp
On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:35, Roger Clough wrote: (previously) Hi Bruno Marchal Comp cannot give subjective content, BRUNO: This is equivalent to saying that comp is false. By definition of comp, our consciousness remains intact when we get the right computer, featuring the brain at a genuine description level. Then the math confirms this, even in the ideal case of the arithmetically sound machine, and this by using the most classical definition of belief, knowledge, etc. ROGER: The problem is that the since a computer cannot experience anything (having no 1p) it cannot generate descriptions (3p) of experiences. Or the inverse, to produce experiences (1p) from descriptions (3p) of them. Computers are imprisoned in a 3p world. (previously) can only provide an objective simulation on the BEHAVIOR of a person (or his physical brain). This behavioral information can be dealt with by the philosophy of mind called functionalism: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ BRUNO: Here you defend a reductionist conception of what machines and numbers are. It fails already at 3p level, by the incompleteness phenomena. (functionalism is an older version of comp, with the substitution level made implicit, and usually fixed at the neuronal level for the brain, and in that sense comp is a weaker hypothesis than functionalism, as it does not bound the comp subst. level. ROGER: Perhaps, but if I were a brain theorist, I might withhold judgment, as incompleteness might not spoil everything, and my personal attitude is to leave whatever cards you can play still on the table. Sometimes you can solve (to some degree of satisfaction) a mystery with an incomplete set of evidence. Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a ?alculating machine?, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only in the last third of the 20th century. Though the term ?unctionalism? is used to designate a variety of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, economics, and architecture, this entry focuses exclusively on functionalism as a philosophical thesis about the nature of mental states. A criticism of functionalism and hence of comp is that if one only considers his physical behavior (and possibily but not necessarily his brain's behavior), a person can behave in a certain way but have a different mental content. Good point, and this is a motivation for making explicit the existence of the level of substitution explicit in the definition. To survive *for a long time* I would personally ask a correct simulation of the molecular levels of both the neurons and the glial cells in the brain. The UD Argument does NOT depend on the choice of the substitution level, as long you get a finite digital description relatively to a universal number/theory/machine. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 03:31:54 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis On 17 Oct 2012, at 15:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/17/2012 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:00, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:23 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:02:44 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: There is of course the idea that the universe is actually a simulation but that is more controversial. A tempting idea until we question what it is a simulation of? We can close this by considering when is a simulation of a real thing indistinguishable from the real thing! What law states that computations exist ab initio, but the capacity to experience and participate in a simulated world does not? Good point! Why not both existing ab initio? But they exists ab initio in the arithmetical truth. So with comp, we can postulate only the numbers, or the computations (they are ontologically equivalent), then consciousness is semantical fixed point, existing for arithmetical reason, yet not describable in direct arithmetical term (like truth, by Tarski, or knowledge by Scott-Montague. The Theaetetical Bp p is very appealing in that setting, as it is not arithmetically definable, yet makes sense in purely arithmetical term for each p in the language of the machine (arithmetic, say). So we don't have to postulate consciousness to explain
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, October 19, 2012 3:29:39 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2012, at 17:04, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:16:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2012, at 18:56, Craig Weinberg wrote: Two men and two women live together. The woman has a child. 2+2=5 You mean two men + two women + a baby = five persons. You need the arithmetical 2+2=4, and 4+1 = 5, in your argument. Bruno I only see that one person plus another person can eventually equal three or more people. With the operation of sexual reproduction, not by the operation of addition. Only if you consider the 2+2=5 to be a complex special case and 2+2=4 to be a simple general rule. 2+2 = 5 is not a special case of 2+2=4. It could just as easily be flipped. Errors are possible pour complex subjects. I can say 2+2=4 by the operation of reflexive neurology, and 2+2=5 is an operation of multiplication. It depends on what level of description you privilege by over-signifying and the consequence that has on the other levels which are under-signified. To me, the Bruno view is near-sighted when it comes to physics (only sees numbers, substance is disqualified) It means that you think that there is a flaw in UDA, as the non materiality of physics is a consequence of the comp hypothesis. There is no choice in the matter (pun included). and far-sighted when it comes to numbers (does not question the autonomy of numbers). Because computer science explains in details how number can be autonomous, or less simplified: how arithmetical realization can generate the beliefs in bodies, relative autonomy, etc. You seem to want to ignore the computer science behind the comp hypothesis. What is it that can tell one number from another? It is not simple to prove, but the laws of addition and multiplication is enough. I am not sanguine on numbers, I can take fortran programs in place, with the same explanation for the origin of the consciousness/realities couplings. What knows that + is different from * and how? Because we know the definition, and practice first order logical language. Everything I say is a theorem in the theory: x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x Why doesn't arithmetic truth need a meta-arithmetic machine to allow it to function (to generate the ontology of 'function' in the first place)? It does not. That's the amazing whole theoretical computer science point. The meta-arithmetic is already a consequence of the four laws above. Bruno It's all sense. It has to be sense. It depends when you start counting and how long it takes you to finish. It depends on what we are talking about. Person with sex is not numbers with addition. You are just changing definition, not invalidating a proof (the proof that 2+2=4, in arithmetic). I'm not trying to invalidate the proof within one context of sense, I'm pointing out that it isn't that simple. There are other contexts of sense which reduce differently. Craig Bruno Craig http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/QjkYW9tKq6EJ . To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- li...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ma4il48CDGAJ . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I have no idea what that means, not a clue Probably for the same reason that you stop at step 3 in the UD Argument. Probably. I remember I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there was no point in reading about things built on top of that; but I don't remember if that was step 3 or not. From your error you have been obliged to say that in the WM duplication, you will live both at W and at W, yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place, so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person and third person. We were many to tell you this, and it seems you are stick in that confusion. By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof. Obviously, reading the sequel, can help you to see the confusion you are doing. You assume a physical reality, I assume that if physical reality doesn't exist then either the words physical or reality or exists are meaningless, and I don't think any of those words are. By assuming a physical reality at the start, you make it into a primitive ontology. But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical reality at the start, like in the numbers' dreams. and you assume that our consciousness is some phenomenon related exclusively to some construct (brain, bodies) If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too, so I'd say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is interlinked with a physical object, in fact it's a downright superb assumption. But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp. If your state appears in a far away galaxies, what will happen far away might change your outcome of an experience you decided to do here. You believe in an identity thesis which can't work, unless you singularize both the mind and the brain matter with special sort of infinities. so if it [Evolution] produced it [consciousness] No. With comp, consciousness was there before. Well I don't know about you but I don't think my consciousness was there before Evolution figured out how to make brains, I believe this because I can't seem to remember events that were going on during the Precambrian. I've always been a little hazy about what exactly comp meant but I had the general feeling that I sorta agreed with it, but apparently not. You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig, but you don't follow its logical consequences, I guess, this is by not wanting to take seriously the first person and third person distinction, which is the key of the UD argument. You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain, but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic (or in a physical universe if that exists) and realizing that brain state. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A test for solipsism
On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:47, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/20/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes brought by percepts, and supposed to be treated by the brain. And yes a zombie as no qualia, as a qualia needs consciousness. The mind then transforms what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red is what the body gives you, the sensation of red is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind also can recall past sensations of red to compare it with and give it a name red, which a real person can identify as eg a red traffic light and stop. A zombie would not stop No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like a human, or like a conscious entity. By definition, if you marry a zombie, your will never been aware of that, your whole life. (I am not allowing the fact that red and green lights are in different positions). That would be a test of zombieness. There exists already detector of colors, smells, capable of doing finer discrimination than human. I have heard about a machine testing old wine better than human experts. Machines evolve quickly. That is why the non-comp people are confronted with the idea that zombie might be logically possible for them. Bruno Hi Bruno and Roger, What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie from a a person that does not see the world external to it as anything other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact? Nobody can distinguish a p-zombie from a human, even if that human is solipsist, even a very special sort of solipsist like the one you describe. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:51, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/20/2012 10:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. I agree with you on this. Dennett is always on the verge of eliminativism. That is deeply wrong. Now, if you want eliminate the zombie, and keep comp, you have to eventually associate the mind to the logico-arithmetical relations defining a computation relative to a universal number, and then a reasoning explains where the laws of physics comes from (the number's dream statistics). This leads also to the arithmetical understanding of Plotinus, and of all those rare people aware of both the importance of staying rational on those issue, *and* open minded on, if not aware of, the existence of consciousness and altered consciousness states. Bruno Dear Bruno, It seems, from this post that you do support some form of panprotopsychism! ? With comp to have a mind, you need a computer, or an universal number. Bruno http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rieo-BDTcko -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?
On 20 Oct 2012, at 22:09, meekerdb wrote: On 10/20/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Stephen, On 19 Oct 2012, at 19:44, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/19/2012 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2012, at 22:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/17 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com 2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Life may support mathematics. Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams. Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible: in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live. So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers. OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it must do in a first person measure winning way on all computations going through our state. That's nice as this explain that your idea of evolution needs to be extended up to the origin of the physical laws. I don´t think so .The difference between computation as an ordinary process of matter from the idea of computation as the ultimate essence of reality is that the first restrict not only the mathematical laws, but also forces a matemacity of reality because computation in living beings becomes a process with a cost that favour a low kolmogorov complexity for the reality. In essence, it forces a discoverable local universe... , In contrast, the idea of computation as the ultimate nature of realtity postulates computations devoid of restrictions by definition, so they may not restrict anything in the reality that we perceive. we may be boltzmann brains, we may be a product not of evolution but a product of random computations. we may perceive elephants flying... And still much of your conclussions coming from the first person indeterminacy may hold by considering living beings as ordinary material personal computers. Yes, that's step seven. If the universe is enough big, to run a *significant* part of the UD. But I think that the white rabbits disappear only on the limit of the whole UD work (UD*). Bruno Dear Bruno, Tell us more about how White Rabbits can appear if there is any restriction of mutual logical consistency between 1p and in any arbitrary recursion of 1p content? We assume comp. If a digital computer processes the activity of your brain in dream state with white rabbits, it means that such a computation with that dream exist in infinitely many local incarnation in the arithmetical (tiny, Turing universal) reality. If you do a physical experience, the hallucination that all goes weird at that moment exists also, in arithmetic. The measure problem consists in justifying from consistency, self-reference, universal numbers, their rarity, And their very specific correlation with the physical brain states of sleep. Of course. But this is taken into account in the theoretical reasoning where we suppose the brain state are obtained by (immaterial) machine doing the computation at the right level. We cannot know our right level, so we are not trying to build an artificial brain. The measure problem comes from the fact that, whatever the level is, the physics has to be given by a measure on computations. That is enough to already derive the logic of the observable, and that a step toward solving the measure problem, although some other possible manner might exist. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
Hi John, On 20 Oct 2012, at 23:16, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, especially in my identification as responding to relations. Now the Self? IT certainly refers to a more sophisticated level of thinking, more so than the average (animalic?) mind. - OR: we have no idea. What WE call 'Self-Ccness' is definitely a human attribute because WE identify it that way. I never talked to a cauliflower to clarify whether she feels like having a self? (In cauliflowerese, of course). My feeling was first that all homeotherm animals have self- consciousness, as they have the ability to dream, easily realted to the ability to build a representation of one self. Then I have enlarged the spectrum up to some spiders and the octopi, just by reading a lot about them, looking video. But this is just a personal appreciation. For the plant, let us say I know nothing, although I supect possible consciousness, related to different scalings. The following theory seems to have consciousness, for different reason (the main one is that it is Turing Universal): x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x But once you add the very powerful induction axioms: which say that if a property F is true for zero, and preserved by the successor operation, then it is true for all natural numbers. That is the infinity of axioms: (F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x), with F(x) being any formula in the arithmetical language (and thus defined with 0, s, +, *), Then you get Löbianity, and this makes it as much conscious as you and me. Indeed, they got a rich theology about which they can develop maximal awareness, and even test it by comparing the physics retrievable by that theology, and the observation and inference on their most probable neighborhoods. Löbianity is the treshold at which any new axiom added will create and enlarge the machine ignorance. It is the utimate modesty treshold. Bruno On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:19, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal IMHO all life must have some degree of consciousness or it cannot perceive its environment. Are you sure? Would you say that the plants are conscious? I do think so, but I am not sure they have self-consciousness. Self-consciousness accelerates the information treatment, and might come from the need of this for the self-movie living creature having some important mass. all life is a very fuzzy notion. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 10:13:37 Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life On 16 Oct 2012, at 18:37, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb wrote: If consciousness doesn't do anything then Evolution can't see it, so how and why did Evolution produce it? The fact that you have no answer to this means your ideas are fatally flawed. I don't see this as a *fatal* flaw. Evolution, as you've noted, is not a paradigm of efficient design. Consciousness might just be a side-effect But that's exactly what I've been saying for months, unless Darwin was dead wrong consciousness must be a side effect of intelligence, so a intelligent computer must be a conscious computer. And I don't think Darwin was dead wrong. Darwin does not need to be wrong. Consciousness role can be deeper, in the evolution/selection of the laws of physics from the coherent dreams (computations from the 1p view) in arithmetic. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
Re: Re: The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 7:19:42 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: CRAIG: Cool Roger, It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale. ROGER: It is not uncommon to find such objective/subjective dyslexia in the literature. This stuff is hard to get a hold of. It can be, yeah, although my model makes it really easy. Subject and object are poles on a continuum, with private, proprietary, solipsistic, trans-rational sense qualities on the East (Orienting) end and public, generic, nihilistic, logical realism quantities on the Western end. In the center region between the two poles, subjectivity and objectivity are clearly discernible as inner and outer body/world perception (I call this the mundane fold as it is like a crease which acts as a barrier). In the edge region, the East and West actually meet in the sort of transcendental oblivion of subjective union with the ultimate (nirvana, satori, enlightenment, etc) CRAIG: To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia. Thinking is a meta-quale of feeling (which is a meta-quale of awarenessperceptionsensationsense) ROGER: Actually I have yet to find a clear or useful definition of thinking (how it works). In fact Wittgenstein at one point said that he does not know what thinking is (!). But I believe you have to think if you compare objects across an equals sign, so comparison (a dyad) seems to me to be a basic type of thinking. A think a comparison is a basic type of everything. As luck would have it, I just posted this definition for what a thought is yesterday: What exactly is a thought? http://s33light.org/post/33997036879 A thought is a private, personal, directly participatory narrative subjective experience which is typically expressed in a verbal-gestural sense modality (as words or feelings easily converted to words by an agency of proprietary interior voice). Thoughts can be discerned from images, awareness, and perception by their potential purposefulness; they serve as the seeds for public action. Generally public actions which are understood to be voluntary are assumed to be the consequence of private thoughts. Behaviors which are ‘thoughtless’ are deemed to be unconscious, subconscious, accidental, or socially impaired. CRAIG: That puts the whole subjective enchilada as Firstness and leaves objects and substance to Secondness. This is Self-Body distinction. What you have is like Lower-Self/Higher- Self distinction but with objects kind of shoehorned in there. Once you see matter as a public extension and self as a private intention, then Thirdness arises as the spatiotemporal interaction of formation and information. ROGER: Yes, distinction is another form of basic thought. But that requires the ability to compare. First you have to be able to distinguish things before you can compare them, otherwise what would you be comparing? CRAIG: That outlines one way of slicing the pizza. I don't know if you can see this but here: https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Xz8OmKGPEjE/UIL6EtVeBEI/AZ4/iBhuMxBj9oU/s1600/trio_sml_entropy.jpg That gives a better idea of the syzygy effect of the big picture, how they overlap in different ways and set each other off in a multi-sense way. The Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness relate respectively to the respective trios: I. Sense, Motive II. Matter, Energy, III. Space, Time ROGER: I could see it, but couldn't see how to interpret it, but's thats OK. The categories, like Hegel's dialectic, seem to be a basic take on existence, So no doubt there are many approaches to defining them, yours included. CRAIG: to get to morality, you have to look at the black and white: IV. Signal (escalating significance), Entropy aka Ent ntr rop opy (attenuating significance... fragmentation and redundancy obstructs discernment capacities... information entropy generates thermodynamic entropy through sense participation) I did a post on this today, but it's pretty intense: http://s33light.org/post/33951454539 ROGER: I welcome your thoughts on this. But as for myself, I try to keep things as simple as possible. The truth is that actually I had a serior moment when I wrote morality. I should have recalled a better term, Ethics. That has to do with law and doing, both typical of III. In my view morality and ethics are manifestation of IV. It is distinct from law because it is not a scripted assumption of compliance, it is an internalized sensitivity to social considerations which drives law from above, rather than a consequence of the existence of a-signifying behavioral constraints. This is actually pretty important as it reveals why COMP
Re: Code length = probability distribution
On 10/21/2012 3:48 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 07:07:14PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/20/2012 5:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: A UD generates and executes all programs, many of which are equivalent. So some programs are represented more than others. The COMP measure is a function over all programs that captures this variation in program respresentation. Why should this be unique, independent of UD, or the universal Turing machine it runs on? Because the UD executes every other UD, as well as itself, the measure will be a limit over contributions from all UDs. Hi Russell, I worry a bit about the use of the word all in your remark. All is too big, usually, to have a single constructable measure! Why not consider some large enough but finite collections of programs, such as what would be captured by the idea of an equivalence class of programs that satisfy some arbitrary parameters (such as solving a finite NP-hard problem) given some large but finite quantity of resources? Of course this goes against the grain of Bruno's theology, but maybe that is what it required to solve the measure problem. :-) I find myself being won over by the finitists, such as Norman J. Wildberger! This may well turn out to be the case. Also Juergen Schmidhuber has investigated this under the rubrik of speed prior. I should have a chat with Norm about that sometime. Maybe if I see him at a Christmas party. I didn't realise he was a finitist. I knew he has an interesting take on how trigonometry should be done. Cheers Hi Russell, I will look at Juergen's stuff again. ;-) -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 4:06:16 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: The atoms in my brain don't have to know how to read Chinese. They only need to know how to be carbon, nitrogen, oxygen etc. atoms. The complex behaviour which is reading Chinese comes from the interaction of billions of these atoms doing their simple thing. I don't think that is true. The other way around makes just as much sense of not more: Reading Chinese is a simple behavior which drives the behavior of billions of atoms to do a complex interaction. To me, it has to be both bottom-up and top-down. It seems completely arbitrary prejudice to presume one over the other just because we think that we understand the bottom-up so well. Once you can see how it is the case that it must be both bottom-up and top-down at the same time, the next step is to see that there is no possibility for it to be a cause-effect relationship, but rather a dual aspect ontological relation. Nothing is translating the functions of neurons into a Cartesian theater of experience - there is nowhere to put it in the tissue of the brain and there is no evidence of a translation from neural protocols to sensorimotive protocols - they are clearly the same thing. If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we would expect some scientific evidence of this. These words are a scientific evidence of this. The atoms of my brain are being manipulated from the top down. I am directly projecting what I want to say through my mind in such a way that the atoms of my brain facilitate changes in the tissues of my body. Fingers move. Keys click. Evidence would constitute, for example, neurons firing when measurements of transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc. suggest that they should not. Do not neurons fire when I decide to type? What you are expecting would be nothing but another homunculus. If there was some special sauce oozing out of your neurons which looked like...what? pictures of me moving my fingers? How would that explain how I am inside those pictures. The problem is that you are committed to the realism of cells and neurons over thoughts and feelings - even when we understand that our idea of neurons are themselves only thoughts and feelings. This isn't a minor glitch, it is The Grand Canyon. What has to be done is to realize that thoughts and feelings cannot be made out of forms and functions, but rather forms and functions are what thoughts and feelings look like from an exterior, impersonal perspective. The thoughts and feelings are the full-spectrum phenomenon, the forms and functions a narrow band of that spectrum. The narrowness of that band is what maximizes the universality of it. Physics is looking a slice of experience across all phenomena, effectively amputating all of the meaning and perceptual inertia which has accumulated orthogonally to that slice. This is the looong way around when it comes to consciousness as consciousness is all about the longitudinal history of experience, not the spatial-exterior mechanics of the moment. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of neurons and other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it has never been experimentally observed. Why? Nobody except you and John Clark are suggesting any anomalous behavior. This is your blind spot. I don't know if you can see beyond. I am not optimistic. If there were any anomalous behavior of neurons, they would STILL require another meta-level of anomalous behaviors to explain them. Whatever level of description you choose for human consciousness - the brain, the body, the extended body, CNS, neurons, molecules, atoms, quanta... it DOESN'T MATTER AT ALL to the hard problem. There is still NO WAY for us to be inside of those descriptions, and even if there were, there is no conceivable purpose for 'our' being there in the first place. This isn't a cause for despair or giving up, it is a triumph of insight. It is to see that the world is round if you are far away from it, but flat if you are on the surface. You keep trying to say that if the world were round you would see anomalous dips and valleys where the Earth begins to curve. You are not getting it. Reality is exactly what it seems to be, and it is many other things as well. Just because our understanding brings us sophisticated views of what we are from the outside in does not in any way validate the supremacy of the realism which we rely on from the inside out to even make sense of science. If the atoms in my brain were put into a Chinese-reading configuration, either through a lot of work learning the language or through direct manipulation, then I would be able to understand Chinese. It's understandable to assume that, but no I don't
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On 10/21/2012 4:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The atoms in my brain don't have to know how to read Chinese. They only need to know how to be carbon, nitrogen, oxygen etc. atoms. The complex behaviour which is reading Chinese comes from the interaction of billions of these atoms doing their simple thing. I don't think that is true. The other way around makes just as much sense of not more: Reading Chinese is a simple behavior which drives the behavior of billions of atoms to do a complex interaction. To me, it has to be both bottom-up and top-down. It seems completely arbitrary prejudice to presume one over the other just because we think that we understand the bottom-up so well. Once you can see how it is the case that it must be both bottom-up and top-down at the same time, the next step is to see that there is no possibility for it to be a cause-effect relationship, but rather a dual aspect ontological relation. Nothing is translating the functions of neurons into a Cartesian theater of experience - there is nowhere to put it in the tissue of the brain and there is no evidence of a translation from neural protocols to sensorimotive protocols - they are clearly the same thing. If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would constitute, for example, neurons firing when measurements of transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc. suggest that they should not. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of neurons and other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it has never been experimentally observed. Why? Hi Stathis, How would you set up the experiment? How do you control for an effect that may well be ubiquitous? Did you somehow miss the point that consciousness can only be observed in 1p? Why are you so insistent on a 3p of it? If the atoms in my brain were put into a Chinese-reading configuration, either through a lot of work learning the language or through direct manipulation, then I would be able to understand Chinese. It's understandable to assume that, but no I don't think it's like that. You can't transplant a language into a brain instantaneously because there is no personal history of association. Your understanding of language is not a lookup table in space, it is made out of you. It's like if you walked around with Google translator in your brain. You could enter words and phrases and turn them into you language, but you would never know the language first hand. The knowledge would be impersonal - accessible, but not woven into your proprietary sense. I don't mean putting an extra module into the brain, I mean putting the brain directly into the same configuration it is put into by learning the language in the normal way. How might we do that? Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same mind. I'm sorry, but this whole passage is a non sequitur as far as the fading qualia thought experiment goes. You have to explain what you think would happen if part of your brain were replaced with a functional equivalent. There is no functional equivalent. That's what I am saying. Functional equivalence when it comes to a person is a non-sequitur. Not only is every person unique, they are an expression of uniqueness itself. They define uniqueness in a never-before-experienced way. This is a completely new way of understanding consciousness and signal. Not as mechanism, but as animism-mechanism. A functional equivalent would stimulate the remaining neurons the same as the part that is replaced. No such thing. Does any imitation function identically to an original? In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the surrounding neurons in the same way as the original. We can even say that it does this miraculously. Would such a device *necessarily* replicate the consciousness along with the neural impulses, or could the two be separated? Is the brain strictly a classical system? The original paper says this is a computer chip but this is not necessary to make the point: we could just say that it is any device, not being the normal biological neurons. If consciousness is substrate-dependent (as you claim) then the device could do its job of stimulating the neurons normally while lacking or differing in consciousness. Since it stimulates the neurons normally you would behave normally. If you didn't then it would be a miracle, since your muscles would have to contract normally. Do you at least see this point, or do you think that your muscles would do something different? I see the point completely. That's the problem is that you keep trying to explain to me what is obvious, while I am trying to explain to you something much more subtle and sophisticated. I can replace neurons which control my muscles because muscles are among the most distant and replaceable parts
Re: a paper by Karl Svozil
Hi Stephen, Pleasing reading indeed. A bit old. You should easily find what is missing. Answer: the mind-body problem. It is still a form of aristotelian physicalism, even if it has the correct natural numbers ontology. There is still an implicit use of the aristotelian identity thesis between a mind and a body. Comp is finitist for the ontology, as there is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. (or K, S, KK, SK, ... ). Then comp is infinitist, both for the subject, and for the math needed to solve the mind body problem in that setting, as we have to take into account non enumerable set of histories and random oracles, etc. Now there might be relation between the Conway Moore automaton and the Z logics, but I have not yet find one, despite some formal relationship/duality between them (please don't jump on the duality here, as it is another one than the one by Pratt). It is nice that Svozil cites people like Descartes, Rossler, Boscovitch and Finkelstein, and also Galouye, but he was somehow closer to comp when he referred also on Everett, like in his Singapore book. I have often (try to) explained on this list that digital physics is self-contradictory, as it entails comp, but comp, if you keep the 1- indeterminacy in mind, entails ~digital physics, and ~digital theology, a priori. The conscious person is still under the rug, I would say. It is still pre-first person indeterminacy, if you want, but it is also pre-the ASSA approaches, or the general everything approach. Bruno On 21 Oct 2012, at 05:15, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Folks, For your amusement, delight and (hopefully) comment, I present a paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0305048 Computational universes Karl Svozil (Submitted on 12 May 2003 (v1), last revised 14 Apr 2005 (this version, v2)) Suspicions that the world might be some sort of a machine or algorithm existing ``in the mind'' of some symbolic number cruncher have lingered from antiquity. Although popular at times, the most radical forms of this idea never reached mainstream. Modern developments in physics and computer science have lent support to the thesis, but empirical evidence is needed before it can begin to replace our contemporary world view. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi John, On 20 Oct 2012, at 23:16, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, especially in my identification as responding to relations. Now the Self? IT certainly refers to a more sophisticated level of thinking, more so than the average (animalic?) mind. - OR: we have no idea. What WE call 'Self-Ccness' is definitely a human attribute because WE identify it that way. I never talked to a cauliflower to clarify whether she feels like having a self? (In cauliflowerese, of course). My feeling was first that all homeotherm animals have self-consciousness, as they have the ability to dream, easily realted to the ability to build a representation of one self. Then I have enlarged the spectrum up to some spiders and the octopi, just by reading a lot about them, looking video. But this is just a personal appreciation. For the plant, let us say I know nothing, although I supect possible consciousness, related to different scalings. The following theory seems to have consciousness, for different reason (the main one is that it is Turing Universal): x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x But once you add the very powerful induction axioms: which say that if a property F is true for zero, and preserved by the successor operation, then it is true for all natural numbers. That is the infinity of axioms: (F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x), with F(x) being any formula in the arithmetical language (and thus defined with 0, s, +, *), Then you get Löbianity, and this makes it as much conscious as you and me. Indeed, they got a rich theology about which they can develop maximal awareness, and even test it by comparing the physics retrievable by that theology, and the observation and inference on their most probable neighborhoods. Löbianity is the treshold at which any new axiom added will create and enlarge the machine ignorance. It is the utimate modesty treshold. Bruno, Might there be still other axioms (which we are not aware of, or at least do not use) that could lead to even higher states of consciousness than we presently have? Also, it isn't quite clear to me how something needs to be added to Turing universality to expand the capabilities of consciousness, if all consciousness is the result of computation. Thanks, Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote: Well I don't know about you but I don't think my consciousness was there before Evolution figured out how to make brains, I believe this because I can't seem to remember events that were going on during the Precambrian. I've always been a little hazy about what exactly comp meant but I had the general feeling that I sorta agreed with it, but apparently not. You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig, but you don't follow its logical consequences, I guess, this is by not wanting to take seriously the first person and third person distinction, which is the key of the UD argument. You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain, but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic (or in a physical universe if that exists) and realizing that brain state. John, I would also suggest that you read this link, it shows how an infinitely large cosmos leads directly to quantum mechanics due to the observer's inability to self-locate. For someone who believes in both mechanism and platonism, it is the exact scenario platonic programs should find themselves in: http://lesswrong.com/lw/3pg/aguirre_tegmark_layzer_cosmological/ http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066 Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there was no point in reading about things built on top of that From your error you have been obliged to say that in the WM duplication, you will live both at W and at W Yes. yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place Yes. so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person and third person. Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we are identical then my first person experience of looking at you is identical to your first person experience of looking at me, and both our actions are identical for a third person looking at both of us. As long as we're identical it's meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings regardless of how many bodies or brains have been duplicated. Your confusion stems from saying you have been duplicated but then not thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun (like a brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has not been as long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if they were nouns and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused by the fact that if 2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as by forming different memories, then they are no longer identical. And finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not each other any more after those changes both still have a equal right to call themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading these multiple confusions in one step of your proof I saw no point in reading more, and I still don't. By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof. If one of the steps in a proof contains a blunder then it would be irrational to keep reading it. By assuming a physical reality at the start That seems like a pretty damn good place to make an assumption. But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical reality at the start Maybe maybe not, but even if you're right that wouldn't make it any less real; and maybe physical reality didn't even need to emerge because there was no start. If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too, so I'd say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is interlinked with a physical object, in fact it's a downright superb assumption. But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp. It's not false and I don't need to assume it and I haven't theorized it from armchair philosophy either, I can show it's true experimentally. And when theory and experiment come into conflict it is the theory that must submit not the experiment. If I insert drugs into your bloodstream it will change the chemistry of your brain, and when that happens your conscious state will also change. Depending on the drug I can make you happy-sad, friendly-angry, frightened-clam, alert-sleepy, dead-alive, you name it. If your state appears in a far away galaxies [...] Then he will be me and he will remain me until differences between that far away galaxy and this one cause us to change in some way, such as by forming different memories; after that he will no longer be me, although we will still both be John K Clark because John K Clark has been duplicated, the machine duplicated the body of him and the environmental differences caused his consciousness to diverge. As I've said before this is a odd situation but in no way paradoxical. You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig, I keep defending my ideas, comp is your homemade term not mine, I have no use for it. You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain, Yes, consciousness is what the brain does. but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic Then I must remember events that happened in the Precambrian because arithmetic existed even back then, but I don't, I don't remember existing then at all. Now that is a paradox! Therefore one of the assumptions must be wrong, namely that the owner of a brain must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
2012/10/21 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there was no point in reading about things built on top of that From your error you have been obliged to say that in the WM duplication, you will live both at W and at W Yes. yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place Yes. so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person and third person. Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we are identical then my first person experience of looking at you is identical to your first person experience of looking at me, and both our actions are identical for a third person looking at both of us. As long as we're identical it's meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings regardless of how many bodies or brains have been duplicated. Your confusion stems from saying you have been duplicated but then not thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun (like a brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has not been as long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if they were nouns and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused by the fact that if 2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as by forming different memories, then they are no longer identical. And finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not each other any more after those changes both still have a equal right to call themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading these multiple confusions in one step of your proof I saw no point in reading more, and I still don't. By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof. If one of the steps in a proof contains a blunder then it would be irrational to keep reading it. By assuming a physical reality at the start That seems like a pretty damn good place to make an assumption. But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical reality at the start Maybe maybe not, but even if you're right that wouldn't make it any less real; and maybe physical reality didn't even need to emerge because there was no start. If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too, so I'd say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is interlinked with a physical object, in fact it's a downright superb assumption. But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp. It's not false and I don't need to assume it and I haven't theorized it from armchair philosophy either, I can show it's true experimentally. And when theory and experiment come into conflict it is the theory that must submit not the experiment. If I insert drugs into your bloodstream it will change the chemistry of your brain, and when that happens your conscious state will also change. Depending on the drug I can make you happy-sad, friendly-angry, frightened-clam, alert-sleepy, dead-alive, you name it. If your state appears in a far away galaxies [...] Then he will be me and he will remain me until differences between that far away galaxy and this one cause us to change in some way, such as by forming different memories; after that he will no longer be me, although we will still both be John K Clark because John K Clark has been duplicated, the machine duplicated the body of him and the environmental differences caused his consciousness to diverge. As I've said before this is a odd situation but in no way paradoxical. You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig, I keep defending my ideas, comp is your homemade term not mine, I have no use for it. You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain, Yes, consciousness is what the brain does. but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic Then I must remember events that happened in the Precambrian because arithmetic existed even back then, but I don't, I don't remember existing then at all. Now that is a paradox! Therefore one of the assumptions must be wrong, Therefore that shows that you do your best to turn the meaning of everything you read to be able to marvel at yourself... but well, that only fools you. Quentin namely that the owner of a brain must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:55, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think if you converse with a real person, he has to have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write. BRUNO: Not necessarily. Its brain can be in vat, and then I talk to him by giving him a virtual body in a virtual environnement. I can also, in principle talk with only its brain, by sending the message through the hearing peripherical system, or with the cerebral stem, and decoding the nervous path acting on the motor vocal cords. ROGER: I forget what my gripe was. This sounds OK. As to conversing (interacting) with a computer, not sure, but doubtful: for example how could it taste a glass of wine to tell good wine from bad ? BRUNO: I just answered this. Machines becomes better than human in smelling and tasting, but plausibly far from dogs and cats competence. ROGER: OK, but computers can't experience anything, it would be simulated experience. Not arbitrarily available. Same is true of a candidate possible zombie person. BRUNO: Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition it behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only God knows, if you want. ROGER: I claim that it is impossible for any kind of zombie that has no mind to act like a human. IMHO that would be an absurdity, because without a mind you cannot know anything. You would run into walls, for example, and couldn't know what to do in any event. Etc. You couldn't understand language. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 14:09:59 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 18 Oct 2012, at 20:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think you can tell is 1p isn't just a shell by trying to converse with it. If it can converse, it's got a mind of its own. I agree with. It has mind, and its has a soul (but he has no real bodies. I can argue this follows from comp). When you attribute 1p to another, you attribute to a shell to manifest a soul or a first person, a knower. Above a treshold of complexity, or reflexivity, (L?ianity), a universal number get a bigger inside view than what he can ever see outside. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 13:36:13 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 17 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Solipsism is a property of 1p= Firstness = subjectivity OK. And non solipsism is about attributing 1p to others, which needs some independent 3p reality you can bet one, for not being only part of yourself. Be it a God, or a physical universe, or an arithmetical reality. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 09:55:41 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can? know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. ? Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, ? doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on ?onjectures. It can go no further than ?cogito ergo
Re: Code length = probability distribution
This does not implies a reality created by an UD algorithm. It may be a mathematical universe, that is a superset of the computable universes. The measure problem in the UD algorith translates to the problem of the effectivity of the Occam Razor, or the problem of the apparent simplicity of the phisical laws, or, in other words, their low kolmogorov complexity, that solomonov translates in his theory of inductive inference. 2012/10/21 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com Ok I don´t remember the reason why Solomonof reduces the probability of the programs according with the length in is theory of inductive inference. I read it time ago. Solomonoff describes in his paper about inductive inference a more clear and direct solution for the measure problem. but I though that it was somehow ad hoc. I tough time ago about the Solomonof solution to the induction problem, and I though as such: living beings have to find, by evolution, at least partial and approximate inductive solutions in order to survive in their environment. This imposes a restriction on the laws of a local universe with life: It demand a low kolmogorov complexity for the *macroscopical* laws. Otherwise these laws would not be discoverable, there would be no induction possible, so the living beings could not anticipate outcomes and they woul not survive. Solomonoff is a living being in a local universe, so shorther programs are more probable and add more weight for induction. I´m just thinking aloud. I will look again to the solomonof inductive inference. I was a great moment when I read it the first time. 2012/10/20 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 09:16:54PM +0200, Alberto G. Corona wrote: This is not a consequence of the shannon optimum coding , in which the coding size of a symbol is inversely proportional to the logaritm of the frequency of the symbol?. Not quite. Traditional shannon entropy uses probability of a symbol, whereas algorithmic complexity uses the probability of the whole sequence. Only if the symbols are independently distributed are the two the same. Usually, in most messages, the symbols are not id. What is exactly the comp measure problem? A UD generates and executes all programs, many of which are equivalent. So some programs are represented more than others. The COMP measure is a function over all programs that captures this variation in program respresentation. Why should this be unique, independent of UD, or the universal Turing machine it runs on? Because the UD executes every other UD, as well as itself, the measure will be a limit over contributions from all UDs. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
3p(1p) = FALSE, 3p(3p(1p))) = TRUE (?)
SNIP Dear Bruno, WHOEVER: Tell us more about how White Rabbits can appear if there is any restriction of mutual logical consistency between 1p and in any arbitrary recursion of 1p content? BRUNO: We assume comp. If a digital computer processes the activity of your brain in dream state with white rabbits, it means that such a computation with that dream exist in infinitely many local incarnation in the arithmetical (tiny, Turing universal) reality. If you do a physical experience, the hallucination that all goes weird at that moment exists also, in arithmetic. The measure problem consists in justifying from consistency, self-reference, universal numbers, their rarity, that is why apparent special universal (Turing) laws prevails (and this keeping in mind the 1p, the 1p-indeterminacy, the 3p relative distinctions, etc.) ROGER: IMHO In either case, the dream or hallucination, I maintain that a computer cannot directly share your experience or even have an experience period. Or to use notation, 3p(1p) is impossible. That is I think the solipsism problem. If I have it right, 3p(1p) = FALSE However, my report of the dream would be 3p(1p), and a computer can in the 3p sense, understand my 3p(1p). That is to say, 3p(3p(1p))) = TRUE. Note that I am not at all proficient regarding logic. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A test for solipsism
WHOEVER: Hi Bruno and Roger, What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie from a a person that does not see the world external to it as anything other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact? BRUNO: Nobody can distinguish a p-zombie from a human, even if that human is solipsist, even a very special sort of solipsist like the one you describe. Bruno ROGER: Previously I deduced that a p-zombie (or any zombie without a brain) would be an absurdity (not be able, as required, to act as a real person) because any being without a brain could not know anything. It would not know what to do in any event -- and as far as conversing with it, it could not understand language. You'd also find it bumping into walls. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Enumeration Without Representation
I propose this simple, counter-COMP truth: Without something to enumerate, numbers are meaningless. Two plus two does not 'equal' anything without a fairly extensive list of a priori meta-artihmetic conditions. As far as I can tell, for two plus two to equal something, there must be: Cause and effect Logic An experience of counting A rigid reference body of equivalences Function Functional phase spaces which are in some sense independent of the reference body A semiotic phase locking function which relates specific functions to the supreme ultimate reference body Something which experiences the function as meaningful Experience A capacity for participation in experience A capacity to direct and control experience, i.e. to cause some function to be enacted as a consequence of another Reliable memory to switch between functions Storage for isolating currently enacted functions from accumulations of sets of tacit functional results. Lots of things. In short, in order to have computation, you need... a computer. The items on this list all supervene on sense. The capacity to detect and project signal. Computation is a way of using signals to refer to other signals - figuratively. They are figures. Quantification is a way of bundling things with other things, but virtually, not literally. There is no actual bundling unless there is some *thing* doing the computing that some *thing* cares about. Does a thing have to be a material object? Our imagination suggests that it does not, although the capacity to imagine is associated with living cells. We have no experience however with things which are neither physical objects, subjective experiences, or subjective experiences of physical instruments interacting with physical objects. There is no experience of math existing ab initio. This correlates with our cosmological investigations as well. Contrary to what we should expect from an inevitable multiverse of every possible combination of universes, our universe exhibits a distinct lack of unexplained chaos. It is one thing to expect that we would naturally find ourselves in one of the many universes which supports our existence, but it is another thing to extend that to the point that we find ourselves also in one of the universes which makes sense wherever we look, all of the time. If anything, the exhaustively granular orderliness of the cosmos defies the imagination, with each particle of sand requiring a team of trillions of lucky monkeys to have typed out the right string of ontological meta-characters, while at the same time synchronizing effortlessly with global, local, and regional harmonies of order. If all of this happens without sense, without anything making sense, then it seems infinitely unlikely that beings such as ourselves who require sense to navigate our own lives should exist, and exist in such a natural and seamless way to the rest of the unconscious universal mechanism. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/r0m1ab6MptYJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Continuous Game of Life
Hi Bruno Marchal 1p is to know by acquaintance (only possible to humans). I conjecture that any statement pertaining to humans containing 1p is TRUE. 3p is to know by description (works for both humans and computers). I believe that any statement pertaining to computers containing 1p is FALSE. Consciousness would be to know that you are conscious, or for a real person, 1p(1p) = TRUE and saying that he is conscious to others would be 3p(1p) = TRUE or even (3p(1p(1p))) = TRUE But a computer cannot experience anything (is blocked from 1p), or for a computer, 3p (1p) = FALSE (or any statement containing 1p) but 3p(3p) = TRUE (or any proposition not containing 1p = TRUE) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-21, 09:56:39 Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life Hi John, On 20 Oct 2012, at 23:16, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, especially in my identification as responding to relations. Now the Self? IT certainly refers to a more sophisticated level of thinking, more so than the average (animalic?) mind. - OR: we have no idea. What WE call 'Self-Ccness' is definitely a human attribute because WE identify it that way. I never talked to a cauliflower to clarify whether she feels like having a self? (In cauliflowerese, of course). My feeling was first that all homeotherm animals have self-consciousness, as they have the ability to dream, easily realted to the ability to build a representation of one self. Then I have enlarged the spectrum up to some spiders and the octopi, just by reading a lot about them, looking video. But this is just a personal appreciation. For the plant, let us say I know nothing, although I supect possible consciousness, related to different scalings. The following theory seems to have consciousness, for different reason (the main one is that it is Turing Universal): x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x But once you add the very powerful induction axioms: which say that if a property F is true for zero, and preserved by the successor operation, then it is true for all natural numbers. That is the infinity of axioms: (F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x), with F(x) being any formula in the arithmetical language (and thus defined with 0, s, +, *), Then you get L?ianity, and this makes it as much conscious as you and me. Indeed, they got a rich theology about which they can develop maximal awareness, and even test it by comparing the physics retrievable by that theology, and the observation and inference on their most probable neighborhoods. L?ianity is the treshold at which any new axiom added will create and enlarge the machine ignorance. It is the utimate modesty treshold. Bruno On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:19, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal IMHO all life must have some degree of consciousness or it cannot perceive its environment. Are you sure? Would you say that the plants are conscious? I do think so, but I am not sure they have self-consciousness. Self-consciousness accelerates the information treatment, and might come from the need of this for the self-movie living creature having some important mass. all life is a very fuzzy notion. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 10:13:37 Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life On 16 Oct 2012, at 18:37, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb wrote: If consciousness doesn't do anything then Evolution can't see it, so how and why did Evolution produce it? The fact that you have no answer to this means your ideas are fatally flawed. I don't see this as a *fatal* flaw. Evolution, as you've noted, is not a paradigm of efficient design. Consciousness might just be a side-effect But that's exactly what I've been saying for months, unless Darwin was dead wrong consciousness must be a side effect of intelligence, so a intelligent computer must be a conscious computer. And I don't think Darwin was dead wrong. Darwin does not need to be wrong. Consciousness role can be deeper, in the evolution/selection of the laws of physics from the coherent dreams (computations from the 1p view) in arithmetic. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
Re: Re: Re: Measurability is not a condition of reality.
Yes, Hi Alberto G. Corona Yes, they are inconsistent. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-20, 14:55:08 Subject: Re: Measurability is not a condition of reality. Then the measure addict people believe in a lot of things that are not measurable: they believe in an external reality . They believe in a certain pitagoric cult to measurement, that is not measurable. They believe that their perception is transparent, and that his mind play no role, because it translates a complete objective and accurate view of reality. ?herefore the mind and his relation with matter is not worth to study. They believe in things not measurable, like countries, specially their own (which they would laugh If i say that their country is ? bunch of atoms. Apparently their reductionism is selective).? They believe in their loved ones that are dead (they do not exist according with their point of view, but they sometimes talk with them, dedicate books to them and act like if they are observing them. They bet, trust and believe in persons, despite the fact that they are nor measurable.. They believe in their leaders. They believe in some scientist that are liars. but they believe them without making measures and experiments for themselves. It seems tha almost all that they believe derives from a sense of authority, like any other persom. And they do it well on believing in these nor measurable things, because if they doint believe, they would be paralized and will kill someone or kill themselves. 2012/10/20 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona I have no problem with that, the problem I have is that I believe that nonphysical things (things, like Descartes' mind, not extended in space) like spirit, truly exist. ?ut to materialists, that's nonsense, because being inextended it can't be measured and so doesn't exist. And life is just a unique form of matter, so can be created. ?nd what is man but a bunch of atoms ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-20, 08:48:39 Subject: Re: Re: A test for solipsism Roger Different Qualia are a result fo different phisical effect in the senses. So a machine does not need to have qualia to distinguish between phisical effectds. It only need sensors that distinguish between them. A sensor can detect a red light and the attached computer can stop a car. With no problems.? http://www.gizmag.com/mercedes-benz-smart-stop-system/13122/ 2012/10/20 Roger Clough Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red is what the body gives you, the sensation of red is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind also can recall past sensations of red to compare it with and give it a name red, which a real person can identify as eg a red traffic light and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing the fact that red and green lights are in different positions). That would be a test of zombieness. ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes about the p-zombie. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you. But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists, without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is no solipsist. There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY
The p-zombie is a strawman argument
Hi Stathis, Sorry, my previous email was accidentally sent too early. You said that if a candidate person behaves as if he has a mind, then he does. That may be OK, but if a person does NOT have a mind, ( is a zombie), then my position is that in fact he cannot behave as one with a mind would. For example, he could not converse with you. He could not tell you where or when he was born, because having no mind, he has no memory, and cannot understand language at all. So the p-zombie definition is an impossibility, and it is a strawman argument, to begin with. - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-21, 03:37:19 Subject: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 11:04 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a realist. Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person does not need to have a mind. But that's in his definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic. Not really, he claims that zombies do not exist and if an entity (human, computer, whatever) behaves as if it has a mind, then it does have a mind. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 3:39:11 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote: BRUNO: Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition it behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only God knows, if you want. ROGER: I claim that it is impossible for any kind of zombie that has no mind to act like a human. IMHO that would be an absurdity, because without a mind you cannot know anything. You would run into walls, for example, and couldn't know what to do in any event. Etc. You couldn't understand language. Roger I agree that your intuition is right - a philosophical zombie cannot exist in reality, but not for the reasons you are coming up with. Anything can be programmed to act like a human in some level of description. A scarecrow may act like a human in the eyes of a crow - well enough that it might be less likely to land nearby. You can make robots which won't run into walls or chatbots which respond to some range of vocabulary and sentence construction. The idea behind philosophical zombies is that we assume that there is nothing stopping us in theory from assembling all of the functions of a human being as a single machine, and that such a machine, it is thought, will either have the some kind of human-like experience or else it would have to have no experience. The absent qualia, fading qualia paper is about a thought experiment which tries to take the latter scenario seriously from the point of view of a person who is having their brain gradually taken over by these substitute sub-brain functional units. Would they see blue as being less and less blue as more of their brain is replaced, or would blue just suddenly disappear at some point? Each one seems absurd given that the sum of the remaining brain functions plus the sum of the replaced brain functions, must, by definition of the thought experiment, equal no change in observed behavior. This is my response to this thought experiment to Stathis: *Stathis: In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the * *surrounding neurons in the same way as the original.* Craig: Then the thought experiment is garbage from the start. It begs the question. Why not just say we can have an imitation human being that stimulates the surrounding human beings in the same way as the original? Ta-da! That makes it easy. Now all we need to do is make a human being that stimulates their social matrix in the same way as the original and we have perfect AI without messing with neurons or brains at all. Just make a whole person out of person stuff - like as a thought experiment suppose there is some stuff X which makes things that human beings think is another human being. Like marzipan. We can put the right pheromones in it and dress it up nice, and according to the thought experiment, let’s say that works. You aren’t allowed to deny this because then you don’t understand the thought experiment, see? Don’t you get it? You have to accept this flawed pretext to have a discussion that I will engage in now. See how it works? Now we can talk for six or eight months about how human marzipan is inevitable because it wouldn’t make sense if you replaced a city gradually with marzipan people that New York would gradually fade into less of a New York or that New York becomes suddenly absent. It’s a fallacy. The premise screws up the result. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/vj3N3gQoVo8J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
a mistake -- and light at the end of the tunnel for comp
Hi everything-list I said that any statement for a computer containing 1p would be FALSE. That is not exactly true. A computer can deal with any 3p operator on the outside, meaning it has already been converted to a descriptive (3p) form. Suppose I tell the computer (or anybody else) that I had a dream about rabbits. Of course I could be lying, but for now assume that I tell the computer the truth. so either to others or to the computer 3p(1p) is TRUE, although 3p(1p) is always distorted. Maybe the rabbits were dancing and I forgot to say that. One can never guarantee that 3p(1p) is accurate except to oneself. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The p-zombie is a strawman argument
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 7:37 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stathis, Sorry, my previous email was accidentally sent too early. You said that if a candidate person behaves as if he has a mind, then he does. That may be OK, but if a person does NOT have a mind, ( is a zombie), then my position is that in fact he cannot behave as one with a mind would. For example, he could not converse with you. He could not tell you where or when he was born, because having no mind, he has no memory, and cannot understand language at all. So the p-zombie definition is an impossibility, and it is a strawman argument, to begin with. Yes, that's Dennett's position. He has called the idea of zombies an embarrassment to philosophy. So do you agree that if a computer could converse with you like a human then it would have a mind? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: AGI
Bruno: my apologies for this late late reply, I am slow to decipher the
listpost from the daily inundation of Roger-stuff so I miss some more
relevant list-post sometimes.
You wrote about the U-M:
*...an entity capable of computing all partial computable functions...*
**
I would be cautios with all since we know only SOME.
I plead ignorance to the difference of a Loeb and another type(?) Univ.
Machine. Is the Leobian restricted? In what sense? BTW: What is
'universal'?
I would think twice to deem something as
*... it might be intrinsically complex...*
**
*EVERYTHING* is intrinsically (too!) complex. We just take simplified
versions - adjusted to OUR mindful capabilities.
*intelligence vs competence?*
**
The 'oldies' (from yesterday back to the Greeks/Indians etc.) were
'competent' in the actual (then) inventory of the knowledge base of their
time. That gave their 'intelligence' (the way I defined it) so: no
controversy.
*Bohm* discussed with Krishnamurty before his association in London with
Hiley. The posthumous book the latter wrote in their combined(?) authorship
includes Bohm's earlier physical stances (~1952) even before his Brazilian
escape.
I do not accuse Hiley of improperness, but he left out all the
Krishnamurtian mystique embraced by Bohm. Granted: Bohm taught later
advanced physical science in London but as far as I know never went back on
his interim (call it: metaphysical?) philosophy.
John M
On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 2:19 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
John,
On 09 Oct 2012, at 22:22, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno,
examples are not identifiction. I was referring to (your?) lack of
detailed description what the universal machine consists of and how it
functions (maybe: beyond what we know - ha ha). A comprehensive ID. Your
lot of examples rather denies that you have one.
A universal machine is any entity capable of computing all partial
computable functions. There are many, and for many we can prove that they
are universal machine. For many we can't prove that, or it might be
intrinsically complex to do so.
A Löbian machine is a universal machine which knows, in a weak technical
precise sense, that they are universal.
Same remark as above, we can prove that some machine are Löbian, but we
might not been able to recognize all those who are.
And:
'if it is enough FOR YOU to consider them, it may not be enough for me. I
don't really know HOW conscious I am.
Nor do I. Nor do they, when you listened to them, taking into account
their silence.
I like your counter-point in competence and intelligence.
I identified the wisdom (maybe it should read: the intelligence) of the
oldies as not 'disturbed' by too many factual(?) known circumstances -
maybe it is competence.
You meant intelligence? I would agree.
You know I prefer the Bohm who discuss with Krishnamurti, than the Bohm
(the same person to be sure) who believes in quantum hidden variables.
To include our inventory accumulated over the millennia as impediment
('blinded by').
Above the Löbian treshold, the machine understands that, the more she
know, the more she is ignorant.
Knowledge is only a lantern on a very big unknown. The more light you put
on it, the bigger it seems.
But we can ask question (= develop theories). And we can have experiences.
Above the Löbian treshold, the machine understands that the more she can
be intelligent, the more she can be stupid.
And that competence is quite relative, but can be magnified uncomputably,
but also (alas) unpredictably, with many simple heuristics, like:
- tolerate errors,
- work in union,
- encourage changes of mind,
etc. (By results of Case and Smith, Blum and Blum, Gold, Putnam, etc.).
reference in the biblio of conscience et mécanisme, in my url.
Bruno
John M
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 11:01 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Oct 2012, at 22:07, John Mikes wrote:
Dear Richard, I think the lengthy text is Ben's article in response to
D. Deutsch.
Sometimes I was erring in the belief that it is YOUR text, but no.
Thanks for copying.
It is too long and too little organized for me to keep up with
ramifications prima vista.
What I extracted from it are some remarks I will try to communicate to
Ben (a longtime e-mail friend) as well.
I have my (agnostically derived) version of intelligence: the capability
of reading 'inter'
lines (words/meanings). Apart from such human distinction: to realize
the 'essence' of relations beyond vocabulary, or 'physical science'
definitions.
Such content is not provided in our practical computing machines
(although Bruno trans-leaps such barriers with his (Löb's) universal
machine unidentified).
Unidentified?I give a lot of examples: PA, ZF, John Mikes, me, and
the octopus.
In some sense they succeed enough the mirror test. That's enough for me
to consider them, well, not just conscious, but as conscious as me, and you.
The
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there was no point in reading about things built on top of that From your error you have been obliged to say that in the WM duplication, you will live both at W and at W Yes. yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place Yes. so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person and third person. Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we are identical then my first person experience of looking at you is identical to your first person experience of looking at me, and both our actions are identical for a third person looking at both of us. As long as we're identical it's meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings regardless of how many bodies or brains have been duplicated. Your confusion stems from saying you have been duplicated but then not thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun (like a brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has not been as long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if they were nouns and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused by the fact that if 2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as by forming different memories, then they are no longer identical. And finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not each other any more after those changes both still have a equal right to call themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading these multiple confusions in one step of your proof I saw no point in reading more, and I still don't. John, I think you are missing something. It is a problem that I noticed after watching the movie The Prestige and it eventually led me to join this list. Unless you consider yourself to be only a single momentary atom of thought, you probably believe there is some stream of thoughts/consciousness that you identify with. You further believe that these thoughts and consciousness are produced by some activity of your brain. Unlike Craig, you believe that whatever horrible injury you suffered, even if every atom in your body were separated from every other atom, in principle you could be put back together, and if the atoms are put back just right, you will be removed and alive and well, and conscious again. Further, you probably believe it doesn't matter if we even re-use the same atoms or not, since atoms of the same elements and isotopes are functionally equivalent. We could take apart your current atoms, then put you back together with atoms from a different pile and your consciousness would continue right where it left off (from before you were obliterated). It would be as if a simulation of your brain were running on a VM, we paused the VM, moved it to a different physical computer and then resumed it. From your perspective inside, there was no interruption, yet your physical incarnation and location has changed. Assuming you are with me so far, an interesting question emerges: what happens to your consciousness when duplicated? Either an atom for atom replica of yourself is created in two places or your VM image which contains your brain emulation is copied to two different computers while paused, and then both are resumed. Initially, the sensory input to the two duplicates could be the same, and in a sense they are still the same mind, just with two instances, but then something interesting happens once different input is fed to the two instances: they split. You could say they split in the same sense as when someone opens the steel box to see whether the cat is alive or dead. All the splitting in quantum mechanics may be the result of our infinite instances discovering/learning different things about our infinite environments. Jason By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof. If one of the steps in a proof contains a blunder then it would be irrational to keep reading it. By assuming a physical reality at the start That seems like a pretty damn good place to make an assumption. But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical reality at the start Maybe maybe not, but even if you're right that wouldn't make it any less real; and maybe physical reality didn't even need to emerge because there was no start. If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too, so I'd say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is interlinked with a physical object, in fact it's a downright superb assumption. But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp. It's not false and I don't need to assume it and I
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would constitute, for example, neurons firing when measurements of transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc. suggest that they should not. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of neurons and other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it has never been experimentally observed. Why? Hi Stathis, How would you set up the experiment? How do you control for an effect that may well be ubiquitous? Did you somehow miss the point that consciousness can only be observed in 1p? Why are you so insistent on a 3p of it? A top-down effect of consciousness on matter could be inferred if miraculous events were observed in neurophysiology research. The consciousness itself cannot be directly observed. I don't mean putting an extra module into the brain, I mean putting the brain directly into the same configuration it is put into by learning the language in the normal way. How might we do that? Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same mind. When you learn something, your brain physically changes. After a year studying Chinese it goes from configuration SPK-E to configuration SPK-E+C. If your brain were put directly into configuration SPK-E+C then you would know Chinese and have a false memory of the year of learning it. In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the surrounding neurons in the same way as the original. We can even say that it does this miraculously. Would such a device *necessarily* replicate the consciousness along with the neural impulses, or could the two be separated? Is the brain strictly a classical system? No, although the consensus appears to be that quantum effects are not significant in its functioning. In any case, this does not invalidate functionalism. As I said, technical problems with computers are not relevant to the argument. The implant is just a device that has the correct timing of neural impulses. Would it necessarily preserve consciousness? Let's see. If I ingest psychoactive substances, there is a 1p observable effect Is this a circumstance that is different in kind from that device? The psychoactive substances cause a physical change in your brain and thereby also a psychological change. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The p-zombie is a strawman argument
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 5:21:53 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: Yes, that's Dennett's position. He has called the idea of zombies an embarrassment to philosophy. So do you agree that if a computer could converse with you like a human then it would have a mind? A movie can converse with you like a human if you are in the right state of mind. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ahhORbganNQJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/21/2012 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would constitute, for example, neurons firing when measurements of transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc. suggest that they should not. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of neurons and other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it has never been experimentally observed. Why? Hi Stathis, How would you set up the experiment? How do you control for an effect that may well be ubiquitous? Did you somehow miss the point that consciousness can only be observed in 1p? Why are you so insistent on a 3p of it? A top-down effect of consciousness on matter could be inferred if miraculous events were observed in neurophysiology research. The consciousness itself cannot be directly observed. Hi Stathis, This would be true only if consciousness is separate from matter, such as in Descartes failed theory of substance dualism. In the dual aspect theory that I am arguing for, there would never be any miracles that would contradict physical law. At most there would be statistical deviations from classical predictions. Check out http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf for details. My support for this theory and not materialism follows from materialism demonstrated inability to account for 1p. Dual aspect monism has 1p built in from first principles. BTW, I don't use the term dualism any more as what I am advocating seems to be too easily confused with the failed version. I don't mean putting an extra module into the brain, I mean putting the brain directly into the same configuration it is put into by learning the language in the normal way. How might we do that? Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same mind. When you learn something, your brain physically changes. After a year studying Chinese it goes from configuration SPK-E to configuration SPK-E+C. If your brain were put directly into configuration SPK-E+C then you would know Chinese and have a false memory of the year of learning it. Ah, but is that change, from SPK-E to SPK-E+C, one that is numerable strictly in terms of a number of neurons changed? No. I would conjecture that it is a computational problem that is at least NP-hard. My reasoning is that if the change where emulable by a computation X *and* that X could also could be used to solve a P-hard problem, then there should exist an algorithm that could easily translate any statement in one language into another *and* finding that algorithm should require only some polynomial quantity of resources (relative to the number of possible algorithms). It should be easy to show that this is not the case. I strongly believe that computational complexity plays a huge role in many aspects of the hard problem of consciousness and that the Platonic approach to computer science is obscuring solutions as it is blind to questions of resource availability and distribution. In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the surrounding neurons in the same way as the original. We can even say that it does this miraculously. Would such a device *necessarily* replicate the consciousness along with the neural impulses, or could the two be separated? Is the brain strictly a classical system? No, although the consensus appears to be that quantum effects are not significant in its functioning. In any case, this does not invalidate functionalism. Well, I don't follow the crowd. I agree that functionalist is not dependent on the type of physics of the system, but there is an issue of functional closure that must be met in my conjecture; there has to be some way for the system (that supports the conscious capacity) to be closed under the transformation involved. As I said, technical problems with computers are not relevant to the argument. The implant is just a device that has the correct timing of neural impulses. Would it necessarily preserve consciousness? Let's see. If I ingest psychoactive substances, there is a 1p observable effect Is this a circumstance that is different in kind from that device? The psychoactive substances cause a physical change in your brain and thereby also a psychological change. Of course. As I see it, there is no brain change without a mind change and vice versa. The mind and brain are dual, as Boolean algebras and topological spaces are dual, the relation is an isomorphism between structures that have oppositely directed arrows of transformation. The math is very straight forward... People just have a hard time understanding the idea that all of matter is some form of topological space and there is no known calculus of variations for Boolean algebras (no one is looking for it, except for me, that
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?
On 10/21/2012 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And their very specific correlation with the physical brain states of sleep. Of course. But this is taken into account in the theoretical reasoning where we suppose the brain state are obtained by (immaterial) machine doing the computation at the right level. We cannot know our right level, so we are not trying to build an artificial brain. The measure problem comes from the fact that, whatever the level is, the physics has to be given by a measure on computations. That is enough to already derive the logic of the observable, and that a step toward solving the measure problem, although some other possible manner might exist. But I think that implies that consciousness (at least human like consciousness) cannot exist without the physics; that materialism is not optional. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Code length = probability distribution
On 10/21/2012 3:48 AM, Russell Standish wrote: I worry a bit about the use of the word all in your remark. All is too big, usually, to have a single constructable measure! Why not consider some large enough but finite collections of programs, such as what would be captured by the idea of an equivalence class of programs that satisfy some arbitrary parameters (such as solving a finite NP-hard problem) given some large but finite quantity of resources? Of course this goes against the grain of Bruno's theology, but maybe that is what it required to solve the measure problem.:-) I find myself being won over by the finitists, such as Norman J. Wildberger! This may well turn out to be the case. Also Juergen Schmidhuber has investigated this under the rubrik of speed prior. Hi Rusell, How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
