date:20131015



On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:39, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/15/2013 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or  
generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all  
the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the  
computable is rare and exceptional.


Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno  
was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by  
"the" or "a" machine?


We assume the arithmetical truth. In particular we assume that all  
closed formula written in the language of arithmetic (and thus  
using logical symbol + the symbol 0, s (+1), + and *) are all  
either true or false, independently of us.


From this we cannot prove that matter exists, or not, but we can  
prove that the average universal numbers will (correctly) believe  
in matter (but it will not know that it is correct).


That's not at all clear to me.  A universal number encodes proofs -  
is that what you mean by it believes something?


Yes. (I am thinking about the Löbian universal numbers).




But how is this something identified at 'matter'?


It should follow from the step seven.








So, if you have no problem in believing propositions like "there is  
no biggest prime number" are true independently of me and you, and  
the universe, then you can understand that the proposition  
asserting the existence of (infinitely many) computations in which  
you believe reading my current post, is also true independently of  
us.


The appearance of matter emerges from the FPI that the machines  
cannot avoid in the arithmetical truth.


Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical  
truth (by Gödel).





And I thought the generalized brain did the computations,


Only the computations associated to your mind.


not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that "all the  
rest" which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed.  
Bruno is constantly confusing me.


I guess you missed the step seven of the UDA, and are perhaps not  
aware that arithmetical truth is incredibly big, *much* bigger than  
what any computer can generate or compute.


Then my, or your, mind is associated to *all* computations going  
through your actual state of mind,


That sounds like an uncomputable totality.



No, by virtue of the closure of the set of partial (includes the total  
functions) computable functions for diagonalization, or equivalently,  
by the existence of universal machines/numbers, that totality is  
computable/enumerable, and that is why we do have a UD.
What happens is that most interesting subset will be uncomputable, so  
that the FPI entails a priori the non computability of *some* physical  
things (which can be only the apparent collapse of the wave, but it  
could be more than that too: open problem).


Bruno








Brent

and below your substitution level there are infinitely many such  
computations. They all exist in arithmetic, and the FPI glues them,  
in a non computable way, in possible long and deep physical  
histories.


Bruno





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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics



On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/15/2013 3:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist 
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized  
brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is  
not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare  
and exceptional.


Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno  
was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by  
"the" or "a" machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the  
computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show  
that "all the rest" which presumably includes energy and matter is  
not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me.



Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by  
the sum


What does "sum" mean?  And how does is constitute a piece of matter?

of the infinity of computations going through your state as it  
is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not  
"computed".


But that's not a definition.  It's saying the piece of matter is  
*constituted* by an infinity of computations.



That is a misleading phrasing. The matter is not constituted of  
anything. It is an appearance coming from the FPI on all computations.



But what associates the computations to a piece of matter that we  
*define* ostensively?


The FPI.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: For John Clark




On Oct 15, 2013, at 11:09 PM, LizR  wrote:


On 16 October 2013 16:58, Jason Resch  wrote:

On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR  wrote:


On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch  wrote:
"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein  
and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and  
deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is  
probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for  
observers to make any predictions better than the limitations  
imposed by the uncertainty principle."


So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully  
deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to  
probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective  
observer's first person view.  Even an observer who had complete  
knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its  
entire evolution could not predict their next experience.


Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will  
have all the available experiences.


That's the third person view. The view of the wavefunction's  
evolution.  That is completely predictible.


Whether or not you will measure the electron to be spin up or spin  
down you can't predict in advance.  That is because you experience  
both but neither experiences it as being both spin up and spin down.


I don't see how that's different from what I said - "afterwards,  
they will feel that they've experienced a probablistic event."




I agree with the text above. The part I was contesting was where you  
said that one can predict their next subjective experience.


When you say that one could answer they will experience all  
perspectives, then you are no longer speaking of a subjective  
experience.


Jason


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Re: For John Clark

On 16 October 2013 16:58, Jason Resch  wrote:

>
> On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> "Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and
>> Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and
>> yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense*that 
>> there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the
>> limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle."
>>
>> So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic
>> from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic
>> (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person
>> view.  Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic
>> wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict
>> their next experience.
>>
>> Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have *all
> * the available experiences.
>
>
> That's the third person view. The view of the wavefunction's evolution.
>  That is completely predictible.
>
> Whether or not you will measure the electron to be spin up or spin down
> you can't predict in advance.  That is because you experience both but
> neither experiences it as being both spin up and spin down.
>
> I don't see how that's different from what I said - "*afterwards*, they
will feel that they've experienced a probablistic event."

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Re: For John Clark




On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR  wrote:


On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch  wrote:
"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and  
Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and  
deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is  
probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers  
to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the  
uncertainty principle."


So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully  
deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to  
probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective  
observer's first person view.  Even an observer who had complete  
knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its  
entire evolution could not predict their next experience.


Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have  
all the available experiences.


That's the third person view. The view of the wavefunction's  
evolution.  That is completely predictible.


Whether or not you will measure the electron to be spin up or spin  
down you can't predict in advance.  That is because you experience  
both but neither experiences it as being both spin up and spin down.



It's only after the measurement has been made that there is an  
appearance of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has  
experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from  
the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer,  
both before and after the measurement.


(However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???)


Apparently not.  John refuses to accept that a fully deterministic  
process can lead to the subjective appearance of randomness when  
duplication is involved. (the third step of the UDA)


Jason



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Re: For John Clark

On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch  wrote:

> "Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr,
> since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on
> the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense* that
> there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the
> limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle."
>
> So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic
> from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic
> (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person
> view.  Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic
> wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict
> their next experience.
>
> Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have *all*the 
> available experiences. It's only after the measurement has been made
that there is an *appearance* of probability, with each duplicate feeling
that he has experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises
from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both
before and after the measurement.

(However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???)

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For John Clark

(And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it comes
to duplication.)

I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter:


"I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the dilemma,
since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the
conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic
postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state
during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory,
only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will
appear to be the case for observers."

He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of observers,
despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying:

"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr,
since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on
the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense* that there
is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations
imposed by the uncertainty principle."

So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic
from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic
(random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person
view.  Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic
wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict
their next experience.


Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists,
including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene
Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College:

Everett:
Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an observer
making a sequence of results of observations on a number of, let's say,
originally identical object systems. At the end of this sequence there is a
large superposition of states, each element of which contains the observer
as having recorded a particular definite sequence of the results of
observation. I identify a single element as what we think of as an
experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert that all of the
elements simultaneously coexist.  In any single element of the final
superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which
describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently
random sequence of events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events
in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large
series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost
all of the elements of the final supeprosition the frequencies of the
results of measurements will be in accord with what one predicts from the
ordinary picture of quantum mechanics. That is very briefly it.


Podolsky: Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or parallel
worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much.

Everett: Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition principle that each
separate element of the superposition will obey the same laws independent
of the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why insist on having
certain selection of one of the elements as being real and all of the
others somehow mysteriously vanishing?

Furry: This means that each of us, you see, exists on a great many sheets
or versions and it's only on this one right here that you have any
particular remembrance of the past. In some other ones we perhaps didn't
come here to Cincinnati.

Everett: We simply do away with the reduction of the wave packet.

Poldolsky: It's certainly consistent as far as we have heard it.

Everett: All of the consistency of ordinary physics is preserved by the
correlation structure of this state.

Podolsky: It looks like we would have a non-denumberable infinity of worlds.

Everett: Yes.

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 7:30 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:59:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Oct 15, 2013, at 7:26 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, October 14, 2013 4:37:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:

>
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 10:54 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:08:01 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 4:52 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> It's not that computers can't do what humans do, it's that they
> can't experience anything. Mozart could dig a hole as well as compose
> music, but that doesn't mean that a backhoe with a player piano on it 
> is
> Mozart. It's a much deeper problem with how machines are 
> conceptualized
> that has nothing at all to do with humans.
>

 So you think "strong AI" is wrong. OK. But why can't computers
 experience anything, in principle, given that people can, and assuming
 people are complicated machines?



>>> I think Craig would say he does think computers (and many/all other
>>> things) do experience something,
>>>
>>
>> You're half right. I would say:
>>
>> 1. All experiences correspond to some natural thing.
>> 2. Not all things are natural things. Bugs Bunny has no independent
>> experience, and neither does Pinocchio.
>> 3. Computers are made of natural things but, like all machines, are
>> ultimately assembled unnaturally.
>> 4. The natural things that machines are made of would have to be very
>> low level, i.e., not gears but the molecules that make up the gears.
>>
>> Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be
>> the only natural things which an experience would be associated with. 
>> They
>> don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an
>> experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic
>> conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any
>> particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every 
>> atom
>> of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some
>> radically different time scale from ours.
>>
>> It's not really important - the main thing is to see how there is no
>> substitute for experience and a machine which is assembled from unrelated
>> parts has no experience and cannot gain new experience in an alien 
>> context.
>>
>> I think that a machine (or any inanimate object or symbol) can also
>> serve as a vehicle for synchronicity. That's a completely different thing
>> because it is the super-personal, holistic end of the sensible spectrum,
>> not the sub-personal, granular end. The creepiness of a ventriloquist 
>> dummy
>> is in our imagination, but that too is 'real' in an absolute sense. If 
>> your
>> life takes you on a path which tempts you to believe that machines are
>> conscious, then the super-personal lensing of your life will stack the 
>> deck
>> just enough to let you jump to those conclusions. It's what we would call
>> supernatural or coincidental, depending on which lens we use to define
>> it..  http://s33light.org/post/
>> **62173**912616  (Don't you want to have a body?)
>>
>
> After reading this (  
> http://marshallbrain.com/**dis**card1.htm ) I am not so sure...
>
>
>>
>>
>>>  just that it is necessarily different from what we experience. The
>>> reason for this has something to do with our history as biological
>>> organisms (according to his theory).
>>>
>>
>> Right, although not necessarily just biological history, it could be
>> chemical too. We may have branched off from anything that could be made
>> into a useful machine (servant to alien agendas) long before life on 
>> Earth.
>>
>>
> What if humanity left behind a nano-technology that eventually evolved
> into mechanical organisms like dogs and fish, would they have animal like
> experiences despite that they descended from "unnatural" things?
>

 The thing that makes sense to me is that the richness of sensation and
 intention are inversely proportionate to the degree to which a phenomenon
 can be controlled from the outside. If we put nano-tech extensions on some
 living organism, then sure, the organism could learn how to use those
 extensions and evolve a symbiotic

Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On 16 October 2013 14:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:52:48 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> Sorry I should have added... your statement "A human body may be a
>> machine" contradicts "a machine does not build itself from a single
>> reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get
>> bored or tired" - unless a human being is not the same thing as a human
>> body, of course. Is that the point?
>>
>
> Right, a human body is not the same thing as a human being. A human body
> is still a body after the human ceases being. Not because there is an
> immaterial spirit, but because the entire universe is a nested experience
> and the body is more about experiences on the cellular and molecular level
> than it is about individual lifetimes.
>

Now you've lost me. Is a "nested experience" anything like Max Tegmark's
"self-aware subsystems" ?

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On 16 October 2013 14:05, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:51:17 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that
>>> does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in.
>>> That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself
>>> from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing,
>>> it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that
>>> people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to
>>> suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that
>>> it could be defined by mechanism.
>>>
>>> So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated,
>> molecular-component-**containing) machine? (Or is "machine" being
>> defined in a specialised sense here?)
>>
>
> A human being is the collective self experience received during the
> phenomenon known as a human lifetime. The body is only one aspect of that
> experience - a reflection defined as a familiar body in the context of its
> own perception.
>

That's cool, but if the body is a (complicated, etc) machine, then either
those experiences are part of the machine, or they're something else. If
they're part of the machine then you're wrong in some of the above-quoted
statements (and you contradicted yourself by saying that a machine doesn't
grow from a cell, by the way) If it's something else, then - depending on
the nature of that something else - it's possible that other things have
it, and we don't recognise the fact. It would be important to know what
that something else is before one can construct an argument. (For example,
I believe Bruno thinks the "something else" is an infinite sheaf of
computations.)

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers



On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:52:48 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> Sorry I should have added... your statement "A human body may be a 
> machine" contradicts "a machine does not build itself from a single 
> reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get 
> bored or tired" - unless a human being is not the same thing as a human 
> body, of course. Is that the point?
>

Right, a human body is not the same thing as a human being. A human body is 
still a body after the human ceases being. Not because there is an 
immaterial spirit, but because the entire universe is a nested experience 
and the body is more about experiences on the cellular and molecular level 
than it is about individual lifetimes.

Craig
 

>
>
>
>
> On 16 October 2013 13:51, LizR > wrote:
>
>> On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg 
>> > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that 
>>> does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. 
>>> That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself 
>>> from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, 
>>> it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that 
>>> people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to 
>>> suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that 
>>> it could be defined by mechanism.
>>>
>>> So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, 
>> molecular-component-containing) machine? (Or is "machine" being defined in 
>> a specialised sense here?) 
>>
>>  
>

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers



On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:51:17 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that 
>> does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. 
>> That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself 
>> from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, 
>> it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that 
>> people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to 
>> suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that 
>> it could be defined by mechanism.
>>
>> So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, 
> molecular-component-containing) machine? (Or is "machine" being defined in 
> a specialised sense here?) 
>

A human being is the collective self experience received during the 
phenomenon known as a human lifetime. The body is only one aspect of that 
experience - a reflection defined as a familiar body in the context of its 
own perception.
 

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers



On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:45:38 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Oct 2013, at 22:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 14, 2013 3:17:06 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 Oct 2013, at 20:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, October 13, 2013 5:03:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> All object are conscious?
>>>
>>
>> No objects are conscious.
>>
>>
>> We agree on this.
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Not at all. It is here and now. I have already interview such machines. 
>>>
>>
>> Are there any such machines available to interview online?
>>
>>
>> I can give you the code in Lisp, and it is up to you to find a good free 
>> lisp. But don't mind too much, AUDA is an integral description of the 
>> interview. Today, such interviews is done by paper and pencils, and appears 
>> in books and papers.
>> You better buy Boolos 1979, or 1993, but you have to study more logic too.
>>
>
> Doesn't it seem odd that there isn't much out there that is newer than 20 
> years old, 
>
>
> That is simply wrong, and I don't see why you say that. But even if that 
> was true, that would prove nothing.
>

It still seems odd. There are a lot of good programmers out there. If this 
is the frontier of machine intelligence, where is the interest? Not saying 
it proves something, but it doesn't instill much confidence that this is as 
fertile an area as you imply.
 

>
>
> and that paper and pencils are the preferred instruments?
>
>
> Maybe I was premature in saying it was promissory...it would appears that 
> there has not been any promise for it in quite some time.
>  
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> It is almost applicable, but the hard part is that it is blind to its 
>>> own blindness, so that the certainty offered by mathematics comes at a cost 
>>> which mathematics has no choice but to deny completely. Because mathematics 
>>> cannot lie, 
>>>
>>>
>>> G* proves <>[]f
>>>
>>> Even Peano Arithmetic can lie.  
>>> Mathematical theories (set of beliefs) can lie.
>>>
>>> Only truth cannot lie, but nobody know the truth as such.
>>>
>>
>>  Something that is a paradox or inconsistent is not the same thing as an 
>> intentional attempt to deceive. I'm not sure what 'G* proves <>[]f' means 
>> but I think it will mean the same thing to anyone who understands it, and 
>> not something different to the boss than it does to the neighbor.
>>
>>
>> Actually it will have as much meaning as there are correct machines (a 
>> lot), but the laws remains the same. Then adding the non-monotonical 
>> umbrella, saving the Lôbian machines from the constant mistakes and lies 
>> they do, provides different interpretation of []f, like
>>
>> I dream,
>> I die,
>> I get mad,
>> I am in a cul-de-sac
>> I get wrong
>>
>> etc.
>>
>> It will depend on the intensional nuances in play.
>>
>
> Couldn't the machine output the same product as musical notes or colored 
> pixels instead?
>
>
> Why not. Humans can do that too.
>

If I asked a person to turn some data into music or art, no two people 
would agree on what that output would be and no person's output would be 
decipherable as input to another person. Computers, on the other hand, 
would automatically be able to reverse any kind of i/o in the same way. One 
computer could play a file as a song, and another could make a graphic file 
out of the audio line out data which would be fully reversible to the 
original binary file.


>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> it cannot intentionally tell the truth either, and no matter how 
>>> sophisticated and self-referential a logic it is based on, it can never 
>>> transcend its own alienation from feeling, physics, and authenticity. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That is correct, but again, that is justifiable by all correct 
>>> sufficiently rich machines.
>>>
>>
>> Not sure I understand. Are you saying that we, as rich machines, cannot 
>> intentionally lie or tell the truth either?
>>
>>
>> No, I am saying that all correct machines can eventually justify that if 
>> they are correct they can't  express it, and if they are consistent, it 
>> will be consistent they are wrong. So it means they can eventually exploits 
>> the false locally. Team of universal numbers get entangled in very subtle 
>> prisoner dilemma. 
>> Universal machines can lie, and can crash.
>>
>
> That sounds like they can lie only when they calculate that they must, not 
> that they can lie intentionally because they enjoy it or out of sadism.
>
>
> That sounds like an opportunistic inference.
>

I think that computationalism maintains the illusion of legitimacy on basis 
of seducing us to play only by its rules. It says that we must give the 
undead a chance to be alive - that we cannot know for sure whether a 
machine is not at least as worthy of our love as a newborn baby. To fight 
this seduction, we must use what is our birthright as living beings. We can 
be opportunistic, we can cheat, and lie, and unplug machines whenever we 
want, because that

Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

Sorry I should have added... your statement "A human body may be a machine"
contradicts "a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing
cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or
tired" - unless a human being is not the same thing as a human body, of
course. Is that the point?




On 16 October 2013 13:51, LizR  wrote:

> On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>>
>> No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that
>> does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in.
>> That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself
>> from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing,
>> it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that
>> people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to
>> suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that
>> it could be defined by mechanism.
>>
>> So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated,
> molecular-component-containing) machine? (Or is "machine" being defined in
> a specialised sense here?)
>
>

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
> No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that
> does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in.
> That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself
> from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing,
> it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that
> people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to
> suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that
> it could be defined by mechanism.
>
> So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated,
molecular-component-containing) machine? (Or is "machine" being defined in
a specialised sense here?)

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 6:50:53 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 16 October 2013 01:26, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>  
>
>> Thanks for your answer.  That was not quite what I was asking though.  
>>> Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living organism, but were some 
>>> entirely autonomous, entirely artificial  cell-like structures, which could 
>>> find and utilize energy sources in the environment and reproduce 
>>> themselves.  Let's say after millions (or billions) of years, these 
>>> self-replicating nanobots evolved into "multi-cellular" organisms like 
>>> animals we are familiar with today. Could they have experiences like other 
>>> biological creatures that have a biological lineage? If not, why not?
>>>
>>
>> No, I don't think that they could have experiences like biological 
>> creatures. If they could, then we *should *probably see at least one 
>> example of 
>>
>
> Excuse me for butting in, but I'm not sure what "should" means here. Are 
> you saying these things should *already* exist? But the original 
> suggestion was about future technology... Though I can't see what else you 
> could mean, though.
>
>>
>> 1. a natural occurrence of inorganic biology
>>
>
> Why would it occur naturally, when organic biology has done so, and 
> presumably used up all the food sources that might be available?
>

If inorganic biology were possible, shouldn't it use inorganic food sources?

>  
>
>> 2. an organism which can survive only on inorganic nutrients
>>
>
> ???
>

A bird that can live on rocks, etc.

>  
>
>> 3. a successful experiment to create life from basic molecules
>>
>  
> Arguably the biosphere counts as this, presumably not an intentional 
> experiment.
>

That's begging the question. We don't know that abiogenesis is a fact, or 
if it was, we don't know that it is possible to reoccur. Our experiments 
thus far have not supported the idea that biological life can be be created 
again.

>  
>
>> 4. a machine which seems to feel, care, and have a unique and 
>> unrepeatable personal presence
>>
>
> Arguably a human being is one of these
>

It's begging the question. I'm saying "people are not like machines, 
because people are all unique but machines are not". You can't use that 
fact to claim that people are representative of machines, and then 
therefore that machines can be like people.  If I said "oil and water don't 
mix", you can't say 'arguably oil is a type of water'.

>  
>
>> 5. a mechanized process which produces artifacts that seem handmade and 
>> unique
>> 6. two separate bodies who are the same person
>> 7. an organism which reproduces by transforming its environment rather 
>> than reproducing by cell division
>>
>
> This seems to me to have gone completely off the point.
>

I would need you to explain more of what you mean.

>  
>
>> 8. an organism which emerges spontaneously from Boltzmann conditions in 
>> the environment rather than seeded inheritance
>>
>
> What?!? (He said billions of years, not googolplexes...!)
>

I didn't say Boltzmann brain, just a Boltzmann organism.

>  
>
>> 9. an event or observation which leads us to conclude that gathering 
>> energy and reproduction are sufficient to constitute bio-quality awareness.
>>
>> I don't understand that sentence. 
>

The whole basis of computationalism hinges on the assumption that acting 
like you are alive is the same as being alive, which I think is 
demonstrably false. We know for a fact that something that is not alive can 
seem like it is. We know that a machine can produce strings of language 
that carry no meaning for it. So what is it, other than pure blue-sky 
wishful thinking, that leads us to conclude that moving a puppet around in 
the right way is going to bring Pinocchio to life?

>
> I may be missing something here but I believe the question is whether 
> machines can have experiences. Isn't a human being a machine that has 
> experiences?
>

No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that 
does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. 
That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself 
from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, 
it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that 
people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to 
suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that 
it could be defined by mechanism.

Thanks,
Craig 

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On 16 October 2013 13:30, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
> All that we know for sure is that there does not seem to be a single
> example of an inorganic species now, nor does there seem to be a single
> example from the fossil record. It doesn't mean that conscious machines
> cannot evolve, but since it appears that they have not so far, we should
> not, scientifically speaking, give it the benefit of the doubt.
>
> I thought the "default stance" of science was that they did evolve, and
here we are.

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers



On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:59:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Oct 15, 2013, at 7:26 AM, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, October 14, 2013 4:37:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>>



 On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 10:54 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:08:01 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 4:52 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>>  On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
 It's not that computers can't do what humans do, it's that they 
 can't experience anything. Mozart could dig a hole as well as compose 
 music, but that doesn't mean that a backhoe with a player piano on it 
 is 
 Mozart. It's a much deeper problem with how machines are 
 conceptualized 
 that has nothing at all to do with humans.

>>>
>>> So you think "strong AI" is wrong. OK. But why can't computers 
>>> experience anything, in principle, given that people can, and assuming 
>>> people are complicated machines?
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>> I think Craig would say he does think computers (and many/all other 
>> things) do experience something,
>>
>
> You're half right. I would say:
>
> 1. All experiences correspond to some natural thing.
> 2. Not all things are natural things. Bugs Bunny has no independent 
> experience, and neither does Pinocchio. 
> 3. Computers are made of natural things but, like all machines, are 
> ultimately assembled unnaturally.
> 4. The natural things that machines are made of would have to be very 
> low level, i.e., not gears but the molecules that make up the gears.
>
> Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be 
> the only natural things which an experience would be associated with. 
> They 
> don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an 
> experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic 
> conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any 
> particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every 
> atom 
> of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some 
> radically different time scale from ours. 
>
> It's not really important - the main thing is to see how there is no 
> substitute for experience and a machine which is assembled from unrelated 
> parts has no experience and cannot gain new experience in an alien 
> context.
>
> I think that a machine (or any inanimate object or symbol) can also 
> serve as a vehicle for synchronicity. That's a completely different thing 
> because it is the super-personal, holistic end of the sensible spectrum, 
> not the sub-personal, granular end. The creepiness of a ventriloquist 
> dummy 
> is in our imagination, but that too is 'real' in an absolute sense. If 
> your 
> life takes you on a path which tempts you to believe that machines are 
> conscious, then the super-personal lensing of your life will stack the 
> deck 
> just enough to let you jump to those conclusions. It's what we would call 
> supernatural or coincidental, depending on which lens we use to define 
> it..  http://s33light.org/post/*
> *62173912616  (Don't you want to have a body?)
>

 After reading this (  
 http://marshallbrain.com/**discard1.htm ) I am not so sure...
  

>  
>
>>  just that it is necessarily different from what we experience. The 
>> reason for this has something to do with our history as biological 
>> organisms (according to his theory).
>>
>
> Right, although not necessarily just biological history, it could be 
> chemical too. We may have branched off from anything that could be made 
> into a useful machine (servant to alien agendas) long before life on 
> Earth.
>
>
 What if humanity left behind a nano-technology that eventually evolved 
 into mechanical organisms like dogs and fish, would they have animal like 
 experiences despite that they descended from "unnatural" things?

>>>
>>> The thing that makes sense to me is that the richness of sensation and 
>>> intention are inversely proportionate to the degree to which a phenomenon 
>>> can be controlled from the outside. If we put nano-tech extensions on some 
>>> living organism, then sure, the organism could learn how to use those 
>>> extensions and evolve a symbiotic post-biology. I don't think that project 
>>> would be controllable though. They would not be machines in the sense that 
>>> they would not

Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers




On Oct 15, 2013, at 5:52 PM, LizR  wrote:


On 16 October 2013 08:59, Jason Resch  wrote:

7. an organism which reproduces by transforming its environment  
rather than reproducing by cell division


Bruno said cigarettes might qualify as such life forms.

Viruses, surely?




Yes that's a much better example.

Jason


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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On 16 October 2013 08:59, Jason Resch  wrote:

>
> 7. an organism which reproduces by transforming its environment rather
> than reproducing by cell division
>
>
> Bruno said cigarettes might qualify as such life forms.
>
> Viruses, surely?

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On 16 October 2013 01:26, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
> On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>


> Thanks for your answer.  That was not quite what I was asking though.
>> Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living organism, but were some
>> entirely autonomous, entirely artificial  cell-like structures, which could
>> find and utilize energy sources in the environment and reproduce
>> themselves.  Let's say after millions (or billions) of years, these
>> self-replicating nanobots evolved into "multi-cellular" organisms like
>> animals we are familiar with today. Could they have experiences like other
>> biological creatures that have a biological lineage? If not, why not?
>>
>
> No, I don't think that they could have experiences like biological
> creatures. If they could, then we *should *probably see at least one
> example of
>

Excuse me for butting in, but I'm not sure what "should" means here. Are
you saying these things should *already* exist? But the original suggestion
was about future technology... Though I can't see what else you could mean,
though.

>
> 1. a natural occurrence of inorganic biology
>

Why would it occur naturally, when organic biology has done so, and
presumably used up all the food sources that might be available?


> 2. an organism which can survive only on inorganic nutrients
>

???


> 3. a successful experiment to create life from basic molecules
>

Arguably the biosphere counts as this, presumably not an intentional
experiment.


> 4. a machine which seems to feel, care, and have a unique and unrepeatable
> personal presence
>

Arguably a human being is one of these


> 5. a mechanized process which produces artifacts that seem handmade and
> unique
> 6. two separate bodies who are the same person
> 7. an organism which reproduces by transforming its environment rather
> than reproducing by cell division
>

This seems to me to have gone completely off the point.


> 8. an organism which emerges spontaneously from Boltzmann conditions in
> the environment rather than seeded inheritance
>

What?!? (He said billions of years, not googolplexes...!)


> 9. an event or observation which leads us to conclude that gathering
> energy and reproduction are sufficient to constitute bio-quality awareness.
>
> I don't understand that sentence.

I may be missing something here but I believe the question is whether
machines can have experiences. Isn't a human being a machine that has
experiences?

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

2013-10-15 Thread meekerdb


On 10/15/2013 12:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
8. an organism which emerges spontaneously from Boltzmann conditions in the environment 
rather than seeded inheritance


Like the first RNA replicators on Earth.

Brent

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On Oct 15, 2013, at 7:26 AM, Craig Weinberg
wrote:

On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, Craig Weinberg
wrote:

On Monday, October 14, 2013 4:37:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 10:54 AM, Craig Weinberg
wrote:

On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:08:01 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:

On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 4:52 PM, LizR wrote:

On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It's not that computers can't do what humans do, it's that they
can't experience anything. Mozart could dig a hole as well as
compose music, but that doesn't mean that a backhoe with a player
piano on it is Mozart. It's a much deeper problem with how machines
are conceptualized that has nothing at all to do with humans.

So you think "strong AI" is wrong. OK. But why can't computers
experience anything, in principle, given that people can, and
assuming people are complicated machines?

I think Craig would say he does think computers (and many/all other
things) do experience something,

You're half right. I would say:

1. All experiences correspond to some natural thing.
2. Not all things are natural things. Bugs Bunny has no independent
experience, and neither does Pinocchio.
3. Computers are made of natural things but, like all machines, are
ultimately assembled unnaturally.
4. The natural things that machines are made of would have to be
very low level, i.e., not gears but the molecules that make up the
gears.

Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be
the only natural things which an experience would be associated
with. They don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is
probably an experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and
electromagnetic conditions. Experiences on that level may not be
proprietary to any particular molecule - it could be very exotic,
who knows. Maybe every atom of the same structure represents the
same kind of experience on some radically different time scale from
ours.

It's not really important - the main thing is to see how there is no
substitute for experience and a machine which is assembled from
unrelated parts has no experience and cannot gain new experience in
an alien context.

I think that a machine (or any inanimate object or symbol) can also
serve as a vehicle for synchronicity. That's a completely different
thing because it is the super-personal, holistic end of the sensible
spectrum, not the sub-personal, granular end. The creepiness of a
ventriloquist dummy is in our imagination, but that too is 'real' in
an absolute sense. If your life takes you on a path which tempts you
to believe that machines are conscious, then the super-personal
lensing of your life will stack the deck just enough to let you jump
to those conclusions. It's what we would call supernatural or
coincidental, depending on which lens we use to define it.. http://s33light.org/post/62173912616
(Don't you want to have a body?)

After reading this ( http://marshallbrain.com/discard1.htm ) I am
not so sure...

just that it is necessarily different from what we experience. The
reason for this has something to do with our history as biological
organisms (according to his theory).

Right, although not necessarily just biological history, it could be
chemical too. We may have branched off from anything that could be
made into a useful machine (servant to alien agendas) long before
life on Earth.

What if humanity left behind a nano-technology that eventually
evolved into mechanical organisms like dogs and fish, would they
have animal like experiences despite that they descended from
"unnatural" things?

The thing that makes sense to me is that the richness of sensation
and intention are inversely proportionate to the degree to which a
phenomenon can be controlled from the outside. If we put nano-tech
extensions on some living organism, then sure, the organism could
learn how to use those extensions and evolve a symbiotic post-
biology. I don't think that project would be controllable though.
They would not be machines in the sense that they would not
necessarily be of service to those who created them.

Craig,

Thanks for your answer. That was not quite what I was asking
though. Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living
organism, but were some entirely autonomous, entirely artificial
cell-like structures, which could find and utilize energy sources in
the environment and reproduce themselves. Let's say after millions
(or billions) of years, these self-replicating nanobots evolved into
"multi-cellular" organisms like animals we are familiar with today.
Could they have experiences like other biological creatures that
have a biological lineage? If not, why not?

No, I don't think that they could have experiences like biological
creatures. If they could, then we should p

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Russell Standish

On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 01:02:13PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth
> (by Gödel).
> 
> 
> Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible
> arithmetical truth can produce the physical.
> Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe
> if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very
> far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I
> believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I
> will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours.
> 

Then you might well be interested in the Movie Graph Argument, which
deals directly with the case where the universe doesn't have sufficient
resources to run the universal dovetailer.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Karl Pribram: the holographic brain

2013-10-15 Thread spudboy100



Pribram's work comes for over 20 years ago, and it doesn't seem to be a hot 
topic of neuroscience. It may be fact but it has not seemed to illuminate any 
one else studying the brain. I am interested in this sort of thing, as you 
apparently are. Non-traditionalist hypotheses about consciousness need 
exploration. There is also, Hameroff, Tuczyinski's, and Penrose's theory of the 
mind, is certainly worth considering. One can come up with variations on their 
theme. A holographic theory of the universe, may also have purchase, with 
consciousness, via entanglement-or it may all prove useless. But, nothing 
ventured, nothing gained. 

-Original Message-
From: Evgenii Rudnyi 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 2:31 pm
Subject: Karl Pribram: the holographic brain


I once have heard that Karl Pribram has a theory of a holographic brain 
and decided to read his latest book

Karl H Pribram, The Form Within: My Point of View.

Unfortunately I was unable to understand his theory, as for me the book 
was too eclectic. One quote that I like is below, but I have failed to 
understand how he has come exactly to such a conclusion based on 
neuroscience.

Does someone here know his theory? Is there somewhere a better 
description of his ideas as in his book?

Evgenii
-- 
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/karl-h-pribram

p. 531-532 “Most important, ‘in ancient times’ we navigated our world 
and discovered experiences in ourselves that reflected what we observed 
in the world: We woke at sunrise and slept at sunset. We were intimately 
connected at every level with the cycles of nature. This process was 
disrupted by the Copernican revolution, by its aftermaths in biology – 
even by our explorations of quantum physics and cosmology – and in the 
resulting interpretations of our personal experiences. But today, once 
again, we have rediscovered that it is we who observe our cosmos and are 
aware that we observe; that it is we who observe our navigation of our 
world and observe our own observations.”

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Karl Pribram: the holographic brain

2013-10-15 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

I once have heard that Karl Pribram has a theory of a holographic brain 
and decided to read his latest book


Karl H Pribram, The Form Within: My Point of View.

Unfortunately I was unable to understand his theory, as for me the book 
was too eclectic. One quote that I like is below, but I have failed to 
understand how he has come exactly to such a conclusion based on 
neuroscience.


Does someone here know his theory? Is there somewhere a better 
description of his ideas as in his book?


Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/karl-h-pribram

p. 531-532 “Most important, ‘in ancient times’ we navigated our world 
and discovered experiences in ourselves that reflected what we observed 
in the world: We woke at sunrise and slept at sunset. We were intimately 
connected at every level with the cycles of nature. This process was 
disrupted by the Copernican revolution, by its aftermaths in biology – 
even by our explorations of quantum physics and cosmology – and in the 
resulting interpretations of our personal experiences. But today, once 
again, we have rediscovered that it is we who observe our cosmos and are 
aware that we observe; that it is we who observe our navigation of our 
world and observe our own observations.”


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread meekerdb


On 10/15/2013 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is 
computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in 
arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.


Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How 
does anything exist if it is not computed by "the" or "a" machine?


We assume the arithmetical truth. In particular we assume that all closed formula 
written in the language of arithmetic (and thus using logical symbol + the symbol 0, s 
(+1), + and *) are all either true or false, independently of us.


From this we cannot prove that matter exists, or not, but we can prove that the average 
universal numbers will (correctly) believe in matter (but it will not know that it is 
correct).


That's not at all clear to me.  A universal number encodes proofs - is that what you mean 
by it believes something?  But how is this something identified at 'matter'?




So, if you have no problem in believing propositions like "there is no biggest prime 
number" are true independently of me and you, and the universe, then you can understand 
that the proposition asserting the existence of (infinitely many) computations in which 
you believe reading my current post, is also true independently of us.


The appearance of matter emerges from the FPI that the machines cannot avoid in the 
arithmetical truth.


Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel).






And I thought the generalized brain did the computations,


Only the computations associated to your mind.


not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that "all the rest" which presumably 
includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me.


I guess you missed the step seven of the UDA, and are perhaps not aware that 
arithmetical truth is incredibly big, *much* bigger than what any computer can generate 
or compute.


Then my, or your, mind is associated to *all* computations going through your actual 
state of mind,


That sounds like an uncomputable totality.

Brent

and below your substitution level there are infinitely many such computations. They all 
exist in arithmetic, and the FPI glues them, in a non computable way, in possible long 
and deep physical histories.


Bruno




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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread meekerdb


On 10/15/2013 3:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist mailto:yann...@gmail.com>>

Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) 
is
computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, 
or just
in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.

Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was 
claiming. How
does anything exist if it is not computed by "the" or "a" machine? And I 
thought the
generalized brain did the computations, not that it was only computed. How 
does
Bruno show that "all the rest" which presumably includes energy and matter 
is not
computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me.


Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum


What does "sum" mean?  And how does is constitute a piece of matter?

of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is defined by an 
infinity of computations (and not one), it is not "computed".


But that's not a definition.  It's saying the piece of matter is *constituted* by an 
infinity of computations.  But what associates the computations to a piece of matter that 
we *define* ostensively?


Brent



A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity of 
computations.

Quentin


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth
(by Gödel).

Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible
arithmetical truth can produce the physical.
Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe
if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very
far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I
believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I
will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours.

On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 10:53 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 15 Oct 2013, at 13:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist 
>
>>
>>
>> -- Forwarded message --
>> From: Quentin Anciaux 
>> Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
>> Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist 
>>
>>> Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
>>> brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
>>> everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.
>>>
>>> Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
>>> claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by "the" or "a"
>>> machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that
>>> it was only computed. How does Bruno show that "all the rest" which
>>> presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly
>>> confusing me.
>>>
>>>
>> Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the
>> sum of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is
>> defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not "computed".
>>
>> A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an
>> infinity of computations.
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>
>
> No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the infinite
> set of computations going through your current state (at every state, an
> infinity of computations diverge, but there is still an infinity going
> through that state and it's for every state).
>
>
> Yes. It generalizes what Everett did on the universal quantum wave, on the
> whole arithmetical truth (which contains the whole computer science
> theoretical truth). If QM is correct, the SWE is redundant, and a
> consequence of comp. Physics is one aspect of arithmetic seen by its
> internal creatures (the universal or not numbers). We can concretely
> extract physics from the interview of the chatty rich one (the Löbian
> numbers).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Quentin
>
>>
>>
>> You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed.
>> That does not make sense.
>> Richard
>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>

 On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

   So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
 measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
 divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
 many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
 produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
 a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
 square numbers?).

 And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule
 derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example,
 Chris Fuchs?

  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences",
 (then), disappearing, please do.

 I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you
 refer to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?

  The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be
 contagious on the observer"

 I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
 superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.

  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
 interference in the two slits experiment.

 ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
 photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
 observer required.

 But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely
 mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 15 Oct 2013, at 17:18, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> what you say confirms that both the W-man and the M-man will  
assess that they were unable to predict the result of opening the door

Bruno I really didn't need your help on that, I already knew that I  
can't always successfully predict what I will see after I open a door.

The point is that with the step 3 protocol, you (the H-guy) can never  
predict among {W, M}, if the result will be "I feel being the W-man",  
or "I feel being the M-man".

If you are OK with this, please proceed.

>> I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know  
what you're going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a  
long time ago.

> That applies to all indeterminacies. You would have said to the  
founders of QM that we know about indeterminacy since Pascal or  
Boltzman.

No, the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that  
neither Pascal or Boltzman were:

1) Some events have no cause.

Only those believing in the collapse (that Feynman called a collective  
hallucination). You confuse QM and one of his most nonsensical  
interpretation.

2) Probability is a property of the thing itself and not just a  
measure of our lack of information.

In QM-withoit collapse, the probability comes, like in comp, from the  
ignorance about which computation we belong too.

The sort of indeterminacy you're talking about was first discovered  
by Professor Og of Caveman University who didn't write in the  
journal Paleolithic Times because Professor Og didn't know how to  
write.

Lol

> What is new with the FPI in this setting is that everything is  
deterministic in the 3p-view, yet indetermistic in the 1-view,

The trouble is that Bruno Marchal is unable to say who exactly is  
that is experiencing this "1-view".

I don't need this. This should be made utterly clear in the iterated  
self-duplication, where I multiply you 24 times per second (24) during  
1h30 (60 * 90), into as many copies that can be sent in front of one  
of the 2^(16180 * 1) possible images on a screen with 16180 *  
1 pixels, which can be black or white each.

All you need to understand is that almost all among the  2^(16180 *  
1) * (60 * 90) * 24 see white noise, independently of who they  
are. The predictions bears on the relative experiences.

I do not need more about identity than "your definition". Anyone  
capable of remembering having been X, has the right to be recognized  
as X.

Without using pronouns please explain who the hell Mr. 1 is and then  
maybe I can answer your questions.

Without using pronouns, I lost my job.

The whole approach is indexical, and the third person "I" is  
eventually defined in the Gödel-Kleene manner (the Dx = "xx" trick,  
that I promised to Liz to redo in the terms of the phi_i and the w_i).

Then the first person I is defined, in UDA, as being only the content  
of the memory (= "your definition").

The only difference between first person and third person, used here,  
is that the first person memories (the content of the diaries), are  
annihilated and reconstituted together with the person's body.

In the arithmetical version, the first person is proved to be not  
directly amenable to the use of the dx = "xx" algorithm (an obvious  
cousin of the famous Mocking Bird combinators, btw), but, by a sort of  
miracle, thanks to Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, (using the  
Dx = "xx" algorithm at another level!), we can recover it with the  
Theaetetus definition of the knower, which recovers in the only way  
possible (a result proved by Artemov) a knower from the Gödel's notion  
of self-reference.

So, asking me to not use pronouns, in what is in great part a theory  
of pronouns, is like asking me to square the circle.
The eight arithmetical hypostases are eight precise mathematics of  
eight simple and deep machine's self-referential points of view, that  
is pronouns, like 1-I, 3-I, singular, plural, etc.

But in UDA, you don't need Gödel-Kleene, as the first person histories  
are defined in simple third person terms (sequences of W and M written  
in the personal diaries), and it is rather obvious that, with the  
protocols, all are 1-self non predictable, although some statistical  
distribution can be predicted.

Step 4 asks if those statistical distribution [of those first person  
experiences (diary content of the one who actually do the self  
multiplications)]  have to change if we introduce reconstitution  
delays in some branches of the self-multiplication changes ).

That's just step 2 + step 3. So it should be easy.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 10:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> Are you saying that John Clark after going through a (duplicating
> teleporter cannot use anymore the indexical 'I' when talking about himself
>

No.

  me myself and I John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> what you say confirms that both the W-man and the M-man will assess that
> they were unable to predict the result of opening the door
>

Bruno I really didn't need your help on that, I already knew that I can't
always successfully predict what I will see after I open a door.

>> I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what
>> you're going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.
>>
>
> > That applies to all indeterminacies. You would have said to the founders
> of QM that we know about indeterminacy since Pascal or Boltzman.
>

No, the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that neither
Pascal or Boltzman were:

1) Some events have no cause.
2) Probability is a property of the thing itself and not just a measure of
our lack of information.

The sort of indeterminacy you're talking about was first discovered by
Professor Og of Caveman University who didn't write in the journal
Paleolithic Times because Professor Og didn't know how to write.

> What is new with the FPI in this setting is that everything is
> deterministic in the 3p-view, yet indetermistic in the 1-view,
>

The trouble is that Bruno Marchal is unable to say who exactly is that is
experiencing this "1-view".  Without using pronouns please explain who the
hell Mr. 1 is and then maybe I can answer your questions.

  John K Clark

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics



On 15 Oct 2013, at 13:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist 


-- Forwarded message --
From: Quentin Anciaux 
Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist 
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized  
brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is  
not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare  
and exceptional.


Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno  
was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by "the"  
or "a" machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the  
computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show  
that "all the rest" which presumably includes energy and matter is  
not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me.



Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by  
the sum of the infinity of computations going through your state  
as it is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is  
not "computed".


A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an  
infinity of computations.


Quentin


No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the  
infinite set of computations going through your current state (at  
every state, an infinity of computations diverge, but there is still  
an infinity going through that state and it's for every state).


Yes. It generalizes what Everett did on the universal quantum wave, on  
the whole arithmetical truth (which contains the whole computer  
science theoretical truth). If QM is correct, the SWE is redundant,  
and a consequence of comp. Physics is one aspect of arithmetic seen by  
its internal creatures (the universal or not numbers). We can  
concretely extract physics from the interview of the chatty rich one  
(the Löbian numbers).


Bruno





Quentin


You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not  
computed. That does not make sense.

Richard

On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one  
another?   Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a  
binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence  
in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right  
proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning a  
measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even  
numbers that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born  
rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued  
by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel  
"experiences", (then), disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do  
you refer to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be  
contagious on the observer"


I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function -  
so superpositions are just something that happens in the  
mathematics.


But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one  
photon interference in the two slits experiment.


?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a  
single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no  
superposition of observer required.



But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely  
mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.



















When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise:  
yes the "quantum wave" describes only psychological states,  
but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical- 
realities, including the many self-multiplication.


There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the  
personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?


Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the  
real, which is a bit weird to me.


The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible  
futures.  Or even the result of considering all possible paths.


That leads to instrumentalism. That is "don"t ask, don't try to  
understand or get a bigger picture".











I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the  
superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological,  
which is not a problem for me. there are still "many".



Yes, tha

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2013/10/15 John Clark 

>
> On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 5:39 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> > Alright, but this again leaves us at a crossroad:
>>
> 1) You believe that teleportation is fundamentally impossible
>
>
> No.
>
> > 2) You believe that teleportation is possible
>
>
> Yes.
>
> > in which case you accept the thought experiment
>
>
> Yes, both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark see nothing
> fundamentally wrong with the thought experiment, so the pronoun in the
> above causes no problems.
>
> > and are confronted with the question of what you would perceive if you
>> went through such an experience.
>
>
>> ^^^  ^^^
>>
>
> What both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark perceive is that
> Telmo Menezes has caught the pronoun disease from Bruno Marchal.
>

Are you saying that John Clark after going through a (duplicating
teleporter cannot use anymore the indexical 'I' when talking about himself,
and both copy will talk about themselve like Alain Delon and never use 'I'
again because 'I' is an ill concept when a duplicating teleporter exist ?

Quentin


>
> > Telmo Menezes (aka T-bone*)
>>
>> * bonus points if you get the reference
>>
>
> Well I hear that a restaurant in Ecuador called "San Telmo" serves a
> excellent T-bone steak.
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics



On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized  
brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is  
not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare  
and exceptional.


Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno  
was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by "the"  
or "a" machine?


We assume the arithmetical truth. In particular we assume that all  
closed formula written in the language of arithmetic (and thus using  
logical symbol + the symbol 0, s (+1), + and *) are all either true or  
false, independently of us.


From this we cannot prove that matter exists, or not, but we can  
prove that the average universal numbers will (correctly) believe in  
matter (but it will not know that it is correct).


So, if you have no problem in believing propositions like "there is no  
biggest prime number" are true independently of me and you, and the  
universe, then you can understand that the proposition asserting the  
existence of (infinitely many) computations in which you believe  
reading my current post, is also true independently of us.


The appearance of matter emerges from the FPI that the machines cannot  
avoid in the arithmetical truth.


Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth  
(by Gödel).







And I thought the generalized brain did the computations,


Only the computations associated to your mind.


not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that "all the  
rest" which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed.  
Bruno is constantly confusing me.


I guess you missed the step seven of the UDA, and are perhaps not  
aware that arithmetical truth is incredibly big, *much* bigger than  
what any computer can generate or compute.


Then my, or your, mind is associated to *all* computations going  
through your actual state of mind, and below your substitution level  
there are infinitely many such computations. They all exist in  
arithmetic, and the FPI glues them, in a non computable way, in  
possible long and deep physical histories.


Bruno






On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one  
another?   Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a  
binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence  
in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right  
proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning a  
measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even  
numbers that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born  
rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued  
by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel  
"experiences", (then), disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do  
you refer to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be  
contagious on the observer"


I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function -  
so superpositions are just something that happens in the  
mathematics.


But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one  
photon interference in the two slits experiment.


?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a  
single photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no  
superposition of observer required.



But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely  
mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.



















When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise:  
yes the "quantum wave" describes only psychological states,  
but they concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical- 
realities, including the many self-multiplication.


There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the  
personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?


Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.


OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the  
real, which is a bit weird to me.


The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible  
futures.  Or even the result of considering all possible paths.


That leads to instrumentalism. That is "don"t ask, don't try to  
understand or get a bigger picture".











I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the  
superposition disappearing. he only makes

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 5:39 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> Alright, but this again leaves us at a crossroad:
>
1) You believe that teleportation is fundamentally impossible

No.

> 2) You believe that teleportation is possible

Yes.

> in which case you accept the thought experiment

Yes, both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark see nothing
fundamentally wrong with the thought experiment, so the pronoun in the
above causes no problems.

> and are confronted with the question of what you would perceive if you
> went through such an experience.

> ^^^  ^^^
>

What both the original John Clark and the copy John Clark perceive is that
Telmo Menezes has caught the pronoun disease from Bruno Marchal.

> Telmo Menezes (aka T-bone*)
>
> * bonus points if you get the reference
>

Well I hear that a restaurant in Ecuador called "San Telmo" serves a
excellent T-bone steak.

  John K Clark

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

On Monday, October 14, 2013 11:14:36 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, October 14, 2013 4:37:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 10:54 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>

 On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:08:01 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 4:52 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
>  On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>> It's not that computers can't do what humans do, it's that they 
>>> can't experience anything. Mozart could dig a hole as well as compose 
>>> music, but that doesn't mean that a backhoe with a player piano on it 
>>> is 
>>> Mozart. It's a much deeper problem with how machines are conceptualized 
>>> that has nothing at all to do with humans.
>>>
>>
>> So you think "strong AI" is wrong. OK. But why can't computers 
>> experience anything, in principle, given that people can, and assuming 
>> people are complicated machines?
>>  
>>
>>
> I think Craig would say he does think computers (and many/all other 
> things) do experience something,
>

 You're half right. I would say:

 1. All experiences correspond to some natural thing.
 2. Not all things are natural things. Bugs Bunny has no independent 
 experience, and neither does Pinocchio. 
 3. Computers are made of natural things but, like all machines, are 
 ultimately assembled unnaturally.
 4. The natural things that machines are made of would have to be very 
 low level, i.e., not gears but the molecules that make up the gears.

 Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the 
 only natural things which an experience would be associated with. They 
 don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an 
 experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic 
 conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any 
 particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every atom 
 of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some 
 radically different time scale from ours. 

 It's not really important - the main thing is to see how there is no 
 substitute for experience and a machine which is assembled from unrelated 
 parts has no experience and cannot gain new experience in an alien context.

 I think that a machine (or any inanimate object or symbol) can also 
 serve as a vehicle for synchronicity. That's a completely different thing 
 because it is the super-personal, holistic end of the sensible spectrum, 
 not the sub-personal, granular end. The creepiness of a ventriloquist 
 dummy 
 is in our imagination, but that too is 'real' in an absolute sense. If 
 your 
 life takes you on a path which tempts you to believe that machines are 
 conscious, then the super-personal lensing of your life will stack the 
 deck 
 just enough to let you jump to those conclusions. It's what we would call 
 supernatural or coincidental, depending on which lens we use to define 
 it..  
 http://s33light.org/post/**62173912616

 (Don't you want to have a body?)

>>>
>>> After reading this ( 
>>> http://marshallbrain.com/**discard1.htm
>>>  ) 
>>> I am not so sure...
>>>  
>>>

>  just that it is necessarily different from what we experience. The 
> reason for this has something to do with our history as biological 
> organisms (according to his theory).
>

 Right, although not necessarily just biological history, it could be 
 chemical too. We may have branched off from anything that could be made 
 into a useful machine (servant to alien agendas) long before life on Earth.

>>> What if humanity left behind a nano-technology that eventually evolved 
>>> into mechanical organisms like dogs and fish, would they have animal like 
>>> experiences despite that they descended from "unnatural" things?
>>>
>>
>> The thing that makes sense to me is that the richness of sensation and 
>> intention are inversely proportionate to the degree to which a phenomenon 
>> can be controlled from the outside. If we put nano-tech extensions on some 
>> living organism, then sure, the organism could learn how to use those 
>> extensions and evolve a symbiotic post-biology. I don't think that project 
>> would be controllable though. They would not be machines in the sense that 
>> they would not necessarily be of service to those who created them. 
>>
>
>
> Craig,
>
> Thanks for your answer.  That was not quite what I was asking though.  
> Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living organism, but were some 
> entirely autonomous, enti

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist 

>
>
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Quentin Anciaux 
> Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
> Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
>
>
>
> 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist 
>
>> Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
>> brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
>> everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.
>>
>> Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
>> claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by "the" or "a"
>> machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that
>> it was only computed. How does Bruno show that "all the rest" which
>> presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly
>> confusing me.
>>
>>
> Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the
> sum of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is
> defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not "computed".
>
> A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an
> infinity of computations.
>
> Quentin
>


No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the infinite set
of computations going through your current state (at every state, an
infinity of computations diverge, but there is still an infinity going
through that state and it's for every state).

Quentin

>
>
> You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed.
> That does not make sense.
> Richard
>
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>   So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
>>> measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
>>> divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
>>> many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
>>> produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
>>> a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
>>> square numbers?).
>>>
>>> And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule
>>> derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example,
>>> Chris Fuchs?
>>>
>>>
>>>  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences",
>>> (then), disappearing, please do.
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer
>>> to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?
>>>
>>>
>>>  The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be
>>> contagious on the observer"
>>>
>>>
>>> I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
>>> superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.
>>>
>>>
>>>  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
>>> interference in the two slits experiment.
>>>
>>>
>>> ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
>>> photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
>>> observer required.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely
>>> mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
>>> "quantum wave" describes only psychological states, but they concern still
>>> a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
>>> self-multiplication.
>>>
>>>
>>> There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
>>> subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.
>>>
>>>
>>>  I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?
>>>
>>>
>>> Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.
>>>
>>>
>>>  OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the
>>> real, which is a bit weird to me.
>>>
>>>
>>> The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.
>>> Or even the result of considering all possible paths.
>>>
>>>
>>> That leads to instrumentalism. That is "don"t ask, don't try to
>>> understand or get a bigger picture".
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the
>>> superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not
>>> a problem for me. there are still "many".
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I
>>> think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper ca

Fwd: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Richard Ruquist

-- Forwarded message --
From: Quentin Anciaux 
Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist 

> Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
> brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
> everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.
>
> Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
> claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by "the" or "a"
> machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that
> it was only computed. How does Bruno show that "all the rest" which
> presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly
> confusing me.
>
>
Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum
of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is
defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not "computed".

A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity
of computations.

Quentin


You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed.
That does not make sense.
Richard

>
> On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>   So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
>> measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
>> divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
>> many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
>> produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
>> a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
>> square numbers?).
>>
>> And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule
>> derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example,
>> Chris Fuchs?
>>
>>
>>  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences",
>> (then), disappearing, please do.
>>
>>
>> I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer
>> to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?
>>
>>
>>  The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be
>> contagious on the observer"
>>
>>
>> I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
>> superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.
>>
>>
>>  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
>> interference in the two slits experiment.
>>
>>
>> ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
>> photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
>> observer required.
>>
>>
>>
>> But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely
>> mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
>> "quantum wave" describes only psychological states, but they concern still
>> a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
>> self-multiplication.
>>
>>
>> There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
>> subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.
>>
>>
>>  I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?
>>
>>
>> Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.
>>
>>
>>  OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real,
>> which is a bit weird to me.
>>
>>
>> The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.
>> Or even the result of considering all possible paths.
>>
>>
>> That leads to instrumentalism. That is "don"t ask, don't try to
>> understand or get a bigger picture".
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the
>> superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not
>> a problem for me. there are still "many".
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I
>> think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at
>> the end of his book "The Evolution of Reason" - a probabilistic extension
>> of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in "Interview
>> with a Quantum Bayesian", arXiv:1207.2141v1
>>
>>
>>  OK.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.
>>
>>  We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)
>> physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.
>>
>>  Bayesian epistemic view is no problem

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist 

> Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
> brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
> everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.
>
> Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
> claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by "the" or "a"
> machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that
> it was only computed. How does Bruno show that "all the rest" which
> presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly
> confusing me.
>
>
Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum
of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is
defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not "computed".

A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an infinity
of computations.

Quentin


>
> On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>   So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
>> measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
>> divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
>> many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
>> produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
>> a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
>> square numbers?).
>>
>> And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule
>> derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example,
>> Chris Fuchs?
>>
>>
>>  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences",
>> (then), disappearing, please do.
>>
>>
>> I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer
>> to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?
>>
>>
>>  The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be
>> contagious on the observer"
>>
>>
>> I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
>> superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.
>>
>>
>>  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
>> interference in the two slits experiment.
>>
>>
>> ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
>> photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
>> observer required.
>>
>>
>>
>> But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely
>> mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
>> "quantum wave" describes only psychological states, but they concern still
>> a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
>> self-multiplication.
>>
>>
>> There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
>> subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.
>>
>>
>>  I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?
>>
>>
>> Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.
>>
>>
>>  OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real,
>> which is a bit weird to me.
>>
>>
>> The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.
>> Or even the result of considering all possible paths.
>>
>>
>> That leads to instrumentalism. That is "don"t ask, don't try to
>> understand or get a bigger picture".
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the
>> superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not
>> a problem for me. there are still "many".
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I
>> think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at
>> the end of his book "The Evolution of Reason" - a probabilistic extension
>> of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in "Interview
>> with a Quantum Bayesian", arXiv:1207.2141v1
>>
>>
>>  OK.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.
>>
>>  We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)
>> physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.
>>
>>  Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is
>> the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of
>> solipsism, and it can generate some strong "don't ask" imperative.
>>
>>
>> You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.
>>
>>
>>  I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they int

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-15 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain)
is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.

Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by "the" or "a"
machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that
it was only computed. How does Bruno show that "all the rest" which
presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly
confusing me.


On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
> measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
> divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
> many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
> produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
> a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
> square numbers?).
>
> And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives
> from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?
>
>
>  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences",
> (then), disappearing, please do.
>
>
> I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer
> to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?
>
>
>  The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious
> on the observer"
>
>
> I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
> superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.
>
>
>  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
> interference in the two slits experiment.
>
>
> ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
> photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
> observer required.
>
>
>
> But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely
> mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
> "quantum wave" describes only psychological states, but they concern still
> a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
> self-multiplication.
>
>
> There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
> subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.
>
>
>  I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?
>
>
> Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.
>
>
>  OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real,
> which is a bit weird to me.
>
>
> The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.
> Or even the result of considering all possible paths.
>
>
> That leads to instrumentalism. That is "don"t ask, don't try to understand
> or get a bigger picture".
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the
> superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not
> a problem for me. there are still "many".
>
>
>
> Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I
> think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at
> the end of his book "The Evolution of Reason" - a probabilistic extension
> of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in "Interview
> with a Quantum Bayesian", arXiv:1207.2141v1
>
>
>  OK.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.
>
>  We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)
> physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.
>
>  Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is
> the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of
> solipsism, and it can generate some strong "don't ask" imperative.
>
>
> You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.
>
>
>  I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.
>
>
>
> I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you
> do the same).
>
>
>
>  What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, itself
> define by a relative universal numbers.
>
>
> Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his
> actions.
>
>  Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its octalist
> points of view, and an whole theology including his physics, etc.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-15 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 6:39 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 2:14 PM, Telmo Menezes 
> wrote:
>
>>>  >> I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
>>> identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
>>> justified to give them different names.
>>
>>
>> > Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
>> > identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago
>
>
> Yes.
>
>> > But things would get a bit confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue
>> > now.
>
>
> Yes.
>
>>
>> > Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.
>
>
> Yes.
>
>> > Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from time
>> > passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't.
>
>
> Yes.
>
>> > Which one is it?
>
>
> I do.
>
>> > I suspect you think they are the same
>
>
> No, your prediction failed.

There goes my daily dose of dopamine. Will have to find some other way
to get it...

> I think the 2 things are fundamentally different
> because the John Clark of one second ago and the John Clark of right now
> will never meet,

Alright, but this again leaves us at a crossroad:

1) You believe that teleportation is fundamentally impossible, so this
type of thought experiment is based on an absurd premise;

2) You believe that teleportation is possible, in which case you
accept the thought experiment and are confronted with the question of
what you would perceive if you went through such an experience.

I don't feel I am sufficiently knowledge in physics to have and
educated opinion on teleportation. I'm pretty sure you have a much
more sophisticated knowledge of physics than I do, so I'm more than
happy to listen to your arguments. Not going to make any more
prediction on what you might think because my dopamine is already low.

On the next point you will see why I wasn't paying attention in physics class.

> so there is no confusion and separate names are not needed
> to avoid confusion and pronouns cause no trouble. But with duplicating
> chambers the 2 John Clarks could meet and stand right next to each other,
> and if you were to say "I like John Clark but I don't like John Clark" your
> meaning might be clear in your mind but you would need to change your
> language if you wanted to communicate the idea to others.

I had a very unpleasant physics teacher (coincidently... :) ) who
appeared to wear the same trousers throughout the entire semester. A
scientifically-minded colleague of mind decided to throw some ink at
her ass. It turns out that she, indeed, wore the same trousers for the
entire semester. How do you feel about tattoos?

> And the place to
> start would be to be careful with pronouns and give one of the John Clarks,
> it doesn't matter which one, the nickname Mary Sue.

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_OW6wa7cAFBY/TPACSytH_kI/AvQ/BmLVAQA/s1600/mary_sue.jpg

> True, John Clark might
> not like it, but a lot of people don't like their nickname.
>
>>
>> > I also predict an attempt to avoid answering the question directly
>
>
> That prediction has also failed but you still feel like Telmo Menezes
> because predictions, right or wrong, have nothing to do with identity;

I don't think I claimed predictions had anything to do with identity.

> you
> feel like Telmo Menezes because you remember being Telmo Menezes yesterday
> and for no other reason.

Yes.

>Marry Sue (aka John K Clark)

Telmo Menezes (aka T-bone*)

* bonus points if you get the reference

>
>
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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers



On 14 Oct 2013, at 22:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, October 14, 2013 3:17:06 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Oct 2013, at 20:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, October 13, 2013 5:03:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


All object are conscious?

No objects are conscious.


We agree on this.








Not at all. It is here and now. I have already interview such  
machines.


Are there any such machines available to interview online?


I can give you the code in Lisp, and it is up to you to find a good  
free lisp. But don't mind too much, AUDA is an integral description  
of the interview. Today, such interviews is done by paper and  
pencils, and appears in books and papers.
You better buy Boolos 1979, or 1993, but you have to study more  
logic too.


Doesn't it seem odd that there isn't much out there that is newer  
than 20 years old,


That is simply wrong, and I don't see why you say that. But even if  
that was true, that would prove nothing.




and that paper and pencils are the preferred instruments?


Maybe I was premature in saying it was promissory...it would appears  
that there has not been any promise for it in quite some time.






It is almost applicable, but the hard part is that it is blind to  
its own blindness, so that the certainty offered by mathematics  
comes at a cost which mathematics has no choice but to deny  
completely. Because mathematics cannot lie,


G* proves <>[]f

Even Peano Arithmetic can lie.
Mathematical theories (set of beliefs) can lie.

Only truth cannot lie, but nobody know the truth as such.

 Something that is a paradox or inconsistent is not the same thing  
as an intentional attempt to deceive. I'm not sure what 'G* proves  
<>[]f' means but I think it will mean the same thing to anyone who  
understands it, and not something different to the boss than it  
does to the neighbor.


Actually it will have as much meaning as there are correct machines  
(a lot), but the laws remains the same. Then adding the non- 
monotonical umbrella, saving the Lôbian machines from the constant  
mistakes and lies they do, provides different interpretation of []f,  
like


I dream,
I die,
I get mad,
I am in a cul-de-sac
I get wrong

etc.

It will depend on the intensional nuances in play.

Couldn't the machine output the same product as musical notes or  
colored pixels instead?


Why not. Humans can do that too.












it cannot intentionally tell the truth either, and no matter how  
sophisticated and self-referential a logic it is based on, it can  
never transcend its own alienation from feeling, physics, and  
authenticity.


That is correct, but again, that is justifiable by all correct  
sufficiently rich machines.


Not sure I understand. Are you saying that we, as rich machines,  
cannot intentionally lie or tell the truth either?


No, I am saying that all correct machines can eventually justify  
that if they are correct they can't  express it, and if they are  
consistent, it will be consistent they are wrong. So it means they  
can eventually exploits the false locally. Team of universal numbers  
get entangled in very subtle prisoner dilemma.

Universal machines can lie, and can crash.

That sounds like they can lie only when they calculate that they  
must, not that they can lie intentionally because they enjoy it or  
out of sadism.


That sounds like an opportunistic inference.

Bruno




Craig


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics