date:20140112

On 11 Jan 2014, at 13:54, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

The WM experiment is easy to grasp. For me the difficulty lies, as
Liz guessed, with the infinity of possibilities. For continuation Cn
does p(n) stabilize as the number of computations approaches infinity?

If not, comp is false.

Are there an infinity of possible continuations?

Yes.

Are they enumerable?

No, they are not. The infinite computation with some dovetailing on
the real numbers or infinite sequences have to win on all finite or
denumerable histories. But some possible chunk of them might play some
role.

I mean there is a way of using intuition here but infinities have a
way of making intuition obsolete.

Yes, but since Cantor we do have tools, and some can work in the
theoretical computer science context. If the intuition is shown to
lead to an impossibility, this will show a problem with comp, not with
the math derived from it (normally, if there are no flaw in the math
translation, based on the classical theory of knowledge).

Bruno

Terren

On Jan 11, 2014 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 11 Jan 2014, at 02:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to
me, that's it - how an infinity of emulations condense into a
single conscious experience.

I would be please to understand the problem. If you are OK with step
3, you know that the condensation is given by the probability
measure on all computations going through your local current state,
by the FPI.

Your consciousness condenses into here and now for the same
measure the guy in Washington feel to be in only once city after the
WM-duplication.

I am not sure to really see what you don't see.

QM suggests a measure exists, but with comp, if the measure exists,
we must derived it from arithmetic. If we can show that such a
measure does not exist, then we know that comp is false.

Bruno

Terren

On Jan 10, 2014 8:04 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
wrote:

Dear Terren,

Yes, it is about the continuations and measures thereof. I am not
having much luck discovering how the measures are defined.

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 8:02 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com
wrote:
Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
(notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds
would be separated as a result of the measure of stable
continuations of those worlds... or were you making a different
point?

Terren

On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined
- but only for a particular point of view. So I, Terren,
experience one and only one physics, because my consciousness is
the selection criteria among the infinity of computations going
through my state. But what about Glak, a being in an alternative
physics? Glak's consciousness selects a unique/invariant physics
for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak experiences is
characterized by laws that are different from what I experience.

But then if you ask, Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-
versa? you see that the answer must be that it would be an
improbable continuation of my brain states to suddenly instantiate
a different physics and experience being Glak. This is like the
white rabbit problem, except in the form of why don't I turn into
a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps saying must have a solution (if
comp is true).

Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 14:05, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Unfortunately I don't have enough familiarity with the math to  
follow you here. It is something I'd like to become fluent in one of  
these days but unfortunately I barely have enough time these days to  
read this list.


OK. Good book are Mendelson, Boolos and Jeffrey (and Burgess), etc.  
Unfortunately they asks for a lot ow work. Logic is the less known  
branch of math. The beginning *seems* easy, but is not (unlike  
computability theiory).




However one thing still nags me. I don't find it hard to imagine  
that given enough computational power, we could simulate a universe  
with alternative physics, that leads within the simulation to  
intelligent, conscious life forms, eventually.


The simulated agent will be conscious in the 3-1 sense, but we will  
have to manipulate them infinitely to fail them. Indeed they can  
read and think like us, do the UD-Argument, and find the comp-physics,  
and compare it with their artificial physics, and their choice will be  
that either they are indeed in a normal simulation, or that comp is  
false. But we will have ourself an infinite task to fail them. If not  
they will soon or later find the discrepancies.




So Glak appears in our simulation. And if we can simulate it, well,  
it's already in the UD*, as well as the infinite computations going  
through Glak's state.


Bur from their own 1-1 points of view, they are in the UD*, and will  
follow the path with the greater measure.
They will not stay in the simulation. That will happen only in our  
3-1 view (or 1-3-1 views).




The only way I can resolve this with your reply is that I fear you  
have to say conscious beings cannot exist in alternative physics  
simulations, but I'd love to be wrong here.


They can, from our points of view, but they will find themselves in  
the most common computations in the UD* which pass through their states.
Those people stays in the simulation, only from our points of view,  
and this asks infinite word from our part if we want them to stay  
failed by our simulation. Their situation is similar with the  
stochastically rare witness of a quantum suicide surviver. He survived  
with probability 1, from their own view, but with probability near 0  
for their witness (in iterated quantum suicides).


Bruno

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 15:38, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear Bruno,


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 11 Jan 2014, at 08:56, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Der Bruno,

The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD,  
UD*, which from the first person perspective is entirely given,  
by the 1p delay invariance.


   The UD never stops. If a process lasts forever, it is eternal,  
then it does not ever complete and thus its results never obtain in  
any way that can be considered as accessible.


?
Then real numbers don't exist.

Ah, now you diverge from Kronecker. :-)


Yes, in the epistemology. God created the natural numbers, and the  
natural numbers created the real numbers, to simplify their lives.








To belong to your first person indeterminacy domain, the UD needs  
only to access the state, which, by non stopping, has to occur once.  
of course we might need to look at the 10^(10^1000) nth step of the  
UD. But the 1p is not aware of the reconstitution (in UD*) delay,  
so that does not matter. Either your state is accessed, or not, and  
if it is accessed it take a finite time (number of the UD-steps),  
and belongs to the indeterminacy domain. So the global FPI does have  
the whole infinite trace of the UD as domain, or if you prefer it is  
the infinite union of all its finite parts.  Just keep in mind the  
step 2 and 4.


This makes no sense unless you are assuming time at the ontological  
level for the flow of the UD.


This is your usual stance against block reality. We have discussed  
this many times, and I eventually asked you what you assume, but get  
no answer I could make sense of.





Another indication of non-neutrality.


For your theory, as here you assume a primitive physical time. I do  
not.



We can make appeals from the fact that we seem to have a flow of  
events/states (aka Time) at our level


Yes, we seem.




and wonder where that flow might originate.


From the indexicals. Bp  p, for example, indicates that the machines  
feel their knowledge states as evolving through some subjective time.




The problem is that no change can emerge from stasis, not even an  
illusion.


Proof? I think that any proof of this will entail some non-comp axiom.  
This should follow from the UDA.





The solution is obvious: Take Becoming as fundamental.


Then, not only this is no more neutral monism, but you assume what I  
want to understand.





It is neutral in that no particular order or type is selected to exist


Then becoming is a fuzzy philosophical non workable stuff. What not  
God did it?. Anyway, that moves is forbidden in comp, by the UD- 
Argument.


To explain means to relate the thing we study from things on which we  
agree.


You are not able to define that becoming in a way making it into a 3p  
sharable and testable theory. But the becoming *emerging* from comp is  
testable (indeed it gives the whole of physics).



while some other does not. Being and statics are then the relative  
invariances, fixed points, automorphism, etc. within this neutrality.


Gives some axiom for becoming, but if you make it neutral in your  
(quite personal) sense, I don't even see how that could be possible.


You seem to continue to oppose philosophy to science, but that's bad  
philosophy, Im afraid. If you don't find a flaw in the UDA, I think  
your point is equivalent to a form of non-computationalist stance.


Bruno

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Re: Tegmark and consciousness

On 12 January 2014 19:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  interpret,
 they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical construct
 which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, describes
 observed phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical construct is
 solely and precisely that it is  expected to work.
 --—John von Neumann

 How does one know which mathematical construct to try out, to see if it
will work? Surely interpretation becomes necessary at some point.

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 12 January 2014 18:33, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear LizR,
 On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 12:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 12 January 2014 14:52, Stephen Paul King 
 stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear LizR,

   That is the claim and I show that it is false. A class that has a
 particular set of properties and not the rest of the properties required to
 balance it all out to Nothing is not neutral. It is biased!


 So, can't arithmetic be balanced out to nothing? What can?


 Of course arithmetic be balanced out to nothing! By the class of physical
 objects and their actions! They are what it isn't. Is this not making
 sense? I don't see how it is complicated...

 I must admit to being a little confused.

Brent said

everything is arithmetic IS neutral monism:

You appeared to disagree. But then you said Of course arithmetic be
balanced out to nothing!

I assume you meant to say it *can't *be balanced out to nothing, because
later, you said

My claim is that arithmetic is not Nothing thus it is not neutral and
cannot be the foundation of a neutral monism.

So I'll assume that was a typo above, unless you tell me otherwise.

So, if arithmetic *isn't* capable of being balanced out to nothing, what *is
*capable? (And what is involved in balancing out to nothing, anyway?)

I'll have a stab at what BOTN may involve.

I seem to recall that Russell Standish's book Theory of Nothing says that
all possible information = zero information --- if you have information as
bitstrings, then all possible bitstrings add up to a Library of Babel, a
collection which contains all, and hence no, information --- so that is an
example of something that balances out to nothing.

Similarly, a multiverse in which all possible things happen balances out
to nothing *except for* the laws of physics that operate within it. (While
a universe in which things could have happened differently doesn't - it has
a single, definite history.)

But surely one needs some form of logic to define information, and some
form of logic to define the laws of physics?  So aren't these prior to
something *being able to* balance out to nothing?

And if so, might not arithmetic also fall into the logically prior basket
- i.e. be something that is required thath makes it possible for neutral
monism to exist?

(Did that make sense? I may be losing the thread here. ..)

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Re: Homotopy Type Theory



On 11 Jan 2014, at 22:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

By the way, what about if you find a mathematical theory that show  
that:


computer programs and matematical proofs  are no longer something out
of math,


This is non sense. Computer programs have born in math.





but mathematical structures and both are essentially the same
thing:


The computable is purely mathematical since birth (excepting Babbage,  
but even Babbage discovered it was mathematical at the end of his  
life, arguably, from a work due to Jacques Lafitte).
But the mathematical, classically conceived,  is *much* larger than  
the computable.

N^N is not enumerable. the computable restriction of N^N is enumerable.




both are paths from premises to conclussion in a  space with
topological properties


That does not make them identical.





And the theory stablish topological relations between these paths so
that proofs and computer algorithms are classified according with
these relations.


You might study the book by Szabo, on the category approach on the  
algebra of proofs.
But proofs and computations are not equivalent concept at all. There  
is a Church's thesis for computability, not for provability and  
definability which are machines or theories dependent.






That is homotopy type theory.

http://homotopytypetheory.org/

I´m starting to learn something about it, It is based on type theory,
category theory and topology.


That is very interesting, and category provides nice model for  
constructive subpart of the computable, like typed lambda calculus.  
But category becomes very hard on the complete algebra of computation.  
the partial nature of the fiunctions involved makes hard to even  
compute a co-product.





The book introduction is nice (HOTT link
at the bottom of the page). It seems to be a foundation of computer
science and math that unify both at a higher level, since proofs and
programs become legitimate mathematical structures


They are since Church thesis. That is all what computability or  
recursion theory is all about.
The rest is semantics of languages, more useful in computing theory  
than in computability theory, which is born, I insist, before we  
implement physical computer. The computer have been disocvered by  
mathematicians, in mathematics, indeed, in arithmetic. Those notions  
are born mathematical.


Only later, some physicists have tried to get, without any success, a  
notion of physical computation.




The book:

http://homotopytypetheory.org/2013/06/20/the-hott-book/


Guiseppe Longo wrote also nice book on that subject.  It is a vast  
field, but Gödel made proof into arithmetical objects well before,  
as the notion of computations will follow soon after (if not before if  
we take Post's unpublished anticipation into account).



Bruno





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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 23:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/10/2014 11:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But what is the measure of relative persistence?


It is the measure almost defined by the material hypostases (in  
S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*). It defines the comp physical laws.


How do those different logics define a measure over possible physics?


By defining a proximity space on computation or sigma_sentences proof.

Technically this use a representation theorem of quantum logic (due to  
Goldblatt), which defines such measure, in term of a modal logic  
(known as B), with main axioms Bp - p, and p - BDp. The logics above  
prove those two theorem (and disprove BDp - p, avoiding the collapse  
into classical logic), and heve the exact properties such that the  
translation of p into BDp acts as a quantization, close enough to  
simulate a quantum computer, except from still unsolved problem.


Von Neumann defined a quantum logic to be right, if it determines  
all probabilities (not just the case of certainties). He failed to  
find it, but if comp is correct, and if the classical notion of  
knowledge is accepted, then the representation theorem shows how to  
lift a Gleason like measure unicity proof from them, and so the  
arithmetical quantum logic should be of the type of Von Neumann, ...  
or comp and classical theory of knowledge are false.


One day, I will list (at least) the representation theorems making the  
hypostases and quantization possible (and necessary).


Bruno




Brent

If they don't exist, comp has to be false, or we are in a  
simulation, or the S4 theory of knowledge should be amended.


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Re: Homotopy Type Theory



On 12 Jan 2014, at 02:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


But the proofs where not studied before as mathematical structures.
Godel and any mathematician did profs, but proofs where
meta-mathematical, in the sense that they were not mathematical
objects,


No, that is not true at all, and meaningless. Gödel did arithmetize  
meta-arithmetic. His whole proofs is based on this.







although they could be formalized in a language.


And then translated in math, even arithmetic.




The same
happened with the notion of equality and equivalence etc That are
defined in a fuzzy or ad-hoc way. HOTT study how equal are two things
depending on the path from the one to the other, that is , what
topology has the proof of equality between the two.


That is interesting work, but it is a restriction on some typed or  
constructive approach.
It does not make things more mathematical, as it was elementary  
arithmetic from the start, as Gödel and the sequel have proven.


Note that, computation can be seen as a particular case of proof, and  
proof can be seen as a particular case of computations, but those  
concept are quite different and obeys to quite different mathematics.
That happens often. You can see a function as particular case of a  
relation (functional relation), and you can see a relation as a  
particular case of a function (by the characteristic function), but  
relation and function are not the same notion.


Any way, both computation and proof are mathematical object in  
computer science and mathematical logic, since the start.


Bruno





2014/1/11, LizR lizj...@gmail.com:
That sounds like (some of) what Bruno talks about. The computer  
programme
known as the UD (and its trace) are in maths. (And didn't Godel  
make

proofs paths of maths?)


On 12 January 2014 10:41, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com  
wrote:


By the way, what about if you find a mathematical theory that show  
that:


computer programs and matematical proofs  are no longer something  
out
of math, but mathematical structures and both are essentially the  
same

thing: both are paths from premises to conclussion in a  space with
topological properties

And the theory stablish topological relations between these paths so
that proofs and computer algorithms are classified according with
these relations.

That is homotopy type theory.

http://homotopytypetheory.org/

I´m starting to learn something about it, It is based on type  
theory,
category theory and topology. The book introduction is nice (HOTT  
link

at the bottom of the page). It seems to be a foundation of computer
science and math that unify both at a higher level, since proofs and
programs become legitimate mathematical structures

The book:

http://homotopytypetheory.org/2013/06/20/the-hott-book/

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Re: A different take on the ontological status of Math



On 11 Jan 2014, at 16:06, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:





On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 3:47 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com 
 wrote:

Dear Friends,

  I highly recommend Louis H. Kauffman's new blog. His latest post  
speaks to the Becoming interpretation of mathematics that I advocate:


http://kauffman2013.wordpress.com/2014/01/11/is-mathematics-real/

Last I understood, you advocate some kind of process, here becoming  
interpretation. I don't see how that fits with some set theoretical  
foundation. Could you elaborate? I don't think sets are necessary  
for some comp foundation and arithmetic suffices already in  
throwing us down a rabbit hole. PGC


Yeah, I just commented there. It is nice, but not quite original.  
Also, the idea to extract all sets from the empty set, is just like  
providing the common axiomatic of sets with the reflexion and  
comprehension axioms, but all axiomatics of sets subsumes all sets.
Then if Stephen allows to found becoming on math, like me and  
Kauffman, then he accepts the idea that the illusion of change can be  
explained by a static block reality, which, as you point out,  
contradicts what he just said. On the contrary Kauffman is going, like  
Tegmark, nearer and nearer to the comp theory.


Bruno






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Re: Homotopy Type Theory

Phisical computation was discovered by nature 4000 Million years BT
(Before Turing) . And even before.

2014/1/12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

 On 11 Jan 2014, at 22:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 By the way, what about if you find a mathematical theory that show
 that:

 computer programs and matematical proofs  are no longer something out
 of math,

 This is non sense. Computer programs have born in math.




 but mathematical structures and both are essentially the same
 thing:

 The computable is purely mathematical since birth (excepting Babbage,
 but even Babbage discovered it was mathematical at the end of his
 life, arguably, from a work due to Jacques Lafitte).
 But the mathematical, classically conceived,  is *much* larger than
 the computable.
 N^N is not enumerable. the computable restriction of N^N is enumerable.



 both are paths from premises to conclussion in a  space with
 topological properties

 That does not make them identical.




 And the theory stablish topological relations between these paths so
 that proofs and computer algorithms are classified according with
 these relations.

 You might study the book by Szabo, on the category approach on the
 algebra of proofs.
 But proofs and computations are not equivalent concept at all. There
 is a Church's thesis for computability, not for provability and
 definability which are machines or theories dependent.




 That is homotopy type theory.

 http://homotopytypetheory.org/

 I´m starting to learn something about it, It is based on type theory,
 category theory and topology.

 That is very interesting, and category provides nice model for
 constructive subpart of the computable, like typed lambda calculus.
 But category becomes very hard on the complete algebra of computation.
 the partial nature of the fiunctions involved makes hard to even
 compute a co-product.



 The book introduction is nice (HOTT link
 at the bottom of the page). It seems to be a foundation of computer
 science and math that unify both at a higher level, since proofs and
 programs become legitimate mathematical structures

 They are since Church thesis. That is all what computability or
 recursion theory is all about.
 The rest is semantics of languages, more useful in computing theory
 than in computability theory, which is born, I insist, before we
 implement physical computer. The computer have been disocvered by
 mathematicians, in mathematics, indeed, in arithmetic. Those notions
 are born mathematical.

 Only later, some physicists have tried to get, without any success, a
 notion of physical computation.


 The book:

 http://homotopytypetheory.org/2013/06/20/the-hott-book/

 Guiseppe Longo wrote also nice book on that subject.  It is a vast
 field, but Gödel made proof into arithmetical objects well before,
 as the notion of computations will follow soon after (if not before if
 we take Post's unpublished anticipation into account).


 Bruno




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Re: Homotopy Type Theory

Physical computation was discovered by nature 4000 Million years BT
(Before Turing) . And even before.

2014/1/12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

 On 11 Jan 2014, at 22:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 By the way, what about if you find a mathematical theory that show
 that:

 computer programs and matematical proofs  are no longer something out
 of math,

 This is non sense. Computer programs have born in math.




 but mathematical structures and both are essentially the same
 thing:

 The computable is purely mathematical since birth (excepting Babbage,
 but even Babbage discovered it was mathematical at the end of his
 life, arguably, from a work due to Jacques Lafitte).
 But the mathematical, classically conceived,  is *much* larger than
 the computable.
 N^N is not enumerable. the computable restriction of N^N is enumerable.



 both are paths from premises to conclussion in a  space with
 topological properties

 That does not make them identical.




 And the theory stablish topological relations between these paths so
 that proofs and computer algorithms are classified according with
 these relations.

 You might study the book by Szabo, on the category approach on the
 algebra of proofs.
 But proofs and computations are not equivalent concept at all. There
 is a Church's thesis for computability, not for provability and
 definability which are machines or theories dependent.




 That is homotopy type theory.

 http://homotopytypetheory.org/

 I´m starting to learn something about it, It is based on type theory,
 category theory and topology.

 That is very interesting, and category provides nice model for
 constructive subpart of the computable, like typed lambda calculus.
 But category becomes very hard on the complete algebra of computation.
 the partial nature of the fiunctions involved makes hard to even
 compute a co-product.



 The book introduction is nice (HOTT link
 at the bottom of the page). It seems to be a foundation of computer
 science and math that unify both at a higher level, since proofs and
 programs become legitimate mathematical structures

 They are since Church thesis. That is all what computability or
 recursion theory is all about.
 The rest is semantics of languages, more useful in computing theory
 than in computability theory, which is born, I insist, before we
 implement physical computer. The computer have been disocvered by
 mathematicians, in mathematics, indeed, in arithmetic. Those notions
 are born mathematical.

 Only later, some physicists have tried to get, without any success, a
 notion of physical computation.


 The book:

 http://homotopytypetheory.org/2013/06/20/the-hott-book/

 Guiseppe Longo wrote also nice book on that subject.  It is a vast
 field, but Gödel made proof into arithmetical objects well before,
 as the notion of computations will follow soon after (if not before if
 we take Post's unpublished anticipation into account).


 Bruno




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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 15:43, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear Bruno,

  You wrote:
AR provides the neutral monism!
Comp is neutral monism. Neither mind, nor matter are taken as  
primitive. Both emerge from the additive-multiplicative structure of  
arithmetic (AR), and that structure provides the neutral stuff.


Ontological neutrality is that there are no particular properties or  
orders.



No. Not in the most common standard sense.
Also, if your ontology is so unstructured, how do you use it to derive  
the other things? It does not make sense to me.




AR has a particular set of properties and an order, thus it cannot  
be considered as neutral.


Neutral monism, in the philosophy of mind,  means that we don't  
presuppose neither mind, nor body, and that we account of both of them  
from something else (here the arithmetical reality).





It must includes all possibilities and orderings equally.


It contains all computations, and much more, indeed. That is why it  
can work at all.




Numbers have particular properties and orders so how is it that you  
can think of them as being a neutral monism?


Because they are neither belonging to the mind, nor to the physical  
reality.
In all theories you have to assume something from which you can  
account for other things. The nothing theory assumes some notion of  
things, like set theoretical axioms, or a energy vacuum, etc.





No Bruno, you are advocating a form of Idealism,


Then you make the numbers into a product of the human mind, but with  
comp, the human mind is handled by purely arithmetical notion (like  
relative universal numbers, computations, etc.).


Explaining the number with the human mind is a non-comp attempt to  
explain the simple by the very complex. It is like God did it, or a  
ignorance-gap type of explanation.


Comp defines computations and machines from arithmetic. It is a much  
more fertile way to proceed, as we do agree on the few properties of  
numbers. But nobody agrees on term like mind, human mind, becoming,  
which are fuzzy philosophical jargon.




almost like Berkeley, but unlike Berkeley you do not fall prey to  
Mr. Johnson's criticism by appealing to the kickability of prime  
numbers,


OK.


the truth of theorems (within theories), etc. Nice move, but it is  
still flawed.


It is not a move. It is derived from an assumption. If numbers exists  
only in the human mind, then all machines exists only in the human  
mind, and I am not sure I can say yes to digitalist doctor in that  
case.


Bruno







On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 3:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 11 Jan 2014, at 06:05, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear Brent,

  I will try a crude summary and hope to not be misunderstood... It  
starts with the Stone duality, a well known isomorphism between  
Boolean algebras and totally disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces.  
The former are identified with minds (logical, computational,  
numerical, etc) and the latter with physical objects (what is more  
physical that a space that looks exactly like Democritus' atoms  
in a void?.
   This solves the mind-body linkage problem of Descartes' dualism.  
The paper then discusses how interactions between pairs of minds  
(generalizations of Boolean algebras identified as states) is  
mediated via pairs of bodies (generalizations of Stone spaces to  
include mass, spin, charge, potentials,... physics identified as  
events). A crude diagram of this relation for the evolution of a  
single entity is:


... - Body - Body' - ...
   | |
... - Mind - Mind' - ...

where the | symbol is the Stone isomorphism, - is the physical  
evolution of one event to the next and - is the logical arrow of  
implication.


  Mathematics as considered my most people usually ignores  
evolution of logical structures, such as Boolean algebras, and so  
the difference between mind and mind' is not considered. Now that  
computers are commonplace, the idea that logical structures evolve  
makes a lot more sense! A computation is the transformation of  
information and since logical structures capture the relations of  
the information, it is natural to consider this theory.


  In this theory, minds and bodies (including brains!) are not  
separable substances but are isomorphs that have dynamics whose  
arrows point in opposite directions. Physical process moves  
forward from event to event' in sequences of time according to  
thermodynamics, etc. and logic looks backward to ensure that any  
new state is consistent with previous states. This implies an  
elegant solution to the measurement problem of QM! Differences  
between states and parameters of time can be subdivided as finely  
as one wishes; even to the smoothness of continua.
  It is what the logical 'side of the coin does to select physical  
events that won me over to Pratt's theory: a physical transition  
from event x at time t to event x' at time t' is allowed if and  
only if the

Re: Homotopy Type Theory

2014/1/12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

 On 12 Jan 2014, at 02:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 But the proofs where not studied before as mathematical structures.
 Godel and any mathematician did profs, but proofs where
 meta-mathematical, in the sense that they were not mathematical
 objects,

 No, that is not true at all, and meaningless. Gödel did arithmetize
 meta-arithmetic. His whole proofs is based on this.

That is not the same than study proofs themselves inside math than
reduce them to arithmetic or set theory. Moreover, what Godel did was
called meta-mathematics AFAIK





 although they could be formalized in a language.

 And then translated in math, even arithmetic.



 The same
 happened with the notion of equality and equivalence etc That are
 defined in a fuzzy or ad-hoc way. HOTT study how equal are two things
 depending on the path from the one to the other, that is , what
 topology has the proof of equality between the two.

 That is interesting work, but it is a restriction on some typed or
 constructive approach.
 It does not make things more mathematical, as it was elementary
 arithmetic from the start, as Gödel and the sequel have proven.

 Note that, computation can be seen as a particular case of proof, and
 proof can be seen as a particular case of computations, but those
 concept are quite different and obeys to quite different mathematics.
 That happens often. You can see a function as particular case of a
 relation (functional relation), and you can see a relation as a
 particular case of a function (by the characteristic function), but
 relation and function are not the same notion.

 Any way, both computation and proof are mathematical object in
 computer science and mathematical logic, since the start.

 Bruno




 2014/1/11, LizR lizj...@gmail.com:
 That sounds like (some of) what Bruno talks about. The computer
 programme
 known as the UD (and its trace) are in maths. (And didn't Godel
 make
 proofs paths of maths?)


 On 12 January 2014 10:41, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 By the way, what about if you find a mathematical theory that show
 that:

 computer programs and matematical proofs  are no longer something
 out
 of math, but mathematical structures and both are essentially the
 same
 thing: both are paths from premises to conclussion in a  space with
 topological properties

 And the theory stablish topological relations between these paths so
 that proofs and computer algorithms are classified according with
 these relations.

 That is homotopy type theory.

 http://homotopytypetheory.org/

 I´m starting to learn something about it, It is based on type
 theory,
 category theory and topology. The book introduction is nice (HOTT
 link
 at the bottom of the page). It seems to be a foundation of computer
 science and math that unify both at a higher level, since proofs and
 programs become legitimate mathematical structures

 The book:

 http://homotopytypetheory.org/2013/06/20/the-hott-book/

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 18:57, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 11 Jan 2014, at 08:56, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Der Bruno,

The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD,  
UD*, which from the first person perspective is entirely given,  
by the 1p delay invariance.


   The UD never stops. If a process lasts forever, it is eternal,  
then it does not ever complete and thus its results never obtain in  
any way that can be considered as accessible.


?
Then real numbers don't exist.

To belong to your first person indeterminacy domain, the UD needs  
only to access the state, which, by non stopping, has to occur once.  
of course we might need to look at the 10^(10^1000) nth step of the  
UD. But the 1p is not aware of the reconstitution (in UD*) delay,  
so that does not matter. Either your state is accessed, or not, and  
if it is accessed it take a finite time (number of the UD-steps),  
and belongs to the indeterminacy domain. So the global FPI does have  
the whole infinite trace of the UD as domain, or if you prefer it is  
the infinite union of all its finite parts.  Just keep in mind the  
step 2 and 4.



Bruno,

I was thinking: Shouldn't halting programs still contribute an  
infinite amount of weight in the UD, since they are still reached an  
infinite number of times (at least once each time the UD reaches  
itself).


That will give only a denumerable set. The non enumerable set of  
histories should win. The winner has to exploit this in some way,  
like Feynman formulation of QM illustrates already for the quantum  
(only in the classical case, to be sure). That is why I say that some  
observable must have a continumm spectrum if comp can work. It could  
be just the frequency operator (like in Graham paper in the Graham- 
DeWitt book on the many-worlds, or in Hartle's paper, or in Preskill  
quantum information textbook).




Perhaps there is some noticeable cut off or difference in weight  
between those programs that take longer to reach than the UD itself  
and those that occur multiple times before the UD reaches itself.


I am not sure. I will think about this.

Bruno


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Re: The One



On 11 Jan 2014, at 18:42, John Mikes wrote:


Reply to Bruno;
Wed, Jan 8, 2014 Bruno M wrote:

Note also that Popper's principle has been refuted in the Machine  
Learning theory (by John Case  Al.). Allowing an inductive  
inference machine to bet on some non refutable principle enlarges  
the class of computable functions that they can infer in the limit  
of the presentations of their input, output.
Don't mind too much. Popper criterion remains interesting, just not  
100% correct.

...
Computationalism can justify that, in the matter of machine's  
psychology, every general assertions have to be taken with some  
amount of grains of salt.


Let me try to explain the three notions:  'machine',  'comp',   
'universal'.


Computability theory is a branch of mathematical logic, and the  
notion of computable functions arise from studies in the foundations  
of mathematics. Gödel, in his 1931 negative solution to a problem  
asked by Hilbert, already defined a large class of computable  
functions, needed in his translation of the syntax of arithmetic in  
term of addition and multiplication.


JM: How do you get to SMALLER values by using ONLY addition   
multiplication of natural integers? Is your world a ONE_WAY -UP?


Actually I can define s from 0, addition and multiplication. So we  
have s, the successor notion, that I take often as a primitive too.  
Numbers are then given by 0, s(0), s(s(0)), 


Then you can define x is the predecessor of y by y = s(x). You have y  
= s(x) if and only if x is the predecessor of y.






---BTW: math-logic is the product of human (machine? see below) mind.


With comp, human are particular case of machine.





This has led to the discovery that I sum up as the discovery of the  
universal machine, or of the universal interpreter, missed by Gödel,  
but not by Emile Post, Turing, Kleene, etc. Gödel will take some  
time to accept Church thesis. Eventually he will understand better  
than other, as he will be aware of what he called a *miracle*.


I don't believe in miracles: they mostly turn into process-results  
by further learning.


Miracle means only extremely weird. The Godel miracle (the closure  
of the set of partial computable function) is a mathematically proven  
fact for all the very diverse notion of computability, and provides a  
very deep conceptual argument for the consistency of the Church's  
thesis.






Church defined computable basically by a mathematical programming  
language.
All definitions of computable leads to that same class, and they all  
contains universal programs/machines/numbers.


Programing goes by known elements.


All theories do that. If not it is untestable jargon avoiding the  
questions, and the testability.




Also MACHINES (in my view) include only knowable parts with  
assignable mechanism. Not as 'organizations' that may contain  
unidentified (infinite?) aspects. But I accept your 'machine' as us.


Not at all. Comp would be a human can be replaced by a human, which is  
absurd, or tautological.
The notion of machine I am using is the mathematically precise one  
given by the Church thesis.







Those are digital machines (programs) interpreted by layers of  
universal machine (interpreter or compiler of programming language)  
until the (analog) quantum field implementing it into your laptop or  
GSM.


My laptop does not go 'analogue'(quantum computing). Only digital.  
Restricted.


Quantum computation is still digital. A ruler is analog.





Comp is the opinion of the one who agrees that his surgeon replaces  
his brain with a computer simulating it at some substitution level.  
More exactly comp is the assumption that this opinion is correct,  
for some (unknown) level.


Sorry, Bruno, my answer to the doctor is NO: no (digital) finite  
machine (computer) can completely replace my unrestricted mindwork  
including not-understood infinites etc.


But I will be franc: I don't mind. My point is not that comp is true.  
My point is that if COMP is true, then physics is a theorem in comp,  
and that this makes comp testable. So let us test it. Up to now, comp  
gives a Platonic theology including a precise physics looking already  
like a quantum mechanics.






Comp is for computer science. Theoretical computer science is born  
well before computers appears and develop. By machine I mean  
digital machine, and the universal machines are the one which can  
imitate, by coded instruction, all digital machines.


So far we are in close agreement.

Those machines are enumerable. There is an enumeration of all of  
them: m_0, m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4, ...


So, you can fix one universal language, like a base, and identify  
each machine with a number. Each  programming language, or computers  
boolean net, correspond to some m_i, and are universal m_i, as they  
can imitate all others machines (accepting Church thesis).


What exactly FROM the Church theses?


With Church

Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 22:05, LizR wrote:


On 11 January 2014 23:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 11 Jan 2014, at 11:01, LizR wrote:

nor does it do anything - it's simply there, in a timeless realm.
UD* does not do anything, but we can say that relatively to the  
addition and multiplication laws, the UD does something, indeed, it  
does UD*. But not as an output, it does it as its normal  
arithmetical activity.
The same can be said of you Liz? Your many (3p) activities are  
already in UD*.


Yes, true. I had some difficulty getting up this morning, knowing my  
activities are already there :)


Including your difficulty to get up!  LOL :)

Bruno




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Re: Tegmark and consciousness



On 12 Jan 2014, at 05:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:


RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014
Consciousness as a State of Matter
Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014

Hi Folk,
Grrr!
I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s  
grapplings with consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so  
obvious and so pervasive and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief.  
I know it’s a long way from physics to neuroscience (discipline- 
wise). But surely in 2014 we can see it for what it is. Can’t they  
(Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called “science of consciousness”  
is

· the “the science of the scientific observer”


That's observation theory, not consciousness theories.



· trying to explain observing with observations


Of course you need logic, ans some assumption on the mind (like  
computationalism assume mind to be invariant for Turing simulation).





· trying to explain experience with experiences


Well, at some level, we can't avoid that, but the experience are  
extended into testable theories.





· trying to explain how scientists do science.


In some theoretical frame. yes, meta-science can be handled  
scientifically (= modestly).





· a science of scientific behaviour.
· Descriptive and never explanatory.


You overgeneralize. That is the case of physics, but not of meta- 
mathematics in the comp frame. I recall to you that computationalism  
is incompatible with physicalism.





· Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws of  
nature’ contacts the actual underlying reality...


That's partly wrong, partly correct.



· Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never  
ever ever questioning that.


?
That's fuzzy, and false, as far as I can interpret it precisely.




· Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of anything.


That's false in Everett QM, and in computationalism.



· Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out  
of subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.


Many does evidence the subjectivity. especially on this list. You are  
a bit unfair.




· Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with  
objectified phenomena.


Well, that's exactly the kind of Aristotelianism that computationalism  
refutes.





2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow  
gives us exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A  
new ‘state of matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we  
have to do is admit we are actually inside the universe,


The physical universe? I am agnostic on this, if only because that is  
what we need to explain once we assume the brain Tring emulable at  
some level.







made of whatever it is made of,


Yes, matter is not made of matter. That's the comp point.




getting a view from the point of view of being a bit of it..  
g. The big mistake is that thinking that physics has ever,  
in the history of science, ever ever ever dealt with what the  
universe is actually made of, as opposed to merely describing what a  
presupposed observer ‘sees it looking like’.


Yes, that is what comp makes into a theorem. We agreed on this already  
in previous post. You should send your comment to more physicalist  
forum.
yet you still seem to assume a physical reality, ad so are not yet  
cured of Aristotelian theology, apparently.





The next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what  
the universe is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering  
an ability to scientifically observe in the first place.


Wich stuff?




These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even  
lifted a finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know  
what the problem is. The problem is not one _for_ science. The  
problem is _science itself_  ... _us_.




Science is just a matter of modesty and clarity. And yes, in the mind  
science, the human emotions drives us still a lot, and people get  
unscientific. the problem is not science, it is our tolerance for  
the lack of rigor in theology (efven more so in the theologuy of the  
atheist scientists (a contradiction in term). Science must be  
agnostic, even religion has to be, if comp is true.





Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a  
book on this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll  
sort them out.


It looks like you are still confusing computationalism and  
physicalism. But there are opposed. if comp is correct, the theology  
has to be platonist. The physical universe is not made of things, but  
is an appearance from inside arithmetic.





Happy new year!



Happy new year Colin. You preach a choir here, but amazingly seems to  
still believe in a primitive universe, making your point eventually  
seeming contradictory.


Bruno




Cheers,

Colin   (@Dr_Cuspy, if you tweet).
phew rant

Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 12 Jan 2014, at 06:33, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 12:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 12 January 2014 14:52, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
wrote:

Dear LizR,

That is the claim and I show that it is false. A class that has a
particular set of properties and not the rest of the properties
required to balance it all out to Nothing is not neutral. It is
biased!

So, can't arithmetic be balanced out to nothing? What can?

Of course arithmetic be balanced out to nothing!

What does that means?

By the class of physical objects and their actions!

But your own monism should forbid you to refer to physical objects,
at least before you tell what they are, from a theory which does not
assume them.

They are what it isn't.

Unicorn? Santa Klauss?

Is this not making sense? I don't see how it is complicated...

That might be your main problem.

Bruno

On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 8:32 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 12 January 2014 12:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Because everything is arithmetic IS neutral monism:

Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate
reality is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in
agreement with idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral
monism from its better known monistic rivals is the claim that the
intrinsic nature of ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical.
This negative claim also captures the idea of neutrality: being
intrinsically neither mental nor physical in nature ultimate reality
is said to be neutral between the two.

So comp is neutral monism. I never realised that.

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 12 Jan 2014, at 08:05, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

I am writing about concepts that are more fundamental than
physics, but some of the same ideas transfer from the fundamental to
the phenomenal. Physics is phenomena that we can observe and
measure...

Neutrality is the absence of properties or the sum of all possible
properties.

Sorry but I can't give sense to this.

We get Nothingness either way. My claim is that arithmetic is not
Nothing thus it is not neutral and cannot be the foundation of a
neutral monism.

But as I said, the notion of Nothing assumes many things, and you have
to give the axioms on things to get that nothing.

nothing as a word alone is not better than existence of God or
physical universe, etc.

You start by assuming what we want to explain from things we do grasp.
It is equivalent with don't ask, or with don't do science.

Bruno

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 2:00 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 1/11/2014 9:33 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 12:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 12 January 2014 14:52, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
wrote:

Dear LizR,

So, can't arithmetic be balanced out to nothing? What can?

Of course arithmetic be balanced out to nothing! By the class of
physical objects and their actions! They are what it isn't. Is this
not making sense? I don't see how it is complicated...

Doesn't make sense to me. What does balanced out to nothing
mean?...like the net mass-energy of the universe is zero, the
negative gravitational potential just balancing the matter (which
seems to be true)? Or the total information may be zero if we could
count the negative contributions beyond the Hubble sphere?

Brent

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Re: Homotopy Type Theory



On 12 Jan 2014, at 11:28, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


Phisical computation was discovered by nature 4000 Million years BT
(Before Turing) . And even before.


Show me the publication.

Come one, with argument like that I could answer that mathematical  
computation has been discovered already out of time and space, and  
indeed the physical computation (a notion you might try to define,  
btw) have develop from them, which is the computationalist point I try  
to explain.


Bruno





2014/1/12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:


On 11 Jan 2014, at 22:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


By the way, what about if you find a mathematical theory that show
that:

computer programs and matematical proofs  are no longer something  
out

of math,


This is non sense. Computer programs have born in math.





but mathematical structures and both are essentially the same
thing:


The computable is purely mathematical since birth (excepting Babbage,
but even Babbage discovered it was mathematical at the end of his
life, arguably, from a work due to Jacques Lafitte).
But the mathematical, classically conceived,  is *much* larger than
the computable.
N^N is not enumerable. the computable restriction of N^N is  
enumerable.





both are paths from premises to conclussion in a  space with
topological properties


That does not make them identical.





And the theory stablish topological relations between these paths so
that proofs and computer algorithms are classified according with
these relations.


You might study the book by Szabo, on the category approach on the
algebra of proofs.
But proofs and computations are not equivalent concept at all. There
is a Church's thesis for computability, not for provability and
definability which are machines or theories dependent.





That is homotopy type theory.

http://homotopytypetheory.org/

I´m starting to learn something about it, It is based on type  
theory,

category theory and topology.


That is very interesting, and category provides nice model for
constructive subpart of the computable, like typed lambda calculus.
But category becomes very hard on the complete algebra of  
computation.

the partial nature of the fiunctions involved makes hard to even
compute a co-product.




The book introduction is nice (HOTT link
at the bottom of the page). It seems to be a foundation of computer
science and math that unify both at a higher level, since proofs and
programs become legitimate mathematical structures


They are since Church thesis. That is all what computability or
recursion theory is all about.
The rest is semantics of languages, more useful in computing theory
than in computability theory, which is born, I insist, before we
implement physical computer. The computer have been disocvered by
mathematicians, in mathematics, indeed, in arithmetic. Those notions
are born mathematical.

Only later, some physicists have tried to get, without any success, a
notion of physical computation.



The book:

http://homotopytypetheory.org/2013/06/20/the-hott-book/


Guiseppe Longo wrote also nice book on that subject.  It is a vast
field, but Gödel made proof into arithmetical objects well before,
as the notion of computations will follow soon after (if not before  
if

we take Post's unpublished anticipation into account).


Bruno





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Re: Homotopy Type Theory



On 12 Jan 2014, at 11:36, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


2014/1/12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:


On 12 Jan 2014, at 02:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


But the proofs where not studied before as mathematical structures.
Godel and any mathematician did profs, but proofs where
meta-mathematical, in the sense that they were not mathematical
objects,


No, that is not true at all, and meaningless. Gödel did arithmetize
meta-arithmetic. His whole proofs is based on this.


That is not the same than study proofs themselves inside math than
reduce them to arithmetic or set theory. Moreover, what Godel did was
called meta-mathematics AFAIK



The point is that computation have been discovered in arithmetic, and  
were initially defined in arithmetic or principia mathematica, and  
then in other mathematical theories (like combinatirs, or lamda  
calculus).


And meta-mathematics is just the name Kleene gived to the study of the  
mathematical notions of formal proofs, theories, models,  and  
computations. It is the same as mathematical logic.


Bruno










although they could be formalized in a language.


And then translated in math, even arithmetic.




The same
happened with the notion of equality and equivalence etc That are
defined in a fuzzy or ad-hoc way. HOTT study how equal are two  
things

depending on the path from the one to the other, that is , what
topology has the proof of equality between the two.


That is interesting work, but it is a restriction on some typed or
constructive approach.
It does not make things more mathematical, as it was elementary
arithmetic from the start, as Gödel and the sequel have proven.

Note that, computation can be seen as a particular case of proof, and
proof can be seen as a particular case of computations, but those
concept are quite different and obeys to quite different mathematics.
That happens often. You can see a function as particular case of a
relation (functional relation), and you can see a relation as a
particular case of a function (by the characteristic function), but
relation and function are not the same notion.

Any way, both computation and proof are mathematical object in
computer science and mathematical logic, since the start.

Bruno





2014/1/11, LizR lizj...@gmail.com:

That sounds like (some of) what Bruno talks about. The computer
programme
known as the UD (and its trace) are in maths. (And didn't Godel
make
proofs paths of maths?)


On 12 January 2014 10:41, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com
wrote:


By the way, what about if you find a mathematical theory that show
that:

computer programs and matematical proofs  are no longer something
out
of math, but mathematical structures and both are essentially the
same
thing: both are paths from premises to conclussion in a  space  
with

topological properties

And the theory stablish topological relations between these  
paths so

that proofs and computer algorithms are classified according with
these relations.

That is homotopy type theory.

http://homotopytypetheory.org/

I´m starting to learn something about it, It is based on type
theory,
category theory and topology. The book introduction is nice (HOTT
link
at the bottom of the page). It seems to be a foundation of  
computer
science and math that unify both at a higher level, since proofs  
and

programs become legitimate mathematical structures

The book:

http://homotopytypetheory.org/2013/06/20/the-hott-book/

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014/1/12, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com:
 2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

 On 10 Jan 2014, at 13:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

 On 10 Jan 2014, at 10:52, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 2014/1/10, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com:
 2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

 On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear LizR,

 That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.

 It is answered, completely.


 Stephen, LizR

 From what I can understand, once cleared from
 arithmetic-logic-metaphysic misticism,  the determination of the
 laws
 from infinite competitive computations follow Solomonoff's
 theorem
 of inductive inference.

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff
 's_theory_of_inductive_inference

 Or it should. But the problem is that Bruno did not gives a weight
 for
 each computation in order to stablish the outcome of what the
 pencil
 does in the air. Neither the algorithmic complexity of each
 computation (Solomonoff) nor any other. Therefore, it is  a
 complete
 chaos cut by some magic 1p collapse of computations, following QM
 fashion. And there is where the aritmetic-logic-metaphysic
 mysticism
 does his job.


 ... Job that I do not know how it is possible if a computation that
 does everithing OK until it convert the pencil in a fat female
 soprano
 (with big algorithmic complexity) is equally compatible with all
 my 1p
 observations until that moment,  is equally probable than the
 computation with much less algorithmic complexity that does its job
 right and moves the pencil gracefully without emitting molesting
 noises.

 So anything goes

 Yes, that is the white rabbit problem. Most of my earlier posts on
 this list has consisted in explaining why algorithmic complexity
 cannot work. It surely plays some role, but we have to extract it
 from
 the redundancy, no imposed it, as this would mock the consciousness
 invariance, and the FPI invariance which follows from comp.
 Of course, if you think you can eliminate the white rabbit with only
 algorithmic complexity, please do, but you will have to explain why
 the 'non algorithmically simple programs' do no more interfere with
 the FPI global indeterminacy, and by the delay invariance for the 1p
 experiences, that does not seem obvious at all.
 You do seem close to grasp the problem.

 In any case the problem is in your theory.


 That is the result. Yes, it is a problem for comp (which is just
 mechanism after Church, Kleene, Turing, Post).
 Then, using the most classical theory of knowledge, the problem
 becomes a problem in arithmetic.



 QM predict a infinite small
 probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of
 them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but
 yours.

 QM predict all this by using comp, or an unintelligible dualist theory
 of observation.

 Yes, with comp we must derive the wave or the matrix from self-
 observation, itself extracted from arithmetical self-references
 (Gödel, Löb, Solovay).





 What is FPI?

 First Person Indeterminacy. UDA step 3.



 Although it often seems so, this is not a group devoted
 to obtaining a certification on Bruno Marchall comp theories.


 I have a theorem in a theory (or class of theories extended in an
 effective sense).



 You
 have to be more didactic and can not rely on your writings when asking
 concrete questions. If the number of acronyms + theology, logic and
 psychologic concepts mixed in single statements grows when the
 conversation gets more concrete, then it is no surprise that people
 don´t understand you.

 Who does not understand? If you have a problem of understanding, just
 ask. The subject matter (the mind-body problem) is everything but
 simple. Yet we can reason, even get startling conclusions from
 admitting very weak form of mechanism.




  There are many didactic tricks that you refuse
 to use like metaphors and examples.

 I avoid metaphor indeed, but that is the custom in science. Examples?
 You can find them in the textbook. And/or you can ask any one when you
 feel the need.



 And this gives to me the
 impression that you are hiding  consciously or uncosnciously a great
 flaw.

 ?




 And my observation is that no one understand you in what is original
 in your theory.

 ?




 Apart from the brilliant and interesting  first steps.
 That is why I read you with attention.

 Where precisely the flaw appears?




 But until now I don´t find a satisfactory explanation and you confess
 that there is not, for the abundance of white rabbits in your theory.

 I am a scientist. I do not defend any theory. I just reduce the mind-
 body problem into a purely arithmetical belief in body problem.

 I illustrate that with computer science, and usual definitions in
 theology and metaphysics, when we assume comp, we can translate
 theological problem into problem of number theory or computer science.





 You simply say: the fact

Re: Tegmark and consciousness



On Sunday, January 12, 2014 12:21:48 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:



 I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am 
 conscious, so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in 
 a special way might not also be conscious. What is it about that idea 
 that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous? 


Water is just dumb matter arranged in a special way. Why not just drink 
chlorine instead? Liquid is liquid.

Craig
 



 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou 


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Re: Tegmark and consciousness



On Sunday, January 12, 2014 5:41:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 12 Jan 2014, at 05:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

 RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014
 Consciousness as a State of Matter
 Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014
  
 Hi Folk,
 Grrr!
 I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s grapplings 
 with consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so 
 pervasive and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long 
 way from physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we 
 can see it for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the 
 so-called “science of consciousness” is
 · the “the science of the scientific observer”


 That's observation theory, not consciousness theories.


Observation is part of consciousness. Without consciousness there is no 
observation.
 



 · trying to explain observing with observations


 Of course you need logic, ans some assumption on the mind (like 
 computationalism assume mind to be invariant for Turing simulation).


Since observation is part of consciousness, he is pointing out that trying 
to explain consciousness without recognizing that all evidence of it comes 
from consciousness is circular reasoning. Whether or not we need 
assumptions for our theories is not relevant to the ontology of 
consciousness.




 · trying to explain experience with experiences


 Well, at some level, we can't avoid that, but the experience are extended 
 into testable theories.


Tests and theories are experiences.
 




 · trying to explain how scientists do science.


 In some theoretical frame. yes, meta-science can be handled 
 scientifically (= modestly).



But consciousness ≠ modesty or science.




 · a science of scientific behaviour.
 · Descriptive and never explanatory.


 You overgeneralize. That is the case of physics, but not of 
 meta-mathematics in the comp frame. I recall to you that computationalism 
 is incompatible with physicalism. 


Why is meta-mathematics in comp more explanatory?
 





 · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws of 
 nature’ contacts the actual underlying reality...


 That's partly wrong, partly correct. 


That's partly information about an opinion, mostly cryptic.
 




 · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never ever 
 ever questioning that.


 ?
 That's fuzzy, and false, as far as I can interpret it precisely.


It's supposed to be false. He's giving another example of how scientific 
approaches to consciousness beg the question and deceive themselves. It 
means precisely that in reality there are many, many tools within science 
and reason, but the contemporary approaches consolidate science into a 
single dogmatic ideology.
 




 · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of anything.


 That's false in Everett QM, and in computationalism. 


They still do not contain scientists, only toy models of the footprint that 
first person interaction imposes on 3p functions.

Craig
 




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The Scale of Digital



How large does a digital circle have to be before the circumference seems 
like a straight line?

Digital information has no scale or sense of relation. Code is code. Any 
rendering of that code into a visual experience of lines and curves is a 
question of graphic formatting and human optical interaction. With a 
universe that assumes information as fundamental, the proximity-dependent 
flatness or roundness of the Earth would have to be defined 
programmatically. Otherwise, it is simply “the case” that a person is 
standing on the round surface of the round Earth. Proximity is simply a 
value with no inherent geometric relevance.

When we resize a circle in Photoshop, for instance, the program is not 
transforming a real shape, it is erasing the old digital circle and 
creating a new, unrelated digital circle. Like a cartoon, the relation 
between the before and after, between one frame and the “next” is within 
our own interpretation, not within the information.

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Better Than the Chinese Room



Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation can 
differ from natural understanding which is not susceptible to any 
mereological Systems argument. 

If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of keystrokes 
rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you can enter your 
password every day without ever knowing what it is you are typing 
(something with a #r5f^ in it…?). 

I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing and 
copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, but it is 
an instrumental logic that has no way to access the letters of the ‘human 
keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is blank and consists only of 
theoretical x,y coordinates where keys would be. No matter how good or 
sophisticated the machine is, it will still have no way to understand what 
the particular keystrokes mean to a person, only how they fit in with 
whatever set of fixed possibilities has been defined.

Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to public 
communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and entire paragraphs 
or books can be represented by a single thought. Unlike computers, we do 
not have to build our ideas up from syntactic digits. Instead the 
public-facing computation follows from the experienced sense of what is to 
be communicated in general, from the top down, and the inside out.

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Re: A different take on the ontological status of Math

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 11 Jan 2014, at 16:06, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:




 On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 3:47 PM, Stephen Paul King 
 stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Friends,

   I highly recommend Louis H. Kauffman's new blog. His latest post speaks
 to the Becoming interpretation of mathematics that I advocate:

 http://kauffman2013.wordpress.com/2014/01/11/is-mathematics-real/


 Last I understood, you advocate some kind of process, here becoming
 interpretation. I don't see how that fits with some set theoretical
 foundation. Could you elaborate? I don't think sets are necessary for some
 comp foundation and arithmetic suffices already in throwing us down a
 rabbit hole. PGC


 Yeah, I just commented there. It is nice, but not quite original. Also,
 the idea to extract all sets from the empty set, is just like providing the
 common axiomatic of sets with the reflexion and comprehension axioms, but
 all axiomatics of sets subsumes all sets.
 Then if Stephen allows to found becoming on math, like me and Kauffman,
 then he accepts the idea that the illusion of change can be explained by a
 static block reality, which, as you point out, contradicts what he just
 said. On the contrary Kauffman is going, like Tegmark, nearer and nearer to
 the comp theory.


I found Kauffman's development quite interesting. In particular getting the
expression RR=~RR for an imaginary universe
and presumably GG=GG for a real universe. But quantum mechanics demands a
complex universe. It must be a simple step to go from separate real and
imaginary universes to a complex universe. Should I be amused that Kauffman
did not take that step?

I conjectured about doing that in my Metaverse String Cosmology paper. It
would be nice to but some math around it with a suitable reference.
Richard



 Bruno






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Re: The One

Bruno: *Those machines are enumerable. There is an enumeration of all of
them: m_0, m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4, ...*

Richard: We are in close agreement if the digital machines are each a
Calabi-Yau CY Compact Manifold that can be enumerated.

Bruno: *So, you can fix one universal language, like a base, and identify
each machine with a number. *

Richard: Agreed presuming that the base is an m_i and the unique universal
language to that machine involves all other machines.

*Bruno: Each  programming language, or computers boolean net, correspond to
some m_i, and are universal m_i, as they can imitate all others machines
(accepting Church thesis).*

Richard: You seem to be identifying each machine with a programming
language that has the property of imitating all other enumerated machine.

Is it sheer coincidence that for more than one string theory consideration,
each CY machine relects or perceives (or perhaps it can be said is
conscious of) all other machines. So I conjecture that the CY machines
satisfy the Church Thesis. Can that be proven or falsified?


On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 11 Jan 2014, at 18:42, John Mikes wrote:

 Reply to Bruno;

 *Wed, Jan 8, 2014 Bruno M wrote: *

 *Note also that Popper's principle has been refuted in the Machine
 Learning theory (by John Case  Al.). Allowing an inductive inference
 machine to bet on some non refutable principle enlarges the class of
 computable functions that they can infer in the limit of the presentations
 of their input, output.*
 *Don't mind too much. Popper criterion remains interesting, just not 100%
 correct.*
 *...*
 *Computationalism can justify that, in the matter of machine's psychology,
 every general assertions have to be taken with some amount of grains of
 salt. *
 **
 *Let me try to explain the three notions:  'machine',  'comp',
  'universal'.*

 *Computability theory is a branch of mathematical logic, and the notion of
 computable functions arise from studies in the foundations of mathematics.
 Gödel, in his 1931 negative solution to a problem asked by Hilbert, already
 defined a large class of computable functions, needed in his translation of
 the syntax of arithmetic in term of addition and multiplication.*

 JM: How do you get to SMALLER values by using ONLY addition 
 multiplication of natural integers? Is your world a ONE_WAY -UP?


 Actually I can define s from 0, addition and multiplication. So we have
 s, the successor notion, that I take often as a primitive too. Numbers are
 then given by 0, s(0), s(s(0)), 

 Then you can define x is the predecessor of y by y = s(x). You have y =
 s(x) if and only if x is the predecessor of y.




 ---BTW: math-logic is the product of human (machine? see below) mind.


 With comp, human are particular case of machine.




 *This has led to the discovery that I sum up as the discovery of the
 universal machine, or of the universal interpreter, missed by Gödel, but
 not by Emile Post, Turing, Kleene, etc. Gödel will take some time to accept
 Church thesis. Eventually he will understand better than other, as he will
 be aware of what he called a *miracle**.

 I don't believe in miracles: they mostly turn into process-results by
 further learning.


 Miracle means only extremely weird. The Godel miracle (the closure of
 the set of partial computable function) is a mathematically proven fact for
 all the very diverse notion of computability, and provides a very deep
 conceptual argument for the consistency of the Church's thesis.





 *Church defined computable basically by a mathematical programming
 language. *
 *All definitions of computable leads to that same class, and they all
 contains universal programs/machines/numbers.*

 Programing goes by known elements.


 All theories do that. If not it is untestable jargon avoiding the
 questions, and the testability.



 Also *MACHINES *(in my view) include only knowable parts with assignable
 mechanism. Not as 'organizations' that may contain unidentified (infinite?)
 aspects. But I accept your 'machine' as us.


 Not at all. Comp would be a human can be replaced by a human, which is
 absurd, or tautological.
 The notion of machine I am using is the mathematically precise one given
 by the Church thesis.





 *Those are digital machines (programs) interpreted by layers of universal
 machine (interpreter or compiler of programming language) until the
 (analog) quantum field implementing it into your laptop or GSM.*

 My laptop does not go 'analogue'(quantum computing). Only digital.
 Restricted.


 Quantum computation is still digital. A ruler is analog.




 *Comp is the opinion of the one who agrees that his surgeon replaces his
 brain with a computer simulating it at some substitution level. More
 exactly comp is the assumption that this opinion is correct, for some
 (unknown) level.*

 Sorry, Bruno, my answer to the doctor is NO: no (digital) finite machine

Re: Tegmark and consciousness



On 12 Jan 2014, at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 12 January 2014 15:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales  
cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:

RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014

Consciousness as a State of Matter

Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014



Hi Folk,

Grrr!

I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s  
grapplings with
consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so  
pervasive
and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long way  
from
physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we  
can see it

for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called
“science of consciousness” is

· the “the science of the scientific observer”

· trying to explain observing with observations

· trying to explain experience with experiences

· trying to explain how scientists do science.

· a science of scientific behaviour.

· Descriptive and never explanatory.

· Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws  
of nature’

contacts the actual underlying reality...

· Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never  
ever ever

questioning that.

· Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of  
anything.


· Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out of
subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.

· Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with
objectified phenomena.



2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow  
gives us
exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new ‘state  
of
matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is  
admit we
are actually inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of,  
getting a
view from the point of view of being a bit of it.. g.  
The big
mistake is that thinking that physics has ever, in the history of  
science,
ever ever ever dealt with what the universe is actually made of, as  
opposed
to merely describing what a presupposed observer ‘sees it looking  
like’. The
next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what the  
universe

is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering an ability to
scientifically observe in the first place.



These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even  
lifted a
finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know what the  
problem
is. The problem is not one _for_ science. The problem is _science  
itself_

... _us_.



Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a  
book on
this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll sort them  
out.




Happy new year!


I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
conscious,


I think this is misleading. Are you really a dumb of matter? I think  
that your body can be a lump of dumb matter, but that *you* are a  
person, using that dumb of matter as a vehicle and mean to manifest  
yourself. In principle (assuming comp of course), you can change your  
body every morning (and as you have often explain your self, we do  
change our lump of dumb matter every n number of years.






so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
a special way might not also be conscious.


But here I agree with your point, although it is less misleading to  
consider the person as some immaterial entity (like a game, a program,  
memories, personality traits, ... no need of magical soul with wings)  
owning your body.
If the human would born directly fixed inside a car, they would also  
believe that their car is part of their body. Nature provides us with  
a body at birth, and that might be the reason why we tend to identify  
ourselves with our bodies, but comp, which I think you accept, shows  
the limit of this identification, imo.
Eventually, the UDA shows that at a very fundamental level, bodies are  
only statistical machine's percepts, or statistical relative numbers  
percepts.





What is it about that idea
that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous?


It is not what I am saying here, to be sure.

Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Tegmark and consciousness



On 12 Jan 2014, at 14:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, January 12, 2014 5:41:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Jan 2014, at 05:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014
Consciousness as a State of Matter
Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014

Hi Folk,
Grrr!
I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s  
grapplings with consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so  
obvious and so pervasive and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief.  
I know it’s a long way from physics to neuroscience (discipline- 
wise). But surely in 2014 we can see it for what it is. Can’t they  
(Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called “science of  
consciousness” is

· the “the science of the scientific observer”

That's observation theory, not consciousness theories.

Observation is part of consciousness. Without consciousness there is  
no observation.


It depends on what you mean by observation. For many purposes,  
observation can be only an interaction. that is enough to explain the  
wave collapse appearance from the SWE.
Now, observation can also be defined in a stringer sense involving  
consciousness, I can agree.  Yet, this does not permit a direct  
identification of consciousness theory with observation theory.









· trying to explain observing with observations

Of course you need logic, ans some assumption on the mind (like  
computationalism assume mind to be invariant for Turing simulation).


Since observation is part of consciousness,


OK, for some sense of observation. But there are many use of  
observation which do not require consciousness.




he is pointing out that trying to explain consciousness without  
recognizing that all evidence of it comes from consciousness is  
circular reasoning.


But nobody tries to negate that! Obviously consciousness requires  
consciousness to be part of the evidence. The same occurs for matter.  
But from this you cannot conclude that consciousness or matter have to  
be primitively assumed in the theory. That would be circular.




Whether or not we need assumptions for our theories is not relevant  
to the ontology of consciousness.


?









· trying to explain experience with experiences

Well, at some level, we can't avoid that, but the experience are  
extended into testable theories.


Tests and theories are experiences.



You confuse a theory, with the experience of a theory.









· trying to explain how scientists do science.

In some theoretical frame. yes, meta-science can be handled  
scientifically (= modestly).



But consciousness ≠ modesty or science.


Sure. Nobody said that. A theory of consciousness does not need to be  
conscious.










· a science of scientific behaviour.
· Descriptive and never explanatory.

You overgeneralize. That is the case of physics, but not of meta- 
mathematics in the comp frame. I recall to you that computationalism  
is incompatible with physicalism.


Why is meta-mathematics in comp more explanatory?



Meta-mathematics explains how machine can be aware (in some variate  
senses) of their own limitations, in both the ability to justify some  
guess, and to express some lived experience.










· Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws  
of nature’ contacts the actual underlying reality...


That's partly wrong, partly correct.

That's partly information about an opinion, mostly cryptic.


It was correct, because consciousness does not tell anything per se  
about the reality, except for itself.
It was not correct, because a *theory* of consciousness can have  
verifiable aspects, and so, if they are refuted we *might* learn  
something about reality, in some local revisable way.









· Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never  
ever ever questioning that.


?
That's fuzzy, and false, as far as I can interpret it precisely.

It's supposed to be false. He's giving another example of how  
scientific approaches to consciousness beg the question and deceive  
themselves.


I understood that. I was agreeing with Colin.



It means precisely that in reality there are many, many tools within  
science and reason, but the contemporary approaches consolidate  
science into a single dogmatic ideology.


This is a bit frstrating when you read the authors and see that their  
opinions is quite variate and variable. Wjat is true, is that most of  
them adopt, not always consciously, the theology of Aristotle, with  
the belief in Nature and things like that, which gives terms which  
are too much fuzzy for the fundamental questioning.










· Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of  
anything.


That's false in Everett QM, and in computationalism.

They still do not contain scientists, only toy models of the  
footprint that first person interaction imposes on 3p functions.


Not at all. In the Everett universal

Re: The Scale of Digital



On 12 Jan 2014, at 14:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

How large does a digital circle have to be before the circumference  
seems like a straight line?


Digital information has no scale or sense of relation. Code is code.  
Any rendering of that code into a visual experience of lines and  
curves is a question of graphic formatting and human optical  
interaction. With a universe that assumes information as  
fundamental, the proximity-dependent flatness or roundness of the  
Earth would have to be defined programmatically. Otherwise, it is  
simply “the case” that a person is standing on the round surface of  
the round Earth. Proximity is simply a value with no inherent  
geometric relevance.


When we resize a circle in Photoshop, for instance, the program is  
not transforming a real shape, it is erasing the old digital circle  
and creating a new, unrelated digital circle. Like a cartoon, the  
relation between the before and after, between one frame and the  
“next” is within our own interpretation, not within the information.




We can't erase a circle in a cartoon.

Bruno




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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room



On 12 Jan 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation  
can differ from natural understanding which is not susceptible to  
any mereological Systems argument.


If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of  
keystrokes rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you  
can enter your password every day without ever knowing what it is  
you are typing (something with a #r5f^ in it…?).


I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing  
and copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed,  
but it is an instrumental logic that has no way to access the  
letters of the ‘human keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is  
blank and consists only of theoretical x,y coordinates where keys  
would be. No matter how good or sophisticated the machine is, it  
will still have no way to understand what the particular keystrokes  
mean to a person, only how they fit in with whatever set of fixed  
possibilities has been defined.


You confuse level of description. What you say does not distinguish an  
organic brain from a silicon one. The understanding is not done by the  
computation in the brain, but by the person having some role in some  
history, and only manifest itself through some computations (assuming  
comp).




Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to  
public communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and  
entire paragraphs or books can be represented by a single thought.  
Unlike computers, we do not have to build our ideas up from  
syntactic digits.


It is the same for computers, once they have developed some relative  
history. This is well modeled by the  p part of the definition of  
knowing, and the math confirms this. Similarly, no code at all can  
explain why you feel to be the one in W, instead of the one in M, in  
the WM-duplication experience. Computers are not just confronted with  
symbol, but also with truth.




Instead the public-facing computation follows from the experienced  
sense of what is to be communicated in general, from the top down,  
and the inside out.



OK. But that does not distinguish a carbon brain from a silicon machine.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-12 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 2:23 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrot


  In classical physics there is no limit in principle to your knowledge of
 the microstate.


Yes, 150 years ago every physicist alive thought that, today we know better.


  And in quantum physics, there is nothing in principle preventing you
 from determining an exact quantum state for a system; only if you believe
 in some hidden-variables theory


And if you believe in some hidden-variable theory, ANY hidden-variable
theory, then you know that if things are realistic AND local then Bell's
inequality can NEVER be violated; and that would be true in every corner of
the multiverse provided that basic logic and arithmetic  is as true there
as here.  But experiment has shown unequivocally that Bell's inequality IS
violated. So you tell me, what conclusions can a logical person can draw
from that?


  like a theory that says that particles have precise position and
 momentum at all times, even though you can't measure them both
 simultaneously


If things have properties, like position and momentum, even if they are not
observed and even if they can't be observed in principle, then that would
be a realistic theory. If such a theory was also local you would know it is
wrong, that is to say it would conflict with the observed facts.


  Do you think my Toroidal Game of Life (a finite grid of cells with the
 edges identified, giving it the topology of a torus) is a mathematically
 well-defined possible universe?


 Yes.

  Do you disagree that starting from a randomly-chosen initial state which
 is likely to have something close to a 50:50 ratio of black to white
 squares, the board is likely to evolve to a state dominated by white
 squares, which would have lower entropy if we define macrostates in terms
 of the black:white ratio?


 You said it yourself, the rules of the Game of Life are NOT reversible,
that means there is more than one way for something to get into a given
state. And the present entropy of a system is defined by Boltzman as the
logarithm of the number of ways the system could have gotten into the state
it's in now, therefore every application of one of the fundamental rules of
physics in the Game of Life universe can only increase entropy.

  The 2nd law is not restricted to initial conditions of very low
 entropy, it says that if the entropy is anything lower than the maximum it
 will statistically tend to increase, and if the entropy is at the maximum
 it is statistically more likely to stay at that value than to drop to any
 specific lower value.


If the universe started out in a state of maximum entropy then any change
in it, that is to say any application of one of the fundamental laws of
physics will with certainty DECREASE that entropy.  And If the universe
started out in a state of ALMOST maximum entropy then any application of
one of the fundamental laws of physics will PROBABLY decrease that entropy.

  If the initial conditions deviated from maximum entropy even slightly,
 the second law says that an increase in entropy should be more likely than
 a decrease.

That would depend on initial conditions, just how slight the slight
deviation from maximum entropy was.


   Well... you can make a Turing Machine from the Game of Life. And
 according to the Bekenstein Bound



  The Bekenstein Bound is itself just a property of the particular laws of
 physics in our universe,


 This must be one of the few places where people talk about things that
just apply to our universe.


  no one claims it would apply to all logically possible mathematical
 universes, so how is it relevant to this discussion about whether the 2nd
 law would apply to all such possible universes?


 That wasn't what I was responding to. You said:

since even though it's possible our universe could be a cellular
automaton, I think we can be pretty confident it's not a 2-dimensional
cellular automaton like the Game of Life!

 And I gave reasons why I am not pretty confident

 So the rules of the Game of Life apply to some of the cells in the grid
 but do not apply to others. What rules govern which cells must obey the
 rules and which cells can ignore the rules, that is to say who is allowed
 to ignore the laws of physics in that universe?


  No, they apply to all squares in the ideal platonic infinite board whose
 behavior you want to deduce,


Then ratios become meaningless.

 but there is no need to actually *simulate* any of the squares outside
 the region containing black squares, because you know by the rules
 governing the ideal platonic infinite board that those squares will stay
 all-white as long as long as they are not neighbors with any black square


I think you've got your colors backward because a solid block of active
cells does not stay a solid block. But never mind the point is that the
pattern of active cells is constantly expanding and shrinking in a
unpredictable way (that is to say the only way to know what it will do is

Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-12 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 4:47 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Retro-causality (time symmetry is a better term) only exists at the
 quantum level.


Why? Where is the dividing line? And with a Schrodinger's Cat type device a
quantum event can easily be magnified to a macro-event as large as desired,
you could connect it up to an H-bomb.

 The laws of physics are time-symmetric, but constrained by boundary
 conditions.


And that is exactly what I've been saying over and over, and that is why
the second law is almost always true and that is why time has a direction.

 There is a very influential boundary condition in what we call the past,
 namely the Big Bang, plus less influential ones in the future,


Exactly.

 And by the way, if time is symmetrical then there is no point in ever
 actually performing an experiment because you would remember the future as
 clearly as you remember the past, so you would already remember the outcome
 of the experiment just as clearly as you remember setting up the
 experimental apparatus.


 I assume you're not so stupid as to think that's what I've been claiming,
 so I can only assume this is a deliberate attempt at mockery,


Yes sometimes I mock people but I promise you that was not my aim this
time. It's just a fact, if time were symmetrical then you'd be just as good
at predicting the future as you are at remembering the past, so you'd know
the outcome of an experiment before you performed it just as well as you
remember setting up the apparatus. But this is not the way things are
because the second law exists. And the second law exists because of low
entropy initial conditions. And I don't know why there were low entropy
initial conditions.

  John K Clark

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Re: Tegmark and consciousness

2014-01-12 Thread spudboy100


I wonder, if as a side issue, Tegmark still see's Bio matter as unsuitable for 
quantum computation, because of the temperature being to high for qc to 
occur. Does he concede there is a difference between qc and quantum effects 
which can duplicate what super cold qc can (based on recent papers involving 
the quantum and plants)?


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sun, Jan 12, 2014 10:23 am
Subject: Re: Tegmark and consciousness



On 12 Jan 2014, at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On 12 January 2014 15:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales  
 cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:
 RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014

 Consciousness as a State of Matter

 Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014



 Hi Folk,

 Grrr!

 I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s  
 grapplings with
 consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so  
 pervasive
 and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long way  
 from
 physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we  
 can see it
 for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called
 “science of consciousness” is

 · the “the science of the scientific observer”

 · trying to explain observing with observations

 · trying to explain experience with experiences

 · trying to explain how scientists do science.

 · a science of scientific behaviour.

 · Descriptive and never explanatory.

 · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws  
 of nature’
 contacts the actual underlying reality...

 · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never  
 ever ever
 questioning that.

 · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of  
 anything.

 · Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out of
 subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.

 · Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with
 objectified phenomena.



 2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow  
 gives us
 exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new ‘state  
 of
 matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is  
 admit we
 are actually inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of,  
 getting a
 view from the point of view of being a bit of it.. g.  
 The big
 mistake is that thinking that physics has ever, in the history of  
 science,
 ever ever ever dealt with what the universe is actually made of, as  
 opposed
 to merely describing what a presupposed observer ‘sees it looking  
 like’. The
 next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what the  
 universe
 is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering an ability to
 scientifically observe in the first place.



 These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even  
 lifted a
 finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know what the  
 problem
 is. The problem is not one _for_ science. The problem is _science  
 itself_
 ... _us_.



 Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a  
 book on
 this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll sort them  
 out.



 Happy new year!

 I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
 conscious,

I think this is misleading. Are you really a dumb of matter? I think  
that your body can be a lump of dumb matter, but that *you* are a  
person, using that dumb of matter as a vehicle and mean to manifest  
yourself. In principle (assuming comp of course), you can change your  
body every morning (and as you have often explain your self, we do  
change our lump of dumb matter every n number of years.




 so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
 a special way might not also be conscious.

But here I agree with your point, although it is less misleading to  
consider the person as some immaterial entity (like a game, a program,  
memories, personality traits, ... no need of magical soul with wings)  
owning your body.
If the human would born directly fixed inside a car, they would also  
believe that their car is part of their body. Nature provides us with  
a body at birth, and that might be the reason why we tend to identify  
ourselves with our bodies, but comp, which I think you accept, shows  
the limit of this identification, imo.
Eventually, the UDA shows that at a very fundamental level, bodies are  
only statistical machine's percepts, or statistical relative numbers  
percepts.



 What is it about that idea
 that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous?

It is not what I am saying here, to be sure.

Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The One



On 12 Jan 2014, at 15:30, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: Those machines are enumerable. There is an enumeration of all  
of them: m_0, m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4, ...


Richard: We are in close agreement if the digital machines are each  
a Calabi-Yau CY Compact Manifold that can be enumerated.


Bruno: So, you can fix one universal language, like a base, and  
identify each machine with a number.


Richard: Agreed presuming that the base is an m_i and the unique  
universal language to that machine involves all other machines.


Bruno: Each  programming language, or computers boolean net,  
correspond to some m_i, and are universal m_i, as they can imitate  
all others machines (accepting Church thesis).


Richard: You seem to be identifying each machine with a programming  
language that has the property of imitating all other enumerated  
machine.


Is it sheer coincidence that for more than one string theory  
consideration, each CY machine relects or perceives (or perhaps it  
can be said is conscious of) all other machines. So I conjecture  
that the CY machines satisfy the Church Thesis. Can that be proven  
or falsified?






Wow! Pretty difficult question. To prove this you need not just to  
enumerate the objects, but to define how they compute: what they do  
when presenting data. What would be a data for a CY machines? Could a  
CY machines never stop? What would that mean? can you give me a CY  
which generates the Fibonacci numbers?


Thanks to a work by Rogers, an enumeration of machine m_i is Turing  
universal, if each partial computable phi_i is computed by some m_i,  
and if the list of the corresponding phi_i obeys the two rules:


1) Universal machine existence: there is a u such that phi_u(x, y) =  
phi_x(y)  (U emulates x, for all x, on any y).
2) Automated Parametrization: all computable functions with n  
arguments (x, y, z, t, ...) can be transformed into a function of n-1  
arguments by some function SMN fixing his argument to some value:
phi_i(x, y, z, t, ...) = phi_SMN(x)  (y, z, t, ...). Note that SMN is  
a metaprogram: it acts on the indices of the phi_i.


If you prove 1) and 2) for the CY machines, you are done.

Of course another way to prove that would be to directly construct one  
universal CY machines, emulating for example one universal Turing  
machine, or the SK combinators.


Probably the paper by Schmidhuber on formal strings, that I refer to  
you some times ago, should help.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Tegmark and consciousness

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 12 Jan 2014, at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On 12 January 2014 15:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au
 wrote:

 RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014

 Consciousness as a State of Matter

 Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014



 Hi Folk,

 Grrr!

 I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s grapplings
 with
 consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so
 pervasive
 and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long way from
 physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we can see
 it
 for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called
 “science of consciousness” is

 · the “the science of the scientific observer”

 · trying to explain observing with observations

 · trying to explain experience with experiences

 · trying to explain how scientists do science.

 · a science of scientific behaviour.

 · Descriptive and never explanatory.

 · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws of
 nature’

 contacts the actual underlying reality...

 · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never ever
 ever
 questioning that.

 · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of anything.

 · Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out of

 subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.

 · Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with
 objectified phenomena.



 2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow gives us
 exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new ‘state of
 matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is admit we
 are actually inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of,
 getting a

 view from the point of view of being a bit of it.. g. The big
 mistake is that thinking that physics has ever, in the history of
 science,
 ever ever ever dealt with what the universe is actually made of, as
 opposed
 to merely describing what a presupposed observer ‘sees it looking like’.
 The

 next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what the
 universe
 is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering an ability to
 scientifically observe in the first place.



 These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even
 lifted a
 finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know what the problem
 is. The problem is not one _for_ science. The problem is _science itself_
 ... _us_.



 Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a book on
 this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll sort them out.



 Happy new year!


 I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
 conscious,


 I think this is misleading. Are you really a dumb of matter? I think that
 your body can be a lump of dumb matter, but that *you* are a person, using
 that dumb of matter as a vehicle and mean to manifest yourself. In
 principle (assuming comp of course), you can change your body every morning
 (and as you have often explain your self, we do change our lump of dumb
 matter every n number of years.





  so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
 a special way might not also be conscious.


 But here I agree with your point, although it is less misleading to
 consider the person as some immaterial entity (like a game, a program,
 memories, personality traits, ... no need of magical soul with wings)
 owning your body.
 If the human would born directly fixed inside a car, they would also
 believe that their car is part of their body. Nature provides us with a
 body at birth, and that might be the reason why we tend to identify
 ourselves with our bodies, but comp, which I think you accept, shows the
 limit of this identification, imo.
 Eventually, the UDA shows that at a very fundamental level, bodies are
 only statistical machine's percepts, or statistical relative numbers
 percepts.




This is close to Monadology where the monads all perceive each other, and
particularly perceive living beings as statistical relative numbers, but
mainly perceiving and identifying them (and themselves) with a whole
person. Richard






  What is it about that idea
 that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous?


 It is not what I am saying here, to be sure.

 Bruno





 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: What are wavefunctions?



On 12 Jan 2014, at 16:53, John Clark wrote:



On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 2:23 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com  
wrot


 In classical physics there is no limit in principle to your  
knowledge of the microstate.


Yes, 150 years ago every physicist alive thought that, today we know  
better.


 And in quantum physics, there is nothing in principle preventing  
you from determining an exact quantum state for a system; only if  
you believe in some hidden-variables theory


And if you believe in some hidden-variable theory, ANY hidden- 
variable theory, then you know that if things are realistic AND  
local then Bell's inequality can NEVER be violated; and that would  
be true in every corner of the multiverse provided that basic logic  
and arithmetic  is as true there as here.  But experiment has shown  
unequivocally that Bell's inequality IS violated.


You keep saying this, but that is incorrect. The experiments have just  
shown that the Bell's inequality are violated in our universe,  
assuming that the outcomes of our experiments are definite, which they  
are not in the multiverse. Those experiments show nothing about our  
multiverse. The experiment are supposed to give definite outcomes, not  
the never collapsing superposed entanglement described in the big  
picture of the multiverse.
Read Deutsch and Hayden's paper, or Tipler's one, of just try to  
conceive an experimental set up showing a quantum violation of Bell's  
inequality in the many-world picture (if that can mean anything).  
Others gave links and papers.


MW is realist on all outcomes. The wave never collapse, which already  
suggest no action at a distance, but when you do the math, like  
Tipler, or Deustch and Hayden, (using the FPI, though, but restricted  
to the quantum computations, like Everett), you can see that nothing  
non local ever occurs.
Bell uses realism in some of his context, to say that there is only  
one (real) outcome, which is basically the contrary of the MW theory.


Bruno




So you tell me, what conclusions can a logical person can draw from  
that?


 like a theory that says that particles have precise position and  
momentum at all times, even though you can't measure them both  
simultaneously


If things have properties, like position and momentum, even if they  
are not observed and even if they can't be observed in principle,  
then that would be a realistic theory. If such a theory was also  
local you would know it is wrong, that is to say it would conflict  
with the observed facts.


 Do you think my Toroidal Game of Life (a finite grid of cells  
with the edges identified, giving it the topology of a torus) is a  
mathematically well-defined possible universe?


Yes.

 Do you disagree that starting from a randomly-chosen initial state  
which is likely to have something close to a 50:50 ratio of black to  
white squares, the board is likely to evolve to a state dominated by  
white squares, which would have lower entropy if we define  
macrostates in terms of the black:white ratio?


You said it yourself, the rules of the Game of Life are NOT  
reversible, that means there is more than one way for something to  
get into a given state. And the present entropy of a system is  
defined by Boltzman as the logarithm of the number of ways the  
system could have gotten into the state it's in now, therefore every  
application of one of the fundamental rules of physics in the Game  
of Life universe can only increase entropy.


 The 2nd law is not restricted to initial conditions of very low  
entropy, it says that if the entropy is anything lower than the  
maximum it will statistically tend to increase, and if the entropy  
is at the maximum it is statistically more likely to stay at that  
value than to drop to any specific lower value.


If the universe started out in a state of maximum entropy then any  
change in it, that is to say any application of one of the  
fundamental laws of physics will with certainty DECREASE that  
entropy.  And If the universe started out in a state of ALMOST  
maximum entropy then any application of one of the fundamental laws  
of physics will PROBABLY decrease that entropy.
 If the initial conditions deviated from maximum entropy even  
slightly, the second law says that an increase in entropy should be  
more likely than a decrease.


That would depend on initial conditions, just how slight the slight  
deviation from maximum entropy was.


 Well... you can make a Turing Machine from the Game of Life. And  
according to the Bekenstein Bound


 The Bekenstein Bound is itself just a property of the particular  
laws of physics in our universe,


This must be one of the few places where people talk about things  
that just apply to our universe.


 no one claims it would apply to all logically possible  
mathematical universes, so how is it relevant to this discussion  
about whether the 2nd law would apply to all such possible universes?


That wasn't what I

Re: The One

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 11:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 12 Jan 2014, at 15:30, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 Bruno: *Those machines are enumerable. There is an enumeration of all of
 them: m_0, m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4, ...*

 Richard: We are in close agreement if the digital machines are each a
 Calabi-Yau CY Compact Manifold that can be enumerated.

 Bruno: *So, you can fix one universal language, like a base, and identify
 each machine with a number. *

 Richard: Agreed presuming that the base is an m_i and the unique universal
 language to that machine involves all other machines.

  *Bruno: Each  programming language, or computers boolean net, correspond
 to some m_i, and are universal m_i, as they can imitate all others machines
 (accepting Church thesis).*

 Richard: You seem to be identifying each machine with a programming
 language that has the property of imitating all other enumerated machine.

 Is it sheer coincidence that for more than one string theory
 consideration, each CY machine relects or perceives (or perhaps it can be
 said is conscious of) all other machines. So I conjecture that the CY
 machines satisfy the Church Thesis. Can that be proven or falsified?






 Wow! Pretty difficult question. To prove this you need not just to
 enumerate the objects, but to define how they compute: what they do when
 presenting data. What would be a data for a CY machines? Could a CY
 machines never stop? What would that mean? can you give me a CY which
 generates the Fibonacci numbers?

 Thanks to a work by Rogers, an enumeration of machine m_i is Turing
 universal, if each partial computable phi_i is computed by some m_i, and if
 the list of the corresponding phi_i obeys the two rules:

 1) Universal machine existence: there is a u such that phi_u(x, y) =
 phi_x(y)  (U emulates x, for all x, on any y).



1) seems almost obvious if each machine perceives all others yet has a
unique perception..


 2) Automated Parametrization: all computable functions with n arguments
 (x, y, z, t, ...) can be transformed into a function of n-1 arguments by
 some function SMN fixing his argument to some value:
 phi_i(x, y, z, t, ...) = phi_SMN(x)  (y, z, t, ...). Note that SMN is a
 metaprogram: it acts on the indices of the phi_i.


2) I do not understand. No wait. I am getting a glimmer. Lets suppose
phi_i(x,y,z,t...) were the laws of physics.
Ohh, nevermind (delete). Ref for Rogers, please?



 If you prove 1) and 2) for the CY machines, you are done.

 Of course another way to prove that would be to directly construct one
 universal CY machines, emulating for example one universal Turing machine,
 or the SK combinators.

 Probably the paper by Schmidhuber on formal strings, that I refer to you
 some times ago, should help.

 Bruno



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-12 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 9:06 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 I'm not sure what time is symmetrical means to you.


The term is self evident.

 It's the equations of dynamical evolution that are t-symmetric in physics


Yes, time symmetrical laws of physics would usually mean that time was
symmetrical too, but not under very unusual initial conditions, like a
state of very low entropy.

 then retro-causality exists, so how can realism hold? How can the
 outcome of a coin flip today have a definite value independent of the
 observer if next year or next millennium someone can cause a change in
 today's coin flip?



  If the coin flip today had a definite outcome


Then things would be realistic.

why do suppose some one the future could simply choose it to be a different
 outcome?


Because if time were symmetrical then retro-causality would be just as
common as forward-causality and things would not be realistic.

 free will?


Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII sequence free will means.

 So you think realism would have no meaning in Laplace's deterministic
 universe?


Not at all, if things were deterministic then their values would exist
regardless of if somebody was observing them, or even if he could.

 And by the way, if time is symmetrical then there is no point in ever
 actually performing an experiment because you would remember the future as
 clearly as you remember the past, so you would already remember the outcome
 of the experiment just as clearly as you remember setting up the
 experimental apparatus.


  Not if time is symmetrical


No,*only* if time is symmetrical.

  dynamical equations are t-symmetric and memory depends on the state of
 a lot of particles in your brain so that the 2nd law applies.


If the 2nd law applies then time is not symmetrical because it says that
something (entropy) gets larger in one direction than it does in the other,
and that is lopsided.

 John K Clark

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Re: Tegmark and consciousness



On 12 Jan 2014, at 17:26, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

I wonder, if as a side issue, Tegmark still see's Bio matter as  
unsuitable for quantum computation,


Good remark. His consciousness paper seems to contradict his paper  
on the brain being classical.




because of the temperature being to high for qc to occur. Does he  
concede there is a difference between qc and quantum effects which  
can duplicate what super cold qc can (based on recent papers  
involving the quantum and plants)?


I don't know. That nature exploits the quantum is trivial. That plants  
exploits quantum *weirdness* is less trivial, and seems possible to be  
inferred from some work on photosynthesis. Then we really don't know  
if nature go beyond that. The pineal gland is not completely grey, but  
is still very hot for QC or Q weirdness exploitations, unless we  
speculate on some unknown ways used by nature to harness quantum  
information. That might be clarified in the future.


Bruno






-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sun, Jan 12, 2014 10:23 am
Subject: Re: Tegmark and consciousness


On 12 Jan 2014, at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On 12 January 2014 15:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales
 cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:
 RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014

 Consciousness as a State of Matter

 Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014



 Hi Folk,

 Grrr!

 I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s
 grapplings with
 consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so
 pervasive
 and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long way
 from
 physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we
 can see it
 for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so- 
called

 “science of consciousness” is

 · the “the science of the scientific observer”

 · trying to explain observing with observations

 · trying to explain experience with experiences

 · trying to explain how scientists do science.

 · a science of scientific behaviour.

 · Descriptive and never explanatory.

 · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws
 of nature’
 contacts the actual underlying reality...

 · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never
 ever ever
 questioning that.

 · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of
 anything.

 · Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something  
out of

 subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.

 · Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with
 objectified phenomena.



 2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow
 gives us
 exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new ‘state
 of
 matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is
 admit we
 are actually inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of,
 getting a
 view from the point of view of being a bit of it.. g.
 The big
 mistake is that thinking that physics has ever, in the history of
 science,
 ever ever ever dealt with what the universe is actually made of, as
 opposed
 to merely describing what a presupposed observer ‘sees it looking
 like’. The
 next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what the
 universe
 is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering an  
ability to

 scientifically observe in the first place.



 These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even
 lifted a
 finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know what the
 problem
 is. The problem is not one _for_ science. The problem is _science
 itself_
 ... _us_.



 Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a
 book on
 this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll sort them
 out.



 Happy new year!

 I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
 conscious,

I think this is misleading. Are you really a dumb of matter? I think
that your body can be a lump of dumb matter, but that *you* are a
person, using that dumb of matter as a vehicle and mean to manifest
yourself. In principle (assuming comp of course), you can change your
body every morning (and as you have often explain your self, we do
change our lump of dumb matter every n number of years.




 so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
 a special way might not also be conscious.

But here I agree with your point, although it is less misleading to
consider the person as some immaterial entity (like a game, a program,
memories, personality traits, ... no need of magical soul with wings)
owning your body.
If the human would born directly fixed inside a car, they would also
believe that their car is part of their body. Nature provides us with
a body at birth, and that might be the reason why we tend to identify
ourselves with our

Re: Tegmark and consciousness

Yes photosynthesis uses, I read, quantum processing in the tropics.
Birds are alleged to navigate that way, I seem to remember reading.


On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 11:26 AM, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

 I wonder, if as a side issue, Tegmark still see's Bio matter as unsuitable
 for quantum computation, because of the temperature being to high for qc
 to occur. Does he concede there is a difference between qc and quantum
 effects which can duplicate what super cold qc can (based on recent papers
 involving the quantum and plants)?
  -Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Sun, Jan 12, 2014 10:23 am
 Subject: Re: Tegmark and consciousness


 On 12 Jan 2014, at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On 12 January 2014 15:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales
  cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:
  RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014
 
  Consciousness as a State of Matter
 
  Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014
 
 
 
  Hi Folk,
 
  Grrr!
 
  I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s
  grapplings with
  consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so
  pervasive
  and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long way
  from
  physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we
  can see it
  for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called
  “science of consciousness” is
 
  · the “the science of the scientific observer”
 
  · trying to explain observing with observations
 
  · trying to explain experience with experiences
 
  · trying to explain how scientists do science.
 
  · a science of scientific behaviour.
 
  · Descriptive and never explanatory.
 
  · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws
  of nature’
  contacts the actual underlying reality...
 
  · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never
  ever ever
  questioning that.
 
  · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of
  anything.
 
  · Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out of
  subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.
 
  · Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with
  objectified phenomena.
 
 
 
  2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow
  gives us
  exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new ‘state
  of
  matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is
  admit we
  are actually inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of,
  getting a
  view from the point of view of being a bit of it.. g.
  The big
  mistake is that thinking that physics has ever, in the history of
  science,
  ever ever ever dealt with what the universe is actually made of, as
  opposed
  to merely describing what a presupposed observer ‘sees it looking
  like’. The
  next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what the
  universe
  is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering an ability to
  scientifically observe in the first place.
 
 
 
  These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even
  lifted a
  finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know what the
  problem
  is. The problem is not one _for_ science. The problem is _science
  itself_
  ... _us_.
 
 
 
  Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a
  book on
  this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll sort them
  out.
 
 
 
  Happy new year!
 
  I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
  conscious,

 I think this is misleading. Are you really a dumb of matter? I think
 that your body can be a lump of dumb matter, but that *you* are a
 person, using that dumb of matter as a vehicle and mean to manifest
 yourself. In principle (assuming comp of course), you can change your
 body every morning (and as you have often explain your self, we do
 change our lump of dumb matter every n number of years.




  so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
  a special way might not also be conscious.

 But here I agree with your point, although it is less misleading to
 consider the person as some immaterial entity (like a game, a program,
 memories, personality traits, ... no need of magical soul with wings)
 owning your body.
 If the human would born directly fixed inside a car, they would also
 believe that their car is part of their body. Nature provides us with
 a body at birth, and that might be the reason why we tend to identify
 ourselves with our bodies, but comp, which I think you accept, shows
 the limit of this identification, imo.
 Eventually, the UDA shows that at a very fundamental level, bodies are
 only statistical machine's percepts, or statistical relative numbers
 percepts.



  What is it about that idea
  that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous?

 It is not what

Re: The One



On 12 Jan 2014, at 17:50, Richard Ruquist wrote:





On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 11:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 12 Jan 2014, at 15:30, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: Those machines are enumerable. There is an enumeration of  
all of them: m_0, m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4, ...


Richard: We are in close agreement if the digital machines are each  
a Calabi-Yau CY Compact Manifold that can be enumerated.


Bruno: So, you can fix one universal language, like a base, and  
identify each machine with a number.


Richard: Agreed presuming that the base is an m_i and the unique  
universal language to that machine involves all other machines.


Bruno: Each  programming language, or computers boolean net,  
correspond to some m_i, and are universal m_i, as they can imitate  
all others machines (accepting Church thesis).


Richard: You seem to be identifying each machine with a programming  
language that has the property of imitating all other enumerated  
machine.


Is it sheer coincidence that for more than one string theory  
consideration, each CY machine relects or perceives (or perhaps it  
can be said is conscious of) all other machines. So I conjecture  
that the CY machines satisfy the Church Thesis. Can that be proven  
or falsified?






Wow! Pretty difficult question. To prove this you need not just to  
enumerate the objects, but to define how they compute: what they do  
when presenting data. What would be a data for a CY machines? Could  
a CY machines never stop? What would that mean? can you give me a CY  
which generates the Fibonacci numbers?


Thanks to a work by Rogers, an enumeration of machine m_i is Turing  
universal, if each partial computable phi_i is computed by some m_i,  
and if the list of the corresponding phi_i obeys the two rules:


1) Universal machine existence: there is a u such that phi_u(x, y) =  
phi_x(y)  (U emulates x, for all x, on any y).



1) seems almost obvious if each machine perceives all others yet has  
a unique perception..


Most m_i are not universal. Only the m_u are, which are those  
computing the phi_u, capable of emulating all phi_i (as phi_u(i, x) =  
phi_i(x)).
Having a unique perception will define your 1-person, but not your  
universality. Universality is cheap, and the CY might be universal,  
but I doubt that this is obvious.


In case you insist that it is obvious, just gives me the CY computing  
the factorial function. Better: give me a program written in LISP  
emulating the CY computing factorial(5).






2) Automated Parametrization: all computable functions with n  
arguments (x, y, z, t, ...) can be transformed into a function of  
n-1 arguments by some function SMN fixing his argument to some value:
phi_i(x, y, z, t, ...) = phi_SMN(x)  (y, z, t, ...). Note that SMN  
is a metaprogram: it acts on the indices of the phi_i.



2) I do not understand. No wait. I am getting a glimmer. Lets  
suppose phi_i(x,y,z,t...) were the laws of physics.


No phi_i at all computes the physical laws, as the physical laws  
emerges from all computations (or from our relative ignorance on which  
computations supports us below our substitution level).


SMN just says that there is a program capable of doing the  
parametrization. For example you give it a program computing the  
addition x+y, and you give it  x = 4, the parametrization program  
(S21, here) will output the code of a program computing (4 + y).


S21 (4, x + y) = 4 + y.

The SMN just do some substitution, and might eliminate some read x  
in the program given as input.




Ohh, nevermind (delete). Ref for Rogers, please?



ROGERS H., 1958, Gödel Numbering of the Partial Recursive Functions,  
Journal of

Symbolic Logic, 23, pp. 331-341.

But it presupposes familiarity with theorems like the SMN theorem, so  
you might buy the bible of recursion theory, written by the same Rogers:


ROGERS H.,1967, Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective  
Computability, McGraw-

Hill, 1967. (2ed, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1987).

A good introductory book is the one by Cutland:

CUTLAND N. J., 1980, Computability An introduction to recursive  
function theory,

Cambridge University Press.

Someday I will prove Kleene's second recursion theorem (which is the  
math of the Dx = xx method) by using only the SMN (and the  
diagonalization).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Tegmark and consciousness

2014-01-12 Thread Stephen Paul King

Why are we not more interested in the special arrangements?


On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Sunday, January 12, 2014 12:21:48 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:



 I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
 conscious, so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
 a special way might not also be conscious. What is it about that idea
 that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous?


 Water is just dumb matter arranged in a special way. Why not just drink
 chlorine instead? Liquid is liquid.

 Craig




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Re: Tegmark and consciousness

2014-01-12 Thread Stephen Paul King

Tegmark has painted himself into a corner on the subject of high
temperature quantum coherence. The problem is the neglect of the role that
structure (special arrangement) can play. For example check out
metamaterials whose properties mostly come from the special arrangement.
Tegmark treats the brain as a homogeneous lump of matter. No wonder...
I would not consider his arguments credible given resent findings on
photosynthesis and q-coherence.


On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 11:26 AM, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

 I wonder, if as a side issue, Tegmark still see's Bio matter as unsuitable
 for quantum computation, because of the temperature being to high for qc
 to occur. Does he concede there is a difference between qc and quantum
 effects which can duplicate what super cold qc can (based on recent papers
 involving the quantum and plants)?
  -Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Sun, Jan 12, 2014 10:23 am
 Subject: Re: Tegmark and consciousness


 On 12 Jan 2014, at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On 12 January 2014 15:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales
  cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:
  RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014
 
  Consciousness as a State of Matter
 
  Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014
 
 
 
  Hi Folk,
 
  Grrr!
 
  I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s
  grapplings with
  consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so
  pervasive
  and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long way
  from
  physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we
  can see it
  for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called
  “science of consciousness” is
 
  · the “the science of the scientific observer”
 
  · trying to explain observing with observations
 
  · trying to explain experience with experiences
 
  · trying to explain how scientists do science.
 
  · a science of scientific behaviour.
 
  · Descriptive and never explanatory.
 
  · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws
  of nature’
  contacts the actual underlying reality...
 
  · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never
  ever ever
  questioning that.
 
  · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of
  anything.
 
  · Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out of
  subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.
 
  · Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with
  objectified phenomena.
 
 
 
  2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow
  gives us
  exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new ‘state
  of
  matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is
  admit we
  are actually inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of,
  getting a
  view from the point of view of being a bit of it.. g.
  The big
  mistake is that thinking that physics has ever, in the history of
  science,
  ever ever ever dealt with what the universe is actually made of, as
  opposed
  to merely describing what a presupposed observer ‘sees it looking
  like’. The
  next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what the
  universe
  is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering an ability to
  scientifically observe in the first place.
 
 
 
  These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even
  lifted a
  finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know what the
  problem
  is. The problem is not one _for_ science. The problem is _science
  itself_
  ... _us_.
 
 
 
  Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a
  book on
  this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll sort them
  out.
 
 
 
  Happy new year!
 
  I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
  conscious,

 I think this is misleading. Are you really a dumb of matter? I think
 that your body can be a lump of dumb matter, but that *you* are a
 person, using that dumb of matter as a vehicle and mean to manifest
 yourself. In principle (assuming comp of course), you can change your
 body every morning (and as you have often explain your self, we do
 change our lump of dumb matter every n number of years.




  so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
  a special way might not also be conscious.

 But here I agree with your point, although it is less misleading to
 consider the person as some immaterial entity (like a game, a program,
 memories, personality traits, ... no need of magical soul with wings)
 owning your body.
 If the human would born directly fixed inside a car, they would also
 believe that their car is part of their body. Nature provides us with
 a body at birth, and that might be the reason why we tend to identify
 ourselves with our bodies, but comp, which I

Re: Tegmark and consciousness

2014-01-12 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 5:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 On 12 January 2014 15:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:
 RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014

 Consciousness as a State of Matter

 Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014



 Hi Folk,

 Grrr!

 I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s grapplings with
 consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so pervasive
 and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long way from
 physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we can see it
 for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called
 “science of consciousness” is

 · the “the science of the scientific observer”

 · trying to explain observing with observations

 · trying to explain experience with experiences

 · trying to explain how scientists do science.

 · a science of scientific behaviour.

 · Descriptive and never explanatory.

 · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws of nature’
 contacts the actual underlying reality...

 · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never ever ever
 questioning that.

 · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of anything.

 · Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out of
 subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.

 · Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with
 objectified phenomena.



 2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow gives us
 exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new ‘state of
 matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is admit we
 are actually inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of, getting a
 view from the point of view of being a bit of it.. g. The big
 mistake is that thinking that physics has ever, in the history of science,
 ever ever ever dealt with what the universe is actually made of, as opposed
 to merely describing what a presupposed observer ‘sees it looking like’. The
 next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what the universe
 is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering an ability to
 scientifically observe in the first place.



 These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even lifted a
 finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know what the problem
 is. The problem is not one _for_ science. The problem is _science itself_
 ... _us_.



 Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a book on
 this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll sort them out.



 Happy new year!

 I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
 conscious, so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
 a special way might not also be conscious. What is it about that idea
 that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous?

I'm sorry I repeat this answer so many times, but this claim is also
made so many times. The main problem I see with this idea is that no
progress has been made so far in explaining how a lump of matter
becomes conscious, as opposed to just being a zombie mechanically
performing complex behaviors. Insisting that such an explanation must
exist instead of entertaining other models of reality strikes me as a
form of mysticism.

Telmo.


 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Scale of Digital

On Sunday, January 12, 2014 10:45:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 12 Jan 2014, at 14:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 How large does a digital circle have to be before the circumference seems 
 like a straight line?

 Digital information has no scale or sense of relation. Code is code. Any 
 rendering of that code into a visual experience of lines and curves is a 
 question of graphic formatting and human optical interaction. With a 
 universe that assumes information as fundamental, the proximity-dependent 
 flatness or roundness of the Earth would have to be defined 
 programmatically. Otherwise, it is simply “the case” that a person is 
 standing on the round surface of the round Earth. Proximity is simply a 
 value with no inherent geometric relevance.

 When we resize a circle in Photoshop, for instance, the program is not 
 transforming a real shape, it is erasing the old digital circle and 
 creating a new, unrelated digital circle. Like a cartoon, the relation 
 between the before and after, between one frame and the “next” is within 
 our own interpretation, not within the information.


 We can't erase a circle in a cartoon. 


Why not?

 


 Bruno



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 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room



On Sunday, January 12, 2014 10:51:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 12 Jan 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: 

  Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation   
  can differ from natural understanding which is not susceptible to   
  any mereological Systems argument. 
  
  If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of   
  keystrokes rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you   
  can enter your password every day without ever knowing what it is   
  you are typing (something with a #r5f^ in it…?). 
  
  I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing   
  and copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed,   
  but it is an instrumental logic that has no way to access the   
  letters of the ‘human keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is   
  blank and consists only of theoretical x,y coordinates where keys   
  would be. No matter how good or sophisticated the machine is, it   
  will still have no way to understand what the particular keystrokes   
  mean to a person, only how they fit in with whatever set of fixed   
  possibilities has been defined. 
  
 You confuse level of description. 


I think that the existence of a level of description invalidates comp.
 

 What you say does not distinguish an   
 organic brain from a silicon one. 


Sure, but we to give the organic brain the benefit of the doubt of 
association with consciousness. Since silicon does not naturally seek to 
organize itself as a brain, we should doubt that it is associated with 
human consciousness by default.

 

 The understanding is not done by the   
 computation in the brain, but by the person having some role in some   
 history, and only manifest itself through some computations (assuming   
 comp). 


I don't see that computations can manifest anything by themselves though.
 




  Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to   
  public communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and   
  entire paragraphs or books can be represented by a single thought.   
  Unlike computers, we do not have to build our ideas up from   
  syntactic digits. 
  
 It is the same for computers, once they have developed some relative   
 history. This is well modeled by the  p part of the definition of   
 knowing, and the math confirms this. Similarly, no code at all can   
 explain why you feel to be the one in W, instead of the one in M, in   
 the WM-duplication experience. Computers are not just confronted with   
 symbol, but also with truth. 



  Instead the public-facing computation follows from the experienced   
  sense of what is to be communicated in general, from the top down,   
  and the inside out. 
  
 OK. But that does not distinguish a carbon brain from a silicon machine. 


The silicon machine is built from the bottom up and the outside in. It 
doesn't develop its own agenda, it only mindlessly executes an alien agenda.

Craig
 


 Bruno 


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 





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Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-12 Thread Jesse Mazer

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 10:53 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 2:23 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrot


  In classical physics there is no limit in principle to your knowledge
 of the microstate.


 Yes, 150 years ago every physicist alive thought that, today we know
 better.


We know better than to think classical physics represents an exact
description of our universe, but it certainly describes a logically
possible mathematical universe (note that in the previous paragraph of that
message of mine you are replying to, I said Liouville's theorem would be
precisely true in a possible universe where the laws of classical physics
hold exactly...for reference, that message is at
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/hJ9bNWqoAzI/73DulLV7iyEJ )




  And in quantum physics, there is nothing in principle preventing you
 from determining an exact quantum state for a system; only if you believe
 in some hidden-variables theory


 And if you believe in some hidden-variable theory, ANY hidden-variable
 theory, then you know that if things are realistic AND local then Bell's
 inequality can NEVER be violated; and that would be true in every corner of
 the multiverse provided that basic logic and arithmetic  is as true there
 as here.  But experiment has shown unequivocally that Bell's inequality IS
 violated. So you tell me, what conclusions can a logical person can draw
 from that?



It tells us that either we must use a nonlocal hidden variables
interpretation like Bohmian mechanics, or that hidden variables are wrong.
Did you understand that in the sentence above that you quoted, I was saying
that there is nothing in principle preventing you from determining an
exact quantum state for a system in the case that the conjecture of hidden
variables is FALSE, not in the case that it's true? If there are no hidden
variables, then you can in principle perform an exhaustive measurement on a
system that will give you its exact state vector in Hilbert space, putting
it in a pure state rather than a mixed state. So, this contradicts your
claim that the laws of physics insist that you will *always* be uncertain
about the microstates--a pure quantum state *is* a microstate in quantum
physics without hidden variables, a macrostate would be a mixed state.





  Do you disagree that starting from a randomly-chosen initial state which
 is likely to have something close to a 50:50 ratio of black to white
 squares, the board is likely to evolve to a state dominated by white
 squares, which would have lower entropy if we define macrostates in terms
 of the black:white ratio?


 You said it yourself, the rules of the Game of Life are NOT reversible,
 that means there is more than one way for something to get into a given
 state. And the present entropy of a system is defined by Boltzman as the
 logarithm of the number of ways the system could have gotten into the state
 it's in now, therefore every application of one of the fundamental rules of
 physics in the Game of Life universe can only increase entropy.



You are failing to specify whether you mean state to refer to microstate
or macrostate and thus speaking ambiguously. The fact that the rules of the
Game of Life are not reversible means that there is more than one way for
something to get into a given microstate (even with reversible laws there
is more than one way to get into a given macrostate). The entropy is
defined not in terms of some vague notion of the number of ways the system
could have gotten into its present microstate, but rather as the number of
possible microstates the system might be in at this moment given that we
only know the macrostate it's in at this moment. If we define macrostates
for the Toroidal Game of Life in terms of the ratio of black to white
squares, then the entropy of a given macrostate has nothing to do with
looking at the board's possible states in the past, it's just a question of
looking at the number of possible precise patterns of black and white
squares that the board might have on the *current* time-increment that
would give it that ratio of black:white on the current time-increment. For
example, suppose we consider a very small 2x2 board with only 4 cells, and
I use 0s to represent white cells and 1s to represent black cells. Then if
the current macrostate is 2 black:2 white, the number of possible
microstates would be 6, shown below:

11
00

10
10

10
01

01
10

01
01

00
11

If the macrostate were 1 black:3 white there would be 4 possible
microstates (and same for 3 black:1 white), so this macrostate has a
lower entropy:

10
00

01
00

00
10

00
01

And if the macrostate is 0 black:4 white there's only one possible
microstate (same for 4 black:0 white), so this is the lowest possible
entropy for a macrostate:

00
00

It's not hard to see why this pattern would continue to hold for larger
boards--macrostates with a ratio that's closer to 1:1 will have a higher
entropy than

Re: Tegmark and consciousness



On Sunday, January 12, 2014 10:43:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 12 Jan 2014, at 14:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Sunday, January 12, 2014 5:41:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 12 Jan 2014, at 05:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

 RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014
 Consciousness as a State of Matter
 Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014
  
 Hi Folk,
 Grrr!
 I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s grapplings 
 with consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so 
 pervasive and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long 
 way from physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we 
 can see it for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the 
 so-called “science of consciousness” is
 · the “the science of the scientific observer”


 That's observation theory, not consciousness theories.


 Observation is part of consciousness. Without consciousness there is no 
 observation.


 It depends on what you mean by observation. For many purposes, observation 
 can be only an interaction. 


Nothing can interact without consciousness either.

 

 that is enough to explain the wave collapse appearance from the SWE.
 Now, observation can also be defined in a stringer sense involving 
 consciousness, I can agree.  Yet, this does not permit a direct 
 identification of consciousness theory with observation theory.


It does if we question what observation really is other than consciousness.
 





  



 · trying to explain observing with observations


 Of course you need logic, ans some assumption on the mind (like 
 computationalism assume mind to be invariant for Turing simulation).


 Since observation is part of consciousness, 


 OK, for some sense of observation. But there are many use of observation 
 which do not require consciousness.


Those uses are metaphorical. There can be no literal observation, 
detection, signaling, i/o etc of any kind without a sensory-motive 
capacity. The only legitimate confusion in my mind is that it is not 
necessarily intuitive to realize that low level types of sensation do not 
necessarily scale up to higher levels - it is higher levels which can be 
masked and throttled to appear low.
 




 he is pointing out that trying to explain consciousness without 
 recognizing that all evidence of it comes from consciousness is circular 
 reasoning. 


 But nobody tries to negate that! Obviously consciousness requires 
 consciousness to be part of the evidence. 


Not if you invent types of unconscious observation.
 

 The same occurs for matter. But from this you cannot conclude that 
 consciousness or matter have to be primitively assumed in the theory. That 
 would be circular.


I don't see anything circular about assuming that awareness is primitive.
 




 Whether or not we need assumptions for our theories is not relevant to the 
 ontology of consciousness.


 ?


Reality doesn't have to be convenient for our theoretical expectations.
 









 · trying to explain experience with experiences


 Well, at some level, we can't avoid that, but the experience are extended 
 into testable theories.


 Tests and theories are experiences.



 You confuse a theory, with the experience of a theory.


You confuse a theory with the non-experience of a theory.
 





  




 · trying to explain how scientists do science.


 In some theoretical frame. yes, meta-science can be handled 
 scientifically (= modestly).



 But consciousness ≠ modesty or science.


 Sure. Nobody said that. A theory of consciousness does not need to be 
 conscious.


A theory of consciousness needs to reflect the actual nature of 
consciousness, not the nature of theory.
 









 · a science of scientific behaviour.
 · Descriptive and never explanatory.


 You overgeneralize. That is the case of physics, but not of 
 meta-mathematics in the comp frame. I recall to you that computationalism 
 is incompatible with physicalism. 


 Why is meta-mathematics in comp more explanatory?



 Meta-mathematics explains how machine can be aware (in some variate 
 senses) of their own limitations, in both the ability to justify some 
 guess, and to express some lived experience.


But that doesn't explain experience, only that given experience and 
beliefs, mathematics can model the dynamics of trivial self reference. 




  





 · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws of 
 nature’ contacts the actual underlying reality...


 That's partly wrong, partly correct. 


 That's partly information about an opinion, mostly cryptic.


 It was correct, because consciousness does not tell anything per se about 
 the reality, except for itself.


Reality is an expectation within consciousness. There can be contact with 
any reality other than what consciousness presents directly or indirectly.

It was not correct, because a *theory* of

Re: Tegmark and consciousness

On 1/12/2014 12:55 AM, LizR wrote:
On 12 January 2014 19:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, they
mainly
make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, with the
addition
of certain verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The
justification
of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is
expected to work.
--—John von Neumann

How does one know which mathematical construct to try out, to see if it will work?
Surely interpretation becomes necessary at some point.

Von Neumann recognizes above that some interpretation is necessary for the application of
mathematics, the addition of certain verbal interpretations. Which mathematics to try
may be suggested by the interpretation of some earlier theories, which is what I see as
useful about metaphysics - it may suggest improved physics.

But the interesting thing about this quote, which I think is generally overlooked, is that
even those theories/models we think of a providing good explanations only seem that way
because of familiarity. We think easily of gravity as explaining the orbit of the Moon.
But in the 17th century it prompted the question, But what is pushing on the Moon to
provide the force? Now we say there is no force, it's just a distortion of space, so the
Moon is just going in a straight line. So the observable facts stay the same, the
predictions become a little more accurate, but the ontological explanation varies
drastically.

Brent

Re: Tegmark and consciousness

2014-01-12 Thread Stephen Paul King

Dear Brent and LizR,

  Could it be that we are really discussing the Word Problem?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Word_problem_for_groups

Note the relation to computations, via the use of recursively enumerable
sets!

A pair of words, as defined in the Wiki article, could represent the
content of a pair of observers (each defined per Bruno's theoretical
construction as the intersection of an infinity of computations).


On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 2:04 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/12/2014 12:55 AM, LizR wrote:

  On 12 January 2014 19:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  interpret,
 they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical construct
 which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, describes
 observed phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical construct is
 solely and precisely that it is  expected to work.
  --—John von Neumann

  How does one know which mathematical construct to try out, to see if it
 will work? Surely interpretation becomes necessary at some point.


 Von Neumann recognizes above that some interpretation is necessary for the
 application of mathematics, the addition of certain verbal
 interpretations.  Which mathematics to try may be suggested by the
 interpretation of some earlier theories, which is what I see as useful
 about metaphysics - it may suggest improved physics.

 But the interesting thing about this quote, which I think is generally
 overlooked, is that even those theories/models we think of a providing
 good explanations only seem that way because of familiarity.  We think
 easily of gravity as explaining the orbit of the Moon.  But in the 17th
 century it prompted the question, But what is pushing on the Moon to
 provide the force?  Now we say there is no force, it's just a distortion
 of space, so the Moon is just going in a straight line.  So the
 observable facts stay the same, the predictions become a little more
 accurate, but the ontological explanation varies drastically.

 Brent

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Re: Homotopy Type Theory


On 1/12/2014 1:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

You might study the book by Szabo, on the category approach on the algebra of 
proofs.
But proofs and computations are not equivalent concept at all. There is a Church's 
thesis for computability, not for provability and definability which are machines or 
theories dependent. 


But isn't every computation an instantiation of a proof, relative to the 
computer.

Brent

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Re: What are wavefunctions?


On 1/12/2014 8:20 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 4:47 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com 
mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Retro-causality (time symmetry is a better term) only exists at the 
quantum level.


Why? Where is the dividing line? And with a Schrodinger's Cat type device a quantum 
event can easily be magnified to a macro-event as large as desired, you could connect it 
up to an H-bomb.


That's a good question.  But I think it has a good answer.  The quantum level really 
means isolated from the general entropy increase of the universe.  The Bucky Ball 
Young's slit experiment exemplifies this.  If the bucky balls are hot enough to radiate 
photons that will provide which way information, the interference pattern doesn't 
appear.  In the t-symmetry model this means the paths don't interact with the rest of 
universe.  If you tried to send a message back in time via the zig-zag path it would 
require an interaction between the wave-function and your macroscopic message forming and 
environmentally decohered instruments.


Brent

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-12 Thread Jesse Mazer

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 1:22 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote:


 The entropy is defined not in terms of some vague notion of the number of
 ways the system could have gotten into its present microstate, but rather
 as the number of possible microstates the system might be in at this moment
 given that we only know the macrostate it's in at this moment.


Minor correction, I meant to say that the entropy is defined in terms of
the number of microstates associated with the given macrostate--it isn't
defined as the number of microstates itself, but rather the logarithm of
that number (times Boltzmann's constant, if we're talking physical entropy
rather than informational).

Jesse

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-12 Thread ghibbsa


On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:49:38 AM UTC, Kim Jones wrote:

 Maximus writes: 


 The Higgs Boson was predicted with the same tool as the planet Neptune and 
 the radio wave: with mathematics. Why does our universe seem so 
 mathematical, and what does it mean? In my new book, Our Mathematical 
 Universe, which comes out today, I argue that it means that our universe 
 isn't just described by math, but that it is math in the sense that we're 
 all parts of a giant mathematical object, which in turn 
 *is part of a multiverse so huge that it makes the other multiverses 
 debated in recent years seem puny in comparison. *

 
 
that really had me on the floor

  
 At first glance, our universe doesn't seem very mathematical at all. The 
 groundhog who trims our lawn has properties such as cuteness and fluffiness 
 -- not mathematical properties. Yet we know that this groundhog -- and 
 everything else in our universe -- is ultimately made of elementary 
 particles such as quarks and electrons. And what properties does an 
 electron have? Properties like -1, ½ and 1! We physicists call these 
 properties electric charge, spin and lepton number, but those are just 
 words that we've made up and the fundamental properties that an electron 
 has are just numbers, mathematical properties. All elementary particles, 
 the building blocks of everything around, are purely mathematical objects 
 in the sense that they don't have any properties except for mathematical 
 properties. The same goes for the space that these particles are in, which 
 has only mathematical properties -- for example 3, the number of 
 dimensions. If space is mathematical and everything in space is also 
 mathematical, then the idea that everything is mathematical doesn't sound 
 as crazy anymore. 

 That our universe is approximately described by mathematics means that 
 some but not all of its properties are mathematical, and is a venerable 
 idea dating back to the ancient Greeks. That it is mathematical means that 
 all of its properties are mathematical, i.e., that it has no properties at 
 all except mathematical ones. If I'm right and this is true, then it's good 
 news for physics, because all properties of our universe can in principle 
 be understood if we're intelligent and creative enough. For example, this 
 challenges the common assumption that we can never understand 
 consciousness. Instead, it optimistically suggests that consciousness can 
 one day be understood as a form of matter, forming the most beautifully 
 complex structure in space and time that our universe has ever known. Such 
 understanding would enlighten our approaches to animals, unresponsive 
 patients and future ultra-intelligent machines, with wide-ranging ethical, 
 legal and technological implications. 

 As I argue in detail in my book, it also implies that our reality is 
 vastly larger than we thought, containing a diverse collection of universes 
 obeying all mathematically possible laws of physics. An advanced computer 
 program could in principle start generating an atlas of all such 
 mathematically possible universes. The discovery of other solar systems has 
 taught us that 8, the number of planets in ours, doesn't tell us anything 
 fundamental about reality, merely something about which particular solar 
 system we inhabit -- the number 8 is essentially part of our cosmic ZIP 
 code. Similarly, this mathematical atlas tells us that if we one day 
 discover the equations of quantum gravity and print them on a T-shirt, we 
 should not hübristically view these equations as the Theory of 
 Everything, but as information about our location in the mathematical 
 atlas of the ultimate multiverse. 

 It's easy feel small and powerless when faced with this vast reality. 
 Indeed, we humans have had this experience before, over and over again 
 discovering that what we thought was everything was merely a small part of 
 a larger structure: our planet, our solar system, our galaxy, our universe 
 and perhaps a hierarchy of parallel universes, nested like Russian dolls. 
 However, I find this empowering as well, because we've repeatedly 
 underestimated not only the size of our cosmos, but also the power of our 
 human mind to understand it. Our cave-dwelling ancestors had just as big 
 brains as we have, and since they didn't spend their evenings watching TV, 
 I'm sure they asked questions like What's all that stuff up there in the 
 sky? and Where does it all come from?. They'd been told beautiful myths 
 and stories, but little did they realize that they had it in them to 
 actually figure out the answers to these questions for themselves. And that 
 the secret lay not in learning to fly into space to examine the celestial 
 objects, but in letting their human minds fly. When our human imagination 
 first got off the ground and started deciphering the mysteries of space, it 
 was done with mental power rather than rocket power. 

 I find this quest

Re: Tegmark and consciousness


On 1/12/2014 9:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

I'm sorry I repeat this answer so many times, but this claim is also
made so many times. The main problem I see with this idea is that no
progress has been made so far in explaining how a lump of matter
becomes conscious, as opposed to just being a zombie mechanically
performing complex behaviors. Insisting that such an explanation must
exist instead of entertaining other models of reality strikes me as a
form of mysticism.


Well we know that one lump of matter is conscious and we think some others that are 
structually similar are and that some others are not.  A plausible hypothesis is that the 
consciousness is a consequence of the structure.  Alternative hypotheses would have to 
explain this coincidence.


Brent

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Re: The Scale of Digital

On 13 January 2014 02:35, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 How large does a digital circle have to be before the circumference seems
 like a straight line?

That depends on who is viewing it and where from, surely?

 Digital information has no scale or sense of relation. Code is code. Any
 rendering of that code into a visual experience of lines and curves is a
 question of graphic formatting and human optical interaction. With a
 universe that assumes information as fundamental, the proximity-dependent
 flatness or roundness of the Earth would have to be defined
 programmatically. Otherwise, it is simply “the case” that a person is
 standing on the round surface of the round Earth. Proximity is simply a
 value with no inherent geometric relevance.

 When we resize a circle in Photoshop, for instance, the program is not
 transforming a real shape, it is erasing the old digital circle and
 creating a new, unrelated digital circle. Like a cartoon, the relation
 between the before and after, between one frame and the “next” is within
 our own interpretation, not within the information.

I think what's it's doing is re-rendering the circle on a different scale.
The pixels that are set as a result are different, but the underlying
circle data is either unchanged, and a transformation matrix is changed, or
the circle data itself is transformed (the radius is changed, but the
centre remains unchanged).

The real (underlying) circle is an abstraction stored as - I would guess -
a centre and radius, plus no doubt colour, style and so on.

Didn't Plato say something about the world being an imperfect rendering? :-)

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Re: The One


 On 12 Jan 2014, at 15:30, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 Bruno: *Those machines are enumerable. There is an enumeration of all of
 them: m_0, m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4, ...*

 Richard: We are in close agreement if the digital machines are each a
 Calabi-Yau CY Compact Manifold that can be enumerated.

 I thought the CY manifold was what the extra dimensions of string theory
are tied up into? If so, wouldn't making them into digital machines be a
theory closely allied to Edgar's theory of reality being computed by some
unspecified UTM at each point? (OK, maybe not quite, because the CY
manifolds aren't prior to space-time, but are just part of it... still, it
seems kind of similar.)

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

On 13 January 2014 05:20, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 4:47 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

  Retro-causality (time symmetry is a better term) only exists at the
 quantum level.


 Why? Where is the dividing line? And with a Schrodinger's Cat type device
 a quantum event can easily be magnified to a macro-event as large as
 desired, you could connect it up to an H-bomb.


The dividing line appears to be roughly where decoherence occurs. Basically
anything above a single quantum entity engaged in a carefully controlled
interaction is liable to get its time symmetric properties washed out by
interactions with other particles. I'm not sure exactly where the dividing
line is, but once you get above the scale of coarse-graining at which the
entropy gradient becomes manifest, you are going to lose any easily
measurable consequences of time symmetry. Only in carefully controlled
situations (like EPR experiments) can we remove the effects of influences
from the rest of the universe to a great enough extent that we can see
time-symmetry operating in a detectable manner (to, for example, violate
Bell's inequality, at least if Bell is to be believed).


  The laws of physics are time-symmetric, but constrained by boundary
 conditions.


 And that is exactly what I've been saying over and over, and that is why
 the second law is almost always true and that is why time has a direction.


Yes, I've been saying this over and over, too. So we agree. The second law
is almost always true, and only in special cases like EPR experiments can
we easily see the effects of time symmetry -- even though we *know* most of
the laws of physics are time-symmetric (insofar as we know anything, of
course).


  There is a very influential boundary condition in what we call the past,
 namely the Big Bang, plus less influential ones in the future,


 Exactly.


This is why it's so hard to get our heads around the consequences of time
symmetry.


   And by the way, if time is symmetrical then there is no point in ever
 actually performing an experiment because you would remember the future as
 clearly as you remember the past, so you would already remember the outcome
 of the experiment just as clearly as you remember setting up the
 experimental apparatus.


 I assume you're not so stupid as to think that's what I've been
 claiming, so I can only assume this is a deliberate attempt at mockery,


 Yes sometimes I mock people but I promise you that was not my aim this
 time. It's just a fact, if time were symmetrical then you'd be just as good
 at predicting the future as you are at remembering the past, so you'd know
 the outcome of an experiment before you performed it just as well as you
 remember setting up the apparatus. But this is not the way things are
 because the second law exists. And the second law exists because of low
 entropy initial conditions. And I don't know why there were low entropy
 initial conditions.


OK. So the above statement of yours about predicting the future is still
false, and hopefully you now understand why. To recap briefly -- the laws
of physics are time symmetrical, and most particle interactions are
constrained by boundary conditions. Almost everything in the universe is
constrained by the boundary condition of the Big Bang (+ cosmic expansion).
This creates an entropy gradient (or rather what we perceive as one, as
Brent explained the entropy of a system doesn't change at the quantum
level, but we exist above the level of coarse graining at which the 2nd law
emerges). This prevents us measuring the results of any future experiments
that involve anything above the level of coarse-graining, i.e. above the
level of a few carefully prepared particles.

And since we don't use EPR type experiments for our memories, we can't
remember the future.

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RE: Tegmark and consciousness

2014-01-12 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Sunday, 12 January 2014 5:54 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and consciousness

On 1/11/2014 8:12 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014
Consciousness as a State of Matter
Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014

Hi Folk,
Grrr!
I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science's grapplings with 
consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so pervasive and 
so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it's a long way from physics to 
neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we can see it for what it 
is. Can't they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called science of 
consciousness is

* the the science of the scientific observer

* trying to explain observing with observations

* trying to explain experience with experiences

* trying to explain how scientists do science.

* a science of scientific behaviour.

* Descriptive and never explanatory.

The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  interpret, they 
mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical construct which, with 
the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, describes observed phenomena. 
The justification of  such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely 
that it is  expected to work.
---John von Neumann

This is what scientists do (perfectly fine procedural/behaviour) but this 
becomes This is all scientists can do  when? Says who? Von-freaking 
Neumann?

He has no clue that what he declares science to be is not a 'law of nature' and 
must fail to predict or explain _him_ and his ability to be ignorant of what 
the full nature of scientific behaviour entails or how he can observe anything 
at all. To think the von-neumann paragraph is all there is to science, is to 
fail to contact the real problem: the presupposition that von-Neumann's dictum 
is all there is to science/scientific behaviour. Un-argued. Un-documented. 
Untrained. Tacit presupposition learned by imitation.

Section 6.3 in my book nails von-neumann's blinkered view to the great wall of 
trophies dedicated to that view. His view was king in a simpler world: it 
worksin all places except one. Now we attack that very 'one'and we fail 
because of that very presupposition... and we cite bloody von-neumann at 
everyone so we continue to fail, thereby embedding failure at a cultural level.

This garbage has to stop. Time for change. 2014.

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Re: The One

Liz,

CY Compact manifolds are particles of 6d space that precipitate out of 3D
space.
Each particle is about 1000 Planck lengths in diameter.


On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 6:18 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 12 Jan 2014, at 15:30, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 Bruno: *Those machines are enumerable. There is an enumeration of all of
 them: m_0, m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4, ...*

 Richard: We are in close agreement if the digital machines are each a
 Calabi-Yau CY Compact Manifold that can be enumerated.

 I thought the CY manifold was what the extra dimensions of string theory
 are tied up into? If so, wouldn't making them into digital machines be a
 theory closely allied to Edgar's theory of reality being computed by some
 unspecified UTM at each point? (OK, maybe not quite, because the CY
 manifolds aren't prior to space-time, but are just part of it... still, it
 seems kind of similar.)

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Re: The One