Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On May 31, 2:33 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On May 29, 1:45 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take issue with? A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy So does a cadaver's brain and body. The fact that a cadaver is not intelligent should show us that the difference between life and death can't be meaningfully reduced to matter and energy. That some organizations of matter/energy are intelligent and others are not is irrelevant, what matters is whether or not you agree that the brain is made of matter and energy. Do you agree the brain is made of matter and energy, and that the brain is responsible for your consciousness (or at least one of the many possible manifestations of it)? I think that Matter-Energy and Sense-Motive are dual aspects of the same thing. If you are talking about the brain only, then you are talking about matter and energy, but no person exists if you limit the discussion to that. The matter and energy side of what we are is just organs. There is no person there. The brain is not responsible for consciousness anymore than your computer is responsible for the internet. It is the necessary vehicle through which human level awareness is accessed. Would you say, at least, that the brain is responsible for behavior? This conversation was originally on the topic of artificial intelligence, so whatever it is in us that leads to physical changes which manifest as third-person observable behavior, do you believe that to be entirely influenced by physical and (in theory) detectable matter/energy/fields? If not, what mechanism do you theorize mediates between mental and physical events? Is it one way or two way? If two way (or if as you often say it is just the other side of the coin) then why not say it is physical? If such a mechanism exists, it must conform to some set of laws, some rhyme or reason, as otherwise how could the mental world (or side) so reliably control our physical actions, and how do the sensations picked up from physical sensors (retinas, nerve endings) so reliably make their way into our mind? If there is a separation between the mental and physical worlds, there must be reliable rules that govern any interaction between the mind and the physical world, and the interaction must be two way. How then, can they rightly be called two separate worlds? B. that matter and energy follow natural laws, No, laws follow from our observation of natural matter and energy. You are mistaking our approximations and inferences concerning the natural laws for the natural laws themselves. No, you are mistaking the interaction of concretely real natural phenomena with abstract principles which we have derived from measurement and intellectual extension. Regardless of who is making the mistake, above you seem to agree with my premise that there are real natural phenomenon. Before there were any humans, or any life, there must have been laws that the universe obeyed to reach the point where Earth formed and life could develop. Before there was matter, there were no laws that the universe obeyed pertaining to matter, just as there were no laws of biology before biology. This is an interesting way of looking at things: that the capabilities of natural phenomenon change as it develops more and more complex states of being. However, I think the potentiality for those capabilities was there from the beginning, and the determination of whether or not such potentialities existed in the primordial universe could in theory, have been made by a sufficiently great intelligence that had a proper understanding of the natural phenomenon. The universe makes laws by doing. It isn't only a disembodied set of invisible laws which creates obedient bodies. What did the universe have to do to set the speed of light? Laws are not primordial. If not laws, then what? You have to have some kind of capacity to sense and make sense before any kind of regularity of pattern can be established. You might need sense to notice the pattern, but patterns exist that we are unaware of. If this were not the case, there would be no room for discovery. Something has to be able to happen in the first place before you can separate out what can happen under which conditions. The reality of something being able to happen - experience - possibility - prefigures all other principles. I'm not opposed to the idea that possibility or experience could in some sense be more fundamental, but I don't see how this could change the fact that we observe matter and energy to always follow certain rules, and find evidence (when we look at stars and galaxies
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 01 Jun 2012, at 20:18, meekerdb wrote: On 6/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the original remains the same person, so we don't count him as a new person, each time he steps in the box. This, in my opinion, illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA. Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind. Then the probability the original went to Mars is 1. The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a step 5 case. The probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2. Everybody feels they are the original. original refer to the third person body. By definition it is the one being copied. The question before he enters the box is, Will you find yourself on Mars? To which he could reply, What does 'you' refer to? The question is about your future subjective feeling as seen from your future first person perspective. If you assume comp, you know in advance that you will feel entire and unique, either on Earth or on Mars, and you know that you cannot that in advance (or give me the algorithm). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On Jun 2, 2:39 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: I think that Matter-Energy and Sense-Motive are dual aspects of the same thing. If you are talking about the brain only, then you are talking about matter and energy, but no person exists if you limit the discussion to that. The matter and energy side of what we are is just organs. There is no person there. The brain is not responsible for consciousness anymore than your computer is responsible for the internet. It is the necessary vehicle through which human level awareness is accessed. Would you say, at least, that the brain is responsible for behavior? In the sense that buildings, streets, highways, and real estate are responsible for a city's behavior. This conversation was originally on the topic of artificial intelligence, so whatever it is in us that leads to physical changes which manifest as third-person observable behavior, do you believe that to be entirely influenced by physical and (in theory) detectable matter/energy/fields? I'm not saying that though. We *are* the physical changes. Third person and first person seem to us to be separate because the first person end is the 'head' end. You are saying that I think 'whatever it that is our head leads to physical changes which manifest as our tail' and you are trying to get me to see that it makes more sense to say that it is our tail which is responsible for the existence of the head - that the head is what the tail needs to lead it to food and reproduction. That's not my position though. I'm saying head-tail mind- body are a function of the symmetry of sense. As far as fields being detectable - detectable by what? I have no problem detecting humor, irony, style, beauty...to a human being these are detectable energy fields, only higher up on the monochord/chakra- like escalator of qualitative interiority/significance. The universe for us is much more readily detectable by us as a combination of fiction and fact than it is in terms of matter/energy/fields. Those things are a posteriori ideas about the universe of our body, as verified by consensus of inanimate objects interacting. That is only half of the universe - the tail half which is the polar opposite of awareness. It is the perspective from which no life, order, meaning or significance can be detected. If not, what mechanism do you theorize mediates between mental and physical events? Is it one way or two way? If two way (or if as you often say it is just the other side of the coin) then why not say it is physical? I do say it's physical. Physical feelings, physical stories, physical personalities and identities - all physical, but not as objects in space, as experiences through time. There is no mechanism that mediates spacetime-matter-energy with timespace-sense-motive, they are the same thing except the more something is you or is like you, the more it seems to you like the latter instead of the former. If such a mechanism exists, it must conform to some set of laws, some rhyme or reason, as otherwise how could the mental world (or side) so reliably control our physical actions, and how do the sensations picked up from physical sensors (retinas, nerve endings) so reliably make their way into our mind? The 'mechanism' is sense. It doesn't conform to laws but it develops habits which become as laws to those who arise out of them. It's only a mechanism when the insider looks outside. What we are doing now is looking outside as the insider's exterior and finding it lacking any trace of the insider, concluding that the insider is an illusion. When the insider looks inside however, there is more animism than mechanism. Sense experience and meaning. On the outside, the nerves are literal fibers and cells. On the inside 'nerve' is strength, courage, self-legitimizing ontology. They are part of the same thing but don't correlate one-to-one, they correlate as the whole history and potential future of the universe twisting orthogonally into an event horizon of a whole universe of 'here and now' If there is a separation between the mental and physical worlds, there must be reliable rules that govern any interaction between the mind and the physical world, and the interaction must be two way. How then, can they rightly be called two separate worlds? Exactly, they are not separate except to the participant. We are the head looking at our tail, but objectively, if we were not a head, we would see both head and tail are the body with two ends, each being everything that the other is not. If there were rules, then the rules would need rules. What makes the rules? Where to they come from and what mechanism do they use to rule? As you say, and we agree, the interaction must be two way, but no external rules are required to govern the interaction, because both mind and body are, on one level, the same thing
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 6/2/2012 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2012, at 20:18, meekerdb wrote: On 6/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the original remains the same person, so we don't count him as a new person, each time he steps in the box. This, in my opinion, illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA. Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind. Then the probability the original went to Mars is 1. The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a step 5 case. The probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2. Everybody feels they are the original. original refer to the third person body. By definition it is the one being copied. It doesn't really solve the identity problem to assume it is physical continuity. The copy also has physical continuity; and in any even slightly realistic case the 'original' will be destroyed in the process of extracting information, so there will really be two copies and no 'original'. The question before he enters the box is, Will you find yourself on Mars? To which he could reply, What does 'you' refer to? The question is about your future subjective feeling as seen from your future first person perspective.If you assume comp, you know in advance that you will feel entire and unique, No, I expect that two someones will feel entire and unique. either on Earth or on Mars, and you know that you cannot that in advance (or give me the algorithm). But all that assumes that 'you' and 'your' have meaningful referents. According to comp they are no more meaningful than referring to this number 2 and that number 2 and asking which number 2 counts the moons of Mars. Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry- Potter-like. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Yes. Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense. While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), OK. but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to the earth/mars experience. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. This is ambiguous. What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars. Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay). When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th? Yes. That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front of the looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies on mars. Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the Teleporter again? I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the difference between 24. I apologize for not being clear. There are two different experiments I am contrasting: 1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varying delays) are reproduced on Mars. 2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created on Mars. To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself on Mars, he does it again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does so 5 times before giving up. For experiment 1, you and I seem to agree that subjectively, that person person has a 1 in 6 chance of experiencing a continued
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 6/1/2012 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Yes. Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense. While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), OK. but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to the earth/mars experience. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. This is ambiguous. What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars. Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay). When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th? Yes. That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front of the looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies on mars. Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 01 Jun 2012, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote: On 6/1/2012 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Yes. Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense. While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y- axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), OK. but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to the earth/mars experience. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. This is ambiguous. What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars. Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay). When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th? Yes. That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front of the looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies on mars. Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the Teleporter again? I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the difference between 24. I apologize for not being clear. There are two different experiments I am contrasting: 1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varying delays) are reproduced on Mars. 2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created on Mars. To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself on Mars, he does it again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does so 5 times before giving up. For experiment 1, you and I seem to agree
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 6/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the original remains the same person, so we don't count him as a new person, each time he steps in the box. This, in my opinion, illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA. Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind. Then the probability the original went to Mars is 1. The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a step 5 case. The probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2. Everybody feels they are the original. The question before he enters the box is, Will you find yourself on Mars? To which he could reply, What does 'you' refer to? Brent Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On 31 May 2012, at 08:02, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 May 2012, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote: The question I have in mind is Does a brain produce consciousness, or does the brain filter consciousness? I had some thoughts on this same topic a few months ago. I was thinking about what the difference is between a God-mind that knows everything, and an empty mind that knew nothing. Both contain zero information (in an information theoretic sense), so perhaps if someone has no brain they become omniscient (in a certain sense). In a certain sense. OK. (The devil is there). But an empty mind has still to be the mind of a machine, probably the virgin (unprogrammed) universal machine, or the Löbian one (I still dunno). If we consider RSSA, our consciousness followed some path to get to the current moment. Key point. I just used this in a reply on the FOAR list (where I explain UDA/AUDA). If we look at brain development, we find our consciousness formed from what was previously not conscious matter. Not really. It is counter-intuitive, but matter is the last thing that emanates from the ONE (in Plato/Plotinus, and in comp, and even in the information theoretic view of QM as explained by Ron Garrett and that you compare rightly to the comp consequence). Matter can even be seen as what God loose control on. It is almost pure absolute indetermination. The primitive matter is really a product of consciousness differentiation (cf UDA). But I see what you mean. I think. Therefore, there is some path from a (null conscious state)-(you), and perhaps, there are paths from the null state to every possible conscious state. Yes, and vice versa by amnesia, plausibly. If so, then every time we go to sleep, or go under anesthesia, or die, we can wake up as anyone. In a sense, we do that all the time. This points to the idea that there is only one (universal) dreaming person, and that personal identity is a relative illusion. We know that consciousness is in platonia, and that local brains are just relative universal numbers making possible for a person (in a large sense which can include an amoeba) to manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation/environment. But this does not completely answer the question. I think that many thinks that the more a brain is big, the more it can be conscious, which is not so clear when you take the reversal into account. It might be the exact contrary. I think there are many tricks the brain employs against itself to aid the selfish propagation of its genes. One example is the concept of the ego (having an identity). Agreed. As I said just above. Many drugs can temporarily disable whatever mechanism in our brain creates this feeling, leading to ego death, feelings of connectedness, oneness with other or the universe, etc. Perhaps one of our ancestors always felt this way, but died out when the egoist gene developed and made its carriers exploitative of the egoless. Probably. I think so. And this might be confirmed by studies showing that missing some part of the brain, like an half hippocampus, can lead to to a permanent feeling of presence. Recently this has been confirmed by the showing that LSD and psilocybe decrease the activity of the brain during the hallucinogenic phases. And dissociative drugs disconnect parts of the brain, with similar increase of the first person experience. Clinical studies of Near death experiences might also put evidence in that direction. haldous Huxley made a similar proposal for mescaline. This is basically explained with the Bp Dt hypostases. By suppressing material in the brain you make the B poorer (you eliminate belief), but then you augment the possibility so you make the consistency Dt stronger. Eventually you come back to the universal consciousness of the virgin simple universal numbers, perhaps. Here are some recent papers on this: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=do-psychedelics-expand-mind-reducing-brain-activityWT.mc_id=SA_WR_20120523 http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/01/17/1119598109.short Thanks for the links and your thoughts. They are, as always, very interesting. Thanks Jason, Bruno PS I asked Colin on the FOR list if he is aware of the European Brain Project, which is relevant for this thread. Especially that they are aware of simulating nature at some level: http://www.humanbrainproject.eu/introduction.html Has he replied on the FOR list? It seems he has been absent from this list for the past few days. He has disappeared again, apparently. Best, Bruno Jason If you have _everything_ in your model (external world included), then you can simulate it. But you don’t. So you can’t simulate it. Would you stop behaving intelligently if the
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program. A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface and that's the **only** way to interact. Huh? A program interacts with another program directly. Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a program that can talk/share thing with another program without any interface between them... You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be prevented by the lack of such a thing. Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass from one area of memory to another. There is no interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines. Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the physical hardware. The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as the root level. It's entirely up to the programmer how direct they want it to appear to the user, but ultimately, it is still just a program running on the hardware. The virtual machine cannot run without hardware. If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi level. Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't reach the host) unless an interface between them exists. No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all running on the same physical hardware node. Well you can't read unless an interface between them exists. What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire burns in all of them, with no interface required. Well I know you do it through magic mushroom... but hey, that doesn't work. Sounds like you are conceding my point though. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program. A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface and that's the **only** way to interact. Huh? A program interacts with another program directly. Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a program that can talk/share thing with another program without any interface between them... You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be prevented by the lack of such a thing. Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass from one area of memory to another. There is no interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines. Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the physical hardware. The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as the root level. That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to the host hardware it does not... The point is that the program running on the emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical hardware if no interface is present to give it access to it. Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this discussion here, can't cure your stupidity. Quentin It's entirely up to the programmer how direct they want it to appear to the user, but ultimately, it is still just a program running on the hardware. The virtual machine cannot run without hardware. If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi level. Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't reach the host) unless an interface between them exists. No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all running on the same physical hardware node. Well you can't read unless an interface between them exists. What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire burns in all of them, with no interface required. Well I know you do it through magic mushroom... but hey, that doesn't work. Sounds like you are conceding my point though. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Yes. Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense. While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), OK. but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to the earth/mars experience. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. This is ambiguous. What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars. Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay). When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th? Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the Teleporter again? Thanks, Jason In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) Yes. In that case. but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case? RSSA has to be applied. Your first protocol is faithful, isomorphic, to the experience I was describing. Te second is not. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On 5/31/2012 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I think there are many tricks the brain employs against itself to aid the selfish propagation of its genes. One example is the concept of the ego (having an identity). Agreed. As I said just above. So having an identity, a unity of thoughts, depends on there being a brain which depends on physics. Which is why I argue that, whatever is fundamental, physics is essential to consciousness. Many drugs can temporarily disable whatever mechanism in our brain creates this feeling, leading to ego death, feelings of connectedness, oneness with other or the universe, etc. Perhaps one of our ancestors always felt this way, but died out when the egoist gene developed and made its carriers exploitative of the egoless. Probably. I think so. Evolutionarily the ego must have preceded Lobian programming by many generations. Competition and natural selection must have occurred even in the primordial soup. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On May 31, 2:33 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On May 29, 1:45 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take
issue with?
A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy
So does a cadaver's brain and body. The fact that a cadaver is not
intelligent should show us that the difference between life and death
can't be meaningfully reduced to matter and energy.
That some organizations of matter/energy are intelligent and others are not
is irrelevant, what matters is whether or not you agree that the brain is
made of matter and energy. Do you agree the brain is made of matter and
energy, and that the brain is responsible for your consciousness (or at
least one of the many possible manifestations of it)?
I think that Matter-Energy and Sense-Motive are dual aspects of the
same thing. If you are talking about the brain only, then you are
talking about matter and energy, but no person exists if you limit the
discussion to that. The matter and energy side of what we are is just
organs. There is no person there. The brain is not responsible for
consciousness anymore than your computer is responsible for the
internet. It is the necessary vehicle through which human level
awareness is accessed.
B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,
No, laws follow from our observation of natural matter and energy.
You are mistaking our approximations and inferences concerning the natural
laws for the natural laws themselves.
No, you are mistaking the interaction of concretely real natural
phenomena with abstract principles which we have derived from
measurement and intellectual extension.
Before there were any humans, or any
life, there must have been laws that the universe obeyed to reach the point
where Earth formed and life could develop.
Before there was matter, there were no laws that the universe obeyed
pertaining to matter, just as there were no laws of biology before
biology. The universe makes laws by doing. It isn't only a disembodied
set of invisible laws which creates obedient bodies. Laws are not
primordial. You have to have some kind of capacity to sense and make
sense before any kind of regularity of pattern can be established.
Something has to be able to happen in the first place before you can
separate out what can happen under which conditions. The reality of
something being able to happen - experience - possibility - prefigures
all other principles.
Do you agree that such natural
laws exist (regardless of our human approximations of them)?
No. It has nothing to do with human approximations though. If an
audience cheers it is not because there is a law of cheering they are
following, it is because they personally are participating in a
context of sense and motive which they and their world mutually push
and pull. The understanding of when cheering happens and under what
conditions it can be produced is an a posterior abstraction. We can
call it a law, and indeed, it is highly regular and useful to think of
it that way, but ultimately the law itself is nothing. It is a set of
meta-observations about reality, not an ethereal authoritative core
around which concrete reality constellates and obeys. Laws come from
within. Human laws from within humans, atomic laws from within atoms,
etc.
C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms
You have jumped from physics to abstraction. It's like saying 'I have
a rabbit rabbits act like rabbits Bugs Bunny is modeled after the
behavior of rabbits Bugs Bunny is a rabbit'.
I haven't jumped there yet. All C says is that there exists some formal
system that is capable of describing the natural laws as they are. You may
accept or reject this. If you reject this, simply say so and provide some
justification if you have one.
The formal system doesn't exist until some sentient being
intentionally brings it into existence. Bugs Bunny requires a
cartoonist to draw him. Bugs is a formal system that is capable of
describing rabbit behaviors as they are but he doesn't exist
'there' ('he' insists 'here' instead).
Note that I have not made any statement to the effect that an abstract
rabbit is the same as a physical rabbit, only that natural laws that the
matter and energy in (a rabbit or any other physical thing) follow can be
described.
You aren't factoring in the limitation of perception. Think of a young
child trying to imitate an accent from another language. To the child,
they perceive that they are doing a pretty good job of emulating
exactly how that way of speaking sounds. To an adult though,
especially one who is a native speaker of the language being imitated,
there is an obvious difference. This is where we are in our
contemporary belief that we have accounted for physical forces. I
think that we are looking at a
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program. A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface and that's the **only** way to interact. Huh? A program interacts with another program directly. Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a program that can talk/share thing with another program without any interface between them... You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be prevented by the lack of such a thing. Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass from one area of memory to another. There is no interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines. Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the physical hardware. The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as the root level. That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to the host hardware it does not... I'm not talking about the user having access to the host hardware, I'm talking about the virtual machine: the software. It is using the host machines's memory and CPUs, is it not? The point is that the program running on the emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical hardware if no interface is present to give it access to it. No program has any way of knowing whether it is running on physical hardware or not, even if it has an interface. Whether the program is running on an emulator or not makes no difference. Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this discussion here, can't cure your stupidity. Despite your ad hominem retort, there is no basis for it if you understand the points I am making. It is your understanding that is a little fuzzy. I am an MCSE and CCEA btw, and I have been configuring and managing hundreds of RDP, Citrix, and virtual servers every day for over 13 years. Yes but you still have to learn what a program is... then come back talking. Quentin I can assure you that you can break an entire hardware node by doing something on one container. Virtual is a relative term, it is not literal. The virtual machines are all really the same physical computer. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On May 31, 1:58 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program. A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface and that's the **only** way to interact. Huh? A program interacts with another program directly. Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a program that can talk/share thing with another program without any interface between them... You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be prevented by the lack of such a thing. Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass from one area of memory to another. There is no interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines. Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the physical hardware. The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as the root level. That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to the host hardware it does not... I'm not talking about the user having access to the host hardware, I'm talking about the virtual machine: the software. It is using the host machines's memory and CPUs, is it not? The point is that the program running on the emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical hardware if no interface is present to give it access to it. No program has any way of knowing whether it is running on physical hardware or not, even if it has an interface. Whether the program is running on an emulator or not makes no difference. Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this discussion here, can't cure your stupidity. Despite your ad hominem retort, there is no basis for it if you understand the points I am making. It is your understanding that is a little fuzzy. I am an MCSE and CCEA btw, and I have been configuring and managing hundreds of RDP, Citrix, and virtual servers every day for over 13 years. Yes but you still have to learn what a program is... then come back talking. What 'come back'? Did I leave? What understanding about what a program is do you have that could possibly make an difference in this conversation? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 31, 1:58 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program. A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface and that's the **only** way to interact. Huh? A program interacts with another program directly. Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a program that can talk/share thing with another program without any interface between them... You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be prevented by the lack of such a thing. Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass from one area of memory to another. There is no interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines. Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the physical hardware. The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as the root level. That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to the host hardware it does not... I'm not talking about the user having access to the host hardware, I'm talking about the virtual machine: the software. It is using the host machines's memory and CPUs, is it not? The point is that the program running on the emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical hardware if no interface is present to give it access to it. No program has any way of knowing whether it is running on physical hardware or not, even if it has an interface. Whether the program is running on an emulator or not makes no difference. Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this discussion here, can't cure your stupidity. Despite your ad hominem retort, there is no basis for it if you understand the points I am making. It is your understanding that is a little fuzzy. I am an MCSE and CCEA btw, and I have been configuring and managing hundreds of RDP, Citrix, and virtual servers every day for over 13 years. Yes but you still have to learn what a program is... then come back talking. What 'come back'? Did I leave? What understanding about what a program is do you have that could possibly make an difference in this conversation? To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you talk is like hey dude it's in the OS !... like the operating system was not a software... like if you want to access the network you're not calling a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some place in memory... pfff only thing I can say is AhAhAh !!!... as your sense BS. The way you don't understand level... when a emulator is in a emulator... the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware... which run itself run on physical hardware, no program in the nth level could access n-1 level hardware without the n-1 level emulator giving interface to it. Quentin Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On 5/31/2012 12:10 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On May 31, 1:45 am, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Craig, You mentioned that you can open a remote desktop connection from a virtualized computer to a real computer (or even the one running the virtualization). This, as Quentin mentioned, requires an interface. In this case it is provided by the virtual network card made available to the virtual OS. A 'virtual network card' is just a name for the part of OS. There is no interface. The 'real computer' is no more real than the virtual computer. The partition is purely fictional - a presentation layer to appeal to our sense of organization and convenience. No virtual network card is required. You could just call it the part of the OS that we call virtual. The partition between the OS and the actual hardware however, does require an interface for our hands and eyes to make changes to the hardware that affects the software. When the virtual OS writes network traffic to this virtual interface, it is read by the host computer, and from there on can be interpreted and processed. It is only because the host computer is monitoring the state of this virtual network card and forwarding its traffic that the virtual OS is able to send any network traffic outside it. No, the containers all share the same root OS. The virtual interface is a convenient fiction. Craig Hi Craig, It seems that we might be glossing over the difference between hardware and software... -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Yes. Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense. While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), OK. but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to the earth/mars experience. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. This is ambiguous. What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars. Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay). When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th? Yes. That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front of the looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies on mars. Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the Teleporter again? I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the difference between 24. In this thought experience you were supposed to be an external observer on earth, not the candidate doing the duplication. In your diary, you will always write things like, he try to multiply the copy on mars, push on the button and told me this fails again. Bruno In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) Yes. In that case. but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case? RSSA has to be applied. Your first protocol is faithful, isomorphic, to the experience I was
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On 31 May 2012, at 18:56, meekerdb wrote: On 5/31/2012 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I think there are many tricks the brain employs against itself to aid the selfish propagation of its genes. One example is the concept of the ego (having an identity). Agreed. As I said just above. So having an identity, a unity of thoughts, depends on there being a brain which depends on physics. Which is why I argue that, whatever is fundamental, physics is essential to consciousness. I can agree. This does not make physics primitive though. Just that that the physical realm might delude us on our identity, as it does on materiality. Keep in mind that physics, with comp, is a statistic on computations as seen from some points of view. Many drugs can temporarily disable whatever mechanism in our brain creates this feeling, leading to ego death, feelings of connectedness, oneness with other or the universe, etc. Perhaps one of our ancestors always felt this way, but died out when the egoist gene developed and made its carriers exploitative of the egoless. Probably. I think so. Evolutionarily the ego must have preceded Lobian programming by many generations. I agree, for the human egos, but arithmetic is full of relative egos, non lobian and lobian one. Competition and natural selection must have occurred even in the primordial soup. No doubt. From our perspective. (our can include the bacteria, and all living creatures). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Yes. Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense. While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), OK. but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to the earth/mars experience. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. This is ambiguous. What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars. Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay). When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th? Yes. That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front of the looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies on mars. Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the Teleporter again? I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the difference between 24. I apologize for not being clear. There are two different experiments I am contrasting: 1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varying delays) are reproduced on Mars. 2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created on Mars. To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself on Mars, he does it again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does so 5 times before giving up. For experiment 1, you and I seem to agree that subjectively, that person person has a 1 in 6 chance of experiencing a continued presence on earth, and a 5/6 chance of finding himself on mars. For experiment 2, I believe you
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 5/31/2012 12:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Yes. Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense. While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), OK. but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to the earth/mars experience. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. This is ambiguous. What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars. Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay). When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th? Yes. That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front of the looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies on mars. Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that the other copy made it to
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On May 31, 2:22 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you talk is like hey dude it's in the OS !... like the operating system was not a software... No, I'm saying it's all software, except for the hardware. That has been my point from the start. You can make as many virtual worlds nested within each other as you like and it doesn't matter. No interface is required because they are all being physically hosted by the semiconducting microelectronics. It is not a problem to have an avatar have virtual dinner in virtual Paris by using his virtual computer. He can dive into the monitor and end up on the Champs-Élysées if the programmer writes the virtual worlds that way. No interface can allow or restrict anything within a virtual context - it's all an election by the programmer, not an ontological barrier. like if you want to access the network you're not calling a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some place in memory... pfff only thing I can say is AhAhAh !!!... as your sense BS. When I use my keyboard to type these words, I am using hardware. When an avatar uses a virtual keyboard, or when that avatar's avatar's avatar uses a virtual virtual virtual keyboard, there is no keyboard there. The keyboard can be a turnip or a cloud, it doesn't matter. For me, in hardware world, it matters. The way you don't understand level... when a emulator is in a emulator... the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware... No, I understand exactly how you understand level but I am telling you that you are wrong. You are mistaking marketing hype for reality. Emulation is a figure of speech. There is no virtual hardware. It's just one piece of software that acts like several. The organization of it is meaningless ontologically. The entire program is an epiphenomenon of the same piece of hardware. which run itself run on physical hardware, no program in the nth level could access n-1 level hardware without the n-1 level emulator giving interface to it. That is just not true and you aren't listening to what I'm saying. You are confusing user permissions with hardware to software interface. Every week I see nth level programs break n-1 OS and take down the entire node. It's not what you think. They use the same OS. There is only one copy of Windows Server 2008 that every container shares. If they had separate copies, there would still be a meta-OS that they share. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On May 31, 2:29 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: It seems that we might be glossing over the difference between hardware and software... Hi Stephen, Yes, that seems to be the case a lot. I guess it can be confusing, but I'm not sure why. If a cat can pee on it, then it's hardware. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 31, 2:22 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you talk is like hey dude it's in the OS !... like the operating system was not a software... No, I'm saying it's all software, except for the hardware. That has been my point from the start. You can make as many virtual worlds nested within each other as you like and it doesn't matter. No interface is required because they are all being physically hosted by the semiconducting microelectronics. It is not a problem to have an avatar have virtual dinner in virtual Paris by using his virtual computer. He can dive into the monitor and end up on the Champs-Élysées if the programmer writes the virtual worlds that way. No interface can allow or restrict anything within a virtual context You simply don't know what the terms means or you're stupid... one or the other or both. - it's all an election by the programmer, not an ontological barrier. like if you want to access the network you're not calling a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some place in memory... pfff only thing I can say is AhAhAh !!!... as your sense BS. When I use my keyboard to type these words, I am using hardware. Which calls software, basically calling an interrupt and setting something into memory to be read by other programs (os or driver or whatever) When an avatar uses a virtual keyboard, or when that avatar's avatar's avatar uses a virtual virtual virtual keyboard, there is no keyboard there. If you don't do a simulation no.. so what. The keyboard can be a turnip or a cloud, it doesn't matter. For me, in hardware world, it matters. The way you don't understand level... when a emulator is in a emulator... the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware... No, I understand exactly how you understand level but I am telling you that you are wrong. You are mistaking marketing hype for reality. I write emulator, I know exactly how this works contrary to you. Emulation is a figure of speech. No There is no virtual hardware. There is. It's just one piece of software that acts like several. The organization of it is meaningless ontologically. The entire program is an epiphenomenon of the same piece of hardware. which run itself run on physical hardware, no program in the nth level could access n-1 level hardware without the n-1 level emulator giving interface to it. That is just not true and you aren't listening to what I'm saying. You are confusing user permissions with hardware to software interface. Every week I see nth level programs break n-1 OS and take down the entire node. It's not what you think. They use the same OS. There is only one copy of Windows Server 2008 that every container shares. If they had separate copies, there would still be a meta-OS that they share. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On May 31, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 31, 2:22 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you talk is like hey dude it's in the OS !... like the operating system was not a software... No, I'm saying it's all software, except for the hardware. That has been my point from the start. You can make as many virtual worlds nested within each other as you like and it doesn't matter. No interface is required because they are all being physically hosted by the semiconducting microelectronics. It is not a problem to have an avatar have virtual dinner in virtual Paris by using his virtual computer. He can dive into the monitor and end up on the Champs-Élysées if the programmer writes the virtual worlds that way. No interface can allow or restrict anything within a virtual context You simply don't know what the terms means or you're stupid... one or the other or both. No, it's just that you aren't seeing my point that there is a difference between a device that is ontologically necessary and one that that is entirely optional. I don't think that means you're stupid, just that you cannot tolerate being wrong. It doesn't matter if you call it an interface, what matters is that I need a way to turn my free will into electronic changes in a computer, but electronic changes don't need a way to turn themselves into other electronic changes. - it's all an election by the programmer, not an ontological barrier. like if you want to access the network you're not calling a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some place in memory... pfff only thing I can say is AhAhAh !!!... as your sense BS. When I use my keyboard to type these words, I am using hardware. Which calls software, basically calling an interrupt and setting something into memory to be read by other programs (os or driver or whatever) No, it calls hardware, and the behavior of part of that hardware seems to us like software when it is displayed back to us through screen hardware. Programs are nothing but logical scripts to control hardware. Hardware doesn't need a program, but programs need hardware. Programs can run in other programs, but only if they all ultimately run on hardware. They have no existence on their own. There is no virtual universe being created, it is just a well maintained facade. When an avatar uses a virtual keyboard, or when that avatar's avatar's avatar uses a virtual virtual virtual keyboard, there is no keyboard there. If you don't do a simulation no.. so what. So you are not limited to the logic of physics in a virtual world because it's not physically real. The keyboard can be a turnip or a cloud, it doesn't matter. For me, in hardware world, it matters. The way you don't understand level... when a emulator is in a emulator... the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware... No, I understand exactly how you understand level but I am telling you that you are wrong. You are mistaking marketing hype for reality. I write emulator, I know exactly how this works contrary to you. But you don't know how it fails to work, which is the more relevant issue. Emulation is a theory that fails in reality. Emulation is a figure of speech. No Yes There is no virtual hardware. There is. Prove it. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Yes. Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense. While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), OK. but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to the earth/mars experience. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. This is ambiguous. In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) Yes. In that case. but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case? RSSA has to be applied. Your first protocol is faithful, isomorphic, to the experience I was describing. Te second is not. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 29 May 2012, at 22:41, meekerdb wrote: On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case? Thanks, Jason I think you are right, Jason. For the probability to be (1/2^n) implies that there is some single soul that is you and it's notreally duplicated so that if it went to Mars on the first try there would be zero probability of it going on the second. Then theprobability of your soul being on Mars is (1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n). Under the alternative, that you really are duplicated the probability that some you chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/n). But in this case there is really no you, there are n+1 people who have some common history. The probability bears on the first experiences, which are indeed never duplicated from their 1-pov, and we ask for the probability of staying on earth. It is equivalent with the probability of always getting head in a throw of a coin. So, from the perspective of the guy who stays on Earth, he is living an Harry-Potter like experience. But the experience is trivial for the observer looking at it from outside. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 5/30/2012 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 May 2012, at 22:41, meekerdb wrote: On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case? Thanks, Jason I think you are right, Jason. For the probability to be (1/2^n) implies that there is some single soul that is you and it's not really duplicated so that if it went to Mars on the first try there would be zero probability of it going on the second. Then the probability of your soul being on Mars is (1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n). Under the alternative, that you really are duplicated the probability that some you chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/n). But in this case there is really no you, there are n+1 people who have some common history. The probability bears on the first experiences, which are indeed never duplicated from their 1-pov, and we ask for the probability of staying on earth. It is equivalent with the probability of always getting head in a throw of a coin. So, from the perspective of the guy who stays on Earth, he is living an Harry-Potter like experience. No more than the guys who went to Mars. If they compare experiences they will find that although they only had probability 1/2 of it happening, they all went to Mars. Brent But the experience is trivial for the observer looking at it from outside. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 30 May 2012, at 18:16, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2012 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 May 2012, at 22:41, meekerdb wrote: On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y- axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case? Thanks, Jason I think you are right, Jason. For the probability to be (1/2^n) implies that there is some single soul that is you and it's not really duplicated so that if it went to Mars on the first try there would be zero probability of it going on the second. Then the probability of your soul being on Mars is (1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n). Under the alternative, that you really are duplicated the probability that some you chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/ n). But in this case there is really no you, there are n+1 people who have some common history. The probability bears on the first experiences, which are indeed never duplicated from their 1-pov, and we ask for the probability of staying on earth. It is equivalent with the probability of always getting head in a throw of a coin. So, from the perspective of the guy who stays on Earth, he is living an Harry-Potter like experience. No more than the guys who went to Mars. If they compare experiences they will find that although they only had probability 1/2 of it happening, they all went to Mars. They almost all went to Mars ... eventually, with one exception. Besides this was just used in a protocol where the observer is the one looking his friend, that is the exception. It is his 3-view on the 1- view of the guy who never succeed to go on Mars. I have a collection of strategies that he can try, like introducing delays, or using random coin between original and copy, unfortunately for the guy remaining on earth, by definition, he cannot succeed, and he will have hard time to believe things are not conspiring against his will to go on Mars, and this proportionally to the ingenuity developed to assure to be the one going on Mars. If you make that experience, the chance to go on mars is always rather great, but of course, we, the spectators, will have to live with the unlucky (from its first person view) who remains on
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to have dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control real world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was in a virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world for you to interact. You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't see any problem with that. Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface. You could have a virtual world where your avatar has dinner in a virtual virtual Paris on his virtual computer and in a virtual Paris at the same time. You could have a virtual factory where virtual virtual drawings of robots make root level virtual cars. There is something more than level which makes the difference between real and virtual. Level itself is an abstraction. Virtual worlds aren't really worlds at all. They are nothing but sophisticated stories using pictures instead of words. Characters in stories don't really think or feel. It's confusing because what we know of reality is in our mind, and so is what we know of a virtual reality, so it is easy to conflate the two and imagine that reality is nothing more than we think it is. We reduce them both to seem like phenomenological peers, but they aren't. If you look at a mirror in another mirror, they may look the same but one of them is an actual piece of glass. You can't break the reflected mirror. It's not a matter of level, it is a matter of mistaking a purely visual-semantic text for a concrete multi-sense presentation that is rooted in a single historical context that goes back to the beginning of time. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On May 29, 1:45 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take issue with? A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy So does a cadaver's brain and body. The fact that a cadaver is not intelligent should show us that the difference between life and death can't be meaningfully reduced to matter and energy. B. that matter and energy follow natural laws, No, laws follow from our observation of natural matter and energy. C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms You have jumped from physics to abstraction. It's like saying 'I have a rabbit rabbits act like rabbits Bugs Bunny is modeled after the behavior of rabbits Bugs Bunny is a rabbit'. D. that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by algorithms Precision only determines the probability that a particular detector fails to detect the fraud of simulation over time. It says nothing about the genuine equivalence of the simulation and the reality. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to have dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control real world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was in a virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world for you to interact. You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't see any problem with that. Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface. No you can't, if in your virtual world, you made a real computer simulator, what runs in the simulator cannot escape in the upper virtual world unless you've made an interface to it. If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi level. Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't reach the host) unless an interface between them exists. Quentin You could have a virtual world where your avatar has dinner in a virtual virtual Paris on his virtual computer and in a virtual Paris at the same time. You could have a virtual factory where virtual virtual drawings of robots make root level virtual cars. There is something more than level which makes the difference between real and virtual. Level itself is an abstraction. Virtual worlds aren't really worlds at all. They are nothing but sophisticated stories using pictures instead of words. Characters in stories don't really think or feel. It's confusing because what we know of reality is in our mind, and so is what we know of a virtual reality, so it is easy to conflate the two and imagine that reality is nothing more than we think it is. We reduce them both to seem like phenomenological peers, but they aren't. If you look at a mirror in another mirror, they may look the same but one of them is an actual piece of glass. You can't break the reflected mirror. It's not a matter of level, it is a matter of mistaking a purely visual-semantic text for a concrete multi-sense presentation that is rooted in a single historical context that goes back to the beginning of time. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On May 30, 4:36 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to have dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control real world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was in a virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world for you to interact. You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't see any problem with that. Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface. No you can't, if in your virtual world, you made a real computer simulator, what runs in the simulator cannot escape in the upper virtual world unless you've made an interface to it. You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program. If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi level. Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't reach the host) unless an interface between them exists. No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all running on the same physical hardware node. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 30, 4:36 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to have dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control real world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was in a virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world for you to interact. You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't see any problem with that. Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface. No you can't, if in your virtual world, you made a real computer simulator, what runs in the simulator cannot escape in the upper virtual world unless you've made an interface to it. You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program. A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface and that's the **only** way to interact. If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi level. Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't reach the host) unless an interface between them exists. No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all running on the same physical hardware node. Well you can't read unless an interface between them exists. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program. A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface and that's the **only** way to interact. Huh? A program interacts with another program directly. There is no interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines. If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi level. Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't reach the host) unless an interface between them exists. No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all running on the same physical hardware node. Well you can't read unless an interface between them exists. What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire burns in all of them, with no interface required. It would magically burn on command if I wanted it to. It's no problem at all unless I want it to burn outside of the root level - into the literal reality of time-space-matter-energy. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
Craig, You mentioned that you can open a remote desktop connection from a virtualized computer to a real computer (or even the one running the virtualization). This, as Quentin mentioned, requires an interface. In this case it is provided by the virtual network card made available to the virtual OS. When the virtual OS writes network traffic to this virtual interface, it is read by the host computer, and from there on can be interpreted and processed. It is only because the host computer is monitoring the state of this virtual network card and forwarding its traffic that the virtual OS is able to send any network traffic outside it. Jason On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 8:32 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On May 30, 6:13 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop So for you a remote desktop is not an interface... remote is a magic mushroom ? It's not an interface, it's just the OS. It doesn't have to be a remote desktop, it can be anything. I can open a local folder or a remote folder, it makes no difference. So for you when two programs talk they do it through wishful thinking ? read what **interface** means. Then programs are made of 'interfaces'? Each line of code interfaces with another? Each byte interfaces with the next byte? There is no difference between running code on the root level and running it on a nested virtual level. There is a big difference between running code on the root level and causing changes in the outside world. There is no 'interface' that will allow a computer to control all matter and energy in the universe and there is no 'interface' required for a program to control any software running in a given digital environment that it is designed to control. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program. A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface and that's the **only** way to interact. Huh? A program interacts with another program directly. Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a program that can talk/share thing with another program without any interface between them... There is no interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines. Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the physical hardware. If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi level. Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't reach the host) unless an interface between them exists. No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all running on the same physical hardware node. Well you can't read unless an interface between them exists. What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire burns in all of them, with no interface required. Well I know you do it through magic mushroom... but hey, that doesn't work. Quentin It would magically burn on command if I wanted it to. It's no problem at all unless I want it to burn outside of the root level - into the literal reality of time-space-matter-energy. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On 5/28/2012 10:21 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to Paris and then expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the Seine. It is exactly like expecting your computer simulated furnace roasting you a toilet bowl. I'd say it's more like trying to fly by sticking feathers on your arms like Icarus. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
2012/5/29 Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course. Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the sentiments It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care. It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston. You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal. You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert. It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom. It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of flight. It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km. As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody died today. No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion. No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly. We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked. This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any value. Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in the delusion. Q. What scientific discipline could this be? A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence. It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you, the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience, and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an artificial intelligence like us. This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to Paris and then expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the Seine. You always put that level confusion on the table. You could
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On 29 May 2012, at 09:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of Jason Resch Sent: Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Church Turing be dammed. On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course. Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the sentiments It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care. It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston. You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal. You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert. It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom. It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of flight. It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km. As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody died today. No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion. No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly. We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked. This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any value. Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in the delusion. Q. What scientific discipline could this be? A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence. It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you, the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience, and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an artificial
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
2012/5/29 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 2012/5/29 Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course. Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the sentiments It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care. It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston. You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal. You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert. It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom. It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of flight. It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km. As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody died today. No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion. No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly. We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked. This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any value. Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in the delusion. Q. What scientific discipline could this be? A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence. It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you, the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience, and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an artificial intelligence like us. This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to Paris and then expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the Seine. You always
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On 29 May 2012, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 2:02 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of Jason Resch Sent: Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Church Turing be dammed. Natural physics is a computation. Fine. But a computed natural physics model is NOT the natural physicsit is the natural physics of a computer. Colin, I recently read the following excerpt from The Singularity is Near on page 454: The basis of the strong (Church-Turing thesis) is that problems that are not solvable on a Turing Machine cannot be solved by human thought, either. The basis of this thesis is that human thought is performed by the human brain (with some influence by the body), that the human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy, that matter and energy follow natural laws, that these laws are describable in mathematical terms, and that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by algorithms. Therefore there exist algorithms that can simulate human thought. The strong version of the Church- Turing thesis postulates an essential equivalence between what a human can think or know, and what is computable. So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take issue with? A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy B. that matter and energy follow natural laws, C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms D. that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by algorithms Thanks, Jason Hi Jason, Brain physics is there to cognise the (external) world. You do not know the external world. Your brain is there to apprehend it. The physics of the brain inherits properties of the (unknown) external world. This is natural cognition. Therefore you have no model to compute. Game over. If I understand this correctly, your point is that we don't understand the physics and chemistry that is important in the brain? Assuming this is the case, it would be only a temporary barrier, not a permanent reason that prohibits AI in practice. You are right. That would neither prohibit AI, nor comp. There are also reasons to believe we already understand the mechanisms of neurons to a sufficient degree to simulate them. There are numerous instances where computer simulated neurons apparently behaved in the same ways as biological neurons have been observed to. If you're interested I can dig up the references. Meaning: there are reasonable levels to bet on. Here, for once, I will give my opinion, if you don't mind. First, about the level, the question will be this level, this year, or that more finest grained level next year, because technology evolves. In between it *is* a possible Pascal Wag, in the sense that if you have a fatal brain disease, you might not afford the time to wait for possible technological deeper levels. And my opinion is that I can imagine saying yes to a doctor for a cheap neuronal simulator, but I expect getting an altered state of consciousness, and some awareness of it. Like being stone or something. For a long run machine, I doubt we can copy the brain without respecting the entire electromagnetic relation of its constituents. I think it is highly plausible that we are indeed digital with respect to the law of chemistry, and my feeling is that the brain is above all a drug designer, and is a machine where only some part of the communication use the cable. So I would ask to the doctor to take into account the glial cells, who seems to communicate a lot, by mechano-chemical diffusion waves, including some chatting with the neurons. And those immensely complex dialog are mainly chemical. This is quite close to the Heizenberg uncertainty level, which is probably our first person plural level (in which case comp is equivalent with QM). Also, by the first person indeterminacy, a curious happening is made when you accept an artificial brain with a level above the first person plural corresponding level. From your point of view, you survive, but with a larger spectrum of possibilities, just because you miss finer grained constraints. (It the Galois connection, probably where the logical time reverses the arrow and become physical time, to do a pleasure to Stephen). In that situation, an observer of the candidate for a high level artificial brain (higher than the first person plural level) will get with a higher probability realilties disconnected from yours. His mind might even live an Harry Potter type of experience. To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case? Thanks, Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case? Thanks, Jason I think you are right, Jason. For the probability to be (1/2^n) implies that there is some single soul that is you and it's not really duplicated so that if it went to Mars on the first try there would be zero probability of it going on the second. Then the probability of your soul being on Mars is (1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n). Under the alternative, that you really are duplicated the probability that some you chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/n). But in this case there is really no you, there are n+1 people who have some common history. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)
On 5/29/2012 4:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly on Mars. Bruno, Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up. You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations. I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th? While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment: I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state. In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records: 1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. U 6. D However, not all of these copies should have the same measure. The way I see it is they have the following probabilities: 1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. U (1/32) 6. D (1/32) I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once. In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case? Thanks, Jason -- Hi Jason, Fascinating! This decrease in probability given an increase in the number of copies would also hold if the copies had amnesia and could not identify themselves with the original? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course. Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the sentiments It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care. It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston. You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal. You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert. It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom. It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of flight. It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km. As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody died today. No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion. No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly. We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked. This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any value. Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in the delusion. Q. What scientific discipline could this be? A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence. It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you, the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience, and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an artificial intelligence like us. This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to Paris and then expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the Seine. It is exactly like expecting
