Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 18-juil.-06, à 18:42, 1Z a écrit : and I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett ...). Huh Electrons and photons are still matter...what *do* you mean ? matter is a word use like a lot of misuse of God in theocracies. What do you mean when you say photon is matter? That we can make repeated measurement on them and find stable number pattern. Also that we can measure it at all, that is available for causal interaction. That it exists and other things don't. (BTW, Deutsch uses the Johnsonian if it kicks back appraoch to reality). Yes. And Deutsch applied it to defend AR in his FOR (Fabric Of Reality) book. On the basis that you can detect unexpected truths in maths. Which you can. But that is not *causal* interaction, so it is not existence in my book. The big problem with the notion of *primary* matter = how to relate 1-experiences with 3-experiments. The mind-body prolbem boild down to qualia, and the problem of qualia and physics boils down to the problem of qualia and mathematical description Feeling to listen to myself here :) That's the *problem* of maths, not the *solution* ! Any inability to have mental proeprties would itslef be a property and therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a bare substrate. You mean an electron or a string would have bare mental properties. I admire you being coherent with non-comp. I mean a bare substrate. Electons are a particular form of matter which is thought of in physical, and hence ,mathematical terms. The subjectity of consciouss states, often treated as inherent boils down to a problem of communicating one's qualia -- how one feesl, how things seem. I would say it is more the uncommunicability of qualia which could be problematic. Huh ? Meaning if we can't communicate them, that is a problem ? Or meaning that if we can't understand why we can't communicate them, that is a problem. Thus it is not truly inherent but depends on the means of communication being used. Feelings and seemings can be more readily communicated in artistic, poetice language, and least readily in scientifi technical language. OK, but that is not scientific (3-person) communication. An artist need to bet on sufficiently similar experiences for those he wish to communicate with. Mathematics is the epitome and pinnacle of 3rd-person communication *because* it deals with abstract structures. Because it deals with abstract structures, it is not good at handling concrete reality -- substance, time, enality. Since the harder, more technical a science is, the more mathematical it is, the communication problem is at its most acute in a purely mathematical langauge. Thus the problem with physicalism is not its posit of matter (as a bare substrate) but its other posit, that all properties are phycial. Since physics is mathematical, that amounts to the claim that all properties are mathematical (or at least mathematically describable). In making the transition from a physicalist world-view to a mathematical one, the concept of a material substrate is abandoned (although it was never a problem for consciousness) and the posit of mathematical properties becomes, which is a problem for consciousness becomes extreme. I agree. Really ? The naïve idea of attaching consciousness to physical activity leads to fatal difficulties. Do you mean the Maudlin/Olympia/Movie argument ? But that is very much phsyical activity as opposed to physical passivity. If you are the kind of physicalist who thinks counterfactuals and potentials are part of the total physical situation, the Maudlin argument has little impact. This is cute. It is already a way to derive QM from comp, especially if you know Hardegree's work showing that Quantum Logic is a particular logic of counterfactuals. Again, with comp, it is cuter: the stuffy appearances are explained by that very counterfactuality: the stuff can be defined by what makes many comp dreams partially sharable. Solidity has to be explained by *many* things (world, computations, etc.). I don't think of substance in terms of solidity. Is that the problem ? Is that why you keep saying that matter has disappeared from physics -- because solidity has ? May I ask you what is your opinion on Everett? Philosophically, it is still a substance theory. The SWE is a contingent fact which does not emerge out of Platonia, and as such it resolves the HP (as much as it needs to be resolved in the face of the evidence of QM). I think MW has technical probelms as physics. Of course. I start from the assumption that I exist, since I do. If by I you mean your first person, it is a good implicit assumption to motivate the moring cup of coffe or tea. But such an assumption is not scientific,
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 18-juil.-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit : It is far from obvious that a simulation even contains 1stP POV's. I agree with you. That is why I postulate comp to begin with. In any case that doesn't effect the logic: simulations *might* be detectable, so they are not necessarily indetectable. I totally agree with you. Indeed, I take the qm-MWI (Everett, Deutsch, ...) as evidence we are detecting the simulated or emulated aspect of our reality. Comp predict that any machine looking below its level of substitution will detect, albeit indirectly, the presence of *many* interfering realities. Only with comp, those realities are not material, but number theoretical. No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical truth. No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be found in maths than any substantiallity. But there is no more any phenomenality to be found in physics, nor really substantiality, unless you define it by electron or strings. But nobody has proved that electron or string, or energy, ... are stuffy. In books and laboratories I see only relation between numbers, and eventually they are related to personal qualia, like the feeling to see a needle on some apparatus. You seem to believe it is easier to make consciousness emerged or just related with stuffy things. How and why? Many philosophers of mind agree that a pain or any qualia are not something localized. A pain is already immaterial, and that is why so many accept the comp hyp (perhaps without seeing the consequences of it): it is easier to explain (or to tackle an explanation) of consciousness (immaterial) from something immaterial (like numbers or relations between numbers) than on something material. Especially when we don't know what material really means. I hope you agree that the mind/body problem is not yet solved. My point is just a reformulation of it in the comp frame. Then I got partial solutions. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical truth. No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be found in maths than any substantiallity. But there is no more any phenomenality to be found in physics, Then we need something ontologically richer than physics to explain experience, not something onotologically stripped-down (physics without substance). nor really substantiality, unless you define it by electron or strings. Substance is mass-energy, and it still exists as such in current physics. But nobody has proved that electron or string, or energy, ... are stuffy. Huh ? They have non-zero mass-energy. That's all physicists need. Was that a solipsist's proved ? In books and laboratories I see only relation between numbers, and eventually they are related to personal qualia, like the feeling to see a needle on some apparatus. Looks like it was IOW, having assumed solipsism, you can find no way out of it. Well, you can: you can assume the Platonic existence of numbers, even though numbers as such don't feature in your experience. But if you are entitled to do that to find a way out of solipsism, the materialist is entitled to assume matter. (Or even posit substance as necessary to explain the phenomenal flow of time, as Kant did). You seem to believe it is easier to make consciousness emerged or just related with stuffy things. Some kinds of non-mathematical stuff are needed to resolve the HP problem, to explain time, to explain phenomenality and so on. The point is to posit enough to explain the universe as we experience it and then stop. How and why? Many philosophers of mind agree that a pain or any qualia are not something localized. I'm not one of them. A pain is already immaterial, There is no basis for saying that whatosever. Only living organisms feel pains, and organisms are material. and that is why so many accept the comp hyp (perhaps without seeing the consequences of it): it is easier to explain (or to tackle an explanation) of consciousness (immaterial) from something immaterial (like numbers or relations between numbers) than on something material. So can you give the mathematical formula for the colour purple, or the taste of honey ? Of course not! The mind-body problem boils down to reconciling phenomenality with mathematical* descriptions, not with matter pre se! Consciousness is a problem for all forms of materialism and physicalism to some extent, but it is possible to discern where the problem is particularly acute. There is no great problem with the idea that matter considered as a bare substrate can have mental properities. Any inability to have mental proeprties would itslef be a property and therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a bare substrate. The subjectity of consciouss states, often treated as inherent boils down to a problem of communicating one's qualia -- how one feesl, how things seem. Thus it is not truly inherent but depends on the means of communication being used. Feelings and seemings can be more readily communicated in artistic, poetice language, and least readily in scientifi technical language. Since the harder, more technical a science is, the more mathematical it is, the communication problem is at its most acute in a purely mathematical langauge. Thus the problem with physicalism is not its posit of matter (as a bare substrate) but its other posit, that all properties are phycial. Since physics is mathematical, that amounts to the claim that all properties are mathematical (or at least mathematically describable). In making the transition from a physicalist world-view to a mathematical one, the concept of a material substrate is abandoned (although it was never a problem for consciousness) and the posit of mathematical properties becomes, which is a problem for consciousness becomes extreme. Especially when we don't know what material really means. It means the substrate of properties, contingent existence, endurance through time, and hence real change, unactualised potential and causal interaction. I hope you agree that the mind/body problem is not yet solved. My point is just a reformulation of it in the comp frame. Then I got partial solutions. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit : Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism. Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism (whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational thesis, that cognition is computation). If computationalism is true then platonism must also be true. Because if you were in a simulation and you have managed to get out of it, how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the material world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is the real world and not another simulation ? e.g it has some non-computable physics. It is the turtle on the turtle on the turtle... Even if you take standard computational thesis, then by the reasoning upper you must reject a bottom level real... ie: a material world, a stuffy world... every reality is stuffy and real (from the inside). (seemingly) real (from the inside just doesn't add up to really real. Your argument only works if you adopt solipsistic premises to start with -- if you just want to have your sensations explained. All you are saying is that if you don't care about what is ultimately true, you do need to bother with what is ultimately real. Equally, if you are interested in ultimate truth, you will need ultimate reality. It has no impact on a realist at all. (BTW, the same arguments that say you don't need matter mean you don't need Other Minds, so solipsism is very much the word!) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 18-juil.-06, à 12:30, 1Z a écrit : Quentin Anciaux: Because if you were in a simulation and you have managed to get out of it, how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the material world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is the real world and not another simulation ? 1Z: e.g it has some non-computable physics. But comp and platonism already predict some non computable physics. You said it yourself by pointing correctly that platonism leads to the apparent possibility of HP universe (Harry Potter Universe, or flying pigs, or random noise, ...). The mystery with naive comp is that it remains something apparently computable in our neighborhood. And that mystery cannot be used as a straightforward refutation of comp, once we look at the non trivialities of computer science and of consistent self-referential discourses. If we bet on comp, then we can already bet we already live in a simulation, the natural one which emerges from the creative nature of the relations between numbers. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 18-juil.-06, à 16:37, 1Z a écrit : A computer simulation is obviously computable. Not necessarily from the first person povs. The word emerge is often used to hide magic. I agree with you. Often, but not necessarily always. What actually exists cannot emerge from mere truths. No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical truth. Sometimes I feel we agree on everything except the theory we play with. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 18-juil.-06, à 16:37, 1Z a écrit : A computer simulation is obviously computable. Not necessarily from the first person povs. It is far from obvious that a simulation even contains 1stP POV's. In any case that doesn't effect the logic: simulations *might* be detectable, so they are not necessarily indetectable. No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical truth. No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be found in maths than any substantiallity. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit : I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical justification. So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist. Now my problem is that a term like material is very vague in physics, Huh ? Physics studies matter, energy, time and space. Those are its topics. Physics may not have a single neat definition of matter, but that does not mean physicsts are a lot to know what it is. Arguably, the whole of economics is a definition of money, Likewise for physics and matter. and I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett ...). Huh Electrons and photons are still matter...what *do* you mean ? (BTW, Deutsch uses the Johnsonian if it kicks back appraoch to reality). The big problem with the notion of *primary* matter = how to relate 1-experiences with 3-experiments. The mind-body prolbem boild down to qualia, and the problem of qualia and physics boils down to the problem of qualia and mathematical description Consciousness is a problem for all forms of materialism and physicalism to some extent, but it is possible to discern where the problem is particularly acute. There is no great problem with the idea that matter considered as a bare substrate can have mental properities. Any inability to have mental proeprties would itslef be a property and therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a bare substrate. The subjectity of consciouss states, often treated as inherent boils down to a problem of communicating one's qualia -- how one feesl, how things seem. Thus it is not truly inherent but depends on the means of communication being used. Feelings and seemings can be more readily communicated in artistic, poetice language, and least readily in scientifi technical language. Since the harder, more technical a science is, the more mathematical it is, the communication problem is at its most acute in a purely mathematical langauge. Thus the problem with physicalism is not its posit of matter (as a bare substrate) but its other posit, that all properties are phycial. Since physics is mathematical, that amounts to the claim that all properties are mathematical (or at least mathematically describable). In making the transition from a physicalist world-view to a mathematical one, the concept of a material substrate is abandoned (although it was never a problem for consciousness) and the posit of mathematical properties becomes, which is a problem for consciousness becomes extreme. The naïve idea of attaching consciousness to physical activity leads to fatal difficulties. Do you mean the Maudlin/Olympia/Movie argument ? But that is very much phsyical activity as opposed to physical passivity. If you are the kind of physicalist who thinks counterfactuals and potentials are part of the total physical situation, the Maudlin argument has little impact. Well, why not, if that is your definition. I understand better why you say you could introduce matter in Platonia. Plato would have disagree in the sense that matter is the shadow of the ideal intelligible reality. What is material exists. Whether Platonia exists is another matter. It is for Platonism to justify itslef in terms of the concrete reality we find oursleves in, not for concrete reality to be justify itself in terms of Platonia. It depends of the assumptions you start from. Of course. I start from the assumption that I exist, since I do. I don't start from the assumtion that numbers exist supernaturally , floating around in Plato's heaven. The intelligible is a quasi-empiricist mathematical epistemology. Mathematicians are supposed by Platonists to be able to perceive mathematical truth with some extra organ. That is naïve platonism. Already condemned by Plato himself and most of his followers. Read Plotinus for more on this (especially Ennead V). The question then is whether numbers have any role at all, if they have no epistemological role. I don't understand what you mean by numbers don't exist at all. Well, I've never seen one. Again that would be a critics of naïve Platonism. As I have said: number n exists in Platonia means just that the proposition number n exists is true. For example I believe that the equation x^2 - 61y^2 = 1 admits integers solutions independently of any things related to me. If that is all it means, it cannot possibly support an argument whose conclusion is that something really exists. The conclusion of a deductive argument has to be implicit in its premisses. Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that the classical proposition 4356667654090987890111 is prime or 4356667654090987890111 is not prime is true there. It's true here. why bring Platonia into it ? I don't understand what you mean by 4356667654090987890111 is prime or not is true here. Is it false or
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno and 1Z: both of you write extraordinary wise remarks in approx. 3-4 times as many words than I can attentively folloow. However - with mostly agreeing with the positions of BOTH OF YOU - I may remark (hopefully in less words??) * I consider the epistemic development of our experience about the world, from precaveman on, so I consider the figments of earlier explanations reflected in ongoing (scientific and common sense) thinking. Matter(ly?) is a primitive view physicists picked up centuries (25+?) ago and still ride it. I don't know better myself. Experimental (truth) is gathered by whatever constructs the appropriate epistemic level allowed for instrument design and for (sweatty) explanations on readings. Math contributed always to the misunderstganding by equating the primitively cut model-views into soothing matchings: to satisfy the 'savants'. As long as we do abide by the past misunderstandings (and I mean EVERYTHING gotten from past wisdom) and do not regard them just as hints for a better thinking, we go in circles. Example the multiverse as a replications of this one we observe (as we can). I had no echo on 'my' multiverse: universes in all possible qualia and all possible systems (some of them - maybe - CAPABLE OF CONTACTING US. That reaches into sci-fi, into the 'zookeeper' theory, even a rational foundation for many religious miracles and their systemic explanations. E.g. teleportation marvels and Q-suicide etc.) 1Z mentions 'mentality of matter' - of course, if we consider the m-word as ideational functioning, any following of 'rules' in the coexistence(?) simplified in our physics (and logical) reductionism as 'laws'. Matter is more difficult, we 'grew' into percepts over milennia to assign response to impact as 'hard', 'pain', 'warm', whatever. The all possible is a hard phrase, WE are not to tell what is (=we find) possible or not. Matter, particles are not possible, they are explanations for our age- long ignorance and so leveled explanations, which went as inherited memes into our basic 'mental' construction and gives foundation to the ways we think. I cannot elaborate on these features, cannot defend them in an argument, cannot even 'think' in them: I am (I hope) a human being with all the imperfections. And I may be wrong, just as any other thinking person. John Mikes --- 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 12-juil.-06, � 18:06, 1Z a �crit : I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical justification. So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist. Now my problem is that a term like material is very vague in physics, Huh ? Physics studies matter, energy, time and space. Those are its topics. Physics may not have a single neat definition of matter, but that does not mean physicsts are a lot to know what it is. Arguably, the whole of economics is a definition of money, Likewise for physics and matter. and I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett ...). Huh Electrons and photons are still matter...what *do* you mean ? (BTW, Deutsch uses the Johnsonian if it kicks back appraoch to reality). The big problem with the notion of *primary* matter = how to relate 1-experiences with 3-experiments. The mind-body prolbem boild down to qualia, and the problem of qualia and physics boils down to the problem of qualia and mathematical description Consciousness is a problem for all forms of materialism and physicalism to some extent, but it is possible to discern where the problem is particularly acute. There is no great problem with the idea that matter considered as a bare substrate can have mental properities. Any inability to have mental proeprties would itslef be a property and therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a bare substrate. The subjectity of consciouss states, often treated as inherent boils down to a problem of communicating one's qualia -- how one feesl, how things seem. Thus it is not truly inherent but depends on the means of communication being used. Feelings and seemings can be more readily communicated in artistic, poetice language, and least readily in scientifi technical language. Since the harder, more technical a science is, the more mathematical it is, the communication problem is at its most acute in a purely mathematical langauge. Thus the problem with physicalism is not its posit of matter (as a bare substrate) but its other posit, that all properties are phycial. Since physics is mathematical, that amounts to the claim that all properties are mathematical (or at least mathematically describable). In making the transition from a physicalist world-view to a mathematical one, the concept of a material substrate is abandoned (although it was never a problem for consciousness) and the
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Jesse Mazer wrote: 1Z wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: 1Z wrote: If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is not in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are equally likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a specific and definite prediction. IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work. No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the relative probability of different possibilities, that does not justify the claim that the hypothesis predicts each possibility is equally likely. Do you agree with this principle or not? If a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the relative probability of different possibilities, the claim that they are not all the same is unsupported. That isnot really analogous becasue the CC can only have one value at a time. That difference is irrelevant to my point about probabilities. Again, it is *always* unjustified to say that because a theory doesn't predict the relative probabilities of different outcomes, that means it predicts they are equally likely; it doesn't matter whether or not we are talking about the probability in the context of a large ensemble of events (say, the probability a certain type of atom will decay in a 1-minute time period, where we are repeating the test with a large number of atoms) or in the context of a single event. In the absence of evidence to the contrary , you have to assume that probabilites are even. Anyway, it is quite possible that even if string theory could make predictions about the value of the cosmological constant, it would only be a probabilistic prediction rather than predicting a single unique value, which means that if you are prepared to entertain either the MWI of quantum mechanics or chaotic inflation where new universes bubble from prior ones via inflation, then there might in fact be different universes with different values of the cosmological constant. We can make sense of unicorns have horns, despite the lack of reference. In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept which humans have collectively defined; No, that's the sense. Sense is in-hte-head , reference is out-of-the-head. OK, I see. So what if we are talking about a concept in itself, as in most people's concept of a unicorn is that of a horse-like creature with a single horn; would the concept itself be a reference? Only the reference of a concept is a concept. Fictional terms don't have referents. That's why they are unreal. The point is that you don't need reference for meaning. I agree, and even a modal realist philosopher like David Lewis (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lewis_(philosopher) ), who thinks that propositions about possibilities can only be objectively true or false if we assume all possible worlds actually exist, would not say that there is any kind of causal interaction between worlds needed to explain our ability to reason about them. If we can reason about (for instance) historical what-is without concrete ferefernces is parallel dimensions, we can reason about maths without taking a trip to Plato's heaven. But I have already made clear that I *don't* think that we need to refer to platonic forms which somehow causally interact with people's brains in our explanation of how people reason about math, just like David K Lewis doesn't think we need a causal interaction between different possible worlds to explain how people reason about possibilities. So how do we need to refer to them ? Why do we need to refer to them ? If they are causally inactive, an evil daemon could snap his fingers and make them vanish. How do we know that hasn't happened already ? We can interact with real-world objects, and we must interact it them in order to confirm the truth of non-mathematical, not-fictional sentences. If we had reason to think mathematical sentences were uniform with empirical sentences, we would be forced to require the existence of mathematical objects in spite of their lack of a role to play. But it is the very fact that we do not need experiment or observation to confirm mathematical sentences that shows they are differnt from empirical sentences, and different in a way that absolves them from requiring reference. The question was to try to help me grasp what you meant by sense without reference and mind-independent. If it's impossible to come up with any examples outside of math, that should make you suspicious whether mathematics really has the strange and marvellous property of there being objective mind-independent truths about mathematical terms even though they lack any reference. No it shoudn't. Maths is obviously unique in a number of respects. That is why there is such
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Jesse Mazer wrote: 1Z wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work. No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the relative probability of different possibilities, that does not justify the claim that the hypothesis predicts each possibility is equally likely. Do you agree with this principle or not? If a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the relative probability of different possibilities, the claim that they are not all the same is unsupported. That isnot really analogous becasue the CC can only have one value at a time. That difference is irrelevant to my point about probabilities. Again, it is *always* unjustified to say that because a theory doesn't predict the relative probabilities of different outcomes, that means it predicts they are equally likely; it doesn't matter whether or not we are talking about the probability in the context of a large ensemble of events (say, the probability a certain type of atom will decay in a 1-minute time period, where we are repeating the test with a large number of atoms) or in the context of a single event. In the absence of evidence to the contrary , you have to assume that probabilites are even. In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept which humans have collectively defined; No, that's the sense. Sense is in-hte-head , reference is out-of-the-head. OK, I see. So what if we are talking about a concept in itself, as in most people's concept of a unicorn is that of a horse-like creature with a single horn; would the concept itself be a reference? Only the reference of a concept is a concept. Fictional terms don't have referents. That's why they are unreal. The point is that you don't need reference for meaning. If we can reason about (for instance) historical what-is without concrete ferefernces is parallel dimensions, we can reason about maths without taking a trip to Plato's heaven. But I have already made clear that I *don't* think that we need to refer to platonic forms which somehow causally interact with people's brains in our explanation of how people reason about math, just like David K Lewis doesn't think we need a causal interaction between different possible worlds to explain how people reason about possibilities. So how do we need to refer to them ? Why do we need to refer to them ? If they are causally inactive, an evil daemon could snap his fingers and make them vanish. How do we know that hasn't happened already ? We can interact with real-world objects, and we must interact it them in order to confirm the truth of non-mathematical, not-fictional sentences. If we had reason to think mathematical sentences were uniform with empirical sentences, we would be forced to require the existence of mathematical objects in spite of their lack of a role to play. But it is the very fact that we do not need experiment or observation to confirm mathematical sentences that shows they are differnt from empirical sentences, and different in a way that absolves them from requiring reference. The question was to try to help me grasp what you meant by sense without reference and mind-independent. If it's impossible to come up with any examples outside of math, that should make you suspicious whether mathematics really has the strange and marvellous property of there being objective mind-independent truths about mathematical terms even though they lack any reference. No it shoudn't. Maths is obviously unique in a number of respects. That is why there is such a subject as philosophy-of-mathematics. That's pretty vague--unique in what respects? Does uniqueness in these other respects somehow justify the belief that it is unique in the respect of involving both sense-without-reference and mind-independence? Yes. Maths is apriori. It doesn't require experiment or observation. Aprioriness is explained by analycity. An analytical sentences contains in its meaning everything necessary to determine its truth-value. Analycity is explained by sense. Analycity requires a kind of meaning that is in-the-head, in addition to reference. Analycity and aprioriness explain objectivity and necessity. if mathematical sentence doesn't require anything outside itself to arrive at its truth value, then its truth-value is not going to vary between times, places and persons. If you really believe this, you should at least be able to give an argument about *why* math is different from every other domain in this respect. It is on a deeper level of abstraction. That doesn't remotely resemble an argument--can you define precisely what deeper level of abstraction means, and why deepness of abstraction should be in any way related to statements that lack sense but are objectively true? Don't you
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
1Z wrote: Erratum: http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/diagrams/time_growing.jpg http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/met_time2.html --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit : I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical justification. So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist. Now my problem is that a term like material is very vague in physics, and I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett ...). The big problem with the notion of *primary* matter = how to relate 1-experiences with 3-experiments. The naïve idea of attaching consciousness to physical activity leads to fatal difficulties. Well, why not, if that is your definition. I understand better why you say you could introduce matter in Platonia. Plato would have disagree in the sense that matter is the shadow of the ideal intelligible reality. What is material exists. Whether Platonia exists is another matter. It is for Platonism to justify itslef in terms of the concrete reality we find oursleves in, not for concrete reality to be justify itself in terms of Platonia. It depends of the assumptions you start from. The intelligible is a quasi-empiricist mathematical epistemology. Mathematicians are supposed by Platonists to be able to perceive mathematical truth with some extra organ. That is naïve platonism. Already condemned by Plato himself and most of his followers. Read Plotinus for more on this (especially Ennead V). I don't understand what you mean by numbers don't exist at all. Well, I've never seen one. Again that would be a critics of naïve Platonism. As I have said: number n exists in Platonia means just that the proposition number n exists is true. For example I believe that the equation x^2 - 61y^2 = 1 admits integers solutions independently of any things related to me. Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that the classical proposition 4356667654090987890111 is prime or 4356667654090987890111 is not prime is true there. It's true here. why bring Platonia into it ? I don't understand what you mean by 4356667654090987890111 is prime or not is true here. Is it false or meaningless on the moon? is it false or meaningless beyond the solar system? is it false or meaningless beyond the Milky Way? they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world, as Bruno requires. Why? What doesn't exist at all cannot underpin the existence of anything -- even of an illusion. I do agree with you. But, once we assume comp, we can attach consciousness to sheaf of computational histories (abstract computations which can be defined precisely from the Fi and the Wi: more in the diagonalization posts). Those computations are entirely defined by infinite sets of true relations among numbers. You could perhaps wait I define the Kleene predicate in the diagonalization posts. or read the beautiful work of Matiazevitch on the diophantine equations. A set of numbers is RE, i.e. is a Wi set, if and only if it is given by the zero of a diophantine polynomial. In *all* situation, when I say a number exists, or when I say a sequence of numbers exists, I only mean that the proposition expressing that existence is true independently of me or you. With Church thesis all computations, as defined in computer science (not in physics), exists in Platonia, exactly in the same sense that for the prime numbers above. That is a most unhelpful remark. All you said above is that true mathematical sentences have truth-values independent of you. You have now started treating that as a claim about existence. It is as if your are using is true and exists as synonyms. You did not read carefully what I have said. I am just using exists as a quantifier (in first or second order logic). Exists n P(n) = truth of exists n P(n). I believe that there is an infinity of twin primes ... or not, independently of the fact that mathematicians on this planet or elsewhere will solve, or not, that (currently open) problem. And I do provide evidence that rational unitary transform could be the mathematical computations winning the measure-battle in Platonia. Huh How can you have a battle without time ? By using varieties of theoretical computer science notion of convergence. If you want, I am using the integers themselves for measuring complexity of computations. The UDA shows that if you are in the comp state S, then your consistent extensions are defined by a measure on all computations going through that state S. It is a static well defined mathematical set. A type of computation wins the measure-battle if it has a reasonable measure. This would explain not only the existence of computations with self-aware observers, but also they relative stability.@ But MUCH more can be said, from Solovay theorem (justifying the modal logics G and G* for the provable and non provable by a machine/entity self-referential truth) I get not only an arithmetical
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 11-juil.-06, 21:06, 1Z a crit :
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
See my work and this list for some path toward it.
To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
and vice-versa.
So, in the space {0,1}* (that is: the space of functions from N to
{0,1}, or the space of infinite sequence of 0 and 1) together with
some reasonable topology) the set of random sequences, just because it
has non-zero measure, has a material existence ?!?!?!.
Well, why not, if that is your definition. I understand better why you
say you could introduce matter in Platonia. Plato would have disagree
in the sense that matter is the shadow of the ideal intelligible
reality. Note the intelligible, which will be developped by Plotinus
(notably), taking then ontology in my sense (or Jesse one, or as I
and Jesse are suspecting: the common current one).
Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our
mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
ABSTRACT OBJECTS
I agree, (although in some context it helps to consider mathematical
objects like numbers and strings, turing machine's computation as
concrete, to better appreciate the non concreteness of variables and
functions, but this should not be relevant here).
Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even
platonically --
I am just saying that the truth value of the sentence there is a prime
number does not depend on me ...
I don't understand what you mean by numbers don't exist at all.
Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that the classical proposition
4356667654090987890111 is prime or 4356667654090987890111 is not
prime is true there.
they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world,
as Bruno requires.
Why? With Church thesis all computations, as defined in computer
science (not in physics), exists in Platonia, exactly in the same sense
that for the prime numbers above.
And I do provide evidence that rational unitary transform could be
the mathematical computations winning the measure-battle in Platonia.
This would explain not only the existence of computations with
self-aware observers, but also they relative stability.@
But MUCH more can be said, from Solovay theorem (justifying the modal
logics G and G* for the provable and non provable by a machine/entity
self-referential truth) I get not only an arithmetical quantization
justifying the quanta, I get a larger theory divided into sharable and
non sharable measurement results. This means I get one mathematical
structure explaining not only the appearance of a physical world (the
quanta), but explaining why such quanta are accompanied by non
communicable personal truth (like the qualia experienced by the
physicist at the moment where he look at the needle of his/her
measuring apparatus). In *that* precise sense, the comp-physics is in
advance on the materialist hypo based physics.
Now when you say in another post:
I cant address your anti-materialism arguments directly since
you idn't state them, only alluding to them.
I think you have a memory problem. See my URL for my papers. Search in
Science-direct Elsevier for my last one.
Insamuch as you claim that COMP is your only
assumption, CT and AR are *not* assumed explicitly.
I defined in this list comp by yes doctor+ CT + AR. In my Brussel's
thesis conscience et mcanisme I call it digital mechanism. CT is
explicitly assumed for giving a univocal sense to the words
computations or digital machine, and AR is made explicit for clarity.
That comp entails immateriality (in the sense that the observable must
be justified by computer science exclusively) is just a result (not
obvious at all).
Brains are material. Computers are material.
Ah. If you say so. Perhaps you are right, but then they are actual
material realities, not emulable at all by any turing machine. It is up
to you to find the mistake in the UDA, if you still believe that comp
does not entail the reversal between physics and number theory (large
sense like in the book of Manin on Number Theory).
Comp is about the behaviour of the brain as a material system.
This is the naturalist preconception of comp. If you want it is comp
before I get the proof that comp entails immateriality. But perhaps you
agree now, giving that you gave us an immaerial definition of matter:
measure 0. (But elsewhere you gave another: casually capable of
interacting with you: so I am not sure).
Why should I prove my assumptions?
You could at least state them.
I do it in all paper on this subject, and I have done it at nauseam in
this
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 12-juil.-06, à 02:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : BM (Bruno): For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists. BM (Brent): But that is consistent. You assume arithmetic is real and so you seek an arithmetical definition of matter. or better an arithmetical justification why machines believes (in some local correct and stable way) in the appearance of empirical stability/matter. I doubt that word like matter or consciousness or god can be third person defined at all. A scientists assume the matter gives an operational definition, e.g. as Vic Stenger does: matter is what kicks back when you kick it. Deutsch uses this to explain objectivity, and argues, with such a criteria due to Johnson, that math is objective. Perhaps some materialist use this to define matter but then there need to define kicking back, and thus interaction, etc. You cannot criticize people who don't believe in Platonia for giving non-platonic definitions. They believe in Platonia in the sense we use the words in the list since years. Once again, all what I say is that the belief that you can survive with a digital brain (material or not) entails the total lack of explanative power of any notion of primary matter. From a pure logical point of view, a materialist who believes in comp can still believe in primitive matter, but he cannot use it in any account of a material sensation. Primary matter is devoid of any explanation power. It is perhaps the last form of ether or phlogiston ... It would be false modesty on my part to harbor doubt about my derivation. Also, it has been verified by many many people now, and although systematic error are possible, I am on the path to make a paper corresponding to my thesis along with the new development both mathematical, and then plotinian. The result is highly not obvious after 1500 of Aristotelianism, but it has been intuited by many during one millennium of greek rational theology. See also Descartes who, imo, already annonced the coming back of the platonician and the rational mystics (called theoretician by the greeks). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 12-juil.-06, à 03:53, Jesse Mazer a écrit : Well, I don't think the world obeys mathematical laws because it is causally interacting with platonic forms, any more than I think the world obeys the law of noncontradiction because it is causally interacting with platonic laws of logic. I would say ontology is about the most exhaustive possible list of objective truths, and any entity referred to in this exhaustive list of objectively true statements exists by definition. Very well said Jesse. It is a very fundamental point. Even Godel did not entirely understand this for a time, and has been, at some moment of its intellectual life, tempted by the idea that mathematician could have a sort sixth sense letting them to apprehend physically platonist truth. But this can be related to its non-comp earlier temptation. Eventually Godel will see the point: physicalisation of platonia makes the relation between math and physics still more impalatable. In plato it is more simple: the heaven is the *intelligible in principle* realm of forms, and with Plotinus, this is extended up to the border of the non-intelligible called evil, transcendental obscurity or ... matter. This (advanced) remark could help for the arithmetical interpretation of the Plotinian hypostases. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, 21:06, 1Z a crit :
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
See my work and this list for some path toward it.
To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
and vice-versa.
So, in the space {0,1}* (that is: the space of functions from N to
{0,1}, or the space of infinite sequence of 0 and 1) together with
some reasonable topology) the set of random sequences, just because it
has non-zero measure, has a material existence ?!?!?!.
I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
justification.
Well, why not, if that is your definition. I understand better why you
say you could introduce matter in Platonia. Plato would have disagree
in the sense that matter is the shadow of the ideal intelligible
reality.
What is material exists. Whether Platonia exists
is another matter. It is for Platonism to justify itslef
in terms of the concrete reality we find oursleves in,
not for concrete reality to be justify itself in terms
of Platonia.
Note the intelligible, which will be developped by Plotinus
(notably), taking then ontology in my sense (or Jesse one, or as I
and Jesse are suspecting: the common current one).
The intelligible is a quasi-empiricist mathematical epistemology.
Mathematicians are supposed by Platonists to be able to perceive
mathematical
truth with some extra organ.
Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our
mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
ABSTRACT OBJECTS
I agree, (although in some context it helps to consider mathematical
objects like numbers and strings, turing machine's computation as
concrete, to better appreciate the non concreteness of variables and
functions, but this should not be relevant here).
What are you agreeing with? That Platoism is an ontological
claim ?
Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even
platonically --
I am just saying that the truth value of the sentence there is a prime
number does not depend on me ...
Then your AR is non-ontological, and does
not justify the claim that we are in Platonia,
since it doesn't justify the claim that Platonia exists.
I don't understand what you mean by numbers don't exist at all.
Well, I've never seen one.
Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that the classical proposition
4356667654090987890111 is prime or 4356667654090987890111 is not
prime is true there.
It's true here. why bring Platonia into it ?
they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world,
as Bruno requires.
Why?
What doesn't exist at all cannot underpin the existence of anything --
even of an illusion.
With Church thesis all computations, as defined in computer
science (not in physics), exists in Platonia, exactly in the same sense
that for the prime numbers above.
That is a most unhelpful remark. All you said above is
that true mathematical sentences have truth-values
independent of you. You have now started treating
that as a claim about existence. It is as if
your are using is true and exists as synonyms.
And I do provide evidence that rational unitary transform could be
the mathematical computations winning the measure-battle in Platonia.
Huh How can you have a battle without time ?
This would explain not only the existence of computations with
self-aware observers, but also they relative stability.@
But MUCH more can be said, from Solovay theorem (justifying the modal
logics G and G* for the provable and non provable by a machine/entity
self-referential truth) I get not only an arithmetical quantization
justifying the quanta, I get a larger theory divided into sharable and
non sharable measurement results. This means I get one mathematical
structure explaining not only the appearance of a physical world (the
quanta),
You have to explain how a mathematical structure can appear
at all, before you can explain how it can appear quantal (or whatever).
but explaining why such quanta are accompanied by non
communicable personal truth (like the qualia experienced by the
physicist at the moment where he look at the needle of his/her
measuring apparatus). In *that* precise sense, the comp-physics is in
advance on the materialist hypo based physics.
Materialism does not imply everything should be communicable.
Now when you say in another post:
I cant address your anti-materialism arguments directly since
you idn't state them, only alluding to them.
I think you have a memory problem. See my URL for my papers. Search in
Science-direct Elsevier for my last one.
That's an allusion, too.
Insamuch as you claim that COMP is your
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi, 1Z wrote: I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until demostrated otherwise. This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean anything in this context. So the point is not that you accept or not computationalism and stuffy/not stuffy stuff... It is just that if you accept computationalism you cannot accept a primary reality... If you do not (as it seems) then it's normal, but you cannot claim computationalism at the same time, Bruno proved that it is not compatible. Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, 1Z wrote: I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until demostrated otherwise. This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean anything in this context. And the point of my various comments is that what he has actualy shown is that IF computationalism is true AND ontologicial Platonism is true AND if the HP prolbem can be solved AND the appearance-of-time problem can be solved AND if there is nothing more to consciousness than cognition AND occam's razor still applies in Paltonia THEN materialism is an unnecessary hypothesis. So the point is not that you accept or not computationalism and stuffy/not stuffy stuff... It is just that if you accept computationalism you cannot accept a primary reality... If you do not (as it seems) then it's normal, but you cannot claim computationalism at the same time, Bruno proved that it is not compatible. Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism. Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism (whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational thesis, that cognition is computation). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit : Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism. Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism (whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational thesis, that cognition is computation). If computationalism is true then platonism must also be true. Because if you were in a simulation and you have managed to get out of it, how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the material world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is the real world and not another simulation ? It is the turtle on the turtle on the turtle... Even if you take standard computational thesis, then by the reasoning upper you must reject a bottom level real... ie: a material world, a stuffy world... every reality is stuffy and real (from the inside). Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Deutsch uses this to explain objectivity, and argues, with such a criteria due to Johnson, that math is objective. Perhaps some materialist use this to define matter but then there need to define kicking back, and thus interaction, etc. Johnson' demonstration was supposed to be ostensive, not semantic. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
1Z wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: 1Z wrote: But it is a straw man to say everything-theories makes the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones, because in fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said something like, everything theories do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones I wouldn't object. If they do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones then they do IN FACT make the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is not in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are equally likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a specific and definite prediction. IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work. No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the relative probability of different possibilities, that does not justify the claim that the hypothesis predicts each possibility is equally likely. Do you agree with this principle or not? Classical physicists din't WANT to make the implications that atoms are unstable and will implode; nonetheless, classical phsyics makes that assumption. Yes, that is a definite prediction of classical mechanics, and therefore has nothing to do with examples of theories that cannot make definite predictions about certain questions in the first place. A more analogous case would be the fact that string theory cannot at present predict the value of the cosmological constant; would you therefore conclude that string theory predicts all values of the cosmological constant are equally likely? That isnot really analogous becasue the CC can only have one value at a time. That difference is irrelevant to my point about probabilities. Again, it is *always* unjustified to say that because a theory doesn't predict the relative probabilities of different outcomes, that means it predicts they are equally likely; it doesn't matter whether or not we are talking about the probability in the context of a large ensemble of events (say, the probability a certain type of atom will decay in a 1-minute time period, where we are repeating the test with a large number of atoms) or in the context of a single event. Anyway, it is quite possible that even if string theory could make predictions about the value of the cosmological constant, it would only be a probabilistic prediction rather than predicting a single unique value, which means that if you are prepared to entertain either the MWI of quantum mechanics or chaotic inflation where new universes bubble from prior ones via inflation, then there might in fact be different universes with different values of the cosmological constant. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) What do the words abstract object mean to you? To me, if propositions about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything? By having sense but no reference, for instance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our having multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world object...but what would sense but no reference mean? We can make sense of unicorns have horns, despite the lack of reference. In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept which humans have collectively defined; No, that's the sense. Sense is in-hte-head , reference is out-of-the-head. OK, I see. So what if we are talking about a concept in itself, as in most people's concept of a unicorn is that of a horse-like creature with a single horn; would the concept itself be a reference? I don't see how there can be an objective, mind-independent truth about a term that doesn't refer to any coherent object or possibility. I am not asking you to. There are coherent possibilities that are not instantiated (or perphaps I should say, pace many-worlders, not obviously instantiated). Nonetheless, we can address many issues about
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit : It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes. How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit? First nobody knows what such a substance can be defined without infinite regress. Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the property of its subparts (Aristotle the first). But then, the ontological existence of such substance does not fit neither the experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL). If you want use the ontological existence of matter to solve the Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on the list or in my url. And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have to explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the mind/body problem). The question is not whether there is a world beyond even logical possibility, but why the observed world is so much smaller than the Platonias. Matter answers that easily. That the observed world is smaller than platonia is trivial: our observation are finite, and platonia is infinite. Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer it is smaller than platonia. Actually many infinities appears at the bottom, and it is hard how to interpret them. 1Z (to George Levy): Science may have moved close to making the observer central epistemically , but it has not room for the idea that observers are ontologically fundamental. Observers are people, homo sapiens, the product of millions of years of evolution. Scientifically speaking. Human observers are people. With comp, *any* locally or partially irreversible machine is up for the job. Still, comp makes that large class of number/digital-machines basic for just (re)defining a coherent notion of physical reality, which remained to be tested with the facts (current test are going in the quantum direction). 1Z (to John M) The no-metaphysical-role for observers rule is one that maintains the consilience of science. http://www.csicop.org/si/9701/quantum-quackery.html I agree that there is a lot of quantum-quackery, as there is godel-quackery. This makes progress in our fundament fields psychologically difficult to assess. Unfortunately, many if not most scientist reaction to those quackeries are lacking rigor, and contend themselves to present some facts as scientific when they are not. Let me give you an example. After Godel published its 1931 incompleteness paper, the belgium logician Barzin publishes a detailed refutation of Godel's proof (like many). If I remember well it is Kleene, or Kreisel: I should verify, but the point is that big guy in logic will criticize, technically, Barzin's attempt to refute Godel. All scientist will believe that matter settled until 20 years later, Kleene himself (or Kreisel himself) find an error in his own critics. It was just false and Barzin's point appeared to be much subtle and harder to refute. For sure, Barzin *was* wrong, but many scientist took Kleene (or Kreisel) first reply like an authoritative truth ... JM: The observer seems so fundamental in the views of this list (and in wider circles of contemporaryh thinking) that a more general identification may be in order. No, no,nooo!!! It is far too general already. I don't think so. Read about the lobian machine ... The list needs to be a lot more particualr about the difference between ontology and epistemology, between to be and to know. Then they would not slide from X cannot be known without an observer to X cannot exist without an observer. You make a good point, but I am not sure it is a genuine answer for John or me. I will not insist because it is an easy consequence of the UDA (and I recall you saying you don't want to study it because, if I remember well, you are so sure the result is false that you don't need to read it, but then you miss the opportunity to either find a real error of reasoning in my deduction or to discover that the greek theologian were right, and naturalism (nature deification) is wrong). 1Z to Lennart Nilsson I am trying to get away from the idea that logic needs to be propped up by some external authority. The validity of logic comes about from the lack of any basis to criticise it that doesn't presuppose it. That's epistemology, not metaphysics. I agree for the part of logic use in elementary mathematical theories. Still there has been (and still exist) some critics on some
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit : It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes. How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit? By explaining a lot from on e premiss. First nobody knows what such a substance can be defined without infinite regress. No one ? But there are far more materialist philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays. Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the property of its subparts (Aristotle the first). Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day. But then, the ontological existence of such substance does not fit neither the experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL). The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which can be measured and does feature in theories. If you want use the ontological existence of matter to solve the Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on the list or in my url. if you are going to assume that a) all computations already exist immaterially b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational or mathematical property you might be lead to that conculusion. But I don't assume either. And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have to explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the mind/body problem). The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience to mathematical descriptions. Adding matter to Platonia certainly doesn't make things worse. The question is not whether there is a world beyond even logical possibility, but why the observed world is so much smaller than the Platonias. Matter answers that easily. That the observed world is smaller than platonia is trivial: our observation are finite, and platonia is infinite. Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer it is smaller than platonia. The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, as predicted by Platonic theories. It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed, it is falsified. Actually many infinities appears at the bottom, and it is hard how to interpret them. The list needs to be a lot more particualr about the difference between ontology and epistemology, between to be and to know. Then they would not slide from X cannot be known without an observer to X cannot exist without an observer. You make a good point, but I am not sure it is a genuine answer for John or me. I will not insist because it is an easy consequence of the UDA (and I recall you saying you don't want to study it because, if I remember well, you are so sure the result is false that you don't need to read it, but then you miss the opportunity to either find a real error of reasoning in my deduction or to discover that the greek theologian were right, and naturalism (nature deification) is wrong). You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. 1Z to Lennart Nilsson I am trying to get away from the idea that logic needs to be propped up by some external authority. The validity of logic comes about from the lack of any basis to criticise it that doesn't presuppose it. That's epistemology, not metaphysics. I agree for the part of logic use in elementary mathematical theories. Still there has been (and still exist) some critics on some formula. The most known case is the case of the third excluded principle (A v ~A). In my context such a critics is a confusion between first person and third person. Could say more when I get to the Arithmetical Hypostases ... The criticism uses logic. 1Z to Brent The claim I made was Whatever else you do, you'll be using logic. There is no standpoint outside of logic. No, not even evolutionary theory. I agree with you, as an arithmetical platonist. My point was purely epistemological. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
1Z wrote: The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, as predicted by Platonic theories. It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed, it is falsified. But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to the view that every possible world or observer-moment exists (which is the idea that the 'everything' in 'everything-list' is supposed to stand for) would argue for some sort of probability measure on worlds/OMs which would assign much higher probability to worlds with regular laws than to Harry Potter universes. Quantum theory predicts a nonzero probability of Harry Potter type events too (a bunch of random atoms could tunnel into the shape of a living hippogriff, for example), but our failure to observe such events in practice is not a falsification of the theory, since the theory predicts they'd be ridiculously improbable and we should not expect to observe such events on human timescales. You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent--this is itself an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one. Few would literally imagine some alternate dimension called Plato's heaven where platonic forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our brains to produce our ideas about math. Jesse --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit : How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit? By explaining a lot from on e premiss. I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty) explanation. Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E = mc^2), but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc. (You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there is still many remaining questions OK? First nobody knows what such a substance can be defined without infinite regress. No one ? But there are far more materialist philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays. For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists. (btw, invoking the number of people believing something is not an argument). All what I say, is that the notion of primitive matter is unclear. The only definition which we can find in Aristotle is contradict by QM and comp, independently. Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the property of its subparts (Aristotle the first). Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day. Not about matter. Except recently through the slow admittance of quantum (computation) which makes even engineers accepting (like Mellac) that the quantum formalism forces us to choose between: 1) a NON observed reality does not exist (like Bohr often said) 2) Parallel realities exist But then, the ontological existence of such substance does not fit neither the experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL). The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which can be measured and does feature in theories. But the measurment gives numbers. *You* posit some (which btw?) interpretation. If you want use the ontological existence of matter to solve the Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on the list or in my url. if you are going to assume that a) all computations already exist immaterially OK, but in the same sense that PI or sqrt(2) exists. b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational or mathematical property Where do I make that assumption. You forget the main assumption I do: my (generlaized) brain is turing emulable. (or more simply: yes doctor). Church thesis and AR are assumed explicitly for making things clearer, and avoiding spurious debate in the course of the proof. Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp, giving that what I show is that you cannot have both. And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have to explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the mind/body problem). The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience to mathematical descriptions. Adding matter to Platonia certainly doesn't make things worse. It does (with comp). cf UDA. (or just the movie graph, or Maudlin's Olympia). That the observed world is smaller than platonia is trivial: our observation are finite, and platonia is infinite. Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer it is smaller than platonia. The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, as predicted by Platonic theories. Platonic resetting of Everret's QM *does* explained why the Quantum HP universes are *very* difficulmt to observe. Hall Finney-like Universal distribution could explain the same thing for some of the thrid person white rabbits. I show a path leading to a possible explanation of why the first person rabbits are non observable. This has led to 5 mathematical conjectures. The first one has been solved since ... our last conversation ... You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, Why should I prove my assumptions? Also, proving mathematical platonism or proving physical materialism is impossible (what would that means). You could ask me to prove Church thesis at this point. It is non sense, unless you give me some precise other assumption to build on. and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent That is my only claim. is
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
This discussion is very interesting to me. Not addressing anyone in particular, I only have time to make a quick comment, and hope that I can get time for later: In my reading about Plato, it seems that Plato didn't have the answers either. It might be helpful to remember that Plato not only had the Forms, but also Matter. I think he probably was also struggling with the white rabbit and Harry Potter universe problem too (yes, way back then!). Matter was chaotic (anti-Form) and the problem was how to stuff it all into Forms. Mind/body problem. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Jesse Mazer wrote: 1Z wrote: The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, as predicted by Platonic theories. It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed, it is falsified. But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to the view that every possible world or observer-moment exists (which is the idea that the 'everything' in 'everything-list' is supposed to stand for) would argue for some sort of probability measure on worlds/OMs which would assign much higher probability to worlds with regular laws than to Harry Potter universes. They *need* that idea, certainly. The success of mathematical MW theories depends very much on being able to find a natural, intrinsic justification for measure. Physical MW theories are very much on the same side of the fence as classical single-universe theories. In both cases, measure is extraneous to what is being measure. In physical MWI, measure is given by Schrodinger's equation, which is not justified platonically; it is justified empirically. In single-world theories , measure is 1 or 0 -- the Law of the Excluded Middle holds. Quantum theory predicts a nonzero probability of Harry Potter type events too (a bunch of random atoms could tunnel into the shape of a living hippogriff, for example), but our failure to observe such events in practice is not a falsification of the theory, since the theory predicts they'd be ridiculously improbable and we should not expect to observe such events on human timescales. And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1 this is itself an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one. Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ? Few would literally imagine some alternate dimension called Plato's heaven where platonic forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our brains to produce our ideas about math. Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even platonically -- they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world, as Bruno requires. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit : How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit? By explaining a lot from on e premiss. I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty) explanation. It explains nothing in the sense that it buys out of the rationalist dream of explaining the universe on purely logical principles. OTOH, it buys into the other style of explanation, positing the existence of contingent entitites on the basis of empirical evidence. Of course that style of evidence fits the evidence much better, in that we don't experience every logically possible universe simultaneously. Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E = mc^2), But only *certain* numbers. If we are in Platonia, we should be seeing F=m^a , F=ma^3 and all the other infinite possibilites. but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc. So ? Those question are all posed within the framework that empricism-substance-contingency. Being unable to answer those questions doesn't enttile us to say that nothing exists or everything exists. (You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there is still many remaining questions OK? Physical MWI are still on the empiricism-substance-contingency. side of the fence, not the raitonalism-idealism-ncessity side. First nobody knows what such a substance can be defined without infinite regress. No one ? But there are far more materialist philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays. For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And none of your materialist even try to define matter. Materiality is the pre-condition fo anything being able to interact with me casually There. They take it for granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists. Why not ? It's *a* table not all possible tables. (btw, invoking the number of people believing something is not an argument). I cant address your anti-materialism arguments directly since you idn't state them, only alluding to them. All what I say, is that the notion of primitive matter is unclear. The only definition which we can find in Aristotle is contradict by QM and comp, independently. I've just given you a definitiion. Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the property of its subparts (Aristotle the first). Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day. Not about matter. Of course, about matter. Matter is now mostly empty space, it is now interchangeable with energy. Except recently through the slow admittance of quantum (computation) which makes even engineers accepting (like Mellac) that the quantum formalism forces us to choose between: 1) a NON observed reality does not exist (like Bohr often said) 2) Parallel realities exist there are many othe options, inlcuding 3) a non-observed reality exists, and prallel realities are curtailed by an objective, observer-independent process of reduction (Penrose) But then, the ontological existence of such substance does not fit neither the experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL). The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which can be measured and does feature in theories. But the measurment gives numbers. *You* posit some (which btw?) interpretation. Certain numbers, not every possible number. if you are going to assume that a) all computations already exist immaterially OK, but in the same sense that PI or sqrt(2) exists. Which as far as I am concerned, is not at all. b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational or mathematical property Where do I make that assumption. I don't know. You didn't actually give an argument. so I am just guessing. You forget the main assumption I do: my (generlaized) brain is turing emulable. (or more simply: yes doctor). As a material systesm, it can be emulated by antoher, suitable , material system... Church thesis and AR are assumed explicitly for making things clearer, and avoiding spurious debate in the course of the proof. Insamuch as you claim that COMP is your only assumption, CT and AR are *not* assumed explicitly. Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp, giving that what I show is that you cannot have both. Brains are material. Computers are material. The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience to mathematical descriptions. Adding matter to Platonia certainly doesn't make things worse. It does (with comp). Comp
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
IZ wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: 1Z wrote: The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, as predicted by Platonic theories. It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed, it is falsified. But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to the view that every possible world or observer-moment exists (which is the idea that the 'everything' in 'everything-list' is supposed to stand for) would argue for some sort of probability measure on worlds/OMs which would assign much higher probability to worlds with regular laws than to Harry Potter universes. They *need* that idea, certainly. The success of mathematical MW theories depends very much on being able to find a natural, intrinsic justification for measure. Physical MW theories are very much on the same side of the fence as classical single-universe theories. In both cases, measure is extraneous to what is being measure. In physical MWI, measure is given by Schrodinger's equation, which is not justified platonically; it is justified empirically. In single-world theories , measure is 1 or 0 -- the Law of the Excluded Middle holds. Quantum theory predicts a nonzero probability of Harry Potter type events too (a bunch of random atoms could tunnel into the shape of a living hippogriff, for example), but our failure to observe such events in practice is not a falsification of the theory, since the theory predicts they'd be ridiculously improbable and we should not expect to observe such events on human timescales. And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* a satisfactory theory of measure to apply to everything, so it's a strawman to say that it's a prediction of everything hypotheses that Harry Potter universes should be just as probable as any other. Some rough proposals for such a theory of measure have been made in this list in the past, like the universal prior (see http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node2.html or http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/node4.html ), or my own speculation that a theory of consciousness assigning relative and absolute probability to observer-moments might have only a single self-consistent solution (see http://tinyurl.com/ekz7u or http://tinyurl.com/jnaqb for more on this idea). You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) What do the words abstract object mean to you? To me, if propositions about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything? http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1 this is itself an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one. Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ? No, I was responding to your comment: You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. Here you seem to be saying that the truth value of '17 is prime' is mind-independent is a purely epistemological claim. What I'm saying is that it's necessarily ontological, as are any claims about the objective (mind-independent) truth-value of a given proposition. Few would literally imagine some alternate dimension called Plato's heaven where platonic forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our brains to produce our ideas about math. Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even platonically -- they they cannot even produce
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi, Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit : Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp, giving that what I show is that you cannot have both. Brains are material. Computers are material. I think you misunderstand something here (or I do). I think when bruno talk about matter (and always emphasis it with primary), it really means primary reality... That said, it means (taking as an example the movie the matrix), that when neo wake up after taking the red pill and is welcome by Morpheus saying Welcome to the real world is not true... There can't be a real world in this sense, a primary world where the other reality is emulated in a stuffy computer, a world which is at the beginning of the emulated chain... The computer who runs the matrix in the Morpheus real world (so outside the so called matrix) is as stuffy as the computer running the matrix inside the matrix. Regads, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Jesse Mazer wrote: IZ wrote: And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* a satisfactory theory of measure to apply to everything, so it's a strawman to say that it's a prediction of everything hypotheses that Harry Potter universes should be just as probable as any other. Wanting to find a measure theory doesn't mean you have found one, and if you havent found one, it isn't a straw man to say so. Some rough proposals for such a theory of measure have been made in this list in the past, like the universal prior (see http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node2.html or http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/node4.html ), or my own speculation that a theory of consciousness assigning relative and absolute probability to observer-moments might have only a single self-consistent solution (see http://tinyurl.com/ekz7u or http://tinyurl.com/jnaqb for more on this idea). You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) What do the words abstract object mean to you? To me, if propositions about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything? By having sense but no reference, for instance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference The case for mathematical Platonism needs to be made in the first place; if numbers do not exist at all, the universe, as an existing thing, cannot be a mathematical structure. (solipsists read: if numbers are not real, I cannot be mathematical structure). The case for mathematical Platonism is usually argued on the basis of the objective nature of mathematical truth. Superficially, it seems persuasive that objectivity requires objects. However, the basic case for the objectivity of mathematics is the tendency of mathematicians to agree about the answers to mathematical problems; this can be explained by noting that mathematical logic is based on axioms and rules of inference, and different mathematicians following the same rules will tend to get the same answers , like different computers running the same problem. Your remark is quite telling though. Almost everybody on the list is making that kind of asumotion with varying degrees of unconsiousness. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1 this is itself an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one. Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ? No, I was responding to your comment: You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. Here you seem to be saying that the truth value of '17 is prime' is mind-independent is a purely epistemological claim. It certainly *could* be, at least. Platonism is *not* the only philosophy of mathematics! What I'm saying is that it's necessarily ontological, as are any claims about the objective (mind-independent) truth-value of a given proposition. So you are claiming that mathematical Platonism is not merely true but *necessarily* true ? That is quite a claim! Few would literally imagine some alternate dimension called Plato's heaven where platonic forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our brains to produce our ideas about math. Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even platonically -- they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world, as Bruno requires. But
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit : Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp, giving that what I show is that you cannot have both. Brains are material. Computers are material. I think you misunderstand something here (or I do). I think when bruno talk about matter (and always emphasis it with primary), it really means primary reality... That said, it means (taking as an example the movie the matrix), that when neo wake up after taking the red pill and is welcome by Morpheus saying Welcome to the real world is not true... There can't be a real world in this sense, a primary world where the other reality is emulated in a stuffy computer, a world which is at the beginning of the emulated chain... The computer who runs the matrix in the Morpheus real world (so outside the so called matrix) is as stuffy as the computer running the matrix inside the matrix. Regads, Quentin I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until demostrated otherwise. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit : How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit? By explaining a lot from on e premiss. I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty) explanation. Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E = mc^2), but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc. (You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there is still many remaining questions OK? First nobody knows what such a substance can be defined without infinite regress. No one ? But there are far more materialist philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays. For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists. But that is consistent. You assume arithmetic is real and so you seek an arithmetical definition of matter. A scientists assume the matter gives an operational definition, e.g. as Vic Stenger does: matter is what kicks back when you kick it. You cannot criticize people who don't believe in Platonia for giving non-platonic definitions. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Jesse Mazer wrote: IZ wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: IZ wrote: And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* a satisfactory theory of measure to apply to everything, so it's a strawman to say that it's a prediction of everything hypotheses that Harry Potter universes should be just as probable as any other. Wanting to find a measure theory doesn't mean you have found one, and if you havent found one, it isn't a straw man to say so. But it is a straw man to say everything-theories makes the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones, because in fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said something like, everything theories do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones I wouldn't object. If they do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones then they do IN FACT make the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones even if they Everything theorists don't WNAT them to make that prediciton. The implications of a premiss are what they are, not what we want them to be. Classical physicists din't WANT to make the implications that atoms are unstable and will implode; nonetheless, classical phsyics makes that assumption. UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) What do the words abstract object mean to you? To me, if propositions about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything? By having sense but no reference, for instance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our having multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world object...but what would sense but no reference mean? We can make sense of unicorns have horns, despite the lack of reference. Senses are logically interelated in a way that allows us to confirm the truth-values of *some* sentences without seaking theri references. Those kind of sentences are called apriopri, and it is almost universally held that mathematical sentences are apriori. A term that is completely meaningless, like a round square? A refernceless term only needs to be contingently non-existent, like present King of France. Logical impossiblity is over-egging it. I don't see how there can be an objective, mind-independent truth about a term that doesn't refer to any coherent object or possibility. I am not asking you to. There are coherent possibilities that are not instantiated (or perphaps I should say, pace many-worlders, not obviously instantiated). Nonetheless, we can address many issues about these possibilites without peaking into the universe next door. Many-world metaphysics is not needed to explain how abstrract reasoning is possible. Can you think of any statements outside of math or logic that you would say have sense but no reference but also have a mind-independent truth value? What difference does it make ? The topic is maths. The case for mathematical Platonism needs to be made in the first place; if numbers do not exist at all, the universe, as an existing thing, cannot be a mathematical structure. Again, what does exist mean for you? Capable of interacting casually with me, However, the basic case for the objectivity of mathematics is the tendency of mathematicians to agree about the answers to mathematical problems; this can be explained by noting that mathematical logic is based on axioms and
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Brent Meeker wrote: For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists. But that is consistent. You assume arithmetic is real and so you seek an arithmetical definition of matter. A scientists assume the matter gives an operational definition, e.g. as Vic Stenger does: matter is what kicks back when you kick it. You cannot criticize people who don't believe in Platonia for giving non-platonic definitions. hear,hear! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
1Z wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: IZ wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: IZ wrote: And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* a satisfactory theory of measure to apply to everything, so it's a strawman to say that it's a prediction of everything hypotheses that Harry Potter universes should be just as probable as any other. Wanting to find a measure theory doesn't mean you have found one, and if you havent found one, it isn't a straw man to say so. But it is a straw man to say everything-theories makes the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones, because in fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said something like, everything theories do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones I wouldn't object. If they do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones then they do IN FACT make the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is not in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are equally likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a specific and definite prediction. Classical physicists din't WANT to make the implications that atoms are unstable and will implode; nonetheless, classical phsyics makes that assumption. Yes, that is a definite prediction of classical mechanics, and therefore has nothing to do with examples of theories that cannot make definite predictions about certain questions in the first place. A more analogous case would be the fact that string theory cannot at present predict the value of the cosmological constant; would you therefore conclude that string theory predicts all values of the cosmological constant are equally likely? UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) What do the words abstract object mean to you? To me, if propositions about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything? By having sense but no reference, for instance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our having multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world object...but what would sense but no reference mean? We can make sense of unicorns have horns, despite the lack of reference. In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept which humans have collectively defined; there is no way you could have a mind-independent truth about whether unicorns have horns that's separate from what people collectively believe about unicorns. Senses are logically interelated in a way that allows us to confirm the truth-values of *some* sentences without seaking theri references. Those kind of sentences are called apriopri, and it is almost universally held that mathematical sentences are apriori. Holding that they are a priori is not the same as holding that they lack references; platonists would presumably agree they're a priori. I don't see how there can be an objective, mind-independent truth about a term that doesn't refer to any coherent object or possibility. I am not asking you to. There are coherent possibilities that are not instantiated (or perphaps I should say, pace many-worlders, not obviously instantiated). Nonetheless, we can address
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 09-juil.-06, à 17:15, Lennart Nilsson a écrit : I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our observations. But why should we infer a substantial world? Substantial or primary or primitive matter is an incredible metaphysical extrapolation. It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes. I still want to (re)study why Aristotle made that step, except as a tool for burying the mind-body problem. As opposed to the mind-mathematics problem. Sade is very clear on the role of matter and why linking consciousness to it: to make people believed their act have few personal consequences. La Mettrie also begin the celbnrate materialist dissolution of the first person, including its responsibility feelings. The modern materialist have to be a first person eliminativist. I doubt less about consciousness and the number 317 than about *stuffy* strings or waves, which are not even assumed in physical theories, except in the background for separating conceptual issues from practice. Stuffiness explains why the only one logical possibility is real. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Only Existence is necessary?
I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our observations. -Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 9 juli 2006 14:36 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Le 09-juil.-06, à 14:26, 1Z a écrit : So how do insubstantial numbers generate a substantial world ? I guess there is no substantial world and I explain in all details here http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ (and on this list) why insubstantial numbers generate inescapably, by the mixing of their additive and multiplicative structures, local coherent webs of beliefs in substantial worlds, and how the laws of physics must emerge (with comp) from those purely mathematical webs ... making comp testable in the usual Popperian sense. In that sense comp already succeeds some first tests. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
