Re: The duplicators and the restorers
2013/2/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 20 Feb 2013, at 22:38, Alberto G. Corona wrote: if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid. That's correct. So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing whatever ;) That does not follow, because what a single copy does will influence the relative proportion of its consistent extensions. It may be under QM You can take the lift, the stairs or jump out of the window. In all case you will survive. But with the lift and stairs, you have a high probability to feel nice and healthy when getting at the ground floor. If you jump out of the window, you might have a high probability to find yourself in a very painful situation, in some hospital. This can be argued in both QM, or directly in comp. If your were right, it would make no sense to derive the physical laws from comp, and we would not been Turing emulable. Comp would be just false, by leading to too much white rabbits. But the observed lawful behaviour of the (local) universe according with QM, for example, does not coerce the null hypothesis to such consistency. It may be possible a consistent universe at time T and after that a rogue universe where I suffer painful tortures, white rabbits appear by breaking some causality laws but not challenging the continuation of life and intelligence, at least for some time, so that anyone can observe it. Then a mormal universe at T2 can proceed normally. I guess it would be perfectly computable and mathematical (although with a higher Kolmogorov complexity). What avoid that explosion of possibilities?. That is the unreasonable dogmatic, but effective, assumption that puzzled Einstein, that any reality is simple because it is what it is observed locally. And, if they exist, Do we should care for these other realities? It is all this unobserved realities a scientific endavour or it is simply extrapolations as a result of an aestethical or ideological drive? I suppose that questions like these appear here from time to time. Bruno 2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 22 Feb 2013, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2013/2/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 20 Feb 2013, at 22:38, Alberto G. Corona wrote: if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid. That's correct. So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing whatever ;) That does not follow, because what a single copy does will influence the relative proportion of its consistent extensions. It may be under QM Plausibly. That makes my statement even more solid. You can take the lift, the stairs or jump out of the window. In all case you will survive. But with the lift and stairs, you have a high probability to feel nice and healthy when getting at the ground floor. If you jump out of the window, you might have a high probability to find yourself in a very painful situation, in some hospital. This can be argued in both QM, or directly in comp. If your were right, it would make no sense to derive the physical laws from comp, and we would not been Turing emulable. Comp would be just false, by leading to too much white rabbits. But the observed lawful behaviour of the (local) universe according with QM, for example, does not coerce the null hypothesis to such consistency. It is comp that coerce for the null or everything hypothesis. And with comp the everything given by the additive and multiplicative number structure is already enough and not completeable for the ontology (and the epistemology is richer, and QM belongs or should belong to it). Keep in mind I do not assume QM, nor non-QM. In some context, I can talk like if QM was indeed the correct consequence of comp, but that remains to be seen. I tend to think that QM is very plausible, because you can derive it from very small set of experience (like rotational two slits experience, four slits experience (Deutch), five Stern Gerlach experience (Swinger). But with comp, we have to derive the whole SWE, including the linearity, the real and complex numbers, the dimensional geometries, which are assumed to interpret those experiences. It may be possible a consistent universe at time T and after that a rogue universe where I suffer painful tortures, white rabbits appear by breaking some causality laws but not challenging the continuation of life and intelligence, at least for some time, so that anyone can observe it. Then a mormal universe at T2 can proceed normally. We have to compute the comp-probability, or the QM-probability of this happening. If the comp-probability of white rabbits is big, then comp can be considered as empirically refuted. The QM-probability of white rabbit is shown rare, by the Born rule or Gleason's theorem, or by Feynman phase randomization. I guess it would be perfectly computable and mathematical (although with a higher Kolmogorov complexity). Computable is not enough. It has to be computable *and* having the right relative measure. Computable makes it exists, but it can still be relatively rare with respect to all computations going through your actual brain states (at the substitution levels). By the invariance of the first person experience for the computation delay, we cannot use Kolmogorov complexity to solve the measure problem, at least not directly (that would beg the measure problem). What avoid that explosion of possibilities?. Nothing. On the contrary: it is the explosion of possibilities which makes us hope that some normal histories can emerge statistically. That is the unreasonable dogmatic, but effective, assumption that puzzled Einstein, that any reality is simple because it is what it is observed locally. And, if they exist, Do we should care for these other realities? We should not care too much for the non-normal realities, except when we die, or take drugs, or sleep. When we die, a priori with comp, we survive in the most normal consistent extension, with respect to our actual state. It makes violent death a bit more frightening, at first sight. We should definitely care about our local normal realities, as they define our most probable futures, for us and our children. It is all this unobserved realities a scientific endavour or it is simply extrapolations as a result of an aestethical or ideological drive? It is a consequence of the assumption that we can survive with digital brain. The existence of the many computations is a theorem of elementary arithmetic, with comp (and thus Church's thesis) assumed or understood at the meta-level. I suppose that questions like these appear here from time to time. No problem with questions. Only problem with answers :) Bruno 2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 20 Feb 2013, at 21:18, meekerdb wrote: On 2/20/2013 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2013, at 00:27, meekerdb wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical continuity. Physical continuity entails, very plausibly, computability. Yes that is very plausible. But I also suspect that comp plus intelligence entails physics. But comp implies that intelligence exists, in arithmetic, in many exemplars. OK? If you are OK, then comp implies physics, and that's my point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 20 Feb 2013, at 22:38, Alberto G. Corona wrote: if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid. That's correct. So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing whatever ;) That does not follow, because what a single copy does will influence the relative proportion of its consistent extensions. You can take the lift, the stairs or jump out of the window. In all case you will survive. But with the lift and stairs, you have a high probability to feel nice and healthy when getting at the ground floor. If you jump out of the window, you might have a high probability to find yourself in a very painful situation, in some hospital. This can be argued in both QM, or directly in comp. If your were right, it would make no sense to derive the physical laws from comp, and we would not been Turing emulable. Comp would be just false, by leading to too much white rabbits. Bruno 2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience pain but then forget it. OK, same answer (assuming comp). If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the theory of mind that we might propose. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Wednesday, February 20, 2013 8:24:23 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: If there is an infinity of copies of you now being kicked by a wild horse, when is there ever a single copy of yourself doing something? And if there are an infinity of copies which we can't experience, why should we care? How does explaining one universe in terms of infinite universes explain anything at all, other than that we have no idea how the obvious unity of experience can physically exist. (hint: sense = 'the decider' which unifies public narrative from private possibility.) Craig Jason On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Alberto G. Corona agoc...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid. So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing whatever ;) 2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript: On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jason...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience pain but then forget it. OK, same answer (assuming comp). If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the theory of mind that we might propose. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/19/2013 4:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical continuity. I haven't forgotten it, I've just come to see that the simplest theory (while perfectly fine for ordinary scenarios) falls on its face in others. Particularly those involving duplicates, material replacement, teleporters, amnesia, split brains, etc. What is physical continuity's answer to the following questions: Who will you find yourself to be when you awake from a split brain surgery? Do you experience the perspectives of all your branched copies under the Everett multi-verse? Would you survive or die when you use a star-trek style transporter? Do I lose consciousness if I lose access to all my memories? Can my mind be slowly transformed to that of any other conscious person without losing consciousness? If I step into a duplication machine and 10 copies come out, which one do I survive as? Arnold Zuboff gives the following thought experiment to show how inadequate physical continuity theories are: I imagined two brains lying at either end of an operating table. For the sake of vividness - please forgive me - let us say a mad scientist has only a moment ago snatched the brain from your head. It is one of the two on the operating table. The other brain is a precise duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect, including all its patterns of memory traces. Perhaps the scientist created this duplicate himself, or perhaps he stole it from the head of one of those duplicates of you that would have arisen naturally in an infinite universe. Anyway, this mad scientist is capable of feeding into these brains any pattern of stimulation he likes, by means of electrodes plugged into them where nerves would normally be entering from the sense-organs and the rest of the body. And he has chosen to give both of them precisely the same pattern of stimulation that your brain would have been receiving if it had not been snatched from your head moments ago. That would be why it seems to you that your brain is still in your head, that my paper is still before you. As I say, both brains are being fed exactly this same pattern of stimu- lation. What should we expect is true of the subjects and their experience? Would we not suppose that the episode of experience connected with each brain would be qualitatively identical? But would we not also think that, despite the completeness of their qualitative similarity, the subjects and their episodes of experience must be numerically distinct from one another? You are one subject, lost in one experience; at the
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 2:28 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 4:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical continuity. I haven't forgotten it, I've just come to see that the simplest theory (while perfectly fine for ordinary scenarios) falls on its face in others. Particularly those involving duplicates, material replacement, teleporters, amnesia, split brains, etc. What is physical continuity's answer to the following questions: Who will you find yourself to be when you awake from a split brain surgery? Do you experience the perspectives of all your branched copies under the Everett multi-verse? Would you survive or die when you use a star-trek style transporter? Do I lose consciousness if I lose access to all my memories? Can my mind be slowly transformed to that of any other conscious person without losing consciousness? If I step into a duplication machine and 10 copies come out, which one do I survive as? Arnold Zuboff gives the following thought experiment to show how inadequate physical continuity theories are: I imagined two brains lying at either end of an operating table. For the sake of vividness - please forgive me - let us say a mad scientist has only a moment ago snatched the brain from your head. It is one of the two on the operating table. The other brain is a precise duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect, including all its patterns of memory traces. Perhaps the scientist created this duplicate himself, or perhaps he stole it from the head of one of those duplicates of you that would have arisen naturally in an infinite universe. Anyway, this mad scientist is capable of feeding into these brains any pattern of stimulation he likes, by means of electrodes plugged into them where nerves would normally be entering from the sense-organs and the rest of the body. And he has chosen to give both of them precisely the same pattern of stimulation that your brain would have been receiving if it had not been snatched from your head moments ago. That would be why it seems to you that your brain is still in your head, that my paper is still before you. As I say, both brains are being fed exactly this same pattern of stimu- lation. What should we expect is true of the subjects and their experience? Would we not suppose that the episode of experience connected with each brain would be qualitatively identical? But would we not also think that, despite the completeness of their qualitative similarity, the subjects and their episodes of experience must be numerically distinct from one another? You are one subject, lost in one experience; at the other end of the operating table is another subject, lost in his or hers. It is as though we are thinking about two ashtrays of the same
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 19 Feb 2013, at 22:27, meekerdb wrote: On 2/19/2013 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Feb 2013, at 17:29, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Feb 2013, at 18:09, Jason Resch wrote: Thanks to everyone who replied to this post. So far Stathis and Bruno both answered that both cases are equivalent. Is there anyone willing to argue against either: 1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or 2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured? Those are interesting questions, but they ask for thought experiences with amnesia, which can quickly, too much quickly, makes you suspicious that personal identity is an illusion. My experience is that when people begin to grasp this, they can feel quite uneasy. A related question, that I ask to you, Jason. Would you accept to sleep in my sleep-laboratory. I pay you 100$ or even more. But I tell you in advance that you will live your worst nightmare. I tell you also that I have the means to make you, in the morning after, completely forgetting that nightmare. Are you OK? Are you OK that your son or daughter makes money in that way? Can this be legal? Is it equivalent with this: I duplicate you and torture the copy for one hour, and then I kill that copy (assuming I can)? Is this not equivalent with a forgotten dream of torture? Are you OK that your daughter makes money in that way? Bruno There used to be a drug administered for childbirth which would allow the mother-to-be- to experience excruciating pain as evidenced by her behavior during the birthing process yet afterwards she would have no memory of that pain. Doctors found that acceptable and assumed there was no lasting trauma. My opinion is that there is lasting trauma that has to be consciously re-experienced to be resolved. So one may as well experience childbirth without drugs to begin with. BTW- off-list topic?? Not really, as here we were touching on the question of personal identity, in relation with memory. Now, your question is very difficult, and my thought on it is that woman should have the choice, and that nobody can coerce on her decision. Comp + Theaetetus would lead to the idea that nobody can solve that problem, and that only individual woman can take the decision. The very basic idea is that no one can think at the place of other one, especially about possible pain. And can you now make a decision for you in the future - since those are in some degree two different people. Why? Not with comp where we agree that the one restored in Moscow and the one restore in Washington are the same person, despite being different with each other. A forgotten pain has still been a lived pain, and this has to be avoided if possible. Right. Many things happen that we forget - but that doesn't make them unhappen. In the Restorer story there is the assumption that everything can be put back as it was; but that is nomologically impossible. With comp it is possible in principle, if only through a backup, given the equivalence explained above. Bruno Brent Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 20 Feb 2013, at 00:27, meekerdb wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical continuity. Physical continuity entails, very plausibly, computability. If that is not the case, your point would still be only an argument against comp, but I think that Jason was assuming comp. Bruno Brent Universalism is a simpler theory that explains more, in that it can answer why you are experiencing the moment you are in now vs. none at all or some other observer moment. No-self theories, taken seriously, seem incompatible with the scientific method, as if you are trapped in a single OM forever, you cannot perform any experiments, or test predictions. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2899 / Virus Database: 2639/6114 - Release Date: 02/18/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/20/2013 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 2:28 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 4:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical continuity. I haven't forgotten it, I've just come to see that the simplest theory (while perfectly fine for ordinary scenarios) falls on its face in others. Particularly those involving duplicates, material replacement, teleporters, amnesia, split brains, etc. What is physical continuity's answer to the following questions: Who will you find yourself to be when you awake from a split brain surgery? Do you experience the perspectives of all your branched copies under the Everett multi-verse? Would you survive or die when you use a star-trek style transporter? Do I lose consciousness if I lose access to all my memories? Can my mind be slowly transformed to that of any other conscious person without losing consciousness? If I step into a duplication machine and 10 copies come out, which one do I survive as? Arnold Zuboff gives the following thought experiment to show how inadequate physical continuity theories are: I imagined two brains lying at either end of an operating table. For the sake of vividness - please forgive me - let us say a mad scientist has only a moment ago snatched the brain from your head. It is one of the two on the operating table. The other brain is a precise duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect, including all its patterns of memory traces. Perhaps the scientist created this duplicate himself, or perhaps he stole it from the head of one of those duplicates of you that would have arisen naturally in an infinite universe. Anyway, this mad scientist is capable of feeding into these brains any pattern of stimulation he likes, by means of electrodes plugged into them where nerves would normally be entering from the sense-organs and the rest of the body. And he has chosen to give both of them precisely the same pattern of stimulation that your brain would have been receiving if it had not been snatched from your head moments ago. That would be why it seems to you that your brain is still in your head, that my paper is still before you. As I say, both brains are being fed exactly this same pattern of stimu-
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/20/2013 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2013, at 00:27, meekerdb wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical continuity. Physical continuity entails, very plausibly, computability. Yes that is very plausible. But I also suspect that comp plus intelligence entails physics. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid. So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing whatever ;) 2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience pain but then forget it. OK, same answer (assuming comp). If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the theory of mind that we might propose. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_outhttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 1:50 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/20/2013 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 2:28 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 4:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical continuity. I haven't forgotten it, I've just come to see that the simplest theory (while perfectly fine for ordinary scenarios) falls on its face in others. Particularly those involving duplicates, material replacement, teleporters, amnesia, split brains, etc. What is physical continuity's answer to the following questions: Who will you find yourself to be when you awake from a split brain surgery? Do you experience the perspectives of all your branched copies under the Everett multi-verse? Would you survive or die when you use a star-trek style transporter? Do I lose consciousness if I lose access to all my memories? Can my mind be slowly transformed to that of any other conscious person without losing consciousness? If I step into a duplication machine and 10 copies come out, which one do I survive as? Arnold Zuboff gives the following thought experiment to show how inadequate physical continuity theories are: I imagined two brains lying at either end of an operating table. For the sake of vividness - please forgive me - let us say a mad scientist has only a moment ago snatched the brain from your head. It is one of the two on the operating table. The other brain is a precise duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect, including all its patterns of memory traces. Perhaps the scientist created this duplicate himself, or perhaps he stole it from the head of one of those duplicates of you that would have arisen naturally in an infinite universe. Anyway, this mad scientist is capable of feeding into these brains any pattern of stimulation he likes, by means of electrodes plugged into them where nerves would normally be entering from the sense-organs and the rest of the body. And he has chosen to give both of them precisely the same pattern of stimulation that your brain would have been receiving if it had not been snatched from your head moments ago. That would be why it seems to you that your brain is still in your head, that my paper is still before you. As I say, both brains are being fed exactly this same pattern of stimu- lation. What should we expect is true of the subjects and their experience? Would we not suppose that the episode of experience connected with each brain would be qualitatively identical? But would we not also think that, despite the completeness of their qualitative similarity, the subjects and their episodes of experience must be numerically distinct from one another? You are one subject, lost in one experience; at the other end of the
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
If there is an infinity of copies of you now being kicked by a wild horse, when is there ever a single copy of yourself doing something? Jason On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.comwrote: if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid. So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing whatever ;) 2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience pain but then forget it. OK, same answer (assuming comp). If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the theory of mind that we might propose. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_outhttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 18 Feb 2013, at 17:29, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Feb 2013, at 18:09, Jason Resch wrote: Thanks to everyone who replied to this post. So far Stathis and Bruno both answered that both cases are equivalent. Is there anyone willing to argue against either: 1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or 2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured? Those are interesting questions, but they ask for thought experiences with amnesia, which can quickly, too much quickly, makes you suspicious that personal identity is an illusion. My experience is that when people begin to grasp this, they can feel quite uneasy. A related question, that I ask to you, Jason. Would you accept to sleep in my sleep-laboratory. I pay you 100$ or even more. But I tell you in advance that you will live your worst nightmare. I tell you also that I have the means to make you, in the morning after, completely forgetting that nightmare. Are you OK? Are you OK that your son or daughter makes money in that way? Can this be legal? Is it equivalent with this: I duplicate you and torture the copy for one hour, and then I kill that copy (assuming I can)? Is this not equivalent with a forgotten dream of torture? Are you OK that your daughter makes money in that way? Bruno There used to be a drug administered for childbirth which would allow the mother-to-be- to experience excruciating pain as evidenced by her behavior during the birthing process yet afterwards she would have no memory of that pain. Doctors found that acceptable and assumed there was no lasting trauma. My opinion is that there is lasting trauma that has to be consciously re-experienced to be resolved. So one may as well experience childbirth without drugs to begin with. BTW- off-list topic?? Not really, as here we were touching on the question of personal identity, in relation with memory. Now, your question is very difficult, and my thought on it is that woman should have the choice, and that nobody can coerce on her decision. Comp + Theaetetus would lead to the idea that nobody can solve that problem, and that only individual woman can take the decision. The very basic idea is that no one can think at the place of other one, especially about possible pain. A forgotten pain has still been a lived pain, and this has to be avoided if possible. Bruno Jason On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 6:58 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Feb 2013, at 07:49, Jason Resch wrote: Are you OK that your daughter makes money in that way? No. OK. But if she is adult, and if you have the assurance that she knows what she is doing, i.e. that she has some fair account of what is involved, then you can't obliged her to not do it. This follows from what you said above, as I am sure you see. It is not different from alpinism. I would be anxious my daughter make alpinism, as she might get stuck of fall, perhaps die, but then, if she is not a minor, it is her choice. It might be that we just had different connotations of OK. I would be uneasy with and disagree (hence not be OK with) her making a living by causing or suffering. I think there might be better ways to make money but still the decision is hers. Your scenario reminded me of this writing by Lee Corbin: Next suppose that you have a duplicate in an adjacent room that you are monitoring on closed circuit television. You are told that you and he are the same person. Probably, you disagree. You are then asked you whether it is preferable that your duplicate receive two minutes' electrical shock or you receive one minute's. You reply that you would prefer that your duplicate receive the two minutes' worth. (Better him than me.) It is done, but that night a merging process copies 'your' memories of the day into 'his' brain and 'his' memories into 'yours'. (I must use funny quotes around his and yours because my central claim is that ultimately such a distinction is meaningless.) Now the next day the scenario is repeated. I ask 'you' whether it is better that 'your' duplicate get the two minute treatment or that 'you' get the one minute treatment. Now you're not so sure. For you now *remember* that yesterday you were sitting minding your own business being monitored on closed circuit television when suddenly out of the blue there came two minutes' of electrical shock. You remember this as being *very painful*. Nature has constructed you to avoid repetition of unpleasant incidents. So you now begin to suspect that 'you' and 'your duplicate' are the same person. You decide (maybe after several more days of two minute punishments) that perhaps it is better to call down upon 'yourself' the mere one minute punishment. After that night, when the memories are merged, you conclude that you made a wise move. Today's punishment seemed to be less severe than yesterday's. If the person making the decision to take the money in exchange for the torture would make the same decision whether or not the memory was erased, then they are making the right decision for themself. If they change their mind depending on the memory erasure, then I think they are using a faulty theory of personal identity to make their decision, and are prone to making a bad decision. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/19/2013 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Feb 2013, at 17:29, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Feb 2013, at 18:09, Jason Resch wrote: Thanks to everyone who replied to this post. So far Stathis and Bruno both answered that both cases are equivalent. Is there anyone willing to argue against either: 1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or 2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured? Those are interesting questions, but they ask for thought experiences with amnesia, which can quickly, too much quickly, makes you suspicious that personal identity is an illusion. My experience is that when people begin to grasp this, they can feel quite uneasy. A related question, that I ask to you, Jason. Would you accept to sleep in my sleep-laboratory. I pay you 100$ or even more. But I tell you in advance that you will live your worst nightmare. I tell you also that I have the means to make you, in the morning after, completely forgetting that nightmare. Are you OK? Are you OK that your son or daughter makes money in that way? Can this be legal? Is it equivalent with this: I duplicate you and torture the copy for one hour, and then I kill that copy (assuming I can)? Is this not equivalent with a forgotten dream of torture? Are you OK that your daughter makes money in that way? Bruno There used to be a drug administered for childbirth which would allow the mother-to-be- to experience excruciating pain as evidenced by her behavior during the birthing process yet afterwards she would have no memory of that pain. Doctors found that acceptable and assumed there was no lasting trauma. My opinion is that there is lasting trauma that has to be consciously re-experienced to be resolved. So one may as well experience childbirth without drugs to begin with. BTW- off-list topic?? Not really, as here we were touching on the question of personal identity, in relation with memory. Now, your question is very difficult, and my thought on it is that woman should have the choice, and that nobody can coerce on her decision. Comp + Theaetetus would lead to the idea that nobody can solve that problem, and that only individual woman can take the decision. The very basic idea is that no one can think at the place of other one, especially about possible pain. And can you now make a decision for you in the future - since those are in some degree two different people. A forgotten pain has still been a lived pain, and this has to be avoided if possible. Right. Many things happen that we forget - but that doesn't make them unhappen. In the Restorer story there is the assumption that everything can be put back as it was; but that is nomologically impossible. Brent Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 4. In the course of normal life, we gain memories (through experience) and lose memories (by forgetting). Yet most feel they are still the same person. This allows for some interesting experiments with a faulty teleporter. You step into the teleporter and it transports you, but it is not 100% and your resulting copy has lost some small fraction of his long term memories. It has also given you new memories for things you never actually experienced. You comfort yourself with the idea that this is no different than living life and assert you are still the same person. Two very similar twins, Alice and Alicia each use this teleporter at the same time. Alice and Alicia both steps into it and on the recieving end of the teleporter, Alice and Alicia step out. But what really happened is Alice gained and lost some memories and is now identical to the Alicia who stepped into the teleporter, and the Alicia gained and lost some memories and is now identicial to the Alice who stepped into the teleporter. Is this any different from the two of them entering a closet and the two of them coming out? If not, couldn't they be switching places all the time, each always in the other? No, because they occupy different locations and will within milliseconds develop different experiences, e.g. Alice looks at Alicia, but Alicia isn't looking at Alice. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: In the Restorer story there is the assumption that everything can be put back as it was; but that is nomologically impossible. Not everything in the sense of the entire universe, just everything about your physical body/brain. I don't see why this should be nomologically impossible. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 3. We need not our memories to be ourselves. Imagine concentrating heavily on some task, such as taking an exam, or driving in perilous conditions. You become so focused on your task that you use almost none of your personal long term memories. In principal, large portions of your brain could be disconnected without impacting your performance or experience. I think that is very doubtful. You seem to equate memory entirely with conscious narrative memory, but what we think consciously is only a small part of our thinking. In fact it might be a quite small part that could be disconnected. When I think of the solution to a problem it often just 'pops into my head'. It obviously depended on my memory, because, for example, I didn't just unconsciously invent calculus to solve it. Think of how many neurons are dedicated to other things completely unrelated to taking the test: appreciating music, catching a baseball, tasting food, swimming, and so on. Certianly, our experiences shape us in ways we aren't always aware, and unconscious thought plays a big part of solutions we come up with, but when you are for instance, meditating and thinking of almost nothing, but how much of what you consider uniquely defines you as an individual, really goes into that experience? (of meditating, concentrating on an SAT question)? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 4. In the course of normal life, we gain memories (through experience) and lose memories (by forgetting). Yet most feel they are still the same person. This allows for some interesting experiments with a faulty teleporter. You step into the teleporter and it transports you, but it is not 100% and your resulting copy has lost some small fraction of his long term memories. It has also given you new memories for things you never actually experienced. You comfort yourself with the idea that this is no different than living life and assert you are still the same person. Two very similar twins, Alice and Alicia each use this teleporter at the same time. Alice and Alicia both steps into it and on the recieving end of the teleporter, Alice and Alicia step out. But what really happened is Alice gained and lost some memories and is now identical to the Alicia who stepped into the teleporter, and the Alicia gained and lost some memories and is now identicial to the Alice who stepped into the teleporter. Is this any different from the two of them entering a closet and the two of them coming out? If not, couldn't they be switching places all the time, each always in the other? No, because they occupy different locations and will within milliseconds develop different experiences, e.g. Alice looks at Alicia, but Alicia isn't looking at Alice. Consider the case in the absence of alicia. Alice steps into the teleporter, and comes out a little different, but nonetheless she considers herself to have survived. Consider the case in the absence of alice. Alicia steps into the teleporter, and comes out a little different, but nonetheless she considers herself to have survived. Now if they both step into two different teleporters, where Alice steps into the A1 - A2 teleporter, and Alicia steps into the B1-B2 teleporter. When Alice comes out of B2, and Alicia comes out of A2, who is who? What is the first person experience like? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. Universalism is a simpler theory that explains more, in that it can answer why you are experiencing the moment you are in now vs. none at all or some other observer moment. No-self theories, taken seriously, seem incompatible with the scientific method, as if you are trapped in a single OM forever, you cannot perform any experiments, or test predictions. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
2013/2/19 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? Causality ? The you at T1 and the you at T2 are causally linked. Quentin There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. Universalism is a simpler theory that explains more, in that it can answer why you are experiencing the moment you are in now vs. none at all or some other observer moment. No-self theories, taken seriously, seem incompatible with the scientific method, as if you are trapped in a single OM forever, you cannot perform any experiments, or test predictions. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 4:02 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/2/19 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? Causality ? The you at T1 and the you at T2 are causally linked. Causality links many things to you, and you to many things, which you wouldn't normally associate with yourself. I don't think causality alone can serve as a theory of personal identity. A theory of personal identity needs to define the boundaries of a person, and answer questions such as which experiences can be ascribed to a given person. You could trace causality backwards and find that the big bang caused you, but that doesn't mean you are the big bang. Likewise, you could make a fancy dinner (which you caused) but the fancy dinner is not you. I think causally linked might be a requirement but by itself it is too general to delineate an individual. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/19/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 3. We need not our memories to be ourselves. Imagine concentrating heavily on some task, such as taking an exam, or driving in perilous conditions. You become so focused on your task that you use almost none of your personal long term memories. In principal, large portions of your brain could be disconnected without impacting your performance or experience. I think that is very doubtful. You seem to equate memory entirely with conscious narrative memory, but what we think consciously is only a small part of our thinking. In fact it might be a quite small part that could be disconnected. When I think of the solution to a problem it often just 'pops into my head'. It obviously depended on my memory, because, for example, I didn't just unconsciously invent calculus to solve it. Think of how many neurons are dedicated to other things completely unrelated to taking the test: appreciating music, catching a baseball, tasting food, swimming, and so on. How do you know that catching a baseball is *completely* unrelated? I very much doubt that there is a one-to-one mapping between functions and neurons. Certianly, our experiences shape us in ways we aren't always aware, and unconscious thought plays a big part of solutions we come up with, but when you are for instance, meditating and thinking of almost nothing, but how much of what you consider uniquely defines you as an individual, really goes into that experience? (of meditating, concentrating on an SAT question)? What uniquely defines me as an individual (if I am unique) is my moment-to-moment position and viewpoint as well as my stream of consciousness over time intervals. I may have the same thought as you momentarily, but I'm seeing a different room and typing on a different keyboard and my next thought is different than yours. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/19/2013 1:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 4. In the course of normal life, we gain memories (through experience) and lose memories (by forgetting). Yet most feel they are still the same person. This allows for some interesting experiments with a faulty teleporter. You step into the teleporter and it transports you, but it is not 100% and your resulting copy has lost some small fraction of his long term memories. It has also given you new memories for things you never actually experienced. You comfort yourself with the idea that this is no different than living life and assert you are still the same person. Two very similar twins, Alice and Alicia each use this teleporter at the same time. Alice and Alicia both steps into it and on the recieving end of the teleporter, Alice and Alicia step out. But what really happened is Alice gained and lost some memories and is now identical to the Alicia who stepped into the teleporter, and the Alicia gained and lost some memories and is now identicial to the Alice who stepped into the teleporter. Is this any different from the two of them entering a closet and the two of them coming out? If not, couldn't they be switching places all the time, each always in the other? No, because they occupy different locations and will within milliseconds develop different experiences, e.g. Alice looks at Alicia, but Alicia isn't looking at Alice. Consider the case in the absence of alicia. Alice steps into the teleporter, and comes out a little different, but nonetheless she considers herself to have survived. Consider the case in the absence of alice. Alicia steps into the teleporter, and comes out a little different, but nonetheless she considers herself to have survived. Now if they both step into two different teleporters, where Alice steps into the A1 - A2 teleporter, and Alicia steps into the B1-B2 teleporter. When Alice comes out of B2, and Alicia comes out of A2, who is who? What is the first person experience like? ?? Alice is Alice and Alicia is Alicia. I don't know what it's like to be teleported, but I'm not exactly the same as I was yesterday (another day older and deeper in debt). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical continuity. Brent Universalism is a simpler theory that explains more, in that it can answer why you are experiencing the moment you are in now vs. none at all or some other observer moment. No-self theories, taken seriously, seem incompatible with the scientific method, as if you are trapped in a single OM forever, you cannot perform any experiments, or test predictions. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2899 / Virus Database: 2639/6114 - Release Date: 02/18/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:14 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: In the Restorer story there is the assumption that everything can be put back as it was; but that is nomologically impossible. Not everything in the sense of the entire universe, just everything about your physical body/brain. I don't see why this should be nomologically impossible. It probably is, but even if not, do you *only* care about your body/brain? Suppose there is a video of you being tortured - wouldn't it make a difference to you whether it was erased? Brent In experiment, the aliens fly away and you never see them again. If they did take a video recording of it, it shouldn't make any difference from my first person perspective. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:21 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 3. We need not our memories to be ourselves. Imagine concentrating heavily on some task, such as taking an exam, or driving in perilous conditions. You become so focused on your task that you use almost none of your personal long term memories. In principal, large portions of your brain could be disconnected without impacting your performance or experience. I think that is very doubtful. You seem to equate memory entirely with conscious narrative memory, but what we think consciously is only a small part of our thinking. In fact it might be a quite small part that could be disconnected. When I think of the solution to a problem it often just 'pops into my head'. It obviously depended on my memory, because, for example, I didn't just unconsciously invent calculus to solve it. Think of how many neurons are dedicated to other things completely unrelated to taking the test: appreciating music, catching a baseball, tasting food, swimming, and so on. How do you know that catching a baseball is *completely* unrelated? I very much doubt that there is a one-to-one mapping between functions and neurons. What is the information content of your current experience compared to the information content of your entire brain? Do you think they are approximately 1:1, 1:10, 1:100? I would guess it is somewhere less than 1:10, and thus the majority of the me in my brain is of no consequence to my current observer moment, though there is little existing data regarding the information content of our conscious experience, if you look at the bandwidth of the optic nerve, or auditory nerves, they are very low compared to the total estimated storage capacity of the brain. What makes this calculation more complex is that memories are integral to experience; about half the traffic that goes into the visual cortex is from memory, and the other half from the eyes. Certianly, our experiences shape us in ways we aren't always aware, and unconscious thought plays a big part of solutions we come up with, but when you are for instance, meditating and thinking of almost nothing, but how much of what you consider uniquely defines you as an individual, really goes into that experience? (of meditating, concentrating on an SAT question)? What uniquely defines me as an individual (if I am unique) is my moment-to-moment position and viewpoint as well as my stream of consciousness over time intervals. I may have the same thought as you momentarily, but I'm seeing a different room and typing on a different keyboard and my next thought is different than yours. If two people are in the same virtual reality so they see the same room and type on the same keyboard, and they happen to have the same thought, what principal do you use to say one thought is Brent's and another thought is that person's? Is it some intrinsic property of the thought, and if so what is that property? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:39 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 6. Swapping places with someone: In 5 seconds, your mind and consciousness will swap with that of some rich and famous person. Let's say Bill Gates. I hope you are ready. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. The swap is complete. Bill Gates is now in your body, with access to your memories and living as you were just before you got to reading this sentence, while you are living as a billionaire and enjoying Bills bank account. Of course, while you are in his body you only have access to his memories. Not only does his wife not notice the switch, but you don't even notice it. You only have access to Bill's memories now so you do not realize anything is awry. Don't worry, everything will be set back how it was, in 3. 2. 1. Welcome back. How was it? Of course, you don't remember. Fortunately, Bill was nice enough to read the last few sentences for you and now they have been placed into your memory. This shows it is meaningless to say I wish I could live as X, or experience a day in Y's shoes. For all you know, you already are, have, and will. This, if true, only shows that you and Bill Gates don't exist apart from your bodies and memories, so that it is nonsense to talk of exchanging bodies and memories. We agree it is nonsense. For it to make sense there would have to be a you soul and a Bill Gates soul that switched. Okay, if no soul involved, then by what means can we talk of you at T1 and you at T2, when the two are different in terms of memories and material? There is a problem with any theories of personal identity two individuals at two different times. Inevitably it comes down to some arbitrary measure of similarity. There are two alternatives, no-self theories of personal identity, in which you are nothing but a single observer moment, and universalism, which identifies you with every conscious entity. You have been seduced by comp so that you forget the simplest theory - physical continuity. I haven't forgotten it, I've just come to see that the simplest theory (while perfectly fine for ordinary scenarios) falls on its face in others. Particularly those involving duplicates, material replacement, teleporters, amnesia, split brains, etc. What is physical continuity's answer to the following questions: Who will you find yourself to be when you awake from a split brain surgery? Do you experience the perspectives of all your branched copies under the Everett multi-verse? Would you survive or die when you use a star-trek style transporter? Do I lose consciousness if I lose access to all my memories? Can my mind be slowly transformed to that of any other conscious person without losing consciousness? If I step into a duplication machine and 10 copies come out, which one do I survive as? Arnold Zuboff gives the following thought experiment to show how inadequate physical continuity theories are: I imagined two brains lying at either end of an operating table. For the sake of vividness - please forgive me - let us say a mad scientist has only a moment ago snatched the brain from your head. It is one of the two on the operating table. The other brain is a precise duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect, including all its patterns of memory traces. Perhaps the scientist created this duplicate himself, or perhaps he stole it from the head of one of those duplicates of you that would have arisen naturally in an infinite universe. Anyway, this mad scientist is capable of feeding into these brains any pattern of stimulation he likes, by means of electrodes plugged into them where nerves would normally be entering from the sense-organs and the rest of the body. And he has chosen to give both of them precisely the same pattern of stimulation that your brain would have been receiving if it had not been snatched from your head moments ago. That would be why it seems to you that your brain is still in your head, that my paper is still before you. As I say, both brains are being fed exactly this same pattern of stimu- lation. What should we expect is true of the subjects and their experience? Would we not suppose that the episode of experience connected with each brain would be qualitatively identical? But would we not also think that, despite the completeness of their qualitative similarity, the subjects and their episodes of experience must be numerically distinct from one another? You are one subject, lost in one experience; at the other end of the operating table is another subject, lost in his or hers. It is as though we are thinking about two ashtrays of the same design sitting at either end of a coffee table. But now for the experiment itself. Our mad researcher begins by trading one quarter of your brain for the corresponding
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/19/2013 3:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:21 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/19/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 3:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/18/2013 10:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 3. We need not our memories to be ourselves. Imagine concentrating heavily on some task, such as taking an exam, or driving in perilous conditions. You become so focused on your task that you use almost none of your personal long term memories. In principal, large portions of your brain could be disconnected without impacting your performance or experience. I think that is very doubtful. You seem to equate memory entirely with conscious narrative memory, but what we think consciously is only a small part of our thinking. In fact it might be a quite small part that could be disconnected. When I think of the solution to a problem it often just 'pops into my head'. It obviously depended on my memory, because, for example, I didn't just unconsciously invent calculus to solve it. Think of how many neurons are dedicated to other things completely unrelated to taking the test: appreciating music, catching a baseball, tasting food, swimming, and so on. How do you know that catching a baseball is *completely* unrelated? I very much doubt that there is a one-to-one mapping between functions and neurons. What is the information content of your current experience compared to the information content of your entire brain? Do you think they are approximately 1:1, 1:10, 1:100? I would guess it is somewhere less than 1:10, and thus the majority of the me in my brain is of no consequence to my current observer moment, How long is an observer moment? How about 1/100th of an observer moment? Taking a test usually takes an hour. How are moments strung together to make you? though there is little existing data regarding the information content of our conscious experience, if you look at the bandwidth of the optic nerve, or auditory nerves, they are very low compared to the total estimated storage capacity of the brain. What makes this calculation more complex is that memories are integral to experience; about half the traffic that goes into the visual cortex is from memory, and the other half from the eyes. Certianly, our experiences shape us in ways we aren't always aware, and unconscious thought plays a big part of solutions we come up with, but when you are for instance, meditating and thinking of almost nothing, but how much of what you consider uniquely defines you as an individual, really goes into that experience? (of meditating, concentrating on an SAT question)? What uniquely defines me as an individual (if I am unique) is my moment-to-moment position and viewpoint as well as my stream of consciousness over time intervals. I may have the same thought as you momentarily, but I'm seeing a different room and typing on a different keyboard and my next thought is different than yours. If two people are in the same virtual reality so they see the same room and type on the same keyboard, and they happen to have the same thought, Then they are the same person in the virtual reality. what principal do you use to say one thought is Brent's and another thought is that person's? If this is a virtual reality and there's another instance of exactly the same virtual reality - then I'm Brent in both of them. Otherwise, I'm the one on the left. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Feb 2013, at 18:09, Jason Resch wrote: Thanks to everyone who replied to this post. So far Stathis and Bruno both answered that both cases are equivalent. Is there anyone willing to argue against either: 1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or 2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured? Those are interesting questions, but they ask for thought experiences with amnesia, which can quickly, too much quickly, makes you suspicious that personal identity is an illusion. My experience is that when people begin to grasp this, they can feel quite uneasy. A related question, that I ask to you, Jason. Would you accept to sleep in my sleep-laboratory. I pay you 100$ or even more. But I tell you in advance that you will live your worst nightmare. I tell you also that I have the means to make you, in the morning after, completely forgetting that nightmare. Are you OK? Are you OK that your son or daughter makes money in that way? Can this be legal? Is it equivalent with this: I duplicate you and torture the copy for one hour, and then I kill that copy (assuming I can)? Is this not equivalent with a forgotten dream of torture? Are you OK that your daughter makes money in that way? Bruno There used to be a drug administered for childbirth which would allow the mother-to-be- to experience excruciating pain as evidenced by her behavior during the birthing process yet afterwards she would have no memory of that pain. Doctors found that acceptable and assumed there was no lasting trauma. My opinion is that there is lasting trauma that has to be consciously re-experienced to be resolved. So one may as well experience childbirth without drugs to begin with. BTW- off-list topic?? Jason On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 6:58 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. Thank you. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Saturday, February 16, 2013 10:12:34 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: On Feb 16, 2013, at 5:27 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even with advanced scientific methods. Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience not be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have to be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event from eternity. If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is something other than a physical basis to the experience. This something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been repeated 100%. Do you have any theory that explains sensation? Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to make cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other conceptual sensations (thoughts). In other words, you are saying there can be no explanation? Yes, but because sense is already 'planation' itself. You are trying to weigh weight itself, so I am saying there can be no weight of weight itself, just as there is no value of value or size of size. Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your conscious experience over some finite period of time? Information is not physically real. Formations are representations which inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not produced, it is presented. Well are there an infinite or finite number of formations in that presentation? There may be loosely finite ranges of experiences someone can have as that person, as a person in general, as an animal, organism, part of Earth, body, etc but it is self-diagonalizing so probably infinite overall. Until people invented rockets, seeing the Earth from space wasn't within the range of possible experiences. Now the possible experiences of everyone on Earth include seeing pictures from the surface of Mars, or Hubble pictures of a fantastic number of places. Craig Jason If not, then it seems plausible that whatever information needs to go into creating some sensory experience can be duplicated. If it is non infinite then the pigeon hole principle applies ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeonhole_principle http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeonhole_principle ). Sensory experience is not created by information, information is a consequence of sensory experience and conceptual-level motives. Sensory experience is private physics. Information is a conceptual abstraction of sensory experience, so that while our thoughts about information are physical events, the bits and bytes to which they refer are not physically real. Craig Jason The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered experiences and string them together as similar enough to be considered identical. This is equivalent to saying it is magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something else does not change the facts. I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so you strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to is either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or Significance - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing else, and I claim nothing else. Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, No, they are physical, but they are private. but the conventional view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed. This would by definition be something magical, like a soul. Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a belief in a magical non-physical never-never land in which our private experience takes place. Once you realize that the
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Sun, Feb 17, 2013 at 8:07 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Saturday, February 16, 2013 10:12:34 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: On Feb 16, 2013, at 5:27 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even with advanced scientific methods. Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience not be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have to be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event from eternity. If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is something other than a physical basis to the experience. This something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been repeated 100%. Do you have any theory that explains sensation? Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to make cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other conceptual sensations (thoughts). In other words, you are saying there can be no explanation? Yes, but because sense is already 'planation' itself. You are trying to weigh weight itself, so I am saying there can be no weight of weight itself, just as there is no value of value or size of size. Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your conscious experience over some finite period of time? Information is not physically real. Formations are representations which inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not produced, it is presented. Well are there an infinite or finite number of formations in that presentation? There may be loosely finite ranges of experiences someone can have as that person, as a person in general, as an animal, organism, part of Earth, body, etc but it is self-diagonalizing so probably infinite overall. Until people invented rockets, seeing the Earth from space wasn't within the range of possible experiences. Now the possible experiences of everyone on Earth include seeing pictures from the surface of Mars, or Hubble pictures of a fantastic number of places. Would you agree that there is a digital audio quality high enough that no human can distinguish it from the original analog one, and that there is a visual resolution and number of colors per pixel high enough that no human could distinguish the display from an actual scene? If so, there is a large but finite number of 1 minute songs that can be experienced by a human, and there is large but finite number of images a person can see. Therefore, in a universe that is infinite there is bound to be replication of the same experiences. This may not duplicate an experience, which some have argued is a but it does mean there can be multiple instances of the same experience. Arnold Zuboff writes: Let us compare the logic of experience to the logic of something like a novel. A novel might be called a 'detailed type', of which there are 'tokens', which are its copies. For example, on a shelf in a bookshop there might be two copies of but a single novel, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Just as this would be only one novel, this would also constitute no multiplication of the character called Huckleberry Finn, despite there being two copies of his adventures on the shelf. The logic of a copy is different from that of a novel. If one of these copies was destroyed, the novel would continue to exist in the shop so long as there was at least one copy there. The novel has the logic of an Aristotelian universal. There must be at least one instance for it to exist, but repeated instances cannot multiply the number of universals. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
Thanks to everyone who replied to this post. So far Stathis and Bruno both answered that both cases are equivalent. Is there anyone willing to argue against either: 1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or 2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured? Jason On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 6:58 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. Thank you. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/17/2013 9:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Thanks to everyone who replied to this post. So far Stathis and Bruno both answered that both cases are equivalent. Is there anyone willing to argue against either: 1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or 2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured? The two cases can be equivalent and 'you' experience torture in both of them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Sunday, February 17, 2013 11:51:38 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote: On Sun, Feb 17, 2013 at 8:07 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Saturday, February 16, 2013 10:12:34 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: On Feb 16, 2013, at 5:27 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even with advanced scientific methods. Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience not be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have to be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event from eternity. If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is something other than a physical basis to the experience. This something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been repeated 100%. Do you have any theory that explains sensation? Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to make cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other conceptual sensations (thoughts). In other words, you are saying there can be no explanation? Yes, but because sense is already 'planation' itself. You are trying to weigh weight itself, so I am saying there can be no weight of weight itself, just as there is no value of value or size of size. Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your conscious experience over some finite period of time? Information is not physically real. Formations are representations which inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not produced, it is presented. Well are there an infinite or finite number of formations in that presentation? There may be loosely finite ranges of experiences someone can have as that person, as a person in general, as an animal, organism, part of Earth, body, etc but it is self-diagonalizing so probably infinite overall. Until people invented rockets, seeing the Earth from space wasn't within the range of possible experiences. Now the possible experiences of everyone on Earth include seeing pictures from the surface of Mars, or Hubble pictures of a fantastic number of places. Would you agree that there is a digital audio quality high enough that no human can distinguish it from the original analog one, Yes, but that doesn't mean that there is any recording of high enough quality that no human can distinguish if from a live performance in person. When we can use all of our senses, and can walk up to the guitar player and shake his hand, then we can tell that it isn't a recording. and that there is a visual resolution and number of colors per pixel high enough that no human could distinguish the display from an actual scene? Same thing. We don't just see with our eyes. What do you make of this guy? http://www.odditycentral.com/pics/the-paintings-of-a-congenitally-blind-man.html If so, there is a large but finite number of 1 minute songs that can be experienced by a human, and there is large but finite number of images a person can see. Therefore, in a universe that is infinite there is bound to be replication of the same experiences. This may not duplicate an experience, which some have argued is a but it does mean there can be multiple instances of the same experience. If we look at an ambiguous image, we can see two different images through the same matrix of pixels. If you stare at photos you can see simulacrum there. The matrix of pixels is only a conduit for us to receive and project image. The image is more than what we assume. Arnold Zuboff writes: Let us compare the logic of experience to the logic of something like a novel. A novel might be called a 'detailed type', of which there are 'tokens', which are its copies. For example, on a shelf in a bookshop there might be two copies of but a single novel, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Just as this would be only one novel, this would
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even with advanced scientific methods. Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience not be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have to be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event from eternity. If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is something other than a physical basis to the experience. This something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been repeated 100%. The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered experiences and string them together as similar enough to be considered identical. This is equivalent to saying it is magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something else does not change the facts. I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so you strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to is either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or Significance - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing else, and I claim nothing else. Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, No, they are physical, but they are private. but the conventional view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed. This would by definition be something magical, like a soul. Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a belief in a magical non-physical never-never land in which our private experience takes place. Once you realize that the conventional view is impossible, then you can begin to look for more realistic alternatives based on the concrete reality of experience rather than the abstract theory based on measuring interactions of public bodies. I say that every presence is physical. Thoughts, feelings, dreams, symbols - all physical, all physics. The relevant distinction within physics should be private time vs public space, not real vs illusion. Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant. There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be replicated. Except that it happened already and will never happen again - just like every experience. If experience is caused by the brain and the brain is reproduced exactly then the experience will be reproduced exactly. Experience isn't caused by the brain, any more than the internet is caused by your computer. Reproducing your computer from 2000 won't resurrect Napster of 2000. Nothing, and I mean nothing at all has ever been reproduced exactly. In fact, in several models of cosmology it *is* duplicated. Even if there is only one universe but it is infinite in extent, given a large enough volume there is bound to be an exact copy of anything you care to name. You're not seeing that it begs the question though. No matter what I say, you won't be able to imagine that the universe could be fundamentally experiences rather than objects. The whole notion of 'copies' or 'exact' is based purely on sensitivity. If you have cataracts, it becomes harder to tell people apart and the Jack of Diamonds looks like an exact copy of the Queen of Hearts. If you factor out sensation from the start, everything that comes afterward is misconception. Bruno thinks the universe is fundamentally experiences but his view is consistent with science, eg. a close enough copy of an object will behave like the original, even if neither the copy nor the original have a basic physical existence. Behave like
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even with advanced scientific methods. Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience not be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have to be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event from eternity. If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is something other than a physical basis to the experience. This something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been repeated 100%. Do you have any theory that explains sensation? Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to make cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other conceptual sensations (thoughts). Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your conscious experience over some finite period of time? Information is not physically real. Formations are representations which inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not produced, it is presented. If not, then it seems plausible that whatever information needs to go into creating some sensory experience can be duplicated. If it is non infinite then the pigeon hole principle applies ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeonhole_principle ). Sensory experience is not created by information, information is a consequence of sensory experience and conceptual-level motives. Sensory experience is private physics. Information is a conceptual abstraction of sensory experience, so that while our thoughts about information are physical events, the bits and bytes to which they refer are not physically real. Craig Jason The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered experiences and string them together as similar enough to be considered identical. This is equivalent to saying it is magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something else does not change the facts. I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so you strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to is either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or Significance - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing else, and I claim nothing else. Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, No, they are physical, but they are private. but the conventional view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed. This would by definition be something magical, like a soul. Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a belief in a magical non-physical never-never land in which our private experience takes place. Once you realize that the conventional view is impossible, then you can begin to look for more realistic alternatives based on the concrete reality of experience rather than the abstract theory based on measuring interactions of public bodies. I say that every presence is physical. Thoughts, feelings, dreams, symbols - all physical, all physics. The relevant distinction within physics should be private time vs public space, not real vs illusion. Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant. There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be replicated. Except that it happened already and will never happen again - just like every experience. If experience is caused by the brain and the brain
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Feb 16, 2013, at 5:27 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even with advanced scientific methods. Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience not be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have to be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event from eternity. If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is something other than a physical basis to the experience. This something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been repeated 100%. Do you have any theory that explains sensation? Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to make cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other conceptual sensations (thoughts). In other words, you are saying there can be no explanation? Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your conscious experience over some finite period of time? Information is not physically real. Formations are representations which inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not produced, it is presented. Well are there an infinite or finite number of formations in that presentation? Jason If not, then it seems plausible that whatever information needs to go into creating some sensory experience can be duplicated. If it is non infinite then the pigeon hole principle applies ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeonhole_principle ). Sensory experience is not created by information, information is a consequence of sensory experience and conceptual-level motives. Sensory experience is private physics. Information is a conceptual abstraction of sensory experience, so that while our thoughts about information are physical events, the bits and bytes to which they refer are not physically real. Craig Jason The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered experiences and string them together as similar enough to be considered identical. This is equivalent to saying it is magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something else does not change the facts. I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so you strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to is either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or Significance - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing else, and I claim nothing else. Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, No, they are physical, but they are private. but the conventional view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed. This would by definition be something magical, like a soul. Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a belief in a magical non-physical never-never land in which our private experience takes place. Once you realize that the conventional view is impossible, then you can begin to look for more realistic alternatives based on the concrete reality of experience rather than the abstract theory based on measuring interactions of public bodies. I say that every presence is physical. Thoughts, feelings, dreams, symbols - all physical, all physics. The relevant distinction within physics should be private time vs public space, not real vs illusion. Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant. There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be replicated. Except that it
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Sun, Feb 17, 2013 at 6:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is something other than a physical basis to the experience. This something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back yard, etc. If I say No moment can be repeated again, nothing as been repeated 100%. The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered experiences and string them together as similar enough to be considered identical. If I tell you to make a copy of my copper bar which is 100mm x 100mm x10mm with a tolerance of 0.5mm at 25 degrees Celsius would you complain that you can't do it because the idea of repeating something is subjective? I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so you strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to is either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or Significance - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing else, and I claim nothing else. Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, No, they are physical, but they are private. but the conventional view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed. This would by definition be something magical, like a soul. Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a belief in a magical non-physical never-never land in which our private experience takes place. Once you realize that the conventional view is impossible, then you can begin to look for more realistic alternatives based on the concrete reality of experience rather than the abstract theory based on measuring interactions of public bodies. I say that every presence is physical. Thoughts, feelings, dreams, symbols - all physical, all physics. The relevant distinction within physics should be private time vs public space, not real vs illusion. You can't make an immaterial soul part of physics simply by defining it as such. You say that it is impossible to duplicate a mind by duplicating the body, so the mind must not be supervenient on physical properties. If experience is caused by the brain and the brain is reproduced exactly then the experience will be reproduced exactly. Experience isn't caused by the brain, any more than the internet is caused by your computer. Reproducing your computer from 2000 won't resurrect Napster of 2000. Nothing, and I mean nothing at all has ever been reproduced exactly. Perhaps you could explain what you mean by reproduce exactly. Obviously reproducing your computer from 2000 would not reproduce Napster, but reproducing the entire system of computers and users would. And in any case, we don't want to reproduce the Internet of 2000, just the computer from 2000 that will behave the same as the original computer given the same inputs, which is not very difficult to do at all. Bruno thinks the universe is fundamentally experiences but his view is consistent with science, eg. a close enough copy of an object will behave like the original, even if neither the copy nor the original have a basic physical existence. Behave like the original to whom? There is no way to copy water without it being water. If I pour sulfuric acid from a pitcher into a water glass, I might be able to fool someone into thinking that this clear liquid is a perfect copy, but the smell and the severe chemical burns will reveal that the copy is actually very different in many other ways. Plants know it, even inorganic matter will not be fooled. It's only in the visual sense that the two liquids seem equivalent. You've never acknowledged that you understand the concept a good enough copy. All biological components have a certain engineering tolerance, for if *exact* replacements were required when parts wore out no living thing could survive more than a few moments. Of course they will know where they live and how to communicate with each other. The reason you know where you live and how to communicate is that your brain today is a close copy of your brain yesterday. No, that's the same pre-affirmation you are smuggling in. If you can't let go of the certainty that the public shapes of the brain define experience, then you won't ever locate experience at all. Our brain is necessary but not sufficient to explain human quality of consciousness, just as a TV set is necessary but not sufficient to explain Spongebob Squarepants. We aren't inside our brain, we are inside our lifetime. Every part of the
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 14 Feb 2013, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2013 3:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly). To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way. That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no 'person'. Not at all. Both the Bp p, and the UDA-personal-diary definitions relates the first person to a machine in a position of having those experiences, locally. Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally by our local experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to others locally, and so there are locally genuine different persons. There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal bodies and context which relates those experiences, through their self-referential logical and arithmetical (computational) relations. Aren't those relations the ones provided by physics - continuity of bodies, etc. So are you agreeing with my idea that a physical world in necessary for conscious beings to exist IN. Yes, indeed. At least in the form of long/deep computations, having the correct first person sharable indeterminacy measure. That's why physics is necessary indeed, so much that it has to be extracted from arithmetic when we assume comp. That's why also we can accept the postulation of a physical world, or of a God, as an explanation. You might disagree as necessary in natural language can be ambiguous. In logic, if P is necessary in some context, it means that it is derivable from the context, but sometimes it can mean that we have to postulate it (which is the opposite). But with necessary in the logical sense, it makes sense with computationalism and its consequences. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even with advanced scientific methods. Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience not be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have to be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event from eternity. If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is something other than a physical basis to the experience. This something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. This is equivalent to saying it is magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something else does not change the facts. I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so you strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to is either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or Significance - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing else, and I claim nothing else. Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, but the conventional view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed. This would by definition be something magical, like a soul. Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant. There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be replicated. Except that it happened already and will never happen again - just like every experience. If experience is caused by the brain and the brain is reproduced exactly then the experience will be reproduced exactly. In fact, in several models of cosmology it *is* duplicated. Even if there is only one universe but it is infinite in extent, given a large enough volume there is bound to be an exact copy of anything you care to name. You're not seeing that it begs the question though. No matter what I say, you won't be able to imagine that the universe could be fundamentally experiences rather than objects. The whole notion of 'copies' or 'exact' is based purely on sensitivity. If you have cataracts, it becomes harder to tell people apart and the Jack of Diamonds looks like an exact copy of the Queen of Hearts. If you factor out sensation from the start, everything that comes afterward is misconception. Bruno thinks the universe is fundamentally experiences but his view is consistent with science, eg. a close enough copy of an object will behave like the original, even if neither the copy nor the original have a basic physical existence. So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science, If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical twin - my guess is probably a dead one. If it's dead then you would have made some mistake in the duplication. No, your assumption of duplication is not necessarily possible. If you clone everyone in New York City, and drop them into a model you have built of New York, they aren't suddenly going to know where they live and how to communicate with each other. You are assuming that particles are disconnected generic entities which have no past of future. I am saying that precisely the opposite is also true. Of course they will know where they live and how to communicate with each other. The reason you know where you live and how to communicate is that your brain today is a close copy of your brain yesterday. If something goes wrong in the copying process, like a head injury, you might forget how to do these things. Cells and cell components are constantly being replaced yet you survive. Therefore, it is possible to make a copy of you using inanimate matter; for that is in fact what you are. Because you aren't cells, you are the experiences of cells, molecules, organs, people, civilizations. The cells are like the fuel which experience burns. Copying is an intersubjective relation. It just means that in our particular state of mind two things seem identical. But if you copy the cells you reproduce the experience, and if you don't then something is missing. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly). To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way. That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no 'person'. Not at all. Both the Bp p, and the UDA-personal-diary definitions relates the first person to a machine in a position of having those experiences, locally. Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally by our local experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to others locally, and so there are locally genuine different persons. There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal bodies and context which relates those experiences, through their self- referential logical and arithmetical (computational) relations. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/14/2013 3:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly). To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way. That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no 'person'. Not at all. Both the Bp p, and the UDA-personal-diary definitions relates the first person to a machine in a position of having those experiences, locally. Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally by our local experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to others locally, and so there are locally genuine different persons. There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal bodies and context which relates those experiences, through their self-referential logical and arithmetical (computational) relations. Aren't those relations the ones provided by physics - continuity of bodies, etc. So are you agreeing with my idea that a physical world in necessary for conscious beings to exist IN. Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2899 / Virus Database: 2639/6103 - Release Date: 02/14/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 4:45 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious being made up of only a few atoms? Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather atoms exist in the experience of beings. Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even with advanced scientific methods. This is equivalent to saying it is magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something else does not change the facts. Sometimes the objection is raised that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you. Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant. There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be replicated. In fact, in several models of cosmology it *is* duplicated. Even if there is only one universe but it is infinite in extent, given a large enough volume there is bound to be an exact copy of anything you care to name. So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science, If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical twin - my guess is probably a dead one. If it's dead then you would have made some mistake in the duplication. If you haven't made a mistake and it's still dead then there is magic involved, which science will not be able to fathom no matter how advanced. and why you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to day, Because the cells of the body exist within experiences, not the other way around. We aren't spirits or bodies, we are lifetimes. having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the course of months with the matter in the food he eats. It's like saying the cars on a freeway are replaced constantly so it is no longer a freeway. What makes the traffic is the participation of drivers who employ vehicles to take them places. Understanding the phenomenon as just a statistical pattern of positions and frequencies, or of objects in a spatial relation are both interesting and useful, but without the underlying sensory-motive grounding, it's ultimately meaningless to the big picture. Cells and cell components are constantly being replaced yet you survive. Therefore, it is possible to make a copy of you using inanimate matter; for that is in fact what you are. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience pain but then forget it. OK, same answer (assuming comp). If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the theory of mind that we might propose. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 13 Feb 2013, at 06:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. Yes 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only look at the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that, it would not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms to be experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be shaped like you according to an electron microscope does not make them you. 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in the universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased absolutely, because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that extend out to eternity. I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our naive realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to consciousness. Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is mandated by physics to be universal and uniform. What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious being made up of only a few atoms? Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather atoms exist in the experience of beings. But that's a consequence of the fact that we might be 3p-duplicable. Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly). To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way. Bruno Sometimes the objection is raised that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you. Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant. So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science, If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical twin - my guess is probably a dead one. and why you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to day, Because the cells of the body exist within experiences, not the other way around. We aren't spirits or bodies, we are lifetimes. having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the course of months with the matter in the food he eats. It's like saying the cars on a freeway are replaced constantly so it is no longer a freeway. What makes the traffic is the participation of drivers who employ vehicles to take them places. Understanding the phenomenon as just a statistical pattern of positions and frequencies, or of objects in a spatial relation are both interesting and useful, but without the underlying sensory-motive grounding, it's ultimately meaningless to the big picture. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/13/2013 10:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 06:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. Yes 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only look at the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that, it would not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms to be experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be shaped like you according to an electron microscope does not make them you. 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in the universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased absolutely, because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that extend out to eternity. I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our naive realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to consciousness. Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is mandated by physics to be universal and uniform. What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious being made up of only a few atoms? Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather atoms exist in the experience of beings. Dear Bruno, I have some questions but they are not well-formed, my apologies. I hope you can make some sense of them. I agree generally that atoms exist in the experience of beings only. We (the in the plural sense) happen to be able to agree on the locations and other properties of objects within our individual 1p. But that's a consequence of the fact that we might be 3p-duplicable. If we are 3p-duplicatable then how do we obtain the non-clonability of quantum states? Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. Could it be that the 3p-duplicatability is possible but global 1p correlations of these is not possible, thus obtaining the no cloning of QM? An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. Does this follow from the uniqueness of a fixed point (for a given group of transformations on a closed (or semi-closed) collection? It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. So would relate them to each other? Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly). To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way. It seems to me that you are assuming a special observer that can distinguish all 3p-persons from each other. In my thinking this is cheating. Bruno Sometimes the objection is raised that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you. Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant. So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science, If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical twin - my guess is probably a dead one. and why you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to day, Because the cells of the body exist within
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 13 Feb 2013, at 16:25, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience pain but then forget it. OK, same answer (assuming comp). With comp are the probabilities the same? For instance, would there be a 50% chance of experiencing the torture when duplicated vs. 100% in the case of the memory wipe? It is counter-intuitive, but if the memory wipe is perfect, the relative probabilities, evaluated before the experiment, should be the same. If a future memory wipe is done perfectly, it is analogous to a reconstitution of a past (3p) state in the future, and before that first state occurence, you have a probability non null to find yourself in the future. It is not clear if such a perfect memory wipe is possible in practice though. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
Bruno, Thanks for your response. I think I understand now. Jason On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 16:25, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience pain but then forget it. OK, same answer (assuming comp). With comp are the probabilities the same? For instance, would there be a 50% chance of experiencing the torture when duplicated vs. 100% in the case of the memory wipe? It is counter-intuitive, but if the memory wipe is perfect, the relative probabilities, evaluated before the experiment, should be the same. If a future memory wipe is done perfectly, it is analogous to a reconstitution of a past (3p) state in the future, and before that first state occurence, you have a probability non null to find yourself in the future. It is not clear if such a perfect memory wipe is possible in practice though. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
Hi Stephen, On 13 Feb 2013, at 16:53, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2013 10:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 06:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. Yes 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only look at the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that, it would not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms to be experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be shaped like you according to an electron microscope does not make them you. 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in the universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased absolutely, because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that extend out to eternity. I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our naive realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to consciousness. Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is mandated by physics to be universal and uniform. What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious being made up of only a few atoms? Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather atoms exist in the experience of beings. Dear Bruno, I have some questions but they are not well-formed, my apologies. I hope you can make some sense of them. I agree generally that atoms exist in the experience of beings only. We (the in the plural sense) happen to be able to agree on the locations and other properties of objects within our individual 1p. OK, as they will be shared in the plural we. But that's a consequence of the fact that we might be 3p-duplicable. If we are 3p-duplicatable then how do we obtain the non- clonability of quantum states? Because below our substitution level, matter is (re)-defined by all computations going through our state, so the matter which constitute our local material brain cannot be duplicated. It involves the infinite sum on the whole UD*. Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences canliterally be. I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. Could it be that the 3p-duplicatability is possible but global 1p correlations of these is not possible, Hmm... we need the 1p correlations to trust the doctor, and introduce them, by chance perhaps, when betting on the correct level, or below. thus obtaining the no cloning of QM? An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. Does this follow from the uniqueness of a fixed point (for a given group of transformations on a closed (or semi-closed) collection? You can get it intuitively. Even John Clark agrees that two absolutely identical computations, in case they support a mind, will support a unique mind. That's why in fine a mind is associated with all computations going through the states, and UDA makes matter redefined by the 1p relative measure. It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. So would relate them to each other? The density of the sharable computations would relate them to each other, with some high normal probability. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self- body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly). To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way. It seems to me that you are assuming a special observer that can distinguish all 3p-persons from each other. In my thinking this is cheating. To just enunciate comp we have to agree on the (sigma_1, tiny part of) arithmetic, which gives the whole set of possible 3p relations from which the dreams emerges and cohere (or not). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 3:58:31 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 4:45 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious being made up of only a few atoms? Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather atoms exist in the experience of beings. Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even with advanced scientific methods. Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience not be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have to be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event from eternity. This is equivalent to saying it is magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something else does not change the facts. I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so you strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to is either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or Significance - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing else, and I claim nothing else. Sometimes the objection is raised that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you. Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant. There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be replicated. Except that it happened already and will never happen again - just like every experience. In fact, in several models of cosmology it *is* duplicated. Even if there is only one universe but it is infinite in extent, given a large enough volume there is bound to be an exact copy of anything you care to name. You're not seeing that it begs the question though. No matter what I say, you won't be able to imagine that the universe could be fundamentally experiences rather than objects. The whole notion of 'copies' or 'exact' is based purely on sensitivity. If you have cataracts, it becomes harder to tell people apart and the Jack of Diamonds looks like an exact copy of the Queen of Hearts. If you factor out sensation from the start, everything that comes afterward is misconception. So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science, If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical twin - my guess is probably a dead one. If it's dead then you would have made some mistake in the duplication. No, your assumption of duplication is not necessarily possible. If you clone everyone in New York City, and drop them into a model you have built of New York, they aren't suddenly going to know where they live and how to communicate with each other. You are assuming that particles are disconnected generic entities which have no past of future. I am saying that precisely the opposite is also true. If you haven't made a mistake and it's still dead then there is magic involved, which science will not be able to fathom no matter how advanced. If it's not white, it must be blacker than black! There must be consequences for heretic thoughts! This kind of Manichean compulsion has generally been a hindrance to science. and why you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to day, Because the cells of the body exist within experiences, not the other way around. We aren't spirits or bodies, we are lifetimes. having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the course of months with the matter in the food he eats. It's like saying the cars on a freeway are replaced constantly so it is no longer a freeway. What makes the traffic is the
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly). To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way. That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no 'person'. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/13/2013 2:36 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly). To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way. That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no 'person'. Brent Hi Brent, Yes, but that is true only for the computable portion of any 1p view. The person' itself is not computable, but it related to an intersection of an infinite number of computations (if I get Bruno's idea correctly). -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
The duplicators and the restorers
Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. Thank you. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. Yes 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only look at the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that, it would not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms to be experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be shaped like you according to an electron microscope does not make them you. 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in the universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased absolutely, because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that extend out to eternity. I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our naive realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to consciousness. Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is mandated by physics to be universal and uniform. Craig On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 7:58:49 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. Thank you. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. Yes 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only look at the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that, it would not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms to be experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be shaped like you according to an electron microscope does not make them you. 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in the universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased absolutely, because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that extend out to eternity. I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our naive realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to consciousness. Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is mandated by physics to be universal and uniform. What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious being made up of only a few atoms? Sometimes the objection is raised that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you. So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science, and why you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to day, having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the course of months with the matter in the food he eats. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Consider the following thought experiment, called The Duplicators: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These aliens possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to scan and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they call you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called The Restorers: At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens with the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting test after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture and all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, you are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them What about the pain experiments? and they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans call torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You consider this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate rather than you. My questions for the list: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you would prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience pain but then forget it. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. Yes 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain. The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only look at the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that, it would not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms to be experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be shaped like you according to an electron microscope does not make them you. 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in the universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased absolutely, because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that extend out to eternity. I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our naive realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to consciousness. Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is mandated by physics to be universal and uniform. What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious being made up of only a few atoms? Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather atoms exist in the experience of beings. Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. Sometimes the objection is raised that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you. Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant. So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science, If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical twin - my guess is probably a dead one. and why you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to day, Because the cells of the body exist within experiences, not the other way around. We aren't spirits or bodies, we are lifetimes. having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the course of months with the matter in the food he eats. It's like saying the cars on a freeway are replaced constantly so it is no longer a freeway. What makes the traffic is the participation of drivers who employ vehicles to take them places. Understanding the phenomenon as just a statistical pattern of positions and frequencies, or of objects in a spatial relation are both interesting and useful, but without the underlying sensory-motive grounding, it's ultimately meaningless to the big picture. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.