[MD] Pirsig relation query

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Hey All,

So the other day while watching the Penn State - University of Minnesota 
football game, one of my friends said "Hey, there is a player on the Minnesota 
team named 'Pirsig', wonder if he's related to Robert Pirsig?". Of course, I 
immediately added that Robert Pirsig's family was from Minnesota, and Robert's 
father Maynard worked at the University of Minnesota. In addition to 'Pirsig' 
being an uncommon surname, having this student be so close geographically would 
seem to lend possibility to family relation.

The student, Jonah Pirsig, is from Blue Earth, Minnesota, not far to the south 
of Minneapolis, Born May 4, 1993, son of David and Kristin Pirsig. He is an 
education major. 

For those of you who have had some contact with the Pirsig family and/or 
friends, is there any family relation here at all? If Maynard had a brother, 
one of his grandchildren? Or is this just coincidence?

Arlo
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[MD] Punk Rock Existentialism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Hey All,

There is a fun, short article by Stuart Hanscomb in the current edition of 
Philosophy Now, "Existentialism as Punk Philosophy".
https://philosophynow.org/issues/115/Existentialism_as_Punk_Philosophy

Whether or not you'd agree, his statement "Hegel was the Prog Rock of 
philosophy" had me chuckling and wondering... 

If you were building this analogy, what genres of music and philosophy would 
you combine? Personally, I wonder if the 'angst' of existentialism would align 
it better with gothic or darkwave music? But, importantly, what would you align 
with the MOQ? (I'm leaning towards 'post-punk'.)

Arlo

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Re: [MD] When Philosophy Lost It's Way

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Craig]
The problem I see with this article is that it sees the issue as "either / or". 
Rather, Philosophy is done--and philosophers exist--both "in the world" and in 
the academy. Hugh Hefner promoted the "Playboy Philosophy" (which he saw as the 
good life) in the world. Others study Epicureanism in the academy.  Why not 
have both?

[Arlo]
I agree. I thought the article uncovers the same basic problem as Pirsig 
articulates, but fails to offer any substantive solution (as Pirsig attempts in 
ZMM).

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[MD] When Philosophy Lost It's Way

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Hey All,

Not sure if this op piece was mentioned before (I searched my email, didn't see 
any mention of the author so I am guessing not). This is from the New York 
Times "The Stone" series. "When Philosophy Lost It's Way" by Robert Frodeman 
and Adam Briggle from earlier this year (Jan 2016). 

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/when-philosophy-lost-its-way/

There are two main points in this article. Although Pirsig is not cited, its 
hard to imagine the authors are not drawing from ZMM (or Dewey's later works).

The first point is the "sterilization" of philosophy as a process of removing 
it from 'everyday lived experience'. "Philosophy, then, as the French thinker 
Bruno Latour would have it, was “purified” — separated from society in the 
process of modernization."

The second point is a "sterilization" of philosophy in the following way. 
"There is another layer to this story. The act of purification accompanying the 
creation of the modern research university was not just about differentiating 
realms of knowledge. It was also about divorcing knowledge from virtue. ... 
Knowing and being good were intimately linked."

The authors conclude, "The point of philosophy now is to be smart, not good. It 
has been the heart of our undoing."

I'm not presenting this short article as anything I expect any of you to find 
earth-shattering, this is ground that Pirsig (and others) exposed decades ago. 
But I thought, since appeared very recently in the NYT, it would be worth 
sharing.

Arlo

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Re: [MD] Two Minds

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
Right. Maybe it would help to point out that each level includes all the levels 
below it or prior to it. In other words, the intellect obviously requires a 
healthy brain and body but that's not enough because it also requires social 
level cognition too and so does not derive from biology directly. In the same 
way, social structures can't be directly derived from inorganic matter but you 
can't have life without those basic physical elements so that the social level 
requires both but emerges only after life has evolved enough to sustain it.

[Arlo]
Yes, for sure. 

[Austin]
So what makes the inorganic 'go', what it values are this forces of nature.  
Patterned forces are valued in such a way that enough patterns are produced by 
dynamic quality that biology can emerge.

[Arlo]
The key here is that Pirsig identified the 'bonding potential' of carbon atoms 
as the catalyzing agent from which biological patterns could emerge from the 
inorganic strata. I think this relationship, Dynamic Quality exploits 
'potentiality' that appears on each level from which a higher level can emerge, 
holds true for the appearance of each of the MOQ's levels. 

In 'The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition', Tomasello points to just such a 
catalyzing potentiality within the biological level from which social patterns 
are seen to emerge. (Note that I am not talking reductionism or determinism 
here, carbon atoms don't 'cause' biology, nor is all biology reducible to 
carbon atoms). For Tomasello, 'sociality' emerges when sufficiently complex 
neural wiring permitted the potential for 'shared attention'. That is, just as 
inorganic carbon's potential was the catalyst for the emergence of biology, 
biology's 'shared attention' was the catalyst for the emergence of sociality.

I've heard arguments that 'semiotic abstraction', which requires a certain 
level of symbolic/linguistic complexity, would be a good candidate for a social 
potentiality that served as the catalyst for the emergence of intellectuality. 
I.e., it would be from the potentiality of semiotic abstraction that 
intellectual patterns like 'scientific methodology' and 'reason' would emerge. 

This would give us a process model something like this:

Inorganic [carbon] -> Biological [shared attention] -> Social [semiotic 
abstraction] -> Intellectual

To restate, as Pirsig did with 'carbon', this seeks to find the potential 
within each level that is exploited by Dynamic forces and from which higher 
level patterns are able to emerge. 

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Re: [MD] Two Minds

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Austin]
I think that both the social and intellectual levels emerged out of the 
biological level.  The intellectual did emerge after the social and still holds 
moral authority over it and still has access to it, but it is more correct to 
say that it emerged from biology.

[Arlo]
This is a frequent lament from those schooled in the West. But you must know 
this upfront, this is NOT Pirsig's MOQ. The Inorganic-Biologic-Intellectual 
trajectory resurfaces from time to time, sometimes out of the 'anti-social, raw 
individualism' cowboy motif of American culture, and sometimes out of the 
West's inability to understand the social origins of cognition (those are not 
random words). 

This can be a long discussion, and if you're genuinely interested I'll bite and 
try to walk through this again. Before I do, I would encourage you to read some 
Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Tomasello, as these are three of the more translated 
philosopher/psychologists who agree with Pirsig that 'intellect' is a product 
of social origins. 

Wherever you end up, understand though that a KEY point to the MOQ is that 
intellect does NOT derive from biology. It can be a difficult point to grasp, 
but it's critical to understanding Pirsig. Here are two more popular works to 
get you started.

The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition: Michael Tomasello 
(http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674005822)

Voices of the Mind: James Wertsch 
(https://books.google.com/books?id=9EtTuaPMtjAC=frontcover=voices+of+the+mind+wertsch=en=X=0CCYQ6AEwAGoVChMI8b6rwbj9yAIVBlcmCh1zpAj0#v=onepage=voices%20of%20the%20mind%20wertsch=false)
 this book overviews bothg Vygotsky and Bakhtin


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[MD] IJMS Articles

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Hi All,

I can't recall if this has been shared before. I searched my archives and don't 
see mention of it, but my apologies if this duplicates another share.

The April 2014 issue of the International Journal of Motorcycle Studies was 
devoted to articles reflecting on Pirsig's ZMM. There are a total of seven 
articles, some are not massive in length, but I found them all to be enjoyable, 
if not somewhat nostalgic. I feel compelled to say upfront, this is not a 
philosophical publication, it's self-described goal is to examine "motorcycle 
culture", so consider it more cultural anthropology than strict philosophy. 

The IJMS website is here: http://motorcyclestudies.org/

The April 2014 issue is available online here: https://doaj.org/toc/1931-275X

Or you can use these links (from that page) to navigate to individual articles.

Absolutely Nothing, Next 22 Miles . . . A Fugue for Motorcycle: An 
Interpretation
Miguel Grunstein
http://ijms.nova.edu/Spring2014/IJMS_Artcl.Grunstein.html

Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and the Art of Philosophical Fiction
Craig Bourne, Emily Caddick Bourne
http://ijms.nova.edu/Fall2014/IJMS_Rndtble.BourneCaddickBourne.html

Drinking (just a little) on the Fault Line
Barry Coleman
http://ijms.nova.edu/Fall2014/IJMS_Rndtble.Coleman.html

Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and the Art of Shelf-Life Maintenance
Andreas Schroder
http://ijms.nova.edu/Fall2014/IJMS_Rndtble.Schroder.html

Reflections on Philosophy and Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
Graham Priest
http://ijms.nova.edu/Fall2014/IJMS_Rndtble.Priest.html

Introduction: Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values 
by Robert Pirsig: A Retrospective Roundtable, Forty Years Down the Road 
Thomas Goodmann
http://ijms.nova.edu/Fall2014/IJMS_Rndtble.Goodmann.html

Less Zen and More Art of Motorcycle Maintenance 
Christian Pierce
http://ijms.nova.edu/Fall2014/IJMS_Rndtble.Pierce. html
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Re: [MD] Living MOQ practically

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Greetings to both Albert and Emily...

[Albert]
I am a recent college graduate of the sciences and humanities...

[Arlo]
An interdisciplinary field? Did you feel as if Pirsig's (via Northrop's) 
distinction of classical (sciences) and romantic (humanities) captured your 
academic experience. (*I realize much in the humanities have largely tried to 
shape themselves as scientific, so I am using this loosely.)

[Albert]
Yet, I still have a very hard time living in line with ZMM. It is a very loose 
concept and hard to make practical.

[Arlo]
My experience is that its often cultural norms that can make it difficult to 
apply the sort of artistry-practice to our everyday activities. In fact, I'd 
argue that a lot of the suggestions in ZMM emerge as contrary to the cultural 
expectations around us. So 'living in line with ZMM' involves almost by 
definition a sort of tension with modern western culture. As John replied, 
there is no 1-2-3 recipe to this, but my advice is to start small, turn one of 
your daily activities into an 'art', this may take time but it will start to 
radiate out into other practices as well. For example, one night a week you 
could approach your evening meal preparation as an art. Don't rush through it, 
enjoy all aspects of it, take the time to make cuts artistically. Feel out each 
step, savor every moment. Don't watch the clock and don't feel the need to 
follow a recipe exactly, mess around with it, let your feelings guide how much 
of this to use, or whether or not to use that. The goal is not som
 e prescripted meal, but the experience of artistic engagement. Whatever you 
do, start with something you do unartistically and start making it something 
you do artistically. Find that one brick, and soon you'll be writing a novel. 
:-)

[Emily]
Former Cognitive Psychology / Psycholinguistics Major in two of the U.C. 
"churches of higher learning".

[Arlo]
Interesting. In a previous position I worked closely with the applied 
linguistics department. But it was clear there was tension between those doing 
socio-cultural linguistics and those doing psycholinguistics. I have a good 
friend who worked with Leo van Leer at the monterey institute of international 
studies (now the middlebury institute at monterey) for several years. 

[Emily]
Another good read on philosophy is "The Power of Now" and other works of 
non-fiction by Eckart Tolle. It's not MOQ, but just an interesting perspective.

[Arlo]
There have been other participants over the years that admire Tolle's work and 
see in it a connection to Pirsig. I am not personally familiar enough with his 
writing to say one way or another, but that's why we are here, to share and to 
talk about these things. 

Again, welcome to both of you.

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Re: [MD] Fwd: ACLA 2016: "Poetry as Practice, Practice as Poetry"

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ron]
ORPHEUS with his lute made trees 
And the mountain tops that freeze 
   Bow themselves when he did sing:

[Arlo]
Hi Ron, good to hear from you. Someone once told me that words are musical 
notes, and we either create cacophony or euphony (I tend to use 'symphony' now 
when I share the analogy, as it better underscores the shared voices of our 
being). Poetry in this way of thinking is the art of tuning one's words towards 
euphony, sculpting away the excess and leaving the beautiful. When our words 
flow, note after note, we mirror in language the skill of the welder in ZMM.

"He sparks the torch, and sets a tiny little blue flame and then, it's hard to 
describe, actually dances the torch and the rod in separate little rhythms over 
the thin sheet metal, the whole spot a uniform luminous orange-yellow, dropping 
the torch and filler rod down at the exact right moment and then removing them. 
No holes. You can hardly see the weld. "That's beautiful," I say."

So, to me, in the end, poetry is simply a way of being artful, and caring in 
our expressions. And the more we practice that, the more it becomes habit, the 
more it spreads into other practices. Whether we are putting paint onto a 
canvas, musical scoring onto paper, or words into an utterance. 
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Re: [MD] Fwd: ACLA 2016: "Poetry as Practice, Practice as Poetry"

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
Second, poetry is different from painting, music and sculpting in that it 
requires a higher-order brain to comprehend.

[Arlo]
First, are you suggesting that "painting, music and sculpting" does not require 
a higher-order brain to comprehend? Does this suggest that, say, a cat can 
comprehend Beethoven's Ninth? But you are completely wrong here, John, all of 
these are semiotic systems, whether markings on a page or brushstrokes on a 
canvas or sound waves in the air or vocal utterances on a stage. Poetry is one 
form of high-quality endeavor, and like other forms of high-quality endeavor it 
can leverage opportunities for dynamic emergence. 

Perhaps you can criticize this seminar for focusing specifically on poetics 
(over other forms of artistic semiosis), but 

[John]
Anybody can hear music, or see a painting or feel a sculpture, and have a good 
sense of what they are - empirically speaking.

[Arlo]
Well "anybody" seems to refer to humans, so I'd imagine what you mean here are 
humans without higher-order brains (possible due to traumatic injury?). It's 
true, iconographic semiosis can appear, on some levels, to be more 
trans-cultural, but this is mostly illusion, a projection of your cultural 
assumptions onto a artifact with no regard for the intentions or meaning 
ascribed to it from within its own culture. But indeed, as we move from 
iconographic semiosis towards more symbolic semiosis (e.g. from a 'picture of a 
building' to the word "BUILDING"), the argument is that the MEANING has greater 
potential for complexity. By your argument, then, poetics is a more advanced, 
and thus better 'meaning bearer', than painting or music. And, as such, poetics 
SHOULD be the something that better represents the intricate aesthetic practice 
of human experience.

[John]
But poetry depends upon linguistic and cultural interpretations that can be 
different for different listeners.

[Arlo]
I dare you to make your way to the heart of Australia, sit with an Aboriginal 
tribe, listen to one of them play the didgeridoo, and tell me you this form of 
semiosis requires no 'linguistic and cultural interpretation' for you to 
understand its meaning. But, certainly, all semiosis rests on a foundation of 
interpretation, there is never some 'pure' transmission of meaning that occurs 
without enconding-interpretation. It's just that the more shared the 
socio-cultural context, the more common are the interpretations. 

[Arlo previously]
Or... we could call Hollywood's output "cinema" and have a separate dialogue 
about the way the art of cinema (like any "art", including "poetry") can 
introduce dynamic elements into static dialogues.

[John]
that sounds like a better way of putting it and a better discussion to have.  I 
definitely agree that cinema with its use of music, image and words can have a 
more powerful affect than even the best poetry. 

[Arlo]
Maybe, at times, but cinema has a measure of temporal engagement that may be 
less emphatic in other forms of semiosis. While one can (and I have) stood in 
front a painting for hours, the 'effect' of cinema can build off hour long 
engagements that an image may, in isolation, appear to lack. Of course, 
literature parallels cinema in this regard, a good book can engage a reader for 
days, if not hours, or even longer. One poem in isolation may not lend itself 
to this as readily.

But, I think you've must have had a very impoverished exposure to poetry over 
the years, John, as I can think of several poems that, in a few short lines, 
altered the way I see the world, changed the way I look at things, and in the 
end made me a better person. 

[John]
All poetry is practice.  Not all practice is poetic.

[Arlo]
I don't think this call for abstracts would disagree. Indeed, I think the point 
was to reframe the dialogue (in parallel to the reframing in ZMM) to get people 
to 'see' that practice is not divorced from poetics, to reflect Pirsig's term, 
that practice is aesthetic. 

[John]
I'm more concerned that you're wasting YOUR time, Arlo. 

[Arlo]
Yes, many days I read the MD and think the same thing. Which is one reason I 
spend my time now mostly in other discourse communities. But, from time to 
time, I guess I fall prey to that old naivety.

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Re: [MD] Fwd: ACLA 2016: "Poetry as Practice, Practice as Poetry"

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
Well thanks, I guess.  Altho "poetry' is a category fraught with opportunity 
for misinterpretation...

[Arlo]
How is this 'criticism' any different than painting? Or music? Or sculpting?

[John]
You could call hollywood's ouput "poetry" I suppose, and thus illuminate the 
way in which new ideas influence social patterns.

[Arlo]
Or... we could call Hollywood's output "cinema" and have a separate dialogue 
about the way the art of cinema (like any "art", including "poetry") can 
introduce dynamic elements into static dialogues.

[John]
But who talks like that? Certainly not "us" and certainly not them.

[Arlo]
It baffles me that this brief call for abstracts hits you as 'them' speaking in 
some manner different than 'us'. Does the author of the call below use Pirsig's 
terms? Or course not. But I certainly feel like I 'talk' more like 'them' than 
whatever your conflation of 'us' would imply.

To note, the idea of "aesthetic exercise", as introduced below, really seems 
aligned with Dewey's notion of "art as experience". Indeed, when they put forth 
"a broad conception of 'practice,' both spiritual and aesthetic", I can't help 
but think this expansion of 'practice' is identical to the thesis in ZMM. 

[John]
So I'm not sure whom you are addressing, but I do appreciate the effort.

[Arlo]
My assumption is that most people here are interested in discourses that 
circle, overlap, parallel, or dance with the specific ideas put forth by 
Pirsig. If a philosophical discourse on the poetics of lived experience doesn't 
interest you, John, I apologize for wasting your time.


>
> "Poetry as Practice, Practice as Poetry"
>
> The philosopher Pierre Hadot worked throughout his career to locate poetry,
> particularly Goethe’s, within forms of “spiritual exercise” grounded in
> western philosophical and religious traditions. For Hadot, spiritual
> exercises (or practices) are forms of thinking, meditation, or dialogue that
> “have as their goal the transformation of our vision of the world and the
> metamorphosis of our being.” While Hadot’s thought on spiritual practice
> found its widest audience through Foucault’s work on “care of the self,” it
> has recently resurfaced in Gabriel Trop’s Poetry as a Way of Life (2015),
> whose title echoes that of the 1995 English translation of Hadot’s
> Philosophy as a Way of Life (quoted above). Drawing on Hadot and Foucault,
> Trop argues that the reading and writing of poetry can be understood as
> “aesthetic exercise,” a form of practice involving "sensually oriented
> activity in the world attempts to form, influence, perturb or otherwise
> generate patterns of thought, perception, or action.” Though Trop is careful
> to distinguish his ideas from Hadot and Foucault, we might argue that poetry
> allows the aesthetic or spiritual practitioner to “struggl[e] against the
> ‘government of individualization’” (Foucault, 1982) and to enact “a way of
> being, a way of coping within, reacting to, and acting upon the world”
> (Trop, 2015).
>
> Our seminar takes as its starting point a broad conception of “practice,”
> both spiritual and aesthetic. We seek proposals that consider poetries and
> ways of reading as forms of practice or that challenge the premise
> altogether. Some questions that might be considered:
>
> • Trop suggests that religious poetries (e.g., Greek tragedy, the Divina
> Commedia) are conducive to “aesthetic exercise.” In what ways do poets and
> readers within religious/meditative traditions enact disciplines/practices
> of the self?
> • Poets associated with avant-garde movements often make strong claims about
> the urgency of their poetics. In what ways can “poetry as practice” help us
> understand their reading and writing practices? Can non- or even
> anti-avant-garde poetries be understood in similar terms?
> • How might the notion of poetry as a “way of life” help us understand
> contemporary lyric poetry?
> • Trop argues that late 18th century German poets, including Novalis and
> Holderlin, used their poetic practice to constitute themselves as
> non-normative subjects. What other times/places/poets might we see as
> concerned with poetry as a form of self-constitution?
> • George Oppen suggests that “part of the function of poetry is to serve as
> a test of truth.” In what ways can Oppen’s poetics, or those of similarly
> engaged poets, be understood as enabling spiritual or aesthetic exercise?
> • How might the concept of spiritual/aesthetic practice contribute to
> current debates about the relevance of poetry to the
> social/economic/environmental justice movements?
>
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[MD] Fwd: ACLA 2016: "Poetry as Practice, Practice as Poetry"

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Hi All,

A call for abstracts under the category "Poetry as Practice, Practice as 
Poetry" came through the Foucault mailing list for the American Comparative 
Literature Association's Annual Meeting, 17-20 March, 2016, Harvard University. 
I did find the premise of this endeavor very interesting, and am forwarding on 
the general description and reasoning behind this. 

Arlo

- Forwarded Message -
From: "ROBERT.FARRELL" 
To: foucaul...@foucault.info
Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2015 9:17:38 AM
Subject: [Foucault-L] CFP: ACLA 2016: "Poetry as Practice,Practice as 
Poetry"


"Poetry as Practice, Practice as Poetry"

The philosopher Pierre Hadot worked throughout his career to locate poetry, 
particularly Goethe’s, within forms of “spiritual exercise” grounded in western 
philosophical and religious traditions. For Hadot, spiritual exercises (or 
practices) are forms of thinking, meditation, or dialogue that “have as their 
goal the transformation of our vision of the world and the metamorphosis of our 
being.” While Hadot’s thought on spiritual practice found its widest audience 
through Foucault’s work on “care of the self,” it has recently resurfaced in 
Gabriel Trop’s Poetry as a Way of Life (2015), whose title echoes that of the 
1995 English translation of Hadot’s Philosophy as a Way of Life (quoted above). 
Drawing on Hadot and Foucault, Trop argues that the reading and writing of 
poetry can be understood as “aesthetic exercise,” a form of practice involving 
"sensually oriented activity in the world attempts to form, influence, perturb 
or otherwise generate patterns of thought, perception, or action.” Though Trop 
is careful to distinguish his ideas from Hadot and Foucault, we might argue 
that poetry allows the aesthetic or spiritual practitioner to “struggl[e] 
against the ‘government of individualization’” (Foucault, 1982) and to enact “a 
way of being, a way of coping within, reacting to, and acting upon the world” 
(Trop, 2015).

Our seminar takes as its starting point a broad conception of “practice,” both 
spiritual and aesthetic. We seek proposals that consider poetries and ways of 
reading as forms of practice or that challenge the premise altogether. Some 
questions that might be considered:

• Trop suggests that religious poetries (e.g., Greek tragedy, the Divina 
Commedia) are conducive to “aesthetic exercise.” In what ways do poets and 
readers within religious/meditative traditions enact disciplines/practices of 
the self?
• Poets associated with avant-garde movements often make strong claims about 
the urgency of their poetics. In what ways can “poetry as practice” help us 
understand their reading and writing practices? Can non- or even 
anti-avant-garde poetries be understood in similar terms?
• How might the notion of poetry as a “way of life” help us understand 
contemporary lyric poetry?
• Trop argues that late 18th century German poets, including Novalis and 
Holderlin, used their poetic practice to constitute themselves as non-normative 
subjects. What other times/places/poets might we see as concerned with poetry 
as a form of self-constitution?
• George Oppen suggests that “part of the function of poetry is to serve as a 
test of truth.” In what ways can Oppen’s poetics, or those of similarly engaged 
poets, be understood as enabling spiritual or aesthetic exercise?
• How might the concept of spiritual/aesthetic practice contribute to current 
debates about the relevance of poetry to the social/economic/environmental 
justice movements?

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Re: [MD] Julian Baggini: This is what the clash of civilisations is really about

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
And I felt it touched upon an explanation of myself, a bit.  For people who 
wonder how an intellectually-oriented person can dabble in religion.

[Arlo]
I heard an analogy the other day I really like, to restate it, in many ways 
'religion' is like the solid rocket boosters under a space shuttle. Their goal 
is to lift the shuttle into orbit, and fall away when no longer needed. Of 
course, there are other ways to achieve orbit, one does not NEED solid rocket 
boosters. But when these boosters fail to fall away, when they remain attached 
to the shuttle, ultimately the shuttle will fail to achieve a sustainable orbit 
and will fall back down to the ground.

In this analogy, 'mythology' is the larger set of the knowledge of the many and 
different ways people have to achieve orbit. Sure, for some solid rocket 
boosters can be a very useful tool. But when religion does not detach, when it 
locks itself into its inerrant or exoteric forms, it actually becomes a 
hinderance. At the level of mythology, 'religion' is viewed (as Joseph Campbell 
does) through its esoteric form, and valued as its ability to lift- and then 
detach- and ALL means of achieving orbit can be viewed and discussed as all 
lifting wo/man to the same heights (the monomyth) and challenged when they fail 
and pull wo/man back down to their (in this analogy) spiritual deaths.

So by dabble in religion, I hear you say something like dabble in solid 
rocket boosters, which is fine, so long as we share an understanding that 
there are many other ways to achieve orbit, some might be better for others and 
no one in particular is either necessary nor required, and some (call it The 
Cult of The Solid Rocket Booster) need to be condemned for failing to use the 
tool properly. 

But if by dabble in religion you mean support those who demand the solid 
rocket boosters never decouple, or that everyone NEEDS solid rocket boosters in 
order to achieve orbit, in short if you either support or fail to criticize The 
Cult of The Solid Rocket Booster, then, yes, I would wonder how an 
intellectually-oriented person dabble as such.

Of course, all this is just losing my religion, as REM sang.

[John]
Well according to Deep Ecology, you must find a way to make nature your 
religion. practical scientific mind is not the way, it has no provision for 
Value.

[Arlo]
This is a condemnation of S/O science, and I would think we all share it. But 
nature as your religion (in the John Muir way) isn't really 'religion', its 
trying to coopt a term of value from within the S/O discourse, when, of course 
the solution is to evolve from the S/O discourse.  We all (I hope) love and 
respect and care for our families, but you don't hear people say families are 
our religion because our culture normalizes love-for-family. My point is you 
don't need 'religion' to justify love-for-nature, you just need a heart.

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Re: [MD] Julian Baggini: This is what the clash of civilisations is really about

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John Carl]
there is a logic to the fact that the only way to intellectually resist social 
pressure is individually.

[Arlo]
Both biological and intellectual patterns resist social patterns. Your 
conflation of intellectual and individual does not recognize that 'individuals' 
and 'collectives' exist on all of the MOQ's levels. It's simply a matter of the 
focus of your lens. Also, keep in mind that 'activity' (in this case the means 
to intellectually resist social power) is through a collectively mediated (and 
appropriated/internalized) symbolic structure (language, of course is the 
'macro' example, but mathematics, and even say the semiotic forms of dance) 
that ONLY emerges through this social level of value. 

[John Carl]
If you just prefer the beliefs of one group as opposed to another, you're 
taking sides in a social conflict but you're not really thinking for yourself 
and the distinction between social patterns and intellectual ones would be 
meaningless.

[Arlo]
Social conflict can emerge outside of intellectual resistance, social value is 
not simply 'thoughtless conformity'. And, rather than 'thinking for yourself' 
(which is cliche but philosophically misleading) I'd say 'participating in 
intellectual discourses'. Intellectuality, and sociality (and physiocality, and 
physicality) are active processes that occur within an 'individual/collective' 
milieu. Intellectuality, specifically, as Bakhtin argued, is a 
'ventriologuated' activity; done though the appropriation of the voices of 
others, projecting towards an anticipated audience of future voices, and 
delivered within a culturally-salient semiotic-social media. 

As Siouxsie Sioux sang, even when we're on our own, we are never all alone, 
when we're singing.

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Re: [MD] Dissertation re/Pirisig and Postmodernity

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Andre]
Thanks Arlo, it indeed is not a dissertation on Pirsig’s philosophy. I have 
read the pieces on her reading of ZMM and LILA from her perspective and must 
say that von Dahlern makes some worthwhile and interesting comments once again 
from her perspective. However I must say that there are still things 
irritating. I’ll cite a few below:

On page 209 von Dahlem asks: If intellectual activity does not automatically 
lead to the right understanding of Quality, how can we prove that the MOQ is 
correct? 

[Arlo]
Hi, Andre. Yeah, this is one area where I think she struggles. Here (in this 
passage) she is forced to switch from the epistemological position to the 
ontological one, and I think this causes her to misstep. 

[Andre] 
On page 210: There is no good and evil, there is only power… . This literary 
quote could be altered to describe the MOQ as follows: There is no good and 
evil, there is only Quality.

[Arlo]
Personally, I dislike her use of JK Rowkling's words from Harry Potter here. 
Not because I oppose the juxtaposition of literary and philosophical discourse 
(her entire thesis makes use of this juxtapostion, a juxtaposition also used by 
Granger, by the way). I oppose it because she glosses over several authors 
(Foucault and Bourdieu, come to mind) that would advance her narrative rather 
than introducing a literary quote for the purpose of a philosophical 
restatement. And, as you are likely suggesting, the restatement is problematic 
without bringing in a context from LILA that she does not do. Here, I think she 
would find support for her argument by an understanding that there are two 
kinds of good and evil, as Pirsig refers to in LILA as static good and 
Dynamic good. Here, its entirely possible to note (as Pirsig does) that It's 
out of this struggle between conflicting static patterns that the concepts of 
good and evil arise but also There has to be another source of good and evil 
outside the [static social patterns] that produces the [Dynamic] change. (LILA)

Anyways, I'm continuing to work my way through it. I have to stop and dive into 
some of the authors she is citing to try to see the context she is developing. 
Hopefully, this will be more positive for Pirsig studies than negative (so far, 
I do believe that it is). 
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Re: [MD] Dissertation re/Pirisig and Postmodernity

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Andre]
I haven’t read the hundred odd pages von Dahlem has devoted to ZMM and the MoQ 
in their entirety (am at page 229) but, reading what she has to say from the 
perspective of this communicative foundationalist ethics” which she thinks is 
perhaps the latest saviour but  I sincerely wonder if she understands the MoQ 
or its implications as I sense that it is beyond this narrow, advocated 
perspective. All I read is an attack on the intellectual level (which Phaedrus 
represents) as developed in Pirsig’s MoQ. There appears to be a great 
psychological/interpersonal thing going on from the S/O perspective and there 
appears to be little by way of interpersonal relationship understanding from 
the MoQ perspective.

Am interested to hear your comments/thoughts. Perhaps I completely 
misunderstand.

[Arlo]
Like you, I am making my way through this. Bearning in mind that this is NOT a 
dissertation on Pirsig's philosophy (as is Ant's), I was reading it with less 
scrutiny, perhaps. So, I've went back and reread the author's introduction and 
conclusions several times. I don't see the misunderstandings you imply above 
(can you give specific instances in the text where you read this?). 

I will say, it seems to me the author generally stays within Pirsig's 
epistemological narrative, and although she evokes LILA (at length), she 
maintains the 'ghost' position throughout. That is, her overall concern with 
the communicative foundation (social-cultural origins) of 'reality'. So, as I 
read it, she is not interested in reifying the MOQ's levels as much as she is 
interested in using Pirsig's understanding of the (language)-mediated nature of 
thought to help argue for the inherent communicative nature of 'ethics'. That 
is (as I am reading it), her primary term communicative foundationalist 
ethics could be restated along the lines of social-foundational intellect. 
Its this border between the social and intellectual that's she's playing around 
with, and showing that the 'universal ground' for all intellectual activity is 
social (for her, communicative) activity.

And, keep in mind that while we could go into great depth over semiosis and 
where/how/when it appears (or is ubiquitous) with the MOQ, and this is fertile, 
interesting ground, but her context here is not that, and I don't think its 
fair to fault her for that. Whether you want to tease apart her notion of 
communicative from Pirsig's general social, I think her points are solid in 
context. 

That said, one criticism I would make is that she seems to imply a 
Lacanian-esque view that could, if taken to its extreme, imply something like 
'a metaphysics of pure semiosis'. Her way out, here, is to use literary 
narratives that ground her ideas in a more 'lived' manner than her thesis alone 
would seem to suggest. 

But, this is still just a cursory read on my part. To be fair, apart from 
Habermas, many of the voices she evokes to build this are ones that I am 
unfamiliar with. So I could be (re)constructing her ideas in ways she did not 
intend. I was thinking of reaching out to her, not until I feel I am fairly 
satisfied that I can with her about her thesis intelligently. Or, maybe an 
informal Q/A via Ant or Horse? 

Anyways, my initial thoughts...  

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Re: [MD] Dissertation re/Pirisig and Postmodernity

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
You're probably right, Andre. I starting reading on page 140 and it only took 
about two pages to see that the author misconstrues some very basic points. For 
example, about the classic-romantic split she says, What Pirsig’s narrator 
suggests in Zen is the categorical disjunction of these modes of understanding 
reality in the everyday world. That is the opposite of Pirsig's point, the 
misconception he's trying to overcome, the very disjunction that we do NOT find 
in the artful mechanic.

In that respect, apparently, she is way off the mark right from the start.

But it's still pretty cool that Pirsig's work increasingly appears in academic 
literature. Nothing will advance the MOQ like a good debate in that arena.

[Arlo]
Hmm... I went back and re-read this, because I had initially read it in the 
context of setting up the argument, not a statement of conclusions. Two pages 
later she writes, for example, Yet, the ardent opposition of the two 
dimensions in the beginning of the narration makes the achievement generated 
through their combination appear all the more valuable.

So I'd read her comment as being proclaiming that the classic-romantic had 
become two categorically disjunct ways of thinking, which was the impetus to 
write ZMM and offer a resolution, not that Pirsig himself was arguing that the 
classic and romantic should be, or are ipso facto, categorially disjunct. 

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[MD] Dissertation re/Pirisig and Postmodernity

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Hi All (Ant in particular),

First off, apologies if this has been shared before. It didn't come up when I 
did a keyword search of my email archives, so...

Below is a link to a dissertation, Nina Michaela von Dahlern (2012) at the 
University of Hamburg, The Ethical Foundations of Postmodernity – 
Communicative Reality and Relative Individuals in Theory and North American 
Literature. 

Beginning (primarily) on page 140 (Deconstructing Traditional Values: Zen and 
the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance – An Inquiry into Values) and continuing 
through at least page 240 (including The Creation of a New Ethics: Lila – An 
Inquiry into Morals) is some interesting discussion on Pirsig.

Ant, please note (if you had not already known) that your dissertation (and 
'Intro' web article) is cited. :-).

http://ediss.sub.uni-hamburg.de/volltexte/2012/5740/pdf/Dissertation.pdf

I've only had a chance to glance this so far, but wanted to share for anyone 
interested in Pirsig's ideas within the academy.

Arlo
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Re: [MD] Julian Baggini: This is what the clash of civilisations is really about

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
The linked article takes up the same basic problem that Baggini's article 
discusses, but from a different angle. It just came out (June  8, 2015) and is 
titled The Attack on Truth: We have entered an age of willful ignorance. 
Check it out. I think it describes John's thinking pretty well. 
http://chronicle.com/article/The-Attack-on-Truth/230631/  

[Arlo]
I read this article the other day, and was left a little disappointed. The 
author sets up the (almost classic) 'subjective-objective' clash, here coming 
from the cultural studies folks versus natural scientists. And from here he 
laments how the rhetoric of the cultural studies folks (no truth) was 
appropriated by the anti-intellectualists as a way of undermining research that 
violated their ideology. But I think what the author is trying to present is 
impossible without an understanding of the simultaneous clash between social 
and intellectual values. Without this, it comes across as an argument for the 
'objective' truth of the natural scientists, when instead the 'victory' should 
be to the empirical truth of intellect over the dogmatic truth of social value. 

This would allow the author to better illuminate the 'intelligent design 
theory' strategy of the Discovery Institute, not as way to use relativism to 
discredit evolution theory, but as a way of masquerading social dogma as 
intellectual theory. Or, to restate, its wrong argue the objective truth of 
evolution theory when we should not take it is objective truth. But the 
challenges, when they come, should originate in empirically-based research, not 
in the scripture-based rituals of organized religions. 

So the solution to the dilemma proposed by the author is not to hunker down 
with the objective truth of the natural scientists as the author is forced to 
imply (in my reading) without a way of introducing the social-intellectual 
clash that is driving the willfully ignorant. 

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[MD] Pragmatism Today

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

All,

Since you are discussing (or talking at each other, as the case may be) what 
pragmatism is and is not, I thought I'd pass on a link for Pragmatism Today: 
The Journal of the Central-European Pragmatist Forum. Their articles (as PDFs) 
are all available for free off the website. Here is the link to the current 
issue:

http://www.pragmatismtoday.eu/index.php?id=2015summer1

Myself, I will be reading Art, Truth, Event. Positioning the 
Non-representationalist Paradigms of Pragmatic Naturalism and Philosophical 
Hermeneutics on the bus home today.

Arlo
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[MD] What is Art? (Philosophynow)

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Hey All,

For those interested, I see the new (June/July) issue of Philosophy Now is 
all about art. While most of the articles are behind a subscription wall (I 
do not have a subscription), a couple are free, including the editorial that 
sets up the issue.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/108/Angles_on_Art

Obviously, I'm a little disappointed that neither Pirsig nor Dewey (nor 
Nietzsche) are even mentioned (one would think that Dewey's Art as Experience 
would warrant at least passing mention). Although, maybe, these ideas are 
addressed in the walled articles. 

Still, since art is of primary importance within a MoQ, thought I'd share.

Arlo
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[MD] Matthew Crawford book/article

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Hey all,

Crawford's book Shop Class as Soulcraft is frequently mentioned as drawing 
on, or at least inspired by, Pirsig's ZMM. He has a second book out (I have not 
read it yet), and there is a short article on this in the Chronicle of Higher 
Education. 

http://chronicle.com/article/Can-Matthew-Crawford-Deliver/229185/

Arlo
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[MD] What is the present?

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Hi All,

Just sharing this, as it was brought to my attention today. The Straight Dope 
question of the day is What is the present?. 

http://www.straightdope.com/columns/read/3214/what-is-the-present

Obviously, 'Cecil' has some fun with his answer, and, in that light, I think 
it's an answer you'll find entertaining.

Arlo
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Re: [MD] Fwd: What's valuable?

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[David]
Just thought it strange that these were the first things he said. And your 
answers confuse me too. Maybe I'd assumed most would immediately think of 
intellectual or Dynamic pursuits.

[Arlo]
Why strange? Camaraderie, warmth, empathy, kin, love... these are all among the 
top things I would EXPECT someone to say. If you wanted to know what 
intellectual pursuits, apart from the MOQ, people here valued, maybe that is 
something you should have specifically asked? And, I am not sure what a 
Dynamic pursuit would be, apart from say art as lived experience. 
Jan-Anders mentioned how Pirsig's ideas inform the way he approaches and 
understands the crafting of beer, which reflects the way Quality informed 
Pirsig's approach to motorcycle maintenance in ZMM. Yet you seemed to criticize 
this, so I get the notion that your category for Dynamic pursuits is more 
along the lines of culturally-sanctioned art (theatre, painting, dance, 
etc.). 

But, so, to answer your intended question: two intellectual pursuits that i 
have found most valuable are (broadly) socio-cultural theory (or, 
cultural-historical psychology) and its direct descendant activity theory. A 
current project I am working on (which I would argue is a Dynamic pursuit) 
involves expanding Artaud's theatrical imperative (his Theatre of Cruelty) to a 
more general pedagogical imperative. (To tease a relation to Pirsig, you can 
see this first evident in Pirsig's English classroom in ZMM. How are we 
supposed to know what quality is? they said. You're supposed to tell us!... 
I sat there all night long, one said. I was ready to cry, I was so mad, a 
girl next to the window said. You should warn us, a third said. ... But then, 
below the definition on the blackboard, he wrote, But even though Quality 
cannot be defined, you know what Quality is! and the storm started all over 
again. Oh, no, we don't! Oh, yes, you do. Oh, no, we don't!  Art
 aud was responding to growing dominance of passive 'theatre', mostly in the 
form of cinema. Consider the above classroom scene reading Artaud's call to 
arms, Our long familiarity with theatre as a form of distraction has led us to 
forget the idea of a serious theatre, a theatre which will shove aside our 
representations, and breathe into us the burning magnetism of images and 
finally will act upon us in such a way that there will take place a therapy of 
the soul whose effects will not be forgotten.)

So is this the sort of answer you had wanted? Just to be clear, though, if you 
ask me which I value more, working on this project or Camaraderie, warmth, 
empathy, kin, love..., I would likely chose the latter. And, by the way, I 
take objection to the statement that empathy is very much social. But that's 
another argument.


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Re: [MD] What's valuable?

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[David]
Second only to the MOQ you like biological things? The MOQ would say that is 
immoral.

[Arlo]
I think the MOQ would only say this is immoral only if social and intellectual 
values were being subordinated to biological patterns. I am not sure we can 
deduce from Jan-Anders short reply that such a subordination is occurring. If 
Jan-Anders preference for beer and boobs was advocating alcoholism and rape, 
then, yeah, for sure the MOQ would have something to say about the immorality 
of this preference.

But I don't think the MOQ makes elitist claims about what a person should 
like or value. I mean, is it immoral to prefer punk-rock to Wagnerian 
opera? To enjoy hiking more than painting? Pizza more than soccer? Or soccer 
more than Greek drama?

Also, to be fair too, you didn't actually ask what people value second to the 
MOQ. 

[David]
Anyone have anything worthwhile they value other than the MOQ itself?

[Arlo]
I'm guessing from your reply to Jan-Anders that your question, and your 
addition of the word worthwhile here, is not so much about what people value, 
but what they SHOULD value. And I'm guessing what you wanted was for people to 
say things like art, violin concertos, poetry, and maybe mediation and tea 
ceremonies. Or maybe you were looking for the big categories: love, honor, 
trust, etc. 

In any event, I have to say I agree with Jan-Anders, two things I value 
(besides the MOQ) are: the camaraderie of friends and the warmth of intimacy.

What do I value second to the MOQ? Most days I'd answer empathy. Some days, 
I'd consider answering Hannah (my daughter), but she mostly holds a 
second-to-nothing spot.  But on a cold, snowy, winter's day like today, I admit 
I'd be tempted to go with winter ale and a warm embrace. (TL/DR; agape, philia, 
eros).

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Re: [MD] Review of 'The Truth About Art'.

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ant]
Remember that Patrick Doorly (the author of TTAA) was primarily aiming his book 
towards an academic audience (I guess fine art critics and philosophers mainly) 
so a vanity publisher such as CreateSpace (whose academic credibility is 
basically zero) was not an option open to him.  It's the finely honed arguments 
in Patrick's book which give it, its intellectual quality and its these 
arguments that I ask the reader of this post to be primarily concerned with.

[Dan]
In other words (and forgive me if I am translating this wrongly), folk like me 
have no reason to be reading Patrick Doorly's book. Only those who are 
academically trained in the fine arts and philosophy would have any use for it. 
It is a text book.

[Arlo]
I don't think academic here should be a point of contention Dan (*I* think 
you are highly academic). Sadly, textbooks do tend to be very expensive, even 
David Grange's text (which is mostly text) sold for $110 upon publication (I 
see the price is down to $69 on Amazon). So authors who publish in this format 
may do everything they can to keep costs down. How many 'non-academics' do you 
think will shell out $110 for Granger's book? And yet I'd argue its incredibly 
important. So $25 for Doorley's book as it is, or $110+ for the book with 
high-quality print and hi-res color images? Which do you think will reach more 
readers?

And, we can't really deny that there is a symbolic capital to be had with the 
publisher imprint. Right or wrong, it has meaning. Many academic authors are 
required, for tenure, to publish using certain 'respected' or 'established' 
publishing venues. Having your book published by Oxford University Press (for 
example) establishes symbolic capital for both the author and the argument. 
Whether this is wholly good or bad, whether it is something that we should 
reject outright or accept, it is a fact for those publishing within their 
academic tenure. 

[Dan]
CreateSpace is different than a vanity publisher in that no upfront purchase is 
necessary.

[Arlo]
Another consideration is that often authors (academic or otherwise) are 
provided with some compensation when their manuscript is accepted. Pirsig, for 
example, worked off a Guggenheim grant. Now, I'm not sure if that specific 
grant conferred certain rights to the publisher (and away from Pirsig), but 
often authors need compensation (even in the form of work-release) while they 
are writing. I do not know the specifics of Doorly's publishing contract, but 
there may have been important and unavoidable reasons (in addition to academic 
capital) that he went with a publisher rather than self-publishing. 



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Re: [MD] Review of 'The Truth About Art'.

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Arlo]
The book is printed on low-quality paper with dense text in double columns, 
which do not make for pleasant reading. Ouch.

[Dan]
If I had purchased a book printed on low-quality paper with dense text in 
double columns I would have promptly sent it back for a refund. Not only is 
this information the reader needs to know before they buy the book (there is no 
free preview available on Amazon as most books have) but it is something that 
can (probably) be remedied in the next edition. This is constructive 
criticism... something the author can use to improve his work.

[Arlo]
I didn't mean to imply this has no potential impact on the reader, only that I 
find it out of place in a book review (which should address content). I am 
unsure as to the control an author, especially an author going through a 
publisher, has over the hard formatting of her/his work. In this case, it may 
be that distribution and marketing (typically provided through the publisher) 
was a greater consideration than self-publishing to ensure desired font-size, 
etc. 

[Dan]
The point is, there are options out there so that an author does not have to 
settle for low quality, especially when his book is about reclaiming quality!

[Arlo]
It's a trade-off, I imagine, between wanting to reach the widest possible 
audience, through distribution, marketing and (importantly) placement on 
bookshelves in actual bookstores, and sacrificing control over font and 
typeface. Years ago, when I stumbled onto Interview with the Vampire (shortly 
after it was first available in paperback), I found the book was made pretty 
cheap, the ink even smudged my fingers, and the binding started to come apart 
pretty quickly. Nonetheless, it remains one of my favorite works of recent 
fiction, and any review I'd give of the book would focus on Rice's content, not 
the ink/glue-choice of the publisher.

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Re: [MD] Review of 'The Truth About Art'.

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/books/the-truth-about-art-reclaiming-quality-by-patrick-doorly/2016268.article

The reviewer finds things to criticize and things to praise about Patrick 
Doorly's book. (Any press is good press?)

[Arlo]
The book is printed on low-quality paper with dense text in double columns, 
which do not make for pleasant reading. Ouch. 

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Re: [MD] Sociability Re-examined

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Craig, previously]
Perhaps we should look for examples of social immorality:

I promise to meet you, but don't meet up.
We agree to meet, but I don't meet up.
I intend to meet you (but don't promise to)  I realize you recognize my 
intention, but don't meet up.
You expect me to meet you and I realize this, but I don't meet up.
I intend to meet you, but don't meet up.

Which of these are humans but not animals capable of?
Which of these are 3rd level  which are merely 2nd level?

[Arlo had replied]
For Tomasello, and others following the socio-cultural tradition, all of these 
are social.

[Craig]
Yes, but what about my questions?

[Arlo]
Well, this directly answers your second question, all of these are 3rd level 
(social) activities. As to the first, I think I answered that as well, although 
I apologize if that was unclear.

[Arlo previously]
They all derive from semiotically-mediated activity. Even the ones that are not 
outright 'verbal' above require some manner of language to enable the activity. 

[Arlo continues]
All of these evidence enough necessary semiotic mediation as to make them 
exclusively human activities. As for something I might point to as an example 
of primitive social (mediated, purposeful, semiotic, agenic activity) displayed 
by a non-human species would be something like a primate directing the 
attention of another primate to a stick, and that primate picks up and hands 
the stick to the first primate. In this case, although it is 
semiotically-mediated, the mediation is primitive enough so as not to require 
sophisticated language use. In your examples, 'intent' that is able to 
formulate 'in the future' requires a necessary complex enough code as to render 
'in the future' intelligible. So although the primates in this example must 
share attention (biological), and must extend that into a mediated exchange of 
intentional activity (social), it is something that pales in comparison to the 
social activity enabled by complex semiosis. 

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Re: [MD] MOQ is good. What is it good for?

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John M]
The MOQ isn't a living, dynamic entity.  It is a static intellectual pattern.  
It was made at a point in time by one person, in the midst of his own unique 
circumstances.

[Arlo]
Just jumping in to address a couple points, John. In all philosophy (indeed, 
across all academic disciplines), there are (at least) two different ways of 
looking at ideas. First is the overall category, like Idealism or 
Pragmatism. Second is a particular author's ideas, like Hegel or James. 
People tend to use the phrase The MOQ interchangeable across these two, and 
that creates problems, such as the MOQ isn't a living, dynamic entity. As for 
the latter, what Pirsig said (or what Hegel said or what James said), you 
are (mostly) correct. This is static. Unless those authors are still active, 
their ideas become static patterns within the larger intellectual level of 
value. But, as for the former, the more generalized 'tradition' (if you will), 
this is constantly evolving as new voices enter the dialogue, as ideas are 
refined, challenged, revisioned, elaborated, linked, uncoupled, etc. For 
example, Peirce broke from the general field of pragmatism (he even creat
 ed his own label, pragmaticism). So within general discourse on pragmatism, 
one distinguishes (when necessary) between the different voices, but recognizes 
that the overall theory moves forward (and sometimes this happens by rejecting 
certain voices as much as appropriating them). 

Personally, I try to use Pirsig's MOQ when talking, or thinking, about 
specifically what Pirsig wrote. But I use the more general MOQ to refer to 
the field, or category, of ideas is, or will, evolve within a larger, general 
tradition. So, yes, while one was made at a point in time by one person, the 
other is a living, evolving pattern of understandings that incorporates many 
voices. 

[John M]
But it doesn't fit mine, so I try to bend it into something I can use, and I 
get chastised by some in this forum for doing that. 

[Arlo]
The only time I've seen anyone chastised is when they erroneously attribute a 
position to Pirsig. For example, if I said Pirsig's MOQ includes animal 
behavior on the social level, this would be wrong, and I'd imagine those 
familiar with Pirsig's writings would call me out on this mistake. But, I've 
said many times that I, personally, distance myself from this categorical 
mandate, and have never been chastised for this. But, I can, and have, made an 
argument that is within the larger, general tradition of a MOQ that preserves 
the structure even if it disagrees with certain details of Pirsig's personal 
ideas. 

Importantly, you have to understand what someone says before you can agree of 
disagree, or revise or extend, etc. Peirce had to understand exactly and 
precisely what James was saying in order for his pragmaticism to make any 
sense. When people get very sloppy about what Pirsig did, or did not, say, it 
hinders the way intellectual evolution works. So, if you bend Pirsig's ideas 
into something you can use, and think this would be of value to others, by all 
means share (and be prepared for evaluation). Just be clear in your thoughts in 
articulating; (1) this is what Pirsig said, (2) this is why he was wrong, (3) 
this other way of looking at it is better, (4) and here is why. (I should 
addend this by saying that if you're disagreement with Pirsig takes you so far 
away from a MOQ-discourse that you are really presenting a different 
metaphysical approach altogether, you'd really be better off taking your ideas 
to a more similar forum.)

[John]
So this is one of the key issues with the MOQ for me.  Pirsig avers that the 
four levels of the MOQ embrace all of evolution and of human experience.  Well, 
it deliberately (and I think arbitrarily) excludes the most significant 
dimension of my human experience! 

[Arlo]
Based on the preceding paragraph, I assume this dimension you refer to is 
religion? What Pirsig does is separate out a mystical awareness of Dynamic 
Quality (or the Buddha, or the Godhead), from the dogmatic, theistic narratives 
of religion. The latter becomes social patterns, but the former really is 
'outside' the describable experiential landscape. It sounds like you want 
Pirsig to have included DQ within the four levels of his MOQ? 

[John]
But then came the MOQ.  It's brilliant and beautiful.  But it comes up short 
and says, Your experience doesn't count.  It isn't valid, and there's no place 
for it in the MOQ.

[DMB]
The MOQ  says, Your experience doesn't count.  It isn't valid, and there's no 
place for it in the MOQ ?! Where did you get that idea? Nothing could be 
further from the truth. The MOQ absolutely does NOT say any such thing. Quite 
the opposite, in fact. 

[Arlo]
I agree with DMB, I do not think Pirsig's MOQ says your experience doesn't 
count. Almost to the contrary, I'd argue he says your experience is all there 
is. Everything in his described four levels is derivative to 'experience'. 

Re: [MD] Sociability Re-examined

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Craig]
Perhaps we should look for examples of social immorality:
I promise to meet you, but don't meet up.
We agree to meet, but I don't meet up.
I intend to meet you (but don't promise to)  I realize you recognize my 
intention, but don't meet up.
You expect me to meet you and I realize this, but I don't meet up.
I intend to meet you, but don't meet up.

Which of these are humans but not animals capable of?
Which of these are 3rd level  which are merely 2nd level?

[Arlo]
For Tomasello, and others following the socio-cultural tradition, all of these 
are social. They all derive from semiotically-mediated activity. Even the ones 
that are not outright 'verbal' above require some manner of language to enable 
the activity. 

The biological (neural) origin of shared attention is pre-language, and limited 
to the experiential moment. The social act of formulating 'plans', even 
mentally and not spoken out loud, requires at least some manner of 
semiotic-symbol manipulation. 


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Re: [MD] Analogues and metaphors, etc.

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
For centuries, metaphor was just the place where poets went to show off. But in 
their 1980 book, Metaphors We Live By, the linguist George Lakoff (at the 
University of California at Berkeley) and the philosopher Mark Johnson (now at 
the University of Oregon) revolutionized linguistics by showing that metaphor 
is actually a fundamental constituent of language.

[Arlo]
You should definitely check out Mark Johnson's Philosophical Perspectives on 
Metaphor. And, relatedly, Carl Hausman's The Creativity Question (Hausman is 
both a Peircian and a Metaphorician, and from Penn State (although Emeritus 
now)). The overarching theme for Johnson and Hausman (and Lakoff) is that 
metaphor is art; there is, at its core, an 'indefinable' nature. Hausman 
called it the 'wellspring through which the indefinable enters the definable 
world' (Johnson and Lakoff would, no doubt, agree). 

[DMB]
I think their work might also support Pirsig's assertion that the levels have a 
matter-of-fact-evolutionary relationship, specifically the connections between 
the biological and social levels such that the structure of the body (matter) 
shapes the structures of thought (mind).

[Arlo]
Absolutely. There is growing research on this. Body metaphors: reading the 
body in contemporary culture by Danica Skara (http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/44018) 
is an interesting read, and it draws from Lakoff and Johnson's book Philosophy 
in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought.

Another interesting note about this, specifically Lakoff's work, is that 
cultural metaphors shape our activity in ways we are often unaware of. His 
classic example is argument is war. In English, this cultural metaphor 
informs the way we frame, and think about, 'argument'. He states these 
examples: Your claims are indefensible. He attacked every weak point in my 
argument. His criticisms were right on target. I demolished his argument. I've 
never won an argument with him. You disagree? Okay, shoot! If you use that 
strategy, he'll wipe you out. He shot down all of my arguments.

Time is money is another. His basic thesis is summarized here: 
http://theliterarylink.com/metaphors.html


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Re: [MD] Academic philosophy

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC]
#2:  I said I never read anyone who takes philosophy personally [look of great 
distaste] or confuses philosophy with things that matter in their little lives.

#1:Right.  If they want to talk about philosophy as if it matters personally 
they need to get out of the profession or at least go back to school.

[Arlo]
I imagine this is just a Platonic-style dialogue, and, here, the academics 
are the dreaded Sophists who are creatively demonized by unfair, and largely 
fictional, dialogues. I say this, mostly, because its absurd. Every philosophy 
professor I have EVER had has gone out of his way to make philosophy personal. 
The constant theme was this matters, this effects your life, this shapes who 
you are, this is PERSONAL!. It was precisely abstract, irrelevant, 'mind play' 
that they were arguing against. Good god, imagine trying to understand Adorno's 
Minima Moralia from an impersonal perspective. Imagine trying to teach 
Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy without constant recourse to the immediate, 
lived life of the students.

No, either he's using a completely unrepresentational dialogue to slander all 
of academia, or he's writing his own demons into his narrative. 

The fact that you buy into this man's psychological rage really demonstrates 
how little real experience you've had in the academy. Or maybe, you're 
co-opting an damn the academics attitude to assuage your own personal 
failures as not your own, but of an inflexible and sociopathic institution. 

Are there more rigid (but still plastic) boundaries around the academy? Sure. 
There HAS to be. Is it entirely perfect and entirely fair to everyone 
immediately? No, of course not. But the alternative is an uninformed bazaar 
that can not distinguish at all between flat-earth theory and the theory of 
relativity. And, let's be honest, our cultural and intellectual libraries are 
enormous. Even 'favored' philosophers within the academy, like Nietzsche, get 
barely any screen-time at all. At the undergraduate level, students are lucky 
if they hear his name, let alone read select writings. Foucault? Until you're 
in certain graduate programs you probably won't even hear his name.

The larger, and more devastating, problem with the academy is that it has 
turned into little more than a glorified jobs program. Does it bother me that 
Pirsig doesn't warrant his own course in our philosophy program? Absolutely. 
But it bothers me more that even the philosophers that DO are relegated to 
irrelevant status in our quest to fulfill an increasingly singular capital 
goal. The problem is not with the philosopher-academics, but with the 
businessperson-deans that dictate curricular and degree structures- and the 
capital culture that wants our graduates to be little more than skilled 
workers, not critically-thoughtful, agenic beings.

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Re: [MD] Academic philosophy

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
It may be hard to see through all the slander and insults (against those who 
are philosophizing poorly, dogmatically, even sociopathically, and these 
sociopaths who are running a scam, and the swindlers who participate in a 
great confidence game) but Auxier is really just complaining about analytic 
philosophers. 

Analytic philosophy is (or was) the dominant style of philosophy in 
English-speaking countries in the 20th century. It was born as a reaction 
against the kind of Hegelian Idealists like Bradley and Royce. It effectively 
killed idealism early in the century, which probably explains why Auxier has an 
axe to grind and why John would enjoy Auxier's grinding noises. 

[Arlo]
You may be right. I was never that interested in Bertrand Russell's ideas to 
take a course covering his ideas. So maybe this is how analytic philosophers 
think. I will say, however, that I did take a course covering Wittgenstein 
(listed as an analytic philosopher on Wikipedia), and the professor was not at 
all like JC-per-Auxier suggests. I never got a sense that it was supposed to be 
'impersonal', but this was a course mostly about his ideas concerning language, 
and maybe that's why (Wittgenstein argued that language could not be separated 
from the reality it described). Is it even possible for language to be 
impersonal? (Don't answer that, I know the idea of a Universal Grammar still 
floats around out there.)

But, yeah. This is hardly representative of philosophers, or the academy, in 
general. And its not even original. Pirsig made the same criticisms to 
'objectivity' in the, then, dominant Boas tradition. However, in the years 
since this 'objectivist tradition' has waned. Raging against Boas in 2014, as 
an exemplar of all anthropology (or even the entire academy) would be absurd. 
Sure, there are still Boasians around, but you have an increasing presence of 
Tomaselloans, and others in a broad spectrum of cultural anthropological 
positions, many of who look to Bourdieu, not Boas, as a guide.


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Re: [MD] Sociopathy (wasRe: Step Two)

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JA]
RMP says it began with level 1 the inorganic a while ago. Was the social level 
then? No. Is the social level present now? Yes.

[DMB]
It's true that the MOQ's levels are presented as an evolutionary hierarchy so 
that each level is a distinct stage or phase of evolutionary development - but 
it does not promise and cannot offer the kind of magnifying glass you seek.

[Arlo]
What JA is presenting (to reference back to Paul Turner's Two Contexts paper) 
is the 'ontological' framework of Pirsig's MOQ. But what seems to be missing is 
an understanding of the 'epistemological' foundations. That is, I think JA is 
misconstruing a high-quality intellectual pattern (evolution) with an external, 
objective 'reality'. To be sure, 'evolution' is highly explanatory, and 
provides us with a lens that provides very useful answers to many questions. 
But what appears missing is an understanding (or acceptance) that 
epistemologically 'time' and 'evolution' do not precede 'experience'. That is, 
saying that the inorganic level predated the biological, which came 'after' 
(aka time), is not a description of an external 'reality' but a highly-useful 
way of understanding experience. Perhaps a better 'lens' than 'time is an 
arrow' will come along one day, and we'll have to reconsider how we understand 
'evolution'. In this way, Pirsig's MOQ is not a 'description of an ex
 ternal reality' but a 'way of ordering and understanding experience'. 

[DMB]
It seems that many of the questions about the transitions between levels are 
simply scientific questions and we can look at their data and see how it fits 
in - or not. Arlo's recent attempts are a good example of that.

[Arlo]
Precisely. Arguments over the nature of 'social patterns' go wrong when they 
start to imply a fixed, objective, nature that is True. The argument is really 
about which 'lens' holds better explanatory value; both in preserving coherence 
within the MOQ, and taking this into a pragmatic, interdisciplinary theory that 
is supported by empirical studies. That is, (1) does it make sense within the 
MOQ's structure, and (2) does it makes sense when applied to our experience. 

If I argue that the fundamental nature of social patterns is 'reading', I would 
have to explain (1) how this preserves coherence with the MOQ (how does 
'reading' emerge directly from biological patterns), and (2) how does this 
transition into a coherence with our experience in the world (where do we 
observe, or how can we study, this claim? is it supported by archaeology? 
psychology? anthropology? physiology? biology? etc.?).

This is why I've argued that 'shared attention' is the best lens I've come 
across for understanding bio-to-socio evolution. It preserves internal 
coherence within the MOQ's structure, and it is supported by empirical (and 
broad interdisciplinary) studies. That is, it has both 'internal' and 
'external' coherence. 

Is it the ONLY lens? No. Do other lenses have any value? Sure. Will a better 
lens come along? Very likely. But this is just restating what Pirsig wrote:

But if Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it becomes 
possible for more than one set of truths to exist. Then one doesn't seek the 
absolute Truth. One seeks instead the highest quality intellectual 
explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any guide to the 
future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful until something 
better comes along. One can then examine intellectual realities the same way he 
examines paintings in an art gallery, not with an effort to find out which one 
is the real painting, but simply to enjoy and keep those that are of value. 
There are many sets of intellectual reality in existence and we can perceive 
some to have more quality than others, but that we do so is, in part, the 
result of our history and current patterns of values. (Pirsig, LILA)

[DMB]
I think there are some very interesting studies in primate morality that show 
us where our own social level morality comes from. You can see the seeds of it 
in the behavior of our closest primate cousins and even a little bit in rats. 
But these are empirical questions that can only rightly be answered by research 
out in the fields and labs.

[Arlo]
Of course, I agree. This is why I distance myself from the notion that the 
social level must exclude ANY and ALL non-human patterns of activity, even at 
the lowest, most primitive or rudimentary end of the social-level spectrum. 
It's certainly untenable with regard to external coherence, and ultimately its 
problematic for internal coherence as well. 

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Re: [MD] Sociability Re-examined

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Craig]
I did read the Wikipedia article on Tomasello, where he seems to agree with 
Pirsig that humans have a capacity that non-humans (on earth) don't. This 
capacity could be the divide between the 2nd  3rd levels.

[Arlo]
Yes, Tomasello certainly agrees that human have a capacity that non-human 
species do not. This is central point of Vygotsky's (which Tomasello is working 
from). One of Tomasello's main arguments is that human social patterns (as 
semiotic, mediated activity) have the capacity to evolve, while the primitive 
social activity of certain sufficiently advanced primates near the bio/socio do 
not evolve (either ontologically or phylogeneticially). This is why I (and this 
comes from the same socio-cultural tradition) focus on 'activity' that is 
semiotic, mediated and purposeful as the best lens to view social patterns. 

The borderlands are not as troubling to me, and I do allow for them to be not 
laser-etched lines when examined closely, and this is why I don't worry about 
demanding every possible non-human activity be absolutely defined out of the 
social level. By the time we are talking about semiotic, mediated, purposeful 
activity within a modern cultural milieu, we are talking exclusively about 
human behavior anyway. Bringing up rudimentary non-human social patterns is 
like bringing up algae or lichen when you are talking about the complexity of 
human physiology. Both are biological patterns, but lichen (many varieties) 
remains unevolved since the paleozoic whereas the physiology of the modern 
human is long path of evolution, especially neural evolution. Anyway, I think 
this is creating disagreement where there really isn't (or shouldn't be) any. 

[Craig]
The following is the handout of Bratman's talk at Stanford.  I hope it is of 
some value even without the talk itself.  [Beware, the format might be garbled 
in transmission.]

[Arlo]
The talk appears to be recorded and available as a podcast 
(http://upload.sms.csx.cam.ac.uk/media/1737335). 

Its interesting, although I still think there are important (to me) differences 
between Tomasello and Bratman. It's probably not worth elaborating this here, 
but if you get the chance to read The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, I 
think you may start to see them too. There are a number of others working 
around this common term (e.g., joint attention, collective intentionality) that 
may, or may not, have the same theoretical foundations. Tomasello, to my 
interest, is explicit in working within the socio-cultural theoretical 
framework, and is true to Vygotsky's cultural-historical psychology.

Anyway, thanks for the information, overall I think this 'lens' does provide us 
with the best way to look at sociality, to explain the emergence of social 
patterns out of biological (neural) patterns, to account for social patterns 
across the evolutionary spectrum (the simplest to the most complex) and to 
explain phylogenetic, historical and ontogenetic development. 

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Re: [MD] [LS:9743] The social level.

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Mary]
If I may be permitted one comment, the degree of smugness demonstrated by Arlo, 
DMB, and Ant is unbecoming.  There is no place for this attitude in the high 
country of the mind.

[Arlo]
No one has been more smug than Bo, Mary. I mean, he is the one whose ego 
couldn't resist sending me unwanted emails simply to masturbate his ego. If he 
read or understood my posts to MD and wanted genuine dialogue, this would be 
one thing, but his posts attempting ridicule evidenced that this was not the 
case. Whether he couldn't be bothered to read, or simply didn't understand, he 
still felt so threatened that he needed to sound off his typically mocking but 
sophomoric derision. He is the classic Ignatius Reilly.

So let's be clear. Have I, Mary, gone out of MY way to contact and harass 
members of the LS offlist? Were the posts Bo was 'responding' to in any way 
associated with his SOL idea? No. So ask yourself, Mary, why this man needs 
to cc people on emails when all he is attempting to do is ridicule them? And 
you call ME smug?! Maybe I am NOW. I tell you what, if you can convince Bo to 
stop emailing me, to stop cc'ing me on his posts, then you'll never have to 
deal with MY smugness again. Fair? And all I ask in return is that when a post 
comes through the LS with lines like ... the 'mastermind' Arlo..., that you 
reject them and scold Bo for being smug. How's that? Deal? 

I mean, don't you all have the grand task of developing the SOL? Isn't that 
more important than monitoring MD traffic simply to find a mechanism to try to 
ridicule people here? If, as Bo implies, all of us here are lessers, why are 
any of you even connected or concerned with this place at all. Until yesterday 
I hadn't even looked at LS. I don't monitor it. I don't read it. And I don't 
seek your members out to ridicule them. Why do you think Bo is unable to do the 
same? 

[Bo]
I think both Arlo and DMB would be a bit surprised to know how much Paul Turner 
and I agree on and how far he has come from DMB's. Turner has a high standing 
with everyone and corresponds with Pirsig. The fun thing is that as long as we 
all are committed to the MOQ, Arlo cannot use it to condemn me he knows that he 
will make himself a fool if he tries.  

[Arlo]
Paul Turner is no more messiah than you, Bo. I have little trouble disagreeing 
with people. Even in introducing Tomasello I have been honest and unconcerned 
that this presents disagreement with Pirsig. Unlike you, I don't need to 
pretend I am the MOQ's saviour. I am more interested in high-quality ideas than 
who says them. An ecology of ideas that includes many voices, not a myopic one 
true idea system where everyone is wrong but X. 

As I said to you long ago, if you took the honest road of putting the SOL out 
there as your own MOQ, or even as a revision of Pirsig, you'd be on more solid 
ground. Its you seem unable to think apart from celebrity, needing to 'coopt' 
Pirsig and paint his name onto your ideas. And now here it is again with Paul 
Turner. What you seem to constantly misunderstand is that your ideas are 
low-quality due to their content, not who is saying it. I mean, even in Pirsig 
stood up and supported the SOL interpretation, I would simply say no thanks 
and bow out of the discussion entirely. Too many high-quality ideas out there, 
too much good stuff to read and think about, than ridiculously sophomoric ideas 
like the SOL just because X said it. 

Horse, I apologize for dragging all this stupid into the MD. I'll do my part to 
let it hopefully start to disappear. 

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Re: [MD] [LS:9743] The social level.

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC]
It's pretty quiet on L.S.  I agree.  Quiet except for the ravings of Tim and 
Bo, and they are loony. Maybe I'm loony too.  Pirsig certainly went all loony, 
and I don't know how any person living in this loony world can help it but go 
loony on occasion.

[Arlo]
This is one point I will comment on. I have nothing but love for loony. Every 
person I have the privilege of calling friend is eccentric or 'strange' in 
some way. Normalcy is nothing more than a coercive hammer of 'power' (in the 
Foucaultian meaning). My advocacy for educational reform is largely constructed 
on this opposition to cultural conformity. I have a Weirdo. Mosher. Freak. 
poster on my wall. 

That said, John, you have to be able to differentiate between loony and 
delusional psychotic. Van Gogh was 'loony', but that does not make every 
inmate of every asylum a highly-creative post-impressionist painter. If you 
confuse incoherence with genius, you'll simple support the delusional's 
confusion of criticism with genius. This, as DMB pointed out, sadly symptomatic 
of many who read Pirsig, mistake their own delusions as evidence that they, 
too, like Phaedrus are misunderstood geniuses. If I had a dime for every 
self-proclaimed saviour-savant sent to the MD to rescue Pirsig from the evil, 
damnable 'intellectuals', I'd have enough to buy... well at least a round of 
beers for me and my loony friends.

[JC]
Tim and Bo both,, are as enamored of ideas and philosophy as anybody on this 
list..maybe more.

[Arlo]
When I was doing undergraduate work in clinical psychology, I did some 
observations at the local psych ward. I remember there was a patient there who 
was absolutely enamored with art, and would paint the walls with his feces. If 
you need someone to paint your house, I can see if he's still available.

The point is, don't confuse someone enamored exclusively with his own shit as 
being a good artist.

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Re: [MD] Rhetoric and Madness

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ron]
All (especially the true MOQers of the Lila squad) I found this paper some 
years ago, I don't know who authored it but it's quite a nice paper. ... 
Rhetoric and Madness: Robert Pirsig's Inquiry into Values.

[Arlo]
This article appeared in the Southern Speech Communication Journal, Volume 43, 
Issue 1, 1977. The author is Scott Consigny. 
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Re: [MD] Sociability Re-examined

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Craig]
What we would call 'braves' go on what we would call a 'hunt'.  After the hunt 
each brave usually brings his or her gain back to what we would call the 
'chief', who distributes it amongst the entire (what we would call) 'tribe'. If 
a brave fails to deliver the gain and the chief finds out, there is a conflict 
between the brave and the chief (and perhaps with the rest of the tribe).  The 
brave can decide to risk keeping his gain or give it up.   At this point IMHO 
there is no right or wrong in the matter; it is a matter of biology.  What 
would need to be different for this to be a third level situation?

[Arlo]
This IS a third level (social) activity. The conflict you are introducing is 
between satiating the biological drive of hunger (biological level) or 
fulfilling the semiotically mediated activity relating to the tribe (social 
level).

As Tomasello would argue, socialtity begins historically long before this. By 
the time you are talking about tribes and rules and agreements and social 
hierarchy you are awash in social patterns. Sociality begins (both 
ontologically (for the infant) and phylogenetically (for the species)) at the 
moment of shared attention; that is at the moment when 'two' (or more) 
conspecifics recognize the agency and purpose of the 'other' in the immediate 
moment of experience. From this (biologically-enabled) moment come all the 
semiotic, mediated, social activities of the (now) social child and the 
sociality of the species.

So, again, the biological pattern above is 'hunger'. This is in competition 
with the social patterns of tribal activity.  If the 'brave' keeps the grain 
(to satiate his hunger) he is acting morally biologically, but (in your 
example) immorally socially. If he turns the grain over, he is acting morally 
socially, but (if he receives no sustenance from his labor) immorally 
biologically.

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Re: [MD] [LS:9743] The social level.

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[As Bo has refused to stop hounding my personal email, I thought I'd make this 
response public.]

I have to admit, Bo. Even I was surprised by your tenacious need for 
recognition and ego-stroking. How else, I thought, could one explain that this 
person keeps emailing me repeatedly after I've asked him many, many times (and 
very politely as well) to refrain. Certainly, I thought, he gets off on wanting 
to imagine himself one-upping others, maybe I should be flattered that he so 
obviously needs my attention.

And then I went to Google groups and read the the posts to LilaSquad.

Good... fucking... god.

No wonder you want so badly to interact with us. What a bunch of incoherent, 
unintelligible, and outright moronic nonsense. The majority of contributors 
appear to be schizophrenics who've gone off their lithium. I am not 
exaggerating here... Horse and DMB (anyone else with a functioning frontal 
lobe), if you haven't you simply must check this out: 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/lilasquad

I feel bad for you, Bo. As unsophisticated as your understanding of the MOQ 
always has been, at least you are mostly semi-intelligible to read. As for the 
true MOQers who are following you, well, I think this caliber of acolyte 
should alert you to the quality of your ideas. Sad. Really, just sad.

I'm not going to humor you by trying to address all your mistakes in your post. 
You would not genuinely read that anyway. You would do what you've always done, 
read only so that you prop yourself up as a messiah of sorts. What you want is 
a soapbox. What you have is a court of fools. Congratulations.

I'll end this simply with another beg to stop being contacted. If you really 
need attention this badly, consider hiring a prostitute. 



- Original Message -
From: skut...@online.no
To: lilasq...@googlegroups.com
Cc: ajb...@psu.edu dmbucha...@hotmail.com ho...@darkstar.uk.net 
daneglo...@gmail.com
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:28:12 AM
Subject: Re: [LS:9743] The social level.

John
Regarding the Sociability re-examined thread at the MD. Sorry to
have gotten you into trouble by saying that you had the 3rd level =
Religion from me. However you corrected it and I accept that you had
harbored that from before. From now I act as if I participate in the MD
discussion.

The MD seems like a contest of non-MOQ-ishness and when true
quality inputs are made they act like a disturbed hornet's nest. You
referred to an interview (Baggini) where Pirsig say that in a sense
everything is social and Dan asked you to where exactly he says so.
One just have to go to Pirsig's letter to Paul Turner (2003) .

There has been a tendency to extend the meaning of social down into the
biological with the assertion that, for example, ants are social, but I
have argued that this extends the meaning to a point where it is useless
for classification. I said that even atoms can be called societies of
electrons and protons. And since everything is thus social, why even have
the word?

B:
However the term religion make the lesser minds like Horse go to
church.:

Horse to JC:
 No it's not - religion is a social pattern, not the Social level. Don't be
 silly!

Then the mastermind Arlo:
 Of course its a very sophomoric idea. And here's the context behind it. Bo
 (who apparently still monitors MD) sent me an email that read, in part,
 About religion as the social definition is something John has from me,
 but he omitted my reservations and qualifications. So now you know where
 this is originating. Whatever other deductions you make from this are up
 to you.

Bo:
See if Bo (who has saved the MOQ from DMB's travesty) is behind it,
it's like poking the proverbial hornet's nest.

Then the ûber-mastermind DMB:
 Yes, a very sophomoric idea and a conspicuously self-serving idea too.
 It's not just a gross distortion to equate religion with the social level,
 it's not even true that all religion is social. The MOQ is a religion is
 some sense and yet it is intellectual.

Nonsense, the MOQ isn't social in any sense. The 3rd level's essence
is the notion of an afterlife and the myriad fall-outs (patterns)  from that
notion ... of which monotheist religions are rather late patterns. The
mentioned notion of an afterlife came along with human beings and
language which I believe also came along with Homo becoming
Sapient, meaning that the social level's (biological) building bock is
the human organism with its big brain and language.

DMB:
 The MOQ does not oppose religion per se but rather opposes the
 assertion of social level values (from social level religions) over
 intellectual values. And of course this is a real-world problem, as in
 the case where creationism is taught in science classes along side of
 instead of the theory of evolution or the cases where our rights are
 subverted or distorted by traditional forms of bigotry and oppression.

B:
Elementary Dr Buchanan, but I can't see the relevance.

DMB:
 I mean, 

Re: [MD] Sociability Re-examined

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Craig]
Consider a lion pride where the lionesses hunt  bring the catch back to the 
male lion to eat first. This is social (in the sense that ants  bees are 
social insects but moths aren't).

[Arlo]
Not according to my view, not according to Tomasello's view. Sociality requires 
purposeful, semiotic, mediated activity. What you are describing is 
instinctual. Think of it this way, have you ever seen a lioness and a lion 
argue about who's going out to make the kill? Again, the shared attention of 
Tomasello (I really wish you'd read it to help avoid these misconceptions) is 
biological, but it is the first 'step' up the ladder to sociality. Sociality is 
not instinct, and it is not instinctual coordination. It is not responding to 
pheromone trails. 

[Craig]
But Pirsig does not consider it 3rd level because it lacks something that on 
earth only human interaction has.

[Arlo]
Ultimately, I believe, this is an untenable proposition. If you make the jump 
from biology to sociality so extreme as to include 'only humans', you can't 
account for the transition at all. Its just some magical thing that appears out 
of nowhere on top of human physiology. 

What Tomasello offers is an ability to define not only human behavior as 
social, but to account for the border, and to provide a language for talking 
about ALL social patterns. So far, it is the most comprehensive lens for 
talking about social patterns because it applies as equally and as correctly to 
the earliest human dyads as well as the most complex human cities.

But, of course, I freely admit Tomasello introduces non-human social behavior, 
but again, this is not any coordinated animal behavior, only that which (1) is 
built of the recognition of the 'other' as a similar agenic being, and (2) is 
mediated and purposeful. Only a very small strata of (mostly) primate behavior 
even touches upon this, and even then we are talking (in the MOQ) about simple 
social patterns very near the bio/socio border. Modern human social activity 
is, of course, highly evolved social patterns that, in turn, border the 
socio/intellectual divide.

[Craig]
That is, is there an example of humans acting in a social manner but which is 
not on the 3rd level? 

[Arlo]
All 'social' behavior is 3rd level. If you are going to define a 'social level' 
that does not include all 'social' patterns, then you're off on a track that I 
have little interest in. Are there 'biological' behaviors that are not 2nd 
level? Inorganic behavior that is not 1st level? That's just getting quite 
absurd, IMO.

[Craig]
If so, then we could consider what would need to change to make it a case of 
the 3rd level.

[Arlo]
All the thoughts I've introduced require nothing to change, other than 
admitting some rudimentary or proto non-human sociality near the bio/socio 
divide. Other than that, shared attention, and activity (again, in the 
Russian sense of agenic, purposeful, semiotic, mediated) allows us a lens to 
understand sociality without resorting to all kinds of illogical or absurd 
leaps. It is supported by archeology, by anthropology, by evolutionary 
physiology, it explains not just ontogeny (growth and maturation of the child) 
but also phylogeny (growth and evolution of the species). 


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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Craig]
What I think Bratman is saying is that what makes us individual agents is our 
individual plans and what makes us social agents emerges from the plans of 
individuals.

[Arlo]
Thanks, Craig. I think this is different than what Tomasello (and the 
socio-cultural tradition) argues. But I will still take a look at it when I get 
the chance.

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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Craig]
For the latest on this topic:
http://www.amazon.com/Shared-Agency-Planning-Theory-Together/dp/0199339996/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8sr=1-1qid=1408394217

[Arlo]
Thanks, Craig. I am unfamiliar with Bratman, but will add this to my list to 
take a look at. 

One note, as I had said in a post to Ant, typically those working with the 
sociocultural tradition align with Pirsig's MOQ as a basic tenet of both is 
that sociality emerges from biology. I am not sure I see this in the overview 
for this book where it states There is an independent reason - grounded in the 
diachronic organization of our temporally extended agency - to see planning 
structures as basic to our individual agency. Once these planning structures 
are on board, we can expect them to play central roles in our sociality. Here, 
I'd want to explore what Bratman means by planning structures (and how they 
get on board), as I've not encountered anyone using this term before. 

By the way, I do see in Tomasello's newest book (The Natural History of Human 
Language), which I have not read yet either (too much to read, most days I feel 
like Burgess Meredith in the Twilight Zone), now refers shared intentionality 
rather than shared attention, so there ya go. :-)

 
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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Jan Anders]
I don’t think social patterns must consist of humans. Most animals and herbs 
are using sexual strategies to breed.

[Arlo]
Sexual strategies are biological, not social, so I am not sure how these two 
thoughts follow each other.

And, no, like you I do not think the social level is exclusively human. I do 
think, however, that non-human social patterns are found near the 
biological/social border, and are primitive or proto- as compared to evolved 
and complex social patterns we see in human activity. Saying this, I realize, 
will disturb both the 'purists' who (admittedly, along with Pirsig) mark the 
bio/socio divide with exclusively human activity, and the animists who will 
interpret my remarks as unfairly anthropomorphically biased (which perhaps they 
are). However, as my 'springboard' is the neural-mass-enabled 'shared 
intentionality', certainly we see (in primates or animals with sufficiently 
complex neural structures) some rudimentary forms of social activity. As I've 
said, this is to be distinguished from the bio-chemical/pheromone structured 
behavior of ants and bees, for example. In any event, once we traverse the 
border and start to move up the social-evolutionary spectrum towards highly 
complex social patterns, we do start to see more exclusively human activity. 

[Jan Anders]
It now appears to me that this Celebrity is to social patterns as sex is to 
biological patterns.” must be a formal flaw in Lila. RMP was right when he said 
the Victorian social pattern were supressing sex as sex was a representative 
for the lower organic level. Sexual activities and erotic patterns were banned 
because it led to undesireable organic reproduction.. 

[Arlo]
Again, not following your reasoning here. Sex is (one way) biological patterns 
reproduce, or sex is the way most advanced biological patterns reproduce. I 
don't see how the Victorian repression of sexual activity would deny that 
'celebrity' is (one way) social patterns reproduce. This was given, by Pirsig, 
as an example of a higher order pattern exerting control over a lower level 
pattern; i.e., social patterns dominating biological patterns.

[Jan Anders]
Sexually social patterns appear now to belong to the social level as they are 
acts of shared intention and attention, depending upon and using organic 
patterns for their own benefit and purpose, increasing the rate of mutations 
per generation into a superior number in an exponential figure. 

[Arlo]
Ah, I think you are confusing human sexual rituals with sexual reproduction. 

No, the act of sexual reproduction does not require shared attention. Go to a 
farm and watch the cows. But, certainly, as social beings, we enact a lot of 
social ritual around sexual behavior. Certainly sexual selection has become a 
social activity. Determining consent, boundaries, expectations, precautions, 
all of these are social rituals humans partake in on top of the biological act 
of sex. 



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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Jan Anders]
So you think a cow can’t say no? Or that the bull doesn’t give a shit about 
her? Maybe if they are stalled and bound in a meat factory but not outside in 
the field.
You go to a farm, please. I have cows and bull(s) living just across the 
street. Self breeding stock.

[Arlo]
I am saying that the cows and bulls sexual behavior is strictly biologically. 
Sure, there are biological 'responses' to the bull, but they are not 
socially-mediated. If you are having trouble de-anthropomorphising cows, think 
about the horseshoe crab instead. 

And please keep in mind that Tomasello's notion of shared attention (or, now, 
shared intentionality) is a very specific construct, and should not be 
confused with any time two biological patterns are interacting. For instance, 
it emerges off the very specific (mutual) recognition of the 'other' as a 
similarly autonomous agent acting with the same attentional behavior.

Here is an article you might enjoy that attempts to clarify the varieties of 
'gaze' behaviors among humans and animals. It is not Tomasello-centric, but 
refers to his work. Gaze Following and Joint Visual Attention in Nonhuman 
Animals (Itakura, Kyoto University, 
http://www.psy.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/COE21/report/H15/9D-2.pdf).
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Re: [MD] Sociability Re-examined

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Horse to JC]
No it's not - religion is a social pattern, not the Social level. Don't be 
silly!

[Arlo]
Of course its a very sophomoric idea. And here's the context behind it. Bo (who 
apparently still monitors MD) sent me an email that read, in part, About 
religion as the social definition is something John has from me, but he 
omitted my reservations and qualifications. 

So now you know where this is originating. Whatever other deductions you make 
from this are up to you. 

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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John to Craig]
I agree.  Social is really such a general category for so many kinds of 
patterns. How about the label religion?

[Arlo]
Religion is one of many evolved social pattern. It is not the foundation of 
all social patterns. And it certainly is not the catalyzing nature of a 
biological pattern that allowed for the emergence of social from biological. 

Whatever you're proposing as the catalyzing agent, the carbon atom, that seeded 
the emergence of the social level out of the biological, has to have its roots 
in the biological (as the carbon atom has its roots in the inorganic), and has 
'something' that the dynamic forces can sieze.

This: Biological evolution can be seen as a process by which weak Dynamic 
forces at a subatomic level discover stratagems for overcoming huge static 
inorganic forces at a superatomic level. (LILA)

Becomes this: Social evolution can be seen as a process by which weak Dynamic 
forces at a subcellular level discover stratagems for overcoming huge static 
biological forces at a supercellular level.

And shared attention, a strategem rooted in subcellular neurology fits this 
process precisely. 

As for a 'lens' we can use to see social patterns, 'activity' (mediated, 
purposeful, semiotic) sees them all. In your proposal of religion, you are 
confusing one pattern with the level of patterns. It's akin to saying the 
biological level is the 'neural' level. Certainly, the brain is a biological 
pattern, but it is not the only biological pattern. 

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Re: [MD] similar to ZAMM/Phaedrus/Pirsig?

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[alyosha]
I'm searching for a book or person similar to ZAMM/Phaedrus/Pirsig, and would 
love to hear your ideas.

[Arlo]
I'd *strongly* recommend FSC Northrop's The Meeting of East and West.

It's a text on Oriental philosophy and it's the most difficult book he's ever 
read. He's glad to be alone and bored in this empty troop compartment, 
otherwise he'd never get through it.

The book states that there's a theoretic component of man's existence which is 
primarily Western (and this corresponded to Phædrus' laboratory past) and an 
esthetic component of man's existence which is seen more strongly in the Orient 
(and this corresponded to Phædrus' Korean past) and that these never seem to 
meet. These terms theoretic and esthetic correspond to what Phædrus later 
called classic and romantic modes of reality and probably shaped these terms in 
his mind more than he ever knew. The difference is that the classic reality is 
primarily theoretic but has its own esthetics too. The romantic reality is 
primarily esthetic, but has its theory too. The theoretic and esthetic split is 
between components of a single world. The classic and romantic split is between 
two separate worlds. The philosophy book, which is called The Meeting of East 
and West, by F. S. C. Northrop, suggests that greater cognizance be made of the 
undifferentiated aesthetic continuum from which the theoretic arises. (ZMM)

If you're looking for more of a 'reflective travelogue', I'd suggest Blue 
Highways by William Least Heat-Moon. It probably doesn't go into formal 
philosophy (per se) as much as you seem to want, but the themes and topics are 
there.

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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
I haven't read Tomasello but it sounds like a description of intersubjectivity 
in its earliest stage of development, the seed that would eventually grow into 
a common cultural space, a mental space, so to speak.

[Arlo]
Yes, I think that's right. Tomasello's main inquiry was in where/how the 
sociocultural emerged from the biological. I don't recall that he uses the term 
intersubjectivity, but from what I understand, yes, intersubjectivity is what 
emerges from shared attention (which is rooted in the biological).

[DMB]
It sounds like something wolves and chimpanzees could do to some extent.

[Arlo]
Right, although Tomasello's focus is on human phylogenetic evolution, and he'd 
likely argue that the leap from biologically-enabled shared attention to 
semiotically-mediated activity (social behavior) in humans was really his area 
of inquiry. As you know, I do think we see non-human species near the 
biological/social boundary, but I would agree with Tomasello that this is 
requires evidence of shared attention.

[DMB]
I guess the difference really shows up in the fact that culture grows and 
evolves whereas the social behavior of canines and primates is relatively fixed.

[Arlo]
Right. Its the transition from phylogentic evolution to sociocultural evolution 
that is unique to the human species. As Alexander Luria might have said, 'we 
don't just use tools, we improve them and they share our activity'. 

[DMB]
We can pretty well discern the difference even in the history of our species. 
Stone tools were used for a million years before any innovations began and then 
- all of a sudden - there was an explosion of new tool designs. And with that 
came all kinds of new social behaviors involving ritual and art, or at least 
decoration.

[Arlo]
Exactly. 'Humans' appear around 2 million years ago. For most of that time, 
evolution was still strictly biological. Little changed in the activity of 
humans. Then, around 200,000 years ago, the slow progression of biological 
evolution lead to the emergence of the neural mass that enabled shared 
attention. From this point on, social evolution has been rapid. Human activity 
changed more in the past 200,000 years than in the previous 1.8 million years. 
And this sociocultural evolution has been on a exponential curve. Canine 
activity is pretty much the same today as it was 2 million years ago. And this 
was precisely Tomasello's point, and I think Pirsig's as well, social patterns 
evolve (as do all patterns), and we can see/trace/study this evolution just 
like we can see/trace/study biological and inorganic patterns.


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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Arlo previously]
The basis for social patterns is, IMHO, activity (in the Russian sense; 
purposeful, agenic, semiotic, mediated). And the root, the carbon atom, for 
activity is shared attention.

[Craig]
IMHO the root of social activity is shared INtention, rather than shared 
ATtention.  Two people aware of each other watching a bird are not necessarily 
engaged in a social activity, but merely a biological activity. It only becomes 
a ritual if there is shared intention.

[Arlo]
I agree, Craig. I mentioned the definition caveat for activity to 
specifically include purposeful (which to me is intentional). And, I would 
think Tomasello (who's idea on shared attention I am using) would agree with 
you too. His description of shared attention includes mutually recognizing the 
intentionality of the conspecific; an academic way of saying that shared 
attention depends on recognizing that, like you, the 'other' is acting with 
intention. He uses the term shared attention as his ideas derive from 
mediated action, that intention requires something to be acted upon, 
whereas he might say shared intention doesn't necessarily convey acting in 
the world. In any event (I can't speak for him, obviously), I would agree with 
your point here, and its a good one to make.

But, I think he would say that two people watching a bird would be social if 
(1) as mentioned both recognize each other in that moment as intentional agents 
in the world, and (2) both recognize that they are sharing a social-semiotic 
reaction to the attentional 'object'. That they DON'T act together in that 
moment is overshadowed by that they COULD act in that moment. Like I said, I 
don't think we are in disagreement in substance, maybe just in terminology.





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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Dan]
I suppose it all depends on the definition of 'seeing.' As Ant brought up, all 
patterns are 'seen' as representations in the mind. I would say that 'seeing' a 
game is dependent upon underlying assumptions that are at work in all phases of 
our culture.

[Arlo]
So is 'seeing' a red blood cell under a microscope. Or 'seeing' a quark in a 
particle accelerator. If you took a person who had never seen a microscope, or 
had no idea what it was, and who had a culturally variant understanding of the 
human body, and you took him/her and told him to look into a microscope, s/he'd 
have no understanding of what s/he was looking at. All tools are cultural 
tools, and all depend on cultural assumptions, as you suggest. So, certainly, 
in this same way someone who had never seen a soccer match, or has never seen 
any organized sport, would probably not see the same social patterns that I 
would. This is, of course, exactly like the green flash of the sun. 

All I am suggesting is that ALL levels are visible, but you have to be looking 
with the right tool. But, yes, all tools require cultural familiarity. 

[Dan]
Exactly... I agree. Still, you would be using underlying assumptions built into 
our culture in establishing which person is POTUS. If we were to take a 
tribesman from some obscure corner of the globe and drop him into a White House 
meeting he would probably think they were all crazy as loons.

[Arlo]
Right, I think we are in agreement, Dan. Certainly an un-western-enculturated 
tribesman would not know how to use our 'activity' lens to see our social 
patterns. In the same way you or I would not be able to see his cultures social 
patterns with our 'activity' lens (this was, largely, Kluckhohn's point as 
referenced in LILA). But I think this extends to all tools, tools for examining 
all four levels require understanding or awareness of the cultural assumptions 
and 'knowledge' underlying that tool. 

By the way, I think we can see intellectual patterns as well, but here we can't 
use the 'activity' lens, we need a new tool, and I'd argue that 
semiotic/symbolic 'recursion/self-reference' is one lens we can use to examine 
intellectual patterns. Only saying this because I don't want the intellectual 
level to feel left out in all this. 

[Ant]
Thanks for that last post Arlo and especially for that phrase shared 
attention.  That's a nice intellectual tool that you discovered there.

[Arlo]
I think it works nicely as the emergent-catalyst for social patterns. In the 
same way that you can find carbon atoms at the base of all biological patterns, 
I think you can find shared attention at the base of all social patterns. I 
think the idea works well within the MOQ's framework of levels, as the question 
of 'how did social life emerge from biological life?' was exactly the question 
Tomasello was considering.

As an aside (mostly), I think that those operating within the general mindset 
of sociocultural theory present a strong overlap with the MOQ as this tradition 
specifically adopts a biological-social-intellectual evolutionary trajectory 
(even if they lack the MOQ's Quality-based ontology), whereas most others seem 
to work from a biological-intellectual or biological-consciousness 
perspective. Sociocultural theory has heavily informed 'activity theory' 
(which, to be fair, has its heart now in Scandinavia). This is why when I say 
'activity' I mean it in the Russian (and now heavily Scandinavian) sense 
defined as purposeful, agenic, semiotic, mediated.

[Ant]
P.S. Like Jan-Anders and Dan, I have also found Henry Miller's BIG SUR book a 
REALLY well written book. 

[Arlo]
With so many accolades appearing on this list, I've added this book to my 
queue. :-)


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Re: [MD] Welcome to Horse's MOQ Wild West Saloon Bar

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Jan Anders]
A philosophy that doesn’t include sex is not complete.

[Arlo]
If you haven't already, you should look over Michel Foucault's three volume 
History of Sexuality. I don't have them in front of me at the moment, so I'm 
copying this description from Wikipedia.

History of Sexuality, Volume I, Part III:
Part three, Scientia Sexualis, explores the development of the scientific 
study of sex, the attempt to unearth the truth of sex, a phenomenon which 
Foucault argues is peculiar to the West. In contrast to the West's sexual 
science, Foucault introduces the ars erotica which he states has only existed 
in Ancient and Eastern societies.

I will admit I spend more time on the ideas he developed in Discipline and 
Punish, but History of Sexuality is interesting, and maybe something that would 
support/contrast/extend the ideas you're working on.

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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Jan-Anders]
Football and other team sports can be considered as instruments for evaluating 
social patterns of ”shared attention”, isn’t it? 

[Arlo]
I'm not exactly sure of what you mean by evaluating. Taking a stab, I 
overheard someone tell in my local pub say that Mario Goetze's World Cup Final 
goal was  a work of art. Certainly, the work of art was the coordination, 
awareness, precision and communication between not just Andre Schurrle and 
Mario Goetze, but the entire team. In that sense, yes, I'd say that the 
activity displayed among the German team day was 'artistry' (read high quality 
endeavor). And, I admit I choose soccer in my example specifically because of 
the (IMHO) obvious need for all players to have shared attention on the ball 
(in order to succeed). 

But, I'd caution here that I am not saying that social patterns are nothing 
more than shared attention. The World Cup is no more 'just shared attention' 
any more than the human body is 'just carbon atoms'. Shared attention (I argue) 
is present in all social patterns, the same way carbon atoms are present in all 
biological patterns, but I am not arguing that social patterns = shared 
attention (which, again, would be like saying biological patterns = carbon 
atoms). As Tomasello argued, shared attention is a specific feature of a 
complex neural mass, not a social pattern in and of itself. It is what enabled 
the emergence of the social level. From this evolutionary stratagem (as 
Pirsig refers to carbon bonding) appears increasingly complex semiotic, 
mediated activity (social patterns).

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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Jan Anders]
Football, shared attention and sex are only examples of patterns at the levels, 
we should hold on to RMP’s definition to be able to extract the more details 
better. 

Celebrity is to social patterns as sex is to biological patterns. Now he was 
getting it. This celebrity is Dynamic Quality within a static social level of 
evolution. It looks and feels like pure Dynamic Quality for a while, but it 
isn't. Sexual desire is the Dynamic Quality that primitive biological patterns 
once used to organize themselves. Celebrity is the Dynamic Quality that 
primitive social patterns once used to organize themselves. That gives 
celebrity a new importance.” Lila

[Arlo]
I don't have any qualms with Pirsig's description of celebrity as the social 
equivalent to biological sex. But here, too, I'd caution that to reduce all 
social patterns to celebrity would be like reducing all biological patterns 
to sex. I think all of these: shared attention, celebrity and (I'd strongly 
argue) activity (*in the previously mentioned Russian/Scandinavian sense), 
are all necessary and important aspects to talking about social patterns and 
the social level (in the same way that carbon atoms, sex and neural masses are 
all important ways to consider and understand the biological level).

Now I'm bumping up against my daily quota (for the first time in a long while), 
so I'll catch up on any further remarks tomorrow. 

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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Dan]
If you are talking about the MOQ, then social patterns have nothing to do with 
groups of individuals.

[Arlo]
I this this is right. On all the MOQ levels we can see 'individual' patterns 
and 'groups' of patterns. This is why I think what we are looking for (in 
locating the catalyst-agent from which social emerges from biological) is 
'shared attention' (which, to clarify, can occur even with one body present). 
Obviously, there is an evolution of complexity within the social level, just as 
within the biological level (amoeba to human body), so the earliest, simplest 
social patterns would have consisted of brief, simple moments of 'shared 
attention', while on the other end of the level we see the complex social 
patterns underlying such activities as the World Cup (and probably at this 
complex level we see also an interplay or co-presence of both social and 
intellectual patterns). 

[Dan]
Social patterns cannot be seen. They exist in the mind, not in physical reality.

[Arlo]
I'm going to disagree with you here. Or I think I am. Maybe its just the 
wording. But I'd say social patterns exist 'in the activity'. I think 
juxtaposing 'mind/physical reality' here reinstates an S/O view I know you 
don't hold. And so, I'd say, we most absolutely can see social patterns. I 
recently saw a beautiful one that won the World Cup for Germany, but really I 
see them around me all the time. We are awash in social patterns, to the point 
where I'd say its almost hard to NOT see them.

[Dan]
No matter how closely you examine the man you will find nothing to lead you to 
believe that he is President of the United States.

[Arlo]
Well, no, if you are suggesting looking for a social pattern by looking on the 
biological level. But let me watch five people engaged in their genuine 
activity and I'll tell you right away which on is President of the United 
States. So, yes, microscopes are useful tools for making biological patterns 
more visible. But here you're just suggesting the wrong tool for the job. 

The basis for social patterns is, IMHO, activity (in the Russian sense; 
purposeful, agenic, semiotic, mediated). And the root, the carbon atom, for 
activity is shared attention. 

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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Jan-Anders]
Transposed to human and animal organisations this means that groups of 
different members playing certain roles are making better results than 
individuals.

[Arlo]
I think its important to stress that 'individuals' whose behavior is mediated 
by a social-semiotic system (e.g. language) are still acting socially even 
if there are, at that precise moment, no other humans co-present. In other 
words, social activity is not measured by counting the number of biological 
agents present at any given time, but by looking at the nature of the activity 
in question. 

As Siouxsie sings in Israel: Even though we're all alone. We are never on our 
own. When we're singing, singing.

In the example above, it is the semiotically-mediated nature of the activity of 
the 'different members' that evidences social activity. This also starts to 
allow us to zoom our focus in at the fractal boundary between biological and 
social patterns. As you suggest (and I agree) certain animal (non-human) groups 
do evidence (what I'd call) proto- or rudimentary social behavior, precisely 
because we see proto-semiosis in certain animal activity. Certainly, we do not 
see a level of semiotic complexity among animal activity that we do see within 
human activity. But I do believe this is a difference of 'phenotype' not of 
'genotype'.



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Re: [MD] A message for John Carl

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ian]
In fact I was tempted to respond to this from Arlo 

...As I tell students I work with, the simplest progression is A said B. A 
was wrong about B. This is why A was wrong about B. I propose C instead of B. 
Here's why C is better. Each step in this progression is subject to 
examination for accuracy, and you can't conflate criticism with one step as 
criticism for another (or all).

That this is the problem.
It's all criticism, the cart before the horse.
Nothing before the disagreement.

[Arlo]
Except, what I wrote is not criticism by any stretch of that word. It's a 
simple presentation of a process. Could I have been more elaborate? Perhaps. 
But I guess I am used to working with people who wouldn't need this process 
elaborated upon. Apparently, I was wrong. (Yes, you can count THAT as 
criticism.)

I am tempted to point out that your reply to this, however, was all criticism. 
And you didn't follow your Dennett-steps yourself. 

[Ian]
Criticism is to be used very, very, very, very sparingly, and only after 1, 2 
and 3 are established in the conversation.

[Arlo]
Do as I say, not as I do, eh? (Count that as a bonus criticism.)




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Re: [MD] Discretion

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
Maybe my problem with Pirsig's lack of intellectualizing about art is just 
this:  Art shouldn't be intellectualized.

[Arlo]
I'm not sure what you meant to say above, but this is contradictory. If art 
shouldn't be intellectualized, why would Pirsig's lack of intellectualizing 
about art be a problem?

This would make sense (logically) if you removed lack of from the statement, 
but then the only solution would be for Pirsig to have never written either 
book (assuming by intellectualizing you mean talking about it at all). Could 
Pirsig have written either ZMM or LILA without any intellectual treatment of 
art? Or Zen? Or Dynamic Quality? Obviously, trying to unite the S/O-duality of 
separating classical and romantic thinking required Pirsig to address both. 
And of course Pirsig was, himself, aware of the inherent degeneracy of a 
metaphysics with a central undefined term. But, again, the solution would 
be...? Would you have preferred he did not write the books?

Nonetheless, I don't think Pirsig ever 'intellectualizes' art. What he does is 
bring the artistic impulse, the high-quality endeavor, back into the domain of 
everyday lived experience. He rescues 'art' from the museums and the walled 
gardens of elitism by showing how 'art' is lived Quality. 

In his essay What is art?, Tolstoy writes: Art is a human activity 
consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain external 
signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that other people 
are infected by these feelings and also experience them.

Broadly, for Tolstoy, art is (high-quality), deliberate, communicative 
endeavor, but bear in mind that this endeavor is historical, becoming a 
relationship both with him who produced, or is producing, the art, and with 
all those who, simultaneously, previously, or subsequently, receive the same 
artistic impression. 

Notice that for Tolstoy (as with Pirsig), the appreciation (or recognition of 
the 'art-act/object') is inherently personal, it is between the 'interlocutors' 
in the art-dialogue, it is not a 'stamp' placed on an object by a committee, 
nor is it restricted to certain domains of external signs. 

And I think there is a world of difference between (1) intellectualizing art, 
(2) intellectualizing about art, (3) intellectualizing artfully (or maybe 
'artisizing intellect'). The first reduces 'art' to an intellectual pattern. 
The second seeks to understand what we mean when we say 'art'. The third 
results from an understanding that 'intellectualizing' can be as artful as 
painting or dancing. In every case, though, its impossible to even use the term 
'art' if it isn't intellectualized to some degree, no? If we use the word, we 
have to have at least a rudimentary shared understanding as to what the word 
means, don't we?

Last point about Tolstoy's essay, which I think is still relevant today (and 
echoes, IMO, the central theme of ZMM): Art, in our society, has been so 
perverted that not only has bad art come to be considered good, but even the 
very perception of what art really is has been lost. In order to be able to 
speak about the art of our society, it is, therefore, first of all necessary to 
distinguish art from counterfeit art.

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Re: [MD] Discretion

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Arlo previously]
Broadly, for Tolstoy, art is (high-quality), deliberate, communicative 
endeavor, but bear in mind that this endeavor is historical, becoming a 
relationship both with him who produced, or is producing, the art, and with 
all those who, simultaneously, previously, or subsequently, receive the same 
artistic impression.

[John]
But communication is more than personal.  Who communicates with himself?  If 
Art is communicative, then some other must be intended, no?

[Arlo]
Just a quick answer here, because its a little off-topic. You have to remember 
that in the Russian tradition 'communication' is both 'internal' and 
'historical'. Bakhtin summarized this with the term ventriloquation. Simply, 
the manipulation of symbols is inherently social, inherently communicative, as 
it always is 'responsive' and 'anticipative'. That is, everything we 'say' 
(through language or some other form of symbol-system) is at heart a response 
to a previous statement and at the same time framed to anticipate being itself 
responded to. In addition to this historical aspect, Bakhtin explains the 
interalized-sociality of expression by pointing out that all expressed symbols 
inherently include the voices of others. In the simplest sense, thinking to 
yourself in a quiet room all by yourself is a social-communicative act. In this 
light, to answer your last point, yes, communication always anticipates (or 
intends) some 'other', as well as itself being responsive to some '
 other'. 

[Arlo previously]
Last point about Tolstoy's essay, which I think is still relevant today (and 
echoes, IMO, the central theme of ZMM): Art, in our society, has been so 
perverted that not only has bad art come to be considered good, but even the 
very perception of what art really is has been lost. In order to be able to 
speak about the art of our society, it is, therefore, first of all necessary to 
distinguish art from counterfeit art.

[John]
What art really is, cannot be defined, except badly.  Art can't be defined.  
Art can only be experienced.  Art IS Quality.

[Arlo]
While I agree that art cannot be defined, I think it can be understood, and I 
think what Tolstoy (and Pirsig) are saying is that the modern social-cultural 
understanding of 'art' has been perverted. Neither are proposing a rigid 
definition, but neither are both saying that its so mystic we can't talk about 
better ways to understand what art is. 

For example, Tolstoy writes, It is true that this indication is an internal 
one, and that there are people who have forgotten what the action of real art 
is, who expect something else form art (in our society the great majority are 
in this state), and that therefore such people may mistake for this aesthetic 
feeling the feeling of diversion and a certain excitement which they receive 
from counterfeits of art.

This correlates strongly with what Pirsig saw in ZMM, Along the streets that 
lead away from the apartment he can never see anything through the concrete and 
brick and neon but he knows that buried within it are grotesque, twisted souls 
forever trying the manners that will convince themselves they possess Quality, 
learning strange poses of style and glamour vended by dream magazines and other 
mass media, and paid for by the vendors of substance. He thinks of them at 
night alone with their advertised glamorous shoes and stockings and 
underclothes off, staring through the sooty windows at the grotesque shells 
revealed beyond them, when the poses weaken and the truth creeps in, the only 
truth that exists here, crying to heaven, God, there is nothing here but dead 
neon and cement and brick.

Art is the Godhead as revealed in the works of man is not a bad definition of 
art. It is, I'd argue, quite good. But good in a MOQ sense, as a map that 
does a good job of orienting our travels (and importantly, a better job than 
the one currently in use by many). 

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Re: [MD] Discretion

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
Is Pirsig about learning one route, and one route only?  If what we are 
supposed to take from his work, is memorizing words and parroting them exactly, 
then I guess I've really been wrong about ZAMM and Lila. 

[Arlo]
Any philosophy forum is open to (or should be open to) what I call learned 
disagreement. Philosophy itself, as a tradition, is a long narrative of 
thesis, disagreement, affirmation, reconstruction and extension. Pirsig, in 
this larger narrative, presents a learned disagreement with the Aristotelian 
tradition and how it has shaped cultural attitudes. His work is, in many ways, 
an extension of the works of James and Dewey and other pragmatists. It is not 
'copy', but it is not a soliloquy in a vacuum either. 

But (as DMB already pointed out numerous times), disagreement is predicated on 
an understanding of what you are, ostensibly, disagreeing with. This is why I 
refer to it as learned disagreement. In order to form a critical response to 
Aristotle, Pirsig had to really understand what Aristotle was saying. Here is 
where you 'disagreements' fall down. You keep presenting disagreement with 
Pirsig in ways that demonstrate you really don't understand Pirsig. Your 
question to Dan where is art? is an astounding example of this. Aside from 
the fact that Pirsig answers this very question, is the simplest of terms (Art 
is high-quality endeavor.), it ignores the entire endeavor, to unify a duality 
caused by the philosophical tradition he is criticizing. Art is not separate 
from, is not in opposition with, is not contrary to, intellectual endeavors. 
Art is as much a part of scientific practice as it is painting and drumming. 
Art is every much 'high-quality' motorcycle repair as it is 
 'high-quality' clay sculpting. 

Recently you've stated that the 4th level gives birth to the 3rd level. This 
is a more clear disagreement with Pirsig, as you're altering Pirsig's 
evolutionary model. But this also changes the notion of hierarchical moral 
superiority, unless this is a clear statement that social level patterns are 
morally superior to intellectual level patterns. Otherwise, you aren't really 
talking about an evolutionary morality (and certainly not Pirsig's MOQ).

In any case, John, as has been said many, many, many times, you are certainly 
free to disagree with Pirsig. You are certainly free to make a case for why 
your reconstruction is a better metaphysics than Pirsig's. I disagree with 
Pirsig on a few points. No one here is demanding you 'parrot' his words, that's 
just a fiction you're creating. But, those here who point out your 
disagreements are based in misunderstanding are absolutely correct in pointing 
this out.

As I tell students I work with, the simplest progression is A said B. A was 
wrong about B. This is why A was wrong about B. I propose C instead of B. 
Here's why C is better. Each step in this progression is subject to 
examination for accuracy, and you can't conflate criticism with one step as 
criticism for another (or all). 



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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Jan-Anders]
I'd like to complete step two first...

Now, what about step two? In Lila we can read that it is something about how 
the reproduction change from direct selfcopying into the superior schem called 
sexual reproduction which results in different copies that fit together in a 
social organisation that is superior to pure biological patterns. The social 
patterns are controlling and using the biological patterns, are dependant of 
biological patterns but social patterns are using biological structures for its 
own purpose.

[Arlo]
The same comments I made about step three apply here as well. As you narrow 
in on the boundary between biological and social patterns, you will likely find 
a more 'fractal' space than a clear, single line. This is because, as with the 
carbon atom being the catalyst for evolution from inorganic to biological 
levels, you are looking for not only the potentiality for evolution but at the 
simplest proto-patterns that may, at the level, not appear as 'social' when 
contrasted with the amazingly complex social milieu surrounding us today. 

As I mentioned, Michael Tomasello's work The Cultural Origins of Human 
Cognition also examines the 'bridge' between biological and social existence 
in our species. In doing so, he traces what he calls the possibility for 
shared attention to specific neural structures in the evolving human brain. 
Before cries of reductionism resound, keep in mind that he is not saying this 
neural space 'caused' social behavior, any more than Pirsig is saying the 
carbon atom 'caused' biological existence. What both Pirsig and Tomasello are 
doing is looking for that 'latch' (Pirsig in the inorganic level, and Tomasello 
in the biological level) than served as the catalyst for dynamic evolution. 
Just as all biological life, from the simplest single-celled organism to the 
homo-sapien, owes its existence to the unique capacity of the carbon atom, all 
social life, from the simplest act of joint activity to the splendor of the 
World Cup, owes its existence to the unique capacity of a neural mass
  allowing for shared attention. 

Here is a derivative paper that explains it: Do you see what I see? The neural 
basis of joint attention. Redcay  Saxe.
http://www.dscn.umd.edu/DSCN/papers/Redcay_Saxe_JA.pdf

Of course maybe others have other theories or ideas as to what the 'carbon 
atom' was that provided the catalyst for evolution from the biological to the 
social level. Tomasello, obviously, is not writing in direct correspondence 
with Pirsig, even though they map together very nicely. 


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Re: [MD] Post-Intellectualism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
But some merely use the quips and quotes that seem to validate them. I don't 
what that's called, but it ain't the love of wisdom and I can only see the most 
common and crude value in that; ego

[Ant]
I fully agree with Dave here.  I would just add that some of these latter ego 
driven people primarily just like the attention.

[Arlo]
You two are so naive. ;-)

See, I think its often a bit more insidious than simple ego or attention. For 
example, it was painfully obvious from his many posts that, for Bo, SOL was a 
means to elevate Euro-Christian culture as morally superior to those inferior 
dark-skinned Muslims. Remember that, in this formulation, Christianity became 
an intellectual-level pattern, while Islam was an- INFERIOR- social-level 
pattern. That entire endeavor was predicated on a desire to demonstrate why his 
culture and it's (ostensibly) dominate religion were morally superior to 
others. Remember that this is a guy who felt the MOQ provided moral authority 
to criminalize wearing a hijab.

Platt, in a similar vein, had a two-fold agenda. At times his MOQ was altered 
to be inorganic-biological-social-individual as a way of denouncing whatever 
collectivist boogeyman Fox was warning about that particular week. At other 
times, his Fox-fueled rage at the media and academia led him to condemn 
intellect as SOL as a means of demoting it dominance over society. In this 
regard, he promoted the SOL as a way of ensuring that society should not follow 
intellectual principles (this was the guy that once said to me he supported a 
state's right to make interracial marriage illegal). In both ways, the SOL 
served to ensure that white-conservative values had moral dominance over 
immigrant-liberal (SOL) values.

With Marsha the SOL made strange bedfellows, as it was obvious that for her the 
SOL gave her a way of rebelling against 'male-dominated' institutions. 
Intellect was, basically, just dumb, boring white males, and the SOL gave her 
a excuse to ignore whatever 'they' said. This is why Bo, at least, made a token 
attempt to 'reason' the SOL, even if his reason was always dubious and 
sophomoric (although laden with delusions of grandeur). Marsha flat out 
rejected reason itself, and flaunted her incoherence as evidence of moral 
superiority over all the dumb, boring white males who just didn't 'groove'. For 
Marsha, Lila was the hero to emulate; Phaedrus was just another stupid man 
trying to tie her down with reason and intellect.  

John, well, he's the guy who insists he understands Einstein's Theory of 
Relativity while at the same time denouncing it for 'ignoring Spacetime'. 
Yeah, sure Mr. Einstein, if your Theory of Relativity is so great, then how 
come you don't account for spacetime? To which I can only really shake my head 
and sigh. I think, legitimately, John is stuck in having normalized ZMM's 
problem space. For him, the division of 'art' and 'science' is natural, and the 
solution is to keep them functionally separate but kinda slosh them together a 
bit. When he asked me would you want a sculptor repairing your motorcycle? it 
was one of those bizarre questions that really evidences a gross 
misunderstanding of Pirsig's entire undertaking. But, of course, that's where 
the ego comes in, and he simply turns all the evidence of this misunderstanding 
into proof of his genius. His incoherence, in his mind, is proof only that no 
one understands his brilliance. 

Where is art?... Indeed, Mr. Einstein, just where is spacetime in your 
theory, you loser, bow to my genius. 

In the end, Ant, as Ron White is fond of saying, you can't fix stupid.




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Re: [MD] Step two

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Jan-Anders]
When we have done step two clear we can go on to the next step: step three. The 
understanding of the evolutionary step from the social level into the 
intellectual level.

[Arlo]
I think a critical consideration in this path of inquiry is to remember that 
the levels capture a wide range of complexity. You wouldn't begin an inquiry 
into the appearance of the biological level by envisioning lions or dolphins 
springing into existence directly from inorganic patterns. If you zoom in on 
the boundary between inorganic and biological patterns you're going to 
encounter amoebas, bacterium and eventually simple carbon atoms. At that level 
of analysis, I think, you'll find the boundary to be more fractal than 
absolute. Theorists like Michael Tomasello have speculated that the boundary 
between biological and social patterns was precipitated by the simple moment of 
'shared attention'. That the simplest forms of 'social behavior' is just the 
recognition that something else is an attentional being like yourself. From 
that simple recognition (simple in act, although amazingly consequential) come 
all the larger and complex social structure we see around us today. I th
 ink you'll find the same thing when you zoom in on the boundary between 
intellectual and social patterns. What you want to find are those social 
'carbon atoms' that led to the simplest of intellectual patterns. 

The other things to keep in mind is that the emergence or appearance of one 
level does not entail a cessation of evolution on the lower levels, and 
emergence does not entail immediate dominance. The lives of the first 
proto-social humans was still largely dominated by biological necessity. 
Imagine the length of time between the behavior of those carbon atoms and the 
dominance of biology over inorganic forces. So I'd expect that the first 
proto-intellectual patterns existed before an era where we expect to see them 
as the dominate level. 

In ZMM, Pirsig traces the moment of 'dominance' (the conflict point at which 
intellect first began to assert dominance over social patterns) to the 
intellectual conflict between the Sophists and the Cosmologists. Some (like the 
SOL crowd) use this to assert that Pirsig places the entirety of 'intellect' as 
the offspring of the Greeks (another way of declaring moral superiority over 
the non-Eurocentric peoples), but instead Greece became the first visible 
battleground between intellect and society in our own cultural history. And, 
due to the outcome of that conflict (the Cosmologists won), it was a 
S/O-intellect that rose to dominance. Had the Sophists won, well, we'll never 
know what our own intellectual history would have looked like (we can glean 
some guesses by looking at the intellectual histories of the Orient and other 
global cultures outside the European trajectory (a la FSC Northrop).

I'm saying all this here because if this was a clash of intellectual 
orientations (Cosmologists vs. Sophists), then even here we are at the end of a 
long history since the first proto-intellectual patterns appeared. So you have 
to (IMHO) go back even further, to the origins and similarities that both of 
these traditions have evolved from. Someone once said to me that all 
intelligence was derived from the simple statement why?. Its pithy, and of 
course you'd have to substitute in the accurate early linguistic counterparts. 
Maybe its some perception of 'planned action', which must have predated (and 
enabled) the appearance of tool use.

Finally, keep in mind that when you identify this social 'carbon atom' you may 
not be identifying something noticeably 'intellectual'. Few consider a carbon 
atom to be in and of itself a biological life form, but nonetheless it was the 
catalyst from which all terran biology descends. 

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Re: [MD] Post-Intellectualism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John said]
...Here's a big problem, I have.  Where's art?  Where does art fit in?  You can 
say intellect but when you make intellect the arbiter of all reality, it 
tends to decide for itself what is art and what is not and that is a very bad 
idea. I don't misunderstand Pirsig on this subject, you dolt.  I argue with 
him.  And if you don't think it's permissible to argue with authority, in 
philosophical discussion, then you are in the wrong field completely my friend.

[dmb says]
This is NOT Pirsig's view and in fact Pirsig makes quite an effort to dispute 
the view you are pinning on him. This is not a matter of disagreeing with 
Pirsig but a matter of misunderstanding Pirsig - and in a very big way too. 

[Arlo]
Yeah, this is a horribly confused thing to say for someone who claims to I 
don't misunderstand Pirsig. 

Where is art? Besides in the title of his first book? In Chapter 8 (ZMM), 
Pirsig likens the art of motorcycle maintenance to the art of rationality. 
Here even a casual reader should be able to discern the role of art, 
something Pirsig makes explicit later on. Art is high-quality endeavor. That 
is all that really needs to be said. Or, if something more high-sounding is 
demanded: Art is the Godhead as revealed in the works of man.

Granger captures the implication here by noticing, Art is thus a part of our 
most elementary and indigenous mode of being in the world. (John Dewey, Robert 
Pirsig, and the Art of Living)

In LILA, Pirsig clarifies even further the nature of art within his MOQ. In 
a subject-object metaphysics morals and art are worlds apart, morals being 
concerned with the subject quality and art with object quality. But in the 
Metaphysics of Quality that division doesn't exist. They're the same. To make 
his position ultimately clear, he states, there's a fourth Dynamic morality 
which isn't a code. He supposed you could call it a code of Art or something 
like that...

Where is art? Art is Quality revealed in the works of man.

And which works? Just painting, sculpting, dancing? No. ALL works. Art is high 
quality endeavor in philosophy. Art is high quality endeavor in motorcycle 
repair. Art is high quality endeavor in culinary practice. Art is high quality 
endeavor in composition. In assembling rotisseries. In sculpting images from 
clay. 

And the goal? As Granger explains it, In learning to conduct more of everyday 
experience in an artful manner, we increase our ability to liberate and expand 
the potential meanings of things. 

Included on Ant's DVD is a 2010 interview with Pirsig, which Ant has titled 
The MOQ and Art. Here, Pirsig clarifies (again) his position on art. “I 
agree with Patrick Dourly that this corresponds to Gengrich’s(?) notion of art 
as mastery.  He does not think of art as an object (I think that was his first 
sentence) and neither does Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance or my 
ideas of the Metaphysics of Quality.  Art is endeavor.

I'm just going to encourage you to get this DVD, so I won't copy more than this 
one paragraph, which I think reflects precisely what Pirsig has already 
elaborated on in his earlier works. 

Oh, art as placed in the levels of evolution.  Well, if you read the 
Metaphysics of Quality, you know there are four levels of evolution: the 
Inorganic, the Biological, the Social, and the Intellectual.  And art is a 
mixture of all of those with Dynamic Quality if it’s really art – not – I say 
mixture - I don’t say it’s completely Dynamic Quality.  Finger painting by a 
two year old is Dynamic.  But it’s a mixture of somebody who knows how to 
satisfy the art traditions of history but at the same time has a direction that 
he wants to go on his own to some extent, so he’s not a complete copy-cat and 
he’s not a complete wild-man – he’s in between.  And, the amount of Dynamic 
Quality should not be overcome by Intellectual Quality, by these static 
patterns.  At the same time, the static patterns or the intellect- the Dynamic 
Quality should not overcome your static patterns to a point where it’s 
meaningless to a person who writes.

Which itself is simply an elaboration of this statement in ZMM: ...the art of 
the work is just as dependent upon your own mind and spirit as it is upon the 
material of the machine.

[DMB]
And there are many pieces of evidence showing that art is not to be confused 
with the fine arts, as Arlo so patiently and fruitlessly tried to show you.

[Arlo]
My money is on this confusion persisting.

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Re: [MD] Rethinking Education as the Practice of Freedom: Paulo Freire and the Promise of Critical Pedagogy

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ron]
Has anyone here read Paulo Freire? Has anyone linked his ideas of critical 
pedagogy with RMPs Work?

[Arlo]
I've mentioned Freire several times over the years. The perennial and, now, 
generational educational crisis in America, I believe, results from a 
societal inability to answer the fundamental question why educate? We talk 
about testing and assessment and standards but few can articulate a 'purpose' 
behind the structure, and those that can (and do) are those that have come to 
see education as a servant to capitalism; the goal of education is to meet 
labor demands.

This is evident in every budget cut that guts arts and the humanities in favor 
of math and science. It is evident every time someone comments on a class, 
course or degree by asking what is the cost-benefit of taking this? It is 
evident every time someone responds to I have a degree in philosophy (or 
theatre, or poetry, or history) with something amounting to that degree was a 
waste of money/is useless. It is evident when the U.S. government moves to tie 
awarding student loans to the income potential of a degree. 

Many Universities actually market themselves as no-frills (i.e., no time wasted 
on irrelevant things like the arts and literature) vocational schools. Indeed, 
in the very act of marketing themselves, many universities have become 
themselves more and more like corporations. 

Into all this, I think the two most important voices on education are Freire 
and Dewey. Obviously, Granger's work has already established a link between 
Dewey and Pirsig. As for Freire, here is the abstract for Graham Patterson's A 
Pedagogy for Teachers and Other Educational Decision Makers: Paulo Freire 
advocates a problem posing approach based on dialogue which is quite different 
to a problem solving approach that assumes the decision maker has all the 
necessary knowledge and wisdom. There is rather interesting and unexpected 
support for Freire's problem posing approach in Pirsig's didactic novel, Zen 
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. These two writers, Freire and Pirsig, 
have a similar message for teachers and administrators even though their styles 
and contexts are “worlds” apart.


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Re: [MD] Arlo

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
Asymmetrical responses? Wait, wasn't it you that said there was new proof that 
they were homogenous?

[Arlo]
Sigh. Really? Really?? This is why its such a waste of time to respond to you 
directly, John. 

Every.. count them, EVERY... post I made about this (including the very one 
with all those citations), I have reiterated of course there are 
lateralization differences. I have never said, nor even let open to 
implication, that the two sides were homogenous. And yet here you are, 
despite all that in EVERY SINGLE POST, making this absurd response like AHA! 
there are differences! and you said there were none.

Sigh.

So. For the record. YOU claimed that dominant left-brainedness and 
right-brainedness mapped to people who were classical thinkers and 
romantic thinkers. I pointed out that either way you frame it, that 
classical/romantic thinking caused- or was caused by- left/right brain 
dominance WAS WRONG. Period. And the research backs this up completely.

And, in my very first reply I pointed out some of the lateralization they DID 
find, e.g. language tends to be left-lateralized. But this lateralization is 
UNIVERSAL. Language was just as left-lateralized for Einstein as for Picasso. 
And neither of them 'thought more with one side of their brain'. ANY 
lateralization effect found tends to be either universal in this way, or 
individually unique for people who have suffered some form of brain injury.

So, sure, the brain divides tasks around its infrastructure (again, as I have 
said from day ONE), but this division IN NO WAY AT ALL maps to the 'classical 
mode' and 'romantic mode' of thinking that Pirsig describes as competing ways 
of understanding the word in ZMM.

Either you don't read what I write, or you willingly twist it to create an 
endless shifting-sands landscape of shameless rhetoric. Either way, its a waste 
of my time.


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Re: [MD] Arlo

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
Well clearly I was being ironic.  I don't think that differentiaion is bad. 

[Arlo]
Who said differentiation is bad? What you're doing is the reductio ad 
absurdum, by suggesting that because Pirsig sought to fuse classical and 
romantic modes of thinking (the result of SOM) into one, that ALL forms of 
difference (e.g. you suggested night and day and male and female) are 
useless.


[John]
Just to be clear, Arlo, are you saying the concept art ought to be eliminated?

[Arlo]
Art is high-quality endeavor. I've said this repeatedly. Why would you 
suggest I want to eliminate the concept? Art suffers under the 
classic/romantic schism, and, like Pirsig, I hold that uniting these RESCUES 
'art'.

[John]
You think that would make everybody more artistic in their academic and and 
economic production?

[Arlo]
Like Pirsig, I think expanding the concept of art to apply equally to 
motorcycle repair and painting make all forms of human activity potentially 
better. Yes, I think both academics and business professionals benefit from an 
understanding that unites (classical) 'science' and (romantic) 'art'.

[John]
You really think it would help us if we just eliminated all art classed, and 
then remove the name so we won't miss it?

[Arlo]
Again, this is absurd. But, on the level of terminology, why not rename 'art 
classes' to just say the activity? Painting 101, An Introduction to 
Sculpture, Music in the Middle Ages. Then we could have classes like The 
Art of Painting, The Art of Rhetoric, The Art of Rationality, The Art of 
Motorcycle Repair. 

But, here, I suggest you read Doorly. And Ant has already given you Doorly's 
way of approaching the terminology.

[John]
Since sculpture is the same as rotisserie assembly and motorcycle maintenance, 
then we don't need separate terms so lets just call it all what it is.

[Arlo]
Sculpting with clay, assembling a rotisserie, and repairing a motorcycle 
require both domain specific knowledge and an awareness that the patterns you 
are working on are in harmony with yourself and everything else. You continue 
to suggest that by uniting classical and romantic separations that anyone can 
do anything. Expertise derives from care, which derives from both an 
understanding of the historically accumulated knowledge on that activity AND an 
appreciation/awareness of immediate Quality. In LILA terms, you need BOTH 
static and Dynamic Quality. 

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Re: [MD] Arlo

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ian]
... different people have different propensities to mental styles that use the 
different halves.

[Arlo]
No. The research says exactly otherwise.

[IG] Evidence - ready when you are.

[Arlo]
I've already listed two different overviews of the current research. Each of 
these has links to the empirical studies cited. But, sure, I'll play along...

http://www.npr.org/blogs/13.7/2013/12/02/248089436/the-truth-about-the-left-brain-right-brain-relationship
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0071275
http://ideas.time.com/2013/11/29/there-is-no-left-brainright-brain-divide/
http://www.livescience.com/39373-left-brain-right-brain-myth.html
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/08/130814190513.htm
http://scan.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/4/475.abstract?sid=b99d03b9-38cc-4858-98e3-49f54244898d
http://www.spring.org.uk/2013/08/debunked-right-brain-and-left-brain-personalities.php
http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/more-left-brain-right-brain-nonsense/
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-theory-cognitive-modes/201401/left-brain-right-brain-wrong
http://www.yalescientific.org/2012/04/left-brain-right-brain-an-outdated-argument/

How, then, did the left-brained/right-brained theory take root? Experts 
suggest the myth dates back to the 1800s, when scientists discovered that an 
injury to one side of the brain caused a loss of specific abilities. The 
concept gained ground in the 1960s based on Nobel-prize-winning split-brain 
work by neuropsychologists Robert Sperry, and Michael Gazzaniga. The 
researchers conducted studies with patients who had undergone surgery to cut 
the corpus callosum – the band of neural fibers that connect the hemispheres – 
as a last-resort treatment for epilepsy. They discovered that when the two 
sides of the brain weren't able to communicate with each other, they responded 
differently to stimuli, indicating that the hemispheres have different 
functions.

Both of these bodies of research tout findings related to function; it was 
popular psychology enthusiasts who undoubtedly took this work a step further 
and pegged personality types to brain hemispheres.

According to Anderson:

The neuroscience community has never accepted the idea of 'left-dominant' or 
'right-dominant' personality types. Lesion studies don't support it, and the 
truth is that it would be highly inefficient for one half of the brain to 
consistently be more active than the other.

Yet, despite Anderson's work and other studies that continue to disprove the 
idea that personality type is related to one or the other side of the brain 
being stronger, my guess is that the left-brained/right-brained vernacular 
isn't going away anytime soon. Human society is built around categories, 
classifications and generalizations, and there's something seductively simple 
about labeling yourself and others as either a logical left-brainer or a 
free-spirited right brainer.

This is one of those memes that refuses to die. It’s a zombie-meme, the 
terminator of myths, one of those ideas of popular culture that everyone knows 
but is simply wrong – the idea that individuals can be categorized as either 
left-brain or right-brain in terms of their personality and the way they 
process information.

I have no doubt those whose profession depends on the 'brainedness' myth will 
go down with their sinking ship rather than follow the research. But, hey, 
Peirce talked about the strength of tenacity. But here's a grain of hope, maybe 
rather than turning this into a battle with me, you should really let this cast 
a little doubt on your beliefs.


Finally, I like how one author ends his article: The left-brain/right-brain 
dichotomy is pop-psychology pseudoscience. Be suspicious of anyone touting it 
as a legitimate or insightful way of looking at human personality or cognition.

Yep.

Finally, just to avoid the there are differences! reply, lateralization is 
universal, not personality-dependent. For example, language function 
lateralizes to the dominant hemisphere, which is the left hemisphere for most 
people. Visuo-spacial reasoning lateralizes to the non-dominant hemisphere 
(right hemisphere for most people). And again, even this can be overcome when 
necessary (neuroplasticity). 

At the very least, I hope anyone with half a brain will not put this idea that 
the hemisphere dominance myth maps on to Pirsig's notions of (SOM-derived) 
classical and romantic modes of thinking.


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Re: [MD] Arlo

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ian]
Clearly short-hand naming of groups can be misused...

[Arlo]
Clearly.

[Ian]
... different people have different propensities to mental styles that use the 
different halves.

[Arlo]
No. The research says exactly otherwise. The research says specifically that 
'mental styles' ARE NOT lateralized. I understand this will take some time 
before pop-psychologists and self-help gurus are able to accept the research, 
but its embarrassing to see this repeated here over and over. 

What IS lateralized, Ian, are things like 'language' which tends... FOR 
EVERYONE... to be left-lateralized. 

Do people have varying aptitudes, skills, abilities, interests, proficiencies, 
goals, talents...? Gee, of course they do. Are people brought up in a culture 
where science and art are not only divorced but antagonistic? Of course. Has 
'art' been devolved in our schools by capital interests to a zero-value 
commodity? Of course. This was the problem space of ZMM.

Rather than normalize or naturalize 'classical' versus 'romantic' modes of 
thinking, and rather than then trying to invoke faulty pop-psychology to 
imprint this distinction onto the biological level, maybe you and John should 
join every one else here in the solution space, where Pirsig's goal was to 
problematize this artificial distinction- as derivative of SOM thinking- and 
unite/fuse these two at the basic level. 

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Re: [MD] Minding half of your brain?

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ian]
I doubt John claimed belief that Pirsig's classical and romantic modes of 
thinking are neurological determined.

[Arlo]
No, you're right. He had reversed his claim into classic/romantic modes of 
thinking causes left/right brainedness.

[Ian]
More like neurologically supported, predictable, consistent, consilient,  
few things are determined in this world.

[Arlo]
Except they are not supported neurologically. All the current research 
suggests that 'logic' tasks and 'creative' tasks are not lateralized. 

Here's an overview that appeared on NPR.
http://www.npr.org/blogs/13.7/2013/12/02/248089436/the-truth-about-the-left-brain-right-brain-relationship

And, keep in mind, that lateralizations (or even verticalizations) found were 
universal, not dependent on the personality of the individual. 'Language' 
tends, they found, to be left-lateralized. But that has nothing to do with 
calling someone 'creative' or 'logical'.

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Re: [MD] Anti-intellectualism revisited

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
One of the objections sometimes raised (against an intellectually guided 
society) is that some ideas are bad ideas. Intellectual static patterns of low 
quality should be trumped by social patterns, they might add. But, again, we 
can never discern the difference between good ideas and bad ideas without 
intellect. That's what we mean by intellectual values. It's not that we're 
supposed to love every idea just because it's an idea.

[Arlo]
The irony, of course, is that the same people who condemn 'intellect' on the 
grounds that some ideas are bad, and the same people that, on those grounds, 
demand that social patterns dominate intellectual patterns... these are the 
same people that turn and say that all 'interpretations' of Pirsig are equally 
valid, that there is no way to discern who is right and who is wrong, its all 
just a matter of opinion. Witness John who continues to not only dwell in ZMM's 
problem space, but he has naturalized it into the way things are. Its no longer 
a problem, people are either 'classical' or 'romantic' and rather than unite 
these into one the best we can do is help classical people think a little more 
'artistically' and help romantic people think a little more 'logically'. But 
(for John) this is an entrenched distinction, not one to be overcome, but one 
that just IS. And, of course, he can claim that this represents Pirsig's ideas 
because, after all, its all just opinion and interpretation. 

The answer is Phædrus' contention that classic understanding should not be 
overlaid with romantic prettiness; classic and romantic understanding should be 
united at a basic level. (ZMM)

In each case there's a beautiful way of doing it and an ugly way of doing it, 
and in arriving at the high-quality, beautiful way of doing it, both an ability 
to see what looks good and an ability to understand the underlying methods to 
arrive at that good are needed. Both classic and romantic understandings of 
Quality must be combined. (ZMM)

This is the solution, a fusion of classic and romantic quality (ZMM), that 
continues to evade John, despite his reliance on slippery sophistry. Because, 
as you correctly pointed out, it contradicts the notion that intellect is 
*inherently* SOM (and its correlate that 'art' is confined to 'the romantic'). 
And THAT, of course, is like a frustrating cancer that the anti-intellectuals 
continue to propagate. 

[DMB]
It's the quality of the idea that matters, of course, and that's why we're 
supposed to care about things like clarity, coherence, consistency with the 
evidence, honesty, precision is the use of words and the relations between 
concepts. These aren't arbitrary demands or oppressive rules used to squelch 
dissent or anything like that. They are just some of the most common marks of 
intellectual quality. Ideally, you want to raise this to an art form and those 
will be some of the likely ingredients. The art of rationality requires 
intellectual quality and then some.

[Arlo]
This is worth repeating. Its the outcome of overcoming the problem of the 
classical/romantic schism. Reason is an art, with its own markers of Quality. 
Just like motorcycle repair, painting, dance, music, welding, or anything else. 
It requires a fusion of both an understanding of the the long freight-train of 
constructed knowledge and an awareness/appreciation of that leading-edge of the 
train. 'Artful' motorcycle maintenance (aka high-quality motorcycle 
maintenance) requires both a thorough understanding of all the constructed 
knowledge pertaining to the motorcycle and an appreciation/awareness that the 
motorcycle is not a separate 'object' but a pattern of values that are in 
harmony with you and everything else. 

As Pirsig says in ZMM, Sometime look at a novice workman or a bad workman and 
compare his expression with that of a craftsman whose work you know is 
excellent and you'll see the difference. The craftsman isn't ever following a 
single line of instruction. He's making decisions as he goes along. For that 
reason he'll be absorbed and attentive to what he's doing even though he 
doesn't deliberately contrive this. His motions and the machine are in a kind 
of harmony. He isn't following any set of written instructions because the 
nature of the material at hand determines his thoughts and motions, which 
simultaneously change the nature of the material at hand. The material and his 
thoughts are changing together in a progression of changes until his mind's at 
rest at the same time the material's right. ... Sounds like art, the 
instructor says. ... Well, it is art, I say. (ZMM)

Of course, for John, unable to see that a fusion of this artificial 
interpretation superimposed on reality (ZMM) requires and unites both modes of 
this schism, replies by asking me if I'd want a sculptor (implying one with no 
knowledge of motorcycle repair) repairing my motorcycle. 

As Pirsig says, there's a beautiful way of doing it and an ugly way of doing 

Re: [MD] Anti intellectualism as a traditional American value

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ron]
When I do an internet search on anti intellectualism a whole host of topics 
comes to the fore front. Topics like : anti intellectualism is taking over the 
U.S. and anti intellectualism in Christianity are the top subjects of my 
search. Anti intellectualism in education seemed to me to be the most troubling 
hit on the list.  [...] Is anti intellectualism considered in modern America as 
a traditional American value, as “American” as apple pie and Mom?

[Arlo]
As DMB already mentioned, anti-intellectualism has a long history (probably 
traces can be found as far back as the first appearances of social authority). 
Its not an American value, either, as evidence of anti-intellectual 
reactionism can be seen, in history and in modern times, in many cultures 
around the world. It appears as a shadow to intellectual authority, as 
intellect gains authority (or threatens to do so), anti-intellectual 
reactionary movements grow. Today, within all Occidental religions, there is a 
growing tendency towards fundamentalism. The rise of anti-intellectual forces 
in the East is matched by a rise of anti-intellectual forces in the West. 
This is traced in detail by the BBC in The Power of Nightmares. 
Anti-intellectualism around the world is evidenced by both resurgences in 
demands for 'religious law' and 'fierce nationalism'.

This current upsurge in anti-intellectualism in America, fueled by Leo 
Strauss's neoconservative reactionism, achieved critical mass with 
gubernatorial candidate Ronald Reagan's question why should we subsidize 
intellectual curiosity?, who then proceeded to cut education funding and 
eliminate the state's free tuition. But what's important to understand is that 
part of this is the coopting of the value of education by capitalistic 
thinking. Today, one of the loudest voices of anti-intellectualism, is the idea 
that 'educational value' is an economic commodity, that what our kids (and 
ourselves) should only learn is the knowledge and skills that allow us to be 
productive laborers and workers in a capital economy. Philosophy, music, 
literature, theatre, painting, all of these are dismissed (and/or condemned) as 
'useless' domains. Intellect is being redefined as skilled labor. 

We see a growing wave of de-funding both 'non-vocational' education at the 
program level and at the access level (e.g., student loans). Our dialogues at 
the policy levels locally and nationally, from both political parties, reflect 
this vocationally-normalized revaluation of education. And, again, make no 
mistake, this is a deliberate agenda of anti-intellectual forces. In much the 
same way, witness that political aptitude is (for many) measured by the degree 
to which one is NOT educated. Candidates are ridiculed for being bilingual, or 
for having degrees, or for having extensive knowledge of areas they will 
oversee. 

I know DMB shared this short article before, but it summarizes this 
normalization of anti-intellectualism in America: The Death of Expertise, by 
Tom Nichols. (http://thefederalist.com/2014/01/17/the-death-of-expertise/) If 
you haven't already looked at this as part of your inquiry into 
anti-intellectualism, I'd recommend it.

All this is just to point out that the faces of anti-intellectuals aren't just 
the sneeringly dismissive ridicule of professors as 'pointy-headed elitists', 
but are often in the less visible, normalizing effects occurring throughout the 
culture.





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Re: [MD] Arlo

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC]
Nope, because I'm not arguing that the bi-hemisphericality of the human brain 
is the cause of dualistic thinking, I'm arguing that its the effect.

[Arlo]
And, again, the studies DO NOT back this up. Even if you flip the cause and 
effect, it makes no different. There is no evidence that people, anyone, is 
'right-brained' or 'left-brained'. What the studies DO show is that there may 
be universal tasks that correlate with specific hemispheres (e.g. language to 
the left), but even this is subject to neuroplasticity.

That is the point. Your coopting a mistaken 'popular' belief and then trying to 
apply it to normalize Pirsig's classical/romantic schism. 

[JC]
I don't care if right-brained is a physiological fact, or not.  I care if the 
mental behavior we label right-brain is real.  and it is.  

[Arlo]
It is NOT. As I said, John, I'm not going to debate neurology with you. Any 
genuinely interested in the research has easy access to it.

[JC]
You prefer to think that the behavioral distinction doesn't exist, if we 
semantically ignore it.  

[Arlo]
Like Pirsig, I think the distinction is one coerced upon us by the metaphysical 
ideas that underlie our culture. This was the point of ZMM. This distinction is 
ARTIFICIAL. I'm not sure what more I can even say, John, this is like basic ZMM 
101, its completely disheartening to have to even act like this is somehow 
disputable.

[JC]
So what can I conclude but that science marches on and the beliefs of today 
will be attacked tomorrow.

[Arlo]
You should conclude that our understanding of things is in a constant state of 
refinement. People though the world was flat once too. 

[John]
only you can say, when you've had enough.  I have a feeling I'm in for some 
more.

[Arlo]
Yeah, but consider this nothing more than a frustrated summation. 
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Re: [MD] Arlo

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC]
Finally had time to sit down and glance through the article you posted.  I 
can't believe you think it supports the idea that left-brainedness and 
right-brainedness, are not distinctive.

[Arlo previously]
... in reality these don't map to the categories you're still stuck in 
(Pirsig's pre-solution classical/romantic schism).

[Arlo]
I'm sorry, John, as I said it was pop article that just covered the fact that 
the distinction you had proposed (right brain = romantic/dynamic, left brain = 
classic/static) really does not hold up. 

Maybe you're right-brained: creative, artistic, an open-minded thinker who 
perceives things in subjective terms.Or perhaps you're more of a left-brained 
person, where you're analytical, good at tasks that require attention to 
detail, and more logically minded.

It turns out, though, that this idea of brained-ness might be more of a 
figure of speech than anything, as researchers have found that these 
personality traits may not have anything to do with which side of the brain you 
use more.

ARE there distinctions? The researchers found that Language tends to be on the 
left, attention more on the right.. Let's go on to the study in question and 
see what they say.

In popular reports, “left-brained” and “right-brained” have become terms 
associated with both personality traits and cognitive strategies, with a 
“left-brained” individual or cognitive style typically associated with a 
logical, methodical approach and “right-brained” with a more creative, fluid, 
and intuitive approach. Based on the brain regions we identified as hubs in the 
broader left-dominant and right-dominant connectivity networks, a more 
consistent schema might include left-dominant connections associated with 
language and perception of internal stimuli, and right-dominant connections 
associated with attention to external stimuli.

Yet our analyses suggest that an individual brain is not “left-brained” or 
“right-brained” as a global property, but that asymmetric lateralization is a 
property of individual nodes or local subnetworks, and that different aspects 
of the left-dominant network and right-dominant network may show relatively 
greater or lesser lateralization within an individual. 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0071275

So, first, the intent here is to show that your proposed mapping of left/right 
to classic/romantic is not accurate and has no theoretical or pragmatic value. 
If you want to get into a more neurological discussion about the structural and 
functional role of lateralization (and I'd suggest branching out into studies 
at neuroplasticity before cementing a bio-reductionist position), there are far 
better forums for that exploration. 

[JC]
In other words, the empirical behavior we observe, doesn't map totally to the 
biological brain.  Ok, very interesting.  But that doesn't mean there is not a 
difference between the two sides of the brain.

[Arlo]
In the pop article, one of the researches said, Language tends to be on the 
left, attention more on the right. But people don’t tend to have a stronger 
left- or right-sided brain network. It seems to be determined more connection 
by connection.

In the empirical article, the authors conclude: Despite the need for further 
study of the relationship between behavior and lateralized connectivity, we 
demonstrate that left- and right-lateralized networks are homogeneously 
stronger among a constellation of hubs in the left and right hemispheres, but 
that such connections do not result in a subject-specific global brain 
lateralization difference that favors one network over the other (i.e. 
left-brained or right-brained). Rather, lateralized brain networks appear to 
show local correlation across subjects with only weak changes from childhood 
into early adulthood and very small if any differences with gender.

Note that the lateraization hub preferences found are not varied among 
individuals, language tends to activate left-lateralized networks in both you 
and me and everyone else. The author suggest that this is a result of both 
structure and function. To fully appreciate 'why' this is, or what this means, 
as I said you'd need to branch out into neuroplasticity studies to see how, 
say, language-related neural hubs are impacted by damage to the left-hemisphere 
(a cursory glace reveals that while the brain has difficulty overcoming 
catastrophic injury, minor injuries often led to these hubs simply being 
'relocated' to other areas of the brain, even cross-hemisphere).


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Re: [MD] John Carl

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC re: left/right brainedness]
My arguments were influenced a lot by a thread by David Thomas, some time back 
and a book that came out a year or so ago, I could look it up and then my 
experts would counter your experts and then where would we be?

[Arlo]
I hear this a lot. Its a reduction of expertise and research to opinion. But 
where would we be? We'd be in the Academy, John. This is where research and 
theory and praxis are tested and thought about and hypothesized about, and we 
do research and form better opinions and move forward. You're making a very 
specific claim, in order to reduce Pirsig's problematic classical/romantic 
schism to one that is determined by neurophysiology. I'm saying, the current 
research does not support that at all. 

What's critical here is that you're not making the claim to support a 
neurological position, you're coopting a popularly held neurological belief in 
order to support a metaphysical distinction. If you were interested in 
neurology, I suppose, you'd find better discussion on a neurology board, or 
you'd be going through the current research yourself to see what's going on in 
the field. But what you seem to be interested in is finding neurological 
theories, no matter how they are being reshaped by current studies, that 
support your belief that Pirsig's classical and romantic modes of thinking are 
neurological determined. 

Where Pirsig was arguing for a way of overcoming this 
philosophically-determined artificial schism, you're seeking to make it a 
biological-determined natural distinction.

[JC]
So, Yeah, I'd say we're stuck with this distinction, and I still don't 
understand why that has to be a bad thing.

[Arlo]
Why is is a bad thing is articulated as the major dysfunction in ZMM.

[JC]
As long as people realize that there are different kinds of people, can't we 
all just get along?  Or do we have to wash away all differences in order for 
that to happen?

[Arlo]
I'll ignore the reductio ad absurdum here (who's talking about eliminating all 
differences?). What Pirsig was arguing is that people like the cold, artless 
'scientist' and the anti-intellectual, reasonless 'artist' aren't 'just 
different kinds of people' but are trapped in ways of thinking that do not do 
justice to either, let alone do justice to Quality. He's arguing that these are 
not natural ways of thinking, but emanate from a faulty metaphysical premise. 

He's not talking about eliminating the distinction between the scientist and 
the sculptor, of course they do different activities, of course their own 
internal aesthetics and reason have different 'flavors'. He's not talking about 
eliminate the distinction between activity, but eliminating the idea that the 
distinction is one of 'reason vs. art'.

[JC]
You honestly think motorcycle maintenance ought to be taught by the same guy 
who teaches sculpture?

[Arlo]
This is just an absurd argument. Of course I want my maintenance done by 
someone with the specific knowledge related to this activity. But, hell yes 
give me a mechanic who understands that his activity is an 'art', who sees the 
motorcycle as something he is 'sculpting'. Just like, hell yes, give me a 
sculptor who understands that his activity has a reason and an intellect to it, 
who sees his works as something to which he is 'maintaining'.

I'm not sure where or why you've drawn the conclusion that eliminating the 
problem of the classical and romantic schism means that artful work can be done 
by anyone without any domain expertise of knowledge within that domain, which 
is informed by both 'reason' and 'beauty'. 

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Re: [MD] Arlo

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC]
No, I'm not interested in a bio-reductionist view.  I am interested in basic 
duality of human perspective.

[Arlo]
Huh? A bioreductionist view is just that, John. It argues (as you are) that 
'human perspective' or cognition is determined by neurology. You're 
specifically stating that whether a person operates in the classical mode or 
the romantic mode is determined by their left or right brainedness. 

But let's set that misunderstanding aside. As I've said now several times, 
current understandings of neurology DO NOT SUPPORT your belief. The article 
specifically says this.

It starts by repeating your exact argument: Maybe you're right-brained: 
creative, artistic, an open-minded thinker who perceives things in subjective 
terms.Or perhaps you're more of a left-brained person, where you're 
analytical, good at tasks that require attention to detail, and more logically 
minded.

That, right there, is what you are arguing. That left-brained people are 
classical, and right-brained people are romantic. 

Then the articles states: It turns out, though, that this idea of 
brained-ness might be more of a figure of speech than anything, as 
researchers have found that these personality traits may not have anything to 
do with which side of the brain you use more.

I'm going to repeat this next section from the empirical study because you 
apparently skipped over it.

In popular reports, “left-brained” and “right-brained” have become terms 
associated with both personality traits and cognitive strategies, with a 
“left-brained” individual or cognitive style typically associated with a 
logical, methodical approach and “right-brained” with a more creative, fluid, 
and intuitive approach. Based on the brain regions we identified as hubs in the 
broader left-dominant and right-dominant connectivity networks, a more 
consistent schema might include left-dominant connections associated with 
language and perception of internal stimuli, and right-dominant connections 
associated with attention to external stimuli.

Yet our analyses suggest that an individual brain is not “left-brained” or 
“right-brained” as a global property, but that asymmetric lateralization is a 
property of individual nodes or local subnetworks, and that different aspects 
of the left-dominant network and right-dominant network may show relatively 
greater or lesser lateralization within an individual.

So what they found was that there are UNIVERSAL HUMAN differences in where 
different types of activity appear localized. You, me, Ant, Dan, everyone... we 
ALL seem to have our language activity localized towards left-lateralization. 
BUT, the authors themselves suggest even this is not an argument for 
bioreductionism, that they are not arguing that the left-hemisphere of the 
brain causes language. AND, as I mentioned, studies on neuroplasticity 
demonstrate that injuries to the left-hemisphere can be overcome by relocating 
the neural hub, even across hemispheres. 

NONE of this supports your argument that (1) the left-hemisphere is analytic 
and the right is creative, let alone that (2) these two 
'biologically-determined' divisions create two different types of people mapped 
to Pirsig's 'classical' and 'romantic' ways of thinking. 

[JC]
But however you wanna map it, there are two distinct ways in which we humans 
process information and I think the labels romantic and classic work well 
to describe these two different ways.

[Arlo]
And this, again, was the PROBLEM addressed by ZMM. These categories ARE NOT 
'NATURAL', they are artificially-coerced ways of thinking resulting from a 
problematic subject-object metaphysical view. To use the language from the 
article (also above), these personality traits may not have anything to do 
with which side of the brain you use more but they arise as people are 
acclimated to life within a SOM-dominant culture. 

And, seriously, I think I've flogged this horse enough. 

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Re: [MD] John Carl

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC earlier]
I associate the romantic with art.

[JC]
Well actually, Arlo. I've had a problem with the 4th level for some time 
because it's labeled intellectual and imho, it ought to be labeled artistic 
or something similar  because I see intellect as a species of art.

[JC to Ant]
... don't accuse me of anti-intellectualism just because I follow Pirsig's 
teaching in ZAMM.

[Arlo]
There is a HUGE disconnect here, and its more than a little deflating to have 
to even point it out. You DO NOT follow Pirsig's teachings in ZMM if you 
associate the romantic with art. The entire point of ZMM was to present the 
classic/romantic schism as a PROBLEM. Pirsig's self-stated goal was to show 
that using this knife creatively and effectively can result in solutions to 
the classic and romantic split. (ZMM) And, Phædrus' resolution of the entire 
problem of classic and romantic understanding occurred at first in this high 
country of the mind... (ZMM)

And so in recent times we have seen a huge split develop between a classic 
culture and a romantic counterculture...two worlds growingly alienated and 
hateful toward each other with everyone wondering if it will always be this 
way, a house divided against itself. (ZMM)

The answer is Phædrus' contention that classic understanding should not be 
overlaid with romantic prettiness; classic and romantic understanding should be 
united at a basic level. (ZMM)

I think that the referent of a term that can split a world into hip and 
square, classic and romantic, technological and humanistic, is an entity that 
can unite a world already split along these lines into one. (ZMM)

Actually a root word of technology, techne, originally meant art. The 
ancient Greeks never separated art from manufacture in their minds, and so 
never developed separate words for them. (ZMM)

So I guess what I'm trying to say is that the solution to the problem isn't 
that you abandon rationality but that you expand the nature of rationality so 
that it's capable of coming up with a solution. (ZMM)

By 'associating the romantic with art', your simply denying that Pirsig offered 
a solution, indeed, you're denying there's a problem! You had asked me a for a 
quote to back-up my assertion that Pirsig's solution eliminates this 
distinction, above are several. In Pirsig's solution-space, the classical and 
the romantic modes are united. Indeed, as should be obvious, the very 
distinction in the first place was the PROBLEM.

[JC]
So I'd be fine with art and intellect on a continuum, with intellect at the 
static end and art at the dynamic.

[Arlo]
I'm not even sure how to frame a response to this, so I'll go back to ZMM and 
start with a simple substitution. For Pirsig, Art is high-quality endeavor. 
(ZMM) If you follow Pirsig's teaching in ZAMM, this substitution should be 
flawless. Instead, we get I'd be fine with high-quality endeavor and intellect 
on a continuum, with intellect at the static end and high-quality endeavor at 
the dynamic. Certainly there are high-quality intellectual endeavors. What's 
apparent here is that you continue to use 'art' in its old 'romantic' 
distinction, you're back in the problem-space of ZMM and trying to criticize 
LILA on the basis that Pirsig's classic/romantic distinction is itself the 
solution, but also you appear to be confused in trying to map romantic/art/DQ 
and classic/intellect/SQ. 

But the fact that Quality was the best way of uniting the two was no guarantee 
that the reverse was true - that the classic-romantic split was the best way of 
dividing Quality. It wasn't. (LILA)

[JC]
You don't want motorcycle maintainers to creatively form engine parts because 
it feels good, and you don't want art that's been produced by copying.

[Arlo]
Which is what you HAD in the problem-space of ZMM. It was a misunderstanding of 
Quality that led to the misunderstood way you speak here. Of COURSE, creatively 
forming engine parts feels good, when those parts are produced with a united 
appreciation of 'romantic' and 'classical' thought. And you're use of art is 
so limited here to refer almost exclusively to artifacts. I am certainly 
grateful that my artfully constructed motorcycle 'copied' well-functioning 
design principles. In LILA, with the shift to 'static' and 'dynamic', we see 
that there is value to both 'copying' (preserving well-formed patterns) and 
'creating' (pursuing even better patterns). 

I'll end here simply getting back to what I think is a critical comment in ZMM: 
Art is the Godhead as revealed in the works of man. (ZMM)

As such, art rests just as comfortably in a philosophical thesis as it does a 
Degas, in a mathematical set theory as it does in a performance of Bach's Cello 
Suite No. 1 by Yo-Yo Ma. By continuing the divorce 'art' from 'intellect', your 
not only not following Pirsig's teaching in ZMM, your arguing AGAINST it. 


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Re: [MD] John Carl

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC]
But go ahead, Arlo, argue some more with me.  I always like your arguments.  
They're pretty good, tho not deeply thought out.

[Arlo]
Ah, rhetoric. It's amazing how dismissive rhetoric can conceal sloppy thinking, 
isn't it? You can jump around and try to skirt whatever I've said, its fine, 
I'm not so much arguing with you as arguing AT you, to be honest. I've 
recognized long ago the difference between showing somebody something, and 
showing others something that somebody doesn't understand.

In any event, you mentioned this 'right/left brain' thing now, and, maybe if 
you spent more time in the academy you'd realize this is really not taken 
seriously much anymore. Here's a short pop article you might understand about 
this: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/19/right-brain-left-brain-debunked_n_3762322.html.
 So while we'll likely use in the vernacular right-brained and left-brained 
for a while, in reality these don't map to the categories you're still stuck in 
(Pirsig's pre-solution classical/romantic schism).

[JC]
Uniting does not mean erasing individual differences.

[Arlo]
Pirsig specifically said unite... into ONE. He specifically calls the schism 
a problem, and offered a resolution of the entire PROBLEM of classic and 
romantic understanding. His solution is the classic and romantic 
understanding should be UNITED at a basic level. No where in ZMM do I see him 
make any effort to maintain this division, no where do I am here say these 
should be coexisting but independent categories. His argument originates in a 
world (Ancient Greece) where this division does not exist. 

[JC]
Yes, but in the end, that  technne has evolved into something far different 
from art.  Unless you want to say that global-corporate economic control is an 
art. 

[Arlo]
No, because I'd say that global-corporate economic control is not a 
high-quality endeavor. What it IS, often, is a manifestation of social power 
seeking to dominate intellectual patterns. I think others have already said to 
you that just because human activity can be artful, doesn't mean all human 
activity is artful. You seem to think that Pirsig's solution obliterates art, 
and I think that only demonstrates you do not understand much of what he has 
said. Pirsig's solution RESCUES 'art', and until you understand that, you're 
missing the entire point.

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Re: [MD] John Carl

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
The substance of the complaints against John's assertions with respect to 
intellectual values is that John can maintain his anti-intellectualism only by 
ignoring the distinction between the problem (SOM) and the solution (MOQ). John 
keeps treating intellectual values as they exist in the problem space, as 
Arlo put it, rather than the solution space. In other words, John can 
maintain his anti-intellectualism only by ignoring Pirsig's solution, namely 
the root expansion of rationality, the art of rationality.

[Arlo]
That's how I see it too. By saying I associate the romantic with art, he is 
also saying I do not associate the classical [logical, rational] with art. 
This was precisely the problem that Pirsig was addressing in ZMM. This is 
precisely something that Pirsig was saying was WRONG. The solution offered by 
ZMM says that it is WRONG to associate the romantic with art, that it is WRONG 
to even be stuck in these two artificial 'modes', that Quality [art, 
high-quality endeavor] not just applied to both of these modes, but it 
eliminated their distinction! 

Had John said some people out there still associate art with what Pirsig 
called the 'romantic mode of understanding', I'd say, sure, yeah, I can see 
that. There are many people who think that logic is cold, artless, and value 
free, and many who think that grooving on something requires ignoring and 
demeaning the value of logic and intellect. Sure, the problem that Pirsig 
addressed in ZMM still exists. By these people a copy of ZMM, talk to them 
about this way of thinking about 'art' that unifies these two artificially 
divorced ways of thinking. 

But to say '***I***, John Carl, associate the romantic with art' is to move 
back before the solution Pirsig offered, to deny the solution (as DMB says). In 
fact, this statement could easily be attributed to John of ZMM, John 
Sutherland. John Sutherland certainly did associate the romantic with art, 
although lacking Pirsig's words he'd probably have said art is separate from 
reason. And that was precisely the attitude that sparked Pirsig to write ZMM 
in the first place!

And this brings me to a short response to Ian, that aligns here, so here is 
where I will put it.

[Ian]
Post-intellectual. Not non-intellectual or anti-intellectual, but the idea of 
intellectual but more so, more evolved, more progressive kind of intellectual.

[Arlo]
Ignoring whatever definitions and implications the term post-intellectual may 
have in the literature, applying this to Pirsig's ideas only works IF 
'intellectual' is kept to mean SOM. Because what post-intellectual is 
trying to point to here is post-SOM. The problem with post-intellectual is 
that it traps intellectual in its pre-expanded, pre-ZMM, pre-MOQ meaning. 

See, there was intellectual, and then there came ZMM and the MOQ, and now we 
are post-intellectual. See how that works only if intellectual is cemented 
with its pre-Pirsig implications. 

Both of these, I associate the romantic with art and post-intellectual, are 
built off a belief that intellect is cold, sterile, artless, value-free, 
'objective'. And THAT was something that should've been solved with ZMM/MOQ.

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Re: [MD] Post-Intellectualism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ron]
I don't think artist is a very nice word. It implies some special status that 
lets certain people be creative while the rest of us muddle along.

[Arlo]
Agree. I think its better to use artful and append it to the activity (artful 
painting, artful inquiry, artful woodworking, artful trombone playing, etc.). 
Rather than she's an artist, you could say she paints very artfully. And 
that guy over there, he artfully maintains his motorcycle. 

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Re: [MD] Post-Intellectualism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC]
I try and keep it simple.  What does my speech mean?  To the average person on 
the street?  Intellect has a definition and art have definitions. Quality 
doesn't have a definition.  So I'd rather speak in terms of classic and 
romantic (the problem space) because that's where the one's I talk to, dwell.

[Arlo]
Well, okay, but that is not what you said. You said, I associate the romantic 
with art. YOU. Not the average person on the street. 

If your goal is to use the crisis in ZMM to help the average person on the 
street expand their vision as to what art is, then all power to you. If you, 
personally, continue to associate ZMM's romantic understanding with art, 
then you're missing Pirsig's point.

[DMB]
And of course that solution space IS the MOQ rather than its metaphysical 
enemy, namely SOM with its artless attitudes of objectivity.

[Arlo]
Exactly. Associating art with the romantic (and in parallel, divorcing 
art from the classical) is the heart of the SOM crisis in ZMM.


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Re: [MD] Art fine art

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ant]
Coming back to Pirsig, the latter would say (and Patrick agrees with him on 
this point) that we are ALL artists; you can rebuild a motorcycle artfully or 
you can bugger around (such as the monkey like mechanics in ZMM who only 
secured one of Pirsig's motorcycle wheels with one properly tightened nut).  
You can write artfully, deal with your personal relationships in an artful way; 
in fact do ANYTHING that requires a little bit of concentration in an artful 
way. I think that's the important issue when looking at art in the context of 
Pirsig's work.

[Arlo]
I really should read my inbox 'last in, first out' rather than oldest first. 
Yes, this. Exactly. This is what I was trying to say to Ron in my post a few 
minutes ago.

[Ant]
Finally, regarding the recent notion of Artists (invented by Kant  friends) 
is that Patrick replaces the latter term with the more accurate (and always in 
lower case!) term fine artists.

[Arlo]
I can see this, but I prefer simply painter, sculptor, photographer, 
dancer, musician, etc. Umbrella categories are fine and all, but to me it 
makes more sense to describe the activity directly whenever possible.

[Ant]
I think it's work of art in itself!

[Arlo]
It very much is. 
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Re: [MD] Post-Intellectualism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC]
I agree, but I associate the romantic with art.  Is that wrong?

[Arlo]
Again, depends on if you're in the problem space or the solution space. In ZMM, 
the romantic was associated with art because art was artificially 
divorced from reason. So, yes, within the problem space of ZMM, the romantic 
perspective was associated with aesthetics and beauty and painting and music. 

In the solution space, however, this is very wrong. Art is high-quality 
endeavor, and applies equally to the former distinctions of romantic and 
classic. In this post-ZMM space, it'd be more accurate to 'associate' art with 
Quality. High-quality and artistic become synonyms.In this space, 'art' is 
as much a part of reason as it is painting. Indeed, the distinction between 
'classic' and 'romantic' is broken down entirely. 'Writing a novel', 'repairing 
a motorcycle', 'building a rotisserie', 'painting a watercolor', 'performing a 
symphony', 'constructing a metaphysics', 'dancing around a maypole', 'doing 
differential calculus', ALL of these are 'art'. 
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Re: [MD] Post-Intellectualism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[JC]
I would say intellect evolved through an artform.

[Dan]
I'll have to think about this a little more. It doesn't sound right, somehow, 
but I can't quite put my finger on exactly why that is.

[Arlo]
I think the language is imprecise. Perhaps intellect evolved AS an artform 
(understanding that art is a high quality endeavor), and it has been the 
divorcing of 'art' and 'intellect' that led to the crisis in ZMM. 

In other words, intellect itself is an artform, no more and no less than 
abstract painting or sculpture. 

[JC]
But both art and intellect are best when they inform each other - ideas that 
are beautiful and works that are true.

[Arlo]
Here you're using these terms to restate the romantic/classic distinction 
directly (art=beautiful, intellect=true). I think we should be careful here 
when we're using these terms in the 'problem space' (art as being divorced from 
reason), and when we're using them in the 'solution space' (art has 
high-quality endeavor that applies to reason, painting, all forms of human 
activity).

Perhaps better to say, intellect is best when done artfully? But that's a 
sort of tautology, isn't it? Or maybe intellect is best when it is not 
artificially divorced from notions of aesthetics and beauty? Inform each 
other seems, to me, to normalize a distinction that isn't there, the very 
distinction Pirsig argued was inherently artificial.

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Re: [MD] Post-Intellectualism/Post-Rationalism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Arlo had said]
There are many post- philosophies out there. Post-technological, 
post-consumerism, post-industrial (of course)... I've been reading some 
articles lately on post-postmodernism (which has its own Wikipedia page: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-postmodernism).

[Ron]
Incidentally, I didn't like the wiki article much.  I preferred the SEP's 
description of post-modern.

[Arlo]
Just to clarify, what I was linking wasn't about post-modernism but 
POST-post-modernism. And, not making any claims, just pointing out the fun 
with this way of labeling.

[Arlo previously]
Overall, I think the use of post- to demonstrate an initial cleave with a 
dominant ideology is an appropriate first-step, but its a definition by 
negation; defining this as not that. It provides a point of departure, but 
not a point of destination.

[Dan]
I was under the assumption that the prefix 'post' normally connotes 'after' 
just as 'pre' designates 'before.'

[Arlo]
Certainly it does, Dan. My only point was to say that defining something as 
being after something else doesn't really define what something is, just 
what it is no longer. I have no problem with these label, but I think a lot 
of authors are starting to realize we need something more descriptive than 
simply labeling everything post-modern. 

Its the same thing with the label post-intellectual, or maybe 
post-rationalist. As you point out, there are significant differences between 
Kirby's ideas about post-modernism and post-postmodernism and the MOQ, and yet 
I'd argue that Pirsig's MOQ is certainly NOT modernist. Does that make it 
post-modern? Post-postmodern? If so, what does that mean? What does  it share 
with these other theories? Is it fair to 

Consider this paragraph from Alfredi Ruiz. It certainly seems like Pirsig's MOQ 
would be described as post-rationalist. 

According to Guidano, the most important problem which has been posed to this 
epistemologic approach has been the radical change which has taken place in the 
conception of the relation between observer and observed. In the empirist 
approach the observer faces a reality, objective in itself, which exists 
independently. The observer in this case is considered impartial and objective. 
The observation of the observer corresponds to reality. Now, with the changes 
produced in the notion of the relations between observer and observed, the 
observer no longer stands as neutral. On the contrary, with his observation he 
introduces an order in what he observes and what he observes is much more 
dependent on his perceptual apparatus than on the structure itself of something 
objective external to him. What is now happening is that we are beginning to 
attain greater conscience that the reality in which we live is codependent of 
our way of ordering and goes together with our perception. The 
 world of regularities we live in is a world which is co-constructed by the 
observer. (Ruiz, Theoretical Bases of the Post-Rationalist Approach. 
http://www.inteco.cl/post-rac/ifundam.htm)

I should note that this short article also calls for an ontological and an 
epistomological approach to experience, in much the same way that Paul Turner 
approached describing two approaches to Pirsig's MOQ. Consider too that Ruiz 
writes, The first dimension is immediate experience. Like what occurs in other 
animals, the experience of living, of feeling alive, is something with simply 
occurs to us, something we can not decide. The other dimension is explanation. 
Sounds very Dynamic/static, doesn't it?

But this seems different from the post-postmodernism Kirby describes. How would 
Ruiz's post-rational compare to Wood's post-intellectual (I have no idea)? 
Do either reflect, even partially, the MOQ's spirirationality (if I'm 
remember the term Ant's friend used)?

We are awash in a sea of post-Xs, though, that's for sure.


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Re: [MD] Post-Intellectualism/Post-Rationalism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Arlo corrects an error]
Below where it says Ron it should say John. Sorry for the confusion.



[Arlo had said]
There are many post- philosophies out there. Post-technological, 
post-consumerism, post-industrial (of course)... I've been reading some 
articles lately on post-postmodernism (which has its own Wikipedia page: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-postmodernism).

[Ron] -- change to [John]
Incidentally, I didn't like the wiki article much.  I preferred the SEP's 
description of post-modern.

[Arlo]
Just to clarify, what I was linking wasn't about post-modernism but 
POST-post-modernism. And, not making any claims, just pointing out the fun 
with this way of labeling.

[Arlo previously]
Overall, I think the use of post- to demonstrate an initial cleave with a 
dominant ideology is an appropriate first-step, but its a definition by 
negation; defining this as not that. It provides a point of departure, but 
not a point of destination.

[Dan]
I was under the assumption that the prefix 'post' normally connotes 'after' 
just as 'pre' designates 'before.'

[Arlo]
Certainly it does, Dan. My only point was to say that defining something as 
being after something else doesn't really define what something is, just 
what it is no longer. I have no problem with these label, but I think a lot 
of authors are starting to realize we need something more descriptive than 
simply labeling everything post-modern. 

Its the same thing with the label post-intellectual, or maybe 
post-rationalist. As you point out, there are significant differences between 
Kirby's ideas about post-modernism and post-postmodernism and the MOQ, and yet 
I'd argue that Pirsig's MOQ is certainly NOT modernist. Does that make it 
post-modern? Post-postmodern? If so, what does that mean? What does  it share 
with these other theories? Is it fair to 

Consider this paragraph from Alfredi Ruiz. It certainly seems like Pirsig's MOQ 
would be described as post-rationalist. 

According to Guidano, the most important problem which has been posed to this 
epistemologic approach has been the radical change which has taken place in the 
conception of the relation between observer and observed. In the empirist 
approach the observer faces a reality, objective in itself, which exists 
independently. The observer in this case is considered impartial and objective. 
The observation of the observer corresponds to reality. Now, with the changes 
produced in the notion of the relations between observer and observed, the 
observer no longer stands as neutral. On the contrary, with his observation he 
introduces an order in what he observes and what he observes is much more 
dependent on his perceptual apparatus than on the structure itself of something 
objective external to him. What is now happening is that we are beginning to 
attain greater conscience that the reality in which we live is codependent of 
our way of ordering and goes together with our perception. The 
 world of regularities we live in is a world which is co-constructed by the 
observer. (Ruiz, Theoretical Bases of the Post-Rationalist Approach. 
http://www.inteco.cl/post-rac/ifundam.htm)

I should note that this short article also calls for an ontological and an 
epistomological approach to experience, in much the same way that Paul Turner 
approached describing two approaches to Pirsig's MOQ. Consider too that Ruiz 
writes, The first dimension is immediate experience. Like what occurs in other 
animals, the experience of living, of feeling alive, is something with simply 
occurs to us, something we can not decide. The other dimension is explanation. 
Sounds very Dynamic/static, doesn't it?

But this seems different from the post-postmodernism Kirby describes. How would 
Ruiz's post-rational compare to Wood's post-intellectual (I have no idea)? 
Do either reflect, even partially, the MOQ's spirirationality (if I'm 
remember the term Ant's friend used)?

We are awash in a sea of post-Xs, though, that's for sure.


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Re: [MD] Post-Intellectualism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ian had asked]
You've had Post-structuralism. You've had Post-Modernism. Thus side of the 
pond, we've even recently had Post-Christian. What about Post-Intellectualism?

[Arlo replied]
This has been done, no? Donald Wood wrote Post-Intellectualism and the Decline 
of Democracy: The Failure of Reason and Responsibility in the Twentieth 
Century in 1996.

[Dan]
Having not read Donald Wood's book I cannot comment on it other than to note it 
was written some 18 years ago and so might well be outdated.

[Arlo]
To be clear, I have not read Wood's book, nor was I making any connection 
between his use of post-intellectualism and Pirsig's philosophy. I was simply 
pointing out that the term post-intellectualism has appeared in the 
literature, and quite a while back. Any attempt to appropriate this term to 
describe Pirsig has to account for how the term is used in the literature. 

There are many post- philosophies out there. Post-technological, 
post-consumerism, post-industrial (of course)... I've been reading some 
articles lately on post-postmodernism (which has its own Wikipedia page: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-postmodernism). Overall, I think the use of 
post- to demonstrate an initial cleave with a dominant ideology is an 
appropriate first-step, but its a definition by negation; defining this as 
not that. It provides a point of departure, but not a point of destination. 

Anyway, for an interesting article on post-postmodernism, check out Alan 
Kirby's The Death of Postmodernism and Beyond 
(http://philosophynow.org/issues/58/The_Death_of_Postmodernism_And_Beyond). 
(DMB- I think either you or one of the other Partially-Examined Life moderators 
shared this article maybe a couple of months back?)


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Re: [MD] Post-Intellectualism

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ian]
You've had
Post-structuralism.
You've had
Post-Modernism
Thus side of the pond, we've even recently had
Post-Christian
What about
Post-Intellectualism?

[Arlo]
This has been done, no? Donald Wood wrote Post-Intellectualism and the Decline 
of Democracy: The Failure of Reason and Responsibility in the Twentieth 
Century in 1996. 

From Amazon's site: Our society's institutional infrastructures—our democratic 
political system, economic structures, legal practices, and educational 
establishment—were all created as intellectual outgrowths of the Enlightenment. 
All our cultural institutions are based on the intellectual idea that an 
enlightened citizenry could govern its affairs with reason and responsibility. 
In the late 20th century, however, we are witnessing the disintegration of much 
of our cultural heritage. Wood argues that this is due to our evolution into a 
^Upost-intellectual society^R—a society characterized by a loss of critical 
thinking, the substitution of information for knowledge, mediated reality, 
increasing illiteracy, loss of privacy, specialization, psychological 
isolation, hyper-urbanization, moral anarchy, and political debilitation. These 
post-intellectual realities are all triggered by three underlying determinants: 
the failure of linear growth and expansion to sustain our economic system; the 
runaway information overload; and technological determinism. Wood presents a 
new and innovative social theory, challenging readers to analyze all our 
post-intellectual cultural malaise in terms of these three fundamental 
determinants.



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Re: [MD] Quality in academia

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
I was wondering about the Trickster part and wondered if (even hoped) 
Campbell was an influence. Thanks for that too. Now I have a hunch that maybe 
this trickster is friends with the contrarian, even though that's a Lila thing.

[Arlo]
Early on, Frentz describes the trickster as a rule-bending, humor-laced 
outsider who contests rigid organizational rules without threatening the people 
who uphold them. (In Chapter 13, he talks about a friend of his who rolled for 
a while with Ken Kesey and the Merry Pranksters, and although he does not 
mention this again, the language of that movement ventriloquates throughout the 
book.)

A bit later, he adds, Tricksters are more than mischievous misfits. Like 
Prometheus and Hermes, 'tricksters are regularly honored as the creators of 
culture.'... In their best moments, tricksters reveal ways of living that 
excite others to thought and action. As such, they are rhetors in the classical 
sense, instructing, cajoling, and challenging others to live a more humane 
existence. (p.23)

I'm not through this enough to really speak to a direct, or more elaborate, 
mapping of the trickster to the contrarian, but its hard not to get some sense 
of that when reading his book. It does seem, though, that his 'trickster' 
aligns more with what may be 'deliberate' attempts to break conventions than, 
at least in LILA's brujo example, more of an 'unintended consequence'. 

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Re: [MD] Quality in academia

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ian]
It was Goodall's review of Frentz that made the latter day Robert Pirsig 
reference, not Frentz' own work.

[dmb]
 Goodall says Frentz's biographical book is the story of a latter day Robert 
Pirsig-inspired Phaedrus and the subtitle of said book contains the phrase 
quest for quality. How is that NOT a reference to Frentz' own work? What 
else could he be referring to? Or are you saying that Goodall is interesting 
because he's making a Pirsig connection to the book even though the book is 
not really connected to Pirsig? He didn't find that connection in the book but 
fabricated the connection himself? 

[Arlo]
For the record, I checked this out of the library the other day (its a good 
read), but the author (Frentz) explicitly makes the Pirsig connection himself.

Echoing Robert M. Pirsig's charge in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle 
Maintenance, this narrative is my own quest for living a high quality life, 
both personally and professionally (p.13)

And, to avoid lines of quote, in the Index, under both Phaedrus and Pirsig, are 
28 separate pages listed, many in multiple page format (e.g., 20-22). There are 
five more pages listed under Church of Reason.

So, I'd say Frentz's connection to Pirsig is without a doubt both deliberate 
and explicit in his book.

As an aside, Frentz opens up Chapter 1 with a quote from Joseph Campbell's 
Hero with a Thousand Faces. So there's that explicit link as well.


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Re: [MD] The Sleep of Reason (Pirsig's Central Metaphor)

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
From a Theism that is rejected by science, we turn to human explanations for 
the world and the faith I'm talking about, is faith in intellect.  Faith in 
intellect is not scientifically supported. 

[Arlo]
If you reduce everything to equivalent faith, the term is meaningless. I know 
this is a common tactic about those who advocate things like 'creationism' and 
'evolution' being both 'faith-based' and equal 'theories'. 

[John]
For instance, scientifically speaking, it's impossible to measure the age of 
the universe - except that you pretend time is uniform and absolute to human 
perspective.  You have to put man as the center of the universe, to come up 
with that - it's a religious teaching - some simple catechism we give to the 
kiddies.  Not much different from Sunday school really.

[Arlo]
Not at all, on either point. First, although yes, all time as we measure it is 
(tautologically) a reference to 'our' (and hence 'human') experience, no one is 
claiming that its anything but this. When I say last year of course I mean 
year as socially understood and defined by our shared experience. Its 
ultimately arbitrary, to measure rotations around the sun (although 
historically its easy to understand why the species has done this nearly 
ubiquitously across culture and history). Second, the estimation is one that 
allows us to build ever-improving models of understanding experience. Much 
different from Sunday school, these numbers changes as better numbers come in, 
as models improve, as intellectual patterns evolve. To claim that this is a 
religious teaching is just absurd, John, really, really absurd.

[John]
Since there is no more God, it's all ours and we can do what we want with it.

[Arlo]
But suppose you do just what you like? Does that mean you're going to go out 
and shoot heroin, rob banks and rape old ladies? The person who is counseling 
you not to do just as you like is making some remarkable presumptions as to 
what is likable. He seems unaware that people may not rob banks because they 
have considered the consequences and decided they don't like to. He doesn't see 
that banks exist in the first place because they're just what people like, 
namely, providers of loans. Phædrus began to wonder how all this condemnation 
of what you like ever seemed such a natural objection in the first place. 
(ZMM)

If you need God so that you don't 'shoot heroin, rob banks and rape old 
ladies', I think that says more about you than humanists. 

[John]
But the arrogance of humanism is that we think we've got all the final 
answers.  Now we know what is actually objectively true through the working of 
our human reason, forgetting that the universe is a lot bigger than we are. 

[Arlo]
You've made an ipso facto comflation here of 'humanism' and 'SOM' (actually 
objectively true). I'd argue that 'humanism' is, like any other 
sub-metaphysical view, dependent on the over-arching metaphysics. If you want 
to challenge 'SOM' (final answers... actually objectively true), that's good 
with me, but if you're creating a dichotomy where 'theism' and 'SOM-humanism' 
are the only options, you're barking up the wrong tree.

[John]
From a larger perspective, it's impossible to say who is revolving around whom, 
really. It's all just a twirling in space.  But the human perspective says the 
moon revolves around the Earth because we're ON the Earth.

[Arlo]
Yeah, this is the story about William James and the squirrel. Its important, 
philosophically, to understand the relational aspects of our ideas. But, 
importantly, saying the moon revolves around the earth has allowed us to 
deploy satellites, understand (and provide early warnings) of weather patterns, 
etc. Its a very high-quality experientially-bsaed observation, much higher 
quality than 'everything revolves around the earth' (which, I point out, is far 
more arrogant and anthropomorphological, and was considered much more a 'final 
answer' and 'true', than what we use today).

[John]
Too often it seems that the MoQ focuses upon the aspect of resisting social 
controls without doing anything constructive or coming up with creative social 
patterns. 

[Arlo]
I think intellect has come up with a whole host of constructive and creative 
ways to structure social patterns (freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, 
e.g.) We (should) live in an ere where, say, determining speed limits to 
improve mobility and flow at the social level are based on intellectual inquiry 
and reason. We are at a point where things like 'who can I marry' are being 
answered, intellectually, with reason and intellect rather social convention or 
'god'. It is intellectual dominance of social patterns that has created the 
public art museums, green spaces in cities, and has improved farming practices. 
Certainly, there are ongoing revisions that we need to attend to (does this 
park work? how can this museum better serve the local population? when does 
genetic manipulation of plants 

Re: [MD] The Sleep of Reason (Pirsig's Central Metaphor)

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
Freedom to think whatever you want to think (intellectual) AND do whatever you 
want to do (social) but when intellectuals want to be in control, 
anti-intellectualism is moral.

[Arlo]
Are you advocating anarchy? If not intellectuals, then who should be in 
charge? Clergy? CEOs?

Also, by what rationale do you advocate freedom to do whatever you want for 
the intellectual and social levels but not the biological level? Does freedom 
only pertain to social and intellectual activity? Why not biological? 

[John]
He says that  sometimes anti-intellectualism is good.   You prat on about 
fascism as anti-intellectual but there's a very intellectualized attempt at 
social control going on there.

[Arlo]
Anti-intellectualism is never good. There is a difference between advocating 
for an expansion of intellect (as Pirsig does) and suppressing reason to social 
control. More specifically, you are conflating anti-SOM with 
anti-intellectualism, a mistake made by those who continue to mistakenly 
equate SOM and intellect. 

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Re: [MD] The Sleep of Reason (Pirsig's Central Metaphor)

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
First of all, Intellectuals in charge is a misnomer.

[Arlo]
Well, yes, but for a different reason. What's at issue is that social laws be 
subordinate to intellectual reason. In the past, that reason (although morally 
superior) was defective (according to Pirsig) for not acknowledging Quality. 
The failures of socialism (intellectual control over society) should not be 
taken as evidence that Pirsig would endorse a reversion to social (e.g., 
tradition, religious, economic) control (i.e., law) dominance or fascism 
(social control over intellect). By intellectuals in charge, we are simply 
advocating that social law be informed by reason, and when in conflict (free 
speech versus religious censorship) intellectual values trump social values.

Of course, caution must be made so that intellectual dominance does not 
suffocate Dynamic Quality, and a expanded reason (or spirirationality, if I 
remember correctly) would certainly account for this. Our argument, the MOQ's 
(Pirsig's) argument is that the solution is to expand the intellectual level, 
not subvert it to social dominance.

[John quotes Pirsig]
The Hippie revolution of the eighties was a moral revolution against both 
society and intellectuality.

[Arlo]
Right, but keep in mind that intellectuality in this context referred to an 
S/O dominant intellectual level. From LILA, Now that intellect was in command 
of society for the first time in history, was this the intellectual pattern it 
was going to run society with? is the key question, and the one the Hippies 
were revolting against.

So, yes, like the Hippies back in the sixties, you SHOULD revolt against BOTH 
society and intellectuality, and this is precisely what Pirsig offers with his 
MOQ, a path forward out of social and S/O-dominant intellect towards an 
expanded spiritual rationality. 

[John]
Because freedom to eat your neighbor and breed with his wife is a bad thing.  
Humans always have at least some sort of social control upon their behavior.  
This is evident in every human group that science has
uncovered.

[Arlo]
So you argument for why we should not be permitted biological freedom is that 
it can, potentially, lead to what you consider 'bad outcomes'. Why does this 
not apply to the social and intellectual levels? Aren't social laws (e.g. laws 
against speeding) designed to control social behavior to avoid 'bad outcomes'? 
Aren't academic standards promoting coherence designed to control intellectual 
behavior to avoid 'bad outcomes'? And, to extend this throughout the MOQ, don't 
we build buildings to withstand earthquakes (inorganic value patterns) to avoid 
'bad outcomes'? We routinely place checks and balances into all four of the 
MOQ's moral levels because unrestricted activity (whether inorganic, 
biological, social or intellectual) leads towards chaos. Its a balance, always, 
to find enough checks and balances to preserve growth, but less than would 
stiffle or suffocate growth.

Anti-intellectualism would claim that these checks and balances be determined 
by social convention. The MOQ argues (rightly) that these checks and balances 
be the product of reason and intellect, albeit it an expanded spiritual 
rationality, not an SOM-intellect.

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Re: [MD] The Sleep of Reason (Pirsig's Central Metaphor)

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
But of course Pirsig drops the classic-romantic distinction because romantic 
thinking is still thinking and so distinguishable from DQ, which is 
pre-intellectal or pre-conceptal and prior to any kind of thinking. 

[Re: Goya]
For Goya, art is the child of reason in combination with imagination. (Text by 
Sarah C. Schaefer)

[Arlo]
Yes, I think Goya's thoughts align more with ZMM's synthesis of classic and 
romantic understanding than with LILA's DQ/SQ. It was with his statement that 
Imagination abandoned by reason produces impossible monsters that I was 
squinting a bit and seeing the necessary harmony between DQ and SQ come through 
(something like DQ abandoned by SQ produces chaos), but this was only an 
exercise in vague symmetry. 



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[MD] The Sleep of Reason (Pirsig's Central Metaphor)

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

Hi All,

I recently got a print of Fransisco Goya's The Sleep of Reason Produces 
Monsters for my office, and this morning I was asked about it, and in talking 
about it I went back to this passage from the Khan Academy's SmartHistory.

http://smarthistory.khanacademy.org/goyas-the-sleep-of-reason-produces-monsters.html

Imagination United with Reason
In the image, an artist, asleep at his drawing table, is besieged by creatures 
associated in Spanish folk tradition with mystery and evil. The title of the 
print, emblazoned on the front of the desk, is often read as a proclamation of 
Goya’s adherence to the values of the Enlightenment—without Reason, evil and 
corruption prevail.

However, Goya wrote a caption for the print that complicates its message, 
“Imagination abandoned by reason produces impossible monsters; united with her, 
she is the mother of the arts and source of their wonders.”
 
In other words, Goya believed that imagination should never be completely 
renounced in favor of the strictly rational. For Goya, art is the child of 
reason in combination with imagination. (Text by Sarah C. Schaefer)

It strikes me that this could be a sort of proto-MOQ description of Pirsig's 
central metaphor. For Goya (in 1799), 'reason' was a new child of the 
Enlightenment. Goya's work was being done right at the moment in time the 
intellectual level was gaining independence from social forces. Pirsig writes, 
The intellectual level of patterns, in the historic process of freeing itself 
from its parent social level, namely the church, has tended to invent a myth of 
independence from the social level for its own benefit. Science and reason, 
this myth goes, come only from the objective world, never from the social 
world. The world of objects imposes itself upon the mind with no social 
mediation whatsoever. (LILA) 

That was the reason Goya was talking about, science and reason come only from 
the objective world. While the Enlightenment gave way to the Romantic Period, 
which in many ways as an abandonment of intellect in favor or 'validated 
intense emotion' (Wikipedia), Goya seemed to point to an expansion of reason 
rather than a dismissal. For Goya, 'reason' without imagination led to 
corruption, but imagination without reason fairs no better. It is when 'reason' 
and 'imagination' are united that the arts flourish.

Arlo

PS: I am no expert on Goya, Enlightenment or Romanticism. 


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Re: [MD] The Sleep of Reason (Pirsig's Central Metaphor)

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ian]
BTW nice to see Khan Academy cited there too, I'm seeing traction in other 
on-line communities potentially using it. Do you have any opinion on its wider 
value than this specific reference ?

[Arlo]
Well, its certainly at the epicenter of a lot of talk regarding educational 
reform. I think in many ways what they are doing is necessary, and they are 
part of an initiative that (at least ideally and theoretically) hoping to 
extend educational opportunities to populations (socio-cultural and geographic) 
that may otherwise not have access (although of course they won't serve 
populations tht don't have easy/comprehensive internet/broadband access). And, 
I think they will serve the more-autonomous, returning/lifelong learner 
populations well. But, I think learning environments are ecosystems, and the 
instructor is a keystone species therein, so I am cautious about programs that 
remove the role of the human expert (I think immediate, emotional, aesthetic 
sensibility, grounded in an understanding of the activity's cultural-historical 
context, is an important component to teaching). I am also worried that (IMHO) 
reform must begin with a reform to pedagogy, not just delivery (I've 
 used Pirsig's metaphor of the factory in some conversations, if the pedagogy 
itself is flawed (as I believe it is), the building a new factory will simply 
replicate those flaws). I think we also need to be very cautious about 
hegemony, and pushing a (more or less) Western, capital, market, mono-tone 
voice centered on conformity in thought (and obedience to Western market 
ideology) and drowning out other voices (a la Freire).

So, in short, I think it will serve some populations very well (and probably 
some disciplines better than others) and has some interesting potential that is 
worth keeping an eye on, but I am watching more for pedagogical reform than 
economical/technological/expansive reform. 

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Re: [MD] absorbing the immoral

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Ian]
I thought there was a reference to this in list posts from the past week or 
two, but can't find it. Regardless, I'm looking for something from Lila, which 
concerned (this is paraphrasing) absorbing something which was immoral, and not 
passing it on (as a high form of morality). Does this ring a bell with anyone? 
If so, where in Lila can it be found? Many thanks,

[Arlo]
I think the passage you are referring to occurs at the end of page 398 in the 
hardcover edition:

If you take all this karmic garbage and make yourself feel better by passing 
it on to others that's normal. That's the way the world works. But if you 
manage to absorb it and not pass it on, that's the highest moral conduct of 
all. That really advances everything, not just you. The whole world. If you 
look at the lives of some of the great moral figures of history-Christ, 
Lincoln, Gandhi, and others­ you'll see that that's what they were really 
involved in, the cleansing of the world through the absorption of karmic 
garbage. They didn't pass it on. Their followers sometimes did, but they 
didn't. (Pirsig, LILA)

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Re: [MD] 42

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[DMB]
Wow. Thanks, Arlo. The paper was easy to find and it's free. I've downloaded 
and printed it. So cool to see Pirsig's name in an abstract. Looking forward to 
reading the thing. 

[Arlo]
Sure thing, I too am always excited to see Pirsig cited in academic papers. 
This one was especially interesting to me because I had been exposed to 
Freire's work through my interest in Vygotsky and socio-cultural theory. And 
while its no secret I find symbiosis between these philosophers, its 
additionally encouraging to find others have made that connection as well (and 
in this case as far back as 1980). 

Another article that came to my attention today is just from last Friday, but I 
think it touches on everything we've been talking about (although this article 
lacks Pirsig's vocabulary to frame the problem).

http://thefederalist.com/2014/01/17/the-death-of-expertise/

The death of expertise is a rejection not only of knowledge, but of the ways 
in which we gain knowledge and learn about things. Fundamentally, it’s a 
rejection of science and rationality, which are the foundations of Western 
civilization itself.

Critics might dismiss all this by saying that everyone has a right to 
participate in the public sphere. That’s true. But every discussion must take 
place within limits and above a certain baseline of competence. And competence 
is sorely lacking in the public arena. 

This subverts any real hope of a conversation, because it is simply exhausting 
... to have to start from the very beginning of every argument and establish 
the merest baseline of knowledge, and then constantly to have to negotiate the 
rules of logical argument.

... I like the democratization of knowledge and the wider circle of public 
participation. That greater participation, however, is endangered by the 
utterly illogical insistence that every opinion should have equal weight...

As a result, many academic departments are boutiques, in which the professors 
are expected to be something like intellectual valets. This produces nothing 
but a delusion of intellectual adequacy in children who should be instructed, 
not catered to.

[Arlo continues]
Yes, I did read your article (for those who may not have seen it, 
http://www.partiallyexaminedlife.com/2014/01/20/truth-without-the-capital-t/#more-24507).
 I think you could make a strong argument that, for Freire as well, education 
is much more about examining the 'reality goggles' as it is about describing 
reality through those goggles. The first part of his statement (induction into 
the logic of the present system) is about just the latter, while his second 
point (creatively transforming the system) rests on critical evaluation and 
adjustments to the goggles. 

You mentioned in closing Pirsig's comments on maps, and this reminded me of a 
related topic that I was made aware of through my interest in Freire, 
counter-mapping. Wikimedia's article is lacking, so you'll find more 
interesting and well-presented information in the (dreaded) academic 
literature ;-) but the idea shares Pirsig view while adding that the map 
making itself is not neutral and often includes very specific power-reinforcing 
elements.  

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter-mapping

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Re: [MD] 42

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
It's probably too late to go over this ground again, but I thought Pirsig said 
it was *the law* of gravity that was merely in our heads.

[Arlo]
You can substitute whatever intellectual pattern you feel comfortable with, the 
point is that we have torn down the objectivism of intellectual patterns but 
our only recourse has been to regress to subjectivism. Certainly you're not 
arguing that Pirsig was advancing subjectivism? Instead of expanding intellect, 
we've simply said its all relative opinion, and opinion that should bow to 
social (often in the guise of religious) authority. And this underscores a big 
problem for education.

[Arlo previously]
We are seeing a culture whose intellect has destroyed its own objective 
position (rightly so), but rather than an expansion of reason we are simply 
reverting to subjective relativism.

[John]
Very astute Arlo; the argument Rigel made perhaps?

[Arlo]
I think Rigel demanded a return to social authority, because he believed it was 
the only protection against subjective relativism, which was in turn the only 
alternative he saw to objectivism. Rigel's problem was that he didn't see the 
alternate way out of this dichotomy.

Moreso, what I was evoking here was Pirsig's sentiment that And from the early 
seventies on there has been a slow confused mindless drift back to a kind of 
pseudo-­Victorian moral posture. (LILA) In a world of subjective relativism, 
social authority becomes THE authority, and this is what we are seeing in the 
way we are responding to the crisis in education. We see the walls of objective 
Truth come down, posit instead (the only alternative we see in) subjective 
relativism, and social authority moves into control the curriculum. 

[John]
Freeing the mules to kick as they please reduces the world to a desert.  You 
don't mess with social patterns lightly.

[Arlo]
Well, as was mentioned by DMB and myself earlier, creativity and transformative 
power arise through structure, anarchy would ultimately lead back to biological 
rule. No one has suggested, that I am aware of, that social structures be torn 
down just because they are social structures. For Freire, the goal of education 
is to allow people to not simply see when and where they are being oppressed by 
which social structures, but also the power to transform and reconstruct those 
structures to eliminate oppression. Freire was not an anarchist that wanted to 
see everything burn. Nor is Pirsig. Nor am I. But, simply preserving and 
recreating structures isn't the answer either. You've got to know when to hold 
'em, know when to fold 'em, know when to walk away, and know when to run.

[John]
SOM is a social pattern.

[Arlo]
I've been avoiding this, and I think Dan gave a great reply already, but since 
you're saying this again let me say, no. SOM is an intellectual pattern of 
values that holds subjects and/or objects and primary metaphysical entities. 

[John]
All intellectual patterns that succeed, influence and create societies that 
adopt them, idolize them, make them into concrete structures whereby people 
live and breathe.

[Arlo]
There is undoubtably feedback down the hierarchy. Indeed, ZMM is largely about 
how a culturally-adopted subject-object metaphysics has impacted the way we 
live, and the way we work, as much as it has the way we think. (In the same 
manner, social behavior has influenced the biological level of patterns.) For 
Pirsig, and I agree, SOM is an intellectual pattern, that certainly informed 
the social pattern in cultures where it was predominate. Consider that a 
Buddhist tea-ceremony is not SOM, subjects and objects do not become the 
primary metaphysical realities just because the Buddhist has moved from 
thinking about the cosmos to having tea in a certain way.

[John]
And again, I think this use of the term intellect is questionable because it 
seems by that you mean a certain social authority (academia) whereas the MoQ 
definition of the 4th level is more complicated than the shorthand term we use 
around here - intellectual.

[Arlo]
Calling academia a social authority is recreating the confusing between the 
Church of Reason and the university structures in ZMM. Of course, the Church of 
Reason is much larger than what we see as 'official' buildings and institutions 
of academia. Above the library here on campus reads the words The true 
university is a collection of books, and while I am not so keen on the 
materialization present in the language, I get what they are going for, and I 
agree in spirit. 

[John]
The one thing I don't like about the English system is you do that testing once 
and for all. 

[Arlo]
I agree, and have been arguing this for years. This is part of the homogenous, 
factory-line process of 'education'. It is part of the 'sorting' that requires 
certain people 'sink' to fill certain labor needs. It is a gross misuse, and 
misunderstanding, of learning and assessment. One of the dirty little secrets 
of public