Re: [PEIRCE-L] Clear Ideas,

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear robert, list,


Thank you for bringing special attention to this recurring matter, *again*.


I know we all remember the pugilistic we have engaged in our own past,

and I find it especially important to remember that we did/do this,

not because we’re stupid but because we appear to have no other recourse.


I mean, what is the point of expressing knowledge conveniently in
categorical propositions?

So, if we can’t get out of it, then let’s get into it, *amirite*?



In support of your post, here is another sentence that engages Peirce’s
general intention.


For example, when he conducts his survey of the different kinds of causes (
*aitiai*) identified by earlier thinkers he comments:


*These thinkers, as we say, appear to have grasped up to a certain point *

*two of the causes we distinguished in our work on nature [Physics II.3 7]
 *

*— that of matter and the source of motion —  *

*but obscurely and making nothing clear  (amudrôs mentoi kai outhen saphôs)
 *

*as untrained men behave in fights;  *

*for they go round with their opponents and often strike fine blows,  *

*but they fight without science; *


*so these thinkers seem not to know what they are saying; *

*for they appear to make no use of their causes or only to a small extent. *

*(CP 9.85a).*


*We must next observe that neither matter nor form *

*(I mean in the proximate sense) is generated.  *


*All change is of some subject by some agent into some object.  *

*The agent is the immediate mover; the subject is the matter; *

*and the object is the form.  *


*Thus the process will go on to infinity *

*if not only the bronze comes to be round, *

*but also roundness or bronze comes to be; *

*there must, then, be some stopping-point..*

*(CP 10.69b)*


As I look at what we are experiencing in the world today, nothing is more
clear than this.


With best wishes,
j

On Sun, Dec 17, 2023 at 4:12 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> List,
>
> In the end, Peirce left us a research journal of over 100,000 pages. The
> current debate shows that any assertion or term can give rise to sourced
> contestation. However, the choice of sources and the meanings attributed to
> them can create a fog, mainly through biased responses, which can
> discourage even the best-disposed people.
>
> Proof: The message I reply to begins with “*For the record (again),
> although the three interpretants are not a trichotomy for sign
> classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the specific sense
> defined by Peirce as follows*.”
>
> I’ll spend little time on “*again,”* which shows a certain
> self-importance on the part of the person who, *once again*, has to
> defend himself against a false accusation. Then comes the rhetorical
> process of admitting what you’re about to contest (*the three
> interpretants are not a trichotomy for sign classification*), only to
> deny it by invoking another meaning of the terms, a “specific” meaning
> attributed to Peirce and pointed out by the author for the sake of his
> argument. This is pure fantasy, as there is nothing new or specific in 5.72
> that follows. Indeed, all you have to do is look it up and read just the
> two sentences that precede the quotation and which have not been reproduced
> by the author:
>
> *5.72. The relatively degenerate forms of the Third category do not fall
> into a catena, like those of the Second. What we find is this.*
>
> So, there’s nothing “specific” about what follows. It’s about genuine
> Thirdness and its two degenerate forms. It’s easy to see that this is a
> trichotomy in Peirce’s sense since authentic Thirdness is the Category of
> the law independently of any application; it degenerates in the first
> degree in its role of governing facts (relatively reactional) and in the
> second degree in its role of governing qualities of feeling embodied in
> these same facts (relatively qualitative). Peirce’s use of this supposedly
> “specific” trichotomy is usual; it is found a little further on in 5.73 :
>
> *5.73. The representamen, for example, divides by trichotomy into the
> general sign or symbol, the index, and the icon*.
>
>  And he confirms this without possible dispute:
>
> *5.73 Of these three genera of representamens the Icon is the
> Qualitatively Degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the
> Symbol is the relatively genuine genus.*
>
> Therefore, I stand by my statement in its entirety, particularly by the
> fact that the three interpretants, however Peirce calls them, cannot be the
> result of a trichotomy. Moreover, we get no results if we research the
> terms “trichotomy” or “trichotomies” in my thesaurus of definitions, which
> contains 76 definitions of signs including those with two objects and three
> interpretants.
>
> What can we learn from this dissension? Peirce again provides it:
>
> *Such false distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs
> really different, and are among the pitfalls of which we ought constantly
> to beware, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jack, list,


Haha!! I see what you did there.. ;)


But of course, all Peirceans *already* recognize the “boiled oats, milk,
and sugar”,

the “milk and water and sugar” argument, *already*.

For did not JAS, in his wonderful post, cite (CP 5.553, EP 2:380), *already*
?


On the other hand,

you may authentically take the poison of salt to be different from the
poison of sugar..

Gosh, I hope not.. for that would destroy my entire argument!


With best wishes,
jerry r

On Wed, May 3, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:

> Jon, List
>
> Semeiotic is, however you define it, a schema for a series of relations
> between predicates (or qualities or whatever you want to call a
> classificatory schema). It is a formalism - to be frank. Now being a
> formalism the terms "dynamical object" and so on -- these are about as
> arbitrary as it gets. For they are "stand in" predicates for a given
> quality within a formal structure (semiotic). In understanding Kant's thing
> in itself, we must throw it all away (suspend it until the noumena has been
> comprehended insofar as it can be).
>
> Kant's noumenal/thing in itself is pre-form wherein the metaphysical may
> be of the physical but is always pre-physical. Pre-capacity to even
> understand form/content. That is what the noumena is (for humans). You
> cannot usefully use Peirce to address the thing-in-itself (via semiotic
> formalisms) for it transcends the very notion of form.
>
> The noumenal is pre-consubstantiality even as consubstantiality is how we
> make sense of it. It is not possible to represent the thing in itself via
> form, or any means, because it goes before - our attempts to do so will
> always be wrong. Except we know via consubstantiality/contiguity that it,
> the noumenal, necessarily is.
>
> So
>
> Salt-Snail-Poison
>
> Ignoring any formal terms, semeiotic or otherwise, it is best to restrict
> theses to the simplest terms possible. Quality/Element/Subject. To a
> physicist, perhaps all three are elements?
>
>
> That the "quality" of the "element" (salt) is "poison" to a snail, is the
> formal - semiotic - classifcation of the relation in its simplest possible
> form.
>
> That the Q of the E(s) is not poison to any other organism (or need not
> be) is the point. Thus, the essence of salt, as it is in itself, is proven
> (regardless of formal structure but via formal structure - as with Godel).
>
> Thus Q of E(S) = V(P-H[S]) but not [X]. To humans, always V(-X) (in
> itself, there, but not possible to represent). All
> mathematics/lexicals/sciences/logics produce a value within a formal relata
> (relational schema) which value is never the thing in itself (but we know
> the thing in itself necessarily is and is pre-form). That is as scientific
> as Semeiotic may ever be. But only if it understands the X restriction
> which enables its liftoff - the fallibilism upon which science is based and
> which Peirce always embraced - thus there should be no reticience in
> disregarding large chunks of Peircean terminology as that is what Peirce
> aimed for (semeiotic as science).
>
> Quality of Element(Snail) = Value(Poison-to-Human[-of-Snail]). That is the
> semeiotic "standing for" schema simplified. I.e, Salt-Snail-Poison =
> Value(Poison-to-Human[-of-Snail].
>
> However, P-H[S] is necessarily not Poison to a Snail which in
> semiotic/formal terms is more like P(S[Sa]). The first has a human
> intermediary - we cannot pretend that this doesn't "count" (formal logic
> and mathematics will tell you that it does). Thus, what salt - as poison -
> is to a snail, in absentia of human understanding, cannot be the "same"
> thing (Reality or otherwise) as it is to a snail minus the human predicate.
> And this is only in logical terms - which occludes the fact that no animal
> understands such things via logic (of this lexical, received, variety,
> other than the human).
>
> We have no idea - no matter what anyone says - of how a snail perceives
> salt. We assume it is the same - or similar - as in "fire is hot" (Kantian
> objectivity 1.0) but similar, mutual threshold of understanding, is not the
> "same" (it cannot be, even from the biological point of view - it mightbe
> similar, but never the same, for the divergences among humans themselves
> tell us this with zero ambiguity: savoury for some, poisonous for others).
> Nor is it relativity, it is just true.
>
> Every single mathematical system ever derived partakes of precisely the
> same schema. Bar none. Formal relationships - genres if you like - which
> justify certain functions/operations within a given "habitus" (area of
> operational protocol - entirely habitual insofar as the numericals/etc go).
> And all such are discursivities - which is why logic goes ahead of
> mathematics in every schema you've ever seen (epistemological). This is why
> Russell derives a paradox and Godel derives incompleteness -- the terms are
> arbitrary discursivities (functional, yes, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Question about Boole’s An Investigation of the Laws of Thought

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Franklin, list,


It is walking on landmines to figure out someone else’s intention and
deliver your opinion out loud in public

*as if *your opinion is the only one that is correct.

However, if your purpose is, “to understand better the genesis of Peirce’s
work in logic”,

then you could always just ask him, but, as we say, ‘he is safely dead’.


If that is not enough for you, then check out Amirouche Moktefi’s
presentation here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YSmdpsaMvXg


21:00

“If by modern, we mean what we are doing today,

so what we are doing comes from there,

- we could do that, of course.

But then, I’m not doing history, what we are doing is.. heritage-

It’s the idea that you are looking for the advancement of the discipline.

How advanced is it.


So, we would say, for instance,

‘Given what we are doing today, Frege was the most advanced in 1879’.

Meaning that it is the closest to what we are doing.

That’s the top.

And then, you can search for the next step..

We don’t have historical moments but historical steps.


But if you want to know how logic was in 1879,

..  if you’re interested in the state of logic.. How was logic in 1879?..

What were all the other people doing?”


For instance.. and he gives examples, including situating Boole beginning
at ~35:15,

introducing Peirce at 38:20

and Ladd-Franklin at 38:45, who is not developing Peirce’s system.


“She is introducing her own system.

‘There are in existence, five.  I propose to add one more to the number.’


The whole idea here is that you have a lot of different logicians
introducing different systems.

Now how do they compare their methods?

It’s very simple..

You apply them on the same problem,  (cf, slide at 40:00)

and show how their method works best.”


I hope that helps.

With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 9:46 AM  wrote:

> List,
>
> After receiving an off-list suggestion to pick up an introduction to
> symbolic logic and use Wikipedia as a resource, it will be well for me to
> clarify that I am quite familiar with symbolic logic, having mastered
> sentential logic and predicate calculus, dabbled in modal logic, and gotten
> to be familiar with Peirce’s graphical logic. The purpose of understanding
> Boole’s work is not to learn symbolic logic—which is in fact quite
> different in many respects from Boolean calculus—but specifically to
> understand better the genesis of Peirce’s work in logic, which I take to be
> a broader and deeper conception of logic than one finds in studies of
> symbolic logic.
>
> Sincerely,
> Franklin Ransom
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> > On Jan 10, 2022, at 12:03 AM, pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com wrote:
> >
> > 
> > Hello list,
> >
> > It has been some years since I lasted posted, and I have only been
> lurking ever since.
> >
> > I am hoping to get some advice on reading George Boole’s An
> Investigation of the Laws of Thought. This is a text which CS Peirce
> references in his earlier logical work, and I was hoping to follow along
> Peirce’s early work by understanding what he used as a basis for developing
> his own ideas.
> >
> > I’ve had some difficulty though in trying to decipher Boole’s work. His
> earlier essay on his work I was able to get through, but the book proves
> more challenging. At first I tried an online PDF, but what I found had
> noticeable typos, the sort of thing one really wants to avoid in a work
> using a lot of abstract symbols.
> >
> > So some years ago I acquired a hard copy of the currently printed
> version from Watchmaker Publishing, but found the book still having typos.
> This is rather frustrating, as they’ve had over a century and a half to get
> it right. I suspect it has to do with digitization of the book and then
> publishing the latest hard copy based on this poor digitization. After
> trying for a couple years to get through it, I decided I couldn’t figure
> out if it was due to typos that I don’t know are typos, or simply inability
> to comprehend on my part, that has kept me from being able to interpret the
> work successfully.
> >
> > So what I’d like to know is if there are possibly any publications on
> Boole’s work, hopefully in relation to Peirce’s early logical work
> extending the Boolean calculus, that might assist me in finally getting
> through Boole’s book. Any advice or suggestions in regard to this matter
> will be appreciated.
> >
> > Sincerely,
> > Franklin Ransom
> > Sent from my iPhone
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body.  More at
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
_ _ 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Gary, Jack, list,


There have been many really good notions floating about in the past few
days-

most of which I’d prefer to be silent about.


However, given how much this particular notion can be of use to us,

I feel compelled to bring attention to it.


To the extent that we prefer not to be hypocrites,

and I mean hypocritical in the sense of, it is better to remember to do as
we preach,

and not merely as a political tactic of flinging accusations given we are
all blameworthy,

I find your selection of this following Peirce statement to be extremely
pertinent to our oft-called plea for improving list-relations.


Here is what you quoted:


*CSP: Nor must any synechist say, ‘I am altogether myself, and not at all
you.’ *

*If you embrace synechism, you must abjure this metaphysics of wickedness. *


*In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far
greater measure than, *

*without deep studies in psychology, you would believe. *

*Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, for the most
part, *

*the vulgarest delusion of vanity. *

*In the second place, all men who resemble you and are in analogous
circumstances are, in a measure, yourself, though not quite in the same way
in which your neighbors are you. (EP2:2, CP 7:571, 1894)*


Now, what is phaneroscopy such that we are being concretely reasonable
under such circumstances?


Let us remind ourselves of this moment every time we fail,

for we will do so, again and again,

because this is *us*.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sun, Oct 24, 2021 at 12:33 PM  wrote:

> Jon, I’m with you on this, except maybe for one detail. You quoted
> Peirce’s Logic Notebook:
>
> CSP: The Immediate Interpretant is the Interpretant represented,
> explicitly or implicitly, in the sign itself. I have thus omitted the
> *intended *interpretant. So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign,
> it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed,
> it may be the Interpretant of *another *sign, but it is in no sense the
> interpretant of *that *sign. (R 339:414[276r], 1906 Apr 2)
>
> I wouldn't say that this entry means that he “abandoned” the term
> “Intentional Interpretant” introduced in his letter to Welby. Peirce
> introduced three or four sets of Interpretants, and I think he used them
> for different analytical purposes, so that they might well overlap in their
> reference to a given situation. In the Welby letter, Peirce is focused on
> the *communicative* function of signs. In the Logic Notebook entry he
> seems to be more focused on, well, logic (as semeiotic). The
> Immediate/Dynamic/Final triad of interpretants may be the basic one for
> logic, but that doesn't render the other triads useless.
>
> Semiotically, if both utterer and interpreter of a sign have their own
> internal contexts for the external (“published”) sign – as is generally the
> case in verbal communication between humans – an Intentional Interpretant
> as Peirce defines it can be internal *both* to the sign itself and to the
> utterer, so that it is an Immediate Interpretant *as well as* an
> Intentional Interpretant. The same Immediate Interpretant of the same sign
> can also be part of the interpreter's internal context, as his more or less
> intuitive sense of what the utterer's intention was in uttering the sign.
>
> If a semiosic process is *continuous*, as you have argued in another
> thread, then the boundaries between sign and interpretant are artifacts of
> analysis: they are not as real as the process of which they are parts. On
> the psychological side, Peirce asserted that the boundaries between
> *people* are likewise indeterminate and arbitrary:
>
>
>
> CSP: Nor must any synechist say, ‘I am altogether myself, and not at all
> you.’ If you embrace synechism, you must abjure this metaphysics of
> wickedness. In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself,
> and in far greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you
> would believe. Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is,
> for the most part, the vulgarest delusion of vanity. In the second place,
> all men who resemble you and are in analogous circumstances are, in a
> measure, yourself, though not quite in the same way in which your neighbors
> are you. (EP2:2, CP 7:571, 1894)
>
>
>
> Peirce also recognized that persons are themselves signs, so that a
> continuous semiosic process can very well involve both. How else would
> communication between people by means of signs be possible? This synechism
> also has a phenomenological basis, which Peirce recognized in his early
> work (long before he started using the term “phenomenology”):
>
>
>
> CSP: … whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some
> feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a
> sign. But it follows from our own existence (which is proved by the
> occurrence of ignorance and error) that everything which is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct, intuition and semiosis

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear robert, list,


You said,

however, he (Gary F) is in a position of advantage over Peirce-L


What are you talking about?

The history of this list is detailed on the Arisbe site and

Gary R also gave his version as recently as the other day:


I am in the process of exploring the future direction of Peirce-L with
Nathan Houser, who heads The Peirce Group (TPG), and Peter Skagestaad, a
member of TPG who was charged with overseeing the functioning of Peirce-L
when over a decade ago I was appointed moderator of the List in accordance
with Joseph Ransdell's express wishes. I suggested that Ben Udell, who
immediately agreed to take on the duties of webmaster (which Joe had also
requested), also serve as co-manager with me of Peirce-L and Arisbe; he is
also now involved in these discussions.


Don’t give up power you think you don’t have,

especially to others who don’t claim to have it.


And if you think what you just said is justification for a new list,

then it follows that you don’t have that justification.


Besides, signing up for another list-

that’s not something everyone on this list will do.

So, starting up another list has constraints of its own,

where one possibility is that you end up just talking amongst yourselves.


I would recommend listening to Margarithe’s smart advice,

which is to fix what we have here, more or less.


I believe Peirce offered a method to get us out of this type of situation.

Do you not see it?


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sun, Oct 17, 2021 at 11:18 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> List,
> Finally everything becomes clearer and I understand better why Gary F sees
> me as a Post-Peircean ... it is because he is basically himself an
> Ante-Peircean who reduces Peirce to an Idioscopy as it could exist before
> him, without Cenoscopy and of course without Mathematics . ... as I simply
> claim to be Peircean, without any truncation, he sees me as Post ... and I
> see him as Ante ... however, he is in a position of advantage over
> Peirce-L; consequently, if a justification of a parallel list was needed,
> here it is ...
> RM
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
>
>
> Le dim. 17 oct. 2021 à 16:24,  a écrit :
>
>> Jack, I appreciate your point that “we cannot have an epistemology
>> without some form of "anthropology".” If I may extend the idea a little, we
>> cannot hope to understand human nature, or why humans think and act the way
>> we do, unless we can draw on insights emerging from biology, anthropology,
>> sociology, psychology, phenomenology, semiotics, and the whole range of
>> empirical sciences (“Idioscopy” was Peirce’s term). But the fact that all
>> these disciplines have been hived off into academic special interests makes
>> it difficult to integrate them all into a coherent system.
>>
>> I happen to think that Peirce’s philosophy, especially his phenomenology
>> and the semiotics which is quite explicitly based on it, is highly relevant
>> to the challenges of living in our time — relevant *just as it is,* in
>> the writings that Peirce left us. That’s why I included so much of it in my
>> online book *Turning Signs . *My purpose
>> there was to *integrate *it with more recent insights from the
>> disciplines mentioned above, along with selections from ancient scriptures
>> and Indigenous traditions. Jeremy Lent’s new book *The Web of Meaning*
>> does much the same thing, and very well (I think), but leaves out the
>> semiotics. So I think my book may have some added value, although Lent’s
>> may be more accessible.
>>
>> I do *not* believe that studies of Peirce are relevant *only* when we
>> can link them up somehow with current developments in our own specialized
>> field (such as “Cognitive Science,” using John Sowa’s example). I think
>> Peirce’s ideas, just as he expressed them, can and should be integrated
>> with matters of living concern. I think they are “directly applicable to
>> the conduct of life, and full of nutrition for man's highest growth,” as
>> Peirce said of his “neglected argument” (EP2:435). The center of my own
>> concern these days (as readers of my blog 
>> know) is the current global situation in which human activity is rapidly
>> undermining our life support system. Since there is wide consensus on what
>> needs to be done *in this decade* to have a chance of stabilizing our
>> life support system, I am especially interested in what it is about human
>> nature that has brought us to this pass and seems to be preventing us from
>> doing what needs to be done. But I do *not* consider this to be a
>> ‘special interest’; I think it is of *general* concern for all life
>> forms on this planet.
>>
>> I have several reasons for thinking that Peirce’s work is highly relevant
>> to this *general* concern. One is his emphasis on the *continuity* of
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Margaretha, John, Edwina, list,


I concur about the absurdity of beginning a separate list and very much
appreciate the manner in which you have put it.


As for Popper and Peirce, warnings are everywhere.

Proceeding with good judgment about them is harder to find.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 10:22 AM Margaretha Hendrickx 
wrote:

> List,
>
> I think it is absurd to start a separate mailing list.
>
> Especially since its purpose would be to use Peirce's work as a mirror to
> see what is going on in society today.
>
> If people feel perturbed or unvalidated after reading the emails
> distributed by this list, well, have you ever had a discussion about the
> possibility that this has to do more with what is going on in society today
> and that one's feelings about society are being projected on the emails
> distributed by this list?
>
> My very best, Margaretha H.
>
> PS.  I also find it unreasonable to expect people to reply to list emails
> within 24-48 hrs.  I cannot operate in that way.  I am juggling many other
> balls.  There are many interesting emails on this list, but I am simply not
> in the right place to reply to them immediately. I hope to reply to them in
> the future once my schedule is less hectic.  The reason I replied to this
> email immediately before other ones, well, it caught my attention and it
> kept on bothering me.  Its divisive rhetoric mirrors the divisive
> rhetoric in society at large.
>
> Let me end with a question.  Popper is known for warning against the
> manipulative use of language and logic. Did Peirce do something similar?
> If my question shows a lack of understanding of Peirce's work, I
> apologize.  I am still in the learning stages.
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 6:02 PM sowa @bestweb.net 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> On Thursday, I sent the note below to Peirce-L.   I received some strong
>> positive comments and suggestions offline, but complete silence from the
>> people who send most of the notes to Peirce-L.For example:  "As for the
>> natural extensions of Peirce's thought, even when they agree closely with
>> his principles, they are rejected [on Peirce-L] as post-Peircean"
>>
>> I interpret those responses as evidence that we need n email list that is
>> dedicated to the kinds of topics that dominated the Peirce Centennial
>> Congress in 2014.  That was a very exciting conference on  research that
>> builds on Peirce's work and relates it to developments in the century after
>> Peirce.   As Peirce frequently emphasized, the meaning of any  sign is its
>> implications for action in the future.  We live in Peirce's future, and our
>> actions today depend critically on the developments in the century after
>> Peirce.
>>
>> I don't believe that we should reject Peirce-l, but we should have
>> another email list that relates Peirce's ideas to the issues of today.  I
>> would encourage subscribers to Peirce-L to participate in both lists.  I'll
>> send another note tomorrow..
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>> --
>> *From*: "sowa @bestweb.net" 
>> *Sent*: Thursday, October 14, 2021 10:39 PM
>> *To*: "Peirce-L" 
>> *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's contributions to the 21st century
>>
>> Robert, Edwina, List,
>>
>> The passages Robert quoted show that Peirce admitted that his system
>> was a work in progress.  We could add his remark that phaneroscopy was
>> still a "science egg".
>>
>> CSP:  I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in
>> the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the
>> doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible
>> semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a
>> first-comer.  I am, accordingly, obliged to confine myself to the most
>> important questions.  (CP 5.488)
>>
>> CSP:  All that you can find in print of my work on logic are simply
>> scattered outcroppings here and there of a rich vein which remains
>> unpublished.  Most of it I suppose has been written down; but no human
>> being could ever put together the fragments.  I could not myself do
>> so.  (CP 2.1)
>>
>> RM:  we must make, collectively and in the long run, a rational
>> representative construction of Peirce's work that is communicable with
>> a minimum of effort.  To reach this goal, we must not fall into a
>> dialogue of the deaf.  We are also backwoodsmen in the traces left by
>> Peirce; faithful to his spirit there are several of us on this list
>> who follow and develop some of these traces.  We find them
>> particularly relevant because we have new tools.  Some literalists
>> think we should leave the forest as it is.  Every time they get in the
>> way, which keeps happening, there's a big problem.
>>
>> ET:  Thank you Robert, for this analysis.  But I'm beginning to think
>> that the Peirce-List is not equipped to handle the exploration of
>> Peirce and his analytic framework in the 21st century.  After all -
>> some of us have been 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's contributions to the 21st century (was Dimensionality

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear robert, John, Gary, list,


   robert said:

we *must* make, collectively and in the long run,

a rational representative construction of Peirce's work

that is communicable with a minimum of effort.

To reach this goal, we must not fall into a dialogue of the deaf.


   and John said:

It's important to recognize that we are all sinners,

and to do our *best* to promote more constructive discussions.


   To which, Gary said:

I agree. And in a philosophical forum such as this, to "do our best"

is to *be as reasonable as it is possible for each of us to be*.

After all, 'reasonableness' is Peirce's *summum bonum *of philosophical
esthetics,

which principle accepted and followed can then ground philosophical ethics..

The 'sin' -- for philosophy, logic, and science more generally -- is being
*un*reasonable.

As you concluded:  "Occasional lapses may occur.  But we should do our
best.”


   So let us do our best!

   For ‘*what is, is best!*’


   And if not,

*It seems almost ridiculous that, while every other science moves forward
ceaselessly,*

*This one claiming to be wisdom itself, whose oracular pronouncements
everyone consults, *

*is continually revolving in one spot without advancing a step.*


For Peirce was sure that by himself, or perhaps by some young people
trained by him, it would be finished.

This height of all sciences, this self- knowledge of reason,

the new metaphysics or however you would call it,

would be finished completely by Peirce or, at the latest,

in the generation after Peirce and then there could not be any further
progress . . .


Of course, this is a very popular and provisional statement, but it is
still revealing.

That is, *revealing* in spite of Peirce’s self-proclaimed statements about
being a “pioneer, a backwoodsman, a first-comer, scattered outcroppings and
unpublished rich vein that no human being could ever put together” and all
that..

With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Tue, Oct 12, 2021 at 8:44 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List
>
> thank you Robert, for this analysis. But I'm beginning to think that the
> Peirce-List is not equipped to handle the exploration of Peirce and his
> analytic framework in the 21st century.
>
> After all -  some of us have been trying for years to introduce
> current scientific and other research areas [linguistic, AI, societal,
> economic] and explore how the Peircean framework, in different terms, is
> being used to examine these fields. We've been met with a refusal to engage
> in any discussion and/or, an open almost horror of such an approach. We've
> been told that 'Peirce never used such words'; ...and...your focus is
> 'post-Peirce'.I think that this phrase of 'post-Peirce' makes it very clear
> that the Peirce-List can't handle such a movement.  Or we've been
> told 'no-where in the texts did Peirce discuss such an issue'. That is, the
> feeling seems to be that to venture into these modern areas is somehow
> tainting or harming not merely the value but the legitimacy of Peirce.
>
> I suggest that what is needed - after all these fruitless years of trying
> to introduce the examination of the Peircean framework in the 21st century
> fields of research of our world..what is needed is a NEW LIST. It could
> be affiliated or somehow 'accepted' by the Peirce-List - but, it would
> be specifically open to this modern world. It would not object to
> non-Peircean terms or research areas - but would be engaged in showing how
> these modern areas are actually using the Peircean framework and how
> further use can help those research fields. There would be no need for
> members on this new List to be 'cautioned' that they were 'post Peirce' or
> using 'non-Peirce' terms. The focus would be on the meaning of these
> research areas and their relevance to Peirce.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 12/10/21 6:59 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R., John, List,
>
> It is necessary, in the first place, to consider that the text of which we
> speak is, in the field of knowledge, a true "continent," a metaphor of
> Jean-Marie Chevallier[1] <#m_-6251563585640681687__ftn1>,  a particularly
> accurate metaphor that illustrates its extent, its complexity, the variety
> of its territories. Inside we find in particular semiotics and logic of
> which Peirce said himself:
>
> I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work
> of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of
> the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I
> find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer. I am,
> accordingly, obliged to confine myself to the most important questions.
> (CP 5.488) [emphasize mine]
>
> And of the only writings related to logic, he said:
>
> All that you can find in print of my work on logic are simply scattered
> outcroppings here and there of a rich vein which remains unpublished. Most
> of it I suppose has been written 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1))

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Margaretha, JAS, Edwina, list,


Why pay

   deliberate and careful attention to

- argument as war

- argument as a tennis tournament

- argument as constructing a cathedral

- argument as dance

- argument as repairing a ship in the middle of the sea

- argument as computer programming



When

*Do not take offense *will do, *amirite*?


Or better than even that, (in the form of an imperative):

Do *both*!


*everyone *would (a) refrain from posting "you" messages, especially when
the subject matter is potentially contentious,

and (b) deliberately choose *not *to take personal offense at anything
posted by anyone else.


Hope that helps.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Wed, Oct 6, 2021 at 2:03 PM Margaretha Hendrickx 
wrote:

> Hi all.
>
> Yes, I believe it can be fixed.  It is a manner of deliberate and careful
> attention to the metaphors one uses while arguing, Lakoff & Johnson's 
> *Metaphors
> We Live By *opened my eyes to the choices we have on *how *to argue:
> - argument as war
> - argument as a tennis tournament
> - argument as constructing a cathedral
> - argument as dance
> - argument as repairing a ship in the middle of the sea
> - argument as computer programming
>
> Each one of these metaphors sets up written argumentation in subtly
> different form highlighting subtly different dimensions and downplaying
> others.  It is all a manner of deliberate and critical self-reflection on
> what one gets from being and participating on this ListServ.
>
> In case you wonder about my agenda, I am on this list to learn more on the
> received views on semiotic triangles, and how to generate more global
> awareness about this structure, and how to use it effectively precisely to
> reduce the likelihood of frustrating misunderstandings.
> But I have to admit that I needed to be educated about the omnipresence of
> spatial metaphors in human communicative processes before I fully grasped
> how to put semiotic triangles to work.
>
> I am still learning about whether Peirce had a unique theory of metaphor
> usage or whether there is such a thing as Peirce's own metaphor
> theory-in-use.
>
> So far, Stephen Pepper's (1942) *World Hypotheses * has been most helpful
> for me to put the work of Lakoff and Johnson in the larger context.
>
> My very best, Margaretha H.
>
> On Wed, Oct 6, 2021 at 2:29 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
>> Jerry - yes, we know what the problem is. The question is:
>>
>> 1] How do we fix it? And even..
>>
>> 2] Can it be fixed?
>>
>> My answer to 2 is: No. Because we can't deal with 1.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 06/10/21 2:10 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Dear Edwina, Jerry, Bernard, list,
>>
>>
>> Why so pessimistic?
>>
>> I mean, we at least profess a dogmatic view that Peirce was a great
>> philosopher,
>>
>> and as such, we would at least follow his method of mediation, amirite?
>>
>> .. because ‘spring to action’ and all that..
>>
>>
>> So then, what does one do, as Peirceans, when faced with tribal behavior
>> in our own midst?
>>
>>
>> For the problem can be stated as thus:
>>
>>
>> And before a crowd means among the ignorant:
>>
>> for surely, among those who know, he will not be more convincing..
>>
>> Therefore when the rhetorician is more convincing than the doctor,
>>
>> the ignorant is more convincing among the ignorant than the expert.
>>
>>
>>
>> With best wishes,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 6, 2021 at 12:58 PM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I think it is very difficult to change this list.  It can be difficult
>>> to post, since one is so frequently met with, not a discussion, but
>>> authoritative assertions of 'No, Peirce did not say/mean...that'...
>>>
>>> One doesn't find words like: "In my understanding' or 'in my view'. Or
>>> 'I think that'.  Instead, it's authoritative verbiage that is quite
>>> relentless in claiming that you are quite wrong, you are not genuinely
>>> following Peirce...and so on.
>>>
>>> It's almost like a tribal syndrome, where a few people consider
>>> themselves 'Genuine Members of the Peirce Tribe'..and others are viewed as
>>> outsiders with little claim or right to discuss the issues - and certainly
>>> cannot claim membership with the select few.
>>>
>>> I doubt if this can change.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed 06/10/21 1:30 PM , Bernard Morand morand.bern...@neuf.fr sent:
>>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1))

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Edwina, Jerry, Bernard, list,


Why so pessimistic?

I mean, we at least profess a dogmatic view that Peirce was a great
philosopher,

and *as* such, we would at least follow his method of mediation, *amirite*?


.. because ‘spring to action’ and all that..


So then, what does one do, *as* Peirceans, when faced with tribal behavior
in our own midst?


For the problem can be stated as thus:


And before a crowd means among the ignorant:

for surely, among those who know, he will not be more convincing..

Therefore when the rhetorician is more convincing than the doctor,

the ignorant is more convincing among the ignorant than the expert.



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Wed, Oct 6, 2021 at 12:58 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I think it is very difficult to change this list.  It can be difficult to
> post, since one is so frequently met with, not a discussion, but
> authoritative assertions of 'No, Peirce did not say/mean...that'...
>
> One doesn't find words like: "In my understanding' or 'in my view'. Or 'I
> think that'.  Instead, it's authoritative verbiage that is quite relentless
> in claiming that you are quite wrong, you are not genuinely following
> Peirce...and so on.
>
> It's almost like a tribal syndrome, where a few people consider themselves
> 'Genuine Members of the Peirce Tribe'..and others are viewed as outsiders
> with little claim or right to discuss the issues - and certainly cannot
> claim membership with the select few.
>
> I doubt if this can change.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 06/10/21 1:30 PM , Bernard Morand morand.bern...@neuf.fr sent:
>
> Thanks Jerry for this reply and support.
>
> Unfortunately I have no complete answer to your pertinent question: "What
> practical steps are necessary to re-enliven our community and our
> communications? "
>
> Perhaps some listers actually silent have good ideas about that. They
> ought to be encouraged to manifest themselves in some kind of "one hundred
> flowers" campaign.
>
> Regards
>
> Bernard
> Le 06/10/2021 à 18:03, Jerry LR Chandler a écrit :
>
> Bernard:
>
> On Aug 27, 2021, at 5:33 PM, Bernard Morand 
> wrote:
>
> It is a good illustration of my feeling about the bad quality level of the
> discussions on Peirce-l.
>
>
> My feelings are fully parallel with yours.
>
> Your articulative description of the styles of communication denotes the
> essential nature of the subjective logical fallacies that constrain the
> discussions to the very, very  narrow interests of some scholars.
>
> Such styles, while offering a sense of historical truth functions, ignore
> the historically historic roots of CSP writings in centuries of earlier
> scholarship as well as his extreme breath of knowledge and imagination in
> mathematics, logic, physics, chemistry and multiple natural languages,
> thereby reducing brilliance to dullness.  The consequence is the turning of
> lively ideas into deadly boredom.  (If not even more deadly complete
> mis-representation.)
>
> What practical steps are necessary to re-enliven our community and our
> communications?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
> Postscript for Robert Marty:  Do you believe that CSP’s logic is congruent
> with Robinson arithmetic?:-).
>
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body.  More at
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Re: Cognitive Signs (was All Semiotic, No Puzzle)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jack, Jerry, list,

as to the
"do these two requests induce the same sort of questions
as the things you are now talking and thinking about

in an *efficient* manner?"..


*meh*.. perhaps not..


with best wishes,
j

On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 2:56 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:

> Jerry, List,
>
> *JR*: Would you say, based on your immediate recognition and habits, that
> the purpose of bringing to attention these two sayings is the same?
>
> Immediately, yes. I see the resemblance clearly. It puts me in mind of
> Plato's Meno - the slave whom Socrates "uses" to "prove" the power of
> non-recollectional learning (perhaps we would call it something like
> generative inference as opposed to the more behaviorist tradition which
> predates generative grammar). It's been a while since I read that passage
> but what I took away from it was that once one discerns a relationship
> within a formal pattern - a structural relationship - one can abstract
> basic elements involved in that pattern in order to generatively infer what
> might logically be but which is not yet objectively known. This is a kind
> of contact paradox -we "establish the existence of an unperceived object"
> by means of contact with/perception of an object which (indexically) points
> to the said unperceived object indirectly.
>
> The question, then, is whether the object is in fact "fully" unperceived
> or if it exists "pre hoc" (*abductively*, in the realm of the "about to
> be" but not yet "realised" or "effected", as C. W. Spinks has characterized
> the abductive function) (1983: 195-208). "Effect" is perhaps the better
> term in line with what JAS has just pointed out with regard to efficiency
> and habit - are abductive hypotheses akin to formal abstractions which
> exist like *possible* pathways we establish, perhaps *somatically*, below
> the threshold of consciousness, as a result of polysemy? Thereby, contact
> with one aspect of a given object might allow us insight/knowledge
> regarding the structural conditions/formal properties of (as yet)
> unencountered objects.
>
> I'm afraid I have more questions than answers! But I do sense a
> significant overlap between your line of inquiry and mine (the contrast
> between the two definitely induces the same order of heuristic to my mind,
> there is something structurally equivalent between your query and mine, to
> my mind).
>
> I hope to clarify my position within the week as it is still very much up
> in the air, and, in truth, off the beaten track of what I'm supposed to be
> doing (which is why I've thrown it to the "floor"!).
>
> Best
>
> Jack
>
> --
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> on behalf of Jerry Rhee 
> *Sent:* Monday, October 4, 2021 7:58 PM
> *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Re: Cognitive Signs (was All
> Semiotic, No Puzzle)
>
>
> Dear Jack, list,
>
>
> You have raised some very interesting points that invite reflective
> propositions from the audience who,
>
> as you say, “Would be very interested to receive any variety of response
> to this
>
> - preferably those which ardently disagree with me!”
>
>
> I must say I do not ardently disagree with you, for it seems to me we are
> interested in similar things.
>
> And as far as similar things go,
>
> I have recently sent out a letter, which I’m afraid went unnoticed,
>
> inquiring about a similar question.
>
>
> I wonder if you can help me,
>
> since the similarity will become obvious once we place the two requests
> next to one another:
>
>
> *The goal of an inference is *
>
> *to establish the existence of an unperceived object,*
>
> *and if we did perceive that object, *
>
> *we would have no need to infer it; *
>
> *however inference *necessarily* regards an object *
>
> *that has already been perceived.*
>
>
> Does anyone know what this means and who wrote it?
>
> I am *certain* there is Wisdom in it but not sure why.
>
> (Sep 10, 2021)
>
> —-
>
> *Knowledge in some way renders them efficient; and a sign is something by
> knowing which we know something more.*
>
>
> What does Peirce mean by "a sign is something by knowing which we know
> something more"?
>
> (Oct 4, 2021)
>
>
> Would you say, based on your immediate recognition and habits,
>
> that the purpose of bringing to attention these two sayings is the same?
>
>
> But then this would suggest,
>
> if we analyze the one to one corre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Re: Cognitive Signs (was All Semiotic, No Puzzle)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jack, list,


You have raised some very interesting points that invite reflective
propositions from the audience who,

as you say, “Would be very interested to receive any variety of response to
this

- preferably those which ardently disagree with me!”


I must say I do not ardently disagree with you, for it seems to me we are
interested in similar things.

And as far as similar things go,

I have recently sent out a letter, which I’m afraid went unnoticed,

inquiring about a similar question.


I wonder if you can help me,

since the similarity will become obvious once we place the two requests
next to one another:


*The goal of an inference is *

*to establish the existence of an unperceived object,*

*and if we did perceive that object, *

*we would have no need to infer it; *

*however inference *necessarily* regards an object *

*that has already been perceived.*


Does anyone know what this means and who wrote it?

I am *certain* there is Wisdom in it but not sure why.

(Sep 10, 2021)

—-

*Knowledge in some way renders them efficient; and a sign is something by
knowing which we know something more.*


What does Peirce mean by "a sign is something by knowing which we know
something more"?

(Oct 4, 2021)


Would you say, based on your immediate recognition and habits,

that the purpose of bringing to attention these two sayings is the same?


But then this would suggest,

if we analyze the one to one correspondence, that an inference is like a
sign.


And since our habit is not to look like an expert who knowingly ignores
what we have *already* acknowledged,

such as what definition of ‘normative inference’ means

(that is, has Peirce ever spoken on what inference is?

I mean, it seems we would remember something like that and would be able to
tell us.),

do these two requests induce the same sort of questions as the things you
are now talking and thinking about

in an *efficient* manner?


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 1:34 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jack, List:
>
> Good stuff, thanks. I would just like to clarify one other thing from your
> earlier post.
>
> JRKC: It also refers back, in a roundabout way, to the discussion we had
> here last week regarding Peirce's position on the existence of god (insofar
> as object-sign-interpretant implies that the object itself belongs to some
> universe-external position ...
>
>
> Peirce's conception of object-sign-interpretant only implies that the
> (dynamical) object is external to, independent of, and unaffected by any
> sign that it determines. Hence, an object that is "universe-external" is
> only necessary if we also accept the distinct premiss that the entire
> universe is a sign, i.e., "a vast representamen" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193,
> 1903). However, Peirce also claims that "if any signs are connected, no
> matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign," calling this a
> theorem of "the science of semeiotics" but unfortunately not providing a
> proof (R 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904). Therefore, in order to *avoid *the
> conclusion that there is a "universe-external" object that determines the
> entire universe, one must either *reject *this particular theorem or *deny
> *the further premiss that the entire universe is "composed exclusively of
> signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 12:41 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
> jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List,
>>
>> The only way to know something at all, and therefore the only way to know
>> something more, is by means of signs; and in accordance with Peirce's
>> pragmatism, the ultimate meaning of any acquired knowledge consists in
>> self-controlled habits of conduct, by which those signs have a real effect
>> on the external world
>>
>> Thanks for that reply, Jon, it was quite succinct. The linkage you make
>> (from Peirce) between efficiency and habit is very interesting. I know the
>> centrality of habit to Peirce's doctrine (if we may call it doctrine) and
>> am currently expanding my own knowledge regarding all its significances.
>> For instance, that Peirce considers habits to be, in much greater extent,
>> creative forces instead of constraints (though he acknowledges that they
>> necessarily constrain, too):
>>
>> "Some undisciplined young persons may have *come to think of acquired
>> human habits chiefly as constraints; and undoubtedly they all are so in a
>> measure*. *But good habits are in much greater measure powers than they
>> are limitations* . . .” (MS 930: 31)
>>
>> Your summary here dovetails quite nicely with much of what Pierre
>> Bourdieu has to say about habit, too ("*habitus*" in his formulation,
>> carried over from Marcel Mauss). Those "self-controlled habits of
>> conduct... which... have a real effect on the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear JAS Edwina list,


JAS said:


*  ET: I think that it's important to differentiate these various actions -
and not lump all into 'science'.*


*  That is fine. My point is simply that **Peirce's definition of "science"
is broader than this**, *

*  such that it is sufficient for a field of study to be descriptive or
classificatory. *

*  He does not require it to be nomological in order to qualify as a
science.*


So we’re now questioning what ‘science’ means and that Peirce somehow had a
clear notion of it that is ‘broader’ than this?

It is obvious to me that what is more likely is that JAS has a clear notion
of what he thinks Peirce understood ‘science’ to be,

*and that we ought to have it too, amirite?*


So where, in all this, is the science?

What expertise does Peirce claim to teach?


Btw, I came across an unexpected discussion on ‘wind-eggs’ with a simple
google search.

I’m sure we all could have done this about as quickly and easily as
flipping through Peirce quotes and deciding which ones to fling at one
another.

But then again, what would be the fun in it, *amirite*?

I mean, how else could we fulfill this *need* that is a part of our nature?


*But come now, let us examine your utterance together, *

*and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere **wind**-**egg**. *

*Perception, you say, is knowledge? * (151e)


Moreover, if this definition of ‘wind-egg’ existed in the way it does
without my prior knowledge,

and given it was I who was first to call phaneroscopy a mere ‘wind-egg’ and
not a ‘science-egg’,

does the law state that this definition of ‘wind-egg’ ought to remain
merely ‘unfertilized egg’ forever and ever,

with *no* possibility of them ever merging in the future?

I mean, isn't this how signs work?

That they remain calcified with only JAS having access to them?


Those of you who remember the *Crito* will remember that in a crucial
passage there,

this substitution of the human beings for the law saves the credit of the
law in this very difficulty argument.


You know Socrates was condemned to death.

A terrible injustice has been committed.


But Socrates says:

No, you can’t blame the law for that,

you have to blame the human beings who apply the law.

And so the authority of the law is saved.


Something similar is going on here.

But that is of course not sufficient.

It is only an attempt to restore the distinction

between discovery of being and an attempt or a wish to discover being.


But could one not say also this:

that if law is essentially an attempt,

law is never a success?

And therefore no law which was ever established anywhere really does what
law wishes to do; therefore all laws are imperfect.


Is this not implied, if it is essentially a wish for something,

an attempt and not the fulfillment?


Socrates, I believe, tries to avoid this by making here this distinction
between law and human beings,

which in its suggestive character

(which does not quite jibe with what is explicitly said)

would mean this:

the law is the truth, but the human beings do not always know the truth.



*Thereforeergohence*, let us turn to the phaneron and see what we find in
fact.

But we must now ask: *how*?


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Fri, Sep 17, 2021 at 10:01 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: I think that it's important to differentiate these various actions -
> and not lump all into 'science'.
>
>
> That is fine. My point is simply that *Peirce's *definition of "science"
> is broader than this, such that it is sufficient for a field of study to be
> descriptive or classificatory. He does not require it to be nomological in
> order to qualify as a science.
>
> ET: I think that mathematics IS an analytic process because it DOES
> analyze relations and therefore qualifies as a science.
>
>
> My objection was not about whether mathematics analyzes relations, but
> about whether it does so "within a whole function or semiosic process." In
> accordance with *Peirce's *definitions and classification of the
> sciences, mathematics does not concern itself with "semiosic process," and
> neither do phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics. Nevertheless, as I already
> said in my reply to John Sowa this morning, Peirce would have been the
> first to insist upon his own fallibility, and reasonable people can
> disagree about whether this aspect of his mature classification is
> "correct" or useful.
>
> ET: The fact that Peirce does not use the term 'phases' of a semiosic
> process does NOT mean that these relations cannot be described as such!
>
>
> I agree. My point is simply that one cannot claim *Peirce's *endorsement
> for characterizing the object, the sign, and the interpretant as "phases"
> of a semiosic process. It is a further development inspired by his thought,
> rather than a repetition of his own ideas. Again, reasonable people can
> disagree about whether his specific terminology is "correct" or useful, but
> there should be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Gary, list:


You said:


*As for those questions, each reader of the list will have to come up with
their own answers (or else leave the questions open).*

*Nothing has been said during the slow read that would persuade me to make
substantial changes to that paper, so I’m content to let it speak for me.*



I have heard similar laments in the recent and long-forgotten past

   - and some of them very damning to our current democratic condition,

  that is, to our general (275e) political condition.



Do you ask me to prove this?

If so, you must be a rationalist, indeed.


I can prove it

-- but *only by assuming a logical principle *

 of the demonstration of which I shall give a hint in the next lecture.


With best wishes,
Jerry R


PS.


Tao Te Ching 32..

That is a wonderful recommendation that I whole-heartedly endorse.

I mean what does ephectic desire have to do with anything, *amirite*?

On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 2:30 PM  wrote:

> Jerry R,
>
> The slow read is not *quite* concluded: there are still two more slides
> to go. Slide 50 consists of a series of questions similar to the one you
> ask here; the last slide is a graphic showing ADT’s somewhat whimsical
> portrait of a science-egg (with its various parts labelled).
>
> As for those questions, each reader of the list will have to come up with
> their own answers (or else leave the questions open). I’ve given some hints
> of my own answers along the way, and back in June I submitted a paper on
> the subject which is due to be published later this year as part of a
> collection edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Mohammad Shafiei. Nothing
> has been said during the slow read that would persuade me to make
> substantial changes to that paper, so I’m content to let it speak for me.
>
> I wouldn’t have written such a paper if I hadn’t paid very close attention
> to Peirce’s writings that *explicitly deal with phenomenology and
> phaneroscopy*. Some of the most vociferous opinions expressed during the
> slow read came from people who consider themselves experts but obviously
> have *not* paid close attention to what *Peirce* said on the subject, and
> have even objected to Peirce’s writings on the subject being posted to the
> list (instead of his writings on mathematics, for instance). Some of these
> opinions were clearly motivated by a hostile reading
> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#hxrd> of ADT’s slides. I think any
> readers who still have open minds regarding phaneroscopy owe it to
> themselves to at least read everything in EP2 on the subject, if not some
> of the harder-to-find texts like R 645
> <https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm> (which is now on my website).
>
> If someone has paid close attention to the *practice* of phaneroscopy as
> described in concrete detail by Peirce, and has tried it out for himself
> (as Peirce insisted one must in order to draw any conclusions from it),
> *then* he can form and express a valid opinion about its scientific value
> (or lack thereof), as R.K. Atkins did in his book about it. I don’t believe
> that any opinions about it which *aren’t* based on such a study are worth
> arguing about. I also believe that opinions about Peirce’s philosophy which
> ignore his phenomenology/phaneroscopy are just as liable to distortion as
> opinions which ignore his mathematics or his semeiotics.
>
> I said in a previous post that phaneroscopy is pre-scientific. I don’t
> have a more direct answer to your question, so this will have to do.
>
> Gary f.
>
> } Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already
> enough names. One must know when to stop. [*Tao Te Ching* 32
> (Feng/English)] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Jerry Rhee
> *Sent:* 16-Sep-21 13:56
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 49
>
>
>
> Dear Gary, list:
>
>
>
> Since the slow read has concluded,
>
> I would like to recall a letter sent immediately after its initial
> announcement
>
> (on June 11).
>
>
>
> “My apologies for skipping to the end but it was always my assumption that
>
> Phaneroscopy was a wind-egg, not a science-egg.
>
> That is, it appears, then, that Peirce always presented Phaneroscopy
>
> merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily)
>
> and not systematically- as a true science.”
>
>
>
> So now, what is your judgment?   What is the verdict?
>
>
>
> *Phaneroscopy, science-egg or wind-egg?*
>
>
>
> ___
>
>
>
> If, as Peirce says
>
>   *Phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg,*
>
>   *hardly any details

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 49

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jon, list,

Thank you for this note ("I know you meant it in the nicest possible
way..").
I believe *that* is the only meaning for 'wind-egg' that I know or have
ever heard of..

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 1:24 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Hi Jerry,
>
> I remember that ... because I was not familiar with the term “wind-egg”
> and had to look it up ... one meaning being an unfertilized egg ... and
> though I thought that just a little bit snarky at the time, I know you
> meant it in the nicest possible way ... and now I'd have say it makes
> a kind of sense if I view in light of my usual first approximation to
> Peirce's Calcification Of Sciences (COS), to wit, the following Fig.
>
> Peirce Syllabus
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.jpg
>
> For without the fertilization by Mathematics
> the Oöscience of Phaneroscopy will forever
> remain an armchair wannabe science.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Jon
>
> On 9/16/2021 1:55 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> > Dear Gary, list:
> >
> >
> > Since the slow read has concluded,
> >
> > I would like to recall a letter sent immediately after its initial
> announcement
> >
> > (on June 11).
> >
> >
> > “My apologies for skipping to the end but it was always my assumption
> that
> >
> > Phaneroscopy was a wind-egg, not a science-egg.
> >
> > That is, it appears, then, that Peirce always presented Phaneroscopy
> >
> > merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily)
> >
> > and not systematically- as a true science.”
> >
> >
> > So now, what is your judgment?   What is the verdict?
> >
> >
> > *Phaneroscopy, science-egg or wind-egg?*
> >
> >
> > ___
> >
> >
> > If, as Peirce says
> >
> > *  Phaneroscopy is still in the condition of a science-egg, *
> >
> > *  hardly any details of it being as yet distinguishable, *
> >
> > *  though enough to assure the student of it that … *
> >
> >*it **surely** will in the future become a strong and beneficent
> science.*
> > (R 645:2, 1909)
> >
> >
> > And if, as Gary says
> >
> > *  In these letters (between Peirce and William James, 1898) *
> >
> > *  Peirce asserts his allegiance to what he calls *
> >
> > *  “conservative sentimentalism” or “sentimental conservatism.” *
> >
> > *  The basic idea is that in the conduct of everyday social life, *
> >
> > *  when it comes to making crucial decisions, *
> >
> > *  we ought to trust our instinctive or “gut feelings” *
> >
> > *  rather than our capacity for reasoning or our philosophical
> theories..*
> >
> >
> > I hardly see any reason why we ought to take him seriously.
> >
> > That is, it is *impossible* for me to believe a man,
> >
> > who puts himself forth genuinely *as logician*,
> >
> > that he would *prescribe* such an immature belief.
> >
> >
> > That he *has* the belief is not surprising, but there is something
> *obvious*
> > that is missing here.
> >
> > For have you forgotten the old decree?
> >
> >
> >Believest thou that he there spake the truth?
> >
> >Why dost thou believe it?"
> >
> >
> >The disciple answered: "I believe in Zarathustra."
> >
> >
> >But Zarathustra shook his head and smiled.
> >
> >-- Belief doth not sanctify me, said he,
> >
> >least of all the belief in myself.
> >
> >
> >But granting that some one did say in all seriousness
> >
> >that the poets lie too much: he was right
> >
> >   —WE do lie too much.
> >
> >
> > Moreover, when Peirce admits
> >
> >
> > *in all the works on pedagogy that ever I read,- and they have been many,
> > big, and heavy,-*
> >
> > *I don’t remember that any one has advocated a system of teaching by
> > practical jokes..  *
> >
> > *That however, describes the method of our great teacher, Experience.
> She
> > says*
> >
> >
> > *Open your mouth and shut your eyes*
> >
> > *And I’ll give you something to make you wise;*
> >
> >
> > Would you be prepared to do this action because Peirce said “*Believe
> me!*’?
> >
> >
> > Would you want Experience to keep her promise-
> >
> > to take her pay in the fun of tormenting us?
> >
> >
> > I mean, *what was our 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A comment

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Phyllis, Edwina, JAS, John, Gary, list,


I have read that:


*The goal of an inference is *

*to establish the existence of an unperceived object,*

*and if we did perceive that object, *

*we would have no need to infer it; *

*however inference *necessarily* regards an object *

*that has already been perceived.*


Does anyone know what this means and who wrote it?

I am *certain* there is Wisdom in it but not sure why.

It appears to me there is fruit here,

which may connect to Phyllis’ call for formal analysis by the ordinary;

that is, fifth graders.

I mean, even *Harris* knows that, *already*, amirite?


Btw, Phyllis, I have long admired your efforts to communicate Peirce ideas
to ordinary folk.

In fact, I have sometimes used your go-carts of judgment.

Thank you, also, for your attempts at reducing the temperature on here.

Your actions, I believe, are representative of *sophrosune*,

the virtue of the man who could but does not abuse his power..

and when the word is applied to women.. *the* womanly virtue..


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Fri, Sep 10, 2021 at 2:11 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, Edwina, List:
>
> JFS: In the beginning (en arche) was the Logos, and the Logos was with
> God, and God was the Logos. That is the only definition of God in the New
> Testament.
>
>
> On the contrary, it is by no means the *only *definition of God in the
> New Testament, or even in the writings of John the Evangelist. For example,
> "God is a Spirit" (John 4:24); "God is light" (1 John 1:5); "God is love"
> (1 John 4:8&16).
>
> ET: I see ‘Logos’ as Mind.
>
>
> The problem with interpreting "Logos" as *impersonal *"Mind" in the first
> chapter of John's Gospel is what the text goes on to say in verse 14--"And
> the Word [Logos] was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld his
> glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and
> truth." This obviously entails a conception of the Logos as *personal *such
> that God became a human being.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Sep 10, 2021 at 11:51 AM Edwina Taborsky <
> edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Yes, I agree, they are compatible.
>>
>> Other terms- which are used ( by Peirce and others )   - such as ‘soul’
>> would have to be explained .
>> I see ‘Logos’ as Mind.
>> The development of metaphysical explanations for experience and reality,
>> by all peoples, which are filled with both emotional and rational
>> narratives is a fascinating aspect of humanity.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> Sent from my iPad
>>
>> On Sep 10, 2021, at 12:39 PM, sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:
>>
>> Edwina, Jon AS, List,
>>
>> Those two comments are completely compatible.
>> --
>> ET: Prayer is, in my view, a psychological form of behaviour - among ALL
>> human populations.
>>
>> JAS:  Peirce...:states plainly that prayer is a universal human instinct
>> by which the soul expresses consciousness of its relation to God.
>>
>> But the word 'plainly' is not appropriate.  That sentence is a paraphrase
>> of a much more nuanced comment, which he would admit is fallible.  Please
>> note that Peirce's favorite gospel is the one by John the Evangelist:  In
>> the beginning (en arche) was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and God
>> was the Logos.   That is the only definition of God in the New Testament.
>> And it is consistent with what Heraclitus wrote.
>>
>> In fact, Philo Judaeus of Alexandria wrote many volumes (in Greek) to
>> show that the Greek philosophers were influenced by the Hebrew prophets.  I
>> don't believe that it's an accident that all of them lived along the Silk
>> Road that carried soldiers, merchants, and gurus\ to and from China, India,
>> Persia, Babylon, Greece, Israel, and Egypt.
>>
>> Also note that Alexandria was in Egypt, and Philo used the Septuagint
>> (Greek translation of the Hebrew).  It's very likely that John was
>> influenced by Philo as well as the Greek philosophers..
>>
>> John
>>
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body.  More at
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jeff, list,


You said:


Jeff D:

My assumption is that those who are having disagreements on this list about
how to apply Peircean phenomenology to positive questions in the normative
sciences and metaphysics are engaged in honest disagreements.

The fact that we sometimes appear to be working at cross-purposes applying
pragmaticist methods is something we're trying to sort out by talking it
through. Otherwise, there is not much hope of learning one from another.


I agree.

For it must be true that

“Pragmatism maintains that in those cases the disputants must be at
cross-purposes.”


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 2:53 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jerry,
>
>
> Let me offer a brief response to the rhetorical points you make at the end
> of your post. You say:
>
>
> Jerry R:  I see the answer as being obvious.
> Jeff D:  I don't think the answer as to what Peirce's view is concerning
> the real business of the phenomenology is obvious. If it were obvious,
> intelligent people wouldn't have disagreements about the matter.
>
> Jerry R:  We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, *amirite*?
> Jeff D: My aim is to learn how to employ the methods Peirce recommends in
> philosophical inquiry. Given the challenges involved in doing it well,
> especially when it comes to phenomenology, I am often concerned that I
> misunderstand what it is that I'm supposed to be doing at each step in my
> inquiries about any positive question in philosophy. If the questions
> weren't so hard, and if there weren't so many competing hypotheses, things
> would be easier. As it is, I find myself struggling to ensure that I'm on a
> productive track.
>
> Jerry R: For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist!
> Jeff D:  I'm trying to learn to do it better. It is not clear that I'm
> doing it well.
>
> Jerry R:  And what we do, *as* Peircean phenomenologist, must be *right*,
> amirite?
> Jeff D: I don't assume Peirce must be right about how we should practice
> phenomenological inquiry. He is fallible, as am I. Having said that, I've
> studied other methods in philosophy, including those recommended by Plato,
> Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Quine, Goodman, Sellars, van Frassen, etc.
> Thus far, I've found limitations in their methods that are hard to fix.
> Thus far, Peirce's methods seem more promising. Having said that, I'm
> always looking for ways in which the methods I'm using might be refined and
> improved. I'm fairly confident Peirce was moved by the same aim of
> improving his methods.
>
> Jerry R: For we *cannot* be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean
> phenomenologist.
> Jeff D: My assumption is that those who are having disagreements on this
> list about how to apply Peircean phenomenology to positive questions in the
> normative sciences and metaphysics are engaged in honest disagreements. The
> fact that we sometimes appear to be working at cross-purposes applying
> pragmaticist methods is something we're trying to sort out by talking it
> through. Otherwise, there is not much hope of learning one from another.
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> --
> *From:* Jerry Rhee 
> *Sent:* Monday, August 30, 2021 12:29:50 PM
> *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
>
>
> Dear Jeff, list,
>
>
> Thank you for making manifest where the disagreement lies.
>
> For it is obvious to me, as it must be for you,
>
> that it is inconsistent to agree with you
>
> and to agree with Gary *at the same time*,
>
>   -which is asserted by the speaker who says, ’I agree with Gary and
> Jeff’,
>
> which is what JAS has said,
>
> when you agree with John but disagree with Gary.
>
>
> “I didn’t presuppose that!”
>
>
> That is, JAS has said (more or less but not exactly),
>
> “I didn’t presuppose that the main “business" of the
> Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying
> phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences is:
>
>
> 1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
> conscious human experience.
>
> 1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the
> elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
> scientific intelligence.”
>
>
> (for where and when, *exactly*, does Peirce say this? Please state the
> reference and year)
>
>
> So then, what *needs* to be done?
>
> What, here, is *necessary* to make philosophical inquiry more rigorou

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jeff, list,


Thank you for making manifest where the disagreement lies.

For it is obvious to me, as it must be for you,

that it is inconsistent to agree with you

and to agree with Gary *at the same time*,

  -which is asserted by the speaker who says, ’I agree with Gary and Jeff’,

which is what JAS has said,

when you agree with John but disagree with Gary.


“I didn’t presuppose that!”


That is, JAS has said (more or less but not exactly),

“I didn’t presuppose that the main “business" of the
Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying
phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences is:


1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
conscious human experience.

1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the
elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
scientific intelligence.”


(for where and when, *exactly*, does Peirce say this? Please state the
reference and year)


So then, what *needs* to be done?

What, here, is *necessary* to make philosophical inquiry more rigorous

   * in order to* ultimate aim?


I see the answer as being obvious.

We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, *amirite*?

For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist!

And what we do, *as* Peircean phenomenologist, must be *right*, amirite?

For we *cannot* be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean
phenomenologist.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 1:20 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List,
>
>
> Jon says:  "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and
> Jeff."
>
>
> Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main 
> "business"
> of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying
> phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact that
> Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I
> may have some disagreements.
>
>
> At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still
> somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say
> more about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you
> stand on the apparent disagreement?
>
>
> Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes
> to aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that:
>
>
>
>1. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
>conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are
>particularly puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for
>explanations of consciousness.
>2. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of
>the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
>scientific intelligence. An account of the elemental features in
>experience--both material and formal--will be helpful for the practice
>of analyzing scientific observations of any sort of phenomena. Better
>analyses of the phenomena that are part of our common experience will
>be important for philosophical inquiry because we are highly prone to
>observational error in philosophy, and we are often at a loss as to
>how to make measurements of these phenomena and how to formulate
>plausible explanations. Most importantly, an account of the elemental
>forms of experience will put us in a better position to frame scientific
>questions and more clearly comprehend the space of possible hypothetical
>explanations. As such, a Peircean phenomenology will be similarly
>helpful in the special sciences, especially where there are disputes about
>(1) the proper forms of measurement of the phenomena and/or (2) the 
> plausibility
>of various hypotheses.
>
>
> Consider the subtitle of Richard Atkin's recent work on Peirce's
> phenomenology:
>
>
> Atkins, Richard Kenneth. *Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and
> Consciousness*. Oxford University Press, 2018.
>
>
> The subtitle might lead one to think that (1) is the right approach to
> understanding the business of doing phenomenology. As such, the main
> advantage of getting the right theory of phenomenology is that we will then
> be able to formulate better metaphysical explanations of human
> consciousness. As I've indicated earlier, I think this approach is based on
> a misunderstanding of Peirce's phenomenology. I do not mean to suggest that
> Richard Atkins is committed to (1) and rejects (2). I'll let him speak for
> himself.
>
>
> Having said that, I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's
> phenomenology that does what I think needs to be done--which is to
> provide an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features
> of experience will enable scientific inquirers better to identify and
> correct for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space
> of possible 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,


Any self-respecting follower of Peirce would remember his assertion that

*The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim.*


So, if it is also the case that

*we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us..*


in other words, were it possible

to see himself in this respect,

as he himself would see himself

if he could duplicate himself

and observe himself with a critical eye,


what would he say of himself?

Would he say that “I boast myself to be a reasonable man"?

Would he say *this* is what I boast myself to be?


I mean, would a rational man ever say

“the only relevant "moral authority" is the List moderator, Gary Richmond,

and it is entirely up to him whether, when, and how to intervene”,


Would we agree that this is being *Rational*?


Why of course we would!

Because *that* is what being *Rational* means, amirite?


I mean, this is why we quibble and fight rather than state our ultimate aim.

For we quibble and fight instead of applying Peirce’s “method of science”
because

*there are **“expressive implicatures” that allow speakers*

*“to project certain qualities of their own act as significant aspects of
the message.”*


For why are we doing what we’re doing?

   .. i*n order to* ultimate aim.

I mean, *everybody* knows that, *already*, amirite?


So much for power and Form, then..

This is us.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 2:05 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Robert, List:
>
> RM: This is a shameful manipulation that everyone can see. It offends
> scientific ethics.
>
>
> There is nothing shameful, manipulative, offensive, unscientific, or
> unethical about highlighting and emphasizing a portion of a direct
> quotation to make a particular point, especially in a context where it is
> being ignored or at least discounted. It is incontrovertible that according
> to Peirce in CP 3.559 (and elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure
> hypothesis *without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual
> facts or not.*
>
> RM: All these absolutely disloyal practices that Bernard Morand has just
> denounced ...
>
>
> Disloyal to whom? What matters here is being faithful to *Peirce's own
> texts* when attributing specific views to him. Why not just acknowledge
> disagreement with him where one thinks that he got something wrong?
>
> RM: ... after many others, and not the least, such as John Sowa, whose
> awareness of Peirce and scientific stature is indisputable,
>
>
> Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy, and Peirce sharply contrasts the
> method of authority with the method of science.
>
> RM: I note that the debate has fallen to a level unworthy of Charles S.
> Peirce to whom this list is dedicated, and this without any moral authority
> intervening.
>
>
> I agree, but we presumably have very different perceptions of who is
> responsible for the degradation of the discourse here. Besides, the only
> relevant "moral authority" is the List moderator, Gary Richmond, and it is
> entirely up to him whether, when, and how to intervene.
>
> RM: However, I am not going to give up... simply, I would not waste
> another minute fighting arguments biased by such practices...
>
>
> In other words, a *substantive *rebuttal is not possible, so instead
> there is yet another emotional rant full of baseless allegations and empty
> complaints.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 4:37 AM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>>
>>  JAS > . "As for CP 3.559, there is no"magic trick" involved in simply
>> recognizing that its last sentence is a *summary *of the entire
>> paragraph."
>>
>>
>>
>> Here is that last sentence. This is indeed a summary of CP 3.559. But
>> you, JAS, *summarize this summary* to the only part I underlined in bold:
>>
>>
>>
>> *"**Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he
>> first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not
>> concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does* *without
>> inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not **(1*
>> *);* *and, secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from
>> that hypothesis."*
>>
>>
>> This is a shameful manipulation that everyone can see. It offends
>> scientific ethics.
>>
>> After the hodgepodge of quotes created in a few minutes that would
>> require a whole book to answer,
>>
>> After the "improved" quote from EDT kindly qualified as a humoristic
>> touch by Gary Richmond,
>>
>> After this "reconstructed" quote to cover up an operation to revise the
>> foundations of Peirce's thought,
>>
>> All these absolutely disloyal practices that Bernard Morand has just
>> denounced after many others, and not the least, such as John Sowa, whose
>> awareness of Peirce and scientific stature is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,


Before getting swept away by the emotional content of what is *here*,

perhaps we ought to apply this method of phaneroscopy,

(which we run up the flagpole and salute),

to ourselves,

as he himself would see himself if he could duplicate himself and observe
himself with a critical eye.


I mean, *everybody* knows what Cathy meant by her farewell, *already*,
amirite?


“Thank you so much, but I'm finding some Plato and Descartes influences to
be a little too entrenched

here.”


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 3:04 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Incredible - someone joins the list and then leaves it, and gives their
> reason for leaving with a critique  - and instead of examining why she left
> the list, ie, examining the validity of her critique - you turn her
> comments into a rather vicious attack on me.
>
> Instead - you should be asking HER what SHE sees as Cartesian and
> Platonic, and what she sees as confined - since SHE is the one who made
> those statements. Have you asked her? Why do you think she thought this
> way?  Or are you just brushing her off as you do with me?
>
> As for the Cartesian/Platonic ideologies - well, we've been through that
> with the rejection of hylomorphic objective idealism - which posits NO
> primordial laws but a correlation of the two. .
>
> How odd; you have set up a trio, yourself, JAS and Gary F, as some kind of
> contained 'set' on this list. But there are others in the field of Peircean
> semiotics - who DO want to see how it operates pragmatically.  And they
> shouldn't be treated viciously.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 16/06/21 3:33 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List,
>
> Edwina wrote: "I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique
> of it [Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked."
>
> What do you mean that her critique of the List "should not be
> overlooked"? What I think should not be 'overlooked' is outlined in what
> I write below.
>
> In truth, I was surprised at the reason Cathy gave for leaving the List:
> "finding some Plato and Descartes influences to be a little too entrenched
> here." I can say with some confidence that, for example, the principal
> organizers of this slow read (not do mention De TIenne himself) are about
> as influenced by Plato and Descartes as Peirce was, which is to say
> essentially rejecting Platonism (pure, as opposed to objective idealism,
> etc.) and Cartesianism (Cartesian dualism, etc.) And none of us has written
> anything whatsoever since this slow read began which could even be vaguely
> interpreted as even referring to Plato or Descartes.
>
> It is you who keeps making the claim that certain members of the List
> express Cartesian and, especially, Platonic ideas. But you have not been
> able to support that claim because it is empty and patently false. Please
> offer some quotations from, for example, any of Gary Fuhrman's, Jon Alan
> Schmidt's, or my (or others') posts which you believe show these
> influences. You make these entirely bogus claims about forum members who
> are just going about doing what I see to be serious work in philosophy,
> this work being appreciated by a number of members of the larger Peirce
> community, being published in the doing, etc. It is as if you seemed to
> imagine that your own fields of interest countered the very legitimacy of
> the fields in which they work, denigrating their work as being " confined
> to the seminar room" as you wrote just yesterday and as you've written on
> several occasions. Do you think that we should all just stop doing
> cenoscopic philosophy because you've determined that all that's really
> important are applications of semeiotic?
>
> Perhaps it is that kind of baseless critique which "should not be
> overlooked" because, perhaps it suggests to potential new members, for
> example, a kind of narrowness of perspective, one which it seems to me to
> be reflected more in your often contemptuous critique than in the work of
> those whom you not infrequently disparagingly criticize.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 12:46 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> List
>>
>> I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique of it
>> [Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 16/06/21 10:32 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>
>> Jon AS, list,
>>
>> I’m looking forward to the part of our slow read that delves into
>> Peirce’s classification of sciences, as I think that will explain what
>> André means by saying that phaneroscopists are “pre-truthists.” But you’re
>> right, some of the ideas floated in the other thread show what happens when
>> people try to fit 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Gary, list,


Thank you and others for initiating and leading this project.

My apologies for skipping to the end but it was always my assumption that
Phaneroscopy was a wind-egg, not a science-egg.


That is, it appears, then, that Peirce always presented Phaneroscopy merely
as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily) and not
systematically- as a true science.


No need to respond directly to my immediate reaction.

Just some food for Thought.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Fri, Jun 11, 2021 at 2:04 PM  wrote:

> As Gary R announced, we’re starting a slow read of Andre De Tienne’s
> slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
>  site. Here’s
> the first slide (a table of contents, actually). I’ll probably post the
> next slide here this weekend. If you have any questions or comments about
> this one, jump right in!
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> [image: Chart, diagram, pie chart Description automatically generated]
>
>
>
> Text:
>
> • 1. Phaneroscopy may be mystifying but is no mystery
>
> • 2. Reminders about Peirce's theory of three categories
>
> • 3. The place of phaneroscopy in Peirce's mature classification of
> sciences
>
> • 4. From mathematics to phaneroscopy
>
> • 5. Phaneroscopy as Inquiry into the positiveness of experience
>
> • 6. The Phaneron and its ingredients
>
> • 7. How to scope the phaneron and why
>
> • 8. Phaneroscopy's role and relevance for any inquiry
>
> • Conclusion: Phaneroscopy as a science-egg
>
>
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body.  More at
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Semantic Externalism

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Dan, list,


* Who is Mats Bergman and Collateral Experience..*


Next, I will take ’Signs and Limits’ for $400, please, Alex..


Hth,
Jerry R


https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/01/what-was-this-article-about-again/551603/

On Tue, Feb 23, 2021 at 1:46 PM Daniel L. Everett 
wrote:

> As you will be aware, there is a veritable industry on semantic
> externalism as a result of Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment. But it
> also fits my own experiences in field research. For example, although every
> speaker I have ever encountered in an Amazonian language knows the names of
> all flora and fauna in their environment, my own vocabulary with respect to
> flora in particular is limited. Most trees I know simply by the name “tree.”
>
> Amazonian friends therefore think that English is an extremely
> impoverished language. But, I tell them, I can find out what each tree is
> called not only in popular vernacular or with botanical precision by
> consulting an expert. Much of my semantics is stored externally (semantic
> externalism is compatible with Clark’s “extended mind” hypothesis as well).
>
> This is an interesting fact about human cognition, culture, and semantics
> that is not found in other species, what one might refer to as
> enthymemetical semiotics in each individual.
>
> Though I have done my own searches, I was wondering if anyone on this list
> is aware of research on Peircean semeiotics and semantic externalism.
>
> Dan
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Jerry Rhee]

Gary f., list,


You said:


I wonder which case applies to this early (1868) remark of Peirce’s:

“The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by
ignorance and error,

so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they
are to be,

is only a negation” (EP1:55, CP 5.317).

Either? Both? Neither?


JAS:  I suggest that we interpret that particular statement

*in light of **what comes right before it.*

__


But why should we interpret that particular statement

*in light of* what comes right *before* it,

when we could just as well do,

*in light of* what comes right *after* it?


And we know what comes right after, amirite?


*This is man,*

". . . proud man,

Most ignorant of what he's most assured,

His glassy essence."


There doesn't appear to be any ambiguity here.

He says '*this* is man', and points.

So, in light of that obvious reference to Milton,

*I* would say *this* is the *ideal* man in the *ideal* community through
agency of the third term.

I mean, *everybody* knows *that*!


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 1:31 PM  wrote:

> Jon Alan, list,
>
> GF: a relation of negation can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. I
> wonder which case applies to this early (1868) remark of Peirce’s: “The
> individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by
> ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and
> from what he and they are to be, is only a negation” (EP1:55, CP 5.317).
> Either? Both? Neither?
>
> JAS: I suggest that we interpret that particular statement in light of
> what comes right before it.
>
> GF: I think that goes without saying, but I don’t think your
> interpretation (copied below) answers the question. If the context involves
> “the ideal state of complete information”, then the contrast is between an
> *ideal* “individual” and an *ideal* “community” — not between real people
> and real communities. That might justify saying that the individual is
> absolutely and dyadically *not* the community, which (as I understand it)
> would make the negation symmetrical.
>
> On the other hand, if we interpret Peirce’s reference as being to the
> *actual* cognition of a *real* “individual man” rather than a logically
> *strict* individual, that would point to the asymmetry of the relation,
> if only because *cognition takes time*, and in real time the relation
> between past and future is asymmetrical. Even in more spatial terms, the
> relation between a community and a member of the community is obviously
> asymmetrical.
>
> As a quasi-corollary, I would say that mathematical logic which formalizes
> patterns in actual reasoning by omitting the time factor also eliminates
> the asymmetry of the antecedent-consequent relation. Whether this is true
> of Existential Graphs depends on how we interpret them; and how we
> interpret them depends (in reality) on what purpose we are using them for.
>
> By the way, my question was not intended as a terminological one, so
> John’s reply didn’t strike me as relevant. To me, the asymmetries of both
> logic and time are issues of positive science, even cenoscopy, not
> mathematics. As for Peirce’s proposition “Triadic Logic is universally
> true”, I’m still wondering what that could mean! (That there’s no such
> thing as falsity in Triadic Logic?)
>
> Also by the way, I corrected above the typo in my previous text (“(18)”
> for “(1868)”); sorry about that.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* 20-Dec-20 15:30
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was
> multiple-valued logic)
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> I suggest that we interpret that particular statement in light of what
> comes right before it.
>
>
>
> CSP: Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to
> be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality
> depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it
> is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value
> as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the
> existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has
> only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the
> community. (CP 5.316, EP 1:54-55, 1868)
>
>
>
> Note that Peirce wrote the article in which these quotes appear ("Some
> Consequences of Four Incapacities") at age 28, not 18. He is contrasting
> the *individual *human, "apart from his fellows," with "the community"
> whose *collective *thought would "be in the ideal state of complete
> information" after infinite inquiry and thus would know "what anything
> really is." This is the *telos *of the ongoing process of semiosis that
> Richard Kenneth Atkins calls "cognitive welding" in his 2016 book, *Peirce
> and the Conduct of Life: Sentiment and Instinct in Ethics and Religion*.
>
>
>
> To the extent that each 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Steven,

I suppose it makes about as much sense as talking about a "final
interpretant" that is a moral community.. or some Supreme End.
*Any* Supreme End will do, of course.

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 5:37 PM Skaggs,Steven 
wrote:

> Jerry,
>
> My opinion is that Peirce leads to a "convergence toward", but much art
> produces a "divergence from". So, for example, what sense does it make to
> talk about the “final interpretant” of a Rothko?
>
> SxS
>
>
>
> On Dec 20, 2020, at 4:26 PM, Skaggs,Steven 
> wrote:
>
> *CAUTION:* This email originated from outside of our organization. Do not
> click links, open attachments, or respond unless you recognize the sender's
> email address and know the contents are safe.
> "CSP: Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to
> be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality
> depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it
> is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value
> as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the
> existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has
> only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the
> community. (CP 5.316, EP 1:54-55, 1868)"
>
> Although this quote goes a long way toward envisioning an empirical
> process or an ontology (i.e. the process of science and an understanding
> of what and how what is is), it seems almost completely inapplicable to the
> process of making art or a poem. This is a major shortcoming, it seems to
> me, in Peirce, a shortcoming Dewey, for one, addressed.
>
> SxS
>
>
> On Dec 20, 2020, at 3:29 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> *CAUTION:* This email originated from outside of our organization. Do not
> click links, open attachments, or respond unless you recognize the sender's
> email address and know the contents are safe.
> Gary F., List:
>
> I suggest that we interpret that particular statement in light of what
> comes right before it.
>
> CSP: Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to
> be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality
> depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it
> is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value
> as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the
> existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has
> only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the
> community. (CP 5.316, EP 1:54-55, 1868)
>
>
> Note that Peirce wrote the article in which these quotes appear ("Some
> Consequences of Four Incapacities") at age 28, not 18. He is contrasting
> the *individual *human, "apart from his fellows," with "the community"
> whose *collective *thought would "be in the ideal state of complete
> information" after infinite inquiry and thus would know "what anything
> really is." This is the *telos *of the ongoing process of semiosis that
> Richard Kenneth Atkins calls "cognitive welding" in his 2016 book, *Peirce
> and the Conduct of Life: Sentiment and Instinct in Ethics and Religion*.
>
> To the extent that each of us suffers from "ignorance and error," we have
> a "separate existence" from the continuum of Truth that is represented in
> existential graphs by the sheet of assertion. Again, whether this
> "negation" is "symmetrical by composition" or unsymmetrical depends on
> whether excluded middle holds, such that every proposition is either true
> or false; and Peirce states plainly, "This assumption ... I consider
> utterly unwarranted, and do not believe it" (NEM 3:758, 1893). That is why
> "Triadic Logic does not *conflict *with Dyadic Logic; only, it
> recognizes, what the latter does not" such that "Triadic Logic is
> universally true" (R 339:515[344r], 1909).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
>
> On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 6:59 AM  wrote:
>
>> Thanks, Jon Alan, I think I’m aboard this train of thought, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Steven, list,


You said:

*‘seems’, ‘almost’, ‘completely’..  ‘inapplicable’.*


You must agree with me that *your* use of such terms makes *my*
interpreting *your* position on this matter extremely vague,

don’t you think?


As for

*“This is a major shortcoming, it seems to me, in Peirce, *

*a shortcoming Dewey, for one, addressed”.*


To which, I must say, *meh*..


For

besides these two, each man possesses opinions about the future,

which go by the general name of “expectations”;

and of these, that which precedes pain bears the special name of “fear,”

and that which precedes pleasure the special name of “confidence”;

and in addition to all these there is “calculation,”

pronouncing which of them is good, which bad;


and “calculation,”

when it has become the public decree of the State,

is named “law.”


Hth.

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 3:26 PM Skaggs,Steven 
wrote:

> "CSP: Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to
> be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality
> depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it
> is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value
> as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the
> existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has
> only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the
> community. (CP 5.316, EP 1:54-55, 1868)"
>
> Although this quote goes a long way toward envisioning an empirical
> process or an ontology (i.e. the process of science and an understanding
> of what and how what is is), it seems almost completely inapplicable to the
> process of making art or a poem. This is a major shortcoming, it seems to
> me, in Peirce, a shortcoming Dewey, for one, addressed.
>
> SxS
>
>
> On Dec 20, 2020, at 3:29 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> *CAUTION:* This email originated from outside of our organization. Do not
> click links, open attachments, or respond unless you recognize the sender's
> email address and know the contents are safe.
> Gary F., List:
>
> I suggest that we interpret that particular statement in light of what
> comes right before it.
>
> CSP: Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to
> be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality
> depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it
> is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value
> as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the
> existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has
> only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the
> community. (CP 5.316, EP 1:54-55, 1868)
>
>
> Note that Peirce wrote the article in which these quotes appear ("Some
> Consequences of Four Incapacities") at age 28, not 18. He is contrasting
> the *individual *human, "apart from his fellows," with "the community"
> whose *collective *thought would "be in the ideal state of complete
> information" after infinite inquiry and thus would know "what anything
> really is." This is the *telos *of the ongoing process of semiosis that
> Richard Kenneth Atkins calls "cognitive welding" in his 2016 book, *Peirce
> and the Conduct of Life: Sentiment and Instinct in Ethics and Religion*.
>
> To the extent that each of us suffers from "ignorance and error," we have
> a "separate existence" from the continuum of Truth that is represented in
> existential graphs by the sheet of assertion. Again, whether this
> "negation" is "symmetrical by composition" or unsymmetrical depends on
> whether excluded middle holds, such that every proposition is either true
> or false; and Peirce states plainly, "This assumption ... I consider
> utterly unwarranted, and do not believe it" (NEM 3:758, 1893). That is why
> "Triadic Logic does not *conflict *with Dyadic Logic; only, it
> recognizes, what the latter does not" such that "Triadic Logic is
> universally true" (R 339:515[344r], 1909).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 

Re: Re: RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Pragmatic Trivium

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,

To these passionate pleas to "Do good, avoid bad",
I would implore you to consider the critical question:

"*Why then had it not been put to its serious use?"*

For
*No doubt, Pragmaticism makes thought ultimately apply to action
exclusively *
*- to conceived action.*

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sun, Jul 5, 2020 at 2:03 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> Whoops. I was just informed that I left off the Kyle Henry quote. Sorry
> about that. Here it is:
>
> Kyle Henry: Extremist Libertarianism, ascendant from the Reagan revolution
> onward, has been so corrosive in the USA to community and civic life. What
> would have happened in the USA if Utilitarianism instead would have won out
> ideologically in 1980? Reading my notes on J.S. Mill's "Utilitarianism"
> this morning, this stood out: "Not only does all strengthening of social
> ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger
> personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others; it
> also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or
> at least with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it...
> The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be
> attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence. Now,
> whatever amount of this feeling a person has, he is urged by the strongest
> motives both of interest and of sympathy to demonstrate it, and to the
> utmost of his power encourage it in others; and even if he has none of it
> himself, he is as greatly interested as any one elase that others should
> have it... This mode of conceiving ourselves and human life, as
> civilization goes on, is felt to be more and more natural."
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jul 5, 2020 at 1:56 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Helmut, List,
>>
>> After reading your email I happened to get a post from Kyle Henry, a
>> well-known film-maker and educator whom I met a few years ago at the SXSW
>> premiere of a documentary, 'Before You Know It', which Kyle edited and in
>> which I appear. Kyle is also an educator and an armchair philosopher (when
>> thoroughly 'self-educated' in philosophy, the best kind, I'm beginning to
>> think).
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyle_Henry
>>
>> In any event, he recently wrote this, which I found thought-provoking in
>> the context of several of your recent reflections in the Pragmatic Trivium
>> thread. In light of Peirce's discussions of Mill's philosophy (in the
>> secondary literature (see, for example:
>> https://www.jstor.org/stable/40320085?seq=1), I thought that it might
>> help bring the discussion back to pragmatism. Perhaps not. In any event, I
>> found it is interesting in its own right and hope that you do as well.
>> (Btw, I'll not be discussing politics. including "Libertarianism," in this
>> thread unless I see a clear connection to philosophical pragmatism).
>> So, this should be seen principally as more American Independence Day
>> food for thought.
>>
>> ,
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>>
>> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jul 4, 2020 at 2:25 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>>> Edwina, List,
>>>
>>> I don´t think that rightism is the same as individualism. I is
>>> collective ideology too, though more particularistic than leftism. It
>>> claims a supremacy of a particular collective such as "race" or nation.
>>> Though leftism sometimes also is particularist, classist. Leftism, if it is
>>> supremacistic, wants to give supremacy to groups that dont have it now,
>>> while rightism wants the groups that have supremacy now to keep it.
>>> Capitalism is neither rightism nor leftism, because it allows the power in
>>> the form of money to freely wander between the groups. Only it does not. It
>>> tends to stay with those who already have it.
>>>
>>>
>>> 04. Juli 2020 um 19:20 Uhr
>>> "Edwina Taborsky" 
>>> *wrote:*
>>>
>>> Terry - please see my comments below:
>>>
>>> 1] I don't think my understanding of fascism is a 'small minority
>>> conception'. I won't take a Wikipedia definition as legitimate and refer
>>> you to such works as Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism; Roger Eatwell:
>>> Fascism: A History. Of course, there's Mussolini's definition. See also
>>> Popper's long definition and analysis in his books: The Open Society and
>>> Its Enemies.
>>>
>>> . All of them focus on the definition of fascism as a collective
>>> ideology [which is what makes it 'left' rather than 'right' - for the
>>> 'right' ideology promotes the individual while the left promotes the
>>> collective'. ]. The point about fascism, with its 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Pragmatic Trivium

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Gary, list,

You said:
"Secondly, why speak of Peirce's normatives sciences of esthetics, ethics,
and logic as "exalted"?
Who "exalts" them? What a strange expression to use about these sciences."

Is it not *we Peirceans,* who exalts the normative sciences?
I mean, *everybody* knows what the normative sciences are,
which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of
Phenomena to *Ends*, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, and Beauty.
And is it not ends that are exalted?
I mean, if Truth Right and Beauty is not exalted, then what, amirite?

Moreover, need we quibble over the definition of 'exalted"?

I mean, any of these dictionary meanings will qualify..

hold (someone or something) in very high regard; think or speak very highly
of.
"the party will continue to exalt its hero"

revere
reverence
venerate
worship
hero-worship
lionize
idolize
deify
esteem
hold in high regard
hold in high esteem
hold in awe
look up to
put on a pedestal
laud
magnify
Opposite:
disparage
despise

   - raise to a higher rank or a position of greater power.
   "this naturally exalts the peasant above his brethren in the same rank
   of society"
   - make noble in character; dignify.
   -

So, if you are so offended that I speak here for the community,
so offended that you think you ought to say something in contradiction to
what I say,
then please feel free to say something opposite to that of exalting the
normative sciences.
I mean, what's left but to say that we ought to denigrate or ignore it..
or worse yet, treat it like any other.

That is, rather than exalting the Normative Sciences,
any esthetics will do.
any ethics will do.
any logic will do.

That is what we value, then..  as Peirceans, that is..

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 3:03 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jerry, Gary F,
>
> Jerry, first, I would like to know why you -- or, for that matter, anyone
> -- can speak for all list members on any matter? ("like everyone else on
> this list")
>
> Secondly, why speak of Peirce's normatives sciences of esthetics, ethics,
> and logic as "exalted"? Who "exalts" them? What a strange expression to use
> about these sciences.
>
> Thirdly, Peirce's philosophical trivium (i.e., the normative sciences) has
> hardly been neglected and, in fact, has been widely discussed in the
> literature for almost a century now. While his logic as semeiotic has
> perhaps been the *most *discussed -- and that to this day--, his ethics
> has gotten considerable scholarly treatment for decades now, while his
> esthetics is only recently being more fully explored. In short, there are
> books and book chapters, monographs, and myriad published essays on the
> normative sciences.
>
> Finally, have you read the passage Gary F linked to? If not, that *might *be
> helpful to you in answering your question. I wouldn't concentrate on the
> James the Elder quote which is not, I don't believe, at all in itself why
> GF posted the link and shouldn't be taken out of *that *context.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail>
>  Virus-free.
> www.avg.com
> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail>
> <#m_3937679862003297641_m_-6051862502008732852_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>
>
> On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:55 PM Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Gary F, list,
>>
>> I, like everyone else on this list I'm sure, am curious as to learn more
>> about what you mean by this.
>> Please elaborate, for we all stand in need of a clear explanation for why
>> it is that a thing as exalted as Peirce's Trivium is merely being
>> neglected, don't you agree?
>>
>> So please, tell us, "Why then had it not been put to its serious use?"
>>
>> With best wishes,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 12:39 PM  wrote:
>>
>>> Gary R, list,
>>>
>>> I just came across a piece of the reverse side of *Turning Signs* that
>>> strikes me as relevant to the “ways in which Peirce's philosophical
>>> trivium might help inform the aesthetics, ethics, and critical thinking of
>>> the world as it emerges from the coronavirus pandemic” — and relevant in a
>>> way that I don’t think has been discussed in this thread before. It’s only
>>> a 3-to-5 minute read: http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/snc.htm#x14 .
>&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Pragmatic Trivium

[Jerry Rhee]

Gary F, list,

I, like everyone else on this list I'm sure, am curious as to learn more
about what you mean by this.
Please elaborate, for we all stand in need of a clear explanation for why
it is that a thing as exalted as Peirce's Trivium is merely being
neglected, don't you agree?

So please, tell us, "Why then had it not been put to its serious use?"

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 12:39 PM  wrote:

> Gary R, list,
>
> I just came across a piece of the reverse side of *Turning Signs* that
> strikes me as relevant to the “ways in which Peirce's philosophical
> trivium might help inform the aesthetics, ethics, and critical thinking of
> the world as it emerges from the coronavirus pandemic” — and relevant in a
> way that I don’t think has been discussed in this thread before. It’s only
> a 3-to-5 minute read: http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/snc.htm#x14 .
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* 13-Jun-20 16:04
>
> List,
>
> In a recent op-ed piece titled "The End of College as We Knew It" (
> https://tinyurl.com/ybha8mhb), Frank Bruni reflects on something I've
> been informally discussing with friends and colleagues now for years;
> namely, that "A society without a grounding in ethics, self-reflection,
> empathy and beauty is one that has lost its way” (Brian Rosenberg, recently 
> president
> of Macalester College). It seems to me that this has happened in the United
> States.
>
> It has long seemed to me that America today has largely abandoned what
> might be called the normative trivium of aesthetics, ethics, and logic --
> Peirce's three Normative Sciences, *not* the classical trivium (for which
> see Sister Miriam Joseph
> 's 2002 book, *The
> Trivium: The Liberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric*) that he
> generalized to serve as the three branches of Logic as Semeiotic.
>
> This philosophical trivium points to the possible *application *of
> Peirce's three Normative Sciences -- not their theoretical forms, but
> rather their ordinary and potentially pragmatic guises as they appear in
> life practice, including reflection and action upon what is beautiful in
> art and nature, what is ethical in our behavior in the world, and how we
> can apply 'critical commonsenseism' in our quotidian lives. Bruni writes: "We
> need writers, philosophers, historians. They’ll be the ones to chart the
> social, cultural and political challenges of this pandemic -- and of all
> the other dynamics that have pushed the United States so harrowingly close
> to the edge. In terms of restoring faith in the American project and
> reseeding common ground, they’re beyond essential."
>
> Bruni's op-ed reflection came in part in response to a recent article by
> Rosenberg in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*; see "How Should
> Colleges Prepare for a Post-Pandemic World" (
> https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Should-Colleges-Prepare/248507).
> Rosenberg writes: “If one were to invent a crisis uniquely and diabolically
> designed to undermine the foundations of traditional colleges and
> universities, it might look very much like the current global pandemic.” In
> a similar vein, Professor Andrew Belbanco, president of the Teagle
> Foundation which gives as its purpose promoting the liberal arts, writes: 
> “This
> is not only a public health crisis and an economic crisis, though Lord
> knows it’s both of those. It’s also a values crisis. It raises all kinds
> of deep human questions: What are our responsibilities to other people?
> Does representative democracy work? How do we get to a place where
> something like bipartisanship could emerge again?”
>
> Commenting on the economic divide of the American university, Bruni notes
> that "the already pronounced divide between richly endowed, largely
> residential schools and more socioeconomically diverse ones that depend on
> public funding grows wider as state and local governments face
> unprecedented financial distress. A shrinking minority of students get a
> boutique college experience. Then there’s everybody else."  Gail Mellow,
> former president of LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> (where I taught for decades before my retirement) is quoted as saying, “We
> always knew that America was moving more and more toward very different
> groups of people," to which Bruni adds, "that movement is only
> accelerating."
>
> Confronting all this will undoubtedly be one of the great challenges that
> America -- and for that matter, the world -- will have in the years and
> decades to come. The question I pose is: Can Peirce's version of pragmatism
> (or pragmaticism) -- which he also calls 'critical commonsenseism' --
> creatively contribute to these enormous challenges? And, if so, how? And
> are there ways in which Peirce's philosophical trivium might help inform
> the aesthetics, ethics, and critical thinking of the world as it emerges
> from the coronavirus pandemic? If 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] (offline) Nasty behavior by JAS

[Jerry Rhee]

Gary,

I have also sent my support to auke in private.
"But instead of reprimanding him, you told me that you would cut off my
access to Peirce-L."

With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 2:15 PM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Gary,
>
> I agree with Auke that JAS is frustrating to the point of nastiness
> Trying to communicate with JAS is like beating your head against a concrete
> wall.  See the thread attached below.
>
> JAS has a right to his own opinions.  But instead of recognizing that
> other people are making valid observations, JAS unleashes a barrage of
> quotations that do not support his position.  We all agree with Peirce.
> But we do not agree with JAS's interpretation of Peirce.   And we're
> frustrated by his wall of irrelevant quotations.
>
> I keep emphasizing that Peirce's writings are just the tip of an
> iceberg.   In order to understand his words, it's essential to understand
> his methods.   That is not just my opinion, please look at the 1024
> instances of method- (with various endings) in CP.
>
> I did my best in trying to get through to JAS.  But instead of
> reprimanding him, you told me that you would cut off my access to Peirce-L.
>
> My solution:  direct messages from JAS to directly to Trash.  But I keep
> seeing copies of his messages in notes by people I respect.
>
> John
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Pragmatic Trivium

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



I have tried to stay quiet but this statement really offends me:



“So now I will tell you what nobody has told you before this;

*that we older folks are waiting for you*.”



It is as though the older folk have forgotten their obligation to address
the following criticism:



'Why doth he not come who hath so long announced himself?'

thus do many people ask;

'hath solitude swallowed him up? Or should we perhaps go to him?'

For

There are Two Causes of Sin, Ignorance and Weakness;
And We need Divine Help to Overcome Both



There are two causes that lead to sin:
either we do not yet know our duty,
or we do not perform the duty that we know.

___



All this talk about esthetics ethics logic and normative sciences..

Is it not obvious that Peirce was incompetent for the task imposed upon him
of defining the esthetically good?

For if he had, then it would be just as obvious that we would recognize and
communicate it.

For are we not, *already*, the moral community?
I mean, what other reason is there for the surprising fact, that



America today has largely abandoned what might be called the normative
trivium of aesthetics, ethics, and logic -- Peirce's three Normative
Sciences



To the question, then, for

"*Why then had it not been put to its serious use?"*

No reason can be given, except that the motive to do so was not strong
enough.
The motives to doing so could *only* have been desire for gain and
philanthropy.



*The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, *

*or the Greatest Happiness Principle, *

*holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote
happiness, *

*wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. *

*By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; *

*by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.  *

*The pursuit of pleasure and *the avoidance of pain* motivate all our
actions.*



*The initial question,*
*“Why does cognition sometimes lead to action and sometimes not?”*
*should be understood to demand the answer that the syllogistic examples
will provide: because sometimes there are present both a desire for the
apprehended goal and a cognitive specification of what must be done if the
goal is to be reached, and sometimes not.*



“as I was saying all along, in respect to these matters I go astray, up and
down, and never hold the same opinion; and that I, or any other ordinary
man, go astray is not surprising;



but if you wise men likewise go astray, that is a terrible thing for us
also,

if even when we have come to you we are not to cease from our straying.”



*From A Little Known Argument for the Being of God to A Neglected Argument
for the Reality of God*



So that this is not yet ‘another’ kind of criticism put forth by the likes
of Mrs. Bell to Emerson,

I would demand of the older folk, then, to



*summarize the article in a concluding page or two, to be added to the
article, in order to forestall careless cavillers who might say, *

*Œwhat, then, precisely, is your neglected argument?'"*





With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sun, Jun 14, 2020 at 1:24 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> My good friend, Joseph Dauben, Distinguished Professor at the Graduate
> Center of The City University of New York/Lehman College, whose research
> interests include History of Science and History of Mathematics, wrote in
> response to my initial post in this thread:
>
> Many thanks for your very insightful observations. When I read what you've
> written, I immediately thought of the graduation speech E.L. Doctorow
> gave at his own alma mater, the Bronx HS of Science, a few years ago. You
> may well already have seen this, but if not, I think you’ll find what he
> had to say of interest.
>
>
> https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/11/nyregion/el-doctorow-graduation-speech-bronx-science.html
>
>
> While the entire piece is of interest (in a subsequent email, Joe remarked
> how he ". . . especially liked how Doctorow foiled the chemistry class
> experiment. He really wasn't so bad at chemistry after all!"), I've
> excerpted a quote from its conclusion as being of particular relevance to
> this thread. Doctorow writes:
>
> I’m thinking now of the principal at Science in my day, Dr. Morris Meister
> .
> I remember that he said about scientific knowledge that in the passage of
> time, it was like a searchlight beam expanding and lighting up more and
> more of the darkness. But as it did, he said, so did the circumference of
> darkness expand. That’s a pretty good line, don’t you think? As the light
> spreads out so does it discern more and more of the darkness. Actually this
> may have been said first by Albert Einstein, but no matter.
>
> The human quest for knowledge, for knowing everything there is to know,
> will always face that expanding circumference of darkness. That is what
> makes learning such an 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Auke, JAS, list,



Could you help me work this out?



AvB:  If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we
may say that he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did
err when he discarded A.



*‘man is a sign’ (1868)*

*‘the general answer to the question what is man? is that he is a symbol.’
(**CP 7.585)*



So there, (pointing), you have A and not-A, because *C A B*.



What would be a reason to say we did err, were we to discard A,

since a two (sign) cannot be a three (symbol) at the same time?



I mean what “either side” are we talking about?

Are we saying that we should only accept that man is a three because it is
the more considered view because later, and that man can no longer be a two?



JAS:  As I have said before, I believe that the proper approach--in
accordance with the hermeneutic principle of charity--is to *assume*
that *Peirce's
writings never contradict each other*, unless and until this turns out to
be untenable.

At that point, I agree that a *case can sometimes be made for either side*;
but my default assumption is that his later writings reflect his *more
considered* views, and hence should be given *slightly *more weight
accordingly.



Thanks for your time,
Jerry R

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 9:22 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Bernard, List:
>
> BM:  I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is pursuing.
>
>
> Thanks for clarifying this, I did not think that was your intent.
>
> BM:  Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. But it
> needs to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly with Robert
> on this.
>
>
> I agree that a sign must be perceived in order to *act *as such--i.e., it
> must be embodied in an *actual *token that determines an *actual *(dynamical)
> interpretant--but that is not what Robert stated.  Here is the relevant
> part of our exchange again.
>
> RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it
> must be perceived
>
> JAS:  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as
> long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue
> of having an immediate interpretant ... and a final interpretant ...
>
>
> My point was that a sign need not be perceived in order to *be *a sign.
>
> BM:  If it is possible to speak seriously about signs without referring
> explicitly to their technical definitions, what does it mean to practice
> "applied semiotics"?
>
>
> This is an excellent question for those who routinely complain about the
> supposedly excessive emphasis on semeiotic theory in List discussions.  We
> cannot properly *apply *Peirce's ideas to today's problems unless we
> first establish *what *those ideas were, which requires paying careful
> attention to his technical definitions of the relevant terms.
>
> BM:  If signs need an observer, who is this observer if not a sign himself?
>
>
> Indeed, as I have noted previously, Peirce often uses "quasi-mind" in lieu
> of "mind" when referring to both the utterer and the interpreter of a sign;
> and he says that "every sign even if external to all minds must be a
> determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a
> determinable sign" (SS 195, 1906).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Le 10/06/2020 à 18:08, John F. Sowa a écrit :
>> >
>> > Bernard Morand summarized the meaningful content of this debate in one
>> sentence plus one image:
>> >
>> > BM> In place of the old, often recurring debates on this subject I
>> propose to muse over a painting from René Magritte entitled "Le sens
>> > des réalités"
>> >
>> > That image, which shows a large boulder suspended in the middle of the
>> clouds, is an excellent illustration of the way JAS assembles
>> > "fireworks of quotations" (RM's phrase) to state a hypothesis (AKA
>> guess) and defend as if it were gospel truth.
>> >
>> John, List
>>
>> I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is persuing.
>>
>> I wanted to ask by means of the painting: what does "Real" mean ? With
>> the consequence: What is "Real" in the nature of signs?
>>
>> This latter question seems to me to be at the core of the Peirce's way of
>> thinking.
>>
>> Going back to the Magritte's painting, I think impossible that the
>> boulder may be "suspended in the middle of the clouds" as John see it.
>>
>> Because it would be a manifest violation of the law of universal
>> gravitation. The boulder is falling down to the earth that we see
>> distinctly on the lower part of the image, may be it is some kind of
>> meteorite.
>>
>> So we have from the beginning an image of the Reality: that which will
>> hurt you -and perhaps kill you-  if you stay under the boulder.
>>
>> But we can imagine some other senses of realities apart 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Bernard, list,



I’m surprised you do not have answers to your own questions, since this is,
after all, a Peirce list, and of course, a Peirce list is about ‘*what
Peirce actually wrote’* regards *‘Peirce’s way of thinking’*.



And Peirce said this:



‘This is man,’



I mean, *everybody* knows that,

that is, if one is able to entertain the thought that *everybody* is
hypostatically the same ego.



Besides, would Peirce even be a philosopher,

if he failed to recognize and treat the question of ‘*Man is a Sign*’?



For we all know, and Peirce has even said, that

“All Men are equal in their political rights.”

Hence, that must be *true* because Peirce said it.



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand 
wrote:

>
> Le 10/06/2020 à 18:08, John F. Sowa a écrit :
> >
> > Bernard Morand summarized the meaningful content of this debate in one
> > sentence plus one image:
> >
> > BM> In place of the old, often recurring debates on this subject I
> > propose to muse over a painting from René Magritte entitled "Le sens
> > des réalités"
> >
> > That image, which shows a large boulder suspended in the middle of the
> > clouds, is an excellent illustration of the way JAS assembles
> > "fireworks of quotations" (RM's phrase) to state a hypothesis (AKA
> > guess) and defend as if it were gospel truth.
> >
> John, List
>
> I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is persuing.
>
> I wanted to ask by means of the painting: what does "Real" mean ? With
> the consequence: What is "Real" in the nature of signs?
>
> This latter question seems to me to be at the core of the Peirce's way
> of thinking.
>
> Going back to the Magritte's painting, I think impossible that the
> boulder may be "suspended in the middle of the clouds" as John see it.
>
> Because it would be a manifest violation of the law of universal
> gravitation. The boulder is falling down to the earth that we see
> distinctly on the lower part of the image, may be it is some kind of
> meteorite.
>
> So we have from the beginning an image of the Reality: that which will
> hurt you -and perhaps kill you-  if you stay under the boulder.
>
> But we can imagine some other senses of realities apart this one that
> has been derived from the necessity of law.
>
> The boulder is really an event, here and there on the painted scene, -it
> is an intrusion- and as such it causes an effect of surprise for the
> audience (this effect is also initiated by Magritte himself to make the
> spectator think about the scene). This intrusive event is also a sense
> of realities: to be able of observation.
>
> Finally one latter sense of reality may consist in the consideration of
> the painting as recalling to our memories the extinction of the
> dinosaurs. A possibility already envisaged by scientists.
>
> Sure, all of this comment of the Magritte painting is highly
> problematic. Many more stories could be presented in illustration of the
> painting, probably as much as people commenting it.
>
> Sure, there is in this example nothing which proves that Peirce's
> semiotic is a truth. As a matter of fact common sense has already
> recognized that "an example is not a proof".
>
> Nevertheless one can see that his semiotic elementary distinctions
> -immediate and dynamic object, immediate dynamic normal interpretant,
> sign- are there, behind. I just choose to escape technical terms in this
> mail.
>
> Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. But it
> needs to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly with
> Robert on this.
>
> I finish with two questions of which I have quite no answer:
>
> 1) If it is possible to speak seriously about signs without referring
> explicitely to their technical definitions, what does it mean to pratice
> "applied semiotics"?
>
> 2) If signs need an observer, who is this observer if not a sign himself?
>
> Regards
>
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis (was Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear John, list,



I must admit, I am enjoying this conversation.

I would also absolutely, 100% for sure, no doubt agree with you that were
he alive today,

Peirce would agree with your



“I doubt that Peirce himself would continue to talk about fusing minds if
he were among us.”



On a completely different matter, a student once asked

if there is such a thing as *sumphuton pneuma*

and whether people talk about it seriously.

What I don’t understand is why anyone would talk about such things
*seriously*?



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Fri, Jun 5, 2020 at 9:21 PM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Terry,
>
> I agree that Peirce's "mind fusion" is a good metaphor.  It reminds me of
> Spock's "mind meld" in Star Trek.  But the Trekkies don't explain how the
> Vulcan neural system (in conjunction with the human neural system) could
> establish that meld.
>
> TR> I’m delighted to find this remark in Peirce! For my $0.02, thinking of
> Peirce’s “fusion” as harmoniously resonant semiosis (very large SNR) –
> e.g., as in all waveforms from music to radiation and gravity, and in the
> cognitive commens of sentient and sapient community, we’d be fine if
> dissonant discord over our differences weren’t, to put it mildly these
> days, so dissonant and discordant.
>
> But what does it mean?  If two people don't have sufficient "collateral
> experience" to understand one another, they don't do a Vulcan mind meld.
> What they do is to find some way to get the experience.
>
> If it's musical, they practice performing, listening to, and dancing to
> music.  If it's something physical, like playing Cricket, they may have to
> watch a game with somebody explaining each move.  If it's a color, they
> have to look at colored things or pictures of them.  If it's some
> scientific theory, they have to read a book , take a course, or do some
> experiments.
>
> In each case, people can gain the collateral experience by doing
> something.  Just repeating or quoting Peirce's words is insufficient to
> explain what he meant.  It's necessary to explain "mind fusion" in terms of
> some method for getting the experience.
>
> John
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The English Verb Equation

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Cécile, list,



The first thing that caught my eye from your announcement is “V-ed”.



This immediately recalled in my mind the word, ‘is observed’,

then ‘if.. would be..’,

and hence, ‘is reason to suspect is true’.



So the order is ‘past future present’ forms of ‘to be’ (for obvious
reasons).

Which is to say, that is how I would give a form to a verb.

 I hope that helps.



With best wishes,
Jerry R



*The only important thing here is our metaphysical phenomenon, or familiar
notion, *

*that the past is a matter for knowledge but not for endeavor, *

*that the future is an object that we may hope to influence, but which
cannot affect us except through our anticipations, and that the present is
a moment immeasurably small through which, as their limit, past and future
can alone act upon one another. *

*Whether this be an illusion or not, it is the phenomenon of which the
metaphysician has to give an account.  (CP 8:113)*





*What now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come nor past are.
*

*Nor is it properly said, “there be three times, past, present, and to
come”: *

*yet perchance it might be properly said, *

*“there be three times; a present of things past, a present of things
present, and a present of things future.” *



*For these three do exist in some sort, in the soul, but otherwise do I not
see them; *

*present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present
of things future, expectation.*

On Tue, Jun 2, 2020 at 12:54 PM Cécile Menieu-Cosculluela <
cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote:

> Dear list members (especially those of you interested in linguistics),
>
> I have been working on verb operators in English in the light of Peirce's
> three categories and it seems firstness, secondness, and thirdness appear
> at different levels of the analysis so that the broader approach (that
> includes all types of sentences) shows the following:
>
> 1rstness: V-zero (can't find the ASCII code for zero)
> TO V
> V-ing
>
> 2ndness: V-s
> V-ed
>
> 3rdness: MODAL + V-zero
>HAVE + V-en
>BE + V-ing
>BE + V-en
>DO + V-zero
>
>
> A more restricted approach (that doesn't take into account V1-V2
> structures) leaves out the operators of firstness above and seems to
> redistribute the other operators as follows:
>
> 1rstness: V-s
> V-ed
>
> 3rdness: MODAL + V-zero
>HAVE + V-en
>BE + V-ing
>BE + V-en
>
> 2ndness: DO + V-zero
>
>
> And then a third, more detailed approach of the 4 operators of thirdness
> above would lead to the following conclusion:
>
> 3rdness: MODAL + V-zero
> 1rstness: HAVE + V-en
> 2ndness: BE + V-ing
> BE + V-en
>
> I was rather happy with that still-in-progress background when teaching my
> first year students of E.S.L. until I made a video (to which you'll find a
> link below) in which I heard myself say that operator of secondness DO +
> V-zero is not compatible with the operators of thirdness (MODAL + V-zero,
> HAVE + V-en, BE + V-ing, and BE + V-en). Secondness incompatible with
> thirdness? That doesn't make any sense, does it? I have just realized that
> and I now find it hard to see how to make the link between the verb
> operators in English and Peirce's categories and I thought I would look for
> help on Peirce-L.
>
> Would you happen to have some ideas on the matter?
>
> Any insight would be greatly appreciated!
>
> I guess I'll have to rethink my system (hopefully in the light of your
> comments) but for now I have put online a video presentation of the English
> verb equation I have been working on over the past two decades, and I
> thought it might possibly be of interest to you and/or your students if
> your field involves both semiotics and linguistic grammar. This equation
> has been designed for first year students to use throughout their
> undergraduate studies and can be adapted for high school education or
> beginners of E.S.L., the aim being to get one's ideas clear on how to give
> a form to a verb. This easy-to-grasp six-step process includes a very short
> series of operators resorting to firstness, secondness, and thirdness, that
> gives rise to all possible verb forms and to a plethora of verb phrases.
> You can find it on the web by simply typing the key words "verb equation"
> on YouTube or by clicking the link below:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MgUxlfbleBM
>
> I would really appreciate it if you and/or your students would be so kind
> as to give me some feedback on that work. Please also feel free to share
> with anyone who might be interested.
>
> Thank you for your answers & collaboration.
>
> Best regards & wishes.
>
> Cécile Cosculluela
> UPPA (University of Pau)
>
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jeff, JAS list,



Forgive my interruption but were I to offer my opinion on your question
regards *Quality*,

my response would be ‘meh.. *any* immediate interpretant would do”;

for they are all *predestinate* opinions.



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 2:13 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
>
> How does your definition of the immediate interpretant compare to what
> Peirce says in the following passage:  "The Immediate Interpretant consists
> in the *Quality *of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to
> any actual reaction"? (CP 8.315)
>
>
> JAS:  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly could* 
> signify
> within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical interpretant
> is whatever a sign token *actually does* signify on an individual
> occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign itself *necessarily
> would* signify under ideal circumstances.
>
>
> Notice the three features that are highlighted in Peirce's account. The
> immediate object of a sign is:
>
>
>
>1. a Quality
>2. of the Impression
>3. that a sign is *fit* to produce
>
>
> Let me try to frame a question. This account of the immediate interpretant
> seems to accept the further division Peirce draws between the presentation
> of immediate interpretants as possibles, existents and necessitants. How
> does this division apply to your definition?
>
> Yours,
>
> Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, May 26, 2020 9:57 AM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants
>
> Auke, List:
>
> JAS:  I continue to stand by my own definitions.
>
> AvB:  Own definitions? I only see citations.
>
>
> My own definitions are stated in the very next sentence, copied verbatim
> from a previous post.
>
> JAS:  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly could*
> signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical
> interpretant is whatever a sign token *actually does* signify on an
> individual occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign itself 
> *necessarily
> would* signify under ideal circumstances.
>
>
> This is my summary based on Peirce's various descriptions of the three
> interpretants in his writings.  The quotations that I provided were
> intended to support my understanding of the immediate interpretant in
> particular.
>
> JAS:  I am really trying to understand *both* the system *and* the
> process.
>
> AvB:  is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph
> indicating your process view?
>
>
> Yes, any *actual* effect of a sign token is a *dynamical* interpretant--a
> feeling (emotional), an exertion (energetic), or a further sign token
> (logical).  The sign token itself is its efficient cause, the immediate
> interpretant is its formal cause, and the final interpretant is its final
> cause.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 4:13 AM  wrote:
>
>> Jon Alen,
>>
>> you wrote: I continue to stand by my own definitions.
>>
>> Own definitions? I only see citations.
>>
>> You wrote: I am really trying to understand *both *the system *and *the
>> process.
>>
>> My question: is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph
>> indicating your process view?
>>
>> Every sign *in actu* is a token of a type that belongs to a particular
>> system of signs and is determined by its dynamical object to determine a
>> dynamical interpretant--an *actual *effect on an interpreter as a
>> feeling (emotional interpretant), an exertion (energetic interpretant), or
>> a further sign (logical interpretant).  However, an interpreter who is
>> insufficiently acquainted with that system will be incapable of getting any
>> idea signified by the sign token, or might (as in my example) *misinterpret
>> *it as a token of a different sign type that belongs to a different
>> system.
>>
>> best,
>>
>> Auke
>>
>> Op 26 mei 2020 om 3:11 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
>>
>>
>> Auke, List:
>>
>> AvB:  The relevant part: "I have been accustomed to identify this
>> [immediate interpretant] with the effect the sign first produces or may
>> produce upon a mind".
>>
>> Peirce leaves two options open for the immediate interpretant here--it is 
>> *either
>> *the effect that the sign first (actually) produces upon a mind * or *the
>> effect that the sign may (possibly) produce upon a mind.  In order to
>> clarify this, I believe that the entire sentence is relevant, including a
>> clause that I am underlining here because it is omitted from the quotation
>> below.
>>
>> CSP:  My Immediate Interpretant is, I think, very nearly, if not quite,
>> the same as your "Sense"; for I understand the former to be the total
>> unanalyzed effect that the Sign is calculated to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear JAS, list,



Thank you for all your work in collating.



*Now let us turn to the phaneron and see what we find in fact. (CP 1.299)*



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 9:38 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> Speculating is easy and sometimes even fun, but I suggest that the best
> way to ascertain what Peirce means by "predestinate" is carefully studying
> how else he uses the word and its close cognates in his writings (all bold
> added).
>
> CSP:  Because the only purpose of inquiry is the settlement of opinion, we
> have seen that everyone who investigates, that is, pursues an inquiry by
> the fourth method [that of science] assumes that that process will, if
> carried far enough, lead him to a certain conclusion, he knows not what
> beforehand, but which no further investigation will change. No matter what
> his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one
> *predestinated* belief. (CP 7.327, 1873)
>
> CSP:  Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but
> the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves
> to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are
> carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the
> operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no
> selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can
> enable a man to escape the *predestinate *opinion. This great hope is
> embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is
> fated* to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean
> by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That
> is the way I would explain reality.
> *Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can nohow be
> avoided. It is a superstition to suppose that a certain sort of events are
> ever fated, and it is another to suppose that the word fate can never be
> freed from its superstitious taint. We are all fated to die. (CP 5.407, EP
> 1:138-139, 1878)
>
> CSP:  At the same time that this process of inference, or the spontaneous
> development of belief, is continually going on within us, fresh peripheral
> excitations are also continually creating new belief-habits. Thus, belief
> is partly determined by old beliefs and partly by new experience. Is there
> any law about the mode of the peripheral excitations? The logician
> maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that
> of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain *predestinate *conclusions
> which are the same for all men. This is the faith of the logician. This is
> the matter of fact, upon which all maxims of reasoning repose. In virtue of
> this fact, what is to be believed at last is independent of what has been
> believed hitherto, and therefore has the character of *reality*. Hence,
> if a given habit, considered as determining an inference, is of such a sort
> as to tend toward the final result, it is correct; otherwise not. Thus,
> inferences become divisible into the valid and the invalid; and thus logic
> takes its reason of existence. (CP 3.161, 1880)
>
> CSP:  [T]he only object to which inquiry seeks to make our opinion conform
> is itself something of the nature of thought; namely, it is the
> *predestined* ultimate idea, which is independent of what you, I, or any
> number of men may persist, for however long, in thinking, yet which remains
> thought, after all. (CP 8.101, c. 1900)
>
> CSP:  In the light of what has been said, what are we to say to that
> logical fatalism whose stock in trade is the argument that I have already
> indicated? I mean the argument that science is *predestined *to reach the
> truth, and that it can therefore make no difference whether she observes
> carefully or carelessly nor what sort of formulae she treats as reasons.
> The answer to it is that the only kind of *predestination *of the
> attainment of truth by science is an eventual *predestination*,--a 
> *predestination
> **aliquando denique*. Sooner or later it will attain the truth, nothing
> more. ... Let us remember, then, that the precise practical service of
> sound theory of logic is to abbreviate the time of waiting to know the
> truth, to expedite the *predestined *result. (CP 7.78, c. 1905-6)
>
> CSP:  I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so
> far as there is any "truth") to its being the *predestined *result to
> which sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419, 1907)
>
>
> It is not that reality *itself *is predestined, but that reality is the 
> *object
> *of "the predestinate opinion," which is "the ultimate interpretant of
> every sign" (EP 2:304, 1904)--whatever *would *be believed by an infinite
> community after infinite inquiry.  Brute 2ns and spontaneous 1ns ensure
> that the necessities of the future are *conditional*, rather than actual;
> as Vincent Colapietro has put it, "It 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

“Let us acknowledge, then, that we have no preamble.  ..

 for the statement that is to follow the prelude is one of no small
importance, and it makes no difference whether these statements are
distinctly or indistinctly remembered.”~ *Laws*, 723c



I hope that helps.



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 6:14 PM Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Cecile, Helmut, Michael, Robert, Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> Hence, this is why I do not believe it.
>
>
>
> With best wishes,
> Jerry R
>
>
>
>
>
> Helmut said:
> do I understand it correctly, that the paradoxon here is, that the final
> interpretant is the first element in logical order, but the last in
> temporal order? In this case I would propose a solution attempt like this:
> The truth works as a motive, a quest for it, although it is not yet
> achieved. People (animals, organisms, molecules?) have a feeling,
> intuition, instinct, internalised law or axiom, that everything has or
> would have a true representation. This final interpretant, though not
> realised, does nevertheless do its work for the sign this way here and now.
>
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 6:01 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry- you are moving into Alice in Wonderland territory: Why is a raven
>> like a writing desk?
>>
>> And remember, the White Queen in Alive Through the Looking Glass could
>> remember future events before they even happened!
>>
>> And I quote the Queen..."Why sometimes I've believed as many as six
>> impossible things before breakfast!.
>>
>> And the Cat said: "We're all mad here. I'm made. You're mad..
>>
>> How do you know I'm mad? said Alice. ' You must be, said the Cat, or you
>> wouldn't have come here.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 19/05/20 6:23 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Dear Edwina, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Isn’t the a priori before the opinion, whether predestinate or destinate?
>>
>> So we could even decide whether we intend the a priori as necessary when
>> we refer to predestinate opinion.
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:14 PM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry - surely you are joking with me!
>>>
>>> How can there be such a 'thing' as a predestinate opinion???  Is there
>>> any 'thing' whether material or cognitive (an opinion) that is
>>> 'predestinate', ie, is there any actuality that is predetermined to become
>>> that actuality??? Is there anything that has been preplanned such that the
>>> outcome is necessary and unchangeable?  I can't think of a single material
>>> or cognitive 'thing'.. Necessity is always confronted with possibility.
>>>
>>> You cannot use me as your authority or guide as to whether a
>>> 'predestinate' is good or bad; you must make up your own mind.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue 19/05/20 5:30 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thank you for your response.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To make the matter more clear, perhaps you can tell me whether your
>>> attitude toward predestinate opinion is positive or negative.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> For if the predestinate opinion is bad, then surely I ought not believe
>>> in it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If it is good, I ought to believe in it because
>>>
>>> predestinate opinion-> destinate opinion -> truth
>>>
>>> and I prefer truth to untruth.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There appears to be some measure of adequacy implied in the problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So, is predestinate opinion that upon which I ought to be prepared to
>>> act,
>>>
>>> or would you recommend against it?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best wishes,
>>>
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:06 PM Edwina Taborsky 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation out
>>>> of an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.
>>>>
>>>> To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the
>>>> decision to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial agency
>>>> making such a decision
>>>>
>>>> Edwina

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Cecile, Helmut, Michael, Robert, Edwina, list,



Hence, this is why I do not believe it.



With best wishes,
Jerry R





Helmut said:
do I understand it correctly, that the paradoxon here is, that the final
interpretant is the first element in logical order, but the last in
temporal order? In this case I would propose a solution attempt like this:
The truth works as a motive, a quest for it, although it is not yet
achieved. People (animals, organisms, molecules?) have a feeling,
intuition, instinct, internalised law or axiom, that everything has or
would have a true representation. This final interpretant, though not
realised, does nevertheless do its work for the sign this way here and now.

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 6:01 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jerry- you are moving into Alice in Wonderland territory: Why is a raven
> like a writing desk?
>
> And remember, the White Queen in Alive Through the Looking Glass could
> remember future events before they even happened!
>
> And I quote the Queen..."Why sometimes I've believed as many as six
> impossible things before breakfast!.
>
> And the Cat said: "We're all mad here. I'm made. You're mad..
>
> How do you know I'm mad? said Alice. ' You must be, said the Cat, or you
> wouldn't have come here.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue 19/05/20 6:23 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Dear Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> Isn’t the a priori before the opinion, whether predestinate or destinate?
>
> So we could even decide whether we intend the a priori as necessary when
> we refer to predestinate opinion.
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:14 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry - surely you are joking with me!
>>
>> How can there be such a 'thing' as a predestinate opinion???  Is there
>> any 'thing' whether material or cognitive (an opinion) that is
>> 'predestinate', ie, is there any actuality that is predetermined to become
>> that actuality??? Is there anything that has been preplanned such that the
>> outcome is necessary and unchangeable?  I can't think of a single material
>> or cognitive 'thing'.. Necessity is always confronted with possibility.
>>
>> You cannot use me as your authority or guide as to whether a
>> 'predestinate' is good or bad; you must make up your own mind.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 19/05/20 5:30 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Thank you for your response.
>>
>>
>>
>> To make the matter more clear, perhaps you can tell me whether your
>> attitude toward predestinate opinion is positive or negative.
>>
>>
>>
>> For if the predestinate opinion is bad, then surely I ought not believe
>> in it.
>>
>>
>>
>> If it is good, I ought to believe in it because
>>
>> predestinate opinion-> destinate opinion -> truth
>>
>> and I prefer truth to untruth.
>>
>>
>>
>> There appears to be some measure of adequacy implied in the problem.
>>
>>
>>
>> So, is predestinate opinion that upon which I ought to be prepared to
>> act,
>>
>> or would you recommend against it?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best wishes,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:06 PM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation out
>>> of an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.
>>>
>>> To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the
>>> decision to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial agency
>>> making such a decision
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue 19/05/20 2:40 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>>
>>> Dear Edwina, list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate opinion’?
>>>
>>> I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move,
>>>
>>> as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a
>>> habitual hiccup.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and
>>> supposition,
>>>
>>> preamble and amble or precognition and cognition?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon - yes, i

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Edwina, list,



Isn’t the *a priori* before the opinion, whether predestinate or destinate?

So we could even decide whether we intend the *a priori* as necessary when
we refer to predestinate opinion.



Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:14 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jerry - surely you are joking with me!
>
> How can there be such a 'thing' as a predestinate opinion???  Is there any
> 'thing' whether material or cognitive (an opinion) that is 'predestinate',
> ie, is there any actuality that is predetermined to become that
> actuality??? Is there anything that has been preplanned such that the
> outcome is necessary and unchangeable?  I can't think of a single material
> or cognitive 'thing'.. Necessity is always confronted with possibility.
>
> You cannot use me as your authority or guide as to whether a
> 'predestinate' is good or bad; you must make up your own mind.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 19/05/20 5:30 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> Thank you for your response.
>
>
>
> To make the matter more clear, perhaps you can tell me whether your
> attitude toward predestinate opinion is positive or negative.
>
>
>
> For if the predestinate opinion is bad, then surely I ought not believe in
> it.
>
>
>
> If it is good, I ought to believe in it because
>
> predestinate opinion-> destinate opinion -> truth
>
> and I prefer truth to untruth.
>
>
>
> There appears to be some measure of adequacy implied in the problem.
>
>
>
> So, is predestinate opinion that upon which I ought to be prepared to act,
>
> or would you recommend against it?
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:06 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation out
>> of an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.
>>
>> To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the decision
>> to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial agency making
>> such a decision
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 19/05/20 2:40 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Dear Edwina, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate opinion’?
>>
>> I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move,
>>
>> as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a
>> habitual hiccup.
>>
>>
>>
>> I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and supposition,
>>
>> preamble and amble or precognition and cognition?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis generates
>>> regulative principles but as to whether these are 'abductive hopes' - hmm.
>>> I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the Universe actually 'hope'?  I
>>> think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with Will understood only as the
>>> Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, All ...
>>>
>>> In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the last
>>> couple of decades I think it's most commonly
>>> been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
>>> principles, in effect falling into the category of
>>> abductive hopes.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of
>>> > a 'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a
>>> > 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda
>>> > is the 'nature of Peircean semiosis'.
>>> >
>>> > Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both
>>> > assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'.
>>> > Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there
>>> > is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison;
>>> > in the factual nature of an historical event.
>>> >
>>> > But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean
>>> > semiosis. Did he 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Edwina, list,



Thank you for your response.



To make the matter more clear, perhaps you can tell me whether your
attitude toward predestinate opinion is positive or negative.



For if the predestinate opinion is bad, then surely I ought not believe in
it.



If it is good, I ought to believe in it because

predestinate opinion-> destinate opinion -> truth

and I prefer truth to untruth.



There appears to be some measure of adequacy implied in the problem.



So, is predestinate opinion that upon which I ought to be prepared to act,

or would you recommend against it?



Best wishes,

Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:06 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation out of
> an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.
>
> To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the decision
> to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial agency making
> such a decision
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 19/05/20 2:40 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Dear Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate opinion’?
>
> I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move,
>
> as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a
> habitual hiccup.
>
>
>
> I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and supposition,
>
> preamble and amble or precognition and cognition?
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis generates
>> regulative principles but as to whether these are 'abductive hopes' - hmm.
>> I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the Universe actually 'hope'?  I
>> think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with Will understood only as the
>> Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
>>
>> Edwina, All ...
>>
>> In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the last
>> couple of decades I think it's most commonly
>> been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
>> principles, in effect falling into the category of
>> abductive hopes.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of
>> > a 'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a
>> > 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda
>> > is the 'nature of Peircean semiosis'.
>> >
>> > Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both
>> > assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'.
>> > Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there
>> > is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison;
>> > in the factual nature of an historical event.
>> >
>> > But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean
>> > semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if
>> > you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether
>> > X is a poison or the truth of what happened'
>> >
>> > This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can
>> > never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness. It
>> > ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally
>> > ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it
>> > ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty.
>> >
>> > I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or'
>> > [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not] ….that
>> > Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power
>> > of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects predestination
>> > of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic and
>> > open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'.
>> >
>> > Edwina
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Edwina, list,



What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate opinion’?

I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move,

as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a habitual
hiccup.



I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and supposition,

preamble and amble or precognition and cognition?



Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis generates
> regulative principles but as to whether these are 'abductive hopes' - hmm.
> I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the Universe actually 'hope'?  I
> think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with Will understood only as the
> Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
>
> Edwina, All ...
>
> In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the last
> couple of decades I think it's most commonly
> been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
> principles, in effect falling into the category of
> abductive hopes.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> >
> >
> > Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of
> > a 'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a
> > 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda
> > is the 'nature of Peircean semiosis'.
> >
> > Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both
> > assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'.
> > Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there
> > is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison;
> > in the factual nature of an historical event.
> >
> > But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean
> > semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if
> > you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether
> > X is a poison or the truth of what happened'
> >
> > This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can
> > never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness. It
> > ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally
> > ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it
> > ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty.
> >
> > I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or'
> > [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not] ….that
> > Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power
> > of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects predestination
> > of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic and
> > open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'.
> >
> > Edwina
> >
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the classification of signs

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Michael, list,



Here is an example of “system of sensing”:



*Hegseth, an outspoken supporter of President Donald Trump who ran for a
Minnesota Senate seat in 2012, has previously urged "healthy people" to
"have some courage" and attempt to contract the coronavirus in order to
build "herd immunity." *



*"The governor can say the state is closed, but if we the people say the
state is open, then ultimately there's not a lot you can do if every
business steps out," Hegseth said while surrounded by protesters outside
Atilis Gym on Monday. *



*"That's pretty much the definition of responsible civil disobedience."*



So what do *you* propose as the prescription from Pragmatism,

the “feedback from the final interpretant situation into the emotional and
motor reflexes”?



From where I stand, it all appears vague.

I mean, what in the world is PREDESTINATE opinion, as some have raised?



Best,

Jerry R

On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 4:27 PM  wrote:

> List,
>
> Whilst there can be an infinite amount of interpreting by a potentially
> limitless community, final interpretant isn't this.
>
> Alongside descriptions by for example Donna Williams, a writer on
> neurology, the immediate interpretant corresponds to the pure perception
> part of colour, shape, space, sounds, scent etc, and the dynamical one
> is the emotional and motor reflexes ensuing either "automatically" or by
> habit (fright, delight, retraction from danger) - Donna calls these two
> combined the "system of sensing"; while the final interpretant comprises
> those concepts one is used to adding, or freshly figures out, namely the
> meaning or signification - Donna's "system of interpretation".  When one
> is unwell or is in delayed development, these occur in sequence or the
> latter one(s) don't readily happen.
>
> In addition, there is feedback from the final interpretant situation
> into the emotional and motor reflexes, e.g one decides it is horrible or
> realises it is dangerous or recognises a thing one likes; this might
> follow by a split second or, if a thing is new to one, longer.
>
> The same set of processes occur when the concretes are imagined and even
> when they are fairly abstract.  This is because imagination is the
> laboratory or workshop atop our shoulders.  Memory outputs into
> imagination and so we can feel, analyse and discuss our memories.
>
> The central nervous system (CNS) handles the symbolism in the sensory
> epistemology arising from physical reality, and there can be infinite
> layers of symbols of symbols.
>
> Words allude, and when several of these intersect, we can have a
> meaning.  This is why reifying (which I see as taking "literally
> literally") doesn't work.
>
> Any comments welcome.
>
> Michael Mitchell - linguist - UK
>
> On 2020-05-18 21:04, Cécile Menieu-Cosculluela wrote:
>
> > Why not? I thought it did sound very interesting indeed
> >
> > -
> >
> > DE: "Jerry Rhee" 
> > À: "Helmut Raulien" 
> > CC: "Gary Fuhrman" , "peirce-l"
> > 
> > ENVOYÉ: Lundi 18 Mai 2020 21:18:19
> > OBJET: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the
> > classification of signs
> >
> > Dear Helmut, list,
> >
> > What an interesting observation.
> >
> > _meh_.. I don’t believe it.
> >
> > With best wishes,
> > Jerry R
> >
> > On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 1:25 PM Helmut Raulien 
> > wrote:
> >
> >> List
> >>
> >> do I understand it correctly, that the paradoxon here is, that the
> >> final interpretant is the first element in logical order, but the
> >> last in temporal order? In this case I would propose a solution
> >> attempt like this: The truth works as a motive, a quest for it,
> >> although it is not yet achieved. People (animals, organisms,
> >> molecules?) have a feeling, intuition, instinct, internalised law or
> >> axiom, that everything has or would have a true representation. This
> >> final interpretant, though not realised, does nevertheless do its
> >> work for the sign this way here and now.
> >>
> >> Best,
> >> Helmut
> >>
> >> 18. Mai 2020 um 17:18 Uhr
> >> g...@gnusystems.ca
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> Robert, is it your intention to argue that communication cannot
> >> “succeed” _at all_ unless the interpretant of the sign is
> >> completely determinate, and identically so for all communicants?
> >>
> >> Would you likewise say that knowledge is not actual, or real, unless
&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the classification of signs

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Cecile, list,



Why not?

I mean, isn’t belief supposedly *that* upon which one is prepared to act?

What, then, is *that* belief?



Let us take our situation, then.

We have utterers and interpreters (and presumably a commens somewhere).

And if we take Peirce at his word, then the only moral evil is not to have
an ultimate aim.  So where is it?  What is our ultimate aim?



From what I see, that aim is nebulous.



And since we are all Peirceans and we have continued to investigate such
things,

then it must be Peirce’s intention for us to argue over such things until
we come to an agreement.  But that end comes at the end, not at the
beginning.



Best,

Jerry R

On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 3:04 PM Cécile Menieu-Cosculluela <
cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote:

> Why not? I thought it did sound very interesting indeed...
>
> --
> *De: *"Jerry Rhee" 
> *À: *"Helmut Raulien" 
> *Cc: *"Gary Fuhrman" , "peirce-l" <
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Envoyé: *Lundi 18 Mai 2020 21:18:19
> *Objet: *Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the
> classification of signs
>
> Dear Helmut, list,
>
>
>
> What an interesting observation.
>
>
>
> *meh*.. I don’t believe it.
>
>
>
> With best wishes,
> Jerry R
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 1:25 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>>
>> List
>>
>> do I understand it correctly, that the paradoxon here is, that the final
>> interpretant is the first element in logical order, but the last in
>> temporal order? In this case I would propose a solution attempt like this:
>> The truth works as a motive, a quest for it, although it is not yet
>> achieved. People (animals, organisms, molecules?) have a feeling,
>> intuition, instinct, internalised law or axiom, that everything has or
>> would have a true representation. This final interpretant, though not
>> realised, does nevertheless do its work for the sign this way here and now.
>>
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>>  18. Mai 2020 um 17:18 Uhr
>> g...@gnusystems.ca
>> wrote:
>>
>> Robert, is it your intention to argue that communication cannot “succeed” *at
>> all* unless the interpretant of the sign is completely determinate, and
>> identically so for all communicants?
>>
>> Would you likewise say that knowledge is not actual, or real, unless it
>> is absolute and unquestionable?
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* robert marty 
>> *Sent:* 18-May-20 03:25
>> *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the
>> classification of signs
>>
>>
>>
>> Jon Alan, List
>>
>>
>>
>> I repeat this debate with you and it leads me to ask you a preliminary
>> question that I should have asked you on September 22, 2018, but I probably
>> did not have very clear ideas 18 months ago. Here it is: what you say this:
>>
>>
>>
>> " The *Destinate* Interpretant is what the Sign is destined to signify
>> at the end of infinite inquiry by an infinite community; i.e., the Final
>> Interpretant"?
>>
>>
>>
>> Because this quote troubles me a little: " In that second part, I call
>> "truth" the *predestinate* opinion,17 by which I ought to have meant
>> that which would ultimately prevail if investigation were carried
>> sufficiently far in that particular direction." (The Essential Peirce A
>> Sketch of Logical Critics  p.457)
>>
>>
>>
>> It seems to me in complete fact that if this were the case the whole of
>> humanity would be doomed to wait until the end of eternity to succeed in
>> its first communication. Unless an immanent power deposits it in all minds
>> at the moment of the perception of the sign? Should we read "predestinate"?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  Because there's a perception, isn't there? You will not be able to
>> escape the chronology until the end of time: the signs that actually occur
>> in social life must be taken care of by the theory of signs, shaped to be
>> subjected to analysis, debated ... Etc... Otherwise what are we doing here?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best regards,
>>
>>
>>
>> Robert
>>
>>
>> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"
>> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should
>> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L"
>> in the BODY of the message. More at
>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>
>
> [Fichier texte:message-footer.txt]
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the classification of signs

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Helmut, list,



What an interesting observation.



*meh*.. I don’t believe it.



With best wishes,
Jerry R



On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 1:25 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> List
>
> do I understand it correctly, that the paradoxon here is, that the final
> interpretant is the first element in logical order, but the last in
> temporal order? In this case I would propose a solution attempt like this:
> The truth works as a motive, a quest for it, although it is not yet
> achieved. People (animals, organisms, molecules?) have a feeling,
> intuition, instinct, internalised law or axiom, that everything has or
> would have a true representation. This final interpretant, though not
> realised, does nevertheless do its work for the sign this way here and now.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  18. Mai 2020 um 17:18 Uhr
> g...@gnusystems.ca
> wrote:
>
> Robert, is it your intention to argue that communication cannot “succeed” *at
> all* unless the interpretant of the sign is completely determinate, and
> identically so for all communicants?
>
> Would you likewise say that knowledge is not actual, or real, unless it is
> absolute and unquestionable?
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* robert marty 
> *Sent:* 18-May-20 03:25
> *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the
> classification of signs
>
>
>
> Jon Alan, List
>
>
>
> I repeat this debate with you and it leads me to ask you a preliminary
> question that I should have asked you on September 22, 2018, but I probably
> did not have very clear ideas 18 months ago. Here it is: what you say this:
>
>
>
> " The *Destinate* Interpretant is what the Sign is destined to signify at
> the end of infinite inquiry by an infinite community; i.e., the Final
> Interpretant"?
>
>
>
> Because this quote troubles me a little: " In that second part, I call
> "truth" the *predestinate* opinion,17 by which I ought to have meant that
> which would ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently
> far in that particular direction." (The Essential Peirce A Sketch of
> Logical Critics  p.457)
>
>
>
> It seems to me in complete fact that if this were the case the whole of
> humanity would be doomed to wait until the end of eternity to succeed in
> its first communication. Unless an immanent power deposits it in all minds
> at the moment of the perception of the sign? Should we read "predestinate"?
>
>
>
>
>
>  Because there's a perception, isn't there? You will not be able to escape
> the chronology until the end of time: the signs that actually occur in
> social life must be taken care of by the theory of signs, shaped to be
> subjected to analysis, debated ... Etc... Otherwise what are we doing here?
>
>
>
> Best regards,
>
>
>
> Robert
>
>
> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"
> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should
> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L"
> in the BODY of the message. More at
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Charity (was Categories and...

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Thank you for this great demonstration of ‘*charity*’.

We have shown ourselves to be a learned person who can define a concept
perfectly.

For who can’t recognize an example when it’s on the table in front of them?



Best,

Jerry R

On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 5:32 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> JAS - and this is getting ridiculous. But - you who openly self-defines
> yourself as very particular about exact references - 'selected' from what I
> wrote - which thereby changed the meaning - and declared that I wrote:
>
> 1] "  theorizing is "an irrelevant exercise" undertaken only by people who
> "prefer the isolation and comfort of what [she calls] 'the seminar room' "
>
> But I did not say the above.
>
> I never said: 'theorizing is an irrelevant exercise'. I said "if one
> substitutes one 'name/term' for another - that is an irrelevant exercise'.
> Substitution of terms is not theorizing - so - why did you change my words?
> Why did you remove 'substitutes' and insert 'theorizing'?
>
> 2] Nor did I say that theorizing is " undertaken only by people who
> "prefer the isolation and comfort of what [she calls] 'the seminar room' .
> Where did I say this???
>
> Nor did I say that I was against theorizing. What I wrote was:
>
> "As for diagrams and models - formulas and terms - I'm not arguing against
> them. I'm asking - can they be applied to real situations in the actual
> world - to explain this real world?
>
> As for asking others to provide examples - I've done so repeatedly, and
> have found that most prefer the isolation and comfort of what I call 'the
> seminar room' - ie, discussions around terms and models...far, far, far
> from the real empirical objective world."
>
> 3] I see nothing wrong, as a researcher, with asking whether a theory can
> be applied, functionally, to explain the real world.
>
> But I do see something wrong - on the basis of not only charity but
> integrity - with changing the words someone writes, with leaving out
> phrases, with putting in other words and phrases - to incorrectly present
> someone's comments. Why did you do this?
>
> Edwina
>
>
> On Thu 14/05/20 4:58 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  You are misinterpreting what I said and writing misleading comments
> about it.
>
>
> Another pot is calling another kettle black, except that I provided links
> to the specific posts that I quoted so that others could see the complete
> contexts for themselves.  That is precisely why I always include the
> CP/EP/NEM/R citation and year of composition with everything that I quote
> from Peirce.
>
> ET:  Here's the quote from me that you used - you selected only a few
> phrases and left out the totality. Why did you do so?
>
>
> Again, I provided links to the original posts and only quoted the portions
> that I considered to be especially inappropriate.  Why fill up an
> e-mail with lengthy excerpts?
>
> ET:  I specifically have said that what I am against is when people don't
> provide us with how these theories can be applied to explain actual
> situations in the real world. That's a HUGE difference from your assertion
> that I am against theories or theorizing.
>
>
> First, where did I make any such assertion?  Specific examples, please.
>
> Second, I fail to see the allegedly "HUGE difference" here.  It sure
> sounds to me like a demand that any and all theorizing must include "how
> these theories can be applied to explain actual situations in the real
> world."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 3:15 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> JAS
>>
>> You are misinterpreting what I said and writing misleading comments about
>> it.
>>
>> I didn't say that I was against theory: What I said was that I was
>> against their isolation from the real world. You constantly ignore this
>> fact and present a false image of me.  Here's the quote from me that you
>> used - you selected only a few phrases and left out the totality. Why did
>> you do so?
>>
>> EDWINA" "As for diagrams and models - formulas and terms - I'm not
>> arguing against them. I'm asking - can they be applied to real situations
>> in the actual world - to explain this real world?
>>
>> As for asking others to provide examples - I've done so repeatedly, and
>> have found that most prefer the isolation and comfort of what I call 'the
>> seminar room' - ie, discussions around terms and models...far, far, far
>> from the real empirical objective world."
>>
>> 
>>
>> My comments above are very different from your statement that I am
>> against theories and theorizing;
>>
>> My comments do NOT say - as you rewrite them -  that I consider
>> that  theorizing is "an irrelevant exercise" undertaken only by people who
>> "prefer the isolation and comfort of what [she calls] 'the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Brief report on the pandemic from a Peircean triadic perspective by Fernando Zalamea

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



I used to wonder why it is that we must,

of *necessity*,

save CP 5.402 in the concept of *the* pragmatic maxim.



I now understand why.

To cantonise *is* natural.



This is *us*. This is our mode.

This is *sensus communis* for us, right now.



*But here, my friend, you must not expect that I should draw you up a
formal scheme of the passions, *

*or pretend to show you their genealogy and relation: how they are
interwoven with one another, *

*or interfere with our happiness and interest. *



*'Twould be out of the genius** and compass of such a letter as this,*

*to frame a just plan or model** by which you might, with an accurate view,
*

*observe what proportion the friendly and natural affections seem to bear
in this order of architecture.   *



With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 2:23 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> List,
> I do not think, that just at some point not talking about some aspect
> means to deliberately ignore it. Also, I do not think that general good
> should be put into competition with individual good. As a humanist I think
> that individual good should come first, and groups and group organisations,
> whether they are communities, societies, or institutions, should serve
> rather the individuals than their system´s self- reinforcement. If it is
> necessary to reinforce group systems to protect the individuals, these
> measures should be abolished again, when they are no longer necessary. I am
> glad, that I do not live in Sweden, where there effectively is no cash
> money anymore, or in China, where there is total control over smartphones,
> and one cannot pass from one place to another without a smartphone. I don´t
> have one, and don´t want to. Not to mention Hungary, which is a fully
> fledged dictatorship now. In Hamburg there is (besides closure of schools,
> cafes,..) not much control except that it is not allowed to gather in
> groups of more than two people who don´t live in a common household, and
> there are about 120 people newly infected each day, but about double as
> many recovering each day. I agree that capitalism is a very problematic
> concept, but not because it is based on firstness rather that thirdness,
> but because it is unjust.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  07. April 2020 um 18:06 Uhr
>  "Jerry LR Chandler" 
> wrote:
> Edwinia:
>
>
> On Apr 7, 2020, at 7:44 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
>  to 'capitalism' which is, after all, an economic system based around
> the individual freedom of private enterprise;
>
> By ignoring the concepts of fairness, equality, justice,
> brotherhood/sisterhood, freedom, opportunity, human weal and human health,
> you provide a truly deep and penetrating insight into who you are.
>
> Your remarkable consistency over the years is admirable.
>
> Cheers
>
> jerry
>
> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"
> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should
> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L"
> in the BODY of the message. More at
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Terry list,



The surprising fact, *climate change*, is observed;
But if ‘grandchildren will pay the price of our neglect’ were true..



*The world is not doing enough.*
*We have to learn from our procrastination.*
*We cannot afford to fail.*



It’s just the latest..
We *have* to..



Do reports like this one, do they have any impact?
Does public shaming actually work, is what I’m trying to ask.



What about for the general public?
How effective are reports like these in

*grabbing* people’s attention
and *changing* people’s behaviors?



I’m curious about the choice of language when trying to alert the public
about the *urgency* of this problem.


The use, for example, of the word ‘fail’..



“You are failing us.

The eyes of all future generations are upon you.
And when you *choose to fail us*, I say, ‘we will never forgive you!"



*Failure*.
Does the world need more language like that,

if we’re going to see the kind of rapid transformational action

that today’s report calls for?



https://www.npr.org/2019/11/26/783069685/u-n-report-says-world-is-not-doing-enough-when-it-comes-to-climate-change
<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.npr.org%2F2019%2F11%2F26%2F783069685%2Fu-n-report-says-world-is-not-doing-enough-when-it-comes-to-climate-change>



With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 4:53 PM Terry L Rankin 
wrote:

> Helmut, et al.,
>
>
>
> By casting “reasons” as a can of worms, I certainly didn’t intend to
> diminish their semiotic significance in the least! Does it constitute its
> own category of indexicality? If so, how does human causal agency (where I
> assume at least some ‘reasons’ originate) interweave semiotically with
> empirical causality?
>
>
>
> The (so-called) ‘climate change’ problem would be an especially
> interesting case to explore from the indexical perspective. IMHO, crucial
> distinctions between ‘climate change’ on one hand and ‘climate crisis’ on
> the other are all too easily obscured and lost precisely because of
> difficulties in grasping the semiotics of causality, especially with
> respect to human causal agency. Again … more to ponder, research, and
> study.
>
>
>
> Thanks!
>
> Terry
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien 
> *Sent:* Saturday, November 30, 2019 4:33 PM
> *To:* Terry L Rankin 
> *Cc:* Jerry Rhee ; Peirce List <
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?
>
>
>
> Thank you, Terry, List,
>
>
>
> you wrote, that regarding reasons for prerequisites (for the capacity to
> send and receive different kinds of signs) strikes you as opening another
> can of worms, regarding purposes etc. This can contents is exactly what I
> find interesting: reasons as different kinds of causality (efficient,
> final, volitional), and their emergences as system qualities, corresponding
> to inventions/emergences of nature, like matter/energy, life, neurons.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>
>
>
>
>
>  30. November 2019 um 18:43 Uhr
>  "Terry L Rankin" *wrote:*
>
>
>
> Thanks, Helmut!
>
>
>
> My question was more philosophical than scientific, I think. Perhaps “sign
> utterance and reception” as such roughly maps onto linguistics and
> communications, while the “capability of uttering and receiving signs”
> refers to the cognitive (semiotic) predispositions to utter and receive
> signs. Simple ‘send / receive’ seems more fitting than ‘utterance and
> reception’ perhaps – both humans and microwave towers possess inherent
> predispositions to send and receive signs (or signals), but the difference
> is categorical, I think: signal towers are neither sentient nor sapient but
> semiosic humans are both (in name at least).
>
>
>
> My initial response would be ‘yes’ to both questions: the (communications
> or linguistic) science of sending and receiving signs (or signals) would
> include or at least intersect with the (physical and cognitive) sciences
> concerning the (electronic or neurological) predispositions forming the
> capacity to do so – specifically as prerequisites for that capacity.
> “Reasons” for doing so strikes me as another can of worms entirely,
> regarding motives, intents, purposes, etc. for exercising that capability.
>
>
>
> RE: organisms as signs, or specifically “Man is a sign” -- don’t
> semioticians generally agree that signs may be primitive, compound,
> complex, more or less systematically or haphazardly arranged, sent,
> received, etc.? As sign systems, ordinary languages (all 7,000+ of them) as
> well as specialized languages (maths, programming, codes, etc.) appear to
> be clear examples where form and structure (syntax?) contain and carry
> (send / receive) meaning and 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Terry list,



I think you are giving your explanation for how one goes

from ‘the primary focus of biosemiotics and cybersemiotics’ to ‘Man is a
Sign’.



That is the thought we are in,

but I suppose there are other ways..



Hth,

Jerry R

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 11:43 AM Terry L Rankin 
wrote:

> Thanks, Helmut!
>
>
>
> My question was more philosophical than scientific, I think. Perhaps “sign
> utterance and reception” as such roughly maps onto linguistics and
> communications, while the “capability of uttering and receiving signs”
> refers to the cognitive (semiotic) predispositions to utter and receive
> signs. Simple ‘send / receive’ seems more fitting than ‘utterance and
> reception’ perhaps – both humans and microwave towers possess inherent
> predispositions to send and receive signs (or signals), but the difference
> is categorical, I think: signal towers are neither sentient nor sapient but
> semiosic humans are both (in name at least).
>
>
>
> My initial response would be ‘yes’ to both questions: the (communications
> or linguistic) science of sending and receiving signs (or signals) would
> include or at least intersect with the (physical and cognitive) sciences
> concerning the (electronic or neurological) predispositions forming the
> capacity to do so – specifically as prerequisites for that capacity.
> “Reasons” for doing so strikes me as another can of worms entirely,
> regarding motives, intents, purposes, etc. for exercising that capability.
>
>
>
> RE: organisms as signs, or specifically “Man is a sign” -- don’t
> semioticians generally agree that signs may be primitive, compound,
> complex, more or less systematically or haphazardly arranged, sent,
> received, etc.? As sign systems, ordinary languages (all 7,000+ of them) as
> well as specialized languages (maths, programming, codes, etc.) appear to
> be clear examples where form and structure (syntax?) contain and carry
> (send / receive) meaning and relevance, belief and truth (semantics?),
> usually (but not always) to serve some purpose (pragmatics?). Inasmuch as
> these all relate mainly if not entirely to *symbolic* semiotics, when the
> wider 1stness and 2ndness of iconicity and indexically fold into the
> semiotic fabric, then it seems quite plausible to view both living
> (organisms) and non-living things (everything else) as being (more or less)
> complex arrangements of (more or less) systematically interrelated signs of
> all three kinds. I take this to be the “perfusion of signs” often cited in
> what Sebeok calls Peirce’s “bedazzling sentence.”
>
>
>
> Closing note: a semiotic extension of the communications concept of
> ‘signal-to-noise ratio’ would seem to play an important role here – e.g.,
> wouldn’t superstring theory suggest that all things living and non-living
> alike exist or not based on the harmonious resonance, as it were, through
> which all things coalesce into wholes of their semiotic parts, all within a
> universally semiotic brane? Would those wholes dissipate, dissolve,
> disintegrate,  collapse, implode, or shatter as that resonance became
> dissonant due to noise levels in their semiotic structure (recall those
> cheesy “Is it live or is it Memorex?” commercials)? I realize I’m
> stretching a metaphor here, of course, but intuitively at least, this SNR
> idea seems to have an intriguing semiotic relevance. Perhaps it’s a case of
> the “much unfinished research still to do” …?
>
>
>
> Terry
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien 
> *Sent:* Saturday, November 30, 2019 11:33 AM
> *To:* Terry L Rankin 
> *Cc:* Jerry Rhee ; Peirce List <
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?
>
>
>
>
>
> Terry, All,
>
>
>
> I dont know. My question would be: Does the science about sign utterance
> and reception by organisms include the science about their capabilty of
> uttering and receiving signs, and the reasons and prerequisites for having
> and using this capability, or not?
>
> And: To just call organisms signs too, isnt that a quick shot? On the
> other hand: To dualize it in the way of Luhmann and Maturana and Varela, by
> saying that the communications are one system, the communicators another,
> both being structurally coupled, is this a shortcut too, explaining the
> problem (of the epistemic cut or whatever) away by introducing the term
> "structural coupling"?
>
> If the answer to both questions is "yes" (which I just suspect, but am not
> sure about), then I guess there is much unfinished research work still to
> do.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>
>
>
>  30. November 2019 um 02:21 Uhr
>  "Terry L Rankin" 
> *wr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Helmut list,



‘Man is a Sign.’



Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion
is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts
are in us.



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 3:32 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Hello List,
>
> I am having the idea that maybe semiotics is non-humanist. But what would
> be humanist? Examples:
>
> - Kant said, that humans do not have value, but dignity, and that you
> should not treat them merely as means, but always as aims too.
> - In Buddhism people (and other organisms) have an innate Buddha-nature.
> - In Judaeo-Christian-Islamic religions, and in Brahmanism people have an
> immortal soul. It is arguable however, whether religions are humanist or
> rather their antithesises are. Depends on interpretation, I guess, and
> whether one conceptualizes a benign or a wrathful God.
>
> In Semiotics it is all about signs, performance. In Capitalism it is about
> the value in the sense of performance people give for serving the rich
> ("human capital"). In Semiotics it is about the value/performance for the
> phaneron. The interpreting system is not denied, but mostly ignored. So I
> donot suspect,that semiotics is antihumanist, just nonhumanist, like just
> not talking about the interpreters, but only about the interpretants. I
> guess that is ok for some time, but at some point maybe it would be ok too
> to take the interpreting systems, like people and other organisms into
> account too, and combine semiotics with systems theories? What do you think?
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Unexplained phenomena (was Talking about...

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear John, list,



I’m not sure what you’re getting at here, for I see no assertion on your
part.

The question I have after reading your post is,



What (would you or Peirce say) makes a phenomenon valuable for science if
there are numerous unexplained facts that can be subject to exact analysis
but not enough time to examine them all?



That is, how do you go from a strange, isolated and unexplained fact useful
to science to “a very serious problem *requiring* respectful treatment”,
which renders it useful?



For I don’t see how *only* theories that can have any value for the
theorist are those from which can be deduced exact predictions capable of
exact verification (presuming there exist those who refuse to acknowledge
sensible limits, and there are those who do so exist).



Thanks,

Jerry R

On Sun, Jun 23, 2019 at 3:34 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> In CP 1.115, Peirce wrote: "At present, while the existence of
> telepathy cannot be said to be established, all scientific men
> are obliged by observed facts to admit that it presents at least
> a very serious problem requiring respectful treatment."
>
> > CP 6.159. I may be asked whether my theory would be favorable or
> > otherwise to telepathy. I have no decided answer to give to this.
> > At first sight, it seems unfavorable. Yet there may be other modes
> > of continuous connection between minds other than those of time
> > and space.
> >
> > CP 6.559. Belief in telepathy ought to be ranked as variation
> > of spiritualism.
> >
> > CP 7.598. Let me endeavor to explain the attitude of the physicist.
> > Many people imagine that there is a certain class of facts which it
> > is repugnant to the physicist to acknowledge. This is not so. If
> > there were such a class of facts, the phenomena connected with
> > radium would fall within it. Yet there has been no disposition to
> > ignore these phenomena. But the physicist recognizes that a phenomenon
> > is of no use to him unless both it and its conditions can be subjected
> > to exact analysis.  Moreover, the only theories that can have any value
> > for him are those from which can be deduced exact predictions capable
> > of exact verification. As long as a fact stands isolated and strange,
> > it is next to impossible to make sure that it is a fact, and quite
> > impossible to render it useful to science.
>
> As an example, I'll mention some unexplained phenomena about the
> composer, Percy Grainger.  He was born in Australia, but he lived
> in White Plains, NY, from 1921 until his death in 1961.  His house
> is now on the National Registry of Historical Places.
>
> I have some friends, musicians and composers, who are members of
> the Percy Grainger Society.  And I have attended some concerts
> and lectures at the Grainger House, which is about a dozen miles
> from my home.
>
> One of them was studying some of Grainger's manuscripts late in the
> evening.  He spread them out on the dining-room table, which was the
> same place where Percy would have written them.  And he had an uncanny
> feeling that Percy was looking over his shoulder.  It seemed that he
> was trying to give some friendly advice.
>
> A few years later, the PG Society installed motion-activated video
> cameras, at the front door, back door, and some of the rooms.  The
> cameras rarely showed any activity.  But on 2 July 2016, there were
> strange occurrences at 8:32 pm and 9:23 pm:
> https://percygraingeramerica.org/blog/4674266.
>
> Both occurred in the dining room -- streaks of light above the
> table where Percy wrote his MSS and where the musicians studied
> them many years after he died.  Unexplained phenomena:
>
>   1. Stray light, by itself, would not trigger the motion detectors
>  of the camera.  They could only be triggered by physical motion.
>
>   2. Light from the outside, even a laser beam, would shine on a wall
>  or the ceiling.  But these lights were bright streaks in the
>  middle of the room above the dining-room table.
>
>   3. The motion detectors that turned on the camera also turned on
>  some lights.  But the streaks of light were brighter than
>  anything in the room that reflected the camera lights.
>
>   4. The motion detectors of the cameras at the front and back doors
>  were not triggered and no other videos were made that evening.
>
>   5. The experts at the company that made the cameras could not
>  explain what turned on the camera or what caused the streaks
>  of light that were recorded by the camera.
>
> As Peirce wrote in CP 7.598, "As long as a fact stands isolated and
> strange, it is next to impossible to make sure that it is a fact,
> and quite impossible to render it useful to science."
>
> John
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Harmonizing and synthesizing

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear John, list,



You said:



That's a good point.  For some person A to take a set of assertions
from anywhere and revise them in some harmonious form is fine --
provided that A states that the result is A's own work.

But it's totally unjustified for any person A to take some assertions
by another person B, harmonize, revise, or paraphrase them in any way
-- and then claim that the result is anything that B intended.



It will be as Shakespeare said (*of it*, remember)



*“Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,*

*But musical as is Apollo’s lute,” etc..*



they could not misjudge or negate their work more seriously— something
higher should never demean itself by becoming the tool of something lower.



The pathos of distance should keep the work of the two groups forever
separate! Their right to exist, the privilege of a bell with a perfect ring
in comparison to one that is cracked and off key, is a thousand times
greater.



With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sat, May 25, 2019 at 8:23 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

> I received an offline comment about harmonizing, which raises
> some important issues.
>
> Offline
> > I wonder if JAS picked up the "harmonizing" idea from Robert Brandom.
> > I don't see any such reference in his paper, but Brandom's work is
> > widely referenced by Peirceans.  Although Brandom does not suggest
> > that we should be harmonizing Peirce's ideas, he does propose that
> > philosophy should demonstrate how to harmonize assertions.
>
> That's a good point.  For some person A to take a set of assertions
> from anywhere and revise them in some harmonious form is fine --
> provided that A states that the result is A's own work.
>
> But it's totally unjustified for any person A to take some assertions
> by another person B, harmonize, revise, or paraphrase them in any way
> -- and then claim that the result is anything that B intended.
>
> I've known people who would never talk to reporters because their
> comments had been hopelessly garbled by so-called summaries and
> paraphrases on previous occasions.
>
> John
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear John, list,



I have heard that we, the general public, have contempt for experts.



If by that, it is meant that we do not have high regard for arguments “that
take more than one step”, I tend to agree..



Well, more than three steps, in general;

for abstrusity tends to count against experts.



On the other hand, experts are not experts in all matters.

And especially on matters relating to things political.

For if there are such experts, then show them to me.



And this question of God is of the utmost political matter.



So then, do me a favor and extend to me your offer to JAS.

Show me what EGs can do on the matter of this question of God.



In what way is God the Sign or the Object, according to EGs?



In what way is the word “God,” so “capitalized” *the* definable proper
name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all
three Universes of Experience, according to EGs?



For I am of the persuasion that I count myself among the careless cavillers
who might say, “what, then, precisely, is your neglected argument?”



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 1:27 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina and Gary R,
>
> I endorse Edwina's caveats.  Her examples are among the "puffy clouds"
> that create ambiguities in any reasoning stated in ordinary language.
> After half a century of using and inventing symbolic logics, Peirce
> could keep the distinctions clear in his own mind, but any excerpt
> from his writings could easily be ambiguous when taken out of context.
>
> That's why formal logic is essential to clarify any reasoning that
> relates quotations from different MSS.
>
> GR
> > I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while insulting and
> > hubristic comments such as saying that if he refuses to accept your
> > "help" that he has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words" is, in my
> > opinion, below any serious scholar's dignity.
>
> When it comes to logic, I treat Jon as a student.  He's not happy
> when I say that, so I haven't said that recently.  Instead, I stated
> the most appropriate analogy for his style of reasoning:  "puffy
> clouds of words".   If that's considered insulting, I'll just give
> him a "gentleman's C".
>
> Ambiguities are the primary reason why words, by themselves, can
> be misleading.  Even in Peirce's technical vocabulary, there are
> ambiguities in the words 'subject' (grammatical or logical) and
> 'universe' (the universe of discourse on the sheet of assertion
> or one of the three modalities -- possible, actual, necessary).
>
> The sheet of assertion, as a piece of paper, is in the universe
> of actuality.  But the universe of discourse represented by the
> EGs on that paper is an abstraction in the universe of possibilities.
> No matter where God may be, any statement about God that is written
> on that paper exists in actuality, and its universe of discourse
> is in the universe of possibility.
>
> Those distinctions provide enough universe-like combinations to
> support any talk about God or anything else.  Another realm for
> God is both semeiotically unnecessary and anti=Peircean.
>
> I admit that Jon has done good work in studying Peirce and relating
> passages from various MSS.  But when he draws inferences that go
> beyond anything Peirce said, there is usually a good reason why
> Peirce did not make those inferences.  It's important to ask why.
>
> It's not acceptable to attribute any position to Peirce that
> he did not explicitly state -- for example, the assumption that
> anything could or even must exist outside his three universes.
>
> Since Gary questioned my qualifications to grade Jon's claims,
> I'll summarize a few points.  I spent 30 years in R & D at IBM,
> where I used math & logic for projects in AI, computational
> linguistics, and parsers and inference engines.  I published
> papers and books and taught courses at IBM and elsewhere.
>
> In 1987, for example, I taught a graduate course at Stanford in the
> Computer Science Dept., which also had many students in linguistics.
> The only prerequisite was "knowledge of first-order logic and natural
> language syntax".  For the course description and student evaluations:
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/su309a.pdf .  Note that my rating was higher
> than the average for the CS department in nearly all categories.
>
> For the first homework assignment, the students were supposed to
> translate 10 English sentences to first-order logic.  None of the
> sentences had any syntactic or semantic ambiguities.  There were
> about 30 students in the class, but only one student got all 10
> sentences correct.  He was a post-doc, who had just finished his
> PhD in linguistics and was just auditing the course.
>
> For more recent work, see the 73-page article on "Reasoning with
> diagrams and images", which was published in 2018 in the Journal
> of Applied Logics, vol. 5:5, pp. 987-1059 of
> http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00025.pdf
>
> Re helping Jon to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



I also have one other concern..



If EGs are a method of making our ideas clear,

then why do you not simply apply the method on this question about God?



What would that look like?  I sincerely would like to know.



Thanks,
Jerry R

On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:39 PM Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> JAS said:
>
> · Major premiss:  Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.
>
> · Minor premiss:  The entire Universe is a Sign.
>
> · Conclusion:  The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
> itself.
>
> I do then add, "And this we call God,"
>
>
>
> So then:
>
> · Major premiss:  Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.
>
> · Minor premiss:  I do then add, “And this we call God” is that Sign
>
> · Conclusion:  I determine that Object other than itself
>
> Major:  Object other than itself
>
> Minor:  I
>
> Middle:  Sign
>
>
>
> Is that right?
>
>
>
>
> https://www.npr.org/2019/05/15/723686017/new-tell-them-i-am-podcast-explores-lives-of-muslims-through-small-defining-mome
>
>
>
> REZA ASLAN: The voice quite famously says...
>
> EUCEPH: It says something really unexpected.
>
> ASLAN:  You can tell them that I am I am.
>
> EUCEPH:  It says Yahweh.
>
> ASLAN:  That's just a Hebrew word that means I am, I was, I will be.
>
> EUCEPH:  Yahweh is not a name.
>
> ASLAN:  The deity didn't say, tell them I am Yahweh.  That's not what he
> said.  He said, tell them I am.
>
> EUCEPH: So I read this passage of the Bible when I was 16. I remember
> reading it and just being so surprised and struck by that line and the fact
> that God, an entity that we're constantly trying to define and understand,
> refuses to be categorized. And it kind of gave me permission as a human
> being to also let go of labels and to transcend category. ..
>
>
> And as we started discussing the idea, we kind of came to the conclusion
> that it should actually be that whole phrase, tell them I am, because it
> embodies the struggle of being a person who is constantly being categorized
> and who is desperately trying to take control of their own narrative..
>
>
> With best wishes,
> Jerry R
>
> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:22 PM  wrote:
>
>> John, in your scenario of “seeing something on a roof,” it’s not clear
>> what your term “mark” refers to. If we assume that it refers to the first
>> sign class in the mark/token/type trichotomy, or a qualisign (as he called
>> it in 1903), your explanation makes no sense:
>>
>> If you see something on a roof, you might interpret as (1) a metallic
>> object; (2) a sculpture of a rooster standing on an arrow; (3) a weather
>> vane; (4) a sign of the direction of the wind...
>>
>> In (1), the mark is a sign of its own existence in a particular
>> location.  In (2), it is also a sign of itself with the additional
>> information about its shape.  In (3), it is a sign of itself with a
>> recognition of its purpose.  In (4), it is interpreted as all of the above
>> plus a recognition of the phenomena it was designed to show.
>>
>>
>>
>> For (1), you say that the mark is a sign of the existence of a metallic
>> object in a particular location. But it would take an index to perform that
>> semiotic function, and an index cannot be a mark (or tone). You *also*
>> say it’s a “sign of its own existence”, which can only mean that the mark
>> itself is a metallic object. But obviously the *image* you experience is
>> not a metallic object — I hope you don’t have a metallic object wither in
>> your eye or in your brain — but a *sign* of an *object other than* the
>> the sign. As for 2, 3 and 4, none of those could be interpretants of a
>> *mark*. If this is lesson #1 of semeiotic, it can’t be Peirce’s
>> semeiotic.
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: John F Sowa 
>> Sent: 16-May-19 09:46
>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/15/2019 4:59 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>>
>> > All I can say is to reiterate that this does not represent Peirce's
>>
>> > view: for him the rock /is/ the Object of the icon whatever
>>
>> > physio-psychologically is going on in the interpreter; it is, in a
>>
>> > word, a matter of logic not of psychology. To see it otherwise is, in
>>
>> > my view, a step in the direction of undermining his entire semeiotic.
>>
>>
>>
>> No.
>>
>>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



JAS said:

· Major premiss:  Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.

· Minor premiss:  The entire Universe is a Sign.

· Conclusion:  The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
itself.

I do then add, "And this we call God,"



So then:

· Major premiss:  Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.

· Minor premiss:  I do then add, “And this we call God” is that Sign

· Conclusion:  I determine that Object other than itself

Major:  Object other than itself

Minor:  I

Middle:  Sign



Is that right?



https://www.npr.org/2019/05/15/723686017/new-tell-them-i-am-podcast-explores-lives-of-muslims-through-small-defining-mome



REZA ASLAN: The voice quite famously says...

EUCEPH: It says something really unexpected.

ASLAN:  You can tell them that I am I am.

EUCEPH:  It says Yahweh.

ASLAN:  That's just a Hebrew word that means I am, I was, I will be.

EUCEPH:  Yahweh is not a name.

ASLAN:  The deity didn't say, tell them I am Yahweh.  That's not what he
said.  He said, tell them I am.

EUCEPH: So I read this passage of the Bible when I was 16. I remember
reading it and just being so surprised and struck by that line and the fact
that God, an entity that we're constantly trying to define and understand,
refuses to be categorized. And it kind of gave me permission as a human
being to also let go of labels and to transcend category. ..


And as we started discussing the idea, we kind of came to the conclusion
that it should actually be that whole phrase, tell them I am, because it
embodies the struggle of being a person who is constantly being categorized
and who is desperately trying to take control of their own narrative..


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:22 PM  wrote:

> John, in your scenario of “seeing something on a roof,” it’s not clear
> what your term “mark” refers to. If we assume that it refers to the first
> sign class in the mark/token/type trichotomy, or a qualisign (as he called
> it in 1903), your explanation makes no sense:
>
> If you see something on a roof, you might interpret as (1) a metallic
> object; (2) a sculpture of a rooster standing on an arrow; (3) a weather
> vane; (4) a sign of the direction of the wind...
>
> In (1), the mark is a sign of its own existence in a particular location.
> In (2), it is also a sign of itself with the additional information about
> its shape.  In (3), it is a sign of itself with a recognition of its
> purpose.  In (4), it is interpreted as all of the above plus a recognition
> of the phenomena it was designed to show.
>
>
>
> For (1), you say that the mark is a sign of the existence of a metallic
> object in a particular location. But it would take an index to perform that
> semiotic function, and an index cannot be a mark (or tone). You *also*
> say it’s a “sign of its own existence”, which can only mean that the mark
> itself is a metallic object. But obviously the *image* you experience is
> not a metallic object — I hope you don’t have a metallic object wither in
> your eye or in your brain — but a *sign* of an *object other than* the
> the sign. As for 2, 3 and 4, none of those could be interpretants of a
> *mark*. If this is lesson #1 of semeiotic, it can’t be Peirce’s semeiotic.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa 
> Sent: 16-May-19 09:46
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited
>
>
>
> On 5/15/2019 4:59 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> > All I can say is to reiterate that this does not represent Peirce's
>
> > view: for him the rock /is/ the Object of the icon whatever
>
> > physio-psychologically is going on in the interpreter; it is, in a
>
> > word, a matter of logic not of psychology. To see it otherwise is, in
>
> > my view, a step in the direction of undermining his entire semeiotic.
>
>
>
> No.
>
>
>
> CSP
>
> > What is a sign? It is anything which in any way represents an object.
>
> > (R 599, 1902)
>
>
>
> Yes.  But any mark (or tone) may be interpreted in many different ways as
> a token of many different types.  If you see something on a roof, you might
> interpret as (1) a metallic object; (2) a sculpture of a rooster standing
> on an arrow; (3) a weather vane; (4) a sign of the direction of the wind...
>
>
>
> In (1), the mark is a sign of its own existence in a particular location.
> In (2), it is also a sign of itself with the additional information about
> its shape.  In (3), it is a sign of itself with a recognition of its
> purpose.  In (4), it is interpreted as all of the above plus a recognition
> of the phenomena it was designed to show.
>
>
>
> This is lesson #1 of semeiotic.  It's the foundation for everything else.
> R 599 does not say or imply that the thing that produces the mark is
> distinct from the object of the token, as it is interpreted.
>
> In fact, the overwhelming majority of the marks that we interpret every
> instant of our lives represent 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Symbols and Syntax (was Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Ha!  If that is the case,



If indeed, it is



*impossible* for Peirce to be incorrect or even incomplete in this context;
he was referring to a *logical relation* that is *irreducibly triadic*--one
that *always* has *exactly three *correlates.



and



A P-giver stands in the relation of P-giving, of a P-gift, to a
P-recipient.



and



I cannot explain the deep emotion with which I open this book again. Here I
write but never after read what I have written for what I write is done in
the process of forming a conception. Yet I cannot forget that here are
the *germs
of the theory of the categories which is (if anything is) the gift I make
to the world*.

That is my child. In it I shall live when oblivion has me—my body.



then we must come down to the particular; each in his turn, to the
habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the
obscure things there.



So then, if you wish not to promote empty thoughts and empty thoughts only,
then



What *P* is?



*What is it*, that gave Peirce such conviction that in future years I am
confident that you will recur to these thoughts and find that you have more
to thank me for than you could understand at first?



And if you don not understand this,

have you truly seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good?



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 1:44 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Dan, List:
>
> No, we are *not* talking about the same thing.  It was *impossible* for
> Peirce to be incorrect or even incomplete in this context; he was referring
> to a *logical relation* that is *irreducibly triadic*--one that *always*
> has *exactly three* correlates.
>
> If it helps, we can call it "P-giving" to distinguish it from the English
> word "giving."  A P-giver stands in the relation of P-giving, of a P-gift,
> to a P-recipient.  Whether or how well this maps to the *actual* usage of
> the verb "giving" by competent English-speakers, let alone the closest
> equivalents in other languages, is completely irrelevant.
>
> That said, since you claim that Peirce got the logic of giving wrong, do
> you likewise hold that he got the logic of representing/mediating
> wrong--i.e., the irreducibly triadic relation between a Sign, its Object,
> and its Interpretant?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019, 12:36 PM Daniel L Everett 
> wrote:
>
>> Actually “incomplete” is a better description than incorrect.
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On Apr 22, 2019, at 13:15, Dan Everett  wrote:
>>
>> Jon,
>>
>> No, we are talking about the same thing: a relationship that he
>> considered logical, but in fact not. This has nothing to do with the
>> English verb per se, but with the logical structure of any act of giving
>> that includes three surface arguments. The point is that Peirce got the
>> *logic* of giving wrong -  for any language.
>>
>> Dan
>>
>> Sent from my iPad
>>
>> On Apr 22, 2019, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Dan, Jeff, List:
>>
>> DE:  I am saying simply that in some cases of lexical analysis modern
>> mathematical logic has tools at its disposal that enable analyses
>> empirically superior to the the common picture of the valency of some verbs.
>>
>>
>> Again, we are talking about two different things.  When Peirce repeatedly
>> characterized *giving *as irreducibly triadic, he was not referring to
>> the *English verb*, but rather a specific *logical relation*--which is
>> more fundamental than, and thus independent of, its *expression *in any
>> particular language or other Sign System.  In an Existential Graph, no
>> matter what symbol we use to label the Spot for that relation, it will
>> always have *exactly three* Pegs.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 3:11 AM Dan Everett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jeff,
>>>
>>> Let's not read too much into what I said. I am not claiming that triadic
>>> relations are reduceable (at least not in all cases) to dyadic relations.
>>> Not at all in fact. Nor am I urging the thesis that Quine, Church, Turing,
>>> etc. are superior in any way to Peirce.
>>>
>>> I am saying simply that in some cases of lexical analysis modern
>>> mathematical logic has tools at its disposal that enable analyses
>>> empirically superior to the the common picture of the valency of some
>>> verbs,. Having said that, it may simply be that Peirce's comments on 'give'
>>> hold at the level of transitivity, though perhaps not at the level of
>>> valency. I am still thinking about that possibilty.
>>>
>>> Peirce may have made mistakes in many places. This should not bother
>>> anyone, though, so long as the mistakes are not at a level that threaten
>>> his overall program. I certainly do not believe that any improvements in
>>> modern logic and math threaten Peirce's program.
>>>
>>> Church 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols

[Jerry Rhee]

oh, I almost forgot this relevant part:

and in future years I am confident that you will recur to these thoughts
and find that *you have more to thank me for than you could understand at
first*.

Best,
J

On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 9:35 PM Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Stephen, list,
>
> A certain maxim of Logic which I have called Pragmatism has recommended
> itself to me for divers reasons and on sundry considerations. Having taken
> it as my guide in most of my thought, I find that as the years of my
> knowledge of it lengthen, my sense of the importance of it presses upon me
> more and more. If it is only true, it is certainly a wonderfully efficient
> instrument. It is not to philosophy only that it is applicable. I have
> found it of signal service in every branch of science that I have studied.
> My want of skill in practical affairs does not prevent me from perceiving
> the advantage of being well imbued with pragmatism in the conduct of life.
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 8:07 PM Stephen Curtiss Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> I understand the omni aspect of Peirce's sense of semiotics - but it
>> really needs to be made the basis of global pedagogy with some
>> interpretation of how it all fits together that ordinary folk can
>> understand.
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 7:39 PM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Stephen, list
>>>
>>> Peirce used the terms 'genuine' and 'degenerate' to refer to what we
>>> might define as 'pure' and 'mixed' categories.
>>>
>>> I don't think that he confined his semiosis to human beings. I think
>>> that his semiosis was an action of Mind - and Mind, as he wrote is not
>>> confined to human beings.
>>>
>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" 4.551.
>>>
>>> Is intentionality agapistic? I'd say ' yes'.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue 16/04/19 7:25 PM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com sent:
>>>
>>> Good to see intentionality and thirdness.  Is genuineness his term?
>>>
>>> I would like to assume that Peirce built a philosophy whose end is
>>> indeed intention and that the primary intenders are human beings. Is there
>>> any instance where Peirce suggests this?  If so is the intention agapaic?
>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 3:50 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>>>
>>>> Folks,
>>>>
>>>> The clearest test for a genuine Thirdness is the presence of some
>>>> intentionality -- of some animate being or of some law of nature.
>>>> I like the examples Peirce cited in CP 1.366 below.
>>>>
>>>> General principle:  Intentionality by some animate agent is always
>>>> a genuine Thirdness.  That agent may be as simple as a bacterium
>>>> swimming upstream in a glucose gradient.  In CP 1.366, Peirce says
>>>> that a law of nature is "intelligence objectified" -- that makes it
>>>> the equivalent of an intention.
>>>>
>>>> If you do a global search of CP, you'll get about 148 instances of
>>>> "intention" or some word that includes it as part.  Representation
>>>> is a special case of intentionality.  In many of the examples, the
>>>> intentionality is clear, but representation is less obvious.
>>>>
>>>> John
>>>>
>>>> _
>>>>
>>>> CP 1.366. Among thirds, there are two degrees of degeneracy.  The first
>>>> is where there is in the fact itself no Thirdness or mediation, but
>>>> where there is true duality; the second degree is where there is not
>>>> even true Secondness in the fact itself.  Consider, first, the thirds
>>>> degenerate in the first degree. A pin fastens two things together by
>>>> sticking through one and also through the other: either might be
>>>> annihilated, and the pin would continue to stick through the one which
>>>> remained. A mixture brings its ingredients together by containing each.
>>>> We may term these accidental thirds. "How did I slay thy son?" asked
>>>> the
>>>> merchant, and the jinnee replied, "When thou threwest away the
>>>> date-stone, it smote my son, who was passing at the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Stephen, list,

A certain maxim of Logic which I have called Pragmatism has recommended
itself to me for divers reasons and on sundry considerations. Having taken
it as my guide in most of my thought, I find that as the years of my
knowledge of it lengthen, my sense of the importance of it presses upon me
more and more. If it is only true, it is certainly a wonderfully efficient
instrument. It is not to philosophy only that it is applicable. I have
found it of signal service in every branch of science that I have studied.
My want of skill in practical affairs does not prevent me from perceiving
the advantage of being well imbued with pragmatism in the conduct of life.

Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 8:07 PM Stephen Curtiss Rose 
wrote:

> I understand the omni aspect of Peirce's sense of semiotics - but it
> really needs to be made the basis of global pedagogy with some
> interpretation of how it all fits together that ordinary folk can
> understand.
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 7:39 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Stephen, list
>>
>> Peirce used the terms 'genuine' and 'degenerate' to refer to what we
>> might define as 'pure' and 'mixed' categories.
>>
>> I don't think that he confined his semiosis to human beings. I think that
>> his semiosis was an action of Mind - and Mind, as he wrote is not confined
>> to human beings.
>>
>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" 4.551.
>>
>> Is intentionality agapistic? I'd say ' yes'.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 16/04/19 7:25 PM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Good to see intentionality and thirdness.  Is genuineness his term?
>>
>> I would like to assume that Peirce built a philosophy whose end is indeed
>> intention and that the primary intenders are human beings. Is there any
>> instance where Peirce suggests this?  If so is the intention agapaic?
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 3:50 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>>
>>> Folks,
>>>
>>> The clearest test for a genuine Thirdness is the presence of some
>>> intentionality -- of some animate being or of some law of nature.
>>> I like the examples Peirce cited in CP 1.366 below.
>>>
>>> General principle:  Intentionality by some animate agent is always
>>> a genuine Thirdness.  That agent may be as simple as a bacterium
>>> swimming upstream in a glucose gradient.  In CP 1.366, Peirce says
>>> that a law of nature is "intelligence objectified" -- that makes it
>>> the equivalent of an intention.
>>>
>>> If you do a global search of CP, you'll get about 148 instances of
>>> "intention" or some word that includes it as part.  Representation
>>> is a special case of intentionality.  In many of the examples, the
>>> intentionality is clear, but representation is less obvious.
>>>
>>> John
>>> _
>>>
>>> CP 1.366. Among thirds, there are two degrees of degeneracy.  The first
>>> is where there is in the fact itself no Thirdness or mediation, but
>>> where there is true duality; the second degree is where there is not
>>> even true Secondness in the fact itself.  Consider, first, the thirds
>>> degenerate in the first degree. A pin fastens two things together by
>>> sticking through one and also through the other: either might be
>>> annihilated, and the pin would continue to stick through the one which
>>> remained. A mixture brings its ingredients together by containing each.
>>> We may term these accidental thirds. "How did I slay thy son?" asked the
>>> merchant, and the jinnee replied, "When thou threwest away the
>>> date-stone, it smote my son, who was passing at the time, on the breast,
>>> and he died forthright." Here there were two independent facts, first
>>> that the merchant threw away the date-stone, and second that the
>>> date-stone struck and killed the jinnee's son. Had it been aimed at him,
>>> the case would have been different; for then there would have been a
>>> relation of aiming which would have connected together the aimer, the
>>> thing aimed, and the object aimed at, in one fact. What monstrous
>>> injustice and inhumanity on the part of that jinnee to hold that poor
>>> merchant responsible for such an accident! I remember how I wept at it,
>>> as I lay in my father's arms and he first told me the story. It is
>>> certainly just that a man, even though he had no evil intention, should
>>> be held responsible for the immediate effects of his actions; but not
>>> for such as might result from them in a sporadic case here and there,
>>> but only for such as might have been guarded against by a reasonable
>>> rule of prudence. Nature herself often supplies the place of the
>>> intention of a rational agent in making a Thirdness genuine and not
>>> merely accidental; as when a spark, as third, falling into a barrel of
>>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



It is said that the Sense of Beauty never furthered the Performance of a
single Act of Duty.

But said by those who, without pretending to understand what they term the
“German Philosophy,” yet presume to censure it.

I fear I may fall under this reproach in the present instance.



And if “Beauty is in the highest degree fruitful with respect to knowledge
and morality,”

The first thing to be done is to define beauty.



It can relate to our will, and be considered as an object of choice for a
rational being;

that is its *moral* quality.



Or finally, it can relate to the entirety of our different powers, without
being a definite object for any single one of them; that is its *aesthetic*
quality.



How vain, how absurd would it be for man, either to oppose or to neglect
the commands that were laid upon him by Infinite Wisdom, and Infinite
Power.  How unnatural, how impiously ungrateful not to reverence the
precepts that were prescribed to him by the infinite goodness of his
Creator, even though no punishment was to follow their violation.



The sense of propriety too is here well supported by the strongest motives
of self-interest.

The idea that, however we may escape the observation of man, or be placed
above the reach of human punishment, yet we are always acting under the
eye, and exposed to the punishment of God, the great avenger of injustice,
is a motive capable of restraining the most headstrong passions, with those
at least who, by constant reflection, have rendered it familiar to them.



It is in this manner that religion enforces the natural sense of duty: and
hence it is, that mankind are generally disposed to place great confidence
in the probity of those who seem deeply impressed with religious
sentiments.



Such persons, they imagine, act under an additional tie, besides those
which regulate the conduct of other men. The regard to the propriety of
action, as well as to reputation, the regard to the applause of his own
breast, as well as to that of others, are motives which they suppose have
the same influence over the religious man, as over the man of the world.



But finally, independent of all this, and without having regard in our
judgement either to any law or any design, he may please us, in pure
contemplation, through his empirical expression.



And since experience affords unanswerable arguments both for the moral
utility and moral evil of a cultivated taste; there seems, then, to be a
false beauty which sometimes misleads experience.



We must seek then a pure idea of beauty, by which we can test experience.



Such an idea of beauty, if it exists, is to be inferred from what our
nature renders possible, and beauty will discover itself to be a necessary
condition of humanity.



It will be necessary, then, in the first place, to develop the purely* a
priori idea of humanity.*



So then, what are its results with respect to morality?



Again, it is possible for men to ‘have knowledge’ in yet another way
besides those just discussed;

for even in the state of having knowledge without exercising it we can
observe a distinction:

a man may in a sense both have it and not have it;

for instance, when he is asleep, or mad, or drunk.



It is clear therefore that we must pronounce the unrestrained to ‘have
knowledge’ only in the same way as men who are asleep or mad or drunk.



Sleep, like beauty, puts us in a state of ability to do our duty,

but it does not further the performance of it.

Sleep is unlike beauty, inasmuch as the latter is an active and the former
a passive state.



I suppose this is what can be meant by ‘having a contrary opinion regards
immediate object’.

For, how, if he declares himself as *rational man*, does he rejects the *a
priori* idea of humanity given by the philosopher, unless asleep?



That is, if the good man has a good soul..

And the philosopher is both artist and lawgiver.



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sun, Apr 7, 2019 at 4:49 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary F, Jon S, List,
>
>
> GF:  The iconicity of EGs avoids such verbal inconsistency by minimizing
> the use of words; but the system only works as a representation of Thought
> if we recognize *the absence of lines* as a *mode of connection*. The
> system appears to involve *invisible icons*!
>
>
> Instead of describing the relations under consideration in terms of what
> is *invisible*, I would stress Peirce's point, made several times in
> NDDR, to the effect that the representation of every logical relation
> implies something about some type of inverse of the relation. Without
> getting into the details of the matter, allow me to gesture in the
> direction of the broader ideas that are in play.
>
>
> In saying that a relation of agent and patient holds between relate and
> correlate that stand as dynamical dyads, it follows that the relation is
> not merely one of dyadic reference, and that is not a mere referential
> relation, and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dan, list,



Thank you for underscoring method.



With regard to method (light of the pragmatic maxim), Peirce gave us
different statements of the maxim,

even saying of one that it is in the form of a philosophical theorem and
that he has succeeded no better than that.



I also recall some other philosopher saying that there would be need of
*habituation* to see the things higher up,

so as to distinguish such from appearances.

And this is necessary because the transition for us would be rough.



Given this, then, to which statement were you referring when you said:



I simply mean to underscore method.

Not who might be correct on the terminology.

I always learn from these discussions.



For I see method here being applied but if we were to judge them by their
fruits, as members say we do,

then the fruits have so far, been rotten.

Moreover, when you call for underscoring of method, I interpret that as
saying,

‘let us consciously adopt the method’.



If, on the other hand, you say that any one of his different statements of
his ‘maxim of logic’ will serve just as well as any other,

then that surely would affirm Peirce as a perfect ignoramus when it comes
to esthetics.

And of course he is, for does he not say so?  Several times over, even?



With best wishes,
Jerry R



In order to be admitted to better philosophical standing

I have endeavored to put pragmatism as I understand it into the same form
of a philosophical theorem.

I have not succeeded any better than this:

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 2:38 AM Daniel L Everett 
wrote:

> Jon
>
> I simply mean to underscore method.
>
> Not who might be correct on the terminology.
>
> I always learn from these discussions.
>
> Thanks
>
> Dan
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Apr 1, 2019, at 21:44, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Dan, List:
>
> Where has anyone on the List engaged in "ad hominem arguments (based on a
> person's worth or unworth in a given subject)"?
>
> Our terminological disputes typically pertain to *Peirce's *usage, so the
> "experiment" by which they can be resolved is careful examination of the
> "data," which consists of the relevant texts in his writings.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 7:42 PM Dan Everett 
> wrote:
>
>> I agree with Edwina on ad hominem arguments (based on a person’s worth or
>> unworth in a given subject). But as I have said before here, one must be
>> able to distinguish interpretations based on their practical results. All
>> terms have to be interpreted in light of the pragmatic maxim. Straying away
>> from that moves into Popperian concerns about essentialism, which is
>> usually pointless.
>>
>> A terminological dispute that cannot be resolved via an experiment or via
>> some other form of data  is of lesser importance.
>>
>> Dan
>>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



haha!



Though I am certain it is not our intention, I don’t think it is possible
to subvert the goal of spreading his method any better than to go on doing
what we are doing.



Perhaps our goal is not to win/come to consensus, but to push a tie
forever..



Dan suggests a useful way (guiding light) forward.. but why isn’t even
*that* working?



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 7:42 PM Dan Everett  wrote:

> I agree with Edwina on ad hominem arguments (based on a person’s worth or
> unworth in a given subject). But as I have said before here, one must be
> able to distinguish interpretations based on their practical results. All
> terms have to be interpreted in light of the pragmatic maxim. Straying away
> from that moves into Popperian concerns about essentialism, which is
> usually pointless.
>
> A terminological dispute that cannot be resolved via an experiment or via
> some other form of data  is of lesser importance.
>
> Dan
>
> On Apr 1, 2019, at 8:37 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> JAS - with regard to your post - who do you think should be the
> authorities who decide on, as you say, what is 'an accurate understanding
> of Peirce's work'??? Is there some kind of - oh, upper level hierarchy of
> Peircean scholars, who are set up [how? by whom?]  to decide on what is
> 'such an accurate understanding"??? What happens if these elites decide
> that your research 'does not show an accurate understanding'? Is it deemed
> - 'unPeircean'?
>
> As for newcomers to Peirce's work, don't you think that they should be
> allowed to read and interpret Peirce's work on their own - rather than
> being told to accept The Right Way To Think About Peirce by this set of
> assumed Peircean authorities?
>
> And as for disagreement - as I've always said - I'm fine with that. That's
> the whole point of a list where we are all equal explorers. However, being
> told that one's views are 'unPeircean' is not disagreement. It is the
> setting up of one person as the Ultimate Authority/Gatekeeper - and the
> other person is defined as an ignoramus.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon 01/04/19 7:43 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  ... IF this particular Peirce list itself has no interest in
> examining how Peirce's work can be used in the pragmatic 'real' world -
> then, why am I even bothering to wish such a thing?
>
>
> The antecedent of this conditional is false.  Plenty of List participants
> have expressed their desire to foster such applications, and I have
> actually done so myself within my profession of structural engineering; but
> the starting point must be an accurate understanding of Peirce's work.
>
> ET:  I don't like to see Peirce 'publicized' so to speak, via an important
> list - as functioning only in that one area that this small group are
> focused on.  Peircean semiosis is much more than this - and I don't think
> we should accept such a reduction.
>
>
> What is posted on-List is whatever List members freely choose to post.
> Those of us with strong interest in Peirce's philosophical views just
> happen to be the ones who post the most these days; and we should not be
> deterred from continuing to have such discussions, either.  There is
> plenty of room on the List for all kinds of topics, as long as they pertain
> in some way to Peirce's thought--which is not much of a limitation, given
> the breadth of his competence.
>
> ET:  Furthermore - newcomers to Peirce should, I think, be made aware of
> the pragmatic functionality of the Peircean analytic frame - as I have
> outlined - and how it can be extended, as Peirce himself did, into
> examining the real existential world.
>
>
> Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of Peirce's own analytic
> frame, including his typically very precise terminology.  Then they will
> be in a position to compare it with various adjustments and alternatives,
> such as what you have outlined.
>
> ET:  So- just because I am met with either silence or hostility by a few
> ...
>
>
> Disagreement is not hostility.  This is an open forum, where anyone is
> welcome to state any opinion related to Peirce--as long as they do so
> respectfully, and are willing and able to back it up with evidence.  For
> example, I have repeatedly expressed and defended my opinion that some of
> what you characterize as "the Peircean analytic frame" is inconsistent with
> Peirce's own texts.  I stand by that opinion, which is not an insult--after
> all, I have acknowledged that some of  my own current views about
> Speculative Grammar are not identical to Peirce's.
>
> I have every right to compare what anyone else writes with what Peirce
> wrote, and then to point out what I see as obvious discrepancies--and
> others have every right to do the same with what I write.  In fact, I see
> that as a major purpose of the List--enabling participants to compare
> notes, and hopefully help each other come to a better understanding of
> 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Edwina, list,



You said:

“My point is only that there is a lot of work being done now in the actual
world, examining complex information dynamics -

and Peirce's framework, to me, is perfect as an analytic tool for that
purpose.



*I just wish* we could expand the knowledge of this framework –

and *see *how very pragmatic and enlightening it could be.”



To which I would add, we seem to be getting along just fine without it.



And given the constant snipping back and forth that goes on in this list

(for instance, on even what a ‘subject’ is;

I mean, who doesn’t know the difference between subject and predicate?),

why would you recommend something to the community-at-large

a something that you can’t even justify to a list who claims to embrace
Peirce?



That is, when you haven’t been able to persuade a group who say

‘we honor that which you claim is not being used enough’ to take right
action,

why would an outside community ever think they could find any use for it,
whatsoever?



It all seems crazy from my point of view..



With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 1:11 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Thanks for your comments.
>
> I don't see how anyone could try to say that I am stretching Peirce's
> words, for after all, his framework has to be an analytic structure to DO
> something! It doesn't make any sense to set up, for example, that semiosic
> triad - with its full six nodes - without using it to explain the world.
> And - he does indeed explain it in one such example - his ten classes. The
> same with the categories and their complex natures - they are set up to
> examine and explain the world.
>
> My point is only that there is a lot of work being done now in the actual
> world, examining complex information dynamics - and Peirce's framework, to
> me, is perfect as an analytic tool for that purpose.
>
> I just wish we could expand the knowledge of this framework - and see how
> very pragmatic and enlightening it could be.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Mon 01/04/19 1:38 PM , Dan Everett danleveret...@gmail.com sent:
>
> This seems very exciting to me, Edwina. It fits exactly my own view of
> Peirce as coming up with ideas for empirical purposes. Even if someone were
> to think that you were stretching Peirce’s words (I don’t), it wouldn’t
> change the usefulness of what you are doing, I suspect.
>
> Thanks for sharing this stuff.
>
> Dan
>
> On Apr 1, 2019, at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> List:
>
> I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean semiosis;
> that is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to examine the
> dynamic operations within the organic chemical, the biological, the
> societal [economic systems, population behaviour] - and the cognitive
> [which includes AI].
>
> Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes the
> self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of knowledge
> development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and behaviour,
> anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on.
>
> Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us to
> examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic
> informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad is
> further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end up with
> six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more information
> transformation at each nodal site.
>
> In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness,
> Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of
> data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of these
> three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms: So- we have
> 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note that Thirdness,
> the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to carry out this action:
> iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a powerful tool.
>
> Then, there are the ten basic classes of Signs - [2:254] - which explain
> the triads from the simple ''feeling' to the complex cognitive.  Put this
> all together and I maintain that Peirce has provided a powerful analytic
> framework for examining the dynamics - and it IS a dynamical operation - of
> information generation, adaptation, evolution and storage. These can, I
> suggest, be moved into the broader scientific world - and would be, I
> think, of great benefit.
>
> I'd like to refer to two articles as examples of how this Peircean
> framework could be put to use. I provide examples from  two reputable
> journals: Biosystems and Entropy. I note that neither deal
> with self-published works; the articles must go through a peer-review and
> revision process.
>
> The first article, from Biosystems, refers to the analogy between the
> biological realm and the work being done in AI.The focus is on
> 'Anticipation' - which is an ability generated by the mode of Thirdness.
> Understanding this mode and that there are THREE 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [ontolog-forum] Identity vs, Spa-Tem Location

[Jerry Rhee]

John, list,



You said:

‘Any ontology that is not designed for some purpose or intention has no
purpose.’



I must then ask:



Why do you say,

‘The conclusion that a Seme could be a subject is not just false, it is
horribly false.

It contradicts and undermines Peirce's entire system of semeiotic.’



That is, how is ‘Seme as not-subject’ related to Peirce’s purpose or
intention, if at all?



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sat, Mar 30, 2019 at 2:10 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Pat C, Matthew, Phil M, and Jon A,
>
> Basic issue:  How do we determine whether two things that we
> experience on different occasions (or that we describe in
> different ways) are "the same"?
>
> For example, suppose we describe something as a vase, and somebody
> else describes it as a lump of clay.  Are they referring to the
> "same thing"?
>
> Or suppose we meet John Doe on one occasion and his "identical" twin
> Jimmy Doe at a later date.  Even if Jimmy tells us that he's not
> "the same" as John, we can't observe the earlier stages.  His words
> are our basis for talking, reasoning, or acting about the difference.
> Even if we get more records or testimony from independent sources,
> they are just words or photos.  We can't observe the continuity.
>
> And Pat raises an even more complex example:
>
> PC
> > one can refer to  a “quantity of a substance” as a “PhysicalObject”
> > (mass, location, composition).  In the (very common) case where one
> > has a quantity of some mixture of substances (a 14-K gold ring, e.g.)
> > there is a quantity of “gold” and a quantity of “copper”.  There is
> > no reason I can think of not to be able to refer to the gold in
> > that ring as an object separate from the copper – that is logically
> > coherent.  As long as the ring exists, those two quantities of
> > substance will have the same spatio-temporal location.
>
> You can only answer this question with a question:  Why do you ask?
>
> As a somewhat simpler case, suppose you go to IKEA and buy a box of
> parts for a table.  Those parts were spatially very close from the
> moment they were packed in Sweden, shipped to the store, brought
> to your garage, and taken out of the box.  For a while, they were
> separated by a short distance, mixed with yourself and some tools,
> and finally assembled as a table.  What are the identity conditions
> for that "thing"?
>
> MW
> > if you find two objects with the same spatio-temporal extent, then
> > they are the same thing. Essentially that means that if (and only if)
> > they occupy the same space over the whole of their life, they are the
> > same thing.
>
> But what do you mean by "the whole of their life"?  Are the parts in
> the box a different "thing" or are they part of the life of the table?
>
> PM
> > the 4-D model for objects seems at odds with how humans actually
> > experience and understand the things, beings, and processes around
> > them, regardless of changes in state and changes in characteristics
> > over the course of their existence.
>
> Yes.  Although I have a strong sympathy for the 4D view, it isn't
> sufficient by itself.  Intentions are critical to explain our ways of
> talking, thinking, and acting.  You might say that the table wasn't
> "born" as a table until the parts were assembled in your garage.  But
> then you might discover that getting the table from the garage to your
> basement, up a flight of stairs to the kitchen, and then to the dining
> room was a challenge.
>
> At that point, you wouldn't disassemble the whole table.  You could
> just remove the four legs, ask a friend to help, carry the table top
> to the dining room, go back for the legs, and attach them where you
> want the table.
>
> While the legs were in the garage and the top was being moved,
> the parts were separated by a greater distance than they had been
> since they were packed in the box in Sweden.  How can we describe
> the various stages of the table (or the vase or the gold ring) in
> a systematic way that is faithful to the way we talk and the way
> we translate our talk to some version of logic?
>
> PC
> > Does the notion of “identity” as implying “identical spatio-temporal
> > location” require that we do the impossible, of tracing an object
> > back to the origin of the universe?  How does one preserve that
> > notion of identity and deal with the problem of co-location, within
> > some meaningful and accessible time interval?
>
> The 4D definition requires a "God's eye" view of the universe.  You
> could say, along with Heraclitus and my namesake John the Evangelist,
> "In the beginning was the Logos, all things (panta) that came to be
> (gignomai) came to be through (dia) or according to (kata) that Logos."
>
> St. John added "the Logos is God".  Spinoza was more faithful to
> Heraclitus by identifying God and Nature (i.e., pantheism).  But that
> answer got him in trouble at the local synagogue.
>
> But whether you prefer theism, pantheism, or atheism, you can talk
> about a system 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic (was Ambiguities...

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Given that:



Nothing is complete (teleion) which has no end (telos);

and the end is a limit.



And the final and definitive concept cannot stand at the beginning of the
investigation, but must come at the end.

We must, in other words, work out in the course of the discussion, as its
most important result, the best conceptual formulation of what we here
understand by completeness that is the best from the point of view which
interests us here,



Then it is impossible that Peirce completed anything at all, for the end
comes at the end.

We are not at the end.



On the other hand, it is also said that if Einstein had lived in the
twelfth century, he would have had very little chance to become a good
scientist.



I suppose this all makes it impossible for us to think that Peirce did not
know how to step away from a problem when it was deemed adequate.

Otherwise, he would have left us with a better conception of what Complete
Sign or Absolute Horizon is.

I mean, did he not claim to be a perfect ignoramus in esthetics?



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:08 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Stephen R., List:
>
> I agree with you in the sense that nothing Peirce authored--whether
> published or (especially) in handwritten manuscripts--is properly
> characterized as "complete."
>
> The Harvard website for the Peirce Papers has a link to an interesting
> 1997 book chapter by Mary Keeler and Christian Kloesel, "Communication,
> Semiotic Continuity, and the Margins of the Peircean Text" (
> http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/keelermargins1997.pdf).
> They go so far as to say that for Peirce, "the usual distinction between
> draft versions of a paper and the final version (if there is one) is all
> but useless ... he would not have called a single one of his writings
> 'finished,' 'definitive,' or 'final.'"  That is obviously problematic for
> anyone like me who has a strong "regularizing" tendency, as Gary F. has
> helpfully (and accurately) described it.
>
> They also include a quote from Peirce's Carnegie Institution application
> with which I strongly identify--"What has chiefly prevented my publishing
> much has been, first, that my desire to teach has not been so strong as my
> desire to learn ..."  *Writing* was an integral aspect of Peirce's *thinking
> *and *learning *process, as it is of mine; communicating ideas to others
> was a secondary objective.  After all ...
>
> CSP:  A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain ... and then, when I find
> I cannot express myself, he says, "You see your faculty of language was
> localized in that lobe." No doubt it was; and so, if he had filched my
> inkstand, I should not have been able to continue my discussion until I had
> got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not come to me. So my faculty of
> discussion is equally localized in my inkstand. It is localization in a
> sense in which a thing may be in two places at once. On the theory that the
> distinction between psychical and physical phenomena is the distinction
> between final and efficient causation, it is plain enough that the inkstand
> and the brain-lobe have the same general relation to the functions of the
> mind. (CP 7.366; 1902)
>
>
> Likewise the computer keyboard, in my case; and of course, a Sign is
> precisely the kind of thing that "may be in two places at once," as two
> different Instances.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 11:36 AM Stephen Curtiss Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> I feel the notion Peirce had a complete philosophy is unfair to him and
>> as a characterization, any more than Nietzsche or Wittgenstein could be
>> said to have such a philosophy.  Aside from the fact that completeness is
>> impossible, I explicitly sense that Peirce developed what might be perfect
>> control and understanding and knowing to his personal satisfaction  I more
>> and more sense that his philosophy is bifurcated both by his interpreters
>> and by himself. There is not much point in going on as my posts here are
>> not exactly dialog creators. I think that is actually one way of
>> understanding him, ironic but perhaps the case. Best, S
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] EGs, phenomena, reflection

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Helmut,

I am sure I do not know what you are talking about.

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 7:15 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> Supplement: About the function of the cerebellum, apart from reading
> related scientific texts, I for complete replacement I recommend the song
> by the Ramones: "Cretin Hop".
> Dear Jerry, dear list,
> do you say, that the cerebellum rules? That is, what Heisenberg said, as I
> understood it. Naturalism unreflected, isnt it? Would I say, no, it´s not
> with me that way, I really am interested in sorting things out, in
> cooperation with others, regardless of the percentage my own role plays in
> the process, merely being interested in the result, would you call me a
> liar? Can I say, no, I am not, can I trust my cerebellum? I know that I
> can´t, because I know, that my cerebellum is telling me that I am right,
> and others are wrong. But: By being aware of this function of the
> cerebellum, can I take this knowledge into regard? I guess, it is hard.
> I dont know. Best, Helmut
>
>
>  14. März 2019 um 21:33 Uhr
>  "Jerry Rhee" *wrote:*
> Dear Helmut, list,
>
>
>
> You said:
>
> “What do we want.
>
> Do we want to keep the form of EGs as they are,
>
> then we outsource the question of reflection.”
>
>
>
> *“But it is such a beautiful experiment.”  *
>
> This is probably the strongest motive behind the applications of science;
>
> the scientist needs the confirmation from an impartial judge,
>
> from Nature herself, that he has understood her structure.
>
> And he wants to see the effect of his effort.
>
>
>
> From this attitude one can also easily understand the motives which
> determine the line of research for the individual scientist.
>
> Such a line of research is usually based on some theoretical ideas, on
> conjectures concerning the interpretation of the known phenomena or on
> hopes for finding new ones.
>
>
>
> *But which ideas are accepted?  *
>
> Experience teaches that it is usually not the consistency, the clarity of
> ideas, which makes them acceptable, but the hope that one can participate
> in their elaboration and verification.
>
>
>
> It is the wish for our own activity,
>
> the hope for results from our own efforts, which leads us on our way
> through science.
>
> This wish is stronger than our rational judgment about the merits of
> various theoretical ideas.
>
> ~ Heisenberg, *Tradition in Science*
>
>
>
> With best wishes,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
>
> PS:
>
>
>
> You said,
>
> “A think about a think makes the think fall in the sink.”
>
> haha!!  J
>
>
>
> on precise “inspectable” schema:
>
> *I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
> practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
> indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
> while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
> [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
> shoots through our own minds, it is much safer to define all mental
> characters as far as possible in terms of their outward manifestations. ~ *
> Peirce
>
> On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 3:16 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Supplement: It is a question of outsourcing or insourcing. What do we
>> want. Do we want to keep the form of EGs as they are, then we outsource the
>> question of reflection. But do we want to have some more fun, or, eh, work?
>> Then why not insource the topic about reflection in some way. Peirce cannot.
>> List,
>> I think, that the "existential graphs" don´t have to do with existence in
>> the first place, that is with things that do exist, or phenomena of the
>> real world, but rather with semes(?) that origin in reflection, reflection
>> of reflection, and so on. Do they exist? Are they real? Are they phenomena?
>> I guess, every answer may be so constructed to give a "yes", and if the
>> phenomenon merely exists in one head. A thought-sign by the thinker to the
>> same thinker. It exists, ok, it is real, ok. But what do we gain from this
>> generalisation? Nothing. So I propose to more and better analyse
>> reflection, its nature, its different levels of representation, and so on.
>> Some years ago there was a hype and high flying hopes about research about
>> the brain and consciousness. Now there is nothing more of that left. I
>> guess, the reason is, that too much focus was directed on the technical
>> function of the brain, and not enough focus was directed on the nature of
&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] EGs, phenomena, reflection

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Helmut, list,



You said:

“What do we want.

Do we want to keep the form of EGs as they are,

then we outsource the question of reflection.”



*“But it is such a beautiful experiment.”  *

This is probably the strongest motive behind the applications of science;

the scientist needs the confirmation from an impartial judge,

from Nature herself, that he has understood her structure.

And he wants to see the effect of his effort.



From this attitude one can also easily understand the motives which
determine the line of research for the individual scientist.

Such a line of research is usually based on some theoretical ideas, on
conjectures concerning the interpretation of the known phenomena or on
hopes for finding new ones.



*But which ideas are accepted?  *

Experience teaches that it is usually not the consistency, the clarity of
ideas, which makes them acceptable, but the hope that one can participate
in their elaboration and verification.



It is the wish for our own activity,

the hope for results from our own efforts, which leads us on our way
through science.

This wish is stronger than our rational judgment about the merits of
various theoretical ideas.

~ Heisenberg, *Tradition in Science*



With best wishes,

Jerry R



PS:



You said,

“A think about a think makes the think fall in the sink.”

haha!!  J



on precise “inspectable” schema:

*I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
[we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
shoots through our own minds, it is much safer to define all mental
characters as far as possible in terms of their outward manifestations. ~ *
Peirce

On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 3:16 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Supplement: It is a question of outsourcing or insourcing. What do we
> want. Do we want to keep the form of EGs as they are, then we outsource the
> question of reflection. But do we want to have some more fun, or, eh, work?
> Then why not insource the topic about reflection in some way. Peirce cannot.
> List,
> I think, that the "existential graphs" don´t have to do with existence in
> the first place, that is with things that do exist, or phenomena of the
> real world, but rather with semes(?) that origin in reflection, reflection
> of reflection, and so on. Do they exist? Are they real? Are they phenomena?
> I guess, every answer may be so constructed to give a "yes", and if the
> phenomenon merely exists in one head. A thought-sign by the thinker to the
> same thinker. It exists, ok, it is real, ok. But what do we gain from this
> generalisation? Nothing. So I propose to more and better analyse
> reflection, its nature, its different levels of representation, and so on.
> Some years ago there was a hype and high flying hopes about research about
> the brain and consciousness. Now there is nothing more of that left. I
> guess, the reason is, that too much focus was directed on the technical
> function of the brain, and not enough focus was directed on the nature of
> reflection. Reflection is tricky. If you think that you are thinking, you
> merely think that you are thinking, but in fact you think that you think
> that you are thinking, and forget to think. A think about a think makes the
> think fall in the sink. And with every "about" the time direction changes.
> EGs dont cover that. They dont tell the reflectional level of a
> proposition. Any proposition, no matter of what order, may be inserted. EGs
> are about nothing but reflection (not about existence, contradictory to
> their label), but do not show of which order the reflection is (reflection
> about a natural process, reflection about this reflection, reflection about
> this reflection...) Why not try to make them do? I can´t, too busy and too
> stupid anyway, so your turn.
> Best, Helmut
> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"
> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should
> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L"
> in the BODY of the message. More at
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Peirce and list,



If in the past, you could only say walking upon a bog, this ground seems to
hold for the present-

but now is transformed into ‘Bed-rock beneath Pragmaticism’;

then I must conclude you did converge in your opinion and have come to
truly believe it.



Granted, the genius of a man’s logical method should be loved and
reverenced as his bride,

whom he has chosen from all the world.

Such an attitude would insure that, instead of looking in the wrong
direction, it is turned the way it ought to be.



Is that so?



With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sat, Mar 2, 2019 at 4:05 PM  wrote:

> List,
>
> I finally found (just as I was on the point of giving up) a text in which
> Peirce explains the relationship between his Existential Graphs and his
> phenomenological “categories” (or experiential Universes, as he calls them
> there). It’s one of the incomplete drafts included in R 300, which Peirce
> entitled “The Bed-rock Beneath Pragmaticism.” I’ve been busy transcribing
> this from the manuscript images at the Peirce Archive
> https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/home.php, and although my
> transcript is incomplete, I decided to put it up on my website, because
> parts of it relate to several of the current threads on this list.
>
> R 300 is a very interesting document, partly because it appears to be his
> very last attempt to complete the *Monist* series on pragmatism which had
> occupied him for over three years. The first two articles in the series
> (Selections 24 and 25 in EP2) appeared in 1905, followed by the
> “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” in 1906. In the “Bedrock” MS,
> Peirce says that there would be two more articles in the *Monist* series
> to complete his “proof” of Pragmaticism — and this was apparently written
> *after* Selection 28 in EP2 (R 318, 1907), where “Peirce comes closer
> than in any other to fully expressing his brand of pragmatism and to giving
> a clearly articulated proof,” according to the editors (EP2:398). Don
> Roberts dates R 300 “about March of 1908,” which is consistent with the
> time spans mentioned by Peirce in the MS itself.
>
> The main part of “Bedrock” consists of 65 manuscript pages numbered by
> Peirce. Much of it is about Existential Graphs, identity and teridentity,
> etc., and may be of interest to John S. and Jon A.S. (Jon has posted some
> quotes from it already). Jerry C. should be interested in the part where
> Peirce says that the “most interesting term of comparison for Existential
> Graphs is the system of ‘rational formulae,’ or graphs, that are used in
> Organic Chemistry.” Helmut R. should be interested in Peirce’s argument
> that the concept of *Sequence* (which does indeed involve time) is
> logically *simpler* than the concept of negation. As for the partial
> draft relating EGs to phenomenology, I think it might give some clues as to
> why Peirce abandoned the project of using EGs for his proof of
> pragmaticism. Any of this and a lot more can be found by searching for the
> right keywords in the page on my website, http://gnusystems.ca/Bedrock.htm
> .
>
> Comments or questions on this text can be posted here with the subject
> line above.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



The subject heading is ‘Analyzing Propositions’.



What are the propositions here?



‘you are a student’

‘you are a loose thinker’

‘you are condescending’

‘you are insulting’



Any Peircean would recognize these appellations as such.

Hence, the conclusion would be that we understand the points Peirce was
making.

Again, people can read Peirce's words and what we both say about them for
themselves, then draw their own conclusions.



This is man… proud man.

If *A,* then *B;*
But *A:*
[Ergo,] *B.*



This analysis is somehow intrinsically more accurate.

I have carefully made my case and am sticking to substance rather than
sidetracking into personal disparagement.



Perception, you say, is knowledge?

And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of
knowledge that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give.
Only, he has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere
that man is “the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that
are and the non-existence of the things that are not.”



You have read that, I suppose?



With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 11:46 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, List:
>
> JFS:   If you prefer, I won't call you a student.  I'll call you a "loose
> thinker".
>
>
> So much for not being condescending; and now insulting, as well.  Any
> Peircean would recognize that particular appellation as such.
>
> JFS:  An analysis of the passages you quoted confirms the fact that you
> did not understand the points that Peirce was making.
>
>
> Why should anyone *presuppose *that your analysis is somehow *intrinsically
> *more accurate than mine?  Again, people can read Peirce's words and what
> we both say about them for themselves, then draw their own conclusions.
>
> JFS:  Peirce's writings deserve that depth of analysis.
>
>
> The fact that you happen to disagree with my analysis does not entail that
> it lacks such depth.  I have carefully made my case and responded to your
> objections, sticking to substance rather than sidetracking into personal
> disparagement.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 10:21 AM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> On 2/26/2019 9:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> > I am not /your /student, and we are /both /students of Peirce.
>>
>> Yes.  But you have a lot to learn about recognizing the precision
>> in Peirce's writings.  If you prefer, I won't call you a student.
>> I'll call you a "loose thinker".
>>
>> > I am not willing to accept someone else's dogmatic pronouncements
>> > as if they were beyond questioning.
>>
>> I never make dogmatic statements.  I recognize that everything,
>> including my own writing is fallible.  And I always appreciate
>> corrections or additional points I may have missed.
>>
>> But before you reject what I've written or what Hartshorne and
>> Weiss have written, you must address the issues at the same or
>> deeper level of precision.
>>
>> > I consistently quote Peirce's own writings to back it up--as much
>> > as or more than anyone else on the List these days,
>>
>> A quotation is not a proof.  Until you do the analysis at the level
>> that Peirce was writing, all you did was cut and paste a bunch of
>> words.  An analysis of the passages you quoted confirms the fact
>> that you did not understand the points that Peirce was making.
>>
>> > sometimes that process produces surprises, forcing us to reconsider
>> > views that we previously considered to be settled.
>>
>> Yes indeed.  But the issues aren't settled by juxtaposing passages.
>> All of us must do the much harder work of (1) analyzing those passages
>> at the level that Peirce was writing, (2) considering the unstated
>> background knowledge (i.e., collateral experience) that Peirce assumed
>> his readers would have, and (3) using relevant knowledge developed
>> during the past century.
>>
>> In conclusion, I'll repeat what I wrote in my reply to Stephen:
>>
>> > Many people, including me, have found that in most publications,
>> > even by prominent Peirce scholars, the quotations by Peirce are
>> > more precise than the discussions about them.
>> >
>> > The explanations by Peirce scholars are certainly helpful, because
>> > they highlight points that we may have missed on first reading.
>> > But when we reread Peirce's originals, we marvel at how clearly,
>> > succinctly, and precisely they make their point.
>>
>> Peirce's writings deserve that depth of analysis.
>>
>> John
>>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Stephen said:

Could imitation be so important, that this is the reason why we don’t
recognize it?



Although Peirce read and thought more about Aristotle than about any other
man, the Poetry, he knew nothing about.

That is, Peirce was not Greek-minded.



He then turns to a discussion of representation or imitation (μίμησις).



Tragedy is, then, a representation of an action that is heroic and complete
and of a certain magnitude.. And since tragedy represents action and is
acted by living persons, who must of necessity have certain qualities of
character and thought— for it is these which determine the quality of an
action;

indeed thought and character are the natural causes of any action and it is
in virtue of these that all men succeed or fail—

it follows then that it is the plot which represents the action.



By "plot" I mean here the arrangement of the incidents: "character" is that
which determines the quality of the agents, and "thought" appears wherever
in the dialogue they put forward an argument or deliver an opinion.

(~1450a, Poetics)



No doubt, Pragmaticism makes thought ultimately apply to action exclusively
- to conceived action.



For instance, we all know what he meant by conceived action, here.



With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 3:24 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Stephen, list,
>
>
>
> An interesting question. And an even more interesting approach: But this
> time, applying reverse logic, I asked myself… what are the illnesses that
> manifest because of a patient’s failure to imitate properly? I followed a
> similar strategy and found it most profitable for getting at the finer
> details of the semiotic framework to ask how a-typical behavior and
> mistakes can be understood semiotically.
>
>
>
> The text
> https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf
>
> contains theoretical considerations based on research I did amongst
> children that fall out of the schoolsystem in the Netherlands. Since I
> started with stories from parents, in the majority of cases the blame was
> put on schools not being able to deal with complexities of the child, not
> on children showing some sort of criminal behavior.
>
>
>
> Two labels were used most for the children that surfaced in the research:
> autism and highly gifted. With an autism - highly gifted ratio higher then
> 5 - 1. But one has to take into account that the IQ tests of the majority
> of autism pupils were above average, most of the time with a score on some
> sub-tests considerably higher, then on some other. And that some parents
> that called their children highly gifted based themselves on the average
> result of the wisc test solely. Disregarding enormous discrepancies on
> sub-tests (on a scale length of 19 two lowest score of 5 and two highest of
> 18, the remainder, if I remember correctly above 12) and without
> recognition of the tri-partite demand for highly gifted performance: inborn
> qualities, character of the child and environment.
>
>
>
> With autism the situation is even more complex regarding the feats that
> show themselves in different cases. Compare the child that does hardly
> communicate with the Asperger diagnosed student that follows multiple
> studies at the same time with good learning results or for that matter with
> the 18 years old who socially communicates on a level comparable in some
> respects to a 5 years old, but that at the same time mastered reading by
> himself before being 4 years old.
>
>
>
> The above is meant to underscore that I don’t profess to provide an
> answer, but only raise an alternative explanation.
>
>
>
> So, if it is a failure in the ability to mimic (icon based), it is a
> failure in some not all domains. This points in the direction of a
> background problem with the direction of attention (index based). I regard
> it feasible that autism semiotically can be understood by recognizing that
> a strong reliance on legisigns (types) and their habitually associated
> symbols prevent exploration of the rhematic (combinatoric) possibilities of
> new input signs. The adaptability to circumstances is seriously hindered in
> this way. And indeed, as you state, it appears as an inability  to mimic
> social wished behavior. Until, that is, one succeeds in getting attention
> for the social problems, in that case a social scientist may be the result.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Van:* Stephen Jarosek 
> *Verzonden:* woensdag 20 februari 2019 7:58
> *Aan:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Onderwerp:* [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy
> problem
>
>
>
> Dear Members,
>
> [This post carries on from our December thread “Systems theory, DNA
> entanglement, agents and semiosis”]
>
> I've been trying to put an article together, on imitation, for Gatherings
> in Biosemiotics 2019 in Moscow. But I don’t think I can put together
> anything of substance, in a format 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Jerry Rhee]

Auke, list,



I appreciate what you are doing.

 As you say, you ignore D, E, F, G, H, I, J..  X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, etc..



*.. these three kinds of consciousness are entirely unlike; *

*.. that they are connected with the ideas of one, two, three which are the
three elementary forms with which logical analysis has to deal.*



*One being the form of a simple idea, *

*two that of an ordinary relative idea, and *

*three the only simple form of combination of a direct union of more than
two ideas..*



*I don't pretend that my argument that there are only three kinds of
consciousness does more than raise a presumption by the precision with
which I succeed in defining a great variety of terms without calling in any
fourth element. *



*It will remain for those who question the conclusion to find a term I
cannot define with this apparatus.(~ *CP 8.304)



one two three.. C A B.. already written.



Best,

Jerry R

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen  wrote:

> List,
>
> Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
> 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at
> large
> 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common
> language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.
>
> I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe
> Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping
> with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology,
> that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That
> terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the
> speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce,
> hence argument becomes delome.
>
> If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program
> (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.
>
> I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John
> Sowa points in this direction:
>
> JAS:
> > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to
> > accept our disagreement and move on.
>
> John:
> That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as
> a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that
> definition.  There is nothing more to say.
>
> (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)
>
> Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering
> his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence
> at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program
> and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we
> need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we
> explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is
> captured in logic by the term argument?
>
> In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may
> find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes
> as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different
> terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both
> possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the
> experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an
> example of differences in perspective:
>
> On the terminological level Peirce experimented
>
> He suggested:
> A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative
> trichotomy for
> B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also
> introduced
> C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type.
>
> In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a
> different angle
> With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an
> interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
> With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our
> world, it opens up the sign structure perspective
> With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a
> sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the
> phaneroscopic endeavour.
>
> A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The
> exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking
> recourse to the type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right
> in his interpretation of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic
> considerations, a similarity in tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion
> which allows different tokens to be taken as the same. For instance when we
> deal with the spoken and written forms. Familiarity may overcome
> differences in form by an established law; because two different forms
> raise the same symbol habitually. It acts as a same sign.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Gary, list,



To my open mind and eyes, all that appears to be metaphysical rubbish.



Perhaps not so obvious, then..



Best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 10:53 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, John, List,
>
> JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
> detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
> analysis of a proposition.
> JFS:  No.  Definitely not.
>
>
> Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain
> that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is
> of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
> but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
> such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
> into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
> that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).
> Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried
> analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it
> to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908).
>
> It is clear for those with mind open and eyes to see that the evidence
> says that ""the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever
> there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the
> proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its
> interpreter is requisite," such that "*everything in a proposition that
> possibly can should be thrown into the subjects*, leaving the pure
> predicate a mere form of connection" that is "'*continuous*' or
> 'self-containing" (emphasis added).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 8:16 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> John S., List:
>>
>> With sincere respect, I believe that we are now at the point where we
>> will simply have to accept our disagreement and move on.  Peirce did not
>> introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 1908, so anything
>> that he wrote about Propositions prior to that reflects a different
>> analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern predicate logic, which
>> you continue to advocate.
>>
>> JFS:  EGs with pegs that are not attached to any line of identity
>> represent predicates.
>>
>>
>> No, in my view they represent Semes (or Subjects); the *only *predicate
>> represented in Existential Graphs is the *Continuous* Predicate, which
>> corresponds to *continuous *Lines of Identity.,
>>
>> JFS:  After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because it was simpler
>> and clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', 'triad'... for both
>> predicates and quasi-predicates.
>>
>>
>> No, he continued to use "Seme" in all subsequent Sign taxonomies to name
>> the Possible member of the division according to the Nature of the
>> Influence of the Sign, corresponding to its relation with its Final
>> Interpretant.
>>
>> JFS:  In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of predicate and
>> quasi-predicate.
>>
>>
>> No, he explicitly used "Seme" for "anything which serves for any purpose
>> as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a
>> representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906); in particular, "the Subject or
>> Object of a sentence" (R 295:[28]; 1906).
>>
>> JFS:  The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word 'seme' may be
>> replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-predicate".
>>
>>
>> No, it shows that if anything, the word "Seme" may be replaced by a word
>> that means "Subject."
>>
>> JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
>> detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
>> analysis of a proposition.
>> JFS:  No.  Definitely not.
>>
>>
>> Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain
>> that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is
>> of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
>> but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
>> such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
>> into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
>> that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).
>> Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried
>> analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it
>> to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908).
>>
>>
>> JFS:  His existential graphs and diagrammatic reasoning are the most
>> elegant and powerful basis for his logical analyses.  In fact, they're
>> superior to the systems by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen.
>>
>>
>> No one is disputing this; the difference is in how we interpret the
>> elements of Existential Graphs when analyzing the Propositions that 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



‘A hypostatized attribute is one which is itself regarded as the subject of
attribution or characters; and a hypostatized relation is one treated as
having relations to other relations.’



For instance,

‘If we can hypostatize the community, and treat it as an individual with
magnified but human wants and satisfactions..’



that is,

“given any individual there exists a class having that individual as its
only member”,



‘then, for this leviathan, the ethical end will correspond to what is
called Utilitarianism or Universalistic Hedonism.’



Alternatively,

‘then for this community of inquirers, the ethical end will correspond to
what is called Pragmaticism or growth of concrete reasonableness.’



So, as I see it, the continuity for the community is a possibility that may
or may not be like the operation of destiny.  It is destined to be an
asymptote to which is approached up there with the community of inquirers
and not down there with this leviathan.

This is a possibility that is up there and not down there.

I believe that makes an actual difference, but of course, we’re free to
choose what we believe.



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 3:28 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Helmut, list,
>
> Please explain why you define continuity as possibility.
>
> As for the Final Interpretent, it is not some actual act, but how "every
> mind would act." "No event that occurs to any mind, no action of any mind
> can constitute the truth of that conditional proposition."
>
> The Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any mind does
> act but in the way in which every mind would act. That is, it consists in
> a truth which might be expressed in a conditional proposition of this type:
> “If so and so were to happen to any mind this sign would determine that
> mind to such and such *conduct*.” By “conduct” I mean *action* under an
> intention of self-control. No event that occurs to any mind, no action of
> any mind can constitute the truth of that conditional proposition (Letter
> to William James, 1909;  CP 8.315).
>
>
> As for 'actuality' in this matter,  the movement towards a Final
> Interpretent is but asymptotic; it is never actually arrived at. It is
> "that toward which the actual tends," and that is all.
>
>
> My Final Interpretant is […] the effect the Sign *would* produce upon any
> mind upon which the circumstances should permit it to work out its full
> effect. [—] …the Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to
> which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently
> considered. [—] The Final Interpretant is that toward which the
> actual tends (Letter to Lady Welby; 1909; SS 110-1)  (Both quotes in
> Commens Dictionary).
>
>
> Best,
>
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 3:56 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> Gary, list,
>> if semiosis was continuous with continuity defined as possibility, like
>> interpolability of events due to their embeddedness in continuous time, it
>> (semiosis) neither would be continuous in every theoretical aspect,
>> otherwise it would not contain final interpretants, or how could finality
>> and continuity be not a contradiction.
>> Helmut
>> 14. Januar 2019 um 20:32 Uhr
>> *Von:* "Gary Richmond" 
>>
>> Jeff, list,
>>
>> For me this has been a valuable discussion, but at the moment I haven't
>> much more to offer to it than what has already been said (unless, of
>> course, the matter is take up in terms of the four stages of Peirce's
>> thinking about continuity which Potter and Shields analyze). Meanwhile, I
>> hope that there may be some value in posting this message which I began a
>> few days ago, if only to emphasize a few pertinent points (at least for me)
>> which have been made in the last few days.
>>
>> Again, I like the idea of your basing a discussion of continuity as it
>> pertains to semiosis on (a) the Peirce quotation (CP 1.339) in
>> consideration of "endless series" and (b) the Potter/Shields article which
>> imo is excellent in several respects including its succinctness and it's
>> outlining four periods of Peirce's thinking about continuity (which they
>> refer as 1) the pre-Cantorian, 2) the Cantorian, 3) the Kantistic, and 4),
>> the post-Cantorian periods).
>>
>> While Potter and Shields place both the CP 1.339 and the 1898 lectures in
>> Peirce's penultimate period (from ca. 1895 to 1907) of his thinking about
>> continua, it seems potentially useful to look at this somewhat earlier work
>> in the light of that final period (1908 to his death) in considering
>> semiosis and continuity.
>>
>> You extracted these "three different sorts of endless series" from CP
>> 1.339.
>>
>>
>> 1)  "an endless series of representations, each representing the one
>> behind it."
>>
>> 2) "The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear John, list,



Correct me if I’m wrong but isn’t semiosis a greek term?



To use your arguments to declare such limits as to how we ought to engage
in this conversation, though manly, doesn’t appear, at least to me, that it
is in accord with sophrosune, *the* womanly virtue.



I mean, isn’t that “too much”?



With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sun, Jan 13, 2019 at 10:14 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Folks,
>
> The discussion in this thread suggests the following points:
>
>   1. Peirce used the terms 'continuous' and 'semiosis', but there
>  is no evidence that he used the terms 'continuous semiosis' or
>  'continuity of semiosis'.
>
>   2. Since Peirce said that anything continuous must have material
>  parts, he may have had some reason for not using the term
>  'continuous semiosis' -- i.e., he didn't have a clear idea
>  about the material parts of semiosis.
>
>   3. I am always suspicious of any claim that Peirce would have,
>  might have, or should have used some term that does not occur
>  anywhere in his publications or MSS -- unless there is some
>  very precise definition of how the new term should be used.
>
>   4. If anybody wishes to invent a new term that does not occur in
>  anything CSP wrote, they should (a) give a precise definition with
>  examples. and (b) state that it is their own term, not Peirce's.
>
> By the way, it's possible that some unpublished MS might turn up
> in which Peirce does use that term.  But unless and until any such
> MS is discovered, I would observe the caveats in point #4.
>
> John
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



‘To “hypostatize” is “to attribute substantial existence to:

make into or regard as a distinct individual substance or reality.



The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatization, but to do it
intelligently.’



And as we all have experienced,

You do this intelligently but not I.

At least that is the thought in which we are currently.



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 6:01 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John S., List:
>
> JFS:  What are the material parts of continuous semiosis?
>
>
> I suggest Signs as continuous Types, which is why your initial request ...
>
> JFS:  Can anyone give an example of continuous semiosis in language or
> reasoning?
>
>
> ... is impossible to fulfill.  Any concrete example that anyone could give
> would instead consist of Instances as discrete Tokens.  As for your other
> request ...
>
> JFS:  Unless anybody can find any quotation by Peirce or state any
> explicit example in language or reasoning, I doubt that continuous semiosis
> is a meaningful concept in Peirce's semeiotic.
>
>
> ... I can offer this ...
>
> CSP:  The agapastic development of thought should, if it exists, be
> distinguished by its purposive character, this purpose being the
> development of an idea. We should have a direct agapic or sympathetic
> comprehension and recognition of it by virtue of the *continuity of
> thought*. I here take it for granted that such *continuity of thought*
> has been sufficiently proved by the arguments used in my paper on the "Law
> of Mind" in The Monist of last July. (CP 6.315, EP 1:369; 1893, emphasis
> added)
>
>
> ... assuming that it is not controversial to equate thought with semiosis,
> a word that Peirce had not yet coined at that time.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 3:58 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Edwina and Gary R,
>>
>> ET
>> > I don't see the term 'continuous semiosis' to mean the history
>> > of that chair and its uses.
>>
>> I just cited Whitehead's example to show how he related an abstract
>> discussion to a familiar example.  I was just asking for any kind
>> of example.
>>
>> ET
>> > our universe is continuously engaged in these semiosic actions -
>> > generating all physico-chemical, biological 'things'.
>>
>> Yes.  But Peirce didn't use the term 'continuous semiosis' to
>> describe any of those processes.
>>
>> GR
>> > here's an excerpt from a discussion of some of Peirce's last thoughts
>> > on continuity in the article by Vincent Potter and Paul Shields which
>> > I pointed to in an earlier post...
>>
>> Yes.  I'm familiar with Peirce's writings about continuity.  But note
>> what Potter and Shields wrote:
>>
>> P & S
>> > Peirce proposed the definition: “Whatever is continuous has material
>> > parts,” emphasizing that a continuum should not be thought of as a
>> > collection of points.
>>
>> What are the material parts of continuous semiosis?
>>
>> John
>>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] DNA - The key to life, the universe and everything?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Helmut, list:



You said:

My point was all about the question, which facts are unchangeable, and
which facts are changeable.



On liberalism and tribalism:



*The surprising fact, C, is observed..*



Broadway's 'Lifespan Of A Fact' Tackles The Timely Question: What Is A Fact?

*Here and Now*



“I've never done a play before that has an argument at the center of it,"

Radcliffe tells *Here & Now*'s Robin Young.

"To feel that going backwards and forwards every night is really special."





http://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2018/10/31/lifespan-of-a-fact-broadway



Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Oct 31, 2018 at 3:14 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Stephen,
> I think, "tribal" is not "subjective", but "wanting to remain subjective",
> that is, deliberately thinking no farther than the tribe borders.
> It is possible to get from "is" to "ought" by adding the ("ought"-) rule
> of viability: "Don´t neglect unchangeable facts, if you want to make sense".
> My point was all about the question, which facts are unchangeable, and
> which facts are changeable. I think, universal and humanist values are
> based on unchangeable facts, while cultural conditions are changeable.
> You may call this view "liberal mainstream arrogance", but that would not
> be a valid argument.
> Best, Helmut
>
>  31. Oktober 2018 um 21:00 Uhr
>  "Stephen Jarosek"  wrote:
>
> Helmut, there is little that I can add to Edwina's reply. She has covered
> the important issues eloquently. But I'd like to add a further comment,
> where you write:
>
> >"I agree that the right are tribal. To say that the left are tribal too
> is only partly true, i think."
>
> How do you know this? If you believe this, then maybe you believe it
> because you yourself are seeing the world from that tribal perspective.
> Which means that instead of making an objective observation of your own,
> you are actually proving MY point for me. Almost by definition... to be
> tribal (subjective) is to see the world from your own level. If I am to
> take you seriously, then the onus is on you to convince me that your
> assessment is objective and distinct from your subjective assumptions. My
> metaphor of a fish in water applies... can a fish really understand water,
> if there is no not-water with which to compare it to?
>
> Your reference to Hume provides an interesting, alternative slant on the
> very point that I am making. YOU cannot conclude from your assumptions
> about the way the world is, to what should be.
>
> > "According to Hume, you cannot conclude from something being to what
> > should be (from is to ought)."
>
> sj
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 31, 2018 7:29 PM
> To: michael...@waitrose.com; Helmut Raulien
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: Aw: RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] DNA - The key to life, the
> universe and everything?
>
>
> Helmut- I disagree with your outline.
> Any and all ideologies, whether left, right, green, whatever - as
> ideologies in themselves; i.e., as Thirdness - are closed to the pragmatics
> of both Firstness and Secondness and are essentially 'tribal' - if we
> understand by 'tribal' a population isolated in Thirdness. An ideology is
> alienated from local pragmatic realities and is utopian in its agenda, in
> that it rejects fallibility and has no adaptive capacity.
> I also disagree with your differentiation between 'culture' and
> 'civilization'. I'd agree that, as humans, we have a basic capacity for
> reason but this does not necessarily include universal values. That is, the
> sanctity of life is not a universal value; the notion of equality is not a
> universal value; it's not 'in our DNA'. It took centuries to move into the
> notion of equality - and the US Declaration of Independence is, I think,
> one of its finest articulations.
> Nationalism and populism are not, I suggest, 'right wing ideologies', but
> are pragmatic perspectives - and pragmatism is not an ideology since it
> necessarily includes both Firstness and Secondness.
> I think that 'political correctness' is isolate Thirdness, alienated from
> Firstness and Secondness; it disables thought. It's rather similar to these
> so-called 'Safe Spaces ' in some colleges and universities - where
> students/faculty can go to, to immerse themselves in the purity of their
> Thirdness ideology - without any interference from actuality, from the
> realities of Secondness and from the diversity of another point of view of
> Firstness.
> Not all refuges are in existential danger - and to assume that by
> self-defining oneself as a 'refugee' - that this is a correct definition -
> is, I suggest, naïve and an example of Isolate Thirdness - and an abuse of
> the people of the host nation. It is an abuse of the term, and an abuse of
> the humanity and kindness of the people of another nation - to insist
> that:" IF I call myself a refugee, THEN, you must immediately accept and
> look after me'.
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed 31/10/18 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jerry C, list,

perhaps I am..

which reminds me.. peirce's esthetics, beautiful and unbeautiful.

Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Jerry R:
>
> In response to your query, I have no idea.
>
> Even the notion of any two humans having the “same ego” is foreign to my
> way of thinking.
>
> Perhaps you are thinking of a superficial similarity of styles of
> expression?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry C.
>
>
> On Sep 17, 2018, at 3:15 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
> Dear Jerry, list,
>
>
> What does Peirce mean by
> “entertain a metaphysical theory that they are all *hypostatically the
> same ego*”?
>
>
> Does he mean me and you?   Jon and Gary?  Edwina and kirsti?  John and
> Jeff?
>
>
> Thanks,
> Jerry
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 1:51 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> John:
>>
>> On Sep 15, 2018, at 5:28 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>>
>> To avoid the controversy, I'll delete the phrase "partial and narrow"
>> and replace it with a line that says normative logic is the "theory
>> of self-controlled or deliberate thought".
>>
>> Hmmm…
>>
>> Does this really help?
>> How does a thought, a spontaneous thought, become normative?
>> What is the compelling distinction between an ordinary every day emotion
>> (say, about the sexuality of a beautiful women /man) become differentiated
>> from normative logic?
>>
>> Perhaps CSP would have referred to habitual feelings held by a group of
>> like-minded investigators or some similar rhetorical gesture?
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jerry, list,



What does Peirce mean by

“entertain a metaphysical theory that they are all *hypostatically the same
ego*”?



Does he mean me and you?   Jon and Gary?  Edwina and kirsti?  John and
Jeff?



Thanks,

Jerry


On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 1:51 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> John:
>
> On Sep 15, 2018, at 5:28 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> To avoid the controversy, I'll delete the phrase "partial and narrow"
> and replace it with a line that says normative logic is the "theory
> of self-controlled or deliberate thought".
>
> Hmmm…
>
> Does this really help?
> How does a thought, a spontaneous thought, become normative?
> What is the compelling distinction between an ordinary every day emotion
> (say, about the sexuality of a beautiful women /man) become differentiated
> from normative logic?
>
> Perhaps CSP would have referred to habitual feelings held by a group of
> like-minded investigators or some similar rhetorical gesture?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] bringing Peirce into the 21st century

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Gary f, list,



You said:

“To sum up: many of Peirce’s important ideas don’t need to be ‘brought
into’ the 21stcentury because they are already here..”



I agree.  But there is an important point you neglect about this matter and
is something that is not recognized by most persons.



*In every investigation arguments stated in philosophical form are
different from those that are non-philosophical*..



The above is not Peirce’s terminology and it may or may not matter;- to
give one his due.

As to whether Peirce was aware of these words, consider the Peirce you
quote:



*If the phenomenon, when it comes, fulfills that expectation, it
strengthens the habits of thinking on which that expectation is based, but
teaches us nothing new. *

*But if it involves any surprise, as it mostly does, **our habits of
thinking* *are deranged, whether little or much. *

*We then feel the need of a new idea which shall serve to bind the
surprising phenomenon to our preëxisting experience. *



*One usual phrase is that we want the surprising fact *explained*.*



*.. At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible Explanation, by
which I mean a **syllogism** exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily
consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth
of the credible conjecture, as premisses.*



And about all these matters the endeavor must be made to seek to convince
by means of rational arguments, using observed facts as evidences and
examples.



And this they will do

if led to change their ground,

for everyone has something relative to contribute to the truth,

and we must start from this

to give a sort of proof about our views;

for from statements that are true

but not clearly expressed,

as we advance,

clearness will also be attained,

if at every stage we adopt more scientific positions

in exchange for the customary confused statements.



On How to make our Ideas Clear..

*From CP 5.402 to CP 5.189*



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 3:48 PM, Stephen Curtiss Rose 
wrote:

> I think the case against materialism as the only explanation for things
> has been successfully questioned if not confirmed. Quantom understandings
> do not apply merely to particle research.Visible slit experiments have
> validated its probability assumptions.I think both Newtonian and quantum
> premises can and do coexist just as space and time coexists with spacetime.
> So I would rank quantum understanding as evolving rapidly to challenge the
> materialist world view. To these I would add near death research which has
> been given no real scientific notice though its findings have been
> scientifically tested. Behind nde research there are at least five other
> avenues of the same general sort. Peirce was not unsympathetic to claims
> from this seemingly unrespected quarter. There is a small legion of nondual
> thinkers who hold forth on YouTube, among them Rupert Sheldrake who has
> spoken admiringly of Peirce. Your mention of Gaia coincided with my
> unfortunate encounter with that phenomenon in its Web related activities. I
> would not say it has the heft of the other things I've mentioned but I
> would be willing to be convinced otherwise.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 4:34 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Yes, Gaia’s made her way into the mainstream now … you shouldn’t have to
>> Google the *Science* article because it’s available for free at the link
>> I posted.
>>
>> I don’t think quantum physics tells us much of anything about the
>> capacity of human observation to affect matters *at any level above the
>> ultra-microscopic*. I’m not sure if your message is saying that you’re
>> for or against that idea.
>>
>>
>>
>> gary
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Stephen Curtiss Rose 
>> *Sent:* 16-Sep-18 14:05
>> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] bringing Peirce into the 21st century
>>
>>
>>
>> I long ago said goodbye to Gaia as a basis for nondual understandings and
>> quamtum suppositions regarding the capacity of human observation to affect
>> matters. I will have to Google your reference because there is a great real
>> of other Gaia related stuff out there. As to the nondual and quantum slants
>> I have little doubt that they are relevant and I have always assumed Peirce
>> was in synch if only because his thought implies a cosmic victory for love
>> -- agape. I think materiality is not as doomed as the nondualists suggest
>> but that it is part of what i have suggested in my recurrent root premise
>> that reality is all, t which I still hold.
>>
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 1:38 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> List,
>>
>> The current issue of *Science* magazine features two articles that
>> provoke me to share a few reflections on the subject line, which I’ve
>> chosen to represent the recurring calls on this list for more postings that
>> apply Peircean ideas to “real-world” issues and investigations (as opposed
>> 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear John, list,



You quotes Margolis:

The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-
forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our happiness,
our sensitivities and stimulations.



I agree with this, too.

But my reservation about not treating bacteria as quasi-mind remains.

How is this even possible?



That is, I agree with Peirce’s statement

Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion
is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts
are in us.



So, there doesn’t seem to be a position that is wrong.

Everything is admitted, which is to say that through one side of your
mouth, there are purposes stated whereby we are supposed to be precise but
at the same time, you constrain yourself not to isomorphy but to homomorphy.


But where does that leave us?



That is, you say such things as

Given what Peirce wrote, I believe that he would agree.



This all sounds like insanity where no one is not wrong but the goal
remains to be right.  These don’t appear to be the same, yet they do appear
similar.



Again, I admit that you have put forth a sincere historicist analysis.

And as to whether Peirce answered my questions, I don’t think we’re looking
to the same.  Here, isomorphy and homomorphy, as you define it, matters.



Best,
Jerry R


On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 3:32 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina, Jerry R, Jon AS, and Jerry LRC,
>
> Peirce answered your questions.  I like his 1903 *outline* because
> it's a clean and simple summary of everything he wrote about the
> sciences and their interrelationships.  But as an outline, it omits
> nearly all the details.
>
> ET
>
>> I wonder if this list will ever move beyond debates [and again, I
>> consider them debates and not discussions] about classification
>> and terminology
>>
>
> I definitely do not want to debate.  I consider this thread as a
> *collaborative inquiry* in trying to understand what Peirce said
> and fill in the gaps.  My only goal is to get a clear understanding
> of that outline and its relationship to all of Peirce's writings.
>
> That classification has some very important implications for biology,
> but I'll have to address that separately because it requires more space.
>
> JR
>
>> From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal theory
>> at all.  Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to understand
>> itself.
>>
>
> I agree.  But I'll repeat the diagram in CSPsemiotic.jpg.  Note that
> mathematics includes all possible theories about anything.  Every
> theory, formal or informal, in every branch of philosophy and empirical
> science is an application of some theory of mathematics.
>
> JR
>
>> my question was about biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is
>> different from semiotic because of its special focus on living
>> systems (biology, hence biosemiotic).
>>
>
> Semiotic also has a focus on living systems:  human beings.  Peirce
> himself talked about extensions to parrots, dogs, bees, and crystals.
>
> JR
>
>> I don’t treat bacteria as a quasi-mind.
>>
>
> The biologist Lynn Margulis, who spent her career studying bacteria,
> considered bacteria on a continuum with all higher life forms:
>
>> The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-
>> forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our happiness,
>> our sensitivities and stimulations.
>>
>
> Given what Peirce wrote, I believe that he would agree.  My only
> correction would replace the word 'isomorphic' (equal form) with
> 'homomorphic' (similar form).  This quotation comes from
> https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html
>
> At the end of that article are various comments by prominent
> researchers in biology and related fields.  They're helpful
> for understanding Lynn M's contributions.
>
> JAS
>
>> The other two--quality and brute reaction--are not Signs themselves,
>> and cannot be reduced to Signs
>>
>
> I agree.  I thanked Gary F. for finding a quotation by Peirce
> that clarified that issue.
>
> JAS
>
>> Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as
>> Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology.
>>
>
> No.  He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics.
> As mathematics, it is applicable to every science without exception.
> But most sciences, including phenomenology, do not make value judgments.
> Under normative science, he explictly said that it is a "partial and
> narrow" point of view.  See CP 1.573.
>
> Fundamental principle, which Peirce said many times in many ways:
> Mathematics and logic are the foundation every science without
> exception.  In *every* science, logic is used in the broad sense.
> But normative science is an exception:  it's used in a narrow sense.
>
> JLRC
>
>> Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused.
>> Mathematics alone is not even logic.
>>
>
> I don't know how you define those terms.  What I've been 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear John, list,



My question was a follow-up to your own question on where to place semiotic
in CSPsemiotic.jpg.



Question:  Where is semeiotic?

To which, you said,

As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic
under mathematics.  But semeiotic is also an applied science when
it is used in perception, action, communication...



>From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal theory at
all.

Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to understand itself
(cf., Kull, Velmezova).

Even when compared to semiotic, which is this blob that hovers over The
Sciences, Philosophical, Mathematical and Empirical, my question was about
biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is different from semiotic
because of its special focus on living systems (biology, hence biosemiotic).




I would say I have done biosemiotic, and yet, I don’t treat bacteria as a
quasi-mind.

I see it as a thing that my mind treats.  I recognize bacteria, how it is
used in sciences and respond to it.  Bacteria are grown as cultures or
individually.  We study it, we model its behaviors, we use it to study
other things (eg., for cloning in medicine)..



Therefore, your response is strange to me.

Specifically this:



Very simply.  Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has
a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs
it recognizes and responds to.



Your discussion of the unconscious..

the even mention of it to my question..

that this is somehow consistent with modern views..

this is all very bizarre.



And I am still left with not having an idea on how to use CSPsemiotic.jpg
to classify biosemiotic.  I am sure the image you created, and devoted much
effort to, charts well what may be in the record of Peirce’s writings, but
I still don’t see how it is to be used to classify anything novel at all.  That
is, it does not appear to be adaptable.  Perhaps I do not have the proper
perspective.  Should I turn it, be over it, twist it, wrap it, fold it?



I have a similar gripe as Edwina, above.

We should listen to what she’s saying.



Hth,

Jerry R


On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, list
>
> Agreed - and Pierce was quite specific that you don't need a conscious and
> separate Mind to be involved in semiosis.
>
> My point, again, is that I don't see the function of this list's focus on
> classification and terminology. How does that, for example, help us in
> examining the semiosic processes in a bacterium or in a meadow, filled with
> diverse species, or in a hurricane, or in a societal ideological movement
> or in artificial intelligence?
>
> And even more deeply - do we want to move out of the seminar room and into
> examining the semiosic processes of the outside world?
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Fri 14/09/18 8:38 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> On 9/13/2018 11:27 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> > How do you classify biosemiotic using your scheme?
>
> Very simply. Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has
> a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs
> it recognizes and responds to.
>
> When Peirce said "present to the mind in any way", he did not rule
> out the unconscious. In fact, there are 51 instances of the word
> 'unconscious' in CP. Following is one of them:
>
> > I am prepared to maintain, operations of the mind which are logically
> > exactly analogous to inferences excepting only that they are unconscious
> > and therefore uncontrollable and therefore not subject to criticism.
> > But that makes all the difference in the world; for inference is
> > essentially deliberate, and self controlled. (CP 5.108)
>
> The phrase "logically exactly analogous" implies that the unconscious
> (or at least an important component) involves signs of the same kind
> as conscious thought, except for the option of awareness. Dreams,
> for example, involve processes similar to conscious thought, but we
> have no control over the sequences.
>
> Higher animals may have something similar to human consciousness.
> But the phaneron of lower animals, plants, and bacteria is probably
> completely unconscious. A continuum rather than a sharp dividing
> line is likely.
>
> Re biosemiotic: Peirce mentioned parrots, dogs, and bees. And he
> talked about the origin of life as the first non-degenerate Thirdness.
> He also mentioned crystals as a step along the way toward life. So
> far, his guesses are consistent with modern views.
>
> Deely and others talked about Jakob von Uexküll as another important
> influence. Uexküll used the term 'Umwelt' for the world that a
> living organism perceives and acts in and on. The phaneron of any
> living thing would be an essential component of its Umwelt.
>
> John
>
>
&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

[Jerry Rhee]

John, list,



How do you classify biosemiotic using your scheme?



If there is no room for it, then what good is the classification?



Thanks,

Jerry R

On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 10:05 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina and Jon AS,
>
> ET
>
>> My concern is that this list seems to focus almost exclusively
>> on debates about terminology and classification of research areas, and
>> doesn't venture outside the seminar room into the mud and dirt
>> of the real matter-as-mind world.
>>
>
> Peirce had a long career in science and engineering.  He certainly
> knew how to apply mathematics and science to build things and make
> them work.  And his engineering work influenced what he wrote about
> the practical sciences in his classifications.
>
> One reason why I like Peirce's classification is that it shows
> how all the sciences are related to each other, to mathematics,
> to philosophy, to the methodeutic that "digs in the dirt" to
> discover facts, and to the practical sciences that build things.
>
> If you can find anything "in the mud and dirt" that it doesn't
> cover, I'd like to see that.
>
> JFS:  The subject matter of phenomenology is the totality of signs
>> that appear to the mind, and CP 1.300 calls the semiotic categories
>> "conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of thought".
>>
>> JAS:  This does not seem right to me; it presupposes that anything
>> that appears to the mind must be a Sign.
>>
>
> Two points:  (1) if the phaneron contains anything that is not
> a sign, semiotic could be defined as the study of the signs in
> phenomenology.  (2) In any case, it's hard to imagine anything
> that appears to the mind that is not a sign. If Peirce ever said
> that there are things in the mind, in thought, or in the phaneron
> that are not signs, I'd like to see the quotation.
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Francesco, list,



Well, the passage seems obvious to me just as it is obvious to JAS, which
is to say that it is vague.



Now, if it is vague, we could simply apply the logic of vagueness, of which
you must obviously be aware.



And if the logic of vagueness is merely something like a completeness, then
you could simply point at JAS’ definition, which states the obvious in its
completeness.

Yet, the part about gates of purposive action.. where is that in his
obvious answer?



To know what we think, to be masters of our own meaning..

To go from a notion to completeness of the concept..

That doesn’t appear to be what we want.

To have what we want is what we want.



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 2:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jeff, Francesco, List:
>
> I agree that this passage is very difficult to untangle.  It might help,
> for the sake of clarity, to spell out what all Peirce said there about
> Percepts and Perceptual Judgments.
>
>- For all thought, the Immediate Object is the Percept, and the
>Immediate Interpretant is Conduct.
>- For a Percept, which is a Seme, the Immediate Object is excessively
>vague. and the Dynamic Interpretant is a Perceptual Judgment.
>- For a Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme, the Dynamic Object is a
>Percept, and the Immediate Interpretant is a fact of Immediate Perception.
>- For a complex of Percepts, the Dynamic Interpretant is eventually
>the Seme of a Perceptual Universe, and then the Seme of a Universe
>resulting from adjunctions to the Perceptual Universe, and ultimately (as
>the Final Interpretant?) the Seme of the highest of all Universes, which we
>call "The Truth."
>- For a true Proposition, the (Dynamic?) Object is the highest of all
>Universes, which we call "The Truth."
>
> The first bullet is basically a summary of his famous statement, "The
> elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
> perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
> whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
> arrested as unauthorized by reason" (CP 5.212, EP 2:241; 1903).  The second
> bullet confirms my insistence that a Seme--which is a further
> generalization of a Rheme--*has *an Immediate Object; even if, in the
> case of a Percept, it is vague.  Taken together, the second and third
> bullets entail that two Signs A and B can be related such that A is the
> Dynamic Object of B and B is the Dynamic Interpretant of A.  The third
> bullet indicates that a fact can be the Immediate Interpretant of a Pheme,
> although I would expect a fact to be its Dynamic Object instead.  The
> fourth and fifth bullets reflect the identity, "in such identity as a sign
> may have," of "the ultimate interpretant of every sign" and "the very
> matter denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304; 1904).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 2:05 PM, Francesco Bellucci  googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jeff, List
>>
>> This passage from Prolegomena is exceedingly obscure to me. Peirce says
>> that the IO of all knowledge is the percept, but then he also says that the
>> IO of a percept is vague. He also says that the percept is the DO of the
>> perceptual judgment. My impression – which because of the passage's
>> obscurity is probably destined to remain such – is that in this convoluted
>> passage Peirce is trying to explain that the object of all thought is the
>> truth, which is represented in Existential Graphs (which have just been
>> introduced to the reader in that paper) by the sheet of assertion ("a Seme
>> of that highest of all Universes which is regarded as the Object of every
>> true Proposition"). If the sheet of assertion represents the truth, and the
>> truth is the object of all thought, then we could infer that the sheet of
>> assertion is the immediate object of thought, i.e. the manner in which the
>> dynamic object is indicated. The dynamic object of thought would be that
>> which is true (real facts, real events), and the sheet would indicate that
>> object without describing it, thus qualifying as the immediate of thought.
>> Now the sheet of assertion is given in perception (we see it), and every
>> further determination of it (any graph that may be scribed on it) is an
>> interpretant of it. But to say more would be to pretend to understand a
>> passage which I don't understand.
>>
>> I only further notice that given its sui generis status, Peirce at some
>> point says that the sheet of assertion is both a rheme ("_ is true") and a
>> proposition ("all that which utterer and interpreter agree upon is true",
>> or "what I aver is true"). But such a distinction is perhaps not fully
>> applicable to the sheet. And I am not sure whether this 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



I am not sure whether I am not heard or I am being ignored.



I suppose when I hear crickets, it could be either or both or neither.



Yet, the question is posed where



if the distinction between internal and external objects are important
enough to matter so as not to be trifling; that it ought to be saved when
discussing general matters regarding triadic relations,



then

that rule should be remembered in any algorithm put forth regarding
relations of sign object interpretant or object sign interpretant.

But I don’t see how this can be done.



Will no one help me?

Where is the reference that decides the matter,

or is this distinction not important enough for a philosopher?



If the distinction is not important enough for a philosopher,

then Peirce, surely, would have ignored or not treated of the matter.



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 3:03 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 9/7/2018 10:51 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
>
>> But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really?
>>
>
> I apologize.  The word 'map' in that sentence was a careless
> mistake.  I've been working on AI and computational linguistics
> for years, and I fully realize the enormous range of difficulties.
> For example, I have been quoting Peirce's note to B. E. Smith
> for years.
>
> So, it is one thing to say that we should evaluate Peirce's
>> semiotic ideas on the background of logic: this I agree
>> wholeheartedly and I wrote a book based precisely on this idea.
>>
>
> Yes.  I have read many of your writings and cited some of them.
> I think they're very good.
>
> But I want to emphasize that a very useful subset of any natural
> language can indeed be mapped to FOL.  The earliest example is
> Ockham's theory of propositions, which is Part II of Summa Logicae.
>
> In that book, which Peirce had lectured on at Harvard, Ockham
> developed a model-theoretic semantics for a very useful subset
> of Latin:  simple sentences in Aristotle's four sentence types,
> and Boolean connectives for AND, OR, NOT, and IF-THEN.
> That version of Latin can express a large subset of FOL.
>
> Furthermore, the discourse representation structures (DRS) by
> Hans Kamp, which are widely used in computational linguistics,
> are limited to FOL.  In fact, they are isomorphic to Peirce's
> Alpha + Beta EGs.  For an overview, see slides 25 to 32 of
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



If:

“It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
object (i.e. internal to the sign)



then:

what is the ‘Object’ in Sign Object Interpretant or Object Sign
Interpretant?



Will you supply a reference where the matter can be settled?



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:52 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Helmut, List
>
> Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
>> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
>> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
>> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
>> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>>
>
> It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
> external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
> object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
> dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
> object too, but so is the subject of the sentence
>
> F
>
>
>> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
>> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
>> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
>> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
>> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
>> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
>> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
>> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
>> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
>> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing,
>> but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal
>> in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that
>> the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
>> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
>> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
>> would be so easy.
>> Best, Helmut
>>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>>
>> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>>
>> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>>
>> FB
>> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling
>> distinctions" (EP 2:494)
>>
>> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
>> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
>> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
>> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
>> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
>> and to the most widely used logics today.
>>
>> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
>> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
>> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>>
>> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> > faculty.
>>
>> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
>> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
>> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
>> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
>> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
>> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
>> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>>
>> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
>> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
>> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>>
>> ET
>> > I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
>> > expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
>> > application to material life.
>> >
>> > My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
>> > is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
>> > Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
>> > vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
>> > nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>>
>> I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
>> terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
>> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
>> terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
>> relating his 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,

I like where this conversation is heading..

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:43 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list
>
> Yes - I obviously agree; I think one can get trapped in the isolation of
> words and should instead, consider their function in the actual world. As
> Peirce noted:
>
> "In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one
> should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by
> necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these
> consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception". CP
> 5.9]and 5.402 and 5.422.
>
> Pragmatism is, as you point out, the key method of 'making our ideas
> clear' [see note 1, CP: 5.9]
>
> Again, "the possible practical consequences of a concept constitute the
> sum total of the concept" 5.27
>
> As Peirce wrote, "Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing
> definitions" 5.393. Certainly, "our existing beliefs can be set in order by
> this process" [ibid] but, this doesn't lead us to understanding what is
> going on.
>
> Obviously, my preferred focus for the pragmatic nature of semiosis is
> biosemiotics, but, I'm also interested in economic and societal realms.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 06/09/18 4:01 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Jon, list,
>
> I agree with Edwina, because to make my ideas clearer, I need to check
> them with real-life-affairs, such as biosemiotics, and other special
> sciences like physics. Especially if I want to overcome the somehow
> ever-present idea of mind-matter-duality, to explain it away by replacing
> it with mind-monism, would be to reconstruct it with the idea of
> spatiotemporal scales. E.g. that matter is effete mind, is a time-scale
> thing, I would say. And therefore it helps very much, I think, to regard
> biosemiotics, with its different time scales in the evolution of
> matter/energy, organisms, animals, mammals, humans, and cultural habits.
> So, only speaking for myself, I get good aha-experiences more likely by
> switching between cenoscopy and idioscopy (or between pure reason and
> examples from experience) all the time from the start.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  06. September 2018 um 19:31 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:
>
> Edwina, John S., List:
>
> As I have said before (more than once), my own purpose in focusing so much
> on Peirce's concepts and terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own
> sake, but primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.  This is a
> necessary and important step before we can properly identify and
> explicate the resulting "pragmatic applications" in other fields,
> beginning with Metaphysics and continuing on to the Special Sciences such
> as biosemiotics.  After all, Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to
> determine any truth of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining
> the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400;
> 1907).
>
> Also, as far as I know, no one on the List is advocating "Platonic
> idealism."  Why keep bringing it up?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 11:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>>
>> John, list
>>
>> Yes, but I'm trying to emphasize, or perhaps remind ourselves, that
>> Peircean semiotics is not expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in
>> its pragmatic application to material life. That is - there are three
>> 'parts' so to speak; language/logic/pragmatic application.
>>
>> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce is
>> often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since Peirce often
>> changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the vital ground of Peircean
>> semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental nature of Peircean semiotics -
>> which is its pragmaticism.
>>
>> And an ever-present danger when we confine ourselves to this rhetoric
>> [but not logic] - is that easy slip into Platonic idealism - which actually
>> denies pragmaticism because it separates Mind and Matter.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Thu 06/09/18 11:35 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>>
>> On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>> > I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but
>> > my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely,
>> > that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system.
>>
>> I agree with your concerns. I know many logicians who get lost
>> in the technical details and ignore all the issues about relating
>> logic to language, thought, and life.
>>
>> I also admit that it's much easier to write many pages of ordinary
>> language than to write a few lines of precisely stated mathematics
>> or mathematical logic. Peirce knew that. But he also knew that
>> precision required a restatement in terms of some version of logic.
>>
>> Basic point: 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Francesco, list:



In London, a person gets mugged every ten minutes.

And he’s getting mighty sick of it!



Why is this joke funny?



~Katy Sarah Jones,

Towards an understanding of the use of indefinite expressions for definite
reference in English discourse



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:41 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following
>
> JAS: the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.
>
> He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the
> sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain
> characters", this is obviosuly and patently false:
>
> CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
> indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)
>
> CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or
> of Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects
> that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
> signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)
>
> "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. of
> symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).
>
> Best
> Francesco
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 10:26 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>>
>>> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
>>> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
>>> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>>>
>>
>> If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object,
>> of course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually,
>> a rhematic index).
>>
>>>
>>> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
>>> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
>>> problem is already here.
>>>
>>>
>>> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false;
>>> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
>>> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
>>> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
>>> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
>>> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>>>
>>
>> Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of generality?
>> Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? As I see
>> it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a symbol.
>> Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context only
>> confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of
>> "necessitant" (see below).
>>
>> Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean
>> that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce
>> was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such
>> ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder
>> whether we are going beyond exegesis.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as
>>> a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore
>>> all propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a
>>> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a
>>> Designative or a Copulative.
>>>
>>
>> In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy
>> descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the
>> trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce
>> established such ordering?
>>
>> Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all
>> propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they
>> are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that
>> propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of
>> indexical propositions?
>>
>>
>>>
>>> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
>>> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
>>> generality, or in neither sense.
>>>
>>>
>>> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic
>>> Object of a Collective Sign.
>>>
>>
>> Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at
>> present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you using
>> general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose of
>> doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are around?
>>
>> Francesco
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
>>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Francesco, list,



Thanks for being patient with me for it is not obvious to me, yet.



You said:

The statue of Peirce's example is an Actisign because it is a singular that
acts as a sign



But what I was asking is, given that that is the rule to which you refer
when you say,

As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign



Do you mean to say that is how you were intending to mean by “the” statue?

That is, why did you say *the* statue and not *that* statue, when Peirce
used the demonstrative pronoun, *that,* and not the definite article, *the*?


That is what is not obvious to me.



With best wishes,

Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
> FB:  I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
> object intended as the subject of a proposition
>
>
> As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose Object
> is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the Immediate
> Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>
> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
> problem is already here.
>
>
> The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false; the
> generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective) has
> absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>
> FB:  Perhaps the solution is that a Symbol cannot be a "normal" Actisign
> but it can be an Actisign which is a replica of a Famisign. The distinction
> between standard Sinsigns and Replicas comes from the Syllabus.
>
>
> Indeed--what I have been suggesting on the List for some time now is that *all
> *Signs are general Types, such that there are no Sinsigns/Actisigns other
> than Replicas (Tokens), and there are no Qualisigns/Potisigns other than
> significant characters (Tones) embodied in Replicas.  This is my
> interpretation of Peirce's statements that "a sign is not a real thing.  It
> is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303; 1904); and "the
> sign's mode of being is ... such that it consists in the existence of
> replicas destined to bring its interpreter into relation to some object ...
> The sign only exists in replicas" (NEM 4:297,300; 1904).  That which is a
> real *thing*--i.e., that which exists in itself (Matter) or as embodied
> characters (Form)--*cannot *be a Sign (Entelechy).
>
> FB:  I think he was not wrong to classify particular propositions as
> Descriptives, the passage clearly shows that with "Descriptive" he means
> "Some S is P".
>
>
> Yes, but he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*")
> as a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and
> therefore all propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a
> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a
> Designative or a Copulative.
>
> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
> generality, or in neither sense.
>
>
> By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic Object
> of a Collective Sign.  If I am right that all Signs are Types, then it
> follows that all Signs have General Objects; i.e., all Signs are
> Collectives.  However, rather than *classifying *Signs, my organizing
> principle is recognizing that there are three kinds of *triadic relations*
> in semiosis--genuine, between the General Object, Sign (Type), and Final
> Interpretant; degenerate, between each individual Dynamic Object,
> Sign-Replica (Token), and Dynamic Interpretant; and doubly degenerate,
> between an Immediate Object, a set of Sign-Qualities (Tone), and an
> Immediate Interpretant.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci  googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>
>> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Francesco, List:
>>>
>>> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
>>> move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
>>> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
>>> latter.
>>>
>>
>> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
>> object intended as the subject of a proposition
>>
>>>
>>> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
>>> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Francesco, list,



Peirce said:

*That* statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign.



You said:

As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign



Is there here a difference between *that* statue and *the* statue?

That is, why is the statue an Actisign, and obviously so?



Thanks,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:24 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List, Jeff:
>
> On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> wrote:
>
> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal
> to Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the
> existential graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more
> minute analysis of examples. What is more, I think that the application of
> such formal tools would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools
> of phenomenological analysis when looking at particular cases of
> inference--such as when we are looking at the role of the immediate object
> in Peirce's discussion with Juliette about the weather. What can we learn
> from the existential graphs and phenomenology about the dialogue that is
> taking place between the two--and the role of the immediate object in
> explaining what it is being conveyed as the conversation progresses from
> Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the decisions she makes about how
> to prepare for her day?
>
> Yours,
>
> Jeff
>
>
> Your suggestion is an important one.
>
> I feel that it part of the deeper issue of the role of the concept of
> identity in bridging the communications gap between the origin of the sign
> and the meaning of the sign for someone who may also be interpreting the
> same sign.
>
> As I have previously noted, the issue of the capability of interpreting a
> form of a sign with a form of responding conceptually to the sign, varies
> widely.  In part, it is a matter of feelings about earlier events which can
> trigger recall of similar signs.  Such feelings may exist in one observer
> but not the other.
>
> (Metaphorically, the two observers may have elaborated two radically
> different sheets of assertion before the sign-event became a shared
> experience.)
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Welcome Francesco;

dear list,



You said:



The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a Symbol.

But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign.

*The problem is already here*.



Would you mind clarifying, please?

What’s the problem again and what rules?



Thanks,



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Francesco, list
>
> Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used by
> Peirce.
>
> One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move away
> from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process. That is, the
> term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a symbol; by a
> legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic embedded nature suggests
> that the term cannot be set up to operate as a pure intellectual construct,
> akin to a Platonic Form.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 05/09/18 2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
>
> Jon, Gary, List
>
> thanks for your replies.
>
> As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" in
> at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
> have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
> types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
> also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
> term).
>
> GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
> quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had
> occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a general
> object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
>
>
> At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the object
> of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is whatever
> possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce, generals are
> real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368 "general object" is
> used in another sense: "distributively general object" means the
> universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why the notion of a general
> object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic, and not as a species of the
> immediate) looks very unPeircean to me: if we mean the object of a symbol,
> it's the dynamic object which is general; if we mean the object of a
> universally quantified sentence, it's the immediate object that is general;
> if we mean a legisign, it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I
> don't see what other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
> interpretation of Peirce.
>
>
> JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I already
> quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not equivalent to
> "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed
> to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover, any common noun, such as
> "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904)
> despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate
> Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds
> to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification
> only comes into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition.
>
>
> The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
> 2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
> opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite". Cf. e.g.
> R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is opposed to vague and
> singular, it means "distributively general". That the sense in which
> "general" is used in the division of signs according to the immediate
> object is "distributively general" is clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284,
> p. 67
>
>
> According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
> Indefinite Sign
> Singular Sign
> Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
>
> General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the logically
> formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive Generality. (R
> 284, p. 67)
>
> Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the rheme
> "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol, i.e. a sign
> whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses the set of
> characters that corresponds to its definition. But the general object of a
> symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of characters that
> corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the dynamic, not the immediate
> object. For icon/index/symbol is a division according to the dynamic, not
> the immediate object.
>
> Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that possesses
> the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the immediate
> object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that corresponds to
> the definition of man? 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Schematic Representation of the Triad ?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



This all sounds Relative..



But if one were to ask of the utterer,

“Why do you do what you do?  What is the good in it?”,

what would he say?



.. because Peirce?  But Peirce is hard.



And let us ask what we mean by calling a thing *hard*.



For What is first for us and what is first by nature are and are not the
same.

But what is first for us is not first in nature.



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 2:42 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

>
> Jon, Edwina, list,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
>
> JAS: I find it misleading to say that Peirce "put the Interpretant first"
> in CP 2.254.  . .  As such, the first trichotomy provides the noun in each
> of the class names, while the other two trichotomies supply the modifying
> adjectives; and it is only because adjectives always come *before* nouns
> in English that the S-FI and S-DO terms precede the S term.  In another
> language (e.g., Spanish) where adjectives can come *after* the nouns that
> they modify, one would presumably refer to a Sinsign Indexical Rhematic.
>
>
> I disagree. As I just wrote in response to Edwina, it is my understanding
> that Peirce named the 10 classes in the Order of Involution, necessarily
> beginning with the Interpretant. Since I associate the Interpretant with
> 3ns, Object with 2ns, and the Sign itself with 1ns, this seems simply the
> ilnvolutional order of naming them as 3ns involves 2ns involves 1ns == I
> involves O involves S. In my view, they would have been named in this order
> even had Peirce been Spanish speaking.
>
>
> JAS: I also find it misleading to suggest that the Sign/Representamen
> comes first in semiosis.  As I have noted recently, since the Sign *mediates
> between*the Object and Interpretant, the "directionality" is instead
> *from *the Object *through *the Sign *to *the Interpretant.
>
>
> Of course I completely agree.
>
> JAS: Moreover, the order of (logical/semeiotic) determination per EP 2:481
> is not DO-IO-S-II-DI-FI, but DO-IO-S-FI-DI-II; the Destinate Interpretant
> is the Final Interpretant and the Explicit Interpretant is the Immediate
> Interpretant, not the other way around.
>
>
> While I have *tended *to agree with your schema, I think it might be
> helpful for those following these grammatical discussions if you were to
> explain your understanding of the "logical order of determination" ("the
> Destinate Interpretant is the Final Interpretant and the Explicit
> Interpretant is the Immediate Interpretant, not the other way around") as
> at first blush it may seem counterintuitive (it certainly did to me!)
>
> JAS: Finally, while Peirce's Categories do not directly apply to Sign
> classification, they are reflected in the three Universes of Possibles,
> Existents, and Necessitants by which Signs are divided in each of the ten
> trichotomies of his 1908 taxonomy.
>
>
> If one associates, as I do, the Sign with 1ns (the simplest), the Object
> with 2ns (the middling complexity), and the Interpretant with 3ns (the most
> complex), then there is at least a double categorial involvement, that for
> each correlate (e.g. icon/index/symbol) and that of the involution of each
> sign class as noted earlier. Indeed, I find at least one, perhaps two other
> ways in which the categories may play a part in the structuring of the
> diagram of the 10 classes. But that's a discussion for another day.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 3:46 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, Cecile, List:
>>
>> I find it misleading to say that Peirce "put the Interpretant first" in
>> CP 2.254.  The three trichotomies of his 1903 taxonomy correspond to the
>> Sign *itself *as Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign, the *relation* of the Sign
>> to its (Dynamic) Object as Icon/Index/Symbol, and the *relation *of the
>> Sign to its (Final) Interpretant as Rheme/Dicent/Argument.  As such, the
>> first trichotomy provides the noun in each of the class names, while the
>> other two trichotomies supply the modifying adjectives; and it is only
>> because adjectives always come *before* nouns in English that the S-FI
>> and S-DO terms precede the S term.  In another language (e.g., Spanish)
>> where adjectives can come *after* the nouns that they modify, one would
>> presumably refer to a Sinsign Indexical Rhematic.
>>
>> I also find it misleading to suggest that the Sign/Representamen comes
>> first in semiosis.  As I have noted recently, since the Sign *mediates
>> between* the Object and Interpretant, the "directionality" is instead *from
>> *the Object *through *the Sign *to *the Interpretant.  Moreover, the
>> order of (logical/semeiotic) determination per EP 2:481 is not
>> DO-IO-S-II-DI-FI, but DO-IO-S-FI-DI-II; the Destinate Interpretant is the
>> Final Interpretant and the Explicit Interpretant is the Immediate
>> Interpretant, not the 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,

If a science, [is] the total principal industry of a social group, whose
whole lives, or many years of them, are consecrated to inquiries to which
they are so devoted as to be drawn to every person who is pursuing similar
inquiries, and these inquiries conducted according to the best methods so
far found out..

*But where, in all this, is the science?*

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina wrote:
>
> Well this is certainly not how Peirce saw scientific inquiry. There are
> many places and times in his life when he wrote something similar to this.
>
> 1910 | Quest of Quest | MS [R] 655
>
> … how shall we define a science? . . . a science, [is] the total
> principal industry of a social group, whose whole lives, or many years of
> them, are consecrated to inquiries to which they are so devoted as to be
> drawn to every person who is pursuing similar inquiries, and these
> inquiries conducted according to the best methods so far found out, to
> which they were trained and for the prosecution of which every [one] of
> them possessed special advantages, their different inquiries being so
> nearly of the same nature that they thoroughly understood one another’s
> difficulties and merits, and could after a brief preparation have generally
> each one have taken up and carried on the other’s work, although probably
> not with quite his success.
>
> So you are a generalist? It is possible that I am, at least to some
> extent, as well. But I respect this definition of discrete sciences which
> Peirce offers.
>
> You wrote: I agree with John that 'the entities of pure mathematics do
> not exist in the universe of actuality'
>
> But John also wrote:  The entities in the universe of necessity, such as
> laws,
> are also outside the universe of actuality.
>
> Do you agree with that as well?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 6:00 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list
>>
>> I don't divide up the world into separate realms of inquiry, so, when you
>> write:
>>
>> "And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns, which
>> are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three Universes, which
>> are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something which you at least seem to
>> do when you write "the three categories/universes." Obviously the Three
>> Universes have a direct connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is
>> an error to conflate or identify them. "
>>
>> ...then, I'm not involved in such a separation of the terms in
>> these disciplines. The three universes, as you note, do have a direct
>> connection to the Categories - and that's my point. I agree with John that
>> 'the entities of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of
>> actuality' - but I don't see how this is a problem.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 22/08/18 5:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, John, Jon, list,
>>
>> Edwina wrote: So- nothing I've said denies the quotes you've provided.
>>
>> I have written enough today on this topic, yet I think that a close
>> reading of at least some of those quotations would refute your denial. But
>> for now let me just ask you, do you agree with the way John Sowa
>> distinguished the three universes in his recent post?
>>
>> JS: I was using Peirce's three disjoint universes. The entities
>> of pure mathematics do not exist in the universe of actuality.
>>
>> The entities in the universe of necessity, such as laws,
>> are also outside the universe of actuality.
>>
>>
>> For me the key phrase in the first passage above is "do not exist in the
>> universe of actuality," and in the second, "are also outside the universe
>> of actuality." I doubt that you'd agree with John that these are "three
>> disjoint universes" (I am assuming that by "disjoint" he means here
>> distinct/discrete.)
>>
>> And, by the way, I would not identify the categories, 1ns/2ns/3ns, which
>> are a product of phenomenological inquiry, with the Three Universes, which
>> are a product of metaphysical inquiry, something which you at least seem to
>> do when you write "the three categories/universes." Obviously the Three
>> Universes have a direct connection to the Categories, yet as I see it it is
>> an error to conflate or identify them.
>>
>> In addition, as Jon just wrote:  "The constituents of Peirce's third
>> Universe--includ[e] not only Laws, but also Signs, Habits, and continua (EP
>> 2:435&479; 1908)-"  and, in my view, continua in particular
>> unequivocally distinguish the third universe from the second.
>>
>> Parenthetically, I'd add that in my view it is an error not to
>> differentiate the universal categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns from their
>> application within semeiotics, metaphysics, and elsewhere. These are
>> separate sciences with different goals, etc. So,  note that in Peirce's
>> classification (following Comte) a science lower in the classification
>> may depend on another 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Logic is rooted in the social principle.



Women were expected to have weak opinions; but the great safeguard of
society and of domestic life was, that opinions were not acted on.  Sane
people did what their neighbors did, so that if any lunatics were at large,
one might know and avoid them. ~George Eliot



This is man:

Again, no.  For Peirce, mediating, synthesizing, and generalizing are
indeed powerful, but they are *not *actions.  ..actions are *always and
only *manifestations of 2ns..

Finally, in my opinion--and, I believe, in Peirce's--someone who is not
interested in terminology is evidently not interested in *making our ideas
clear*.  Carefully selecting and defining the terms that we use to describe
what is going on is not merely an academic exercise for the seminar room,
but *pragmatically critical *for understanding and discussing what is
actually happening in the real world.



“Thus, under color of the fiction (necessary though it be on the given
premises) that the acts of the state embody the real will of all the
people, certain powerful groups are enabled to impose, by force or by
threat of force, their will and interest upon their fellows.



Over against these individual wills is placed a higher will of the state,
to restrain them, combat them, and keep them within bounds.



This higher will of the state is assumed to be the general or social will;
not the will of all the members, for no such entity can possibly exist, but
the will which *purposes* the general good..



.. it certainly seems as though groups which acted with disinterested
benevolence were rare.  ” ~ Randall, *The Problem of Group Responsibility
to Society*





The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
perception and make their exit at the gate of *purposive action*; and
whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
arrested as unauthorized by reason.



With best wishes,

Jerry R


On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action.
> Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which
> is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8
>
>
> No, he did not; at least, certainly not in the cited passage.  In fact,
> this is a blatantly inaccurate paraphrase of it, so I will quote it in full.
>
> CSP:  It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are:
> first, feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of
> time, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis;
> second, consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness,
> sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third,
> synthetic consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought.
>
> If we accept these [as] the fundamental elementary modes of consciousness,
> they afford a psychological explanation of the three logical conceptions of
> quality, relation, and synthesis or mediation. The conception of quality,
> which is absolutely simple in itself and yet viewed in its relations is
> seen to be full of variety, would arise whenever feeling or the singular
> consciousness becomes prominent. The conception of relation comes from the
> dual consciousness or sense of action and reaction. The conception of
> mediation springs out of the plural consciousness or sense of learning. (CP
> 1.377-378; 1887-1888)
>
>
> Peirce here *did not* characterize mediation as "active," or even
> directly contrast "passive consciousness" (1ns) with "synthetic
> consciousness" (3ns) so as to *imply *that the latter is active.  On the
> contrary, he also mentioned "consciousness of an interruption" (2ns), and
> then went on to call it "dual consciousness or sense of action and
> reaction."  In other words, it is clearly the latter type of consciousness
> (2ns), rather than synthetic consciousness (3ns), that is properly
> described as *active*.
>
> ET:  Thirdness is in my understanding of Peirce a dynamic process, which
> is to say, an action.
>
>
> No.  For Peirce, anything "dynamic" is associated with 2ns, not 3ns.  This
> is intrinsic to his analysis of a Sign as having a *Dynamic *Object and
> producing *Dynamic *Interpretants by means of its *actual *Instances.
>
> ET:  As such, it mediates, it synthesizes, it generalizes. These are all
> actions - powerful actions.
>
>
> Again, no.  For Peirce, mediating, synthesizing, and generalizing are
> indeed powerful, but they are *not *actions.  They are manifestations of
> 3ns, while actions are *always and only* manifestations of 2ns.  As Gary
> R. already pointed out, *in Peirce's terminology*, molding reactions is
> *not* an action; imparting a quality to reactions is *not* an action; and
> bringing things into relation with each other is *not *an action.
>
> CSP:  It is to be observed that a sign has its being in the *power *to
> bring about a determination of a Matter to a 

Re: Determination in Logic as Semeiotic vs Biosemiotic, was, [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



I do not think one realizes how *fatal* the following admission is for one
who attempts to ultimately justify a correct interpretation of Peirce’s
intention based only on his writings.



“..when we are talking about Instances or Sign-Replicas.

However, I acknowledge that Peirce himself was not always careful about
this, which sometimes poses challenges for interpreting his writings.”



Best,
Jerry R


On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 6:34 PM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> You appear to be arguing that in 1904, or whenever he wrote “New
> Elements,” Peirce decided that only Types (or Legisigns) were properly
> called “signs,” i.e. Replicas (or Sinsigns) should not be called “signs.”
> But several of the classes *of signs* he named in 1906-08 are not Types
> or Legisigns; so Peirce must have changed his mind about that, if he really
> meant in 1904 that only Types are signs. This brings up two questions:
>
> When and why do you think Peirce changed his mind about only Types being
> signs?
>
> Why should we take Peirce’s usage in “New Elements” as governing his
> entire semiotic theory from then on, rather than taking it as a peculiarity
> of that particular moment of his thinking?
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* 7-Aug-18 18:13
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Determination in Logic as Semeiotic vs Biosemiotic, was,
> [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants
>
>
>
> Jeff, List:
>
>
>
> I understand the reasoning behind that interpretation, but I have argued
> against it previously on the basis that Peirce went on to discuss Icons and
> Indices as Signs at EP 2:306-307, not just Symbols.  A degenerate Sign is
> still a Sign, and later in the same paragraph where he said that "a sign is
> not a real thing," he talked about "Giving to the word *sign *the full
> scope that reasonably belongs to it for logical purposes ..." (although I
> acknowledge that his subsequent examples were all Symbols).
>
>
>
> As I have said before, somewhat controversially, I currently view *every *Sign
> as a Type--such that what Peirce called a Sinsign in 1903 is always an
> Instance or Replica of a Sign (i.e., a Token of a Type), and what he called
> a Qualisign in 1903 is a significant character that is embodied in such an
> Instance or Replica (i.e., a Tone of a Token).  The ripples on a lake (or
> the orientation of a weathercock) are an Index of the direction of the wind 
> *here
> and now* only because there is a *general *law of nature that governs
> them, which makes them capable of being interpreted as such *no matter
> where they are located or when they are observed*.  Again as Peirce put
> it, "A real thing does not so exist in replica" (EP 2:303; 1904).
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 4:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
> Jon S., Edwina, Gary R, List,
>
> There are a number of ways of interpreting the claim that:  "a sign is
> not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904)
>
> Jon suggests that the emphasis should be placed on "thing," rather than on
> "real," which seems like a reasonable suggestion. Another option,
> compatible with this, would be to interpret Peirce as using the more
> general term "sign" in a manner that implied something more restricted like
> "legisign" or "symbolic sign."
>
> The interpretative suggestion I am making may seem strained, but I find
> that Peirce at times is using a more general term (e.g., genuine triad)
> when it is clear that he really means to restrict what is being claimed
> (e.g., to thoroughly genuine triads). As far as I can tell, he seems to
> think the context is sufficient to indicate that the more restricted class
> is meant--although I admit that this could be a misinterpretation of the
> plain meaning of what is said in the texts.
>
> One reason I am drawn to this interpretation is that Peirce says
> (somewhere, I can't put my finger on it) that every individual object that
> stands in an existential relation to another individual object *can*
> serve as an index. If we take the interpretative approach that I'm
> suggesting, then it makes perfect sense to say that a symbolic legisign is
> not a real individual thing. Having said that, a genuine indexical sinsign
> is an existing individual thing. What is more, some indexical sinsigns may
> stand in existential and dynamical relations (i.e., dyadic relations) to
> their objects. That, at least, is how I tend to interpret Peirce's claims
> about indexical sinsigns that have the capacity to be interpreted in a mind
> (e.g., the ripples on the lake as an index of the direction of the
> wind)--but have not, at least not yet.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
>
> 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



I’m convinced our construction and communication of Peirce’s system is a
unicorn;

or even more appropriately- a phoenix.



For I distinctly recall this conversation to have happened before..

then it died..

And now, it bursts forth to reliably disappear again..



It is predictable that we will itch,

and we will scratch it again- perhaps fated forever to never leave a mark.

What a peaceful existence..



Best,
Jerry R


On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 2:22 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
> ok, but "unlimited and final study would" not show what a phoenix or a
> unicorn would be, because if it does not exist, why "would" it anything?
> This study would only show the concept´s extension. And: "What unlimited
> and final study would show it to be" is *now*: A concept. So I am not
> merely reconstructing, but think that my view might also pass for some sort
> of hermeneutics with, admittedly, slight deviations, which I hope may be
> seen as within the interpretational range.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 06. August 2018 um 21:10 Uhr
>
> "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> wrote:
> Helmut, List:
>
> Peirce's example was a phoenix, rather than a unicorn.
>
>
> CSP:  A Replica of the word "camel" is likewise a Rhematic Indexical
> Sinsign, being really affected, through the knowledge of camels, common to
> the speaker and auditor, by the real camel it denotes, even if this one is
> not individually known to the auditor; and it is through such real
> connection that the word "camel" calls up the idea of a camel. The same
> thing is true of the word "phoenix." For although no phoenix really exists,
> real descriptions of the phoenix are well known to the speaker and his
> auditor; and thus the word is really affected by the Object denoted. (CP
> 2.261, EP 2:295; 1903)
>
>
> CSP:  For, after all, collateral observation, aided by imagination and
> thought, will usually result in some idea, though this need not be
> particularly determinate; but may be indefinite in some regards and general
> in others. Such an apprehension, approaching, however distantly, that of
> the Object strictly so called, ought to be, and usually is, termed the
> "immediate object" of the sign in the intention of its utterer. It may be
> that there is no such thing or fact in existence, or in any other mode of
> reality; but we surely shall not deny to the common picture of a phoenix or
> to a figure of naked truth in her well the name of a "sign," simply because
> the bird is a fiction and Truth an *ens rationis*.
> If there be anything *real *(that is, anything whose characters are true
> of it independently of whether you or I, or any man, or any number of men
> think them as being characters of it, or not) that sufficiently corresponds
> with the immediate object (which, since it is an apprehension, is not
> real), then whether this be identifiable with the Object strictly so called
> or not, it ought to be called, and usually is called, the "real object" of
> the sign. (EP 2:409; 1907)
>
>
> CSP:  We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,--i.e., the Object
> as represented in the Sign,--and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object
> is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term; therefore:), say
> rather the Dynamical Object ... (EP 2:498; 1909)
>
>
> A word like "unicorn" or "phoenix" has an Immediate Object (the idea that
> it calls up) and a Dynamic Object (what unlimited and final study would
> show it to be), even though it has no Real Object.
>
>
> HR:  I think, consistency beats hermeneutics.
>
>
> This is true when creating one's own system with consistency as a
> desideratum.  It is a false dichotomy when attempting to reconstruct
> someone else's system--in this case, Peirce's--since the principle of
> charity in hermeneutics is to *presuppose *consistency unless and until
> it proves to be untenable to do so.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 1:24 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Jon, List,
>> I just want to tell how I came to my view: To understand a theory or a
>> mathematical equation, it is good to look at the extreme conditions. An
>> extreme condition for a DO would be, that it does not exist, like a
>> unicorn. In the unicorn case, people (somebody in this list many years ago)
>> said, that in this case the DO would be its concept. But a binary switch
>> (this case so, other case other) is not consistent. So it must be the
>> concept in any case, is what I concluded.
>> And: Peirce was not the burning bush. I think, consistency beats
>> hermeneutics.
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>> 06. August 2018 um 19:58 Uhr
>>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>> wrote:
>> Helmut, List:
>>
>> With all due respect, that does not solve any problems, it just changes
>> the terminology in a way that deviates from Peirce's own consistent usage.
>> The DO *is* "the thing itself," while the IO is closer to "the thing's
>> concept."
>>
>>
>> CSP:  ... the *immediate* object, if it be the idea which the sign is
>> built upon, the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Helmut, list,



*There is a crying scandal in philosophy.  *

*This is the paradox of an extreme diversity of opinion in regard to the
immediately given as such (that is to say, apparently, in regard to the
obvious in its very obviousness).*



The experiment therefore ought to be made, whether we should not succeed
better with the problems of metaphysic, by assuming that the objects must
conform to our mode of cognition, for this would better agree with the
demanded possibility of an *a priori* knowledge of them, which is to settle
something about objects, *before* they are given us.



We have here the same case as with the first thought of Copernicus..



and I must therefore, even *before* objects are given to me,

presuppose the rules of the understanding as existing within me *a priori*,

these rules being expressed in concepts *a priori*,

to which all objects of experience must necessarily conform,

and with which they must agree.



This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity with that of the
chemists,

which they sometimes call the experiment of reduction,

or the synthetical process in general..



In this case, speculative reason has at least gained for us room for such
an extension of knowledge, though it had to leave it empty, so that we are
not only *at liberty*, but are really called upon to *fill it up*, if we
are able, by *practical data* of reason.



"[I intend] to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to
outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire
work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in
mathematics, in psychology, in the physical sciences, in history, in
sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as
the *filling up* of its details.



The exposition of the materials which for more than twelve successive years
I had been carefully maturing, was not composed in a sufficiently suitable
manner for general comprehension. For the perfecting of its exposition
several years would have been required, whereas I brought it to completion
in some four to five months, in the fear that, on longer delay, so
prolonged a labour might finally become burdensome, and that my increasing
years.. would perhaps incapacitate me, while I am still the sole possessor
of my complete system.



You see at once that we have here all the main elements of moral conduct.





So, why one two three; esthetics ethics logic; *from CP 5.402 to CP 5.189 *?

Well, I would think that is obvious in its very obviousness, for



The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
arrested as unauthorized by reason.



As to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely identical
with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion plus appetition when these
follow as a conclusion from deliberation.



But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some
object, and a man deliberating always has some aim in view with reference
to which he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End,
but this is a starting-point or assumption, like the postulates in the
theoretic sciences;

whereas with all men deliberation whether technical or untechnical is about
the means that lead to their End.



And the question of means will depend rather on a prior question, that is,
the question of object. For one who deliberates deliberates if he has
considered, from the standpoint of the End, either what tends to enable him
to bring the End to himself or how he can himself go to the End.



 “Aristotle thinks that the deliberator begins with a goal or target or
end, the realization of which is both desirable and difficult: she cannot
immediately see how to bring it about.  She reasons backwards from this
end, working out the process by which she might bring it into being.  Drawing
the end into the sphere of her own agency, she eventually hits upon
something she sees she can do.  This action then becomes the object of her
choice. Aristotle’s agent *evaluates* neither the goal with which she
begins her deliberation nor the action in which her deliberation ends.
Instead,
her deliberation consists in the mental activity of *deriving the action
from the goal*.”



Therefore the End is the starting-point of the process of thought,

but the conclusion of the process of thought is the starting-point of
action..

The End is therefore the object for which the thing chosen is the mean, of
which End goodness is the cause by its act of choice—though the choice is
not of the End but of the means adopted for the sake of the End.



"Ethics is not practics; ..

it involves the theory of the ideal itself, the nature of the summum bonum;

and .. in so far as ethics studies the conformity of conduct to an ideal,
it is limited to a particular ideal, which  is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: peerages

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Gary R, list,



I actually found your comment and subsequent Reactions to be very helpful.

It exposes what we say/do know about Peirce’s concept of ‘community of
inquiry’.



All such appearances are now flying around and set down.  What needs left
to do, then, is ‘first working through the puzzles, in this way go on to
show, if possible, the truth of all the beliefs we hold about these
experiences; and, if this is not possible, the truth of the greatest number
and the most authoritative.  For if the difficulties are resolved and the
beliefs are left in place, we will have done enough showing.’



I think if you were to investigate a bit more closely, you might recognize
that Peirce has given us a proper philosophical method.  But where is it,
who possesses it, and how shall we know it?  Until we have discovered the
right path to pursue – a path overgrown by the errors and illusions of
sense- our *conception* of philosophy is only a scholastic *conception* – a
*conception*, that is, of a system of cognition which we are trying to
elaborate into a science..



Moreover, what the genuine community of inquiry recognizes is not merely
obvious.

To assert that we are in possession of that recognition, itself, is
difficult and *hard* to reconcile with the possibility that we may not
belong to that community, but only promises to belong to that community.



It is to our advantage to remember that ‘our defects are the eyes with
which we see the ideal.’

‘An enlightened version of Homeric *ate* (blindness) remains the cause of
hubris even in Socrates.’



For instance, Rick Kennedy relays the story of “King of Siam, while
listening to a Dutch ambassador tell of the far north, suddenly recoil at
the report that water gets so cold in Holland that it turns hard enough for
an elephant to walk on it.  Astonished, the king replies, “Hitherto I have
believed the strange Things you have told me, because I look upon you as a
sober fair man, but now I am sure you lye.”  The story’s goal is to help
readers understand that reliance on one’s own experience and reason is
limited and that assent to testimony, even highly improbable testimony,
from a credible witness is important for right reasoning.”



Alas, if only Peirce was straight with us, rather than succumbing to the
predominance of their horror of the “too much”.



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Tue, Jul 31, 2018 at 4:39 PM,  wrote:

> Gary R,
>
> Near the end of your post, which makes a number of points worthy of a good
> moderator, you wrote:
>
> [[ So, contra your view of the list, Gary f, I do not see Peirce-L as
> *essentially* a "community of inquiry," ]]
>
> I also do not see Peirce-L as *essentially* a "community of inquiry"; I
> see it as essentially a “big tent” which happens to *include* a community
> of inquiry into the truth about Peirce’s system, and I did my best to make
> that clear in my post. But obviously I failed, although on reading it
> again, I don’t see how I could have made my point much clearer. There must
> be something there which is drawing all these hostile readings and angry
> responses to ideas I did not express, but I just can’t see where they are
> coming from. I certainly don’t want to be unhelpful to my peers, so instead
> of thinking twice before writing a post (as a generally do), maybe I should
> think nine or ten times. That should save me a lot of writing time too!
> Anyway, I’ll stop now — sorry if I caused the list any grief.
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* 31-Jul-18 15:10
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: peerages
>
>
>
> Gary f, list,
>
>
>
> While I would certainly hope that all the subscribers to the Peirce-L
> forum know that they are peers here, I'm not at all certain that all do
> feel that way--are always being made to feel that way; and it seems to me
> unlikely that a comment like the following will help many--including
> perhaps especially observers, so-called 'lurkers'--feel that sense of
> peerage.
>
>
>
> You wrote:
>
>
>
> Gf: It’s become clear lately that many (perhaps most) members of the
> peirce-l community are not interested in this kind of inquiry, and belong
> instead to a community interested mainly in the exchange of opinions,
> either about Peirce’s system or about other topics they associate with
> Peirce.
>
>
>
> Most of the members of Peirce-L are observers group which the founder of
> this forum, Joseph Ransdell, earnestly welcomed to it. And neither you nor
> I nor anyone but they know what they are interested in. Joe wrote (and I'd
> especially encourage observers to read this passage):
>
>
>
> OBSERVERS ("LURKERS")
> --
>
> *Observers as well as active participants are welcome, and equally so:
> this is a public forum. Moreover, observers are participants, too, insofar
> as they are affected by what they observe; and those who believe, as Peirce
> did, that thought is best regarded as essentially communicational in form
> will 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear John list,



Who, then, studies the real goal?



Best,

Jerry R


On Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 9:16 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Helmut, Auke, and Jerry,
>
> HR
>
>> what does "normative" mean?
>>
>
> Note what Auke said:
>
>> Don’t confuse mathematical logic with normative logic.
>>
>
> See the attached cspsci.gif, which shows Peirce's classification
> of the sciences.  Note that the word 'logic' appears in two places:
>
>  1. On the left, formal logic is a branch of pure mathematics.
> In that sense, it is treated as pure theory that is independent
> of any application to any subject for any purpose.  It doesn't
> make any value judgments about the two truth values {T,F}.
>
>  2. In the middle, logic is used as a normative science to
> determine how people should reason in order to distinguish
> truth from falsity.
>
> JLRC
>
>> For normative science in general being the science of the laws of
>>> conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose
>>> ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose
>>> ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent
>>> something. (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903)
>>>
>>
>> This is, perhaps, the most remarkable characterization of logic
>> I have ever read!
>>
>
> It would be unusual as a definition of a formal logic.  But Peirce
> was discussing normative logic as a subject that depends on ethics
> and esthetics to make value judgments about truth and falsity.
>
> HR
>
>> what is the separating difference between "relation to ends"
>> and "reality"
>>
>
> The word 'ends' is ambiguous.  In this use, Peirce is not talking
> about a spatial end point, but as the final goal or purpose of
> some action.  For a modern audience, it would be better to use
> the word 'goal' or 'purpose'.
>
> Re: The distinction of "relation to ends" and "reality":
>
> The natural sciences study reality (what there is).
> The normative sciences study goals (what should be).
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Edwina, list,



What a wonderfully restrained and informative post.  Thank you.



You said:



I'm not talking about hard science..

*The key wording is the phrase: I consider. *

This sets up the interaction as one between two individuals, each with a
different perspective.

Other equally valid phrases that convey the same intention of individualism
would be:

"In my view..you are not using  Peirce's view correctly';

Or, "I feel that;Or..."My own view differs from yours'.



But-



when a poster instead sets up their view as representing the Final Truth –

and instead says, conclusively: "Your outline is unPeircean'.

Or "Your outline violates the ethics of Peirce's terminology"



..that rhetoric sets up the poster as self-defining his view as The
conclusive Truth.



All that is needed, is a step down from hubris..and a sense of equality –

so that the poster can say: "In my view, your outline is unPeircean'.

That's all.



Not a huge change in words, but *a HUGE change in perspective*.



I hope your recommendation is something *already* familiar to all who
investigate.

I am certain Peirce would have wished to point out such things to guide us,

rather than leave us groping in the dark,

for he was a philosopher.



Now if the body of the All had had to come into existence as a plane
*surface*, having no *depth*, one middle term would have sufficed to bind
together both itself and its fellow-terms

~Timaeus, 30a- 32c



With best wishes,

Jerry R


On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 8:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> In reply:
>
>
>
> On Wed 25/07/18 5:45 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, Helmut, Gary f, Jon S, list,
>
> 1] GARY R I've hesitated writing this as we've been through it before on
> the list, and I don't expect my observations to change anyone's mind.
> However, I think some points warrant comment as, in my view, they impact at
> least on the progress of list discussion and, perhaps, on inquiry more
> generally.
>
> Edwina wrote:
>
> My view is that we, all of us, are operating in the 'DI phase of
> analysis'. The Dynamic Interpretant. None of us, are at the FI, Final
> Interpretant, or 'ultimate truth' phase - and, as Peirce pointed out -
> that's rarely reached.
>
> But Peirce also pointed out that science makes undeniable progress and
> that there are many signs and actual examples of this progress in the laws
> it has discovered. These have, for example, made myriad technologies
> possible. Such laws at least--and the fruits of them--have been firmly
> established through experimental testing and, beyond that, by their
> providing the basis for these aforementioned technologies.
>
> So, for example, even if it is true that Newtonian physics has been at
> least partially superseded theoretically, the laws that Newton and his
> followers discovered made possible useful technologies that are still being
> invented based on them to this day. So while you are quite correct in
> suggesting that arriving at the 'ultimate Truth' in science is rarely--I'd
> suggest, never--reached from one standpoint, from another real-world
> standpoint, many minor 'truths' (for example, those mechanical laws which
> have resulted in the development of technologies) have been discovered
> and will continue to be discovered.
>
> EDWINA: I'm not talking about hard science, i.e., the natural laws of
> physics, etc - where indeed, 'ultimate Truth' about issues in physics,
> chemistry, etc exist and can be finalized. I'm talking about the
> theoretical outlines of Peircean thought dealing with philosophy,
> metaphysics, pragmatism etc - none of which can be said to operate within
> Natural Laws. The analysis of these theories is necessarily always, in the
> 'DI phase of analysis'. There may ultimately be consensus - which is not
> the same as an acknowledgment of an Objective Natural Law - but, this
> consensus, following Popper, has to be kept open to fallibility.
>
> 2. GARY R: Edwina continued:
>
> Therefore, none of us can claim to act as 'the gatekeeper', as the
> ultimate accepted articulators and explainers of The Real True Peirce. And
> therefore, none of us can claim that we alone are using Peirce in an
> 'ethical manner' - since we are each equal in our exploration of his work.
>
> From my vantage point as moderator of Peirce-L, no one here is ever
> prohibited from expressing opinions in the forum; rather, everyone here is
> indeed encouraged to express and defend reasonable opinions regarding
> Peirce's writings. In my view this ought include there being no prohibition
> against some list member expressing his or her considered judgment that
> another list member is, say, misusing Peirce's terminology or even
> misinterpreting Peirce's writings. After all, not all opinions and views
> can sustain intense examination. That is, some may need some tweaking, or
> may even be essentially incorrect. Another way of saying this is that
> Peirce-L is intended to be a forum for 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Helmut Jon Gary list,



This conversation would also benefit from the actors being clearer about
the difference between logical predicates and determining predicates, for
‘the subject can even be predicated of itself.’



“A certain maxim of Logic which I have called Pragmatism has recommended
itself to me for *divers* reasons and on *sundry* considerations.”



The confirmation is the most striking illustration in Strauss’ own writings
of his golden sentence:

“The problem inherent: in the surface of things, and only in the surface of
things, is the heart of things.”

What is first for us and what is first by nature are and are not the same.



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Sun, Jul 22, 2018 at 4:48 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, Gary, list,
> i think that the matters of dichotomy, rheme, proposition, argument, are
> matters of sign classification, while sign, object (immediate and dynamic),
> interpretant (I,D,F), are matters of a sign´s composition. Different
> matters are different topics not to be blended: You can either talk about
> classes or parts. Of course both correspond, but not by identity or forcing
> both categorially separate topics together, e.g. saying that a rheme has no
> IO.
> Best, Helmut
>
>  22. Juli 2018 um 05:40 Uhr
> "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> wrote:
> Gary F., List:
>
>
> GF:  Jon, you’re asking: If the logical depth/signification of a Sign
> corresponds to its Interpretant … then where does the Sign's information
> fit into the picture? But you’ve already answered that yourself: “The
> information (breadth x depth) of a Sign then corresponds to the unity of
> the Object with its characters; i.e., the Sign's Interpretant.”
>
>
> This is precisely what I see as contradictory.  If breadth and depth are
> the two different *dimensions *of Peircean information, how could *both *depth
> *and *information somehow correspond to the Interpretant?  Perhaps
> muddying the waters further, I just noticed that in NDTR (CP
> 2.257/260/262, EP 2:294-296; 1903), Peirce described each of the three
> types of Dicisigns as involving an Icon or Rheme to embody/signify/express
> its information and an Index to indicate/denote the Object/subject of that
> information.  I would say instead that a Dicisign conveys its information
> by involving an Icon/Rheme to signify its depth and an Index to denote its
> breadth.
>
>
> GF:  I’ve omitted “3ns/Entelechy” from the end of that sentence of yours
> because I think your use of those terms in that context is confusing--and
> may even be causing part of the problem you have with “reconciling” what
> you see as two completely different Peircean analyses.
>
>
> My objective over the last several months has been to map the process of
> semiosis and Peirce's terminology for its constituents to the Aristotelian
> concepts of Form/1ns, Matter/2ns, and Entelechy/3ns as he invoked them in
> "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" and "New Elements."  As I recently
> acknowledged, this is a kind of hypostatic abstraction within logic as
> semeiotic, but it *might *subsequently have application to metaphysics.  I 
> currently
> view the Interpretant (information/Entelechy) as the *semiotic *union of
> the Object (breadth/Matter) with its characters (depth/Form); i.e., "the 
> *attribution
> *of a predicate to a subject" (R 200, CP 6.341; 1908, emphasis added).
>
>
> GF:  One is the *breadth/depth* (*extension/intension*,
> *extension/comprehension*) dichotomy, which is a very old analysis of the
> meanings of terms, but which Peirce extended to apply to propositions and
> arguments as well.
>
>
> Peirce stated on a couple of occasions that he was using "breadth" and
> "depth" in a way that did not *exactly *match that "very old analysis"
> (e.g., CP 4.407; 1867).  In fact, the ellipsis at the beginning of my
> excerpt from R 200 replaced the following text, which comes immediately
> after CP 6:347 in the manuscript.
>
>
> CSP:  In a paper which I printed in 1867 [CP 4.391-426], I gave the
> principal senses in which the terms "logical extension" and "logical
> comprehension" have been widely employed by logicians.  They are more
> numerous than ordinary students of the chief treatises on logic are aware.
> For such books are not usually read with sufficient thought for the
> gathering of exact ideas.  I shall now simply select one meaning of each
> of those two logical "quantities," shall employ that one, and shall neglect
> the others.  With that understanding, and without attempting any precise
> statement which would here be worse than superfluous, I will say that ...
> (R 200:E85-E86; 1908)
>
>
> I omitted all of this because what I quoted was already rather lengthy,
> but I did include Peirce's statement that breadth and depth apply "not
> only to propositions and to arguments, but also to *icons*, *indices*,
> and all kinds of signs."  This brings to mind his comments in "New
> Elements" (EP 2:307; 1904) to the effect that a pure Icon would signify
> without 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Why are examples the go-cart of judgment?



*CALLARD:* I think many reasons, but one of them that pops to my head is
that often in philosophy, we’re trying to theorize some phenomenon. Say
we’re trying to theorize aspiration, trying to give a theory of it, or
weakness of will. The way we do it as philosophers is, we often use example
at least to lay out the problem: “Here’s an example of such and such.”

The problem with examples, though, is that they can collapse under
theoretical pressure. There’s a constant impulse to rewrite the example and
to say, “Oh, well, what was really going on was . . .” Essentially that
impulse comes from the fact that there are certain changes you could make
to the example that would make it theoretically easier to analyze.

There’s a need, I think, for examples that are going to be a bit tough in
response to that kind of pressure. One, it helps if you *didn’t* make the
example, and two, it helps if the person who *did* really understood the
thing that they’re talking about. I think literature gives us that.



https://medium.com/conversations-with-tyler/agnes-callard-tyler-cowen-philosophy-socrates-plato-literature-c70a73cd38eb



I hope this helps future conversation.



Best wishes,
Jerry R


On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 11:01 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R,
>
> I apologize for giving the impression that I consider my reading of Peirce
> more legitimate than yours, or anyone’s. What I said was that *IF one
> reads any work of semiotic analysis as if it were a polemic*, one will
> miss the point of it. I still consider that conditional proposition true.
>
> You write that “while Bellucci's book "is not a polemic and does not try
> to 'prove' that the dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate
> object," *you* have stated that it is.” I assume you mean that I’ve
> stated that the dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate
> object. I may have said that at some point awhile back, but what I’ve said *in
> this thread* is that I consider that statement to be one pole of a
> polarizing debate in which I decline to participate. I never — until last
> night — wanted out of the *discussion *of the nature of the immediate
> object. I just wanted out of the *debate*, which inevitably turns into a
> cherry-picking contest.
>
> I do think, based on your responses, that you’ve missed the point of
> several posts of mine over the past few days, but that is surely my fault
> more than anyone else’s, and I see no way of clarifying those points
> without repeating myself. And I don’t think that would be a worthwhile
> contribution to the list.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* 25-Jun-18 10:33
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> GF: [Bellucci's] book is not a polemic and does not try to “prove” that
> the dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object. If you
> pay close attention to what Peirce wrote about the immediate object in
> 1904-8, setting aside any prejudices you may have about what the immediate
> object of a sign is, you will see that there is no need to “prove” or
> disprove any such thing. But if you read Bellucci polemically, as if he
> were taking one side in the debate that you and Jon seem to be engulfed in,
> then you will surely miss his point (and Peirce’s), just as you’ve missed
> the point of my posts over the past few days.
>
> Gary, while Bellucci's book "is not a polemic and does not try to 'prove'
> that he dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object,"
> *you* have stated that it is. It seems to me that Bellucci's work and
> your thinking on the matter have been quite valuable in stimulating thought
> concerning the dicisign as well as the immediate object. I don't think that
> I or Jon (or any of the list members who have participated in this thread)
> are "engulfed" in anything, and to suggest that we have "prejudices" in the
> matter is, well, untoward. Perhaps it is you who has prejudices. It may be
> that we have missed the point of your recent posts, but to say that we have
> missed Peirce's point, as you remark above, would suggest that your reading
> of Peirce's late work is correct and that our not acknowledging that is the
> problem. I don't see that I am prejudiced in this matter whatsoever and
> rather have been trying to see your (and Bellucci's) point as best I can.
> What more can I do in good faith?
>
> GF: My attempts to clear up misunderstandings having only led to more
> misunderstandings, I think it’s time for me to drop them and get back to
> reading Peirce, as I still have many open questions to ponder about what he
> was trying to do in 1903-08. My apologies for wasting your time in this
> thread.
>
> You have hardly wasted mine or anyone's time--quite the contrary. You have
> stimulated the thinking  of Jon S, Jeff D, Edwina, Helmut, me, and others.
> You have several times now said that you 

Re: Re: Re: Similarities between scientific method and art criticism, was, [PEIRCE-L] Peirce anecdotes

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Helmut list:

You said:

So maybe I was conflating dubitability (being not without doubt) with
vagueness. I however do not understand the concept of vagueness, and can
only guess that it might have to do with the paradoxity I had written about.





CP 5.506:

I have worked out the logic of vagueness with something like completeness,*
but need not inflict more of it upon you at present.

*Where?

http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/complete-sign



This is a specimen of certain lines of reflection which will inevitably
suggest the hypothesis of God's Reality. It is not that such phenomena
might not be capable of being accounted for, in one sense, by the action of
chance with the smallest conceivable dose of a higher element; for if by
God be meant the *Ens necessarium*, that very hypothesis requires that such
should be the case. But the point is that that sort of explanation leaves a
mental explanation just as needful as before…

Hth,
Jerry R

On Sat, Jun 16, 2018 at 4:34 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary, list,
> Thank you. I have looked up "common-sensism" at Commens, and in 1905 |
> Issues of Pragmaticism | EP 2:346-353; CP 5.439-452 (the first entry) he
> writes, that the indubitable (that without doubt) is vague (for the
> critical common-sensist). So maybe I was conflating dubitability (being not
> without doubt) with vagueness. I however do not understand the concept of
> vagueness, and can only guess that it might have to do with the paradoxity
> I had written about.
> Best,
> Helmut
> 15. Juni 2018 um 18:59 Uhr
>  "Gary Richmond" 
> wrote:
> Helmut, list,
>
>
> Helmut wrote "you wrote, that freedom of speech is vital, and without
> doubt."
>
>
> In point of fact, Edwina wrote the first phrase and I agreed with her
> adding the second phrase to emphasize the point.
>
>
> HR: But on the other hand, shoah-denial, or showing the nazi-swastika
> symbol is prohibited in most european countries (which prohibition I think
> is good).
>
>
> I don't think very many believe that there ought be *no* restrictions of
> free speech whosoever. I don't know how it is in other countries but, for
> example, in the USA to cry "Fire!" in a crowded theater when there is no
> fire is a criminal offense and, in my opinion, certainly ought to be.
>
>
> HR: So, perhaps the scrutiny-dogma you wrote about should be extended to
> "freedom of speech" too?
>
>
> I wouldn't call it a 'dogma' but rather a 'method'. Indeed, the method I'm
> advocating is pragmatism.
>
>
> HR: I think, this scrutiny-dogma of yours rsp. of Scott´s is a better way
> of solving the "dont say: dont say"-paradoxon that my
> generalisation-scales-proposal inm y last post.
>
>
> Peirce sometimes calls his version of pragmatism "critical
> common-sensism," and I think this formulation works for scientific as well
> as art criticical 'scrutiny'.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690*
>
> On Fri, Jun 15, 2018 at 11:21 AM, Helmut Raulien 
> wrote:
>>
>> Gary, list,
>> you wrote, that freedom of speech is vital, and without doubt. But on the
>> other hand, shoah-denial, or showing the nazi-swastika symbol is prohibited
>> in most european countries (which prohibition I think is good). So, perhaps
>> the scrutiny-dogma you wrote about should be extended to "freedom of
>> speech" too? I think, this scrutiny-dogma of yours rsp. of Scott´s is a
>> better way of solving the "dont say: dont say"-paradoxon that my
>> generalisation-scales-proposal inm y last post.
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>> 15. Juni 2018 um 02:26 Uhr
>>  "Gary Richmond" 
>>
>> Edwina, list,
>>
>> Edwina wrote:
>>
>>
>> Gary R - yes, nicely put, and therefore:
>>
>> Thank you. Most of what I wrote was merely a reflection on the A. O.
>> Scott quotations in light of pragmaticism.
>>
>> 1] Freedom of speech is vital; and,
>>
>> Without doubt!
>>
>> Edwina, commenting on Scott's remark that "the question is whether the
>> thing in question can bear the scrutiny."
>>
>> 2] Not all belief systems are equally valid, are equally able to 'bear
>> scrutiny' - and - this means that not all belief systems should be accepted
>> without such scrutiny, or which refuse to allow scrutiny.
>>
>>
>> Again, most certainly. Those "which refuse to allow scrutiny" are, in my
>> opinion, by that very act disqualified (unless and until they allow for
>> that scrutiny).
>>
>> So, every belief system ought be open to scrutiny and able to bear
>> scrutiny. There are, of course, art works and scientific matters which are,
>> shall we say, more difficult than others to scrutinize. If the object is
>> 'at hand', 'there before us' for analysis, investigation, etc. it is one
>> thing. But, for example, early cosmologies, cosmogonies, the Big Bang,
>> non-standard or even religious cosmologies are by their very nature much
>> more difficult to scrutinize.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>>
>>
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The real environmental problems are less scientific and more ethical

[Jerry Rhee]

Gary list,



This is an important admission from Spaeth, an experienced scientist-

neglected issues of which can be brought back to attention by putting it
next to comments selected from Stephen Pratten in *Social Ontology and
Modern Economics*.



Pratten highlights Peirce’s remark about the distinction between special
sciences and philosophy (cf. CP 1.246- CP 1.247):



*That which renders the modes of thought of the students of a special
science peculiar is that their experience lies in a special direction.  And
the cause of this is that they are trained and equipped to make a
particular kind of observation, the man who is continually making chemical
analyses lives in a different region of nature from other men.  The same is
true of men who are constantly using a microscope*.  (CP 1.100).



.. The special sciences are united in their dependence on special
observations and this distinguishes them in their totality from philosophy
as a discipline depending rather on the observations open to anyone,
anywhere and at any time.

~* Pratten, The Scope of Ontological Theorizing.*



This issue of dealing with 'selfishness, greed and apathy' is an old
problem that is wrapped up in the contrast between the ancients and moderns.


I suppose if that tension is not already in the mind of the “world
spectator”, then that makes it an educational problem for us.

For why would a scientist need to be trained in the art of rhetoric?



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Sat, Jun 9, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> Today I received a Facebook post which included this quotation:
>
>
> “*I used to think that top environmental problems were biodiversity loss,
> ecosystem collapse and climate change. I thought that thirty years of good
> science could address these problems. I was wrong. The top environmental
> problems are selfishness, greed and apathy, and to deal with these we need
> a cultural and spiritual transformation. And we scientists don’t know how
> to do that*.” Gus Spaeth, a US adviser on climate change
>
> I wonder (1) whether list members agree that the top environmental
> problems aren't "biodiversity loss, ecosystem collapse and climate change"
> but, rather, "selfishness, greed and apathy" and, if the latter (2) the
> extent to which one concurs that "scientists don't know how to address"
> these issues, that even after decades of "good science" around these
> problems that science hasn't been able to significantly impact the most
> serious environmental problems because these are essentially ethical issues
> and, finally (3) what thoughts forum members might have on how Peircean
> pragmatism might address these environmental/ethical issues, however one
> might frame them.
>
> I'd be interested in the views of frequent contributors to this forum, but
> also those of less active list members. I don't present this as a matter
> for 'debate' but, really, just thoughtful reflection.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .