Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Bernard Morand]

Jon, list

OK the main difference comes from our respective understandings for 
final and normal interpretant.


Subsidiarily there may be a question of method too: the order of logical 
determinations is not , I think, the only rationale at stake for the 
second way of dividing signs.


There is also the rationale of the capacity to experiment the possible / 
impossible routes upon the ordered structure. This is the reason that 
lead me to insert the Xth division (assurance of instinct, experience, 
form) before all the descriptions of the interpretants.


Not doing so will lead to render phaneroscopy a simple paraphrase of 
semiotic, ending into some kind of tautology between them.


I am on the contrary convinced that Peirce was after 1903 in search of a 
means for ascertaining the truth of the three categories. After having 
built a solid house on the logical side, implanted on philosophy, he was 
searching after what the practical observation of phanerons could 
reinforce or dismiss.


Regards

Bernard

Le 12/11/2021 à 15:48, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :

Bernard, List:

Just a quick follow-up--I outlined below what my proposed sequence for 
the last six trichotomies entails for the possible and necessitant 
classes, but here is what it entails for the existent classes.


  * An actuous (purpose of If is to produce action) can be a
percussive (Id is an action) or a sympathetic (Id is a feeling)
but cannot be a usual (Id is a further sign).
  * A percussive can be a categorical (EG requires at least one line
of identity) or a hypothetic (no lines of identity) but cannot be
a relative (at least two lines of identity).
  * A categorical can be a proposition/dicisign/pheme or a
term/rheme/seme but cannot be an argument/delome.
  * A proposition/dicisign/pheme can be an imperative (urged) or a
suggestive (presented) but cannot be an indicative (submitted).
  * An imperative can be an inducent (assurance of experience) or an
abducent (assurance of instinct) but cannot be a deducent
(assurance of form).

Again, this all generally makes sense to me, more so than any of the 
alternatives.


Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 7:33 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
 wrote:


Bernard, List:

Thanks very much for these comments. I am grateful to all the
contributors to this thread, whose posts have been consistently
respectful, substantive, and on-topic--Jack, Gary F., Jeff, Gary
R., Mike, Helmut, Phyllis, Vinicius, Robert, Mary, and now
Bernard. Our views diverge when we get down to many of the
details, but we have been able to express those disagreements
without becoming disagreeable.

In this case, I have a different opinion on the logical order of
the ten trichotomies--I see it as Od, Oi, S, Od-S, If, Id, Ii,
S-If, S-Id, Od-S-If; using Peirce's Roman numerals (EP 2:483-490,
1908), III, II, I, IV, VIII, VI, V, IX, VII, X. The underlying
principles are (a) the object determines the sign to determine the
interpretant, (b) the correlates determine their relations, and
(c) each genuine correlate determines its degenerate correlate(s).
The resulting arrangement of the last six divisions produces a
taxonomy of sign classes that generally makes sense to me, more so
than any of the alternatives.

  * A temperative (purpose of If is to produce self-control) can
be a usual (Id is a further sign), a percussive (Id is an
action), or a sympathetic (Id is a feeling), while a gratific
can only be a sympathetic.
  * A usual can be a relative (EG requires at least two lines of
identity), a categorical (at least one line of identity), or a
hypothetic (no lines of identity), while a sympathetic can
only be a hypothetic.
  * A relative can be an argument/delome, a
proposition/dicisign/pheme, or a term/rheme/seme, while a
hypothetic can only be a term/rheme/seme.
  * An argument/delome can be an indicative (submitted), an
imperative (urged), or a suggestive (presented), while a
term/rheme/seme can only be a suggestive (cf. CP 8.338, 1904).
  * An indicative can be a deducent (assurance of form), an
inducent (assurance of experience), or an abducent (assurance
of instinct), while a suggestive can only be an abducent.

As for the normal interpretant, I have mentioned previously that I
take "normal" in this context to mean "normative" rather than "in
accordance with the usual course of things," such that it is
equivalent to the final interpretant in the sense of a /final
cause/, as well as the destinate interpretant in the sense of the
sign's /destined /effect after infinite inquiry by an infinite
community. Peirce prepared the entries for both "normal" and
"normative" in the /Century Dictionary/, and his definitions are
consistent with viewing these terms as nearly synonymous

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Bernard, List:

Just a quick follow-up--I outlined below what my proposed sequence for the
last six trichotomies entails for the possible and necessitant classes, but
here is what it entails for the existent classes.

   - An actuous (purpose of If is to produce action) can be a percussive
   (Id is an action) or a sympathetic (Id is a feeling) but cannot be a usual
   (Id is a further sign).
   - A percussive can be a categorical (EG requires at least one line of
   identity) or a hypothetic (no lines of identity) but cannot be a relative
   (at least two lines of identity).
   - A categorical can be a proposition/dicisign/pheme or a term/rheme/seme
   but cannot be an argument/delome.
   - A proposition/dicisign/pheme can be an imperative (urged) or a
   suggestive (presented) but cannot be an indicative (submitted).
   - An imperative can be an inducent (assurance of experience) or an
   abducent (assurance of instinct) but cannot be a deducent (assurance of
   form).

Again, this all generally makes sense to me, more so than any of the
alternatives.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 7:33 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Bernard, List:
>
> Thanks very much for these comments. I am grateful to all the contributors
> to this thread, whose posts have been consistently respectful, substantive,
> and on-topic--Jack, Gary F., Jeff, Gary R., Mike, Helmut, Phyllis,
> Vinicius, Robert, Mary, and now Bernard. Our views diverge when we get down
> to many of the details, but we have been able to express those
> disagreements without becoming disagreeable.
>
> In this case, I have a different opinion on the logical order of the ten
> trichotomies--I see it as Od, Oi, S, Od-S, If, Id, Ii, S-If, S-Id, Od-S-If;
> using Peirce's Roman numerals (EP 2:483-490, 1908), III, II, I, IV, VIII,
> VI, V, IX, VII, X. The underlying principles are (a) the object determines
> the sign to determine the interpretant, (b) the correlates determine their
> relations, and (c) each genuine correlate determines its degenerate
> correlate(s). The resulting arrangement of the last six divisions produces
> a taxonomy of sign classes that generally makes sense to me, more so than
> any of the alternatives.
>
>- A temperative (purpose of If is to produce self-control) can be a
>usual (Id is a further sign), a percussive (Id is an action), or a
>sympathetic (Id is a feeling), while a gratific can only be a sympathetic.
>- A usual can be a relative (EG requires at least two lines of
>identity), a categorical (at least one line of identity), or a hypothetic
>(no lines of identity), while a sympathetic can only be a hypothetic.
>- A relative can be an argument/delome, a proposition/dicisign/pheme,
>or a term/rheme/seme, while a hypothetic can only be a term/rheme/seme.
>- An argument/delome can be an indicative (submitted), an imperative
>(urged), or a suggestive (presented), while a term/rheme/seme can only be a
>suggestive (cf. CP 8.338, 1904).
>- An indicative can be a deducent (assurance of form), an inducent
>(assurance of experience), or an abducent (assurance of instinct), while a
>suggestive can only be an abducent.
>
> As for the normal interpretant, I have mentioned previously that I take
> "normal" in this context to mean "normative" rather than "in accordance
> with the usual course of things," such that it is equivalent to the final
> interpretant in the sense of a *final cause*, as well as the destinate
> interpretant in the sense of the sign's *destined *effect after infinite
> inquiry by an infinite community. Peirce prepared the entries for both
> "normal" and "normative" in the *Century Dictionary*, and his definitions
> are consistent with viewing these terms as nearly synonymous (
> http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=05=461
> ).
>
> *normal, **a. **1.* According to a rule, principle, or norm; conforming
> to established law, order, habit, or usage: conforming with a certain type
> or standard: not abnormal; regular; natural.
>
> *2.* Serving to fix a standard; intended to set a standard
>
> *normative, **a. *Establishing or setting up a norm, or standard which
> ought to be conformed to.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 12:25 PM Bernard Morand 
> wrote:
>
>> JAS, Vinicius, List
>>
>> Le 10/11/2021 à 20:50, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :
>> >
>> > In my view, Peirce eventually gets the logical order of the
>> correlates right in his later taxonomies--the object determines the sign
>> to determine the interpretant, and the genuine object or
>> interpretant determines the degenerate object or interpretants. Hence,
>> "the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines
>> the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate [final] 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Bernard, List:

Thanks very much for these comments. I am grateful to all the contributors
to this thread, whose posts have been consistently respectful, substantive,
and on-topic--Jack, Gary F., Jeff, Gary R., Mike, Helmut, Phyllis,
Vinicius, Robert, Mary, and now Bernard. Our views diverge when we get down
to many of the details, but we have been able to express those
disagreements without becoming disagreeable.

In this case, I have a different opinion on the logical order of the ten
trichotomies--I see it as Od, Oi, S, Od-S, If, Id, Ii, S-If, S-Id, Od-S-If;
using Peirce's Roman numerals (EP 2:483-490, 1908), III, II, I, IV, VIII,
VI, V, IX, VII, X. The underlying principles are (a) the object determines
the sign to determine the interpretant, (b) the correlates determine their
relations, and (c) each genuine correlate determines its degenerate
correlate(s). The resulting arrangement of the last six divisions produces
a taxonomy of sign classes that generally makes sense to me, more so than
any of the alternatives.

   - A temperative (purpose of If is to produce self-control) can be a
   usual (Id is a further sign), a percussive (Id is an action), or a
   sympathetic (Id is a feeling), while a gratific can only be a sympathetic.
   - A usual can be a relative (EG requires at least two lines of
   identity), a categorical (at least one line of identity), or a hypothetic
   (no lines of identity), while a sympathetic can only be a hypothetic.
   - A relative can be an argument/delome, a proposition/dicisign/pheme, or
   a term/rheme/seme, while a hypothetic can only be a term/rheme/seme.
   - An argument/delome can be an indicative (submitted), an imperative
   (urged), or a suggestive (presented), while a term/rheme/seme can only be a
   suggestive (cf. CP 8.338, 1904).
   - An indicative can be a deducent (assurance of form), an inducent
   (assurance of experience), or an abducent (assurance of instinct), while a
   suggestive can only be an abducent.

As for the normal interpretant, I have mentioned previously that I take
"normal" in this context to mean "normative" rather than "in accordance
with the usual course of things," such that it is equivalent to the final
interpretant in the sense of a *final cause*, as well as the destinate
interpretant in the sense of the sign's *destined *effect after infinite
inquiry by an infinite community. Peirce prepared the entries for both
"normal" and "normative" in the *Century Dictionary*, and his definitions
are consistent with viewing these terms as nearly synonymous (
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=05=461
).

*normal, **a. **1.* According to a rule, principle, or norm; conforming to
established law, order, habit, or usage: conforming with a certain type or
standard: not abnormal; regular; natural.

*2.* Serving to fix a standard; intended to set a standard

*normative, **a. *Establishing or setting up a norm, or standard which
ought to be conformed to.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 12:25 PM Bernard Morand 
wrote:

> JAS, Vinicius, List
>
> Le 10/11/2021 à 20:50, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :
> >
> > In my view, Peirce eventually gets the logical order of the
> correlates right in his later taxonomies--the object determines the sign
> to determine the interpretant, and the genuine object or
> interpretant determines the degenerate object or interpretants. Hence,
> "the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines
> the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate [final] Interpretant, which
> determines the Effective [dynamical] Interpretant, which determines the
> Explicit [immediate] Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908). Again, in this
> context, "determines" means "constrains the potential universe(s) of," not
> "causes" or "temporally precedes." To obtain the ten-trichotomy, 66-class
> taxonomy, I advocate inserting the division according to the Od-S relation
> after the one for the sign itself and placing the divisions according to
> the S-If, S-Id, and Od-S-If relations in that sequence after the one for
> the immediate interpretant.
> >
> > All that said, as I mentioned a few days ago and hinted above, I
> now agree with James Liszka (https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089)
> that focusing on classifying arbitrarily demarcated "individual"
> signs is misplaced, and that concentrating instead on the real and
> continuous process of semiosis is more fruitful.
> >
> Jon, it seems to me that you reach a similar conclusion as mine about the
> organisation of the second division of signs.
>
> As this conclusion may appear quite disturbing to many readers, the
> agreement is worth noticing.
>
> I published it in French in a book entitled "Logique de la Conception.
> Figures de sémiotique générale d'après C.S. Peirce." (L'Harmattan, Paris)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Bernard Morand]

JAS, Vinicius, List

Le 10/11/2021 à 20:50, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :


In my view, Peirce eventually gets the logical order of the correlates 
right in his later taxonomies--the object determines the sign to 
determine the interpretant, and the genuine object or interpretant 
determines the degenerate object or interpretants. Hence, "the 
Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the 
Sign itself, which determines the Destinate [final] Interpretant, 
which determines the Effective [dynamical] Interpretant, which 
determines the Explicit [immediate] Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908). 
Again, in this context, "determines" means "constrains the potential 
universe(s) of," not "causes" or "temporally precedes." To obtain the 
ten-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy, I advocate inserting the division 
according to the Od-S relation after the one for the sign itself and 
placing the divisions according to the S-If, S-Id, and Od-S-If 
relations in that sequence after the one for the immediate interpretant.


All that said, as I mentioned a few days ago and hinted above, I now 
agree with James Liszka (https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that 
focusing on classifying arbitrarily demarcated "individual" signs is 
misplaced, and that concentrating instead on the real and continuous 
process of semiosis is more fruitful.


Jon, it seems to me that you reach a similar conclusion as mine about 
the organisation of the second division of signs.


As this conclusion may appear quite disturbing to many readers, the 
agreement is worth noticing.


I published it in French in a book entitled "Logique de la Conception. 
Figures de sémiotique générale d'après C.S. Peirce." (L'Harmattan, 
Paris) in 2004.


I join in attached file a schema (Fig. 14 p. 228 of the book) that 
shows  how I think the classification of 1903 and the second one are 
articulated: the first (on the right of the figure) is embodied into the 
second on the left).


The second classification adds the ordered divisions VIII, VII, VI, V 
which are an unfolding of the basic original division relative to the 
interpretant of the sign.


At the other end, the additional divisions III, II relative to the 
Object of the sign remained hidden in the previous first division 
relative to the Sign itself.


Finally another division, X, has been inserted into the table to mark 
the actual effect of the final interpretant.


This latter consideration makes me doubt that the Final interpretant in 
its usual peircean sense may be there: its place is taken by the 
"Normal" Interpretant which I interpret as normal or usual course of 
things (Not what can be supposed to be reached in the long run and thus 
not yet actually known). This I think is the very sense of "Destinate".


I came to the ordering shown in the Fig. 14 of divisions III -> II -> I 
-> IV -> X -> IX -> VIII -> VII -> VI -> V after recognizing the 
construction Peirce used in his own labelling of these divisions.


I totally agree too with the remark from Liszka that you are quoting.

Apologies for the french language in the added figure.

Regards

Bernard Morand


fig14.pdf
Description: Adobe PDF document
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Vinicius, List:

Thanks for spelling all this out, there is much to ponder here. I have read
your "Minute Semeiotic" material in the past, but it likely warrants
revisiting now that my own ideas about speculative grammar are more
developed.

VR: Most scholars that have dealt with the interpretants assume that
immediate interpretants can be only emotional, dynamic interpretants can be
emotional and energetic and final intepretants can be emotional, energetic
and logical. From what I can recall, at the time I was studying these
matters, only Short was of the opinion that all three of them could be
trichotomized.


My impression is that this debate is not so much about whether the
immediate/dynamical/final interpretants *have *trichotomies--Peirce clearly
thought so, since he included them in his later taxonomies--as whether they
are properly *labeled *within each division as emotional/energetic/logical
interpretants. Until fairly recently, I agreed strongly with Short that
they are, such that these two trichotomies are orthogonal to each other.
However, after carefully studying the only texts where Peirce discusses the
emotional/energetic/logical interpretants--over 500 pages of manuscripts
for an article entitled "Pragmatism" (R 317-322&324, 1907), intended to
introduce his version to a general audience--I now believe that they are
instead the familiar effects of signs that humans routinely experience as
"modifications of consciousness," while the immediate/dynamical/final
interpretants are the *corresponding *effects of signs in general.

I make my case for this in a paper that *Semiotica* recently accepted for
publication, "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants." I also present my position
(as recently discussed on-List) that in EP 2:478 (1906), the intentional
interpretant is a dynamical interpretant of a previous sign in the mind of
the utterer, the effectual interpretant is a dynamical interpretant of the
current (uttered) sign in the mind of the interpreter, and the
communicational interpretant is the immediate interpretant of the current
(uttered) sign in the commind. I originally went on to argue for the
destinate and explicit interpretants in EP 2:481 (1908) being the final and
immediate interpretants, respectively, but the blind reviewer was adamant
that they must be the other way around. I ultimately deleted that whole
section rather than continuing to debate it, since it had to do with
abstract sign classification rather than the concrete process of semiosis.

VR: Well, precisely when Peirce states his order of determination among the
correlates in the Syllabus of 1903, things get confusing. Hartshorne and
Weiss tried in several footnotes to amend Peirce and made things worse (at
least for me).


Indeed, both CP 2.235-242 (EP 2:290) and the accompanying editorial
footnotes are highly problematic. Peirce is right that from a phaneroscopic
standpoint, the first correlate (sign) is the simplest (genuine only), the
third correlate (interpretant) is the most complex (genuine = final,
degenerate = dynamical, doubly degenerate = immediate), and the second
correlate (object) is of middling complexity (genuine = dynamical,
degenerate = immediate). However, he is wrong about the first correlate
"being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and
not being a law unless all three are of that nature," as well as the third
correlate "being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a
mere possibility unless all three are of that nature." Hartshorne and Weiss
then mix up the second and third correlates *themselves *with their *relations
*to the sign, which are the additional trichotomies that produce the
familiar ten classes in CP 2.243-272 (EP 2:291-299).

In my view, Peirce eventually gets the logical order of the correlates
right in his later taxonomies--the object determines the sign to determine
the interpretant, and the genuine object or interpretant determines the
degenerate object or interpretants. Hence, "the Dynamoid Object determines
the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines
the Destinate [final] Interpretant, which determines the Effective
[dynamical] Interpretant, which determines the Explicit [immediate]
Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908). Again, in this context, "determines" means
"constrains the potential universe(s) of," not "causes" or "temporally
precedes." To obtain the ten-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy, I advocate
inserting the division according to the Od-S relation after the one for the
sign itself and placing the divisions according to the S-If, S-Id, and
Od-S-If relations in that sequence after the one for the immediate
interpretant.

All that said, as I mentioned a few days ago and hinted above, I now agree
with James Liszka (https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that focusing
on classifying arbitrarily demarcated "individual" signs is misplaced, and
that concentrating instead on the real and continuous process of semiosis
is more 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Vinicius Romanini]

Jon, list

JAS: What would be the degenerate classes for the S-O
(iconic/indexical/symbolic) and S-O-I (abducent/inducent/deducent)
relations? Is it feasible instead to make the third move be for the S-I
(rheme/dicisign/argument or seme/pheme/delome) relation, as suggested by
Peirce's 1903 taxonomy? If so, how would the rules and/or results be
different?

I call the degenerate index an iedoseme (or ergoseme). Ex: the arrow of a
rotten weathervane pointing in some direction. Since it is broken, it
collapses into an icon. When you test the alarm of your car, the sound is
an ergoseme (for it does not indicate properly).
I call the symbol degenerated once a metonymy. It is usually a singular
symbol. Ex: the crown of a king, the papal scepter, your signature on a
document (the first two are metonymic sinsigns, the latter is a metonymic
replica)
I call the symbol degenerated twice a metaphor. No need for examples here.

I call the degenerate dicent a syntax. Ex: the juxtaposition of an image
and a name. It is a dicisign if you take the juxtaposition as being
informative, but the mere juxtaposition is the syntax.
I call the argument degenerated once an induction.
I call the argument degenerated twice an abduction.

I am not sure that all genuine arguments ard deductions. Peirce seems to
believe that all genuine general arguments can be reduced to Barbara.

JAS: Are these somehow the same 66 classes obtained from ten trichotomies
arranged in a logical order of determination? Or is it a different scheme
altogether? I assume the latter but would like to confirm.

It is a different scheme. I found 11 trichotomies and their order of
determination involves periods. The aspects are grouped into periods in a
way similar to numbers in Mathematics.
You have the hundreds, the thousands, the millions, and so on.  My periods
are grounding, presentation, representation, and communication.
Here is a link to the rationale :
https://minutesemeiotic.org/XLjO5EL5EYsl6001EwBv

JAS: Please elaborate on why the rules are different for these two moves.
Perhaps it will be clearer upon identifying the degenerate classes for the
two relations.
The second move (S-Od) is where new information is embodied (from the
dynamic object to the sign), usually through icons and hypoicons.
The third move can only communicate the information. The interpretant is an
effect of the relationship S-Od.

JAS: I would say instead that all three interpretants can be in any of the
three *universes *(possible/existent/necessitant). These obviously *correspond
*to the three categories (1ns/2ns/3ns), but they are not *themselves *the
three categories.
I am happy with that.

JAS: I have not come across any Peirce scholar (including Jappy) *denying *that
there are trichotomies for all three interpretants. In fact, Jappy *includes
*those three trichotomies in his "hexad" that produces 28 classes. What am
I missing?
Most scholars that have dealt with the interpretants assume that immediate
interpretants can be only emotional, dynamic interpretants can be emotional
and energetic and final intepretants can be emotional, energetic and
logical.
>From what I can recall, at the time I was studying these matters, only
Short was of the opinion that all three of them could be trichotomized. I
might be wrong, though.

JAS: As I stated, the three *genuine *correlates (S, Od, If) are the ones
in the *genuine *triadic relation of representing or mediating. In my view,
and apparently in Peirce's, there is no distinct trichotomy for Od-S-Id. I
see this as a *degenerate *triadic relation, reducible to its
constituent *dyadic
*relations, which have their own trichotomies (Od-S, S-Id).

Here is the crucial point. I do think the trichotomy S-Od-Id is a necessary
aspect for any communication to be effective. Hence my 11 trichotomies
instead of 10.

JAS: I agree that "determine" has different meanings in different contexts,
even within Peirce's writings. Most notably, I believe that "determines" in
EP 2:481 means "constrains the potential universe(s) of" for abstract sign
classification and *does not* mean "logically and/or temporally precedes"
within the concrete process of semiosis. Those who align "the Destinate
Interpretant" with the immediate interpretant rather than the final
interpretant tend to insist that "determines" must have *both *of these
meanings in that particular passage. Again, just from a terminological
standpoint, it seems to me that "destinate" and "explicit" are much more
congruent with "final" and "immediate" than the other way around.

Yes, I agree.

JAS: His 1903 taxonomy is fairly straightforward and useful as far as it
goes, which is probably why it remains popular despite his subsequent
revisions. Those later taxonomies are indeed much more difficult to
"reconstitute" since they mostly come from various Logic Notebook entries
and draft letters.

Well, precisely when Peirce states his order of determination among the
correlates in the Syllabus of 1903, things 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Vinicius, List:

VR: You can make only three moves on the podium. One for the S, one for the
relation S-0, and one for the relation S-O-I


What would be the degenerate classes for the S-O
(iconic/indexical/symbolic) and S-O-I (abducent/inducent/deducent)
relations? Is it feasible instead to make the third move be for the S-I
(rheme/dicisign/argument or seme/pheme/delome) relation, as suggested by
Peirce's 1903 taxonomy? If so, how would the rules and/or results be
different?

VR: By following these rules, you will find 66 possible solutions, ten of
which have only genuine shadows (these are the 10 genuine classes of
signs). The other 56 are degenerate ones.


Are these somehow the same 66 classes obtained from ten trichotomies
arranged in a logical order of determination? Or is it a different scheme
altogether? I assume the latter but would like to confirm.

VR: In the second move, the relation of the sign to its object can be
ampliative (moving inward). The last move is not ampliative and only
extracts the possible consequences of the former.


Please elaborate on why the rules are different for these two moves.
Perhaps it will be clearer upon identifying the degenerate classes for the
two relations.

VR: For instance, Tom Short has always promoted the idea that all three
interpretants (immediate, dynamic and final) can be of any category.


I would say instead that all three interpretants can be in any of the
three *universes
*(possible/existent/necessitant). These obviously *correspond *to the three
categories (1ns/2ns/3ns), but they are not *themselves *the three
categories.

VR: I agree with him. Most Peirce scholars do not, though (Jappy, for that
matter).


Really? I have not come across any Peirce scholar (including Jappy) *denying
*that there are trichotomies for all three interpretants. In fact,
Jappy *includes
*those three trichotomies in his "hexad" that produces 28 classes. What am
I missing?

VR: But then what about the triadic relations?


As I stated, the three *genuine *correlates (S, Od, If) are the ones in the
*genuine *triadic relation of representing or mediating. In my view, and
apparently in Peirce's, there is no distinct trichotomy for Od-S-Id. I see
this as a *degenerate *triadic relation, reducible to its constituent *dyadic
*relations, which have their own trichotomies (Od-S, S-Id).

VR: Peirce seems to use "determine" with different meanings in different
MS. Sometimes it seems to mean "determines at least", some others
"determines at most".


I agree that "determine" has different meanings in different contexts, even
within Peirce's writings. Most notably, I believe that "determines" in EP
2:481 means "constrains the potential universe(s) of" for abstract sign
classification and *does not* mean "logically and/or temporally precedes"
within the concrete process of semiosis. Those who align "the Destinate
Interpretant" with the immediate interpretant rather than the final
interpretant tend to insist that "determines" must have *both *of these
meanings in that particular passage. Again, just from a terminological
standpoint, it seems to me that "destinate" and "explicit" are much more
congruent with "final" and "immediate" than the other way around.

VR: I gave up trying to reconstitute the exact thread of Peirce's proposals
(if ever there was a unique and definite thread).


His 1903 taxonomy is fairly straightforward and useful as far as it goes,
which is probably why it remains popular despite his subsequent revisions.
Those later taxonomies are indeed much more difficult to "reconstitute"
since they mostly come from various Logic Notebook entries and draft
letters.

VR: I started a completely new rationale, and that's why I should say that
I am a neo-Peircean.


Fair enough. I try to maintain Peirce's rationale in certain respects, as
well as his terminology, while going my own way where I have trouble making
sense of it all otherwise.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Nov 9, 2021 at 10:26 AM Vinicius Romanini 
wrote:

> Jon, list
>
>>
>> [image: image.png]
>>
>>
>> JAS: There are genuine qualisigns (1), sinsigns (2), and legisigns (3);
>> degenerate altersigns (1/2) and replicas (2/3); and doubly degenerate
>> holisigns (1/2/3).
>>
>> Exact. I use a different notation: qualisigns (1), sinsigns (2) and
> legisigns (3); degenerate altersigns (1') and replicas (2'); and doubly
> degenerate holisigns (1").
> Each apostrophe indicates a degree of degeneration.
>
> I wasn't aware of Marty's Podium. I propose a game:
>
> 1) You can make only three moves on the podium. One for the S, one for the
> relation S-0, and one for the relation S-O-I
> 2) In the first move, you can place yourself in any shade at any level.
> 3) For the second move, you can either stay in the shade you are in, jump
> to any shade without leaving the level 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Vinicius Romanini]

Jon, list



> [image: image.png]
>
>
> JAS: There are genuine qualisigns (1), sinsigns (2), and legisigns (3);
> degenerate altersigns (1/2) and replicas (2/3); and doubly degenerate
> holisigns (1/2/3).
>
> Exact. I use a different notation: qualisigns (1), sinsigns (2) and
legisigns (3); degenerate altersigns (1') and replicas (2'); and doubly
degenerate holisigns (1").
Each apostrophe indicates a degree of degeneration.

I wasn't aware of Marty's Podium. I propose a game:

1) You can make only three moves on the podium. One for the S, one for the
relation S-0, and one for the relation S-O-I
2) In the first move, you can place yourself in any shade at any level.
3) For the second move, you can either stay in the shade you are in, jump
to any shade without leaving the level where you are, or jump to any level
and shade below. You cannot go up.
4) For the third and last move, you can either stay in the shade where you
are, move outward to any shade at the level you are, or jump to any level
below provided you land either on the same or an outward relative position.
You cannot go up nor move inward (either staying at your level or jumping
to a lower level)

By following these rules, you will find 66 possible solutions, ten of which
have only genuine shadows (these are the 10 genuine classes of signs). The
other 56 are degenerate ones.
The rules are different for each move. In the second move, the relation of
the sign to its object can be ampliative (moving inward). The last move is
not ampliative and only extracts the possible consequences of the former.


JAS: what exactly does it mean to say that "a representamen has 1ns [or 2ns
or 3ns] for its final interpretant"? Perhaps an example of each would be
helpful.

This is an old debate. It goes back to Gary Sanders's paper. For instance,
Tom Short has always promoted the idea that all three interpretants
(immediate, dynamic and final) can be of any category. I agree with him.
Most Peirce scholars do not, though (Jappy, for that matter). If you
revisit Tom's papers on the Transactions or the debate between Tom and Joe
Ransdell in this list, everything that could be said on this topic has
already been.
No consensus was ever established.

My view is simple. The final interpretant is how the sign projects itself
in a would-be future. A qualisign can have only firstness for its final
interpretant.
A genuine symbol must have a general for its final interpretant for
otherwise it would not be a true general.
By assuming this view, the study of grammar becomes richer and more complex
but at the same time more logical.


> JAS: As I have already discussed in this thread, while
> qualisign/sinsign/legisign are three classes such that each sign is
> assigned to exactly one of them, I see tone/token/type as three
> "dimensions" of the same sign. The sign itself is a continuum, its types
> are its continuous portions of the same dimensionality as definitely
> significant forms, its tokens are its discrete embodiments of lower
> dimensionality that conform to those types, and its tones are indefinitely
> significant characters possessed by those tokens.
>
> I tend to agree. The taxonomy of signs aims at their natural classes. Its
mathematical structure renders them universal. The distinction
type/toke/tone seems more phenomenological.


> JAS: Where I see degeneracy in the later taxonomies is in the initial
> identification of two objects and three interpretants for each sign.
> Referencing Robert's podium diagram again, we have the genuine sign (1),
> dynamical object (2), and final interpretant (3); the degenerate immediate
> object (1/2) and dynamical interpretant (2/3); and the doubly degenerate
> immediate interpretant (1/2/3). Notice that the three genuine correlates
> are the ones in the genuine *triadic *relation of representing or
> mediating.]
>

OK

>
> Here the podium diagram reflects other important aspects, as well. The
> immediate object (1/2) and immediate interpretant (1/2/3) are *internal *to
> the sign (1), while the dynamical object (2), dynamical interpretant (2/3),
> and final interpretant (3) are *external *to the sign (1). That is why
> each of the latter three correlates has a *dyadic *relation with the
> sign, unlike the first two.
>

Agree. But then what about the triadic relations?


> The dynamical object (2) determines the immediate object (1/2), and the
> final interpretant (3) determines the dynamical interpretant (2/3), which
> determines the immediate interpretant (1/2/3)--not as efficient causes,
> just in terms of the logical order of trichotomies where "a Possible can
> determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by
> nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908). This is another reason why I
> maintain that "the Destinate Interpretant" is the final interpretant, not
> the immediate interpretant.
>

Here is where the confusion begins. Peirce seems to use "determine" with
different meanings in different MS. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Vinicius, List:

Thanks for the additional explanations. I see now that holisigns and
altersigns fit into a phaneroscopic analysis in accordance with Robert
Marty's podium diagram (
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338449971_The_podium_of_the_categories-final
).

[image: image.png]


There are genuine qualisigns (1), sinsigns (2), and legisigns (3);
degenerate altersigns (1/2) and replicas (2/3); and doubly degenerate
holisigns (1/2/3).

VR: If a representamen has firstness for its final interpretant, it's
categorial destiny is sealed.


Again, what exactly does it mean to say that "a representamen has 1ns [or
2ns or 3ns] for its final interpretant"? Perhaps an example of each would
be helpful.

VR: They have different classification principles, though.


I agree, but would appreciate some further elaboration. As I have already
discussed in this thread, while qualisign/sinsign/legisign are three
classes such that each sign is assigned to exactly one of them, I see
tone/token/type as three "dimensions" of the same sign. The sign itself is
a continuum, its types are its continuous portions of the same
dimensionality as definitely significant forms, its tokens are its discrete
embodiments of lower dimensionality that conform to those types, and its
tones are indefinitely significant characters possessed by those tokens.

VR: The first uses degenerations, the second does not and by choosing so
Peirce had to deal with a much longer array of aspects.


Where I see degeneracy in the later taxonomies is in the initial
identification of two objects and three interpretants for each sign.
Referencing Robert's podium diagram again, we have the genuine sign (1),
dynamical object (2), and final interpretant (3); the degenerate immediate
object (1/2) and dynamical interpretant (2/3); and the doubly degenerate
immediate interpretant (1/2/3). Notice that the three genuine correlates
are the ones in the genuine *triadic *relation of representing or mediating.

Here the podium diagram reflects other important aspects, as well. The
immediate object (1/2) and immediate interpretant (1/2/3) are *internal *to
the sign (1), while the dynamical object (2), dynamical interpretant (2/3),
and final interpretant (3) are *external *to the sign (1). That is why each
of the latter three correlates has a *dyadic *relation with the sign,
unlike the first two. The dynamical object (2) determines the immediate
object (1/2), and the final interpretant (3) determines the dynamical
interpretant (2/3), which determines the immediate interpretant
(1/2/3)--not as efficient causes, just in terms of the logical order of
trichotomies where "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a
Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481,
1908). This is another reason why I maintain that "the Destinate
Interpretant" is the final interpretant, not the immediate interpretant.

VR: Speculative Grammar is not easy.


I strongly agree. :-)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 8, 2021 at 3:12 PM Vinicius Romanini  wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> Joh, I agree with (almost) everything you say about the final
> interpretant. My take here is purely logical (and categoriological).
> If a representamen has firstness for its final interpretant, it's
> categorial destiny is sealed. It might have an endless series of dynamic
> interpretants but nothing would change the fact that whichever final
> interpretant it might have in the end, if and when the end of semiosis
> comes, its categorical nature would be a first. If we deny that, then its
> final interpretant was not a first to begin with. I am of the opinion that
> signs eventually do have final interpretants, for even an endless series
> can converge to a final state (at least for all practical purposes).
>
> The immediate interpretant is, for me, the sign's interpretability. If it
> is a symbol, the immediate interpretant is its comprehension - or whatever
> is well known about its object at the outset of semiosis.
> If we strip all meaning and focus on a general representamen, the
> immediate interpretant is just the schema of time, or the continuous
> predicate that grounds all sorts of predication.
>
> Self-control in semiosis (I call it semiostasis) is indeed a property of
> final interpretants (if they are thirdness), but also of the dyadic
> relation between the sign and the final interpretant, and also of the
> aspect of the triadic relation among sign, dynamic object and final
> interpretant. Whenever generality and final interpretants are involved in
> the aspects of the sign, we have some sort of self-control. An argument is
> the highest example for it has a leading principle controlling its
> development, which gives its assurance.
>
> I had never thought of holisigns being gratific types and altersigns being
> gratific 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

Thanks for sharing some additional thoughts on this topic. The linked note
obviously presupposes Peirce's 1903 taxonomy that has only three
trichotomies and ten classes, rather than the later ones that have six
trichotomies (for all the correlates) and 28 classes, or ten trichotomies
(for all the correlates and their external relations) and 66 classes. It
also seems to equate "token" with "replica," but I suggest that "token" is
more closely synonymous with "sinsign," while "instance" is what replaces
"replica" (CP 4.537, 1906).

Personally, I am inclined to view all sinsigns/tokens as replicas/instances
of legisigns/types, but others disagree. I suggest accordingly that what
the conclusion lists are the six kinds of replica/instance, rather than the
six kinds of sinsign/token. After all, there are three *additional *kinds
of sinsign/token that are not listed, which correspond to the outermost
oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical
sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 8, 2021 at 12:21 PM robert marty 
wrote:

> Contribution with a note on Signs, Types and Tokens.
>
>
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356001421_Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>  or https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>
> Abstract
>
> In the Peircean Semiotics, there is certain confusion on the
> terminological level as on the semantic one on the distinctions or the
> formal equivalences of the terms: signs, type, token to which one can add,
> instance, graph, graph-Instance, replica, graph-replica, and probably still
> others... These confusions can lead, as Peirce underlines it, to "*Imaginary
> distinctions which are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in
> their mode of expression"*; but with "*wrangling which ensues real enough*"
> (CP 5.398) and even to "*to mistake the sensation produced by our own
> unclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking"*
> (CP 5.398). This short note proposes unifying this sector of knowledge of
> Peirce's work around his ten classes of signs and the relations of
> embodiment they maintain. It is proved that there can only be six kinds of
> tokens and only six, relying only on his use of the term "replica" in his
> definitions of the classes of signs.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Robert Marty
>
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Vinicius Romanini]

y single carved hieroglyph would still be a replica of its legisign.
>>> It's symbolic nature would be buried though, maybe forever.
>>>
>>> Now, a particular hieroglyph before your (a replica) is a cognizable
>>> pattern that is destined to become a brute fact of your experience. It has
>>> existence as its final interpretant. In fact, any replica of a legisign is
>>> cognized as a pattern (a thirdness) that is destined to become a past
>>> memory of our experience (a secondness).
>>>
>>> Legisigns do not end as past memories of particular minds. As generals,
>>> their final interpretants are all the general possible memories, or
>>> sensations, that would or could be produced by a community of possible
>>> interpreters. Its final nature is the esse in futuro.
>>>
>>> In the same vein, holosigns are cognizable patterns (thirdness) that are
>>> destined to become feelings (firstness), maybe even non-conscious ones.
>>> When we look at a painting by Pollock for the first time, we cognize
>>> patterns that produce feelings for their final interpretant. If we
>>> encounter it for a second time, then we might feel the experience of a
>>> replica, and the effect of memorization is stronger than the original
>>> effect of musement.
>>>
>>> Well, maybe things are now more complicated than when we started. Sorry
>>> for that.
>>>
>>> Vinicius
>>>
>>> On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 10:53 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
>>> jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Vincinius, List,
>>>>
>>>> *VR*: I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness
>>>> for the representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.
>>>> I wonder if you would be able to clarify on this notion a little.
>>>> Perhaps delineating exactly what you consider a "degenerate legisign" to
>>>> be, and then how it alters when the mode is "thirdness for representament"
>>>> and "firstness for the final interpretant"?
>>>>
>>>> This is an idiosyncratic request on my part, but lately my mind has
>>>> been awash with abstract terminology. I often read the discourse on this
>>>> list and wonder if contributors shouldn't have to furnish practical
>>>> analogies in order to clarify their use of terms, because trying to ground
>>>> some of these concepts is not easy when everyone seems to be using a
>>>> similar code with different meanings in various places.
>>>>
>>>> Best
>>>>
>>>> Jack
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <
>>>> peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Vinicius Romanini <
>>>> vinir...@gmail.com>
>>>> *Sent:* Saturday, November 6, 2021 3:37 PM
>>>> *To:* Peirce-L 
>>>> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens
>>>>
>>>> Dear colleagues,
>>>>
>>>> This is an interesting thread. I have been working on these questions
>>>> for a while now.
>>>> My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's.
>>>> Tony Jappy once called me a Neo-Peircean, which I found OK. Better than
>>>> post or ante Peircean, anyway.
>>>>
>>>> I will restrict my comment to sign qua sign, or the proper
>>>> representamen. In my opinion, a truly pragmatic account of signhood must
>>>> consider not only how the sign is perceived but also how it ought to be
>>>> experienced in the long run. I mean that we must take into account the
>>>> final interpretant, which is the sign as it is destined to be interpreted.
>>>>
>>>> Roughly,
>>>> A genuine qualisign has firstness both for the representamen and the
>>>> final interpretant.
>>>> A genuine sinsign has secondness both for the representamen and the
>>>> final interpretant.
>>>> A genuine legising has thirdness both for the representamen and the
>>>> final interpretant.
>>>>
>>>> I think the above is plain.
>>>>
>>>> A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the
>>>> representamen but secondness for the final interpretant. Replicas are well
>>>> understood too.
>>>>
>>>> I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdnes

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[robert marty]

is not easy when
> everyone seems to be using a similar code with different meanings in
> various places.
>
>
> I understand the difficulty, and I apologize for contributing to it.
> Unfortunately, as you can probably tell, I tend to be a very abstract
> thinker and honestly have a hard time translating ideas and terminology
> that are clear within my own mind into concrete analogies and examples for
> effective communication to other minds.
>
> VR: When we look at a painting by Pollock for the first time, we cognize
> patterns that produce feelings for their final interpretant.
>
>
> Again, in my view, those *actual *feelings are by definition a *dynamical*
> interpretant. They are only a *final *interpretant if they happen to be
> the very same feelings that *would be* produced under *ideal *circumstances.
> As we have discussed recently on the List, such conformity of a dynamical
> interpretant to the final interpretant is any sincere inquirer's *proper
> aim* when interpreting any sign.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 5:10 PM Vinicius Romanini 
> wrote:
>
>> Jack, list
>>
>> The concept of degeneration comes from projective geometry. It does not
>> carry any moral judgement. You can degenerate a tridimensional figure by
>> projecting it on a plane, and then further degenerate it by projection on a
>> line. Something similar happens when we apply the categories.
>>
>> A legisign can be seen as a general rule that ought to be applied when we
>> generate its replicas. Any word, considered as a representamen, is a
>> legisign, or general sign. Whenever and wherever we use it, we generate one
>> of its replicas and by doing so we degenerate it from thirdness (general)
>> to secondness (its instantiation in space and time).
>>
>> If we didn't have the Rosetta Stone to decipher the ancient Egyptian,
>> every single carved hieroglyph would still be a replica of its legisign.
>> It's symbolic nature would be buried though, maybe forever.
>>
>> Now, a particular hieroglyph before your (a replica) is a cognizable
>> pattern that is destined to become a brute fact of your experience. It has
>> existence as its final interpretant. In fact, any replica of a legisign is
>> cognized as a pattern (a thirdness) that is destined to become a past
>> memory of our experience (a secondness).
>>
>> Legisigns do not end as past memories of particular minds. As generals,
>> their final interpretants are all the general possible memories, or
>> sensations, that would or could be produced by a community of possible
>> interpreters. Its final nature is the esse in futuro.
>>
>> In the same vein, holosigns are cognizable patterns (thirdness) that are
>> destined to become feelings (firstness), maybe even non-conscious ones.
>> When we look at a painting by Pollock for the first time, we cognize
>> patterns that produce feelings for their final interpretant. If we
>> encounter it for a second time, then we might feel the experience of a
>> replica, and the effect of memorization is stronger than the original
>> effect of musement.
>>
>> Well, maybe things are now more complicated than when we started. Sorry
>> for that.
>>
>> Vinicius
>>
>> On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 10:53 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
>> jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:
>>
>>> Vincinius, List,
>>>
>>> *VR*: I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness
>>> for the representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.
>>> I wonder if you would be able to clarify on this notion a little.
>>> Perhaps delineating exactly what you consider a "degenerate legisign" to
>>> be, and then how it alters when the mode is "thirdness for representament"
>>> and "firstness for the final interpretant"?
>>>
>>> This is an idiosyncratic request on my part, but lately my mind has been
>>> awash with abstract terminology. I often read the discourse on this list
>>> and wonder if contributors shouldn't have to furnish practical analogies in
>>> order to clarify their use of terms, because trying to ground some of these
>>> concepts is not easy when everyone seems to be using a similar code with
>>> different meanings in various places.
>>>
>>> Best
>>>
>>> Jack
>>>
>>> --
>>> *From:* peirce-l-re

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Vinicius Romanini]

(For some reason, the message below did not go through. I repost it. Sorry
if there is redundancy)

Jack, list

The concept of degeneration comes from projective geometry. It does not
carry any moral judgement. You can degenerate a tridimensional figure by
projecting it on a plane, and then further degenerate it by projection on a
line. Something similar happens when we apply the categories.

A legisign can be seen as a general rule that ought to be applied when we
generate its replicas. Any word, considered as a representamen, is a
legisign, or general sign. Whenever and wherever we use it, we generate one
of its replicas and by doing so we degenerate it from thirdness (general)
to secondness (its instantiation in space and time).

If we didn't have the Rosetta Stone to decipher the ancient Egyptian, every
single carved hieroglyph would still be a replica of its legisign. It's
symbolic nature would be buried though, maybe forever.

Now, a particular hieroglyph before your (a replica) is a cognizable
pattern that is destined to become a brute fact of your experience. It has
existence as its final interpretant. In fact, any replica of a legisign is
cognized as a pattern (a thirdness) that is destined to become a past
memory of our experience (a secondness).

Legisigns do not end as past memories of particular minds. As generals,
their final interpretants are all the general possible memories, or
sensations, that would or could be produced by a community of possible
interpreters. Its final nature is the esse in futuro.

In the same vein, holosigns are cognizable patterns (thirdness) that are
destined to become feelings (firstness), maybe even non-conscious ones.
When we look at a painting by Pollock for the first time, we cognize
patterns that produce feelings for their final interpretant. If we
encounter it for a second time, then we might feel the experience of a
replica, and the effect of memorization is stronger than the original
effect of musement.

Well, maybe things are now more complicated than when we started. Sorry for
that.

Vinicius

Em sáb., 6 de nov. de 2021 às 12:37, Vinicius Romanini 
escreveu:

> Dear colleagues,
>
> This is an interesting thread. I have been working on these questions for
> a while now.
> My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's.
> Tony Jappy once called me a Neo-Peircean, which I found OK. Better than
> post or ante Peircean, anyway.
>
> I will restrict my comment to sign qua sign, or the proper representamen.
> In my opinion, a truly pragmatic account of signhood must consider not only
> how the sign is perceived but also how it ought to be experienced in the
> long run. I mean that we must take into account the final interpretant,
> which is the sign as it is destined to be interpreted.
>
> Roughly,
> A genuine qualisign has firstness both for the representamen and the final
> interpretant.
> A genuine sinsign has secondness both for the representamen and the final
> interpretant.
> A genuine legising has thirdness both for the representamen and the final
> interpretant.
>
> I think the above is plain.
>
> A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the
> representamen but secondness for the final interpretant. Replicas are well
> understood too.
>
> I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness for the
> representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.
> I call altersings those degenerate sinsigns that have secondness for the
> representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.
>
> Holisigns are ephemeral patterns. They are patterns but tend to dissolve
> in experience as qualitative effects. A dune might be seen as a holisign as
> its shape continuously changes until it vanishes. The melody of jazz music
> is another example. If you gaze at the clouds in the sky, holisigns will
> appear in a multitude of changing patterns. A wave in itself is a holisign.
> General qualities, such as temperature, are holisigns.
>
> Altersigns are gentle signs of otherness. They do not have the lasting
> friction and brute forte of sinsigns. They pop up in perception but
> dissolve themselves as possibilities. Altersings are instantiations of
> holisigns as much as sinsigns are instantiations of legisigns.
> What we perceive of a holisign at any moment is an altersign. It is any
> alternative configuration of a pattern, if you want. The perceived feeling
> of a temperature is an altersign. In fact, it is the embodiment of the
> holisign.
>
> Holisings and altersigns are very important to the semeiotic of art.
>
> I believe these distinctions are important for the grounding and
> presentation of the representamen. Others will be necessary if we go up
> towards representation and communication. Such  considerations that can
> help render semeiotic intelligible and useful, at least as I understand it.
>
> All the best,
> Vinicius
>
>
> Em sex., 5 de nov. de 2021 às 21:51, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF: Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics
(unless we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic).


Indeed, the type/token distinction seems to be one of Peirce's most
commonly employed insights, although I doubt that very many people who use
it know that it came from him or are aware of its primary application
within a theory of signs. Personally, I do tend to think that the entire
universe is "composed exclusively of signs," not just "perfused with signs"
(CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906), but I consider material/physical phenomena to
be *degenerate* manifestations of semiosis in accordance with objective
idealism (CP 6.24-25, EP 1:292-293, 1891).

GF: I take “uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say
that an internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.


I instead take "uttering" to be nearly synonymous with "embodying," such
that there is a sense in which *every *sign token can be conceived as an
"utterance," even when it is strictly an internal thought. That seems to be
Peirce's view, as well, based on his remarks about a proverb being "one and
the same representamen" not only when it "is written or spoken in English,
Greek, or any other language," but also "every time it is thought of" (CP
5.138, EP 2:203, 1903). It also explains why "signs require at least two
Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*," such that "it is
not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every
logical evolution of thought should be dialogic" (CP 4.551, 1906).

GF: Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted
the other day, whether to regard the universe as a *narrative *(Raposa) or
an *argument *(Peirce).


I am glad that you brought this up again--I have been thinking about
responding to those questions, but holding off since this topic has been
prompting so much fruitful discussion. I will address them in the other
thread.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 10:04 AM  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff *et al.*,
>
> Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses *outside* of semiotics
> (unless we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic).
> Gary’s subway token furnishes one example.
>
> My question was whether an unuttered, internal thought is a token. (I take
> “uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say that an
> internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.) In a physiological
> context, specifically that of dynamic systems theory, I would say that it
> is probably a token of a type which is an *attractor in the state space*
> of the brain. Such attractors tend to be reiterated many times, but some of
> them are “strange” so that no two iterations are exactly alike, and
> naturally they all differ in time of occurrence, so I think the type/token
> distinction applies.
>
> Momentary brain events are not necessarily tokens conforming to *any*
> type, not even to a chronic condition such as epilepsy or bipolar disorder.
> They may be random occurrences. But a *thought*, I would think, would
> always belong to a *type* of a semiotic nature: it would be a *signal* as
> opposed to *noise*, or an attractor in a *meaning space
> *. Even a *spontaneous* thought can
> turn out to be significant, or can find itself adapted to some purpose, as
> all creative artists know.
>
> Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted the
> other day, whether to regard the universe as a *narrative* (Raposa) or an
> *argument* (Peirce ).
>
> A *narrative* is basically a representation of *a sequence of events*
> which is not necessarily meaningful in any way. An *argument*, on the
> other hand, represents a logical relation of *consequence.* Peirce says
> that the universe is “a great symbol of God's purpose”; an argument must
> have (and must *represent*) an element of *purposefulness* that a
> narrative can do without. Peirce’s assertion that the universe is an
> argument implies that it has a purpose. I’m inclined to associate this
> assertion with the 19th-century optimism which is also expressed in his
> belief that the universe was *progressing* in a definite direction,
> reflected anthropomorphically in a progress toward “concrete
> reasonableness.” As a 21st-century post-Peircean, I can’t honestly say
> that I share those beliefs. Nor do I believe that every *event* is
> significant.
>
> However, I notice that the term *narrative,* as used nowadays in the
> psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of
> purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to *make sense* of our lives and
> the lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events.
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon AS, Gary R, Phyllis, et al.


Sometimes, such as when I'm done thinking about a philosophical question, I 
look at the time and wonder where it went. I didn't write anything down, and I 
didn't talk to anyone about it. Gary F's question takes the following form:  
are my unuttered thoughts during this period internal sign tokens?


Consider a set of similar cases:


A.  I'm lost in thought, but occasionally muttering to myself. There is no one 
around to hear it, and I'm not even noticing that I'm quietly muttering.


B. I'm lost in thought and sketching a diagram. The diagram is something of a 
mess, and my thoughts are rather confused. I consider several changes that I 
might make, perhaps adding lines here, erasing some there, but I don't make the 
all of the changes considered. After an hour of doodling, I take the sheet of 
paper and throw it away. I don't come back to it later, nor does anyone else 
read it.


Whatever answer we give to your question about internal signs, I think the 
explanations should flow naturally to cover cases A and B. Similarly, the 
explanations should fit variations on A and B where someone else comes along 
and says, "you're muttering" what are you saying and I say "oh it's nothing" 
or, conversely, I reflect and offer an explanation of my thoughts. So, too, for 
the case of the diagram on the piece of paper when someone pulls it out of the 
trash and asks what I was thinking about when making the figure, and I give 
similar responses.


What is clear is that patterns of thought unuttered today may, at some point in 
the future, be uttered. As such, the analysis of those unuttered thoughts 
should account for the future possible forms in which they might be expressed 
verbally, in writing or in some other form of action.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Saturday, November 6, 2021 8:04:29 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff et al.,
Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics (unless 
we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic). Gary’s subway 
token furnishes one example.
My question was whether an unuttered, internal thought is a token. (I take 
“uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say that an 
internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.) In a physiological context, 
specifically that of dynamic systems theory, I would say that it is probably a 
token of a type which is an attractor in the state space of the brain. Such 
attractors tend to be reiterated many times, but some of them are “strange” so 
that no two iterations are exactly alike, and naturally they all differ in time 
of occurrence, so I think the type/token distinction applies.
Momentary brain events are not necessarily tokens conforming to any type, not 
even to a chronic condition such as epilepsy or bipolar disorder. They may be 
random occurrences. But a thought, I would think, would always belong to a type 
of a semiotic nature: it would be a signal as opposed to noise, or an attractor 
in a meaning space<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/mns.htm>. Even a spontaneous 
thought can turn out to be significant, or can find itself adapted to some 
purpose, as all creative artists know.
Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted the other 
day, whether to regard the universe as a narrative (Raposa) or an argument 
(Peirce<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#qarg>).
A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not 
necessarily meaningful in any way. An argument, on the other hand, represents a 
logical relation of consequence. Peirce says that the universe is “a great 
symbol of God's purpose”; an argument must have (and must represent) an element 
of purposefulness that a narrative can do without. Peirce’s assertion that the 
universe is an argument implies that it has a purpose. I’m inclined to 
associate this assertion with the 19th-century optimism which is also expressed 
in his belief that the universe was progressing in a definite direction, 
reflected anthropomorphically in a progress toward “concrete reasonableness.” 
As a 21st-century post-Peircean, I can’t honestly say that I share those 
beliefs. Nor do I believe that every event is significant.
However, I notice that the term narrative, as used nowadays in the 
psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of 
purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to make sense of our lives and the 
lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events. This is 
a natural development because we know that our actions have consequences and we 
would like to know what they are. Even when our actions do no

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Vinicius Romanini]

Dear colleagues,

This is an interesting thread. I have been working on these questions for a
while now.
My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's.
Tony Jappy once called me a Neo-Peircean, which I found OK. Better than
post or ante Peircean, anyway.

I will restrict my comment to sign qua sign, or the proper representamen.
In my opinion, a truly pragmatic account of signhood must consider not only
how the sign is perceived but also how it ought to be experienced in the
long run. I mean that we must take into account the final interpretant,
which is the sign as it is destined to be interpreted.

Roughly,
A genuine qualisign has firstness both for the representamen and the final
interpretant.
A genuine sinsign has secondness both for the representamen and the final
interpretant.
A genuine legising has thirdness both for the representamen and the final
interpretant.

I think the above is plain.

A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the representamen
but secondness for the final interpretant. Replicas are well understood too.

I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness for the
representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.
I call altersings those degenerate sinsigns that have secondness for the
representamen but firstness for the final interpretant.

Holisigns are ephemeral patterns. They are patterns but tend to dissolve in
experience as qualitative effects. A dune might be seen as a holisign as
its shape continuously changes until it vanishes. The melody of jazz music
is another example. If you gaze at the clouds in the sky, holisigns will
appear in a multitude of changing patterns. A wave in itself is a holisign.
General qualities, such as temperature, are holisigns.

Altersigns are gentle signs of otherness. They do not have the lasting
friction and brute forte of sinsigns. They pop up in perception but
dissolve themselves as possibilities. Altersings are instantiations of
holisigns as much as sinsigns are instantiations of legisigns.
What we perceive of a holisign at any moment is an altersign. It is any
alternative configuration of a pattern, if you want. The perceived feeling
of a temperature is an altersign. In fact, it is the embodiment of the
holisign.

Holisings and altersigns are very important to the semeiotic of art.

I believe these distinctions are important for the grounding and
presentation of the representamen. Others will be necessary if we go up
towards representation and communication. Such  considerations that can
help render semeiotic intelligible and useful, at least as I understand it.

All the best,
Vinicius


Em sex., 5 de nov. de 2021 às 21:51, Jon Alan Schmidt <
jonalanschm...@gmail.com> escreveu:

> Gary R., Phyllis, List:
>
> GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the
> subway token is ...
>
>
> I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is *not *a token
> in the semeiotic sense, and its type is *not *a type in the semeiotic
> sense. The English *term *"subway token" is a type, and each *individual 
> *instance
> where and when "subway token" is written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise
> embodied is a token of that type.
>
> GR: ... but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?
>
>
> The type is whatever definitely significant form is embodied by the
> unexpressed thought-token, whether words in a language, an image, a
> diagram, etc. The object is whatever the unexpressed thought-token
> *denotes*, i.e., that which it is *about*.
>
> GR: Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the
> dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than
> the dream, I would expect).
>
>
> Even though the events that take place in a dream are not real, the dream
> itself is still an *actual *thought-token. After all, the events that
> take place in a fictional narrative are not real, but the spoken or written
> story is still an *actual *text-token.
>
> GR: What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come
> "out of the blue" as the expression has it.
>
>
> It would still be a token of a type, an individual embodiment of a
> definitely significant form; and it would still be about something other
> than itself, namely, its object. It would also be a dynamical interpretant
> of the (quasi-)mind that thinks it, which consists of all the signs that
> have previously determined it--a system of connected signs that constitutes
> one sign and thus can determine one such interpretant.
>
> GR: Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it
> might be better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the
> terminology forged in semeiotic grammar.
>
>
> I have gradually come to agree with James Liszka (
> https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that a concentration on *classifying
> signs* is misplaced, and that it is indeed more fruitful to analyze the 
> *process of
> 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[gnox]

Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff et al.,

Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics (unless 
we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic). Gary’s subway 
token furnishes one example. 

My question was whether an unuttered, internal thought is a token. (I take 
“uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say that an 
internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.) In a physiological context, 
specifically that of dynamic systems theory, I would say that it is probably a 
token of a type which is an attractor in the state space of the brain. Such 
attractors tend to be reiterated many times, but some of them are “strange” so 
that no two iterations are exactly alike, and naturally they all differ in time 
of occurrence, so I think the type/token distinction applies.

Momentary brain events are not necessarily tokens conforming to any type, not 
even to a chronic condition such as epilepsy or bipolar disorder. They may be 
random occurrences. But a thought, I would think, would always belong to a type 
of a semiotic nature: it would be a signal as opposed to noise, or an attractor 
in a  <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/mns.htm> meaning space. Even a spontaneous 
thought can turn out to be significant, or can find itself adapted to some 
purpose, as all creative artists know.

Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted the other 
day, whether to regard the universe as a narrative (Raposa) or an argument ( 
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#qarg> Peirce).

A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not 
necessarily meaningful in any way. An argument, on the other hand, represents a 
logical relation of consequence. Peirce says that the universe is “a great 
symbol of God's purpose”; an argument must have (and must represent) an element 
of purposefulness that a narrative can do without. Peirce’s assertion that the 
universe is an argument implies that it has a purpose. I’m inclined to 
associate this assertion with the 19th-century optimism which is also expressed 
in his belief that the universe was progressing in a definite direction, 
reflected anthropomorphically in a progress toward “concrete reasonableness.” 
As a 21st-century post-Peircean, I can’t honestly say that I share those 
beliefs. Nor do I believe that every event is significant.

However, I notice that the term narrative, as used nowadays in the 
psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of 
purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to make sense of our lives and the 
lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events. This is 
a natural development because we know that our actions have consequences and we 
would like to know what they are. Even when our actions do not have  
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/sdg.htm#x02> conscious purposes, they have 
motivations or intentions which can be read as natural signs or tokens of some 
type of “purpose”, or as intimations of Thirdness in the universe.

Consequently I think that in calling the universe a narrative, Raposa is not 
denying that the universe is an argument or has a purpose, he is merely leaving 
that question open. A kind of agnosticism, perhaps.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 5-Nov-21 20:53
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

 

Gary R., Phyllis, List:

 

GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway 
token is ...

 

I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is not a token in the 
semeiotic sense, and its type is not a type in the semeiotic sense. The English 
term "subway token" is a type, and each individual instance where and when 
"subway token" is written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise embodied is a token 
of that type.

 

GR: ... but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?

 

The type is whatever definitely significant form is embodied by the unexpressed 
thought-token, whether words in a language, an image, a diagram, etc. The 
object is whatever the unexpressed thought-token denotes, i.e., that which it 
is about.

 

GR: Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the 
dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than the 
dream, I would expect).

 

Even though the events that take place in a dream are not real, the dream 
itself is still an actual thought-token. After all, the events that take place 
in a fictional narrative are not real, but the spoken or written story is still 
an actual text-token.

 

GR: What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come "out 
of the blue" as the expression has it.

 

It would still be a token of a type, an individual embodiment of a definitely 
significant form; and it would still be about something other

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Phyllis, List:

GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the
subway token is ...


I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is *not *a token
in the semeiotic sense, and its type is *not *a type in the semeiotic
sense. The English *term *"subway token" is a type, and each
*individual *instance
where and when "subway token" is written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise
embodied is a token of that type.

GR: ... but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?


The type is whatever definitely significant form is embodied by the
unexpressed thought-token, whether words in a language, an image, a
diagram, etc. The object is whatever the unexpressed thought-token *denotes*,
i.e., that which it is *about*.

GR: Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the
dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than
the dream, I would expect).


Even though the events that take place in a dream are not real, the dream
itself is still an *actual *thought-token. After all, the events that take
place in a fictional narrative are not real, but the spoken or written
story is still an *actual *text-token.

GR: What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come
"out of the blue" as the expression has it.


It would still be a token of a type, an individual embodiment of a
definitely significant form; and it would still be about something other
than itself, namely, its object. It would also be a dynamical interpretant
of the (quasi-)mind that thinks it, which consists of all the signs that
have previously determined it--a system of connected signs that constitutes
one sign and thus can determine one such interpretant.

GR: Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it
might be better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the
terminology forged in semeiotic grammar.


I have gradually come to agree with James Liszka (
https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that a concentration on *classifying
signs* is misplaced, and that it is indeed more fruitful to analyze
the *process of
semiosis*, especially having taken the position that the former are
discrete *entia rationis* while the latter is a real continuum. However, I
strongly believe that the proper use of the terminology forged in
speculative grammar is indispensable for that task, as demonstrated by the
recent on-List cases of misapplying the type/token distinction to *objects *of
signs rather than signs *themselves*.

GR: In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at
least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a
possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis.


I agree, which is why I have tried to standardize some of the terminology
in my own usage where Peirce himself clearly was experimenting with various
alternatives, such as tone/token/type in lieu of the earlier
qualisign/sinsign/legisign and the later potisign/actisign/famisign.
Name/proposition/argument is another one, as opposed to term or rheme as
the first class, dicisign as the second, and seme/pheme/delome as the full
trichotomy. He is fairly consistent about immediate and dynamical for the
two objects and the first two interpretants, but I tend to use final for
the third interpretant rather than eventual, habitual, normal, or rational.

GR: I'm eager to explore it further.


Likewise, I am enjoying the conversation and look forward to further
exchanges. I hope that more List members will chime in as Jack, Jeff, Mike,
and now Phyllis already have.

PC: What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of
music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art?


These are excellent examples of signs embodied in *other *systems of
expression, which I have tried to keep in mind throughout the discussion
even though we have mostly been talking about written and spoken languages
so far. A handwritten or printed score, a live performance, an audio
recording, and even a person's internal recollection are all tokens of a
piece of music, arguably conforming to different types of the same sign and
obviously possessing very different tones.

GR: But in both linguistic and art creation, I am still unsettled on what
the *object* of that original sign is.


Artistic signs tend to be highly iconic, which entails that they are not so
much about denoting an object as about signifying an interpretant, namely,
producing certain *feelings* as their primary effects. Accordingly, I am
inclined to identify their creators' *intentions* as their objects, much
like the author's intention in the case of a text.

PC: So, while I agree with you that not much is written about the arts from
a Peircean perspective, it is a rich source for such study.


Indeed, much more could and should be said here, so I am very interested to
see what others will add to these initial remarks.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Phyllis Chiasson]

of the sign. After all. . . an
>>> internal thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries
>>> that are marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue
>>> in which the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of
>>> the same (quasi-)mind.  the pattern of neural activity that embodies a
>>> thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of
>>> sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text.
>>>
>>>
>>> But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that original
>>> thought is an alleged 'token' of? And what is its object? What if it were a
>>> random, yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as
>>> the expression has it. Certainly I agree with Jon that "the pattern of
>>> neural activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance
>>> just as much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies
>>> a spoken or written text," and so the same questions just above might
>>> be put to, especially, the verbal expression of that "highly original
>>> thought."
>>>
>>> Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might
>>> be better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the
>>> terminology forged in semeiotic grammar. On the other hand, it would seem
>>> that for the purposes of developing a scientific semeiotic that we require
>>> such terminology to even speak about semiosis with other semioticians, to
>>> discuss semiosis generally, or individual examples of semiosis, etc. The
>>> danger, as I'm beginning to see it, is the possibility of getting 'lost' in
>>> the terminology, to see individual trees rather than the forest, so to
>>> speak. In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at
>>> least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a
>>> possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I doubt that few
>>> would say that there aren't major challenges in dealing with Peirce's
>>> semeiotic terminology as it develops over the course of his logical life.
>>>
>>> I am only today grappling with the intriguing question you posed, Gary
>>> F, and just a few minutes ago read Jon's post, so all of this is still
>>> quite unsettled in my thinking. I'm eager to explore it further.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “Let everything happen to you
>>> Beauty and terror
>>> Just keep going
>>> No feeling is final”
>>> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>>>
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 9:16 AM  wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon, Gary R, List,
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by
>>>> my internal editor.
>>>>
>>>> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
>>>> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
>>>> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
>>>> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
>>>> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος"
>>>> as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of
>>>> those signs.
>>>>
>>>> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a
>>>> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
>>>> *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred
>>>> to as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of
>>>> *tokens*.
>>>>
>>>> I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external
>>>> *signs. In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A
>>>> sign (under which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone
>>>> external signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment
>>>> is certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity,
>>>> whether I *utter* it or not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

ly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as the
>> expression has it. Certainly I agree with Jon that "the pattern of
>> neural activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance
>> just as much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies
>> a spoken or written text," and so the same questions just above might be
>> put to, especially, the verbal expression of that "highly original thought."
>>
>> Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might
>> be better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the
>> terminology forged in semeiotic grammar. On the other hand, it would seem
>> that for the purposes of developing a scientific semeiotic that we require
>> such terminology to even speak about semiosis with other semioticians, to
>> discuss semiosis generally, or individual examples of semiosis, etc. The
>> danger, as I'm beginning to see it, is the possibility of getting 'lost' in
>> the terminology, to see individual trees rather than the forest, so to
>> speak. In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at
>> least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a
>> possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I doubt that few
>> would say that there aren't major challenges in dealing with Peirce's
>> semeiotic terminology as it develops over the course of his logical life.
>>
>> I am only today grappling with the intriguing question you posed, Gary F,
>> and just a few minutes ago read Jon's post, so all of this is still quite
>> unsettled in my thinking. I'm eager to explore it further.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> “Let everything happen to you
>> Beauty and terror
>> Just keep going
>> No feeling is final”
>> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 9:16 AM  wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, Gary R, List,
>>>
>>> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by
>>> my internal editor.
>>>
>>> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
>>> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
>>> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
>>> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
>>> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος"
>>> as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of
>>> those signs.
>>>
>>> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a
>>> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
>>> *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred
>>> to as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of
>>> *tokens*.
>>>
>>> I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external 
>>> *signs.
>>> In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under
>>> which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external
>>> signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is
>>> certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity,
>>> whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is
>>> *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only
>>> difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does
>>> that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it
>>> a *type*.
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>>> *On Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt
>>> *Sent:* 4-Nov-21 18:24
>>> *To:* Peirce-L 
>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary F., List:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
>>> speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign
>>> is a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that
>>> only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Phyllis Chiasson]

gt;
>> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by
>> my internal editor.
>>
>> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
>> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
>> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
>> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
>> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
>> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those
>> signs.
>>
>> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a
>> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
>> *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred
>> to as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of
>> *tokens*.
>>
>> I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external 
>> *signs.
>> In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under
>> which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external
>> signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is
>> certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity,
>> whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is
>> *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only
>> difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does
>> that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a
>> *type*.
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>> *On Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt
>> *Sent:* 4-Nov-21 18:24
>> *To:* Peirce-L 
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>>
>>
>> Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
>> speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is
>> a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that
>> only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and
>> species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality
>> that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
>>
>>
>>
>> Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where
>> they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual 
>> *instances
>> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
>> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
>> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
>> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those
>> signs.
>>
>>
>>
>> Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is
>> simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why
>> the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>>
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>>
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
>> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
>> message and nothing in the body.  More at
>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;
>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body.  More at
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

 the written or spoken *word* that is a
> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
> *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to
> as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of
> *tokens*.
>
> I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external *signs.
> In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under
> which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external
> signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is
> certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity,
> whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is
> *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only
> difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does
> that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a
> *type*.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* 4-Nov-21 18:24
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
> speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is
> a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that
> only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and
> species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality
> that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
>
>
>
> Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where
> they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual 
> *instances
> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those
> signs.
>
>
>
> Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is
> simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why
> the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body.  More at
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF: It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
*subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to
as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types *but not of *tokens*.


I agree, although I prefer to use "type" for what you are calling a
"subtype" and "sign" for what you are calling "the more general type." That
way, the hierarchy has exactly four distinct levels--*tones *as
indefinitely significant characters possessed by *tokens*, each of which is
an individual instance governed by and conforming to a *type*, which is a
definitely significant form within a particular language or other system of
*signs*, each of which encompasses multiple types that are at least
approximate translations of each other.

GF: A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied *here and
now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter *it or not, just as a
spoken or written text is *embodied *in a pattern of sound waves or marks
on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal *sign, invisible
to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*?


I would say that it is indeed a token, because it is an *individual*
embodiment of the sign. After all, as we have discussed previously, an
internal thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries
that are marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue
in which the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of
the same (quasi-)mind. In other words, the pattern of neural activity that
embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much as the
pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written
text.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 8:16 AM  wrote:

> Jon, Gary R, List,
>
> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my
> internal editor.
>
> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those
> signs.
>
> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a
> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
> *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to
> as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of
> *tokens*.
>
> I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external *signs.
> In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under
> which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external
> signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is
> certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity,
> whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is
> *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only
> difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does
> that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a
> *type*.
>
> Gary f.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

This is another example of incorrectly applying Peirce's semeiotic
terminology of "type" and "token" to the *objects *of signs rather than to
signs *themselves*. Just as an individual man is *not *a token of the type
"man" as a word in English, the individual philosophers called by the names
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are *not "*paradigms of token individuals."
Instead, they are the *dynamical *objects of those three names, which are
tokens of types whenever and wherever they are *actually *written, spoken,
thought of, or otherwise embodied.

In a draft letter to Lady Welby (EP 2:484-489, 1908), Peirce gives the
trichotomies for classifying a sign according to its *dynamical *object as
abstractive/concretive/collective, its *immediate *object as
descriptive/designative/copulant, and the sign *itself *as (tentatively)
potisign/actisign/famisign rather than tone/token/type. He further posits
that all famisigns are collective copulants, while actisigns can also be
collective designatives or concretive designatives. Hence, the English word
"man" as a *type *is a collective copulant, and when a *token *of "man" or
a proper name like "Socrates" is used to denote an *individual *man, it is
a concretive designative.

As for quantification, Francesco Bellucci observes that some of Peirce's
earlier taxonomies associate it directly with the *immediate *object as
vague/singular/general (*Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics*,
section 8.1.1). "Greek philosophers" is a collective copulant type, so a
quantifier must be added to identify which *individual* member of that
collection is the dynamical object of an *individual *token of that
type. "*Some
*Greek philosopher" reserves the choice of that individual for the utterer,
"*this *Greek philosopher" indicates that individual within the context of
the utterance, and "*any *Greek philosopher" allows the interpreter to
choose that individual.

"Most Greek philosophers" is a bit trickier, since it ostensibly denotes an
indefinite *collection *of members within the entire collection of Greek
philosophers--which presumably encompasses all past, present, and future
Greek philosophers unless stipulated otherwise by the utterer. I suggest
reformulating the proposition accordingly--"for any Greek philosopher, it
is probable that he/she dies before age 100." The dynamical *object *is
thus whatever individual Greek philosopher is chosen by the interpreter,
and the immediate *interpretant *in accordance with the definition of
"probable" is that if an infinite series of such individuals were to be
randomly chosen, then more than half of them would die before age 100.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:18 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary F, JAS, List,
>
> The points made about types and tokens are interesting.
>
> Consider an inductive argument.
>
>1. Socrates is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 71.
>2. Plato is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 80.
>3. Aristotle is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 62.
>4. Therefore, it is probable that most Greek philosophers die before
>age 100.
>
> In this argument, the philosophers called by the names Socrates, Plato and
> Aristotle are all paradigms of token individuals.
>
> What about "most Greek philosophers?" In logical terms, we take a
> class--Greek philosophers--and then we quantify over it. The quantifier,
> Peirce points out, takes many individuals and treats them as a collection.
> We can, for the purposes of expressing the conclusion in the Beta system of
> the EG, treat that collection as an individual having the character of an
> existing group.
>
> What is the status of the collection when we include the "it is probable
> that" and express the conclusion in the Gamma system of the EG? If we don't
> restrict the group to individuals who lived in the past, but include
> possible living Greek philosophers who have not yet died, then what should
> we say about "most Greek philosophers"? Type or token? General kind or
> group of particular individuals? How about a group that includes future
> Greek philosophers not yet born?
>
> We can, for various purposes, restrict our attention in different ways.
> This is, after all, the function of indices--including the quantifiers
> employed in natural languages.
>
> My suggestion is that we use the formal systems of the EGs as mathematical
> tools for clarifying hypotheses in the philosophical theory of logic. If
> our aim in a critical logic is to give explanations of function of the
> terms and propositions in the argument so as to explain the grounds of the
> validity of the reasoning, then I suspect we'd better take some care to
> sort out the relationships between the quantifiers and modal operators in
> the inductive 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[gnox]

Jon, Gary R, List,

Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my 
internal editor.

JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken word that is a token. It 
would follow that the three words in the different languages are subtypes, not 
tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to as “the same sign.” 
This implies a hierarchy of types but not of tokens.

I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to external signs. In 
his October 1995 Monist article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under which 
designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external signs)” (CP 
5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly embodied 
here and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I utter it or not, just 
as a spoken or written text is embodied in a pattern of sound waves or marks on 
a page. The only difference is that it is an internal sign, invisible to 
others. Does that disqualify it as a token? I would certainly hesitate to call 
it a type.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 4-Nov-21 18:24
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

 

Gary F., List:

 

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative 
grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. 
Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an 
individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both 
types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least 
somewhat arbitrary.

 

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

 

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply 
"sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the 
ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, Gary, Jon, list,

 

I think, being either an animal or a human does not make something either a sign or an object, but the context does.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 05. November 2021 um 06:52 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" 
wrote:

 
















Jon A.S., Gary F, List,

 


JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token (emphasis added, GR).

GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:

 




















A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537, 1906) 




















 

JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an individual organism is properly called a token.

GR: This follows from the above.

 

JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.

GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on 'genus': 

 






















The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists. The standards for genus classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities often produce different classifications for genera.






















 

Something similar is true for 'species': see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species

 

JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed by the general type to which it conforms.

GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation offered, that "only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token."

 

JAS: However, individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the dynamical objects of those signs (emphasis added, GR).

GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans, biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate the two.

 

JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late quotation:

 





























CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)





























 

Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and can be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (at least in the context of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).

 

At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce thought and wrote: Are there any terms and their accompanying meanings which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms and ideas. And one of these is that "within the context of speculative grammar. . . only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token."

 

Best.

 

Gary R

















 

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York





 





























 


On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:



Gary F., List:

 


Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Mike Bergman]

Hi All,

This is a frequent question, between token and type, in knowledge 
representation systems. Of course, the answer to this question is 
context. When talking about a thing or its attributes, token is your 
choice. When talking about external relationships or group membership, 
type is your choice. Sometimes, for the same given thing, either might 
be appropriate, again depending on context.


A real advance in the second version of the OWL language, one of the W3C 
standards, was to enable a metamodeling technique called 'punning'. 
Depending on context, the same 'thing' may be either a class (type) or 
instance (individual) [1]. I think Charlie would approve, but I do not 
have song and verse to cite for that immediately at hand.


Mike

[1] 
https://www.mkbergman.com/2286/knowledge-representation-is-a-tricky-business/


On 11/5/2021 12:52 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Jon A.S., Gary F, List,

JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology /within the context of 
speculative grammar/ is that only an /individual /embodiment of a sign 
is a token (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than 
sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated 
example:


A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to
that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some
single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being
significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as
this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single
copy of a book, I will venture to call a /Token/. (Prolegomena to
an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537, 1906)


JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that 
only an /individual /organism is properly called a token.

GR: This follows from the above.

JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different 
levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at 
least somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history 
of biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia 
article on 'genus':


The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
. The standards
for genus classification are not strictly codified, so different
authorities often produce different classifications for genera.


Something similar is true for 'species': see: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species


JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens 
where they are /actually/ written or spoken, and each of those 
/individual /instances is governed by the /general /type to which it 
conforms.
GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce 
quotation offered, that "only an /individual /embodiment of a sign is 
a token."


JAS: However, /individual *humans* are not tokens of the type "man" as 
a word in English/, the type "homo" as a /word /in Latin, or the type 
"ἄνθρωπος" as a /word /in Greek; instead, they are the /dynamical 
objects/ of those signs (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual 
humans, biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's 
not conflate the two.


JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of 
signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other 
types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be 
unavoidable.
GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be 
unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late 
quotation:


CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable
whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and
imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or
thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)


Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things 
regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and /can be/ quasi-settled 
(the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would 
say that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (/at least/ in the 
context of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) 
regarding 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it 
ought to be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 
'quasi-' here too).


At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what 
Peirce thought and wrote: Are there /any/ terms and their accompanying 
meanings which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there 
are such terms and ideas. And one of these is that "/within the 
context of speculative grammar/. . . only an /individual /embodiment 
of a sign is a token."


Best.

Gary R



  “Let everything happen to you
  Beauty and terror
  Just keep going
  No feeling is final”
  ― 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

List,

To follow up on the message I just sent out:

When I first came to live in NYC, and for several decades after, when you
wanted to take the subway you would go to a booth and purchase
subway 'tokens'. Each subway token was a token (in Peircean terms) of
the *type*, 'that object which will get you a single ride on the subway'. GR
“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 1:52 AM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon A.S., Gary F, List,
>
> JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology *within the context of
> speculative grammar* is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is
> a token (emphasis added, GR).
> GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than
> sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:
>
> A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that
> one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at
> any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
> occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a
> single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to
> call a *Token*. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537,
> 1906)
>
>
> JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only
> an *individual *organism is properly called a token.
> GR: This follows from the above.
>
> JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different
> levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
> GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least
> somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of
> biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on
> 'genus':
>
> The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
> . The standards for
> genus classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities
> often produce different classifications for genera.
>
>
> Something similar is true for 'species': see:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species
>
> JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens
> where they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those
> *individual *instances is governed by the *general *type to which it
> conforms.
> GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation
> offered, that "only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."
>
> JAS: However, *individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as
> a word in English*, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type
> "ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of
> those signs (emphasis added, GR).
> GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans,
> biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate
> the two.
>
> JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs"
> is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is
> why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
> GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
> unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late
> quotation:
>
> CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to
> our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only
> it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning
> Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)
>
>
> Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things
> regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and *can be* quasi-settled
> (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say
> that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (*at least* in the context
> of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding
> 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be
> quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).
>
> At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce
> thought and wrote: Are there *any* terms and their accompanying meanings
> which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms
> and ideas. And one of these is that "*within the context of speculative
> grammar*. . . only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."
>
> Best.
>
> Gary R
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

Jon A.S., Gary F, List,

JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology *within the context of
speculative grammar* is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a
token (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than
sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:

A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one
happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any
one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a
single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to
call a *Token*. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537,
1906)


JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an
*individual *organism is properly called a token.
GR: This follows from the above.

JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels
of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least
somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of
biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on
'genus':

The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
. The standards for genus
classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities often
produce different classifications for genera.


Something similar is true for 'species': see:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species

JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where
they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms.
GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation
offered, that "only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."

JAS: However, *individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as
a word in English*, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type
"ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of
those signs (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans,
biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate
the two.

JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs"
is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is
why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late
quotation:

CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to
our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only
it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning
Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)


Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things regarding
what Peirce thought, ought to be and *can be* quasi-settled (the principle
of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say that from the
standpoint of what Peirce meant (*at least* in the context of semeiotic
grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding 'token', 'type',
'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be quasi-settled (the
principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).

At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce
thought and wrote: Are there *any* terms and their accompanying meanings
which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms
and ideas. And one of these is that "*within the context of speculative
grammar*. . . only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."

Best.

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
> speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is
> a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that
> only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and
> species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality
> that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
>
> Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where
> they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual 
> *instances
> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jack, List:

Peirce writes, "What is reality? Perhaps there isn’t any such thing at all.
As I have repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroduction, a working
hypothesis which we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing
anything" (NEM 4:343, 1898). Hence, the only way to "verify" that there is
a dynamical object "outside the sign" is no different from the only way to
"verify" any other retroductive hypothesis--by deductively explicating its
necessary consequences, and then inductively evaluating whether those
predictions are borne out by additional observations and experiments. If
so, then the hypothesis is corroborated, although it can never be
"verified" with absolute certainty. If not, then the hypothesis is
falsified.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 11:02 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> Thanks for that explanation, Jon.
>
> Another thing that occurred to me recently: in his letter to Lady Welby,
> Peirce posits that the dynamic object is that which "exists outside the
> sign" (EP 2: 480). What I'm wondering is if there's any way to "verify"
> this? Again, I'm mindful of the distinction Peirce makes about his
> semeiotic as not corresponding to metaphysical proofs (or something along
> these lines?). The point is that if we take experience (conscious or
> somatic) to be a series of signs comprised of impressions from immediate
> objects, and immediate objects as one side of dual relationship in which
> dynamic objects (the object as it exists beyond the immediacy of the sign)
> comprise the other side, what uses do people think we can make of the
> dynamical object in practical analysis? It's been rebuffed many times over,
> but every time I read Peirce's theory (regarding the two objects) I am
> always drawn back into a Kantian notion of the thing in itself (with the
> distinction between the two, perhaps, that Peirce says we can experience
> the dynamic object directly via its immediate form whereas Kant's noumena
> and so on is less amenable or wholly denied to perception?).
>
> Just trying to think of Peirce in practical terms by skeletonising his
> theory as much as possible, adding parts when needed.
>
> Jack
>
> --
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 4, 2021 1:06 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key
> principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)
>
> Jack, List:
>
> There is nothing "heretical" or even "heterodox" here from a Peircean
> perspective. It just strikes me as another situation where the boundaries
> are somewhat arbitrary, such that we deliberately draw them in accordance
> with the purpose of a particular analysis.
>
> I tend to focus on one sign (type/token/tones) along with its two objects
> (immediate/dynamical) and three interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final),
> which is a task for speculative grammar, the first branch of the normative
> science of logic as semeiotic. Focusing instead on the different dynamical
> interpretants that one sign token determines in different individual
> (quasi-)minds seems more like a task for speculative rhetoric (or
> methodeutic), the third branch of the normative science of logic as
> semeiotic.
>
> Of course, the latter approach depends to an extent on the former because
> within Peirce's overall theory, each of the interpreting (quasi-)minds is
> itself a sign. In fact, I have suggested that this is why the same uttered
> sign token with the same tones can have different dynamical
> interpretants--the one sign that is constituted by connecting the uttered
> sign to any particular (quasi-)mind is different from the one sign that is
> constituted by connecting the uttered sign to any other (quasi-)mind.
>
> As for "the performative/practical domain," Francesco Bellucci suggests that
> "*speculative grammar came to include a pioneering speech act theory. *For
> the *general *distinction between the immediate, the dynamic, and the
> final interpretant was needed in order to differentiate the illocutionary,
> the perlocutionary, and the locutionary levels of analysis" (*Peirce's
> Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics*, p. 327). However, he also
> points out that in Peirce's late taxonomies for classifying signs, the
> divisions based on perlocutionary effects and illocutionary forces are both
> associated with the *dynamical* interpretant--its nature and its relation
> to the sign, respectively.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Ph

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, JAS, List,


The points made about types and tokens are interesting.


Consider an inductive argument.


  1.  Socrates is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 71.
  2.  Plato is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 80.
  3.  Aristotle is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 62.
  4.  Therefore, it is probable that most Greek philosophers die before age 100.


In this argument, the philosophers called by the names Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle are all paradigms of token individuals.


What about "most Greek philosophers?" In logical terms, we take a class--Greek 
philosophers--and then we quantify over it. The quantifier, Peirce points out, 
takes many individuals and treats them as a collection. We can, for the 
purposes of expressing the conclusion in the Beta system of the EG, treat that 
collection as an individual having the character of an existing group.


What is the status of the collection when we include the "it is probable that" 
and express the conclusion in the Gamma system of the EG? If we don't restrict 
the group to individuals who lived in the past, but include possible living 
Greek philosophers who have not yet died, then what should we say about "most 
Greek philosophers"? Type or token? General kind or group of particular 
individuals? How about a group that includes future Greek philosophers not yet 
born?


We can, for various purposes, restrict our attention in different ways. This 
is, after all, the function of indices--including the quantifiers employed in 
natural languages.


My suggestion is that we use the formal systems of the EGs as mathematical 
tools for clarifying hypotheses in the philosophical theory of logic. If our 
aim in a critical logic is to give explanations of function of the terms and 
propositions in the argument so as to explain the grounds of the validity of 
the reasoning, then I suspect we'd better take some care to sort out the 
relationships between the quantifiers and modal operators in the inductive 
reasoning.


This kind of concern, I believe, should be controlling when it comes to better 
understanding the classification of different kinds of signs in a theory of 
speculative grammar as types or tokens.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 3:23 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

Gary F., List:

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative 
grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. 
Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an 
individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both 
types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least 
somewhat arbitrary.

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply 
"sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the 
ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> 
wrote:
Jon, list,
JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's 
various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a 
type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every 
type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …
GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token relation, like the 
general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or 
holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the level 
in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the genus is type 
and the species is token, but the species is also the type of which an 
individual organism of that species is token (and there can be other levels 
intermediate between those two!).
Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, homo, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’ (MS 9), 
the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the three terms 
are also types of which indi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a
token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only
an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are
both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at
least somewhat arbitrary.

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
individual *humans
*are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in English, the type "homo"
as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead,
they are the *dynamical objects* of those signs.

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is
simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why
the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM  wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with
> Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is
> *either *a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the
> idea that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …
>
> GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token *relation*, like the
> general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or
> holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the
> level in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the
> *genus* is type and the *species* is token, but the *species* is also the
> type of which an individual organism of that species is token (and there
> can be other levels intermediate between those two!).
>
> Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, *homo*, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’
> (MS 9), the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the
> three terms are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we
> use the term “individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is
> the type of which Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual tokens. Is
> there a *top type* (*Archetype? Metatype?) *in the holarchy of signs? The
> universe as sign, perhaps? I don’t know, but I would say that it’s *signs*
> all the way down. So I’d rather not use the word *sign* to refer to
> several specific levels of generality at once.
>
> By the way, some years ago I did a slideshow
>  dealing with the etymology and history
> of the word “type,” in connection with a Peirce text where he uses the
> Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” of Form and Matter in
> semiosis. The text is included in *Turning Signs* here
> , in a passage leading up to a
> discussion of the “categories.”
>
> Gary f.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

Jon, List,

Thanks for that explanation, Jon.

Another thing that occurred to me recently: in his letter to Lady Welby, Peirce 
posits that the dynamic object is that which "exists outside the sign" (EP 2: 
480). What I'm wondering is if there's any way to "verify" this? Again, I'm 
mindful of the distinction Peirce makes about his semeiotic as not 
corresponding to metaphysical proofs (or something along these lines?). The 
point is that if we take experience (conscious or somatic) to be a series of 
signs comprised of impressions from immediate objects, and immediate objects as 
one side of dual relationship in which dynamic objects (the object as it exists 
beyond the immediacy of the sign) comprise the other side, what uses do people 
think we can make of the dynamical object in practical analysis? It's been 
rebuffed many times over, but every time I read Peirce's theory (regarding the 
two objects) I am always drawn back into a Kantian notion of the thing in 
itself (with the distinction between the two, perhaps, that Peirce says we can 
experience the dynamic object directly via its immediate form whereas Kant's 
noumena and so on is less amenable or wholly denied to perception?).

Just trying to think of Peirce in practical terms by skeletonising his theory 
as much as possible, adding parts when needed.

Jack


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 1:06 AM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key 
principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

Jack, List:

There is nothing "heretical" or even "heterodox" here from a Peircean 
perspective. It just strikes me as another situation where the boundaries are 
somewhat arbitrary, such that we deliberately draw them in accordance with the 
purpose of a particular analysis.

I tend to focus on one sign (type/token/tones) along with its two objects 
(immediate/dynamical) and three interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final), 
which is a task for speculative grammar, the first branch of the normative 
science of logic as semeiotic. Focusing instead on the different dynamical 
interpretants that one sign token determines in different individual 
(quasi-)minds seems more like a task for speculative rhetoric (or methodeutic), 
the third branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic.

Of course, the latter approach depends to an extent on the former because 
within Peirce's overall theory, each of the interpreting (quasi-)minds is 
itself a sign. In fact, I have suggested that this is why the same uttered sign 
token with the same tones can have different dynamical interpretants--the one 
sign that is constituted by connecting the uttered sign to any particular 
(quasi-)mind is different from the one sign that is constituted by connecting 
the uttered sign to any other (quasi-)mind.

As for "the performative/practical domain," Francesco Bellucci suggests that 
"speculative grammar came to include a pioneering speech act theory. For the 
general distinction between the immediate, the dynamic, and the final 
interpretant was needed in order to differentiate the illocutionary, the 
perlocutionary, and the locutionary levels of analysis" (Peirce's Speculative 
Grammar: Logic as Semiotics, p. 327). However, he also points out that in 
Peirce's late taxonomies for classifying signs, the divisions based on 
perlocutionary effects and illocutionary forces are both associated with the 
dynamical interpretant--its nature and its relation to the sign, respectively.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 12:53 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote:
Jon, List,
One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term 
"token" is more properly applied to the physical "vehicle" of the sign, such 
that one token can have different dynamical interpretants in different 
quasi-minds, or to the "event of semiosis" that occurs whenever a token 
determines a dynamical interpretant in an individual quasi-mind, such that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between tokens and dynamical 
interpretants. For example, if I utter a sentence out loud to a group of five 
listeners, is there one token that has five dynamical interpretants, or are 
there five tokens, each of which has exactly one dynamical interpretant?
JAS: I am inclined toward the former analysis, such that the token is "counted" 
when it is uttered, not each time it is interpreted, because that utterance is 
a sign token even if it is never actually interpreted--it 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[gnox]

Jon, list,

JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's 
various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a 
type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every 
type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …

GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token relation, like the 
general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or 
holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the level 
in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the genus is type 
and the species is token, but the species is also the type of which an 
individual organism of that species is token (and there can be other levels 
intermediate between those two!). 

Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, homo, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’ (MS 9), 
the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the three terms 
are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we use the term 
“individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is the type of which 
Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual tokens. Is there a top type 
(Archetype? Metatype?) in the holarchy of signs? The universe as sign, perhaps? 
I don’t know, but I would say that it’s signs all the way down. So I’d rather 
not use the word sign to refer to several specific levels of generality at once.

By the way, some years ago I did  <https://gnusystems.ca/Type.pdf> a slideshow 
dealing with the etymology and history of the word “type,” in connection with a 
Peirce text where he uses the Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” 
of Form and Matter in semiosis. The text is included in Turning Signs  
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x29> here, in a passage leading up to a 
discussion of the “categories.”

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 3-Nov-21 13:18
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative 
semeiotic for interpreting texts)

 

Gary F., List:

 

I agree that where we diverge is in treating a type and one of its tokens as 
two different signs vs. two "aspects" (I still need a better term here) of the 
same sign. I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with 
Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is 
either a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea 
that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens, which can (and 
often do) have different tones. In other words, a sign involves types, which 
involve tokens, which involve tones.

 

After all, Peirce writes elsewhere that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of 
such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP 2:303, 1904). He states that every 
individual utterance of a certain proverb is "one and the same representamen" 
even when it "is written or spoken" or "is thought of" in different languages; 
and that the same is true of every individual instance of a certain diagram, 
picture, physical sign, or symptom, as well as every individual weathercock (CP 
5.138, EP 2:203, 1903). Regarding a proposition, he says that its individual 
embodiments are existents governed by the general type, such that each of them 
conforms to that type (CP 8.313, 1905).

 

One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term 
"token" is more properly applied to the physical "vehicle" of the sign, such 
that one token can have different dynamical interpretants in different 
quasi-minds, or to the "event of semiosis" that occurs whenever a token 
determines a dynamical interpretant in an individual quasi-mind, such that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between tokens and dynamical 
interpretants. For example, if I utter a sentence out loud to a group of five 
listeners, is there one token that has five dynamical interpretants, or are 
there five tokens, each of which has exactly one dynamical interpretant? I am 
inclined toward the former analysis, such that the token is "counted" when it 
is uttered, not each time it is interpreted, because that utterance is a sign 
token even if it is never actually interpreted--it only has to be capable of 
determining a dynamical (external) interpretant by virtue of conforming to a 
type that has an immediate (internal) interpretant.

 

Regards,

 

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► T

[PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

I agree that where we diverge is in treating a type and one of its tokens
as two *different *signs vs. two "aspects" (I still need a better term
here) of the *same *sign. I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more
consistent with Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in
which every sign is *either *a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine
is grounded in the idea that every type can (and usually does) have
multiple tokens, which can (and often do) have different tones. In other
words, a sign *involves *types, which *involve *tokens, which *involve *
tones.

After all, Peirce writes elsewhere that "a sign is not a real thing. It is
of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303, 1904). He states
that every *individual *utterance of a certain proverb is "one and the same
representamen" even when it "is written or spoken" or "is thought of" in
different languages; and that the same is true of every *individual* instance
of a certain diagram, picture, physical sign, or symptom, as well as
every *individual
*weathercock (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, 1903). Regarding a proposition, he says
that its *individual *embodiments are existents *governed *by the general
type, such that each of them *conforms *to that type (CP 8.313, 1905).

One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term
"token" is more properly applied to the physical "vehicle" of the sign,
such that one token can have different dynamical interpretants in different
quasi-minds, or to the "event of semiosis" that occurs whenever a token
determines a dynamical interpretant in an individual quasi-mind, such that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between tokens and dynamical
interpretants. For example, if I utter a sentence out loud to a group of
five listeners, is there one token that has five dynamical interpretants,
or are there five tokens, each of which has exactly one dynamical
interpretant? I am inclined toward the former analysis, such that the token
is "counted" when it is uttered, not each time it is interpreted, because
that utterance is a sign token even if it is never *actually *interpreted--it
only has to be *capable *of determining a dynamical (external) interpretant
by virtue of conforming to a type that has an immediate (internal)
interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Nov 2, 2021 at 6:01 AM  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> GF: So in that sense a dynamical interpretant is a translation, not a mere
> replica or copy of the sign.
>
> JAS: That is what I expected you to say, and I agree. However, it seems
> inconsistent with your previous statement--"A printed, written or uttered
> text is only replicable, not translatable." A printed, written, or uttered
> text is *translated *every single time it is read or heard, thus
> producing another dynamical interpretant, and therefore is obviously
> *translatable* as well as replicable. What am I missing?
>
> GF: My previous statement assumes that the type is one sign and its
> embodiment (the token, the *existing* “text”) is another. Your perception
> of inconsistency is based on the assumption that type and token are not two
> “signs” but one. Both assumptions are arbitrary
> . That’s all.
>
> Gary f.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.