subject:"Re\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] Direct experience and immediate object"

Helmut, List

The DO is not affected by the sign. If the sign is "Obama is an
Englishman", Obama remains an American and is not affected by being
represented as an Englishman by the sign.

The IO is affected by the sign in this sense, that the sign says what its
own DO is, i.e. the sign has a proper part of it that indicates the DO. In
this sense, the "being" of the IO depends on the sign, i.e. depends on
being that part of the sign that indicates the DO

Francesco

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Francesco, List,
> I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable
> (O) stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental
> as the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the
> sign or not? Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the
> andromeda galaxy, it is clear, that the andromeda galaxy is no affected at
> all by the sign. If they are talking about their friendship, it (the DO
> "our friendship") certainly is (affected by the sign).
> I am just looking for consistencies of models, and model´s applicational
> performances. Maybe expecting too much, please excuse my muttering!
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  07. September 2018 um 19:52 Uhr
>  "Francesco Bellucci"  wrote:
>
> Helmut, List
>
>
>> Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
>> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
>> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
>> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
>> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>>
>
> It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
> external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
> object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
> dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
> object too, but so is the subject of the sentence
>
> F
>
>
>> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
>> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
>> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
>> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
>> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
>> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
>> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
>> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
>> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
>> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing,
>> but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal
>> in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that
>> the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
>> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
>> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
>> would be so easy.
>> Best, Helmut
>>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>>
>> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>>
>> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>>
>> FB
>> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling
>> distinctions" (EP 2:494)
>>
>> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
>> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
>> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
>> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
>> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
>> and to the most widely used logics today.
>>
>> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
>> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
>> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>>
>> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> > faculty.
>>
>> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
>> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
>> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
>> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
>> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
>> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
>> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>>
>> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
>> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
>> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-07 Thread Helmut Raulien

Francesco, List,

I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable (O) stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental as the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the sign or not? Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the andromeda galaxy, it is clear, that the andromeda galaxy is no affected at all by the sign. If they are talking about their friendship, it (the DO "our friendship") certainly is (affected by the sign).

I am just looking for consistencies of models, and model´s applicational performances. Maybe expecting too much, please excuse my muttering!

Best,

Helmut

 07. September 2018 um 19:52 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci"  wrote:

Helmut, List

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.

It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e. external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the object too, but so is the subject of the sentence

F

To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:

The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.

But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external, in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.

So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.

So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal. Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that would be so easy.

Best, Helmut

 07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr

"John F Sowa"  wrote:

Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,

FB
> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP 2:494)

Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
and to the most widely used logics today.

Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:

> The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> same thing, all the ideas that seek _expression_, is the most
> stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> faculty.

Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

ET
> I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> application to material life.
>
> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-07 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list,



If:

“It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
object (i.e. internal to the sign)



then:

what is the ‘Object’ in Sign Object Interpretant or Object Sign
Interpretant?



Will you supply a reference where the matter can be settled?



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:52 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Helmut, List
>
> Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
>> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
>> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
>> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
>> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>>
>
> It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
> external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
> object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
> dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
> object too, but so is the subject of the sentence
>
> F
>
>
>> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
>> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
>> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
>> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
>> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
>> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
>> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
>> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
>> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
>> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing,
>> but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal
>> in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that
>> the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
>> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
>> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
>> would be so easy.
>> Best, Helmut
>>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>>
>> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>>
>> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>>
>> FB
>> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling
>> distinctions" (EP 2:494)
>>
>> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
>> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
>> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
>> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
>> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
>> and to the most widely used logics today.
>>
>> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
>> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
>> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>>
>> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> > faculty.
>>
>> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
>> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
>> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
>> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
>> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
>> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
>> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>>
>> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
>> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
>> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>>
>> ET
>> > I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
>> > expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
>> > application to material life.
>> >
>> > My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
>> > is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
>> > Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
>> > vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
>> > nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>>
>> I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
>> terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
>> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
>> terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
>> relating his

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Helmut, List

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>

It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
object too, but so is the subject of the sentence

F


> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but
> its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in
> the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the
> knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
> would be so easy.
> Best, Helmut
>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>
> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>
> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>
> FB
> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
> (EP 2:494)
>
> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
> and to the most widely used logics today.
>
> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>
> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> > faculty.
>
> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>
> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>
> ET
> > I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> > expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> > application to material life.
> >
> > My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> > is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> > Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> > vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> > nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>
> I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
> terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
> terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
> relating his terminology to any versions in use today.
>
> That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
> Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
> study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
> to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.
>
> JAS
> > my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
> > terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
> > primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.
>
> Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career. And logic
>

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-07 Thread Helmut Raulien

John, list,

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.

To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:

The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.

But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external, in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.

So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.

So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal. Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that would be so easy.

Best, Helmut

 07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
"John F Sowa"  wrote:

Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,

FB
> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP 2:494)

Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
and to the most widely used logics today.

Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:

> The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> same thing, all the ideas that seek _expression_, is the most
> stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> faculty.

Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

ET
> I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> application to material life.
>
> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
relating his terminology to any versions in use today.

That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.

JAS
> my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
> terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
> primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.

Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career. And logic
was always his primary tool, as he said explicitly in 1877.

JAS
> Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth
> of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings
> of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).

Yes. And remember his comment to Benjamin Smith.

JAS
> no one on the List is advocating "Platonic idealism."
> Why keep bringing it up?

I was citing Peirce's "three universes": possibility, actuality,
and the necessitated.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

John, List

You say "When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and
others, always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL."

I agree wholeheartedly that Peirce's lifelong main interest was in logic,
and that we should evaluate his semiotic doctrines assuming that he is
talking logic.

But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really? Peirce
discovered quantification theory. This theory proved that a proposition is
not composed of general signs alone (symbols), but needs to use indices.
Thus a proposition as "Something loves anything" requires two indices
("something" and "anything") and a symbol ("---loves"). A symbol is a
sign whose object is general, an index a sign whose object is individual.

This is a "grammatical" (= semiotic) analysis of the proposition, and is
informed by the discovery of quantification (in a sense, the discovery of
FOL). But what could it mean to "map his grammatical (= semiotic)
terminologies to FOL" if not this? It cannot mean that we should describe
his grammatical (=semiotic) terms by means of FOL. For in that case, we
would need FOL to describe his grammatical notions, which in their turn are
the instrument for a grammatical description of FOL. We would be launched
in a vicious circle.

So, it is one thing to say that we should evaluate Peirce's semiotic ideas
on the background of logic: this I agree wholeheartedly and I wrote a book
based precisely on this idea. Another thing would be to describe those
ideas by means of that which those ideas were intended to describe.

best
Francesco


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>
> FB
>
>> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
>> (EP 2:494)
>>
>
> Yes!  And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
> logicians today.  This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
> confirm the point I was trying to make:  From age 12 to 74, Peirce
> was a logician.  Every version of logic that he used or invented
> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
> and to the most widely used logics today.
>
> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer.  Note his letter
> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>
> The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> faculty.
>>
>
> Implication:  Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways.  He also
> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
> logics, and metalanguage.  But his first-order logic was equivalent
> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
> first-order logic" today.  For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
> by Hilary Putnam:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>
> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL.  If they
> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>
> ET
>
>> I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
>> expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
>> application to material life.
>>
>> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
>> is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
>> Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
>> vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
>> nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>>
>
> I completely agree.  But Peirce's logic was constant while his
> terminology was changing.  Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else.  But his
> terminology was idiosyncratic.  His logic is the foundation for
> relating his terminology to any versions in use today.
>
> That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
> Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
> study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
> to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.
>
> JAS
>
>> my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
>> terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
>> primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.
>>
>
> Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career.  And logic
> was always his primary tool, as he said explicitly in 1877.
>
> JAS
>
>> Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth
>> of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings
>> of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-07 Thread John F Sowa

Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,

"Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP
2:494)

Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
and to the most widely used logics today.

Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:

The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
faculty.

Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
application to material life.

My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
relating his terminology to any versions in use today.

That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.

JAS

my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.

Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career. And logic
was always his primary tool, as he said explicitly in 1877.

JAS

Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth
of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings
of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).

Yes. And remember his comment to Benjamin Smith.

JAS

no one on the List is advocating "Platonic idealism."
Why keep bringing it up?

I was citing Peirce's "three universes": possibility, actuality,
and the necessitated. Mathematical entities are "real possibles"
in Peirce's terms. For an analysis of Peirce's ideas about these
issues, I recommend an article by Susan Haack:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247935387_Peirce_and_Logicism_Notes_Towards_an_Exposition_1993

On page 9, she wrote

at CP 4.118 (1893) Peirce speaks of "the Platonic world of pure
forms with which mathematics is always dealing," and in the
prospectus for his 12-volume _Principles of Philosophy_ (c. 1893)
he entitles the third volume, _Plato's World: an Elucidation of
the Ideas of Modern Mathematics_. But at 4.161 (c. 1897) we read...

If this is Platonism, it is Platonism of a very distinctively
Peircean stripe.

Edwina

I think one can get trapped in the isolation of words and should
instead, consider their function in the actual world.

Yes. But Peirce claimed that math and logic, formal and informal,
are the foundation for all the sciences and all the ways of thinking
and acting in the world. (See his 1903 classification.)

William James could not fully understand Peirce because he did
not know logic. WJ was never able to understand Peirce's
logic and his distinction between pragmatism and pragmaticism.

In the excerpts below, note that nearly every sentence uses logical
terminology. (This excerpt happens to be something I was recently
reading, but you can find many more examples in all his writings.)

John
___

5.448. Perhaps a more scientific pair of definitions would be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, List

*FB:  Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the proper name, is its
"object" (he says so in very many places).*

*JAS: Please provide at least a couple of citations.*

"Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
(EP 2:494)

 "A Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the Object which it
denotes, called its Subject" (R 425: 135–136) NB: the object indicated is
"called" subject. Here it's not the subject that indicates the object: it's
the proposition that "distinctly" (= separately) indicate its object
(=subject)

 "The first member of the triplet, the “Seme,” embraces the logical Term,
the Subject or Object of a sentence" (R 295: 26–30)

"I term those occasions or objects which are denoted by the indices the
subjects of the assertion" (CP 2.334)

"That which a Sign 'stands for', or 'refers to' [...] is otherwise called
its Object. Usage might, equally well, have made is call it the Subject,
since there is no logical distinction between the two words." (R 849: 11)

"That which a concept is 'about', that to which it applies, that which the
predicate is spoken of, is called its object. In grammar, it is called the
subject nominative. For the words 'subject' and 'object' mean pretty much
the same thing" (R 659: 19–20)

*JAS: Where did Peirce state that (only) Symbols have a general Object and
(only) Indices have an individual Object?  Again, my current understanding
is instead that every Sign is a Type, has a General Object, and only exists
in Replicas, each of which has an individual Dynamic Object.*

Here for example:

CSP: "the demonstrative pronoun "that" [...] is not a Symbol, since it does
not signify a general concept." (EP 2: 295). If the demonstrative pronoun
"that" were capable to signify a general concept, it would be a Symbol. For
only symbols signify general objects. But it is not: it is an index,
because it signifies an individual object. Which, by the way, also refutes
your claim that "every sign has a general object".

Other examples:

CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)

CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or of
Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects that
they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)

CSP: "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs,
i.e. of symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).

*JAS: The General Object of "_ is lethargic" is the aggregate of Real
substances that possess the character of lethargy, its Dynamic Object is
whatever one of its Replicas actually denotes when employed in an Instance
of the Sign, and its Immediate Object is whatever its Replica could denote
to someone who knows only the definitions of English words.*

Not according to Peirce. According to Peirce, " is lethargic" is a
rhematic symbol, and as a symbol it has a general dynamic object (i.e.
whatever possesses the characters of lethargy). But as a rheme, it has no
"hint" that indicates that object, and thus has no immediate object.
Neither the type of this rheme, nor its replicas can denote to someone who
knows only the definitions of English words what the immediate object of
this rheme is, but  can denote to someone who knows only the definitions of
English words to what *kind *of objects such a rheme would be applicable (=
it denotes a general dynamic object). I repeat that talking, in contexts
like this, of a general object as opposed to the dynamic and the immediate
makes little (exegetical) sense to me.

*JAS: I readily acknowledge that my approach is more systematic than
exegetical.  I am seeking to situate Signs and semiosis within an overall
framework that makes sense to me, while remaining as faithful as possible
to Peirce's concepts and terminology.  You stated in your recent book that
you "have not attempted to finish what Peirce left unfinished or to
eliminate 'rubs and botches' from his work," such that your "exposition of
Peirce’s theory of semiotics is no less incomplete than that theory itself
was" (p. 10).  I, on the other hand, am trying to fill in some of those
gaps and further plow the ground that he has cleared and opened up for us
as "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman" (CP 5.488, EP 2:413; 1907)*

Indeed our aims are not identical. But let me notice that in order to fill
in some of the gaps in Peirce's theory one should be well aware of what
those gaps are (and thus the systematic work presupposes the exegetical
one, but not vice versa). But in order for a notion to fill in some gap in
Peirce's theory, such gap should be evident to the community of inquirers.
If the gap is only evident to the one who proposes the notion filling it,
this is just to put the cart before the horse.

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-06 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list,

I like where this conversation is heading..

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:43 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list
>
> Yes - I obviously agree; I think one can get trapped in the isolation of
> words and should instead, consider their function in the actual world. As
> Peirce noted:
>
> "In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one
> should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by
> necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these
> consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception". CP
> 5.9]and 5.402 and 5.422.
>
> Pragmatism is, as you point out, the key method of 'making our ideas
> clear' [see note 1, CP: 5.9]
>
> Again, "the possible practical consequences of a concept constitute the
> sum total of the concept" 5.27
>
> As Peirce wrote, "Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing
> definitions" 5.393. Certainly, "our existing beliefs can be set in order by
> this process" [ibid] but, this doesn't lead us to understanding what is
> going on.
>
> Obviously, my preferred focus for the pragmatic nature of semiosis is
> biosemiotics, but, I'm also interested in economic and societal realms.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 06/09/18 4:01 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Jon, list,
>
> I agree with Edwina, because to make my ideas clearer, I need to check
> them with real-life-affairs, such as biosemiotics, and other special
> sciences like physics. Especially if I want to overcome the somehow
> ever-present idea of mind-matter-duality, to explain it away by replacing
> it with mind-monism, would be to reconstruct it with the idea of
> spatiotemporal scales. E.g. that matter is effete mind, is a time-scale
> thing, I would say. And therefore it helps very much, I think, to regard
> biosemiotics, with its different time scales in the evolution of
> matter/energy, organisms, animals, mammals, humans, and cultural habits.
> So, only speaking for myself, I get good aha-experiences more likely by
> switching between cenoscopy and idioscopy (or between pure reason and
> examples from experience) all the time from the start.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  06. September 2018 um 19:31 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:
>
> Edwina, John S., List:
>
> As I have said before (more than once), my own purpose in focusing so much
> on Peirce's concepts and terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own
> sake, but primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.  This is a
> necessary and important step before we can properly identify and
> explicate the resulting "pragmatic applications" in other fields,
> beginning with Metaphysics and continuing on to the Special Sciences such
> as biosemiotics.  After all, Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to
> determine any truth of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining
> the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400;
> 1907).
>
> Also, as far as I know, no one on the List is advocating "Platonic
> idealism."  Why keep bringing it up?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 11:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>>
>> John, list
>>
>> Yes, but I'm trying to emphasize, or perhaps remind ourselves, that
>> Peircean semiotics is not expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in
>> its pragmatic application to material life. That is - there are three
>> 'parts' so to speak; language/logic/pragmatic application.
>>
>> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce is
>> often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since Peirce often
>> changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the vital ground of Peircean
>> semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental nature of Peircean semiotics -
>> which is its pragmaticism.
>>
>> And an ever-present danger when we confine ourselves to this rhetoric
>> [but not logic] - is that easy slip into Platonic idealism - which actually
>> denies pragmaticism because it separates Mind and Matter.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Thu 06/09/18 11:35 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>>
>> On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>> > I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but
>> > my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely,
>> > that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system.
>>
>> I agree with your concerns. I know many logicians who get lost
>> in the technical details and ignore all the issues about relating
>> logic to language, thought, and life.
>>
>> I also admit that it's much easier to write many pages of ordinary
>> language than to write a few lines of precisely stated mathematics
>> or mathematical logic. Peirce knew that. But he also knew that
>> precision required a restatement in terms of some version of logic.
>>
>> Basic point:

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-06 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, list,

I agree with Edwina, because to make my ideas clearer, I need to check them with real-life-affairs, such as biosemiotics, and other special sciences like physics. Especially if I want to overcome the somehow ever-present idea of mind-matter-duality, to explain it away by replacing it with mind-monism, would be to reconstruct it with the idea of spatiotemporal scales. E.g. that matter is effete mind, is a time-scale thing, I would say. And therefore it helps very much, I think, to regard biosemiotics, with its different time scales in the evolution of matter/energy, organisms, animals, mammals, humans, and cultural habits. So, only speaking for myself, I get good aha-experiences more likely by switching between cenoscopy and idioscopy (or between pure reason and examples from experience) all the time from the start.

Best,

Helmut

06. September 2018 um 19:31 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Edwina, John S., List:

As I have said before (more than once), my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear. This is a necessary and important step before we can properly identify and explicate the resulting "pragmatic applications" in other fields, beginning with Metaphysics and continuing on to the Special Sciences such as biosemiotics. After all, Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).

Also, as far as I know, no one on the List is advocating "Platonic idealism." Why keep bringing it up?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 11:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

John, list

Yes, but I'm trying to emphasize, or perhaps remind ourselves, that Peircean semiotics is not expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic application to material life. That is - there are three 'parts' so to speak; language/logic/pragmatic application.

My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

And an ever-present danger when we confine ourselves to this rhetoric [but not logic] - is that easy slip into Platonic idealism - which actually denies pragmaticism because it separates Mind and Matter.

Edwina

On Thu 06/09/18 11:35 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:

On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but
> my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely,
> that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system.

I agree with your concerns. I know many logicians who get lost
in the technical details and ignore all the issues about relating
logic to language, thought, and life.

I also admit that it's much easier to write many pages of ordinary
language than to write a few lines of precisely stated mathematics
or mathematical logic. Peirce knew that. But he also knew that
precision required a restatement in terms of some version of logic.

Basic point: It's vastly easier to translate logic to language,
than to translate language to logic. But the exercise of writing
the logic is necessary for precision.

John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-06 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, John S., List:

As I have said before (more than once), my own purpose in focusing so much
on Peirce's concepts and terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its *own
*sake, but primarily for the purpose of *making our ideas clear*.  This is
a necessary and important step *before *we can properly identify and
explicate the resulting "pragmatic applications" in *other *fields,
beginning with Metaphysics and continuing on to the Special Sciences such
as biosemiotics.  After all, Peirce *defined *pragmatism as "no attempt to
determine any truth of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining
the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400;
1907).

Also, as far as I know, no one on the List is advocating "Platonic
idealism."  Why keep bringing it up?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 11:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, list
>
> Yes, but I'm trying to emphasize, or perhaps remind ourselves, that
> Peircean semiotics is not expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in
> its pragmatic application to material life. That is - there are three
> 'parts' so to speak; language/logic/pragmatic application.
>
> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce is often
> on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since Peirce often changed
> these terms, then, to me, they are not the vital ground of Peircean
> semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental nature of Peircean semiotics -
> which is its pragmaticism.
>
> And an ever-present danger when we confine ourselves to this rhetoric [but
> not logic] - is that easy slip into Platonic idealism - which actually
> denies pragmaticism because it separates Mind and Matter.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 06/09/18 11:35 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> > I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but
> > my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely,
> > that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system.
>
> I agree with your concerns. I know many logicians who get lost
> in the technical details and ignore all the issues about relating
> logic to language, thought, and life.
>
> I also admit that it's much easier to write many pages of ordinary
> language than to write a few lines of precisely stated mathematics
> or mathematical logic. Peirce knew that. But he also knew that
> precision required a restatement in terms of some version of logic.
>
> Basic point: It's vastly easier to translate logic to language,
> than to translate language to logic. But the exercise of writing
> the logic is necessary for precision.
>
> John
>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-06 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

Yes, but I'm trying to emphasize, or perhaps remind ourselves, that
Peircean semiotics is not expressed simply in language and/or logic,
but in its pragmatic application to material life. That is - there
are three 'parts' so to speak; language/logic/pragmatic application.

My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce is
often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since Peirce
often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the vital ground
of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental nature of
Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism. 

And an ever-present danger when we confine ourselves to this
rhetoric [but not logic] - is that easy slip into Platonic idealism -
which actually denies pragmaticism because it separates Mind and
Matter. 

Edwina
 On Thu 06/09/18 11:35 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 > I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but  
 > my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce;
namely,  
 > that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system. 
 I agree with your concerns.  I know many logicians who get lost 
 in the technical details and ignore all the issues about relating 
 logic to language, thought, and life. 
 I also admit that it's much easier to write many pages of ordinary 
 language than to write a few lines of precisely stated mathematics 
 or mathematical logic.  Peirce knew that.  But he also knew that 
 precision required a restatement in terms of some version of logic. 
 Basic point:  It's vastly easier to translate logic to language, 
 than to translate language to logic.  But the exercise of writing 
 the logic is necessary for precision. 
 John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-06 Thread John F Sowa


On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but 
my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely, 
that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system.


I agree with your concerns.  I know many logicians who get lost
in the technical details and ignore all the issues about relating
logic to language, thought, and life.

I also admit that it's much easier to write many pages of ordinary
language than to write a few lines of precisely stated mathematics
or mathematical logic.  Peirce knew that.  But he also knew that
precision required a restatement in terms of some version of logic.

Basic point:  It's vastly easier to translate logic to language,
than to translate language to logic.  But the exercise of writing
the logic is necessary for precision.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-06 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but my
concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely, that
his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system. It rests its
viability not in intellectual rhetorical definitions and assertions
of Platonic idealism but in the application of logic to pragmatic
reality; i.e., it is 'objective idealism'.

Edwina
 On Thu 06/09/18 10:16 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 9/6/2018 12:26 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: 
 > FB: As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses 
 > "general" in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object
(vs 
 > indices, which have an individual object), 2) legisigns are
general 
 > in themselves (as types that occur in replicas), 3) and
universally 
 > quantified sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce 
 > ("distributively general" his preferred term).  
 >  
 > JAS: Where did Peirce state that (only) Symbols have a general
Object  
 > and (only) Indices have an individual Object?  Again, my current  
 > understanding is instead that /every /Sign is a Type, has a
General  
 > Object, and only exists in Replicas, each of which has an
individual  
 > Dynamic Object. 
 In my previous note to this thread, I replied to Francesco: 
 > I believe that it's important to use Peirce's own tools for
stating 
 > the criteria precisely:  his versions of logic. 
 >  
 > For each of those three senses, any definition in his algebraic 
 > notation of 1885 would have a universal quantifier, and any 
 > definition in existential graphs would have a line of identity 
 > in a negative area.  
 It's important to emphasize that Peirce's later MSS on semiotic 
 came *after* and *during* his later MSS on logic.  He was trying 
 to restate much of his later ideas on semiotic in his later MSS 
 on EGs, and many ideas in one stimulated and extended ideas in 
 the other. 
 Many of his later MSS on semiotic were written as letters to 
 his correspondents, most of whom had little understanding of 
 formal logic.  By writing in English, he could say much more 
 than he was able to restate in his EGs.  That enabled him 
 to cover a broader range of topics. 
 Unfortunately, he no longer had correspondents who could 
 (1) understand his logic, (2) understand his semiotic, and 
 (3) understand his writings about how #1 and #2 are related. 
 JAS 
 > How should we explain the difference between the Essential, 
 > Informed, and Substantial Breadth of a Sign?  Peirce's definitions

 > for them similarly require careful differentiation. 
 Answer:  Continue the project that Peirce himself was trying to 
 accomplish:  restate them in logic. 
 CSP 
 > ... Breadth and Depth, which the logic-books restrict to one class

 > of signs, namely to terms, are equally applicable, by a legitimate

 > and easy generalization of their meanings, not only to
propositions 
 > and to arguments, but also to icons, indices, and all kinds of
signs  
 > ... Breadth refers to the Object, which occasions the use of the
sign, 
 > while Depth refers to the Interpretant, or proper determinate of
the 
 > sign ... (R 200:E87; 1908) 
 Thanks for quoting this passage.  Note that it shows how Peirce 
 was thinking about logic at the same time that he was developing 
 his semiotic.  As he said, logic is formal semiotic. 
 FB 
 > Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent
would 
 > mean that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, 
 > which Peirce was far from having done. 
 The only way to show that the definitions are consistent is to 
 translate them to some version of logic and to show that there 
 exists a model for them (either endoporeutic or Tarski-style). 
 Unfortunately, Peirce did not have the time to do that for his 
 late writings to Lady Welby.  To understand all the implications, 
 it's essential to take up the task he was unable to complete. 
 And by the way, most of the MSS that have never been scanned 
 or microfilmed are from his later years.  Many of the MSS in 
 black and white microfilm are inadequate to show the details. 
 And black and white cannot distinguish colored inks and pencils. 
 John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Francesco, List:

FB:  Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would
mean that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which
Peirce was far from having done.

We are discussing only the trichotomies that Peirce *did *clearly arrange
in an order of determination--Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, Sign, S-DO
Relation.  The sequence of the first three is explicitly given at both EP
2:481 and EP 2:488-489 (1908), and the fourth comes after the third in
accordance with the 1903 taxonomy.  We also know that the Interpretant
trichotomies come after the one for the Sign, and their order is Destinate
(Final), Effectual (Dynamic), Explicit (Immediate).  We further know that
the one for the S-FI Relation comes after the one for the S-DO Relation,
and that the one for the S-DI Relation comes after that (CP 8.338; 1904).

In short, there are only a handful of evaluations to make in order to
ascertain the most viable linear arrangement of all ten trichotomies of the
1908 taxonomy.  I made my case on the List for one particular solution a
few months ago (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-04/msg00016.
html).

FB:   I guess many of your comments depend on such ordering, but since
Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder whether we are going
beyond exegesis.

As Gary Fuhrman can attest, I readily acknowledge that my approach is more
systematic than exegetical.  I am seeking to situate Signs and semiosis
within an overall framework that makes sense to me, while remaining as
faithful as possible to Peirce's concepts and terminology.  You stated in
your recent book that you "have not attempted to finish what Peirce left
unfinished or to eliminate 'rubs and botches' from his work," such that
your "exposition of Peirce’s theory of semiotics is no less incomplete than
that theory itself was" (p. 10).  I, on the other hand, am trying to fill
in some of those gaps and further plow the ground that he has cleared and
opened up for us as "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman" (CP 5.488, EP
2:413; 1907)

That being the case, I am very much open to being *persuaded *that some (or
even all) of my recent suggestions are off-track.  After all, they "are but
opinions at most; and the whole list is provisional.  The scientific man is
not in the least wedded to his conclusions.  He risks nothing upon them.
He stands ready to abandon one or all as soon as experience opposes them"
(CP 1.635, EP 2:33; 1898).

FB:  From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that propositions
can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of indexical
propositions?

I generally reserve "term" and "proposition" for Rhematic and Dicent
Symbols, respectively.  I do not exclude the possibility of Dicent Indices.

FB:  Are you using general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's
the purpose of doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic
generality are around?

I am receptive to alternatives for naming the Object that I take to be
in a *genuine
*triadic relation with the Sign (Type) and Final Interpretant.  Ideally it
would be an adjective applicable to both a discrete collection and a
continuum.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:41 PM, Francesco Bellucci  wrote:

> Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following
>
> JAS: the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.
>
> He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the
> sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain
> characters", this is obviosuly and patently false:
>
> CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
> indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)
>
> CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or
> of Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects
> that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
> signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)
>
> "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. of
> symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).
>
> Best
> Francesco
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 10:26 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>>
>>> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
>>> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
>>> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>>>
>>
>> If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object,
>> of course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually,
>> a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Francesco, List:

FB:  As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general"
in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
term).


Where did Peirce state that (only) Symbols have a general Object and (only)
Indices have an individual Object?  Again, my current understanding is
instead that *every *Sign is a Type, has a General Object, and only exists
in Replicas, each of which has an individual Dynamic Object.

FB:  Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that
possesses the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the
immediate object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that
corresponds to the definition of man? Of course, every really existing man,
as well as those existed and those that will exist. If this is the
immediate object of the rheme "--is a man", what's its dynamic object?


I can see now that this is indeed unclear.  How should we explain the
difference between the Essential, Informed, and Substantial Breadth of a
Sign?  Peirce's definitions for them similarly require careful
differentiation.

CSP:  By the *informed breadth* of a term, I shall mean all the real things
of which it is predicable, with logical truth on the whole in a supposed
state of information ... we define the *essential breadth* of a term as
those real things of which, according to its very meaning, a term is
predicable ... *Substantial breadth* is the aggregate of real substances of
which alone a
term is predicable with absolute truth. (CP 2.407,412,414; 1867)


I suggest that any Sign's Immediate, Dynamic, and General *Objects *correspond
to its Essential, Informed, and Substantial *Breadth*, respectively.  As
such, the Immediate Object is what a Sign-Replica *could *denote to someone
with mere Sign System Acquaintance; the Dynamic Object is what a
Sign-Replica *does *denote to someone with Collateral Experience; and the
General Object is what a Sign-Replica *would *denote to someone with
omniscience.  Likewise ...

CSP:  By the informed depth of a term, I mean all the real characters (in
contradistinction to mere names) which can be predicated of it* (with
logical truth, on the whole) in a supposed state of information ... By
the *essential
depth* of a term, then, I mean the really conceivable qualities predicated
of it in its definition ... Substantial depth is the real concrete form
which belongs to everything of which a term is predicable with absolute
truth.
*That is, of whatever things it is applicable to. (CP 2.408,410,414; 1867)


I suggest that any Sign's Immediate, Dynamic, and Final *Interpretants
*correspond
to its Essential, Informed, and Substantial *Depth*, respectively.  As
such, the Immediate Interpretant is what a Sign-Replica *could *signify to
someone with *minimal *Interpretative Habits, the Dynamic Interpretant is
what a Sign-Replica *does *signify to someone with *fallible *Interpretative
Habits, and the Final Interpretant is what a Sign-Replica *would *signify
to someone with *infallible *Interpretative Habits.

Although these passages are from Peirce's *early *writings, my warrant for
applying them in this way comes from a *late *manuscript that cited the
very article in which they originally appeared.

CSP:  ... Breadth and Depth, which the logic-books restrict to one class of
signs, namely to terms, are equally applicable, by a legitimate and easy
generalization of their meanings, not only to propositions and to
arguments, but also to *icons*, *indices*, and all kinds of signs ...
Breadth refers to the Object, which occasions the use of the sign, while
Depth refers to the Interpretant, or proper determinate of the sign ... (R
200:E87; 1908)


Gary Fuhrman deserves some credit for helping me sort out this
correspondence of Breadth and Depth with Object and Interpretant, since the
1867 article instead aligned Depth with Ground and Information with
Interpretant.

FB:  Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the proper name, is its
"object" (he says so in very many places).


Please provide at least a couple of citations.  My understanding is that
each of a sentence's subjects *indicates *one of its Objects, rather
than *being
*one of its Objects; i.e., it is a Rheme whose own Object is one of the
Objects of the corresponding proposition.  The General Object of "_ is
Napoleon" is the Real historical person, its Dynamic Object is that person
as* actually *denoted by a Replica when employed in an Instance of the
Sign, and its Immediate Object is whatever its Replica *could *denote to
someone who knows only the definitions of English words.

FB:  You get the rheme "--- is lethargic". This rheme has no hint by which
its object is indicated, i.e. has no immediate object.


On the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jeff, Francesco, List:

JD:  My understanding is that the sign and not the immediate object that is
being classified as a vague, singular or general.

I agree; what I should have said was, "Consistent with his earlier division
of Signs according to the Immediate Object into vague/singular/general ..."

FB:  I think it is clear that the immediate object is an indication, and
does not "describe" or "predicate" anything of the object (unlike what Jon,
in a previous post, has suggested: "the object's characters/qualities
which, taken together, constitute its Immediate Object").

I agree; again, my view of the Immediate Object has evolved since I made
that comment a couple of months ago.  I currently see it as whatever
possesses the characters/qualities predicated by the Immediate
Interpretant, in accordance with the definitions of the Sign System
(Essential Information).

JD:  Do you have any suggestions for how we might understand this triadic
production of the proper effect of the sign?

As you might guess, my suggestion is that what Peirce meant by "the
intended, or proper, effect of the sign" in that particular passage
was the *Immediate
*Interpretant; especially since later in the same paragraph he described
the Interpretant that he had in mind as "all that is *explicit in the sign
itself* apart from its context and circumstances of utterance" (CP 5.473;
1907, bold added).  "Triadic production" in this case would then correspond
to what I have posited as the *doubly degenerate* triadic relation between
the Immediate Object, the Sign-Qualities (Tones) that facilitate
recognition of the Sign-Replica (Token) as an Instance of the Sign (Type)
within a given Sign System, and the Immediate Interpretant.

JD:  What, do you think, is the connection between the role of the
immediate object that stands in the triadic relation described at 5.473 and
the triadic relation of assurance that is part and parcel of inferential
processes (e.g., of thought)?

Let me respond to this question by posing another question--what should we
identify as the Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant of an Argument?

JD:  What can we learn from the existential graphs and phenomenology about
... the role of the immediate object ... ?

My (admittedly limited) understanding of Existential Graphs is that they
can only represent Symbols, although as always those may *involve *Indices
and/or Icons.  Therefore, any Signs scribed on the Phemic Sheet are
Copulants.  On the other hand, Peirce's tentative 1908 division of Signs
according to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate *Interpretant *was
Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative.  Like vague/singular/general, these terms
ordinarily name different kinds of *propositions*; and in the EGs, they are
distinguished by how many lines of identity are required to represent
them--zero for hypothetical, one for categorical, and more than one for
relative.  Does this shed any light on the nature and role of the Immediate
Interpretant?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:50 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Jeff, List
>
> thanks for your comments. Further thoughts are interspersed:
>
>> My understanding is that the *sign *and not the *immediate object* that
>> is being classified as a vague, singular or general. The classification is
>> based on the immediate object having the character of a presentation that
>> is a possible, existent or necessitant. In the case of the immediate
>> object, things are somewhat more complicated than in the case of, say, the
>> classification of signs based on the nature of the dynamical object. The
>> reason, of course, is that the immediate object is, in some sense, a part
>> of or an aspect of the sign.
>>
> Right, it's the sign that is vague, singular, or general. Of course, we
> should take notice of Peirce's caveat "in the same respect"(R 9, pp. 2–3).
> The multiple quantified sign "Every catholic adores some woman" is general
> with respect to catholics and vague with respect to women.
>
>> Having said that, I am supposing that the immediate object serves a
>> particular function in its relation to the sign and interpretant. Peirce
>> suggests at CP 8.314 where he offers the example of a conversation he had
>> with Juliette about the weather that the immediate object serves the
>> function of conveying the "notion of the present weather so far as this
>> is common to her mind and mine -- not the character of it, but the identity
>> of it." There are two interesting suggestions here. One that the
>> immediate object seems to serve as a mark of the identity of the object
>> under discussion. The second suggestion is that the immediate object can be
>> something that is held in common by two people who are part of a dialogue.
>>
> I think it is clear that the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Dear Francesco, list:



In London, a person gets mugged every ten minutes.

And he’s getting mighty sick of it!



Why is this joke funny?



~Katy Sarah Jones,

Towards an understanding of the use of indefinite expressions for definite
reference in English discourse



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:41 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following
>
> JAS: the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.
>
> He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the
> sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain
> characters", this is obviosuly and patently false:
>
> CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
> indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)
>
> CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or
> of Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects
> that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
> signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)
>
> "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. of
> symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).
>
> Best
> Francesco
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 10:26 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>>
>>> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
>>> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
>>> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>>>
>>
>> If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object,
>> of course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually,
>> a rhematic index).
>>
>>>
>>> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
>>> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
>>> problem is already here.
>>>
>>>
>>> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false;
>>> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
>>> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
>>> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
>>> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
>>> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>>>
>>
>> Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of generality?
>> Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? As I see
>> it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a symbol.
>> Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context only
>> confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of
>> "necessitant" (see below).
>>
>> Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean
>> that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce
>> was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such
>> ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder
>> whether we are going beyond exegesis.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as
>>> a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore
>>> all propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a
>>> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a
>>> Designative or a Copulative.
>>>
>>
>> In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy
>> descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the
>> trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce
>> established such ordering?
>>
>> Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all
>> propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they
>> are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that
>> propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of
>> indexical propositions?
>>
>>
>>>
>>> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
>>> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
>>> generality, or in neither sense.
>>>
>>>
>>> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic
>>> Object of a Collective Sign.
>>>
>>
>> Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at
>> present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you using
>> general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose of
>> doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are around?
>>
>> Francesco
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
>>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following

JAS: the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
(Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies for
classifying Signs.

He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the
sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain
characters", this is obviosuly and patently false:

CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)

CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or of
Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects that
they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)

"Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. of
symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).

Best
Francesco



On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 10:26 PM, Francesco Bellucci  wrote:

> Jon, List
>>
>> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
>> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
>> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>>
>
> If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object,
> of course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually,
> a rhematic index).
>
>>
>> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
>> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
>> problem is already here.
>>
>>
>> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false;
>> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
>> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
>> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
>> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
>> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>>
>
> Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of generality?
> Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? As I see
> it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a symbol.
> Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context only
> confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of
> "necessitant" (see below).
>
> Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean
> that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce
> was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such
> ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder
> whether we are going beyond exegesis.
>
>
>>
>> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as
>> a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore
>> all propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a
>> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a
>> Designative or a Copulative.
>>
>
> In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy
> descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the
> trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce
> established such ordering?
>
> Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all
> propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they
> are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that
> propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of
> indexical propositions?
>
>
>>
>> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
>> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
>> generality, or in neither sense.
>>
>>
>> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic
>> Object of a Collective Sign.
>>
>
> Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at
> present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you using
> general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose of
> doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are around?
>
> Francesco
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
>> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, List
>>>
>>> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 Francesco, List:

 I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
 move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
 Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
 latter.

>>>
>>> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

>
> Jon, List
>
> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>

If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object, of
course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually, a
rhematic index).

>
> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
> problem is already here.
>
>
> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false;
> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>

Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of generality?
Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? As I see
it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a symbol.
Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context only
confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of
"necessitant" (see below).

Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean
that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce
was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such
ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder
whether we are going beyond exegesis.

>
> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as a
> Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore all
> propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a Sinsign/Actisign
> serving as a Replica, it could only be either a Designative or a Copulative.
>

In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy
descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the
trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce
established such ordering?

Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all
propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they
are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that
propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of
indexical propositions?

>
> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
> generality, or in neither sense.
>
>
> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic
> Object of a Collective Sign.
>

Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at
present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you using
general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose of
doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are around?

Francesco

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>
>> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Francesco, List:
>>>
>>> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
>>> move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
>>> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
>>> latter.
>>>
>>
>> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
>> object intended as the subject of a proposition
>>
>>>
>>> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
>>> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
>>> and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
>>> while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that
>>> one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
>>> century.
>>>
>>> CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is
>>> what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many
>>> singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is taken
>>> to be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of
>>> implying a truth of the kind of "Any *S* is *P*"; it only expresses
>>> "Some *S* is *P*." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant*/*Copulative*//
>>> but only a *Descriptive*. (EP 2:486)
>>>
>>>
>>> As an actual piece of granite, the statue is obviously an Actisign;
>>> i.e., an individual Instance (Token) of a general Sign (Type).  Peirce here
>>> further classified it as a Descriptive, because he held that the equivalent
>>> proposition would be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Dear Francesco, list,



Thanks for being patient with me for it is not obvious to me, yet.



You said:

The statue of Peirce's example is an Actisign because it is a singular that
acts as a sign



But what I was asking is, given that that is the rule to which you refer
when you say,

As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign



Do you mean to say that is how you were intending to mean by “the” statue?

That is, why did you say *the* statue and not *that* statue, when Peirce
used the demonstrative pronoun, *that,* and not the definite article, *the*?


That is what is not obvious to me.



With best wishes,

Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
> FB:  I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
> object intended as the subject of a proposition
>
>
> As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose Object
> is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the Immediate
> Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>
> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
> problem is already here.
>
>
> The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false; the
> generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective) has
> absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>
> FB:  Perhaps the solution is that a Symbol cannot be a "normal" Actisign
> but it can be an Actisign which is a replica of a Famisign. The distinction
> between standard Sinsigns and Replicas comes from the Syllabus.
>
>
> Indeed--what I have been suggesting on the List for some time now is that *all
> *Signs are general Types, such that there are no Sinsigns/Actisigns other
> than Replicas (Tokens), and there are no Qualisigns/Potisigns other than
> significant characters (Tones) embodied in Replicas.  This is my
> interpretation of Peirce's statements that "a sign is not a real thing.  It
> is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303; 1904); and "the
> sign's mode of being is ... such that it consists in the existence of
> replicas destined to bring its interpreter into relation to some object ...
> The sign only exists in replicas" (NEM 4:297,300; 1904).  That which is a
> real *thing*--i.e., that which exists in itself (Matter) or as embodied
> characters (Form)--*cannot *be a Sign (Entelechy).
>
> FB:  I think he was not wrong to classify particular propositions as
> Descriptives, the passage clearly shows that with "Descriptive" he means
> "Some S is P".
>
>
> Yes, but he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*")
> as a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and
> therefore all propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a
> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a
> Designative or a Copulative.
>
> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
> generality, or in neither sense.
>
>
> By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic Object
> of a Collective Sign.  If I am right that all Signs are Types, then it
> follows that all Signs have General Objects; i.e., all Signs are
> Collectives.  However, rather than *classifying *Signs, my organizing
> principle is recognizing that there are three kinds of *triadic relations*
> in semiosis--genuine, between the General Object, Sign (Type), and Final
> Interpretant; degenerate, between each individual Dynamic Object,
> Sign-Replica (Token), and Dynamic Interpretant; and doubly degenerate,
> between an Immediate Object, a set of Sign-Qualities (Tone), and an
> Immediate Interpretant.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci  googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>
>> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Francesco, List:
>>>
>>> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
>>> move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
>>> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
>>> latter.
>>>
>>
>> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
>> object intended as the subject of a proposition
>>
>>>
>>> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
>>> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Francesco, List:

FB:  I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
object intended as the subject of a proposition

As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose Object is
also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the Immediate
Object of a proposition to be a Sign?

FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
problem is already here.

The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false; the
generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective) has
absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
(Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies for
classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent with
Peirce's later taxonomies.

FB:  Perhaps the solution is that a Symbol cannot be a "normal" Actisign
but it can be an Actisign which is a replica of a Famisign. The distinction
between standard Sinsigns and Replicas comes from the Syllabus.

Indeed--what I have been suggesting on the List for some time now is that *all
*Signs are general Types, such that there are no Sinsigns/Actisigns other
than Replicas (Tokens), and there are no Qualisigns/Potisigns other than
significant characters (Tones) embodied in Replicas.  This is my
interpretation of Peirce's statements that "a sign is not a real thing.  It
is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303; 1904); and "the
sign's mode of being is ... such that it consists in the existence of
replicas destined to bring its interpreter into relation to some object ...
The sign only exists in replicas" (NEM 4:297,300; 1904).  That which is a
real *thing*--i.e., that which exists in itself (Matter) or as embodied
characters (Form)--*cannot *be a Sign (Entelechy).

FB:  I think he was not wrong to classify particular propositions as
Descriptives, the passage clearly shows that with "Descriptive" he means
"Some S is P".

Yes, but he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as
a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore all
propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a Sinsign/Actisign
serving as a Replica, it could only be either a Designative or a Copulative.

FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in the
sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive generality,
or in neither sense.

By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic Object
of a Collective Sign.  If I am right that all Signs are Types, then it
follows that all Signs have General Objects; i.e., all Signs are
Collectives.  However, rather than *classifying *Signs, my organizing
principle is recognizing that there are three kinds of *triadic relations*
in semiosis--genuine, between the General Object, Sign (Type), and Final
Interpretant; degenerate, between each individual Dynamic Object,
Sign-Replica (Token), and Dynamic Interpretant; and doubly degenerate,
between an Immediate Object, a set of Sign-Qualities (Tone), and an
Immediate Interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Jon, List
>
> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
>
>> Francesco, List:
>>
>> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
>> move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
>> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
>> latter.
>>
>
> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate object
> intended as the subject of a proposition
>
>>
>> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
>> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
>> and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
>> while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that
>> one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
>> century.
>>
>> CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is
>> what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many
>> singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is taken
>> to be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of
>> implying a truth of the kind of "Any *S* is *P*"; it only expresses "Some
>>  *S* is *P*." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant*/*Copulative*// but only
>> a *Descriptive*. (EP 2:486)
>>
>>
>> As an actual piece of granite, the statue is obviously an Actisign; i.e.,
>> an individual Instance (Token) of a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Dear Jerry R.

The statue of Peirce's example is an Actisign because it is a singular that
acts as a sign

Best
Francesco

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 9:46 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Francesco, list,
>
>
>
> Peirce said:
>
> *That* statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign.
>
>
>
> You said:
>
> As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign
>
>
>
> Is there here a difference between *that* statue and *the* statue?
>
> That is, why is the statue an Actisign, and obviously so?
>
>
>
> Thanks,
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:24 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List, Jeff:
>>
>> On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
>> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>>
>> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal
>> to Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the
>> existential graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more
>> minute analysis of examples. What is more, I think that the application of
>> such formal tools would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools
>> of phenomenological analysis when looking at particular cases of
>> inference--such as when we are looking at the role of the immediate object
>> in Peirce's discussion with Juliette about the weather. What can we learn
>> from the existential graphs and phenomenology about the dialogue that is
>> taking place between the two--and the role of the immediate object in
>> explaining what it is being conveyed as the conversation progresses from
>> Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the decisions she makes about how
>> to prepare for her day?
>>
>> Yours,
>>
>> Jeff
>>
>>
>> Your suggestion is an important one.
>>
>> I feel that it part of the deeper issue of the role of the concept of
>> identity in bridging the communications gap between the origin of the sign
>> and the meaning of the sign for someone who may also be interpreting the
>> same sign.
>>
>> As I have previously noted, the issue of the capability of interpreting a
>> form of a sign with a form of responding conceptually to the sign, varies
>> widely.  In part, it is a matter of feelings about earlier events which can
>> trigger recall of similar signs.  Such feelings may exist in one observer
>> but not the other.
>>
>> (Metaphorically, the two observers may have elaborated two radically
>> different sheets of assertion before the sign-event became a shared
>> experience.)
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

makes about how
> to prepare for her day?
>
>
> Yours,
>
>
> Jeff
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> --
> *From:* Francesco Bellucci 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 5, 2018 10:14:24 AM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
>
> Jon, List
>
> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
>
>> Francesco, List:
>>
>> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
>> move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
>> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
>> latter.
>>
>
> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate object
> intended as the subject of a proposition
>
>>
>> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
>> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
>> and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
>> while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that
>> one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
>> century.
>>
>> CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is
>> what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many
>> singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is taken
>> to be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of
>> implying a truth of the kind of "Any *S* is *P*"; it only expresses "Some
>>  *S* is *P*." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant*/*Copulative*// but only
>> a *Descriptive*. (EP 2:486)
>>
>>
>> As an actual piece of granite, the statue is obviously an Actisign; i.e.,
>> an individual Instance (Token) of a general Sign (Type).  Peirce here
>> further classified it as a Descriptive, because he held that the equivalent
>> proposition would be particular, rather than singular or universal;
>> presumably "*S*" corresponds to "Civil War soldier" and "*P*" to "a
>> person who looked like this."  However, that conflicts with what he went on
>> to say later in the very same manuscript.
>>
>
> The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
> problem is already here. Perhaps the solution is that a Symbol cannot be a
> "normal" Actisign but it can be an Actisign which is a replica of a
> Famisign. The distinction between standard Sinsigns and Replicas comes from
> the Syllabus.
>
>>
>> CSP:  But an Actual Occurrence always determines the Possibility of its
>> character; whence no Descriptive can be a Famisign ... As an example of
>> this, no number of Descriptive propositions of the type "Some *S* is *P*"
>> can ever determine the truth of a Copulative Proposition "Any *S* is *P*."
>> It is, if possible, still more obvious that Possibility can never determine
>> Actuality and therefore *a Descriptive cannot be an Actisign* ... (EP
>> 2:488; bold added)
>>
>>
>> I am a strong proponent of the principle of charity, seeking to harmonize
>> any author's writings as much as possible; but Peirce clearly must have
>> been incorrect in one or the other of these passages, because they are
>> directly contradictory.  The latter one is fully consistent with the order
>> of determination for the semeiotic Correlates as spelled out in something
>> that he wrote no more than a few days earlier (EP 2:481), so my judgment is
>> that he was wrong to classify the statue--and, for that matter, a
>> particular proposition--as a Descriptive.
>>
>
> I think he was not  wrong to classify particular propositions as
> Descriptives, the passage clearly shows that with "Descriptive" he means
> "Some S is P". Since he says that a Descriptive cannot be an Actisign, in
> order for this to be an instance of the furst rule (R1, a first determines
> only a first) the trichotomy Descriptive/Designative/Copulant has to
> precede the trichotomy Potisign/Actisign/Famisign.
>
>
>
>> Again, my current proposal is that instead we treat quantification as the
>> aspect of a proposition's *Immediate *Object that converts the Sign's
>> *General *Object into the Replica

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Dear Francesco, list,



Peirce said:

*That* statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign.



You said:

As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign



Is there here a difference between *that* statue and *the* statue?

That is, why is the statue an Actisign, and obviously so?



Thanks,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:24 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List, Jeff:
>
> On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> wrote:
>
> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal
> to Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the
> existential graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more
> minute analysis of examples. What is more, I think that the application of
> such formal tools would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools
> of phenomenological analysis when looking at particular cases of
> inference--such as when we are looking at the role of the immediate object
> in Peirce's discussion with Juliette about the weather. What can we learn
> from the existential graphs and phenomenology about the dialogue that is
> taking place between the two--and the role of the immediate object in
> explaining what it is being conveyed as the conversation progresses from
> Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the decisions she makes about how
> to prepare for her day?
>
> Yours,
>
> Jeff
>
>
> Your suggestion is an important one.
>
> I feel that it part of the deeper issue of the role of the concept of
> identity in bridging the communications gap between the origin of the sign
> and the meaning of the sign for someone who may also be interpreting the
> same sign.
>
> As I have previously noted, the issue of the capability of interpreting a
> form of a sign with a form of responding conceptually to the sign, varies
> widely.  In part, it is a matter of feelings about earlier events which can
> trigger recall of similar signs.  Such feelings may exist in one observer
> but not the other.
>
> (Metaphorically, the two observers may have elaborated two radically
> different sheets of assertion before the sign-event became a shared
> experience.)
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-05 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List, Jeff: 
> On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal to 
> Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the existential 
> graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more minute analysis 
> of examples. What is more, I think that the application of such formal tools 
> would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools of phenomenological 
> analysis when looking at particular cases of inference--such as when we are 
> looking at the role of the immediate object in Peirce's discussion with 
> Juliette about the weather. What can we learn from the existential graphs and 
> phenomenology about the dialogue that is taking place between the two--and 
> the role of the immediate object in explaining what it is being conveyed as 
> the conversation progresses from Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the 
> decisions she makes about how to prepare for her day?
> 
> Yours,
> 
> Jeff
> 

Your suggestion is an important one.

I feel that it part of the deeper issue of the role of the concept of identity 
in bridging the communications gap between the origin of the sign and the 
meaning of the sign for someone who may also be interpreting the same sign. 

As I have previously noted, the issue of the capability of interpreting a form 
of a sign with a form of responding conceptually to the sign, varies widely.  
In part, it is a matter of feelings about earlier events which can trigger 
recall of similar signs.  Such feelings may exist in one observer but not the 
other. 

(Metaphorically, the two observers may have elaborated two radically different 
sheets of assertion before the sign-event became a shared experience.)

Cheers

Jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-05 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Jon S, Francesco, List,


Let me start with a quick and minor remark.


Jon says:  "Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into 
vague/singular/general,..."


My understanding is that the sign and not the immediate object that is being 
classified as a vague, singular or general. The classification is based on the 
immediate object having the character of a presentation that is a possible, 
existent or necessitant. In the case of the immediate object, things are 
somewhat more complicated than in the case of, say, the classification of signs 
based on the nature of the dynamical object. The reason, of course, is that the 
immediate object is, in some sense, a part of or an aspect of the sign.


Having said that, I am supposing that the immediate object serves a particular 
function in its relation to the sign and interpretant. Peirce suggests at CP 
8.314 where he offers the example of a conversation he had with Juliette about 
the weather that the immediate object serves the function of conveying the 
"notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine -- 
not the character of it, but the identity of it." There are two interesting 
suggestions here. One that the immediate object seems to serve as a mark of the 
identity of the object under discussion. The second suggestion is that the 
immediate object can be something that is held in common by two people who are 
part of a dialogue.


What other functions does the immediate object serve?  At CP 5.473, he says 
that "a mental representation of the index is produced, which mental 
representation is called the immediate object of the sign; and this object does 
triadically produce the intended, or proper, effect of the sign strictly by 
means of another mental sign;..." One thing that strikes me about this passage 
is that it is the immediate object and not, apparently, the dynamical object, 
that has a role in triadically producing the proper effect of the sign. Do you 
have any suggestions for how we might understand this triadic production of the 
proper effect of the sign?


In the late classification of signs, Peirce characterizes the assurance in the 
relationship between the object, sign and interpretant in terms of a triadic 
relation. He indicates that the sign is classified in terms of an assurance of 
instinct where the inference is abductive, experience where the inference is 
inductive, or form where the inference is deductive. What, do you think, is the 
connection between the role of the immediate object that stands in the triadic 
relation described at 5.473 and the triadic relation of assurance that is part 
and parcel of inferential processes (e.g., of thought)?


Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal to 
Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the existential 
graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more minute analysis of 
examples. What is more, I think that the application of such formal tools would 
be considerably aided if we also employed the tools of phenomenological 
analysis when looking at particular cases of inference--such as when we are 
looking at the role of the immediate object in Peirce's discussion with 
Juliette about the weather. What can we learn from the existential graphs and 
phenomenology about the dialogue that is taking place between the two--and the 
role of the immediate object in explaining what it is being conveyed as the 
conversation progresses from Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the 
decisions she makes about how to prepare for her day?


Yours,


Jeff






Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Francesco Bellucci 
Sent: Wednesday, September 5, 2018 10:14:24 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, List

thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Francesco, List:

I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to move on 
to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the Immediate 
Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the latter.

I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate object 
intended as the subject of a proposition

Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into 
vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular and 
universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively, while 
discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that one could 
find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th century.

CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is what 
we call a "Gen

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

>
>
> Would you mind clarifying, please?
>
> What’s the problem again and what rules?
>

According to the Syllabus, a Symbol can only be a Legisign (= Famisign in
the 1908 terminology), and thus cannot be a Sinsign (=Actisign in the 1908
terminology).

Best
F

>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Francesco, list
>>
>> Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used by
>> Peirce.
>>
>> One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move away
>> from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process. That is, the
>> term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a symbol; by a
>> legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic embedded nature suggests
>> that the term cannot be set up to operate as a pure intellectual construct,
>> akin to a Platonic Form.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 05/09/18 2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
>> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
>>
>> Jon, Gary, List
>>
>> thanks for your replies.
>>
>> As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" in
>> at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
>> have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
>> types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
>> also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
>> term).
>>
>> GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
>> quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had
>> occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a general
>> object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
>>
>>
>> At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the
>> object of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is whatever
>> possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce, generals are
>> real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368 "general object"
>> is used in another sense: "distributively general object" means the
>> universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why the notion of a general
>> object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic, and not as a species of the
>> immediate) looks very unPeircean to me: if we mean the object of a symbol,
>> it's the dynamic object which is general; if we mean the object of a
>> universally quantified sentence, it's the immediate object that is general;
>> if we mean a legisign, it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I
>> don't see what other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
>> interpretation of Peirce.
>>
>>
>> JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I
>> already quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not equivalent
>> to "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
>> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed
>> to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover, any common noun, such as
>> "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904)
>> despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate
>> Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds
>> to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification
>> only comes into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition
>> .
>>
>>
>> The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
>> 2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
>> opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite". Cf. e.g.
>> R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is opposed to vague and
>> singular, it means "distributively general". That the sense in which
>> "general" is used in the division of signs according to the immediate
>> object is "distributively general" is clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284,
>> p. 67
>>
>>
>> According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
>> Indefinite Sign
>> Singular Sign
>> Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
>>
>> General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the logically
>> formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive Generality. (R
>> 284, p. 67)
>>
>> Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the
>> rheme "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol, i.e. a
>> sign whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses the set of
>> characters that corresponds to its definition. But the general object of a
>> symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of characters that
>> corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the dynamic, not the immediate
>> object. For icon/index/symbol is a division according to the dynamic, not
>> the immediate object.
>>
>> Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that possesses
>> the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the immediate
>> object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Welcome Francesco;

dear list,



You said:



The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a Symbol.

But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign.

*The problem is already here*.



Would you mind clarifying, please?

What’s the problem again and what rules?



Thanks,



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Francesco, list
>
> Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used by
> Peirce.
>
> One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move away
> from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process. That is, the
> term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a symbol; by a
> legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic embedded nature suggests
> that the term cannot be set up to operate as a pure intellectual construct,
> akin to a Platonic Form.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 05/09/18 2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
>
> Jon, Gary, List
>
> thanks for your replies.
>
> As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" in
> at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
> have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
> types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
> also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
> term).
>
> GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
> quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had
> occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a general
> object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
>
>
> At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the object
> of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is whatever
> possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce, generals are
> real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368 "general object" is
> used in another sense: "distributively general object" means the
> universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why the notion of a general
> object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic, and not as a species of the
> immediate) looks very unPeircean to me: if we mean the object of a symbol,
> it's the dynamic object which is general; if we mean the object of a
> universally quantified sentence, it's the immediate object that is general;
> if we mean a legisign, it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I
> don't see what other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
> interpretation of Peirce.
>
>
> JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I already
> quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not equivalent to
> "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed
> to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover, any common noun, such as
> "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904)
> despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate
> Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds
> to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification
> only comes into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition.
>
>
> The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
> 2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
> opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite". Cf. e.g.
> R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is opposed to vague and
> singular, it means "distributively general". That the sense in which
> "general" is used in the division of signs according to the immediate
> object is "distributively general" is clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284,
> p. 67
>
>
> According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
> Indefinite Sign
> Singular Sign
> Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
>
> General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the logically
> formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive Generality. (R
> 284, p. 67)
>
> Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the rheme
> "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol, i.e. a sign
> whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses the set of
> characters that corresponds to its definition. But the general object of a
> symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of characters that
> corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the dynamic, not the immediate
> object. For icon/index/symbol is a division according to the dynamic, not
> the immediate object.
>
> Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that possesses
> the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the immediate
> object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that corresponds to
> the definition of man?

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-05 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Francesco, list

Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used
by Peirce.

One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move
away from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process.
That is, the term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a
symbol; by a legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic
embedded nature suggests that the term cannot be set up to operate as
a pure intellectual construct, akin to a Platonic Form.

Edwina
 On Wed 05/09/18  2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
 Jon, Gary, List
 thanks for your replies. 
 As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses
"general" in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs
indices, which have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general
in themselves (as types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally
quantified sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce
("distributively general" his preferred term).  
 GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not
have had occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a
general object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
 At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the
object of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is
whatever possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce,
generals are real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368
"general object" is used in another sense: "distributively general
object" means the universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why
the notion of a general object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic,
and not as a species of the immediate) looks very unPeircean to me:
if we mean the object of a symbol, it's the dynamic object which is
general; if we mean the object of a universally quantified sentence,
it's the immediate object that is general; if we mean a legisign,
it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I don't see what
other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
interpretation of Peirce. 
JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I
already quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not
equivalent to "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are
mortal") and particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are
general, as opposed to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover,
any common noun, such as "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a
man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904) despite not being quantified at all;
and it does have an Immediate Object, which is whatever possesses the
set of characters that corresponds to its definition--i.e., its
Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification  only comes into play when
this general Rheme is employed in a proposition.
The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite".
Cf. e.g. R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is
opposed to vague and singular, it means "distributively general".
That the sense in which "general" is used in the division of signs
according to the immediate object is "distributively general" is
clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284, p. 67 
 According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
 Indefinite Sign
 Singular Sign
 Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
 General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the
logically formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive
Generality. (R 284, p. 67) 
 Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the
rheme "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol,
i.e. a sign whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses
the set of characters that corresponds to its definition. But the
general object of a symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of
characters that corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the
dynamic, not the immediate object. For icon/index/symbol is a
division according to the dynamic, not the immediate object.  
 Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that
possesses the set of characters that corresponds to its definition,
is the immediate object. What it is that possesses the set of
characters that corresponds to the definition of man? Of course,
every really existing man, as well as those existed and those that
will exist. If this is the immediate object of the rheme "--is a
man", what's its dynamic object? 
 Another example. Take the sign "Napoleon is lethargic". It contains
a proper name, "Napoleon", which refers to the real Napoleon, the
historical figure. Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the
proper name, is its "object" (he says so in very many

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, List

thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to move
> on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
> latter.
>

I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate object
intended as the subject of a proposition

>
> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
> and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
> while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that
> one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
> century.
>
> CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is
> what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many
> singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is taken to
> be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of
> implying a truth of the kind of "Any *S* is *P*"; it only expresses "Some
> *S* is *P*." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant*/*Copulative*// but only a
> *Descriptive*. (EP 2:486)
>
>
> As an actual piece of granite, the statue is obviously an Actisign; i.e.,
> an individual Instance (Token) of a general Sign (Type).  Peirce here
> further classified it as a Descriptive, because he held that the equivalent
> proposition would be particular, rather than singular or universal;
> presumably "*S*" corresponds to "Civil War soldier" and "*P*" to "a
> person who looked like this."  However, that conflicts with what he went on
> to say later in the very same manuscript.
>

The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a Symbol.
But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The problem is
already here. Perhaps the solution is that a Symbol cannot be a "normal"
Actisign but it can be an Actisign which is a replica of a Famisign. The
distinction between standard Sinsigns and Replicas comes from the Syllabus.

>
> CSP:  But an Actual Occurrence always determines the Possibility of its
> character; whence no Descriptive can be a Famisign ... As an example of
> this, no number of Descriptive propositions of the type "Some *S* is *P*"
> can ever determine the truth of a Copulative Proposition "Any *S* is *P*."
> It is, if possible, still more obvious that Possibility can never determine
> Actuality and therefore *a Descriptive cannot be an Actisign* ... (EP
> 2:488; bold added)
>
>
> I am a strong proponent of the principle of charity, seeking to harmonize
> any author's writings as much as possible; but Peirce clearly must have
> been incorrect in one or the other of these passages, because they are
> directly contradictory.  The latter one is fully consistent with the order
> of determination for the semeiotic Correlates as spelled out in something
> that he wrote no more than a few days earlier (EP 2:481), so my judgment is
> that he was wrong to classify the statue--and, for that matter, a
> particular proposition--as a Descriptive.
>

I think he was not  wrong to classify particular propositions as
Descriptives, the passage clearly shows that with "Descriptive" he means
"Some S is P". Since he says that a Descriptive cannot be an Actisign, in
order for this to be an instance of the furst rule (R1, a first determines
only a first) the trichotomy Descriptive/Designative/Copulant has to
precede the trichotomy Potisign/Actisign/Famisign.



> Again, my current proposal is that instead we treat quantification as the
> aspect of a proposition's *Immediate *Object that converts the Sign's
> *General *Object into the Replica's *Dynamic *Object.
>

 If quantification really were an aspect of a proposition's immediate
object, while didn't Peirce say, in all his writings on the classification
of signs, that the vague/singular/general division does not exhaust the
immediate object of propositions, and is inapplicable to non-propositional
signs. Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
generality, or in neither sense.  If you use "general object" in neither
sense, I think your use is unPeircean.

>
> Every proposition in itself, as a Symbol and therefore a general Sign,
> must be a Copulative.  As with "Any man is mortal," the continuous
> predicate in this case is "_ possesses the character of _," where
> the two blanks correspond to a Designative as the subject ("*S*" with a
> quantifier) and a Descriptive as the predicate ("*P*").  The subject of
> each *Replica *of the proposition must have an *individual *Dynamic
> Object, which is why a quantifier--which Peirce sometimes tellingly called
> a "Selective"--is necessary;

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 Francesco, List:

I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to move
on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
latter.

Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that
one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
century.

CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is
what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many
singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is taken to
be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of
implying a truth of the kind of "Any *S* is *P*"; it only expresses "Some
*S* is *P*." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant*/*Copulative*// but only a
*Descriptive*. (EP 2:486)


As an actual piece of granite, the statue is obviously an Actisign; i.e.,
an individual Instance (Token) of a general Sign (Type).  Peirce here
further classified it as a Descriptive, because he held that the equivalent
proposition would be particular, rather than singular or universal;
presumably "*S*" corresponds to "Civil War soldier" and "*P*" to "a person
who looked like this."  However, that conflicts with what he went on to say
later in the very same manuscript.

CSP:  But an Actual Occurrence always determines the Possibility of its
character; whence no Descriptive can be a Famisign ... As an example of
this, no number of Descriptive propositions of the type "Some *S* is *P*"
can ever determine the truth of a Copulative Proposition "Any *S* is *P*."
It is, if possible, still more obvious that Possibility can never determine
Actuality and therefore *a Descriptive cannot be an Actisign* ... (EP
2:488; bold added)


I am a strong proponent of the principle of charity, seeking to harmonize
any author's writings as much as possible; but Peirce clearly must have
been incorrect in one or the other of these passages, because they are
directly contradictory.  The latter one is fully consistent with the order
of determination for the semeiotic Correlates as spelled out in something
that he wrote no more than a few days earlier (EP 2:481), so my judgment is
that he was wrong to classify the statue--and, for that matter, a
particular proposition--as a Descriptive.  Again, my current proposal is
that instead we treat quantification as the aspect of a proposition's
*Immediate *Object that converts the Sign's *General *Object into the
Replica's *Dynamic *Object.

Every proposition in itself, as a Symbol and therefore a general Sign, must
be a Copulative.  As with "Any man is mortal," the continuous predicate in
this case is "_ possesses the character of _," where the two blanks
correspond to a Designative as the subject ("*S*" with a quantifier) and a
Descriptive as the predicate ("*P*").  The subject of each *Replica *of the
proposition must have an *individual *Dynamic Object, which is why a
quantifier--which Peirce sometimes tellingly called a "Selective"--is
necessary; it indicates whether the *choice* of that individual from the
Sign's (collective or continuous) General Object is left up to the Utterer
("Some *S*"), the Interpreter ("Any *S*"), or neither ("This *S*").

CSP:  A sign (under which designation I place every kind of thought, and
not alone external signs) that is in any respect objectively indeterminate
(i.e., whose object is undetermined by the sign itself) is objectively
*general *in so far as it extends to the interpreter the privilege of
carrying its determination further ... A sign that is objectively
indeterminate in any respect is objectively *vague *in so far as it
reserves further determination to be made in some other conceivable sign,
or at least does not appoint the interpreter as its deputy in this office
... Every utterance naturally leaves the right of further exposition in the
utterer; and therefore, in so far as a sign is indeterminate, it is vague,
unless it is expressly or by a well-understood convention rendered general.
(CP 5.447, EP 2:350-351; 1906)


Peirce's 1908 example could perhaps be taken either way.  On the one hand,
each statue is vague/particular ("Some *S* is *P*") in the sense that the
sculptor as the Utterer determined the specific appearance of the person
depicted by it, which might or might not correspond to an actual person.
On the other hand, each statue is general/universal ("Any *S* is *P*")  in
the sense that for many different local families as the Interpreters, "that
very realistic statue represents the mourned one who fell in the war" (EP
2:486).  Such ambiguity is all the more reason not to tie the
classification of such a Sign-Replica to *its *quantification, but rather
to the fact

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-05 Thread John F Sowa


On 9/5/2018 2:57 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" 
in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, 
which have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves 
(as types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified 
sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively 
general" his preferred term).


I agree.  But I believe that it's important to use Peirce's own
tools for stating the criteria precisely:  his versions of logic.

For each of those three senses, any definition in his algebraic
notation of 1885 would have a universal quantifier, and any
definition in existential graphs would have a line of identity
in a negative area.

That kind of explanation would have several advantages:

 1. It would show the common feature that is present in all
uses of the word 'general'.

 2. By the differences in the logical expressions, it would
show exactly how those three senses differ.

 3. It would illustrate Peirce's claims about the utility
of his writings on formal logic.

 4. It would enable anyone who knows logic, but has not yet
studied Peirce to get a better appreciation for Peirce's
work -- and perhaps begin to dig deeper into his writings.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-04 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Francesco, List:

FB:  If rhemes have an immediate object, then according to Peirce's
taxonomies of 1904-1906 "all men" must be a rheme, because signs with
immediate objects may be general (universally quantified). But "all men" is
not a rheme; therefore, rhemes do not have immediate objects.

I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I already quoted
Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is *not *equivalent to "universally
quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and particular ("Some
men are mortal") propositions are *general*, as opposed to *singular *("This
man is mortal").  Moreover, any common noun, such as "man," is a
*general *Rheme
("_ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904) despite not being quantified *at
all*; and it *does *have an Immediate Object, which is whatever possesses
the set of characters that corresponds to its definition--i.e., its
Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification *only *comes into play when this
general Rheme is employed *in a proposition*.

In other words, the conclusion that I draw from Peirce's 1904-1906 division
of the Immediate Object into vague/singular/general is not that *only
*propositions
have Immediate Objects, but that the Immediate Object of a proposition
*includes
*the quantification of its *general *subject(s).  Nevertheless, I think
that his application of this particular trichotomy to propositions is
problematic--even when revised to Descriptive/Designative/Copulative in
1908; more on that soon.

FB:  I must say I do not understand the discussion of "general object".

Rather than repeating myself, I will respectfully request that you consider
reading through the other current List thread on "The nature of the Dynamic
Object" in its entirety, if you have not done so already; perhaps beginning
with the only post in its predecessor thread (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-08/msg00342.html).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 3:45 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Dear Jon, List
>
> Thanks for your response. Here some further thoughts.
>
> You will agree that the notion of immediate object as a technical notion
> of semiotics emerges in 1904, that it emerges in the classification of
> signs, and that its purpose in the classification of signs up to 1906 is to
> divide signs into vague, singular, and general. You will also agree that in
> that context, as well as in other writings of the same year (Kaina
> Stoicheia, MSS 4-11), singular means existentially quantified and general
> means universally quantified (distributively general). I see that you also
> agree that "all men" is not a rheme. Let's proceed from here.
>
> If rhemes have an immediate object, then according to Peirce's taxonomies
> of 1904-1906 "all men" must be a rheme, because signs with immediate
> objects may be general (universally quantified). But "all men" is not a
> rheme; therefore, rhemes do not have immediate objects.
>
> I must say I do not understand the discussion of "general object". As far
> as I know, symbols have a general object (indices an individual object),
> legisigns are general in themselves (as types) and universally quantified
> sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general"
> his preferred term). Talk of "general objects" besides the dynamic and the
> immediate sounds to me very unPeircean.
>
> Best
> Francesco
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-04 Thread Gary Richmond

Francesco, Jon, List,

May I too, as Moderator of Peirce-L, but especially as a frequent active
participant, join other list members who have welcomed you to the forum.
Several active participants in our forum--including Jon, Gary Fuhrman (who
a couple of years ago organized a slow read of Frederik Stjernfelt's, *Natural
Propositions*, with Frederik joining in the discussion), and Dr. Jeff
Downard--have read your book in its entirety and with great interest,
finding it valuable in many ways. Gary F, in particular, has encouraged
folk here, including me, to read it. So far I have had time to read only
portions of it, but already can say that I greatly admire your scholarship,
insights, and writing style. I hope to finish reading it in the next few
weeks.

May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several quotations
which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had occasion to
read) including:

CSP:  And do not overlook the fact that the pragmaticist maxim says nothing
of single experiments or of single experimental phenomena (for what is
conditionally true *in futuro* can hardly be singular), but only
speaks of *general
kinds* of experimental phenomena. Its adherent does not shrink from
speaking of *general objects* as real, since whatever is true represents a
real. Now the laws of nature are true. (CP 5.426, EP 2:340; 1905, bold
added)

CSP:  … thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the
fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be
the same in the end, however the perversity of thought of whole generations
may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation. If this be so, as
every man of us virtually assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the
truth of which he seriously discusses, then, according to the adopted
definition of "real," the state of things which will be believed in that
ultimate opinion is real. But, for the most part, such opinions will be
general. Consequently, *some* *general objects* are real. (CP 5.430, EP
2:342-343; 1905, bold added)

  CSP:  What is the nature of all these relations [between different points
in space] as well as those of time? They all result from complications of
only two

  elements. One of these is the relation of a distributively *general
object*, "any" something, to the single individual collection which
embraces "any" such,  and nothing else. The other is the relation of
geometrical *betweenness* … (EP 2:368; 1906, bold added)

Why do write that the notion of a *general object* appears to you as "very
unPeircean"?

FB: Talk of "general objects" besides the dynamic and the immediate sounds
to me very unPeircean.

After all, Peirce clearly has the notion in mind in 1905-6. One would hope
that it might at least be considered as "possibly Peircean" even if he is
seen to be in error in positing such an object (a notion which, I must
admit, I am still struggling with).

I am sure I am not alone in looking forward to further lively discussions
of your work (and possibly other Peircean themes) on Peirce-L should you
find the time and have the inclination.

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 4:46 PM Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Dear Jon, List
>
> Thanks for your response. Here some further thoughts.
>
> You will agree that the notion of immediate object as a technical notion
> of semiotics emerges in 1904, that it emerges in the classification of
> signs, and that its purpose in the classification of signs up to 1906 is to
> divide signs into vague, singular, and general. You will also agree that in
> that context, as well as in other writings of the same year (Kaina
> Stoicheia, MSS 4-11), singular means existentially quantified and general
> means universally quantified (distributively general). I see that you also
> agree that "all men" is not a rheme. Let's proceed from here.
>
> If rhemes have an immediate object, then according to Peirce's taxonomies
> of 1904-1906 "all men" must be a rheme, because signs with immediate
> objects may be general (universally quantified). But "all men" is not a
> rheme; therefore, rhemes do not have immediate objects.
>
> I must say I do not understand the discussion of "general object". As far
> as I know, symbols have a general object (indices an individual object),
> legisigns are general in themselves (as types) and universally quantified
> sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general"
> his preferred term). Talk of "general objects" besides the dynamic and the
> immediate sounds to me very unPeircean.
>
> Best
> Francesco
>
>
>>
>> My position regarding the Immediate Object (IO) has evolved since I
>> offered the specific comment that you quoted, but I still maintain that 
>> *every
>> *Sign has one.  Peirce said so

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-04 Thread Francesco Bellucci

Dear Jon, List

Thanks for your response. Here some further thoughts.

You will agree that the notion of immediate object as a technical notion of
semiotics emerges in 1904, that it emerges in the classification of signs,
and that its purpose in the classification of signs up to 1906 is to divide
signs into vague, singular, and general. You will also agree that in that
context, as well as in other writings of the same year (Kaina Stoicheia,
MSS 4-11), singular means existentially quantified and general means
universally quantified (distributively general). I see that you also agree
that "all men" is not a rheme. Let's proceed from here.

If rhemes have an immediate object, then according to Peirce's taxonomies
of 1904-1906 "all men" must be a rheme, because signs with immediate
objects may be general (universally quantified). But "all men" is not a
rheme; therefore, rhemes do not have immediate objects.

I must say I do not understand the discussion of "general object". As far
as I know, symbols have a general object (indices an individual object),
legisigns are general in themselves (as types) and universally quantified
sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general"
his preferred term). Talk of "general objects" besides the dynamic and the
immediate sounds to me very unPeircean.

Best
Francesco


>
> My position regarding the Immediate Object (IO) has evolved since I
> offered the specific comment that you quoted, but I still maintain that *every
> *Sign has one.  Peirce said so explicitly in at least two places, and
> certainly implied it in various others; so I think that any definition of
> the IO that *excludes *any class of Signs *cannot *be correct.
> Specifically, I find it unwarranted to infer from his *temporary *use of
> vague/singular/general as the division of the IO that *only *a
> proposition has one.  Instead, we can say that quantification is always *part
> *of the IO of any *proposition*; but this by no means entails that a less
> complete Sign--i.e., a Rheme--does not have an IO *at all*.
>
> Indeed, "all men" (or "any man") is *not *a Rheme, but "man" certainly
> is; Peirce would have represented it as "_ is a man" accordingly.
> "Mortal" is also a Rheme; Peirce would have likewise represented it as
> "_ is mortal" accordingly.  Quantification only becomes necessary when
> we *combine *two general Rhemes to form a proposition; e.g., "Any man is
> mortal."  As Peirce realized by 1908, all Symbols are Copulatives according
> to the IO; in this case, the continuous predicate is "_ possesses the
> character of _," where the first blank is for a Designative and the
> second blank is for a Descriptive ("mortality").  The quantifier is what
> enables a *general *term ("man") to serve as a Designative ("any man,"
> "this man," or "some man").
>
> This ties in with my recent proposal that a Sign (Type) is in a *genuine 
> *triadic
> relation with a General Object and the Final Interpretant, while an
> individual Sign-Replica (Token) is in a *degenerate *triadic relation
> with a Dynamic Object and a Dynamic Interpretant.  Quantification, as part
> of the (internal) IO, is how a Replica of a proposition *delineates *its
> Dynamic Object from the General Object of the Sign that serves as its
> subject.  This is evident in passages where Peirce referred to a "general
> subject."
>
> CSP:  We know very well that universal propositions have general subjects
> … Thus the subject of a proposition if not an index is a precept
> prescribing the conditions under which an index is to be had. (EP 2:168;
> 1903)
>
>
> CSP:  But a general subject is either an indesignate individual or a
> quodlibetical individual [any individual you please] of the universe to
> which no descriptive character is attached … It involves merely directions
> as to what one is to do to find an individual such as is intended, without
> at all describing that individual. (EP 2:224; 1903)
>
>
>
> CSP:  A subject of a proposition is either *singular*, *general*, or *abstract
> *(*Summulae*). It is singular if it indicates an otherwise known
> individual. It is general if it describes how an individual is to be
> selected. A general subject is (as commonly recognized) either *universal
> *or *particular *(and indefinite). (CP 2.324, EP 2:284; 1903)
>
>
> Without a quantifier, a common noun like "man" has only a General Object,
> not a Dynamic Object.  Being a Symbol, it is a Copulative as the Rheme,
> "_ is a man"; but it is also a Descriptive in the sense that its IO is
> whatever possesses the necessary and sufficient set of *characters *that
> constitutes *what it means* to be a "man" as that term is *defined *in
> standard written English.  It is no different from an adjective like
> "mortal" in that regard.
>
> CSP:  Now a common noun [such] as "man," standing alone, is certainly an
> index, but not of the object it denotes. It is an index of the mental
> object which it calls up.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-02 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Francesco, List:

Welcome!  I am delighted that you are joining the discussion on the List.
I appreciated your recent book on speculative grammar and am very much
looking forward to the (hopefully still forthcoming) sequels on logical
critic and speculative rhetoric.

My position regarding the Immediate Object (IO) has evolved since I offered
the specific comment that you quoted, but I still maintain that *every *Sign
has one.  Peirce said so explicitly in at least two places, and certainly
implied it in various others; so I think that any definition of the IO
that *excludes
*any class of Signs *cannot *be correct.  Specifically, I find it
unwarranted to infer from his *temporary *use of vague/singular/general as
the division of the IO that *only *a proposition has one.  Instead, we can
say that quantification is always *part *of the IO of any *proposition*;
but this by no means entails that a less complete Sign--i.e., a Rheme--does
not have an IO *at all*.

Indeed, "all men" (or "any man") is *not *a Rheme, but "man" certainly is;
Peirce would have represented it as "_ is a man" accordingly.  "Mortal"
is also a Rheme; Peirce would have likewise represented it as "_ is
mortal" accordingly.  Quantification only becomes necessary when we *combine
*two general Rhemes to form a proposition; e.g., "Any man is mortal."  As
Peirce realized by 1908, all Symbols are Copulatives according to the IO;
in this case, the continuous predicate is "_ possesses the character of
_," where the first blank is for a Designative and the second blank is
for a Descriptive ("mortality").  The quantifier is what enables a *general
*term ("man") to serve as a Designative ("any man," "this man," or "some
man").

This ties in with my recent proposal that a Sign (Type) is in a
*genuine *triadic
relation with a General Object and the Final Interpretant, while an
individual Sign-Replica (Token) is in a *degenerate *triadic relation with
a Dynamic Object and a Dynamic Interpretant.  Quantification, as part of
the (internal) IO, is how a Replica of a proposition *delineates *its
Dynamic Object from the General Object of the Sign that serves as its
subject.  This is evident in passages where Peirce referred to a "general
subject."

CSP:  We know very well that universal propositions have general subjects …
Thus the subject of a proposition if not an index is a precept prescribing
the conditions under which an index is to be had. (EP 2:168; 1903)


CSP:  But a general subject is either an indesignate individual or a
quodlibetical individual [any individual you please] of the universe to
which no descriptive character is attached … It involves merely directions
as to what one is to do to find an individual such as is intended, without
at all describing that individual. (EP 2:224; 1903)



CSP:  A subject of a proposition is either *singular*, *general*, or *abstract
*(*Summulae*). It is singular if it indicates an otherwise known
individual. It is general if it describes how an individual is to be
selected. A general subject is (as commonly recognized) either *universal *or
*particular *(and indefinite). (CP 2.324, EP 2:284; 1903)


Without a quantifier, a common noun like "man" has only a General Object,
not a Dynamic Object.  Being a Symbol, it is a Copulative as the Rheme,
"_ is a man"; but it is also a Descriptive in the sense that its IO is
whatever possesses the necessary and sufficient set of *characters *that
constitutes *what it means* to be a "man" as that term is *defined *in
standard written English.  It is no different from an adjective like
"mortal" in that regard.

CSP:  Now a common noun [such] as "man," standing alone, is certainly an
index, but not of the object it denotes. It is an index of the mental
object which it calls up. It is the index of an icon; for it denotes
whatever there may be which is like that image. (EP 2:17-18; 1895)

CSP:  For what is a "term," or "class-name," supposed to be? It is
something which signifies, or, to use J. S. Mills' objectionable
terminology, "connotes" certain characters, and thereby denotes whatever
possesses those characters. That is, it draws the attention to an idea, or
mental construction, or diagram, of something possessing those characters,
and the possession of those characters is kept in the foreground of
consciousness. What does that mean unless that the listener says to
himself, "that which is *here* (before the attention) possesses such and
such characters"? (CP 2.341; c. 1895)

CSP:  A general term denotes whatever there may be which possesses the
characters which it signifies … (CP 2.434; 1901-1902).


This notion of the IO as a "mental object" or "mental construction" is what
I take Peirce to have intended when he called it "the idea which the sign
is built upon" (EP 2:407; 1907).  The IO is thus the Essential Breadth of
the Sign-Replica, the collection of Objects that corresponds to its
Essential Depth--i.e., the Immediate Interpretant (II).  Hence the

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supp.: E.G. in "Catfish tastes well", the term "Catfish" is a rheme (it carries information), because in children´s language "Catfish Hamlet" makes sense, it means "This catfish´s name is "Hamlet"". But in "all men are mortal", "all men Hamlet" does not make sense. Though it might mean "all men are like Hamlet", but that would be suggesting too much wisdom to the child speaking??

Dear Francesco,

That is very interesting and new to me. I had thought, a rheme was a term. In the below quotation from Commens Dictionary "rheme", Peirce writes, that it may be a term, but a term "contains no explicit recognition of its own fragmentary nature" . Now I wonder, does the replacement argument cover a term-as-rheme too? Maybe in children´s language?

1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:308-10

If from a propositional symbol we erase one or more of the parts which separately denote its objects, the remainder is what is called a rhema; but I shall take the liberty of calling it a term. [—] On the whole, it appears to me that the only difference between my rhema and the “term” of other logicians is that the latter contains no explicit recognition of its own fragmentary nature. But this is as much as to say that logically their meaning is the same; and it is for that reason that I venture to use the old, familiar word “term” to denote the rhema.

Best,

Helmut

02. September 2018 um 17:44 Uhr
"Francesco Bellucci"
wrote:

Dear Helmut

an example in which it works: if from the proposition "Every catholic adores some woman", its constituent "Every catholic" is removed, what remains is a rheme, because if we replace "Every catholic" with "John" we obtain "John adores some woman", which is again a proposition. Note that what is removed is not a rheme; the rheme is what remains (or "is extracted") of the proposition after the removal.

Best

Francesco
On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Dear Francesco, list,

For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?

Best,

Helmut

02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
"Francesco Bellucci"
wrote:

Dear All,

I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.

Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (Peirce's Speculative Grammar, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the discussion.

One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity: Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.

Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division, then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all men" is a rheme.

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear Francesco,

1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:308-10

Best,

Helmut

02. September 2018 um 17:44 Uhr
"Francesco Bellucci"
wrote:

Dear Helmut

Best

Francesco
On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Dear Francesco, list,

For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?

Best,

Helmut

02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
"Francesco Bellucci"
wrote:

Dear All,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-02 Thread Francesco Bellucci

Dear Helmut

an example in which it works: if from the proposition "Every catholic
adores some woman", its constituent "Every catholic" is removed, what
remains is a rheme, because if we replace "Every catholic" with "John" we
obtain "John adores some woman", which is again a proposition. Note that
what is removed is not a rheme; the rheme is what remains (or "is
extracted") of the proposition after the removal.

Best
Francesco

On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Dear Francesco, list,
>
> For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can
> you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
>  "Francesco Bellucci" 
> wrote:
> Dear All,
>
> I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is
> Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in
> Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.
>
> Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (*Peirce's Speculative
> Grammar*, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on
> Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further
> thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the
> discussion.
>
> One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate
> objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have
> immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in
> the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone
> discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their
> immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the
> vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina
> Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the
> history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity:
> Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called
> particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which
> traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the
> vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest
> that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object
> into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has
> been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we
> should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least
> that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the
> "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.
>
> Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division,
> then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their
> immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable
> to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a
> "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to
> a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding
> to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the
> idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all
> men" is a rheme.
>
> But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a
> rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by
> a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when
> the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all
> men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been
> extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us
> imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are
> mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a
> proper name, like "Hamlet", this does *not *yield again a proposition:
> "all men Hamlet". From this I conclude that "all men" is not a rheme. And
> since the only justification I can imagine for calling "all men" a rheme is
> that this would allow us to extend the vague/singular/general distinction
> to *all* signs, I conclude that this extension is unjustified.
>
> Let me also ask a question about the following observation made by Jon:
>
> "a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that
> Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute
> its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the
> unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)"
>
> If the Object's characters taken together constitute the Immediate Object
> of the Sign, what does it mean that such Immediate Object can be vague,
> singular, or general? Let's suppose the Sign mentioned here is the
> proposition "Halmet is mad". According to Jon, the Sign denotes the Dynamic
> Object (arguably, Hamlet), and signifies one of the Object's characters
> (arguably, his madness). Is this

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-02 Thread John F Sowa


Francesco,

Thanks for the very helpful comments.  I'd just like to make
one point about terminology:


Peirce defines a rheme as that which remains of a proposition after
something replaceable by a proper name has been removed from it,
where "replaceable" means that when the replacement has occurred,
we have again a proposition.


I believe that this is Peirce's version of what Church called
lambda abstraction.  See the attached lambda.gif.

This is slide 15 from http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf

I wrote egintro for the people I typically work with and talk with.
A few of them know a great deal about Peirce, but most of them have
no idea that his writings are relevant to anything they do.

It's important to reach those people because they are the ones who
teach the next generation.  I have attended a few Peirce sessions
at meetings of the APA, but those were the *only* talks in which
Peirce was mentioned.

It's essential to bring Peirce into the mainstream.  That's the
theme of my article "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century":
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf

John

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear Francesco, list,

For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?

Best,

Helmut

02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
"Francesco Bellucci"
wrote:

Dear All,

But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a proper name, like "Hamlet", this does not yield again a proposition: "all men Hamlet". From this I conclude that "all men" is not a rheme. And since the only justification I can imagine for calling "all men" a rheme is that this would allow us to extend the vague/singular/general distinction to all signs, I conclude that this extension is unjustified.

Let me also ask a question about the following observation made by Jon:

"a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)"

If the Object's characters taken together constitute the Immediate Object of the Sign, what does it mean that such Immediate Object can be vague, singular, or general? Let's suppose the Sign mentioned here is the proposition "Halmet is mad". According to Jon, the Sign denotes the Dynamic Object (arguably, Hamlet), and signifies one of the Object's characters (arguably, his madness). Is this character vague, general, or singular? Can you provide examples of three propositions (which, arguably, are Signs) in one of which the character/Immediate Object is vague, in another is general, and in the third is singular? And can you provide an example of a proposition in which the characters signified are, taken together, singular?

Best,

Francesco

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-02 Thread Francesco Bellucci

Dear All,

I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is
Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in
Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.

Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (*Peirce's Speculative
Grammar*, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on Peirce's
notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further thoughts on
this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the discussion.

One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate
objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have
immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in
the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone
discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their
immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the
vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina
Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the
history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity:
Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called
particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which
traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the
vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest
that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object
into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has
been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we
should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least
that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the
"principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.

Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division,
then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their
immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable
to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a
"general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to
a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding
to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the
idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all
men" is a rheme.

But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a
rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by
a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when
the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all
men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been
extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us
imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are
mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a
proper name, like "Hamlet", this does *not *yield again a proposition: "all
men Hamlet". From this I conclude that "all men" is not a rheme. And since
the only justification I can imagine for calling "all men" a rheme is that
this would allow us to extend the vague/singular/general distinction to
*all* signs, I conclude that this extension is unjustified.

Let me also ask a question about the following observation made by Jon:

"a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that
Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute
its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the
unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)"

If the Object's characters taken together constitute the Immediate Object
of the Sign, what does it mean that such Immediate Object can be vague,
singular, or general? Let's suppose the Sign mentioned here is the
proposition "Halmet is mad". According to Jon, the Sign denotes the Dynamic
Object (arguably, Hamlet), and signifies one of the Object's characters
(arguably, his madness). Is this character vague, general, or singular? Can
you provide examples of three propositions (which, arguably, are Signs) in
one of which the character/Immediate Object is vague, in another is
general, and in the third is singular? And can you provide an example of a
proposition in which the characters signified are, taken together, singular?

Best,
Francesco

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-07-21 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Gary F., List:

Yes, those are Peirce's own page numbers.

Jon S.

On Sat, Jul 21, 2018 at 8:11 AM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
>
>
> Thanks for this, I will add it … you cite “200:E94-E97” — does that refer
> to Peirce’s own numbering of the pages in R 200? It is useful in its way of
> bringing the “principle of contradiction” into the same context with
> “direct experience.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* 20-Jul-18 20:08
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> Later in the same portion of R 200 that I just referenced regarding
> logical depth and signification, between CP 6.347 and CP 6.348--in fact,
> immediately prior to the latter--Peirce provided this discussion of direct
> vs. indirect experience.
>
> CSP:   Direct experience is experience then and there.  Indirect
> experience is an indication by means of a relation to a direct experience.
> Thus, if one speaks of yesterday, the interpreter will know what is meant
> only by its relation to the time-date that is present to him.  If a length
> is expressed by its ratio to a metre, since it is very unlikely that the
> interpreter is at that moment gazing upon the prototype metre in the
> Pavillon de Breteuil, in the Park of St. Cloud,--and even if he were, mere
> gazing would not be the experience required to acquaint him with, say,
> 0.0254 of a metre, it seems to be quite impossible to make the experience
> quite direct.  For example, I once carried a yard-bar, which I had compared
> with the particular interval on a certain brass bar called the "Troughton
> scale," which had for generations been the basis of all American
> specifications of lengths in the English system,--I carried this to
> Westminster and compared it with the prototype yard.  The operation
> occupied some weeks; and after the observations were complete, it still
> remained to make the necessary calculations.  Clearly, there was no point
> of time in which I was under a direct experience of the ratio of the
> American to the British yard.  If my result was published, as it must have
> been in due time, it was the inferential result of the combination of
> hundreds of observations each made under extraordinary precautions.  All
> scientific experience is of that kind.  Indeed, it is not regarded by
> scientific men as being satisfactory unless it combines the direct
> experiences of different observers.  Direct experience is far too vague or
> uncertain to be admitted among the number of scientific results.  Of
> course, the most cogent experience, the experience that least violates the
> principle of contradiction (I mean by this bizarre expression that, for
> example, one of the least vague of scientific experiences is that an inch
> is *somewheres* in the neighborhood of 2.54 centimetres; but any one
> value from 2.53999 to 2.54001 was, at my last advices, about as true,
> considered as the result of scientific experience, as any other, although
> according to the *principle of contradiction*, but a single answer to any
> single question can be true.).  Indeed, *direct* experience is a sort of
> figment, in one sense, although it is the basis of all certitude.  If I am
> making a chemical weighing, I set down a figure which goes a little beyond
> the sensitiveness of my balance.  According to the usual theory of errors,
> which is, itself, only a convenient substitute for a knowledge that I do
> not possess, the average of a hundred weighings (with a rider which enables
> me to express the result considerably more accurately than any weighing can
> be made,) should be ten times as accurate as a single weighing.  Upon the
> same principle, a scientific result that is regarded a single experience is
> far superior to a direct experience, although it is derived from direct
> experience by a process of which we know,--though we do not know much about
> it,--that it is not strictly defensible. (R 200:E94-E97; 1908)
>
> I thought that you might like to add this to the collection on your
> website.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 12:28 PM,  wrote:
>
> List,
>
> While working on my transcription of Lowell Lecture 6 from the manuscript
> on the SPIN site (https://www.fromthepage.com/j
> effdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-472-1903-lowell-lecture-vi), I came
> across what strikes me as a key passage in it, and what struck me as a key
> term in it: *“direct experience”*. To get a more exact se

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-07-21 Thread gnox

Jon,

 

Thanks for this, I will add it … you cite “200:E94-E97” — does that refer to 
Peirce’s own numbering of the pages in R 200? It is useful in its way of 
bringing the “principle of contradiction” into the same context with “direct 
experience.”

 

Regarding your other (longer) post, the one thing you haven’t explained is why 
you see a discrepancy between Peirce’s use of “signification” in reference to 
predicates and his use of the same term in reference to interpretants. I 
imagine that the discrepancy is so obvious to you that it would be difficult 
for you to explain it to people like me who just don’t see it, and therefore 
see no need to “reconcile” Peircean statements that you see as contradictory. 
Nevertheless I hope you’ll try to explain it, so the rest of us can see where 
you’re coming from on this issue (or non-issue, as the case may be!)

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 20-Jul-18 20:08
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 

Gary F., List:

 

Later in the same portion of R 200 that I just referenced regarding logical 
depth and signification, between CP 6.347 and CP 6.348--in fact, immediately 
prior to the latter--Peirce provided this discussion of direct vs. indirect 
experience.

 

CSP:   Direct experience is experience then and there.  Indirect experience is 
an indication by means of a relation to a direct experience.  Thus, if one 
speaks of yesterday, the interpreter will know what is meant only by its 
relation to the time-date that is present to him.  If a length is expressed by 
its ratio to a metre, since it is very unlikely that the interpreter is at that 
moment gazing upon the prototype metre in the Pavillon de Breteuil, in the Park 
of St. Cloud,--and even if he were, mere gazing would not be the experience 
required to acquaint him with, say, 0.0254 of a metre, it seems to be quite 
impossible to make the experience quite direct.  For example, I once carried a 
yard-bar, which I had compared with the particular interval on a certain brass 
bar called the "Troughton scale," which had for generations been the basis of 
all American specifications of lengths in the English system,--I carried this 
to Westminster and compared it with the prototype yard.  The operation occupied 
some weeks; and after the observations were complete, it still remained to make 
the necessary calculations.  Clearly, there was no point of time in which I was 
under a direct experience of the ratio of the American to the British yard.  If 
my result was published, as it must have been in due time, it was the 
inferential result of the combination of hundreds of observations each made 
under extraordinary precautions.  All scientific experience is of that kind.  
Indeed, it is not regarded by scientific men as being satisfactory unless it 
combines the direct experiences of different observers.  Direct experience is 
far too vague or uncertain to be admitted among the number of scientific 
results.  Of course, the most cogent experience, the experience that least 
violates the principle of contradiction (I mean by this bizarre expression 
that, for example, one of the least vague of scientific experiences is that an 
inch is somewheres in the neighborhood of 2.54 centimetres; but any one value 
from 2.53999 to 2.54001 was, at my last advices, about as true, considered as 
the result of scientific experience, as any other, although according to the 
principle of contradiction, but a single answer to any single question can be 
true.).  Indeed, direct experience is a sort of figment, in one sense, although 
it is the basis of all certitude.  If I am making a chemical weighing, I set 
down a figure which goes a little beyond the sensitiveness of my balance.  
According to the usual theory of errors, which is, itself, only a convenient 
substitute for a knowledge that I do not possess, the average of a hundred 
weighings (with a rider which enables me to express the result considerably 
more accurately than any weighing can be made,) should be ten times as accurate 
as a single weighing.  Upon the same principle, a scientific result that is 
regarded a single experience is far superior to a direct experience, although 
it is derived from direct experience by a process of which we know,--though we 
do not know much about it,--that it is not strictly defensible. (R 200:E94-E97; 
1908)

 

I thought that you might like to add this to the collection on your website.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 12:28 PM, mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote:

List,

While working on my transcription of Lowell Lecture 6 from the manuscript on 
the SPIN site 
(https://www.fromthep

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-07-20 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Gary F., List:

Later in the same portion of R 200 that I just referenced regarding logical
depth and signification, between CP 6.347 and CP 6.348--in fact,
immediately prior to the latter--Peirce provided this discussion of direct
vs. indirect experience.

CSP:   Direct experience is experience then and there.  Indirect experience
is an indication by means of a relation to a direct experience.  Thus, if
one speaks of yesterday, the interpreter will know what is meant only by
its relation to the time-date that is present to him.  If a length is
expressed by its ratio to a metre, since it is very unlikely that the
interpreter is at that moment gazing upon the prototype metre in the
Pavillon de Breteuil, in the Park of St. Cloud,--and even if he were, mere
gazing would not be the experience required to acquaint him with, say,
0.0254 of a metre, it seems to be quite impossible to make the experience
quite direct.  For example, I once carried a yard-bar, which I had compared
with the particular interval on a certain brass bar called the "Troughton
scale," which had for generations been the basis of all American
specifications of lengths in the English system,--I carried this to
Westminster and compared it with the prototype yard.  The operation
occupied some weeks; and after the observations were complete, it still
remained to make the necessary calculations.  Clearly, there was no point
of time in which I was under a direct experience of the ratio of the
American to the British yard.  If my result was published, as it must have
been in due time, it was the inferential result of the combination of
hundreds of observations each made under extraordinary precautions.  All
scientific experience is of that kind.  Indeed, it is not regarded by
scientific men as being satisfactory unless it combines the direct
experiences of different observers.  Direct experience is far too vague or
uncertain to be admitted among the number of scientific results.  Of
course, the most cogent experience, the experience that least violates the
principle of contradiction (I mean by this bizarre expression that, for
example, one of the least vague of scientific experiences is that an inch
is *somewheres* in the neighborhood of 2.54 centimetres; but any one value
from 2.53999 to 2.54001 was, at my last advices, about as true, considered
as the result of scientific experience, as any other, although according to
the *principle of contradiction*, but a single answer to any single
question can be true.).  Indeed, *direct* experience is a sort of figment,
in one sense, although it is the basis of all certitude.  If I am making a
chemical weighing, I set down a figure which goes a little beyond the
sensitiveness of my balance.  According to the usual theory of errors,
which is, itself, only a convenient substitute for a knowledge that I do
not possess, the average of a hundred weighings (with a rider which enables
me to express the result considerably more accurately than any weighing can
be made,) should be ten times as accurate as a single weighing.  Upon the
same principle, a scientific result that is regarded a single experience is
far superior to a direct experience, although it is derived from direct
experience by a process of which we know,--though we do not know much about
it,--that it is not strictly defensible. (R 200:E94-E97; 1908)

I thought that you might like to add this to the collection on your website.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 12:28 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
> While working on my transcription of Lowell Lecture 6 from the manuscript
> on the SPIN site (https://www.fromthepage.com/j
> effdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-472-1903-lowell-lecture-vi), I came
> across what strikes me as a key passage in it, and what struck me as a key
> term in it: *“direct experience”*. To get a more exact sense of what
> Peirce meant by that term, I collected several passages where Peirce had
> used it in other contexts and arranged them in chronological order (they
> date from 1893 to 1903). I found the resulting collection so interesting
> that I’ve now included it in the Peirce resources on my website:
> http://www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm#dirxp. It throws a direct light, so
> to speak, on Peirce’s phenomenology.
>

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Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-07-02 Thread Helmut Raulien


Gary, yes, in the future. I will just have to wait when the train stops, because there is no schedule that says whether it has reached the terminal or will go on.

Best, Helmut

 

30. Juni 2018 um 22:47 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut,

Maybe you should finish your train of thought before you post it. That would make it easier for the rest of us to engage in dialogue with you.  

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 30-Jun-18 16:07











  



Suppsuppsupp: Sorry, that this is becoming a monologue, this will be the last part of it.



Instead of "imaginary" in the initial post, I think, that "ideational" is better, and it is not limited to the immediate object, which contains only the ideas transported by the sign. The DO too has an ideational part, the ideas in the world outside the sign.



I wrote "really complicated", but maybe too, not:



A function is a kind of relation. Relations are there or not, they dont unfold, they dont take time. But a relation (so a function too) is a being, something ontological, too (John Deely said so). It can arouse another function: A function of a function. This is a time-taking process again, and as a being, the first function is part of the spatiotemporal world. This process has to do with, or is,  information. After all, every being is a function-that-is: Matter, e.g., is effete mind (Peirce), and mind is function or something like that. Instaead of "mattergy-world" I should have written "matter-energy-informedness-world". It includes functions-as-beings, but not functions-as-functioning, the part of theirs which does not exist, but is real. In German "reality" means "Wirklichkeit", which by regarding the word parts would mean (though not in the common use of the word) "effectliness": Not the things, but their effects. All this has very much to do with scopes and scales.





  



Suppsupp: And between spatiotemporal and functional composition. Time is merely a matter of spatiotemporal composition. Functions are instants not taking time, having nothing to do with time. Bridging the gap takes time due to the spatiotemporal side of the gap. It looks like a sign process would take time, but it doesnt. What is taking time is its constant (not continuous) reaffirmation towards or from the mattergy world.



All this gap-talk sounds like dualism, but only because it is crude. To uncrudify and undualize it would make it really complicated.




Supp.: So the epistemic gap, pansemiotically generalized, is the gap between existence (being) and reality, thing and its function, mattergy-world and phaneron.






List,



One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real (immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and (functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 



In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of reality being shaped or formed by being).



To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to me.



Best,



Helmut



  



















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RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-06-30 Thread gnox

Helmut,

Maybe you should finish your train of thought before you post it. That would 
make it easier for the rest of us to engage in dialogue with you.  

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 30-Jun-18 16:07

  

Suppsuppsupp: Sorry, that this is becoming a monologue, this will be the last 
part of it.

Instead of "imaginary" in the initial post, I think, that "ideational" is 
better, and it is not limited to the immediate object, which contains only the 
ideas transported by the sign. The DO too has an ideational part, the ideas in 
the world outside the sign.

I wrote "really complicated", but maybe too, not:

A function is a kind of relation. Relations are there or not, they dont unfold, 
they dont take time. But a relation (so a function too) is a being, something 
ontological, too (John Deely said so). It can arouse another function: A 
function of a function. This is a time-taking process again, and as a being, 
the first function is part of the spatiotemporal world. This process has to do 
with, or is,  information. After all, every being is a function-that-is: 
Matter, e.g., is effete mind (Peirce), and mind is function or something like 
that. Instaead of "mattergy-world" I should have written 
"matter-energy-informedness-world". It includes functions-as-beings, but not 
functions-as-functioning, the part of theirs which does not exist, but is real. 
In German "reality" means "Wirklichkeit", which by regarding the word parts 
would mean (though not in the common use of the word) "effectliness": Not the 
things, but their effects. All this has very much to do with scopes and scales.

  

Suppsupp: And between spatiotemporal and functional composition. Time is merely 
a matter of spatiotemporal composition. Functions are instants not taking time, 
having nothing to do with time. Bridging the gap takes time due to the 
spatiotemporal side of the gap. It looks like a sign process would take time, 
but it doesnt. What is taking time is its constant (not continuous) 
reaffirmation towards or from the mattergy world.

All this gap-talk sounds like dualism, but only because it is crude. To 
uncrudify and undualize it would make it really complicated.

Supp.: So the epistemic gap, pansemiotically generalized, is the gap between 
existence (being) and reality, thing and its function, mattergy-world and 
phaneron.

List,

One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking 
process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When 
this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject 
is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real 
(immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it 
functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and 
(functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 

In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of 
reality being shaped or formed by being).

To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign 
via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that 
Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical 
object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its 
function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to 
me.

Best,

Helmut

  


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Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-06-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

akes have a single direction like experienced (phenomenological) time? If so, then we have a problem trying to map the order of determination onto an analytical classification of signs. This may explain apparent anomalies such as the fact that the Object determines the Sign, yet Peirce in one place says that the immediate object determines the sign. This is the kind of thing I was driving at with my distinction between “analytical” and “synechistic” approaches to semeiotic questions.

Gary f.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: 28-Jun-18 20:41
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jeff, Gary F., List:

When I see the word "involve" or "involution" in a conversation about Peirce, I tend to think of how he used those terms with respect to his Categories--3ns involves 2ns, which involves 1ns.  In the context of semeiotic, this applies across each of the trichotomies--Necessitants involve Existents, which involve Possibles--rather than from one trichotomy to another, which is where the order of determination governs (cf. EP 2:481; 1908).  Specifically, according to NDTR (EP 2:291-297; 1903) ...

	Legisigns (indirectly) and Sinsigns (directly) involve Qualisigns.
	Symbols involve Indices, which involve Icons (restated in "New Elements," EP 2:318; 1904).
	Arguments involve Dicisigns, which involve
	 Rhemes.

Peirce went on to extend this notion to some of the ten classes of Signs--Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns and Dicent Sinsigns involve Iconic Sinsigns, Dicent Indexical Legisigns involve Iconic Legisigns, and Dicent Symbols involve Rhematic Symbols.  On the other hand, no passages come to mind where Peirce used "evolve" or "evolution" in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic; are there any?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

ifically referring to "the sign which joins 'Socrates' to 'is wise,' so
> as to make the proposition 'Socrates is wise.'"  In other words, a
> proposition is certainly a connection of different words; but this is
> obviously not true of *all* Signs, since words *themselves* are Signs--namely,
> Rhemes.
>
> As for Rhemes affording information, Peirce explicitly wrote that *any* Rheme,
> perhaps, *will* do so; he did not limit this characteristic to *only* the
> peculiar kind of Rheme that is involved in a Dicisign, as you seem to be
> doing.  However, it makes sense that a Rheme would not typically be
> "informational," since Peirce defined information as the product of logical
> depth and breadth, and a Rheme can only have one or the other of these
> dimensions--not both.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 3:03 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> Thanks for noting my typo where I cited “CP 4.581” where I meant 583. I
>> agree that the context there is important — as always with Peirce! By the
>> way, it’s been pointed out to me offlist that I didn’t include the word
>> “list” in the opening line of my reply to your post. That’s because I think
>> it’s redundant: any message I send to the list address is thereby addressed
>> to the list. If I wanted to reply to you alone, I’d send my reply to your
>> address only. I tend to assume that everyone else does the same (though of
>> course accidents happen!)
>>
>> You begin by saying that in EP 2:481 “Peirce was clearly describing a
>> *logical* order there, not a *serial *order.” Yet in your next paragraph
>> you refer to “the *temporal *sequence of semiosis, in which the
>> Immediate Interpretant comes first (internal to the Sign itself) and the
>> Final Interpretant comes last (if it ever occurs at all).” I don’t see how
>> you can attribute a serial order to the triad of Interpretants and *not*
>> to the order of determination given at EP2:481. Is the division of the
>> Interpretant into three is a logical division, or is it not?
>>
>> On your example “vase”, I would say that the word itself is *not an
>> “instance of semiosis*”, to use your term. As Peirce says in KS
>> (EP2:310), “The sign itself is a connection. … in every language, it is the
>> juxtaposition which connects words. Otherwise they might be left in their
>> places in the dictionary.” Any word in the dictionary is a Necessitant
>> (EP2:480), but by itself it is not an instance of semiosis.
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>>
>> *Sent:* 29-Jun-18 14:34
>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>>
>>
>> My interpretation of EP 2:481 seems to be exactly the opposite of yours;
>> I think that Peirce was clearly describing a *logical* order there, not
>> a *serial *order.  After all, right before what you quoted, he stated,
>> "It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is
>> equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
>> Necessitant."  Surely he was not claiming that a Possible can only be 
>> *temporally
>> succeeded* by another Possible, and that a Necessitant can only be 
>> *temporally
>> preceded* by another Necessitant.  On the contrary, that was his
>> summation of the *logical *principle that governs which Sign classes are
>> feasible once two or more trichotomies are arranged in the proper
>> sequence--what Bellucci called R1 and R2.  It is why the three trichotomies
>> of 1903 produce only ten Sign classes (rather than 27), the six Correlate
>> trichotomies produce only 28 Sign classes (rather than 729), and all ten
>> trichotomies produce only 66 Sign classes (rather than 59,049).
>>
>>
>>
>> Moreover, I am now convinced that what Peirce called the Destinate
>> Intepretant corresponds to the Final Interpretant, and the Explicit
>> Interpretant corresponds to the Immediate Interpretant.  That is
>> inconsistent with the *temporal *sequence of semiosis, in which the
>> Immediate Interpretant comes first (internal to the Sign itself) and the
>> Final Interpretant comes last (if it ever occurs at all).  However, it
>> makes sense from a *logical *standpoint--the nature/purpose of the
>> Interpretant that is "destined" limits what kinds of Interpretants can
>> actually occur, and those circumscribe what kinds of Interpretants can be
>> "explicit" within the Sign.  I laid out my complete reasoning about this in
>> the thread on &quo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 Gary F., List:

Getting work done on a Friday afternoon is always hard, and stimulating
posts on Peirce-L do not make it any easier, since I cannot seem to resist
the temptation to check for them every so often. :-)

Again, Peirce was clearly giving a *logical *order at EP 2:481, based on
how he stated R1 and R2 earlier in the same paragraph.  Do you disagree?
Do you hold that he was actually saying that a Possible can only be
temporally succeeded by another Possible, and that a Necessitant can only
be temporally preceded by another Necessitant?

In any *concrete instance* of semiosis, the Sign--including its (internal)
Immediate Interpretant--must temporally precede any Dynamic Interpretant,
since the latter may never be produced at all; and any Dynamic Interpretant
must temporally precede the Final Interpretant, since the latter is only
produced at the ideal end of the process in the infinite future.  To
minimize confusion, I suppose that we should avoid using "determines" when
describing this sequence.

The upshot here is that the division of the Interpretant into three is both
a logical division and a temporal division, and they correspond to
different (opposite) orders.  Logically, the Destinate (Final) Interpretant
determines the Effectual (Dynamic) Interpretant, which determines the
Explicit (Immediate) Interpretant; temporally, the Immediate Interpretant
precedes the Dynamic Interpretant, which precedes the Final Interpretant.
Note that Bellucci (among others) agrees with me that Destinate=Final and
Explicit=Immediate (p. 342).

I did not ask whether the word "vase" by itself is an instance of semiosis,
I asked whether it can exist as a Rheme apart from being incorporated into
a proposition.  Nevertheless, the series of four letters that I typed and
put within quotation marks is clearly a Sign-Replica--Peirce said that
every repetition of the same word on a page in a book is a Replica of that
word, which is a Rheme--and I suspect that it prompted some kind of
(Dynamic) Interpretant in your mind when you (or anyone else) read it.  Why
would this not count as an instance of semiosis?  Why would reading it in
the dictionary not count as an instance of semiosis?

Unlike the paragraph at EP 2:303-304, in the paragraph that you quoted from
EP 2:310, Peirce was *not* discussing "the sign" in general; he was
specifically referring to "the sign which joins 'Socrates' to 'is wise,' so
as to make the proposition 'Socrates is wise.'"  In other words, a
proposition is certainly a connection of different words; but this is
obviously not true of *all* Signs, since words *themselves* are Signs--namely,
Rhemes.

As for Rhemes affording information, Peirce explicitly wrote that *any* Rheme,
perhaps, *will* do so; he did not limit this characteristic to *only* the
peculiar kind of Rheme that is involved in a Dicisign, as you seem to be
doing.  However, it makes sense that a Rheme would not typically be
"informational," since Peirce defined information as the product of logical
depth and breadth, and a Rheme can only have one or the other of these
dimensions--not both.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 3:03 PM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Thanks for noting my typo where I cited “CP 4.581” where I meant 583. I
> agree that the context there is important — as always with Peirce! By the
> way, it’s been pointed out to me offlist that I didn’t include the word
> “list” in the opening line of my reply to your post. That’s because I think
> it’s redundant: any message I send to the list address is thereby addressed
> to the list. If I wanted to reply to you alone, I’d send my reply to your
> address only. I tend to assume that everyone else does the same (though of
> course accidents happen!)
>
> You begin by saying that in EP 2:481 “Peirce was clearly describing a
> *logical* order there, not a *serial *order.” Yet in your next paragraph
> you refer to “the *temporal *sequence of semiosis, in which the Immediate
> Interpretant comes first (internal to the Sign itself) and the Final
> Interpretant comes last (if it ever occurs at all).” I don’t see how you
> can attribute a serial order to the triad of Interpretants and *not* to
> the order of determination given at EP2:481. Is the division of the
> Interpretant into three is a logical division, or is it not?
>
> On your example “vase”, I would say that the word itself is *not an
> “instance of semiosis*”, to use your term. As Peirce says in KS
> (EP2:310), “The sign itself is a connection. … in every language, it is the
> juxtaposition which connects words. Otherwise they might be left in their
> places in the dictionary.” Any word in the dictionary is a Necessitant
> (EP2:480), but by itself it is not an instance of semiosis.
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>
> *Sent:* 29-Jun-18 14:34
> *To:* peirce-l

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon,

Thanks for noting my typo where I cited “CP 4.581” where I meant 583. I agree 
that the context there is important — as always with Peirce! By the way, it’s 
been pointed out to me offlist that I didn’t include the word “list” in the 
opening line of my reply to your post. That’s because I think it’s redundant: 
any message I send to the list address is thereby addressed to the list. If I 
wanted to reply to you alone, I’d send my reply to your address only. I tend to 
assume that everyone else does the same (though of course accidents happen!)

You begin by saying that in EP 2:481 “Peirce was clearly describing a logical 
order there, not a serial order.” Yet in your next paragraph you refer to “the 
temporal sequence of semiosis, in which the Immediate Interpretant comes first 
(internal to the Sign itself) and the Final Interpretant comes last (if it ever 
occurs at all).” I don’t see how you can attribute a serial order to the triad 
of Interpretants and not to the order of determination given at EP2:481. Is the 
division of the Interpretant into three is a logical division, or is it not?

On your example “vase”, I would say that the word itself is not an “instance of 
semiosis”, to use your term. As Peirce says in KS (EP2:310), “The sign itself 
is a connection. … in every language, it is the juxtaposition which connects 
words. Otherwise they might be left in their places in the dictionary.” Any 
word in the dictionary is a Necessitant (EP2:480), but by itself it is not an 
instance of semiosis.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 29-Jun-18 14:34
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 

Gary F., List:

 

My interpretation of EP 2:481 seems to be exactly the opposite of yours; I 
think that Peirce was clearly describing a logical order there, not a serial 
order.  After all, right before what you quoted, he stated, "It is evident that 
a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a 
Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant."  Surely he was not 
claiming that a Possible can only be temporally succeeded by another Possible, 
and that a Necessitant can only be temporally preceded by another Necessitant.  
On the contrary, that was his summation of the logical principle that governs 
which Sign classes are feasible once two or more trichotomies are arranged in 
the proper sequence--what Bellucci called R1 and R2.  It is why the three 
trichotomies of 1903 produce only ten Sign classes (rather than 27), the six 
Correlate trichotomies produce only 28 Sign classes (rather than 729), and all 
ten trichotomies produce only 66 Sign classes (rather than 59,049).

 

Moreover, I am now convinced that what Peirce called the Destinate Intepretant 
corresponds to the Final Interpretant, and the Explicit Interpretant 
corresponds to the Immediate Interpretant.  That is inconsistent with the 
temporal sequence of semiosis, in which the Immediate Interpretant comes first 
(internal to the Sign itself) and the Final Interpretant comes last (if it ever 
occurs at all).  However, it makes sense from a logical standpoint--the 
nature/purpose of the Interpretant that is "destined" limits what kinds of 
Interpretants can actually occur, and those circumscribe what kinds of 
Interpretants can be "explicit" within the Sign.  I laid out my complete 
reasoning about this in the thread on "Order of Determination" a few months ago.

 

With all of that in mind, I accept your correction that "determines" is also a 
logical relation--i.e., a genuine triadic relation--when we say that the 
(Dynamic) Object determines the Sign, which determines the (Final) 
Interpretant.  However, I still hold that when we talk about a concrete 
instance of semiosis, we are describing a temporal sequence when we say that 
the (Dynamic) Object determines the Sign (Replica), which determines the 
(Dynamic) Interpretant.  Lately I have been characterizing this as a degenerate 
triadic relation, which can thus be decomposed into the dyadic DO-SR and SR-DI 
relations.  Every Sign has a Dynamic Object and a Final Interpretant (by 
definition), as well as an Immediate Object and an Immediate Interpretant 
(since those are internal to it); but not every Sign actually produces a 
Dynamic Interpretant by means of a Sign-Replica, and in that sense, the Dynamic 
Interpretant is in the future relative to the Sign.

 

I need to get some work done this afternoon and would like to ponder your 
comments about Rhemes a bit further before responding to them.  For the moment, 
I will just mention that Peirce's comments about non-propositional Signs are 
actually from CP 4.583, and a careful reading of that entire paragraph is 
warranted in order to understand the context of what you quoted.  Dredging up a 
previous example of mine, would you claim that the word "vase" by itself does 
not and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Gary F., List:

My interpretation of EP 2:481 seems to be exactly the opposite of yours; I
think that Peirce was clearly describing a *logical* order there, not a *serial
*order.  After all, right before what you quoted, he stated, "It is evident
that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that
a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant."  Surely he
was not claiming that a Possible can only be *temporally succeeded* by
another Possible, and that a Necessitant can only be *temporally preceded*
by another Necessitant.  On the contrary, that was his summation of
the *logical
*principle that governs which Sign classes are feasible once two or more
trichotomies are arranged in the proper sequence--what Bellucci called R1
and R2.  It is why the three trichotomies of 1903 produce only ten Sign
classes (rather than 27), the six Correlate trichotomies produce only 28
Sign classes (rather than 729), and all ten trichotomies produce only 66
Sign classes (rather than 59,049).

Moreover, I am now convinced that what Peirce called the Destinate
Intepretant corresponds to the Final Interpretant, and the Explicit
Interpretant corresponds to the Immediate Interpretant.  That is
inconsistent with the *temporal *sequence of semiosis, in which the
Immediate Interpretant comes first (internal to the Sign itself) and the
Final Interpretant comes last (if it ever occurs at all).  However, it
makes sense from a *logical *standpoint--the nature/purpose of the
Interpretant that is "destined" limits what kinds of Interpretants can
actually occur, and those circumscribe what kinds of Interpretants can be
"explicit" within the Sign.  I laid out my complete reasoning about this in
the thread on "Order of Determination" a few months ago.

With all of that in mind, I accept your correction that "determines" is
also a *logical relation*--i.e., a *genuine *triadic relation--when we say
that the (Dynamic) Object determines the Sign, which determines the (Final)
Interpretant.  However, I still hold that when we talk about a *concrete
instance* of semiosis, we are describing a *temporal sequence* when we say
that the (Dynamic) Object determines the Sign (Replica), which determines
the (Dynamic) Interpretant.  Lately I have been characterizing this as
a *degenerate
*triadic relation, which can thus be decomposed into the dyadic DO-SR and
SR-DI relations.  Every Sign has a Dynamic Object and a Final Interpretant
(by definition), as well as an Immediate Object and an Immediate
Interpretant (since those are internal to it); but not every Sign *actually
*produces a Dynamic Interpretant by means of a Sign-Replica, and in that
sense, the Dynamic Interpretant *is *in the future relative to the Sign.

I need to get some work done this afternoon and would like to ponder your
comments about Rhemes a bit further before responding to them.  For the
moment, I will just mention that Peirce's comments about non-propositional
Signs are actually from CP 4.583, and a careful reading of that entire
paragraph is warranted in order to understand the context of what you
quoted.  Dredging up a previous example of mine, would you claim that the
word "vase" by itself does not and cannot exist as a Rheme unless and until
it is incorporated into a proposition?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 11:31 AM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Yes, that’s close to the distinction I had in mind. But …
>
> Please read this through carefully before you begin composing a response.
> (Not that you’re obligated to respond at all, of course.)
>
> When Peirce says (EP2:481) that “the Dynamoid Object determines the
> Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the
> Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which
> determines the Explicit Interpretant,” it’s hard to see that as anything
> other than a serial order, like a sequence of events. Logical
> *consequence*, on the other hand, does not refer to a temporal or serial
> ordering. It’s like the difference between “thinking” and “thought” in
> Peirce’s usage of those terms. Thinking is temporal, thought is relational.
>
> Let me put it this way: When we consider one of Peirce’s definitions, such
> as this one — “A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in
> such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object,* as to
> be capable of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant,* to assume
> the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the
> same Object” — we don’t (or at least don’t *necessarily*) read that as a
> sequence of events. The actions denoted by the verbs (“standing,”
> “determining,” “assuming”) can all be understood as happening
> *simultaneously* if they “happen” at all, because they constitute a
> single *genuine triadic

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-06-29 Thread Helmut Raulien

 
 
 


 

Suppsupp: And between spatiotemporal and functional composition. Time is merely a matter of spatiotemporal composition. Functions are instants not taking time, having nothing to do with time. Bridging the gap takes time due to the spatiotemporal side of the gap. It looks like a sign process would take time, but it doesnt. What is taking time is its constant (not continuous) reaffirmation towards or from the mattergy world.

All this gap-talk sounds like dualism, but only because it is crude. To uncrudify and undualize it would make it really complicated.


Supp.: So the epistemic gap, pansemiotically generalized, is the gap between existence (being) and reality, thing and its function, mattergy-world and phaneron.




List,

One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real (immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and (functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 

In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of reality being shaped or formed by being).

To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to me.

Best,

Helmut

 

29. Juni 2018 um 13:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Jon,

No, I haven’t found an instance of Peirce using “evolve” or “evolution” (or “involution”) in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic. In fact, I’ve only found one place where he uses the verb “evolve” at all after 1903, and that one (in the “Neglected Argument” of 1908) puts it in quotation marks:

[[ The student, applying to his own trained habits of research the art of logical analysis,—an art as elaborate and methodical as that of the chemical analyst,—compares the process of thought of the Muser upon the Three Universes with certain parts of the work of scientific discovery, and finds that the “Humble Argument” is nothing but an instance of the first stage of all such work, the stage of observing the facts, of variously rearranging them, and of pondering them until, by their reactions with the results of previous scientific experience, there is “evolved” (as the chemists word it), an explanatory hypothesis. ]]

However, Peirce often refers to the “growth” and “development” of signs (more specifically, symbols), and this is clearly a process that takes time, like the process of “evolution” in our usual current sense of that word. “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover by analysis. Peirce’s semeiotic trichotomies (three of them in 1903, ten in 1908) are all arrived at by analysis, and that analysis — including the order of elements in each — is based on the phenomenological categories. The problem is, how does the order of determination relate to the analysis that produces the trichotomies? Is determination a process that takes time, and does the time it takes have a single direction like experienced (phenomenological) time? If so, then we have a problem trying to map the order of determination onto an analytical classification of signs. This may explain apparent anomalies such as the fact that the Object determines the Sign, yet Peirce in one place says that the immediate object determines the sign. This is the kind of thing I was driving at with my distinction between “analytical” and “synechistic” approaches to semeiotic questions.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: 28-Jun-18 20:41
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 


Jeff, Gary F., List:


 



When I see the word "involve" or "involution" in a conversation about Peirce, I tend to think of how he used those terms with respect to his Categories--3ns involves 2ns, which involves 1ns.  In the context of semeiotic, this applies across each of the trichotomies--Necessitants involve Existents, which involve Possibles--rather than from one trichotomy to another, which is where the order of determination governs (cf. EP 2:481; 1908).  Specifically, according to NDTR (EP 2:291-297; 1903) ...




	Legisigns (indirectly) and Sinsigns (directly) involve Qualisigns.
	Symbols involve Indices, which involve Icons (restated in "New Elements," EP 2:318; 1904).
	Arguments involve Dicisigns, which involve
	 Rhemes.




Peirce went on to extend this notion to some of the ten class

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-06-29 Thread Helmut Raulien

 
 

Supp.: So the epistemic gap, pansemiotically generalized, is the gap between existence (being) and reality, thing and its function, mattergy-world and phaneron.




List,

One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real (immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and (functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 

In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of reality being shaped or formed by being).

To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to me.

Best,

Helmut

 

29. Juni 2018 um 13:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Jon,

No, I haven’t found an instance of Peirce using “evolve” or “evolution” (or “involution”) in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic. In fact, I’ve only found one place where he uses the verb “evolve” at all after 1903, and that one (in the “Neglected Argument” of 1908) puts it in quotation marks:

[[ The student, applying to his own trained habits of research the art of logical analysis,—an art as elaborate and methodical as that of the chemical analyst,—compares the process of thought of the Muser upon the Three Universes with certain parts of the work of scientific discovery, and finds that the “Humble Argument” is nothing but an instance of the first stage of all such work, the stage of observing the facts, of variously rearranging them, and of pondering them until, by their reactions with the results of previous scientific experience, there is “evolved” (as the chemists word it), an explanatory hypothesis. ]]

However, Peirce often refers to the “growth” and “development” of signs (more specifically, symbols), and this is clearly a process that takes time, like the process of “evolution” in our usual current sense of that word. “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover by analysis. Peirce’s semeiotic trichotomies (three of them in 1903, ten in 1908) are all arrived at by analysis, and that analysis — including the order of elements in each — is based on the phenomenological categories. The problem is, how does the order of determination relate to the analysis that produces the trichotomies? Is determination a process that takes time, and does the time it takes have a single direction like experienced (phenomenological) time? If so, then we have a problem trying to map the order of determination onto an analytical classification of signs. This may explain apparent anomalies such as the fact that the Object determines the Sign, yet Peirce in one place says that the immediate object determines the sign. This is the kind of thing I was driving at with my distinction between “analytical” and “synechistic” approaches to semeiotic questions.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: 28-Jun-18 20:41
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 


Jeff, Gary F., List:


 



When I see the word "involve" or "involution" in a conversation about Peirce, I tend to think of how he used those terms with respect to his Categories--3ns involves 2ns, which involves 1ns.  In the context of semeiotic, this applies across each of the trichotomies--Necessitants involve Existents, which involve Possibles--rather than from one trichotomy to another, which is where the order of determination governs (cf. EP 2:481; 1908).  Specifically, according to NDTR (EP 2:291-297; 1903) ...




	Legisigns (indirectly) and Sinsigns (directly) involve Qualisigns.
	Symbols involve Indices, which involve Icons (restated in "New Elements," EP 2:318; 1904).
	Arguments involve Dicisigns, which involve
	 Rhemes.




Peirce went on to extend this notion to some of the ten classes of Signs--Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns and Dicent Sinsigns involve Iconic Sinsigns, Dicent Indexical Legisigns involve Iconic Legisigns, and Dicent Symbols involve Rhematic Symbols.  On the other hand, no passages come to mind where Peirce used "evolve" or "evolution" in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic; are there any?



 



Regards,



 







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA









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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-06-29 Thread Stephen Curtiss Rose

The notion of a sequence makes sense. I do not see how consciousness can
function in a person's own free decisions with some sort of sequence the
person can follow.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-06-29 Thread Helmut Raulien


List,

One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real (immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and (functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 

In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of reality being shaped or formed by being).

To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to me.

Best,

Helmut

 

29. Juni 2018 um 13:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Jon,

No, I haven’t found an instance of Peirce using “evolve” or “evolution” (or “involution”) in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic. In fact, I’ve only found one place where he uses the verb “evolve” at all after 1903, and that one (in the “Neglected Argument” of 1908) puts it in quotation marks:

[[ The student, applying to his own trained habits of research the art of logical analysis,—an art as elaborate and methodical as that of the chemical analyst,—compares the process of thought of the Muser upon the Three Universes with certain parts of the work of scientific discovery, and finds that the “Humble Argument” is nothing but an instance of the first stage of all such work, the stage of observing the facts, of variously rearranging them, and of pondering them until, by their reactions with the results of previous scientific experience, there is “evolved” (as the chemists word it), an explanatory hypothesis. ]]

However, Peirce often refers to the “growth” and “development” of signs (more specifically, symbols), and this is clearly a process that takes time, like the process of “evolution” in our usual current sense of that word. “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover by analysis. Peirce’s semeiotic trichotomies (three of them in 1903, ten in 1908) are all arrived at by analysis, and that analysis — including the order of elements in each — is based on the phenomenological categories. The problem is, how does the order of determination relate to the analysis that produces the trichotomies? Is determination a process that takes time, and does the time it takes have a single direction like experienced (phenomenological) time? If so, then we have a problem trying to map the order of determination onto an analytical classification of signs. This may explain apparent anomalies such as the fact that the Object determines the Sign, yet Peirce in one place says that the immediate object determines the sign. This is the kind of thing I was driving at with my distinction between “analytical” and “synechistic” approaches to semeiotic questions.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: 28-Jun-18 20:41
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 


Jeff, Gary F., List:


 



When I see the word "involve" or "involution" in a conversation about Peirce, I tend to think of how he used those terms with respect to his Categories--3ns involves 2ns, which involves 1ns.  In the context of semeiotic, this applies across each of the trichotomies--Necessitants involve Existents, which involve Possibles--rather than from one trichotomy to another, which is where the order of determination governs (cf. EP 2:481; 1908).  Specifically, according to NDTR (EP 2:291-297; 1903) ...




	Legisigns (indirectly) and Sinsigns (directly) involve Qualisigns.
	Symbols involve Indices, which involve Icons (restated in "New Elements," EP 2:318; 1904).
	Arguments involve Dicisigns, which involve
	 Rhemes.




Peirce went on to extend this notion to some of the ten classes of Signs--Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns and Dicent Sinsigns involve Iconic Sinsigns, Dicent Indexical Legisigns involve Iconic Legisigns, and Dicent Symbols involve Rhematic Symbols.  On the other hand, no passages come to mind where Peirce used "evolve" or "evolution" in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic; are there any?



 



Regards,



 







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA









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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon,

Yes, that’s close to the distinction I had in mind. But …

Please read this through carefully before you begin composing a response. (Not 
that you’re obligated to respond at all, of course.)

When Peirce says (EP2:481) that “the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate 
Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate 
Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the 
Explicit Interpretant,” it’s hard to see that as anything other than a serial 
order, like a sequence of events. Logical consequence, on the other hand, does 
not refer to a temporal or serial ordering. It’s like the difference between 
“thinking” and “thought” in Peirce’s usage of those terms. Thinking is 
temporal, thought is relational.

Let me put it this way: When we consider one of Peirce’s definitions, such as 
this one — “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine 
triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of 
determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic 
relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object” — we don’t 
(or at least don’t necessarily) read that as a sequence of events. The actions 
denoted by the verbs (“standing,” “determining,” “assuming”) can all be 
understood as happening simultaneously if they “happen” at all, because they 
constitute a single genuine triadic relation. The Interpretant, then, is not in 
the future relative to the sign, nor is the Object in the past. The terms 
“First,” “Second” and “Third” do not refer to a serial order. So here 
“determination” appears as a logical relation and not a temporal one.

This feels like I’m belaboring the obvious, but let me give an example of its 
implications. Consider the definitions Peirce gives in NDTR for his third 
trichotomy: “A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of 
qualitative Possibility”; “A Dicent Sign is a Sign, which, for its 
Interpretant, is a Sign of actual existence”; “An Argument is a Sign which, for 
its Interpretant, is a Sign of law.” Each of these is defined by what it is for 
its interpretant — not by its relation to its object (like the 
icon/index/symbol trichotomy), but by what its interpretant represents it to be 
a sign of. 

Take the Rheme, for instance: “Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some 
information; but it is not interpreted as doing so.” It follows that a sign 
which is interpreted as affording information about some subject or object is 
not a Rheme in this definitive sense. It might be a Rheme in the “peculiar” 
sense that it is the rhematic component of a Dicisign: “A Dicisign necessarily 
involves, as a part of it, a Rheme, to describe the fact which it is 
interpreted as indicating. But this is a peculiar kind of Rheme; and while it 
is essential to the Dicisign, it by no means constitutes it.” It’s this 
peculiar kind of Rheme which “perhaps, will afford some information” — because 
it is not interpreted separately from the Dicisign or “informational sign.” A 
Rheme-in-itself is not interpreted as affording information; a sign which is 
interpreted (now or in the future) as doing so is not a Rheme by this 
definition.

On the other hand, the “Rheme-in-itself” is a somewhat artificial product of 
analysis; Peirce says in 1906 “that no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the 
ideas of signs to which concepts belong — can arise except in a proposition; 
and no logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a 
proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents of 
propositions” (CP 4.581). So a Rheme can only exist as a constituent of a 
proposition — in which case it can and “perhaps, will afford some information.” 

I hope all this makes sense to you, but it may be something you are already 
fully aware of … in which case it conveys no information!

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 29-Jun-18 10:22
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 

Gary F., List:

I thought of Peirce's frequent remarks about the "growth" and "development" of 
Signs, as well; but so far, I have not come up with any instances where he 
described this in a way that mirrors the "involution" of Signs as discussed in 
NDTR.

I am not convinced that "determination" in the specific sense used by Peirce to 
arrange the semiotic trichotomies in linear order is "a process that takes 
time."  Instead, like involution across each individual trichotomy, it strikes 
me as the result of logical analysis.  In other words, I suspect that 
"determines" has different meanings when we say that the Object determines the 
Sign (in the temporal process of semiosis) vs. the Immediate Object determines 
the Sign (in the logical analysis of semiosis).  Is this the distinction that 
you have in mind?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kans

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jerry,

I didn’t get the joke in your earlier post, but I do see that your example in 
this one is not to be taken seriously.

Gary f.

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler  
Sent: 29-Jun-18 09:59



Yes.

Over the past several months, my involvement with city government has declined 
from very active to inactive.

 

BY the way, my post was an attempt at humor!

 

Cheers

Jerry

 

 

On Jun 29, 2018, at 8:52 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca   
wrote:

 

Jerry R,

No, it’s an observation about the real objects of those two general terms.

Can you give an example of a process of involvement?

Gary f.

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Gary F., List:

I thought of Peirce's frequent remarks about the "growth" and "development"
of Signs, as well; but so far, I have not come up with any instances where
he described this in a way that mirrors the "involution" of Signs as
discussed in NDTR.

I am not convinced that "determination" in the specific sense used by
Peirce to arrange the semiotic trichotomies in linear order is "a process
that takes time."  Instead, like involution across each individual
trichotomy, it strikes me as the result of logical analysis.  In other
words, I suspect that "determines" has different meanings when we say that
the Object determines the Sign (in the *temporal process* of semiosis) vs.
the Immediate Object determines the Sign (in the *logical analysis* of
semiosis).  Is this the distinction that you have in mind?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 6:31 AM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> No, I haven’t found an instance of Peirce using “evolve” or “evolution”
> (or “involution”) in this kind of technical sense when discussing
> semeiotic. In fact, I’ve only found one place where he uses the verb
> “evolve” at all after 1903, and that one (in the “Neglected Argument” of
> 1908) puts it in quotation marks:
>
> [[ The student, applying to his own trained habits of research the art of
> logical analysis,—an art as elaborate and methodical as that of the
> chemical analyst,—compares the process of thought of the Muser upon the
> Three Universes with certain parts of the work of scientific discovery, and
> finds that the “Humble Argument” is nothing but an instance of the first
> stage of all such work, the stage of observing the facts, of variously
> rearranging them, and of pondering them until, by their reactions with the
> results of previous scientific experience, there is “evolved” (as the
> chemists word it), an explanatory hypothesis. ]]
>
> However, Peirce often refers to the “growth” and “development” of signs
> (more specifically, symbols), and this is clearly a *process* that takes
> time, like the process of “evolution” in our usual current sense of that
> word. “Involvement” on the other hand is *not a process* but a relation
> we discover by analysis. Peirce’s semeiotic trichotomies (three of them in
> 1903, ten in 1908) are all arrived at by analysis, and that analysis —
> including the order of elements in each — is based on the phenomenological
> categories. The problem is, how does the order of *determination* relate
> to the analysis that produces the trichotomies? Is *determination* a
> process that takes time, and does the time it takes have a single direction
> like experienced (phenomenological) time? If so, then we have a problem
> trying to map the order of determination onto an analytical classification
> of signs. This may explain apparent anomalies such as the fact that the
> *Object* determines the *Sign*, yet Peirce in one place says that the
> immediate object determines the sign. This is the kind of thing I was
> driving at with my distinction between “analytical” and “synechistic”
> approaches to semeiotic questions.
>
> Gary f.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-06-29 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

> On Jun 29, 2018, at 6:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> The problem is, how does the order of determination relate to the analysis 
> that produces the trichotomies? Is determination a process that takes time, 
> and does the time it takes have a single direction like experienced 
> (phenomenological) time? If so, then we have a problem trying to map the 
> order of determination onto an analytical classification of signs.

Will you allow a simple medical example?

Consider a physician inquiring into the cause of death of an emaciated  patient.
Emanations (a CSP term) suggest internal decay.
The autopsy reveals several discolored INTERNAL organs.
Specimens are removed and examined under a microscope.
Suspicious signs motivate further examination under an electron microscope.
Further signs motivate cultivating cells from three different organs.
Growth inhibition studies shows signs of genetic defects.
These signs motivate isolation of the DNA from the cultivated cells from two 
organs.
The purpose of isolating the DNA was to sequences particular genes suggested 
from the growth inhibition studies.
The sequences of the genes were measured by chemical methods and compared with 
normal sequences from healthy patients.

This sequence of determinations involved several weeks of investigation as the 
signs evolved from the initial reasoned judgments to conclusion evidence that 
genes x,,y,and z were not different from normal.

Given these antecedent facts, the physician sought another abduction for the 
causes of the cancer.

(Please note that this is another attempt at humor!  :-)   )

Cheers

Jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-06-29 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Yes.

Over the past several months, my involvement with city government has declined 
from very active to inactive.

BY the way, my post was an attempt at humor!

Cheers

Jerry

> On Jun 29, 2018, at 8:52 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Jerry R,
> 
> No, it’s an observation about the real objects of those two general terms.
> 
> Can you give an example of a process of involvement?
> 
> Gary f.
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler  
> Sent: 29-Jun-18 09:45
> 
> Gary F
>> On Jun 29, 2018, at 6:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca  
>> wrote:
>>  
>>  “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover 
>> by analysis.
> 
> Really?
> Is this because of the origins of the two terms?
>  
> 
> -
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jerry R,

No, it’s an observation about the real objects of those two general terms.

Can you give an example of a process of involvement?

Gary f.

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler  
Sent: 29-Jun-18 09:45



Gary F

On Jun 29, 2018, at 6:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca   
wrote:

 

 “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover by 
analysis.

Really?

Is this because of the origins of the two terms?

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-06-29 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Gary F
> On Jun 29, 2018, at 6:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
>  “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover 
> by analysis.

Really?
Is this because of the origins of the two terms?

Cheers

Jerry
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object