On Mar 4, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 15:13, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 03 Mar 2011, at 18:39, 1Z wrote:
If you have a UDA inside a physical universe,
I guess you mean a UD inside a physical
On Mar 6, 4:17 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/5/2011 4:04 PM, Pzomby wrote:
On Mar 5, 1:50 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote:
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a
perfectly
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Chalmers told me that first person indeterminacy does not exist, and
not much more, and Bitbol never reply to me when I sent him my PhD.
I am still not sure if I correctly understand your concept of first
person indeterminacy, though I have gone over
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
BTW, you did not answer my last point on the comp reversal, at the UDA
step seven.
From that previous email
Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and arithmetic
(or any first order theory of any universal system in post
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp makes precise that saying to be a machine is equivalent with
saying that there is a level of functional substitution where my
(first person) consciousness is invariant for a substitution made at
that level. Comp can show that we can never known
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Chalmers defines a 'Computational Hypothesis'
You might attribute this to Putnam or Fodor, or many others, including
Galouye. That's CTM. I argue that the computationalist hypothesis is
already in the King Milinda text, which is a greec-hinduist text
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I have debunked more than once on this list the idea that a movie can
think. (It is an error akin to the confusion between a number and a
gödel number of a number, a confusion between a description of a
computation and a computation, it is a confusion of
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is what seems straightforward to me.
Thought is a computation. OK.
Experiential reality is a computation. OK.
No. When you say experiential reality is a computation, you are
saying something ambiguous, where comp is far more precise. Because if
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I appreciate your point on the logical types. Now, to base them on a
physics, taken a priori, will prevent the solution of the
computationalist mind body problem. Elementary arithmetic, and any
universal system, defines automatically many logical types
On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
occurs. Certainly no coherent concept of how and why collapse occurs has
been formulated in a manner which meets with general acceptance. It
appears, as Davies
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be,
... it
is lacking in one important
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Collapse appears to instruments as well as people - that's why we can
shared records of experiments and agree on them. I'm not sure what you
mean by account for collapse. At least one interpretation of QM,
advocated by Peres,
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the
idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a perfectly
symmetrical emergent property of the
On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote: Collapse appears to instruments as
well as people
We don't have any evidence for that,
Of course we do
indeed, if we take either the
concept of Wigner's friend or Rovelli's RQM
On Mar 6, 1:14 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we
On 05 Mar 2011, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:03, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 15:13, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 03 Mar 2011, at 18:39, 1Z wrote:
If you have a UDA inside a physical universe,
I guess
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:17, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Chalmers defines a 'Computational Hypothesis'
You might attribute this to Putnam or Fodor, or many others,
including Galouye. That's CTM. I argue that the
computationalist hypothesis is
Hi Andrew,
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:14, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we take
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:16, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Chalmers told me that first person indeterminacy does not exist,
and not much more, and Bitbol never reply to me when I sent him my
PhD.
I am still not sure if I correctly understand your concept of
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:16, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
BTW, you did not answer my last point on the comp reversal, at the
UDA step seven.
From that previous email
Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and arithmetic
(or any
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious
at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno
emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:16, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp makes precise that saying to be a machine is equivalent with
saying that there is a level of functional substitution where my
(first person) consciousness is invariant for a substitution made
at
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:18, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I have debunked more than once on this list the idea that a movie
can think. (It is an error akin to the confusion between a number
and a gödel number of a number, a confusion between a description
of
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:18, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is what seems straightforward to me.
Thought is a computation. OK.
Experiential reality is a computation. OK.
No. When you say experiential reality is a computation, you are
saying something
On 3/6/2011 7:16 AM, 1Z wrote:
It is. In the collapse theory, it has to be the collapser (the other
theories are too vague, or refuted).
Not at all. Objective collapse theories such as GRW have not been
refuted,
and spiritual interpretations, like von Neumann's are the vagues of
the lot
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:24, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I appreciate your point on the logical types. Now, to base them on
a physics, taken a priori, will prevent the solution of the
computationalist mind body problem. Elementary arithmetic, and any
On 3/6/2011 7:18 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Collapse appears to instruments as well as people - that's why we can
shared records of experiments and agree on them. I'm not sure what you
mean by account for collapse. At least one
*Brent,*
*I agree with most of your statements (whatver value this may have...) Let
me interject below.*
*John M
*
On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 3:06 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:
On 3/6/2011 7:16 AM, 1Z wrote:
It is. In the collapse theory, it has to be the collapser (the other
-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker Sent: Sunday, March 06, 2011 3:09 PM To:
everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING
was Another TOE short paper
On 3/6/2011 7:18 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Andrew and Bruno:
(Re: Andrew's discussion below): according to what I pretend to understand
of Bruno's position, the math' universe (numbers and what they 'build' as
the 'world') is more fundamental than the application we call physics.
I wrote more because the real fundamental is based on the
On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 3:53 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
* Is the causes word even necessary? Would it not be accurate to say
that a change in information = a change in our description, unless you are
assuming some sort of pluralistic 1st person view, i.e. from the point of
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