On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 11:04 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie
definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind
but it can still behave just as a real person would.
But that assumes, as the materialists do,
On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 07:07:14PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/20/2012 5:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
A UD generates and executes all programs, many of which are
equivalent. So some programs are represented more than others. The
COMP measure is a function over all programs that
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
The atoms in my brain don't have to know how to read Chinese. They only
need to know how to be carbon, nitrogen, oxygen etc. atoms. The complex
behaviour which is reading Chinese comes from the interaction of billions
On 21.10.2012 10:05 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg
whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
...
I don't think that is true. The other way around makes just as much
sense of not more: Reading Chinese is a simple behavior which
drives the behavior
Hi Craig Weinberg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle
...the uncertainty principle is inherent in the properties of all wave-like
systems
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/21/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the
CRAIG: Cool Roger,
It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated
with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person
quale.
ROGER: It is not uncommon to find such objective/subjective dyslexia in the
literature.
This stuff is hard
Hi Russell Standish
Thanks for that info. If you put reprap into the search
window on youtube, you come up with a number of video
clips. It's a stunning achievement.
So I'm wrong, at least you can emulate life. The
only thing that remains for it to emulate a plant
would be to have it run by
Hi Stathis Papaioannou
You say that if a person behaves as if he has a mind,
then he does have a mind.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/21/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
Hi Bruno Marchal
You say
No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like
a human, or like a conscious entity.
My problem is that the definition is an absurdity to begin with.
If he has no mind, he could not know what a red light means.
He could not know anything.
On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:35, Roger Clough wrote:
(previously) Hi Bruno Marchal
Comp cannot give subjective content,
BRUNO: This is equivalent to saying that comp is false.
By definition of comp, our consciousness remains intact when we get
the right computer, featuring the brain at a
On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, October 19, 2012 3:29:39 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Oct 2012, at 17:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:16:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 16 Oct 2012, at 18:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I have no idea what that means, not a clue
Probably for the same reason that you stop at step 3 in the UD
Argument.
Probably. I remember I stopped reading after your proof of the
On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:47, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/20/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
are what the senses tell you.
On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:51, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/20/2012 10:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie
definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind
but it can still behave just
On 20 Oct 2012, at 22:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/20/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Dear Stephen,
On 19 Oct 2012, at 19:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/19/2012 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Oct 2012, at 22:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/17 Alberto G. Corona
Hi John,
On 20 Oct 2012, at 23:16, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno,
especially in my identification as responding to relations.
Now the Self? IT certainly refers to a more sophisticated level of
thinking, more so than the average (animalic?) mind. - OR: we have
no idea. What WE call 'Self-Ccness'
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 7:19:42 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
CRAIG: Cool Roger,
It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is
associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and
first person quale.
ROGER: It is not uncommon to find such
On 10/21/2012 3:48 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 07:07:14PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/20/2012 5:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
A UD generates and executes all programs, many of which are
equivalent. So some programs are represented more than others. The
COMP
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 4:06:16 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
The atoms in my brain don't have to know how to read Chinese. They only
need to know how to be carbon, nitrogen, oxygen etc. atoms. The
On 10/21/2012 4:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
The atoms in my brain don't have to know how to read Chinese. They only
need to know how to be carbon, nitrogen, oxygen etc. atoms. The complex
behaviour which is
Hi Stephen,
Pleasing reading indeed. A bit old. You should easily find what is
missing.
Answer: the mind-body problem. It is still a form of aristotelian
physicalism, even if it has the correct natural numbers ontology.
There is still an implicit use of the aristotelian identity thesis
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi John,
On 20 Oct 2012, at 23:16, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno,
especially in my identification as responding to relations.
Now the Self? IT certainly refers to a more sophisticated level of
thinking, more so than the
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote:
Well I don't know about you but I don't think my consciousness was there
before Evolution figured out how to make brains, I believe this because I
can't seem to remember
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of
indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there
was no point in reading about things built on top of that
From your error you have
2012/10/21 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of
indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there
was no point in reading about things built
On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:55, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
I think if you converse with a real person, he has to
have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write.
BRUNO: Not necessarily. Its brain can be in vat, and then I talk to him by
giving him a virtual body
This does not implies a reality created by an UD algorithm. It may be a
mathematical universe, that is a superset of the computable universes. The
measure problem in the UD algorith translates to the problem of the
effectivity of the Occam Razor, or the problem of the apparent simplicity
of the
SNIP
Dear Bruno,
WHOEVER: Tell us more about how White Rabbits can appear if there is any
restriction of mutual logical consistency between 1p and in any arbitrary
recursion of 1p content?
BRUNO: We assume comp. If a digital computer processes the activity of your
brain in dream state
WHOEVER: Hi Bruno and Roger,
What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie from a a
person that does not see the world external to it as anything other than an
internal panorama with which it cannot interact?
BRUNO: Nobody can distinguish a p-zombie from a human, even
I propose this simple, counter-COMP truth:
Without something to enumerate, numbers are meaningless.
Two plus two does not 'equal' anything without a fairly extensive list of a
priori meta-artihmetic conditions. As far as I can tell, for two plus two
to equal something, there must be:
Cause
Hi Bruno Marchal
1p is to know by acquaintance (only possible to humans).
I conjecture that any statement pertaining to humans containing 1p is TRUE.
3p is to know by description (works for both humans and computers).
I believe that any statement pertaining to computers containing 1p
Yes,
Hi Alberto G. Corona
Yes, they are inconsistent.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/21/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-20, 14:55:08
Hi Stathis,
Sorry, my previous email was accidentally sent too early.
You said that if a candidate person behaves as if he
has a mind, then he does.
That may be OK, but if a person does NOT have a mind,
( is a zombie), then my position is that in fact he
cannot behave as one with a mind
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 3:39:11 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
BRUNO: Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition
it
behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only
God knows, if you want.
ROGER: I claim that it is impossible for any
Hi everything-list
I said that any statement for a computer containing 1p would be FALSE.
That is not exactly true. A computer can deal with any 3p operator on the
outside,
meaning it has already been converted to a descriptive (3p) form.
Suppose I tell the computer (or anybody else) that I
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 7:37 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Stathis,
Sorry, my previous email was accidentally sent too early.
You said that if a candidate person behaves as if he
has a mind, then he does.
That may be OK, but if a person does NOT have a mind,
( is a
Bruno: my apologies for this late late reply, I am slow to decipher the
listpost from the daily inundation of Roger-stuff so I miss some more
relevant list-post sometimes.
You wrote about the U-M:
*...an entity capable of computing all partial computable functions...*
**
I would be cautios with
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of
indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there
was no point
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we
would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would
constitute, for example, neurons firing when measurements of
transmembrane
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 5:21:53 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
Yes, that's Dennett's position. He has called the idea of zombies an
embarrassment to philosophy. So do you agree that if a computer could
converse with you like a human then it would have a mind?
A movie can converse with
On 10/21/2012 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we
would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would
constitute, for example, neurons
On 10/21/2012 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And their very specific correlation with the physical brain states of sleep.
Of course. But this is taken into account in the theoretical reasoning where we suppose
the brain state are obtained by (immaterial) machine doing the computation at the
On 10/21/2012 3:48 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
I worry a bit about the use of the word all in your remark.
All is too big, usually, to have a single constructable measure!
Why not consider some large enough but finite collections of
programs, such as what would be captured by the idea of an
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