: A calculus of personal identity StathisPapaioannouwrote: BrentMeekerwrites: Iwouldsaythatwhatmakesastatementlike"we'rethesamepersonfrommomenttomoment"true isthatit'saninferencefrom,orapartof,amodeloftheworldthatis"true"inthe provisionalsenseofscientifictheories,i.e.itsubsumesandpr
Stathis writes
I am not so sure that the standard model of personal identity with which we
are familiar would be a universal standard. Imagine
intelligent beings evolved from hive insects which go through several radically
different life stages, frequently share genetic
information with each
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I am not so sure that the standard model of personal identity with which we
are familiar would be
a universal standard. Imagine intelligent beings evolved from hive insects
which go through
several radically different life stages, frequently share genetic
Thank you for your responses, Bruno.
I will reply in return.
As an overview to my original theme, I believe you
missed several key notions.First, yes, I am bothered
by interpretations of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems,
but I avoid getting entangled in debating 'interpretations'
by getting
Lee Corbin writes:
Thereisanimportantdifferencebetweennormativestatementsanddescriptiveorempiricalstatements.QuotingfromWikipedia: "Descriptive(orconstative)statementsarefalsifiablestatementsthatattempttodescribereality.Normative
Brent Meeker writes:
I would say that what makes a statement like we're the same person from
moment to moment true is
that it's an inference from, or a part of, a model of the world that is
true in the provisional
sense of scientific theories, i.e. it subsumes and predicts many emprically
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I would say that what makes a statement like we're the same person from
moment to moment true
is that it's an inference from, or a part of, a model of the world that is
true in the
provisional sense of scientific theories, i.e. it
Le 09-juil.-06, à 17:20, James N Rose a écrit :
Bruno, I reviewed the archive and found no reply.
I will repeat it again, hoping for your thoughts:
from July 2, 2006 (lightly amended and then addended)
Bruno,
I have found myself in this lifetime to be a staunch
OP-ponent and
Bruno Marchal a écrit (to Jamie N Rose):
Concerning your use of the word proposition, I don't understand
exactly what you mean by the words exists accessible perfectly
accessible, The whole sentence is rather hard to follow.
Godel used this:
From A - B and A - ~B, infer ~A.
Godel
[Working my way slowly up the list of many excellent posts from the past few
days, excuse me if someone else has already answered this...]
Lee Corbin writes (quoting SP):
If [a] species believed that 2+2=5, or that their kidneys were the organs
of respiration,
they would be wrong. But
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
[Working my way slowly up the list of many excellent posts from the past few
days, excuse me if
someone else has already answered this...]
Lee Corbin writes (quoting SP):
If [a] species believed that 2+2=5, or that their kidneys were the organs
of
Stathis writes
There is an important difference between normative statements and descriptive
or empirical statements. Quoting from Wikipedia:
Descriptive (or constative) statements are falsifiable statements that
attempt to describe reality. Normative
statements, on the other hand,
Brent wrote
I would say that what makes a statement like we're the same person from
moment to moment true is
that it's an inference from, or a part of, a model of the world that is
true in the provisional
sense of scientific theories, i.e. it subsumes and predicts many empirically
Le 09-juil.-06, à 06:50, James N Rose a écrit :
My email has not gotten through accurately this week.
Just wondering if you had replied to my post of July 2nd
or just let it go?
I think I did. Perhaps you could find it on the archive.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Brent Meeker writes:
LeeCorbinwrote: StathiswritesandBrentevidentlyisnotonetoresistagoodpun StathisPapaioannouwrote: Indeed,Iwouldpersonallyfindtheideaofclonesofmyself thatIcouldrunintoquitedisturbing,andthemorelikeme theywere,theworseitwouldbe. Asoberingreflection.;-)
Lee Corbin writes:
Brentwrites Giventhatjustafterthecloning,thecloneswouldquicklydiverge,becomingdifferentpeople;it seemsyoucouldbehappycontemplatingthefuller,richerlifeofallthepeopleyouknowjustas muchasiftheywereclonesofyourself. SoIsupposethatdaybydayyoubecomesomeonedifferent?
Stathis writes
If [a] species believed that 2+2=5, or that their kidneys were the organs of
respiration,
they would be wrong. But if they believe that they wake up a different person
every day,
and live their lives based on this belief, they would *not* be wrong; they
could hold
this
Bruno,
My email has not gotten through accurately this week.
Just wondering if you had replied to my post of July 2nd
or just let it go?
Jamie
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
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Le 07-juil.-06, à 06:45, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Bruno writes
Actually I was about to say that nominal question are suggestive
(anybody can answer by principle of a mailing list), and nominal
question when thread interferes makes possible to send less
mails. But I agree here I miss
PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, July 07, 2006 12:30 AM
Subject: RE: A calculus of personal identity
Stathis writes and Brent evidently is not one to resist a good pun
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself
that I
Dear Lee and Bruno,
- Original Message -
From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, July 07, 2006 12:45 AM
Subject: RE: A calculus of personal identity
Bruno writes
Actually I was about to say that nominal question are suggestive
Le 04-juil.-06, à 23:37, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Bruno had written
[Lee wrote]
What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know
that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated,
but the information will be used to create two exact duplicates,
and then one of the
Le 06-juil.-06, à 17:02, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Le 04-juil.-06, à 23:37, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Bruno had written
[Lee wrote]
What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know
that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated,
but the information will be used
Brent writes
Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming
different people; it
seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the
people you know just as
much as if they were clones of yourself.
So I suppose that day by day you
Stathis writes and Brent evidently is not one to resist a good pun
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself
that I could run into quite disturbing, and the more like me
they were, the worse it would be.
A sobering reflection. ;-)
An
Lee Corbin wrote:
Brent writes
Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming
different people; it
seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the
people you know just as
much as if they were clones of yourself.
So I suppose
Lee Corbin wrote:
Brent writes
Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming
different people; it
seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the
people you know just as
much as if they were clones of yourself.
So I suppose
Bruno writes
Actually I was about to say that nominal question are suggestive
(anybody can answer by principle of a mailing list), and nominal
question when thread interferes makes possible to send less
mails. But I agree here I miss miserably ...
Not sure what mistake you think you made
Lee Corbin wrote:
Stathis writes and Brent evidently is not one to resist a good pun
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself
that I could run into quite disturbing, and the more like me
they were, the worse it would be.
A sobering reflection.
Brent writes
Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge,
becoming different people; it
seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the
people you know just as
much as if they were clones of yourself.
So I suppose that day by day
Brent writes
I agree - I'd like my clone. I once found some old lab reports and as I was
reading through them I
found one that struck me as unusually well written and insightful - and then
I realized it was one I
had written.
But we don't know Stathis. ;-)
Okay---that makes three
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Stathis Papaioannou and Lee Corbin, respectively):
Yet another thought experiment for your consideration. You are
offered the option of 10 years of normal life, or being cloned
20 times with each clone living one year. I would choose the
10 years; if I chose
.
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, July 04, 2006 2:49 PM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
John M wrote:
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
.skip
I'm sure your professors
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself that I could run
into quite
disturbing, and the more like me they were, the worse it would be.
A sobering reflection. ;-)
Brent Meeker
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received
06 4:18 PM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal
identity
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:Indeed, I would
personally find the idea of clones of myself that I could run into
quite disturbing, and the more like me they were, the worse it would
be. A sobering reflection. ;-) Bre
Le 04-juil.-06, à 04:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
x-tad-biggerLee Corbin writes:/x-tad-bigger
x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger
x-tad-bigger > > which is why in symmetrical duplication experiments I anticipate/x-tad-bigger
x-tad-bigger> > that I will become one of the duplicates with equal
John M wrote:
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
.skip
I'm sure your professors will be disappointed to hear
that their hard won theories are inconsistent
with thought.
JM:
and so would be all who's 'working' paradigm changed
in the continuation of the epistemic enrichment
Bruno had written
[Lee wrote]
What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know
that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated,
but the information will be used to create two exact duplicates,
and then one of the duplicates is vaporized and the other
Stathis asks
Yet another thought experiment for your consideration. You are
offered the option of 10 years of normal life, or being cloned
20 times with each clone living one year. I would choose the
10 years; if I chose the 20 clones, each one of those clones
would be kicking
Oh, I see you wrote
more about that long letter of mine.
Thanks for breaking
it up! It's really a separate idea.
I'll respond today
if time.
Lee
-Original Message-From:
everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]On Behalf Of Stathis
PapaioannouSent:
Lee Corbin wrote:
Stathis asks
Yet another thought experiment for your consideration. You are
offered the option of 10 years of normal life, or being cloned
20 times with each clone living one year. I would choose the
10 years; if I chose the 20 clones, each one of those clones
would be
Bruno Marchal writes:
Itcouldbe,forexample,thatIhavebeenbrainwashedandmymemories ofthepastarepartlyorcompletelyfalsememories. Thereisnofalse1-memories.Onlyanassociationbetweensome1-memory andsome3-realitycanbefalse.Ifsomeonesucceedsinimplementing
Stathis and Bruno:
I am still perlexed (aren't we all?) about the use of
the 1 vs 3. There is no 3rd person 'reality', only the
1st person memory of somebody else communicated to me
when it becomes acknowledged as MY 1st person
interpretation of it.
I feel we rub too close to the solipsist
Quentin Anciaux writes:
HiJohn, LeVendredi30Juin200621:06,JohnMaécrit: AninterestingobservationfromSaibalthatincreasing theinfo-inputtoone'sbrainkillsperson(ality?). Iwouldnotsay"dead",rather'changed'asintosome differentone.(Itisagradualchange,deathisbeing thoughtofassomethingmoreabruptand
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 2:54 PM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Sure it is. Just because something
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 2:54 PM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 2:54 PM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
Bruno Marchal
Lee Corbin writes:
whichiswhyinsymmetricalduplicationexperimentsIanticipate thatIwillbecomeoneoftheduplicateswithequalprobability. Whatdoyouthinkofyoursurvivalchancesifyouhappentoknow thatafteryoufallasleeptonight,youwillbedisintegrated, buttheinformationwillbeusedtocreatetwoexactduplicates,
John M wrote:
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 2:54 PM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
Bruno Marchal wrote
. I take it you would choose the 20 clones, and each of your clones would be smug in the knowledge that they have doubled their effective runtime?
Stathis Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: A calculus of personal identity Date: Sat, 1 Jul 2006
Hal writes
What I argued was that it would be easier to find the trace of a person's
thoughts in a universe where he had a physically continuous record than
where there were discontinuities (easier in the sense that a smaller
program would suffice). In my framework, this means that the
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:35, Brent Meeker a écrit :
That's not contrary to my conception at all. I certainly do bet on
the existence of others, and
of chairs and tables and stars and electrons and myself, and all for
the essentially the same reasons.
OK.
I don't understand the
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Sure it is. Just because something cannot be directly experienced
doesn't rule it out of a
scienctific model: quarks can't be observed, but their effects can.
OK, but we were discussing about theories. general relativity, as a
theory does
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:59, James N Rose a écrit :
Math and reductive science ignore and dis-consider collateral
co-extancy.
The comp assumption leads to the less reductive possible account of the
person and person POVs.
For example, comp does not guaranties *any* survival, but it
:51 PM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
Hi John,
Le Vendredi 30 Juin 2006 21:06, John M a écrit :
An interesting observation from Saibal that increasing
the info-input to one's brain kills person(ality?).
I would not say dead, rather 'changed' as into some
different one
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 3:34 PM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
John M wrote:
...
Stathis wrote:
...
I agree. Other people are part of the model of the
world
Stathis also wrote in the same email, Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 12:24 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
Brent wrote
That's why I suggest that OMs are not an adequate ontological basis for a
world model. On the other
hand, if we
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Sure it is. Just because something cannot be directly experienced
doesn't rule it out of a
scienctific model: quarks can't be observed, but their effects can.
OK, but we were discussing about theories. general
Bruno,
I have found myself in this lifetime to be a staunch
OP-ponent and challenger to Godel's incompleteness
theorems.
In the way that they are structured - with the premises
Godel preset, of initial boundaries for what he was
about to design by 'proof' - his theorems are both
Le 30-juin-06, à 21:06, John M a écrit :
I agree. Other people are part of the model of the
world we form. And in the same way the existence of
myself, as a durable entity, is also a part of that
model.
Brent Meeker
*
Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close
on
Le 30-juin-06, à 21:34, Brent Meeker a écrit :
John M:
Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close
on solipsism?
Not if you accept that *all* our ideas of reality are models. The
fact that they work well and are
coherent makes me believe they are models of an external
Le 30-juin-06, à 20:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
There is no false 1-memories. Only an association between some
1-memory and some 3-reality can be false. If someone succeeds in
implementing correctly (more than just coherently) false beliefs (like
I am Napoleon just
Hal Finney writes:
OK,thisistheoldASSAversusRSSAdistinction.Butleavingthis argumentaside,Idon'tseehowteleportationcouldbeanalogoustoa risky,measurereducingactivityifitseemedtobeareliableprocess fromathirdpersonperspective.IfsomeoneplaysRussianRoulette,we
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 30-juin-06, à 21:06, John M a écrit :
I agree. Other people are part of the model of the
world we form. And in the same way the existence of
myself, as a durable entity, is also a part of that
model.
Brent Meeker
*
Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 30-juin-06, à 21:34, Brent Meeker a écrit :
John M:
Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close
on solipsism?
Not if you accept that *all* our ideas of reality are models. The
fact that they work well and are
coherent makes me believe they are models
The notions of observed/observing, of first vs third,
and all such round robin banter .. all fall down as nonsense
conversation because -no one- has in any real sense
specified the new-functions required to make such
concepts ... a calculus.
There are conflated criteria involved - as well as a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 30-juin-06, à 20:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
There is no false 1-memories. Only an association between some
1-memory and some 3-reality can be false. If someone succeeds in
implementing correctly (more than just coherently) false beliefs (like
I
Addendum to my previous:
TO make math sensitive to frame of reference distinctions
and useful in an expanded way added parameter-dimensions
might be useful.
Color coding for example. With new translation operators.
Equations written in red might indicate that attention
be maintained that the
Jamie,
your highly critical post is worthwhile reading.
I like your antithesis for 'reductive operands' and
would almost like what you wrote:
Personal Identity is a de-fault resultant of the
structure of the universe.
unless I had this idiosyncrasy against axioms, givens,
accepted de-faults
Stathis wrote
Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2006 5:53 AM
which is why in symmetrical duplication experiments I anticipate
that I will become one of the duplicates with equal probability.
What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know
that after you fall asleep tonight, you
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 09:23 AM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
Brent Meeker writes:
I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness
Bruno Marchal writes:
Yes,sharingthememoryis*not*thesameashavingtheoriginal experience,butthisappliestorecallingone'sownpastaswell. Areyoureallysure?Whentwopeoplesharememories,theycanonly sharethirdpersoninformation,whichwilltriggertheirrespective unsharablefirstpersonidentities/memories.
Le 30-juin-06, à 15:19, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger
x-tad-bigger I have the subjective experience of being a person persisting through time because I feel that I know in a 1st person way what I did in the past. If I really did know in a 1st person way what I did in
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness that
observer moments don't
*need* anything to connect them other than
their content. They are linked like the novels in a series, not like the
carriages of a train. It
Saibal Mitra wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 09:23 AM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
Brent Meeker writes:
I think it is one of the most profound things
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
...
This is not to say that my mind can or should overcome [Lee Corbin
disagrees on the should] the deeply ingrained belief or illusion
that I am a unique, one-track individual living my life from start to
finish,
Here
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
(unless the final remark with Saibal/s signature
underneath comes from him):
...
Stathis wrote:
...
I would say that the 1st person experience is *not*
an illusion in any sense of the word. It is the very
opposite, in a way: the most real thing,
John M wrote:
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
(unless the final remark with Saibal/s signature
underneath comes from him):
...
Stathis wrote:
...
I would say that the 1st person experience is *not*
an illusion in any sense of the word. It is the very
opposite, in a way: the
Hi John,
Le Vendredi 30 Juin 2006 21:06, John M a écrit :
An interesting observation from Saibal that increasing
the info-input to one's brain kills person(ality?).
I would not say dead, rather 'changed' as into some
different one. (It is a gradual change, death is being
thought of as
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
Yes,sharingthememoryis*not*thesameashavingtheoriginalexperience,butthisappliesto recallingone'sownpastaswell.Youmayarguethatrecallingourpastisdifferentbecausewe havejusttherightbrainstructure,otherassociatedmemoriesandsoontoputitallin
Le 28-juin-06, à 14:52, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno,
I have cut out some of your detailed response to my post where I think we basically agree.
Good idea. Of course it will looks like I disagree with all what you say, but just remember we are concentrating on those points where we
Bruno:
This thread is more than I could follow in detail at
this time, when I am involved with different areas to
speculate on - on other lists. I apologize. Not that I
assume you're missing my input (usually marginal), but
for not being better informed on the details.
I pick from time to time a
Thanks, Stathis, for your words not too distant from
where I stand. As I wrote to Bruno, I assign my
present memory to my present viewing technology, not
to 'my' 5-year old as you refer to.
You mention sense of identity - I think it is more
than just a 'sense': it is a reflective relation of
the
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
Hal Finney writes:
What I argued was that it would be easier to find the trace of a person's
thoughts in a universe where he had a physically continuous record than
where there were discontinuities (easier in the sense that a smaller
program would suffice).
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
Yes, sharing the memory is *not* the same as having the original
experience, but this applies to
recalling one's own past as well. You may argue that recalling our past is
different because we
have just the
John Mikes writes (quoting Brent Meeker):
Well that's the question isn't it. Is there
something besides memories and personality that
makes you you...
But how much do we (already???) know about our
memories
which for sure is a concoction with our personality,
of which we just as
Bruno,
I have cut out some of your detailed response to my post where I think we
basically agree. There remain some differences, and some failings on my part to
understand more technical aspects of your work.
Memories of our past are generally more vivid and hold more
information than
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno,
I have cut out some of your detailed response to my post where I think we
basically agree. There
remain some differences, and some failings on my part to understand more
technical aspects of
your work.
Memories of our past are generally more vivid
Lee Corbin writes:
Stathis writes
Hal Finney in his recent thread on teleportation thought
experiments disagrees with the above view. He suggests
that it is possible for a subject to apparently undergo
successful teleportation, in that the individual walking
out of the receiving
Brent Meeker writes:
If the duplicate did not feel he was the original, then he wouldn't have
all the memories and personality of the original, would he?
Well that's the question isn't it. Is there something besides memories and
personality that makes
you you. Could you feel that
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
If the duplicate did not feel he was the original, then he wouldn't have
all the memories
and personality of the original, would he?
Well that's the question isn't it. Is there something besides memories and
personality that
makes
Brent Meeker writes:
Istheduplicationprocessgoodenoughtomatchorbetterthemechanismsnaturallyinplaceto preservethefunctionalintegrityofthebrainfrommomenttomoment?Thatisthequestionthat needstobeanswered.Itwouldbeunreasonabletospeculatethattheduplicatemaynotbethe
Le 26-juin-06, à 14:28, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
x-tad-bigger Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):/x-tad-bigger
x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger
x-tad-bigger > > Of course, it is not possible for a third person observer to be /x-tad-bigger
x-tad-bigger> > certain about first person mental
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
to Stathis (excerpt):
Well that's the question isn't it. Is there
something besides memories and personality that
makes you you...
But how much do we (already???) know about our
memories
which for sure is a concoction with our personality,
of
Stathis writes
Lee,
It’s perhaps unfortunate that we are arguing about this because
I think we basically agree on what Derek Parfit has called a
reductionist theory of personal identity (in his 1984 book
Reasons and Persons;
Yes, I was very relieved to have read portions of that book.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
Of course, it is not possible for a third person observer to be
certain about first person mental states, and this would apply to our
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
SNIP previous
I we actually tried duplication, then as in all
communication technologies, there would be errors
and the duplication would not be perfect. But then
the question arises, could the duplicate have
all the memories and personality of
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP)
I don't understand why you [Bruno Marchal] say
if duplication (at any level) is a death sentence, then comp is wrong.
There must be a *minimal* level of duplication fidelity below which
: RE: A calculus of personal identity Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 16:45:41 -0700 Stathiswrites PerhapsitwouldhelpifIspokeaboutmycomputerrather thanmyself.Clearly,itsphysicalstatechangesfrommoment tomoment:thephosphorsonthescreen,thepositionofthe harddisk,theelectricalactivityintheCPU
Le 24-juin-06, à 07:19, Colin Hales a écrit :
Hi,
[ALL]
Lee, I seem to have miss-attributed the source of my guffaw that lead
to my
little outburst to Bruno. Apologies to all as appropriate... :-)
That's what I call a scientific attitude. Doing errors, discovering
them, admitting
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