Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Yes it is right. There is no infinity of natural numbers. But the
natural numbers are UNLIMITED, you can construct as many natural
Bruno,
merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble
vivant.
I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the
plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and
connect to assumptions of assumptions, Torgny the zombie,
John,
Great question I am glad you asked it. I think I was driven to this
list because of big questions, especially those which most people seem
to believe are unanswerable. Questions such as: Where did this
universe come from? Why are we here and why am I me? Is there a God?
What is
Bruno,
who was that French poet who made puns after death?
JohnM
On Sun, May 10, 2009 at 3:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Quentin Anciaux skrev:
Hi,
2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus tor...@dsv.su.se:
I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind. Now I accept
that you can say that the natural numbers are unlimited. I only deny
actual infinities. The set of all natural numbers are always finite,
but
On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
you are human, all right?
I look exactly as a human. When you look at me, you will not be
able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake
doubts)
Yes, you are right. I can only fake doubts...
I suspect you
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
you are human, all right?
I look exactly as a human. When you look at me, you will not be
able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I behave exacly like a
human.
Hi,
2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus tor...@dsv.su.se:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
you are human, all right?
I look exactly as a human. When you look at me, you will not be
able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I
On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can
be conscious *about*.
It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake
doubts)
Yes, you are right. I can only fake doubts...
I suspect you are faking faking doubts, but of
: Thursday, May 07, 2009 11:10 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
consciousness, I think, although it can doubt
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can
be conscious *about*.
It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes
systematic doubting procedure (this fit well with the
On 04 May 2009, at 13:31, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/5/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
...
It seems to me that we agree that physical supervenience leads to
many
absurdities. Is your argument purely academical, or do you think it
can be used to prevent the conclusion that
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 1:33 PM
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
snip
Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its consciousness, I
think, although it can doubt everything else it can be conscious *about
On Sun, May 3, 2009 at 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
With just arithmetic, when we stop to postulate a primitive or
ontological material world, all primitive ad-hocness is removed, given
that the existing internal interpretations are all determined, with
their relative
On 05 May 2009, at 22:31, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, May 3, 2009 at 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
With just arithmetic, when we stop to postulate a primitive or
ontological material world, all primitive ad-hocness is removed,
given
that the existing internal
2009/5/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
in the same way a
message is obscured if encoded with a one-time pad that is
subsequently destroyed and forgotten. In fact, even with the
store-bought computer the computation is obscured if there are no
intelligent beings around who can understand
On 03 May 2009, at 17:09, John Mikes wrote:
I would like to go along with Maudlin's point emphasized in Bruno's
text below, adding that causal structure is restricted to the
limited model of which we CAN choose likely 'causes' within our
perceived reality, while the unlimited
2009/5/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
I think that if you take a real forest with birds, here and there, you
can interpret some behavior as NAND or NOR, but you will not succeed
ever in finding the computation of factorial(5).
But you can interpret *any* behaviour as a NAND gate, in an
Stathis, and listers,
I cannot help: I read the text. (Not always, sometimes it seems too obtuse
for me even to 'read' it).
The Subject? ( Consciousness = information )
what happens to that darn 'information'? Oops, 'you' are AWARE of it!?
Meaning: you *DO* something with it (to be - become?
I would like to go along with Maudlin's point emphasized in Bruno's text
below, adding that causal structure is restricted to the limited model of
which we *CAN *choose likely 'causes' within our perceived reality, while
the unlimited possibilities include wider 'intrusions' of domains 'beyond
our
On 03 May 2009, at 09:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/5/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
I think that if you take a real forest with birds, here and there,
you
can interpret some behavior as NAND or NOR, but you will not succeed
ever in finding the computation of factorial(5).
On Apr 29, 2:26 am, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
What extra information do you have in mind? I'd gladly update my
priors with anything I can lay my hands on.
So changes to neural structure and the concentrations of various
chemicals within neurons and around neural synapses
On 30 Apr 2009, at 18:29, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2009, at 23:30, Jesse Mazer wrote:
But I'm not convinced that the basic Olympia machine he describes
doesn't already have a complex causal structure--the causal
structure would be in the way different troughs
On 30 Apr 2009, at 19:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Apr 2009, at 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Marchal wrote
That is weird.
I think that you believe that a rock implements computations, because
you believe a computation can be decomposed in tiny computations,
On 01 May 2009, at 17:02, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/5/1 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
That is, you can't say that the rock
implements one computation but not another.
I don't think it implements any computations. I could accept some
tiny
apparition of tiny pieces of of tiny
On 01 May 2009, at 19:36, Jesse Mazer wrote:
I found a paper on the Mandelbrot set and computability, I
understand very little but maybe Bruno would be able to follow it:
http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.CC/0604003
The same author has a shorter outline or slides for a presentation
on this
On Thu, Apr 30, 2009 at 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The mathematical Universal Dovetailer, the splashed universal Turing
Machine, the rational Mandelbrot set, or any creative sets in the
sense of Emil Post, does all computations. Really all, with Church
thesis. This is
I found a paper on the Mandelbrot set and computability, I understand very
little but maybe Bruno would be able to follow it:
http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.CC/0604003
The same author has a shorter outline or slides for a presentation on this
subject at
On 29 Apr 2009, at 23:30, Jesse Mazer wrote:
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 22:19:56 +0200
Maudlin's point is that the causal structure has no physical role
But I'm not convinced
2009/4/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
This is essentially the problem discussed by Chalmers in Does a Rock
Implement Every Finite-State Automaton
at http://consc.net/papers/rock.html ,
Yes. And I don't buy that argument. I will not insist because you did it
well in your last post.
2009/4/30 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
It seems to me that if the seconds of my life were according to an
external clock being generated backwards or scrambled, I would have no
way of knowing this, nor any way of knowing how fast the clock was
running or if it was changing speed.
2009/4/30 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I see no contradiction in a noticeable gap in consciousness. Whether
noticing such a gap depends on having some theory of the world or is
intrinsic seems to be the question.
You would notice a gap if the background changed, or if your level of
2009/4/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Putnam and Searle use the Rock argument to suggest
that computationalism is false: they consider it absurd that any
conscious computation supervenes on any physical activity (or
equivalently no physical activity, since at one extreme the Rock
On 30 Apr 2009, at 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Putnam and Searle use the Rock argument to suggest
that computationalism is false: they consider it absurd that any
conscious computation supervenes on any physical activity (or
equivalently
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2009, at 23:30, Jesse Mazer wrote:
But I'm not convinced that the basic Olympia machine he describes doesn't
already have a complex causal structure--the causal structure would be in the
way different troughs influence each other via the pipe system he describes,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/30 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I see no contradiction in a noticeable gap in consciousness. Whether
noticing such a gap depends on having some theory of the world or is
intrinsic seems to be the question.
You would notice a gap if the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Putnam and Searle use the Rock argument to suggest
that computationalism is false: they consider it absurd that any
conscious computation supervenes on any physical activity (or
equivalently no physical activity,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Apr 2009, at 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Putnam and Searle use the Rock argument to suggest
that computationalism is false: they consider it absurd that any
conscious computation supervenes on any
On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 08:19:51PM -0700, Kelly wrote:
On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 9:00 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:
In fact I used that same argument with Russell
Standish when he said that ants aren't conscious because if they were
then we should expect to be
2009/4/29 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com:
The Financial Crisis Explained
Heidi is the proprietor of a bar in Berlin . In order to increase sales, she
decides to allow her loyal customers - most of whom are unemployed
alcoholics - to drink now but pay later. She keeps track of the drinks
2009/4/29 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying that the information in most
physical processes, but not consciousness, can be discrete? I would
have said just the opposite: that even if it turns out that physics is
continuous and time is real, it
Hi,
2009/4/29 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
2009/4/29 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying that the information in most
physical processes, but not consciousness, can be discrete? I would
have said just the opposite: that even if it
2009/4/29 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
Kelly wrote:
Not if information exists platonically. So the question is, what does
it mean for a physical system to represent a certain piece of
information? With the correct one-time pad, any desired information
can be extracted from any
2009/4/29 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't
in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My
view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of consciousness,
that you can't slice consciousness
From: stath...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 23:24:35 +1000
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2009/4/29 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
Kelly wrote:
Not if information exists platonically. So the question is, what does
it mean
2009/4/29 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
2009/4/29 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't
in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My
view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of
2009/4/29 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
And in the possibility space of weird alien
computers it seems to me that there will always be a computer
isomorphic with the vibration of atoms in a given rock.
What do you mean by weird alien computers? If we had a way of defining the
notion
On Wed, Apr 29, 2009 at 1:05 AM, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
What you are talking about is what I call the Occam catastrophe in
my book. The resolution of the paradox has to be that the
random/white-noise filled OMs are in fact unable to be observed. In
order for the
On 29 Apr 2009, at 00:25, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Kelly wrote:
Not if information exists platonically. So the question is, what
does
it mean for a physical system to represent a certain piece of
information? With the correct one-time pad, any desired
information
can be extracted
On Wed, 2009-04-29 at 10:28 -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
It
would seem the way the brain is organized it doesn't accept perception
of pure randomness (at least not for long, I have not yet tried the
experiment myself). If it can't find patterns from the senses it
looks like it gives up and
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/29 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying that the information in most
physical processes, but not consciousness, can be discrete? I would
have said just the opposite: that even if it turns out that physics is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/29 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't
in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My
view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of consciousness,
that
Maudlin's point is that the causal structure has no physical role, so
if you maintain the association of consciousness with the causal,
actually computational structure, you have to abandon the physical
supervenience. Or you reintroduce some magic, like if neurons have
some knowledge of
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 22:19:56 +0200
Maudlin's point is that the causal structure has no physical role
But I'm not convinced that the basic Olympia machine he describes doesn't
already
2009/4/28 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Sure. I will ask a bank to lend me huge amount of money, I promise
them to reimburse when I will win ten times the big lottery in a row.
Not so far fetched, really.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You
Stathis,
I think Bruno is not realistic enough. Here is a better story - a solution
to understand the situation:
-
*The Financial Crisis Explained*
Heidi is the proprietor of a bar in Berlin . In order to increase sales, she
decides to allow her loyal customers - most of whom are
On Apr 27, 12:23 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
So you have indeed the necessity to abandon comp to maintain your form
of immaterialist platonism, but then you lose the tool for questioning
nature. It almost look like choosing a theory because it does not even
address the
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 27, 12:23 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
So you have indeed the necessity to abandon comp to maintain your form
of immaterialist platonism, but then you lose the tool for questioning
nature. It almost look like choosing a theory because it does not even
On Apr 27, 3:08 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Your position as you have described it sounds a lot like ASSA only
without taking measure into consideration. I am curious if you
believe there is any merit to counting OMs or not. Meaning, if I have
two computers and set them up
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/25 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But is it the information in consciousness and is it discrete? If you
include the information that is in the brain, but not in consciousness,
I can buy the concept of relating states by similarity of content. Or
On Apr 27, 1:42 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Are you thinking of something like a linked list in which each state, in
it's inherent information, has a pointer to a previous (or future)
state. And the existence of this link constitutes the feeling of flow?
H. As a
Kelly wrote:
Not if information exists platonically. So the question is, what does
it mean for a physical system to represent a certain piece of
information? With the correct one-time pad, any desired information
can be extracted from any random block of data obtained by making any
Kelly wrote:
On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 9:00 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:
In fact I used that same argument with Russell
Standish when he said that ants aren't conscious because if they were
then we should expect to be experiencing life as ants and not humans.
Did you
On Apr 27, 2:27 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
An untestable theory. But that's OK since if it's true it's also useless.
Ha! True, true. But it being true AND useless would have a certain
aesthetic/poetic appeal. Which makes me even more inclined to think
that this is the
Kelly,
Your position as you have described it sounds a lot like ASSA only
without taking measure into consideration. I am curious if you
believe there is any merit to counting OMs or not. Meaning, if I have
two computers and set them up to run simulations of the same mind, are
there two minds
2009/4/27 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com:
I am not sure that the measure problem can be so easily
abandoned/ignored. Assuming every Observer Moment had has an equal
measure, then the random/white-noise filled OMs should vastly
outnumber the ordered and sensible OMs. Though I ever only
2009/4/28 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
2009/4/27 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com:
I am not sure that the measure problem can be so easily
abandoned/ignored. Assuming every Observer Moment had has an equal
measure, then the random/white-noise filled OMs should vastly
outnumber
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 27, 2:27 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
An untestable theory. But that's OK since if it's true it's also useless.
Ha! True, true. But it being true AND useless would have a certain
aesthetic/poetic appeal. Which makes me even more inclined
On 27 Apr 2009, at 06:40, Kelly wrote:
On Apr 26, 12:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
No, I think you're missing my point. Consider your analogy of
fitting
together images to make a complete picture. You present this as a
spatial representation of the sequential
On 27 Apr 2009, at 07:24, Kelly wrote:
On Apr 26, 11:40 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The question is; what are their relative probability measure? What
can
I expect.
Any expectations you have are unfounded. The problem of induction
applies.
There is no problem of
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 26, 12:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
No, I think you're missing my point. Consider your analogy of fitting
together images to make a complete picture. You present this as a
spatial representation of the sequential flow of consciousness. Now
On Apr 26, 1:08 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
These are edges in time, i.e. a future boundary and a past boundary.
If these two boundaries are different then we are not longer talking
about a state, we're talking about an interval, furthermore an interval
that has duration
On 25 Apr 2009, at 21:42, Kelly wrote:
On Apr 24, 3:14 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Kelly,
Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of
doubt
in my mind about computationalism.
Excellent!
It sounds like you are following the same path as I did on
On 25 Apr 2009, at 22:52, Kelly wrote:
On Apr 24, 11:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm
conscious of SOMETHING.
To predict something, the difficulty is to relate that consciousness
to its computational histories. Physics is given by a
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 26, 1:08 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
These are edges in time, i.e. a future boundary and a past boundary.
If these two boundaries are different then we are not longer talking
about a state, we're talking about an interval, furthermore an interval
On Sat, Apr 25, 2009 at 3:52 PM, Kelly harmon...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't say that they are rare, I say they don't make any sense. A
big difference.
I say that every possible event is perceived to happen, and so nothing
is more or less rare than anything else. There are only things that
On Apr 26, 2:01 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
I am not sure that the measure problem can be so easily
abandoned/ignored. Assuming every Observer Moment had has an equal
measure, then the random/white-noise filled OMs should vastly
outnumber the ordered and sensible OMs.
The
On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 7:04 PM, Kelly harmon...@gmail.com wrote:
On Apr 26, 2:01 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
I am not sure that the measure problem can be so easily
abandoned/ignored. Assuming every Observer Moment had has an equal
measure, then the random/white-noise
On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 9:00 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:
In fact I used that same argument with Russell
Standish when he said that ants aren't conscious because if they were
then we should expect to be experiencing life as ants and not humans.
Did you win or lose that
On Apr 26, 12:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
No, I think you're missing my point. Consider your analogy of fitting
together images to make a complete picture. You present this as a
spatial representation of the sequential flow of consciousness. Now
suppose your spatial
On Apr 26, 11:40 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The question is; what are their relative probability measure? What can
I expect.
Any expectations you have are unfounded. The problem of induction
applies.
Any probabilities arrived at empirically are suspect, they will
continue
2009/4/25 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But is it the information in consciousness and is it discrete? If you
include the information that is in the brain, but not in consciousness,
I can buy the concept of relating states by similarity of content. Or
if you suppose a continuum of
2009/4/25 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
No, I don't think the medium makes a difference. But interpretation
makes a difference. Most computations we do, on pencil and paper or
transistors or neurons, have an interpretation in terms of our world.
Kelly is supposing there is a
On Apr 24, 2:41 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
In the materialist view, my mental state is just the
state of the particles of my brain at that instant.
I think we need some definition of state.
Hmmm. Well, I think my view of the word is pretty much the dictionary
On Apr 24, 3:14 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Kelly,
Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
in my mind about computationalism.
Excellent!
It sounds like you are following the same path as I did on all of
this.
So it makes sense to start with
On Apr 24, 11:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm
conscious of SOMETHING.
To predict something, the difficulty is to relate that consciousness
to its computational histories. Physics is given by a measure of
probability on those comp
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 24, 3:14 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Kelly,
Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
in my mind about computationalism.
Excellent!
It sounds like you are following the same path as I did on all of
this.
So it
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 24, 2:41 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
In the materialist view, my mental state is just the
state of the particles of my brain at that instant.
I think we need some definition of state.
Hmmm. Well, I think my view of the word is
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 22, 12:24 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
described by some set of data.
Not fully. I agree with Brent that you need an interpreter to
On 24 Apr 2009, at 02:37, Kelly wrote:
On Apr 22, 2:02 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
I was with you up to that last sentence. Forward or backward, we
just
experience increasing entropy as increasing time, but that doesn't
warrant the conclusion that no process is
Jason Resch wrote:
Kelly,
Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
in my mind about computationalism. I have actually been in somewhat
of a state of confusion since Bruno's movie graph argument coupled
with a paper by Max Tegmark. In Tegmark's paper, he was
2009/4/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Boltzmann brains are improbable, but the example of the punchcards is
not. The operator could have two punchcards in his pocket, have a
conversation with someone on the way from M1 to M2 and end up
forgetting or almost forgetting which is the
2009/4/25 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
This implicitly assumes that you can dispense with the continuum and
treat the process as a succession of discrete states. I question that.
So are you saying that, because we are conscious, that is evidence
that reality is at bottom continuous
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Boltzmann brains are improbable, but the example of the punchcards is
not. The operator could have two punchcards in his pocket, have a
conversation with someone on the way from M1 to M2 and end up
forgetting or
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/25 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
This implicitly assumes that you can dispense with the continuum and
treat the process as a succession of discrete states. I question that.
So are you saying that, because we are conscious, that is
On 22 Apr 2009, at 20:41, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 1:55 AM, Kelly harmon...@gmail.com wrote:
On Apr 21, 11:31 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a
universal machine (a universal number relation)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information
on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded,
and M2 goes into state B. Then what you are suggesting is that this
2009/4/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information
on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded,
and M2 goes into state B.
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