Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King OK if you're satisfied with a vague feeling of agreement among multiple observers. That of course would cause you to see fuzzy or incomplete objects. The Turing Test was suggested to try to wake you up. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-16, 11:37:13 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/16/2012 8:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But how could one know if the others are telling the truth ? Umm, I only assume the barest appearance of interactions. All of this is fully consistent with Leibniz' monadology. Monads have no windows and do not exchange substances. All interactions are only mutual synchronizations of their percepts. The surest test could only be a Turing Test. I am not sure how that is related... Plus I have another difficulty with solipsim. If perception must proceed existence, then one could never be stabbed in the back. Existence must be primitive ontologically, or else how are properties to be extracted from it by perception? There are no knives (or spoons), only phenomena of mutual agreements. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-16, 07:25:39 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/16/2012 6:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King How is the agreement of many minds known if they are all solipsists ? Hi Roger, The agreement is known by the appearance of a common world. It is the manifestation of their mutual truth. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King How is the agreement of many minds known if they are all solipsists ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-15, 16:46:15 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/15/2012 11:27 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But many minds are in agreement that God exists, so that must be true ? Hi Roger, In my proposed definitions, must only follows if and only if there is no accessible possible world where a contraindication of the agreement occurs. Put more simply, a statement is true iff there is no knowable contradiction of the statement. The possible existence of an unknowable contradiction to the truth of a statement acts to support the idea of fallibility. And must unicorns exist because I believe that they do ? The existence or non-existence is not contingent on anything, especially the belief of one person. Your question should be phrased as: Must unicorns be a physical creature because of my belief in such? The answer might be yes is there is some means by which your belief has the causal power to generate a physical being. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/16/2012 6:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King How is the agreement of many minds known if they are all solipsists ? Hi Roger, The agreement is known by the appearance of a common world. It is the manifestation of their mutual truth. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] mailto:rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-11-15, 16:46:15 *Subject:* Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/15/2012 11:27 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But many minds are in agreement that God exists, so that must be true ? Hi Roger, In my proposed definitions, must only follows if and only if there is no accessible possible world where a contraindication of the agreement occurs. Put more simply, a statement is true iff there is no knowable contradiction of the statement. The possible existence of an unknowable contradiction to the truth of a statement acts to support the idea of fallibility. And must unicorns exist because I believe that they do ? The existence or non-existence is not contingent on anything, especially the belief of one person. Your question should be phrased as: Must unicorns be a physical creature because of my belief in such? The answer might be yes is there is some means by which your belief has the causal power to generate a physical being. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King But how could one know if the others are telling the truth ? The surest test could only be a Turing Test. Plus I have another difficulty with solipsim. If perception must proceed existence, then one could never be stabbed in the back. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-16, 07:25:39 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/16/2012 6:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King How is the agreement of many minds known if they are all solipsists ? Hi Roger, The agreement is known by the appearance of a common world. It is the manifestation of their mutual truth. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-15, 16:46:15 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/15/2012 11:27 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But many minds are in agreement that God exists, so that must be true ? Hi Roger, In my proposed definitions, must only follows if and only if there is no accessible possible world where a contraindication of the agreement occurs. Put more simply, a statement is true iff there is no knowable contradiction of the statement. The possible existence of an unknowable contradiction to the truth of a statement acts to support the idea of fallibility. And must unicorns exist because I believe that they do ? The existence or non-existence is not contingent on anything, especially the belief of one person. Your question should be phrased as: Must unicorns be a physical creature because of my belief in such? The answer might be yes is there is some means by which your belief has the causal power to generate a physical being. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/16/2012 8:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But how could one know if the others are telling the truth ? Umm, I only assume the barest appearance of interactions. All of this is fully consistent with Leibniz' monadology. Monads have no windows and do not exchange substances. All interactions are only mutual synchronizations of their percepts. The surest test could only be a Turing Test. I am not sure how that is related... Plus I have another difficulty with solipsim. If perception must proceed existence, then one could never be stabbed in the back. Existence must be primitive ontologically, or else how are properties to be extracted from it by perception? There are no knives (or spoons), only phenomena of mutual agreements. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] mailto:rclo...@verizon.net] 11/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-11-16, 07:25:39 *Subject:* Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/16/2012 6:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King How is the agreement of many minds known if they are all solipsists ? Hi Roger, The agreement is known by the appearance of a common world. It is the manifestation of their mutual truth. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King But many minds are in agreement that God exists, so that must be true ? And must unicorns exist because I believe that they do ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/15/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 12:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/15/2012 11:27 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King But many minds are in agreement that God exists, so that must be true ? Hi Roger, In my proposed definitions, must only follows if and only if there is no accessible possible world where a contraindication of the agreement occurs. Put more simply, a statement is true iff there is no knowable contradiction of the statement. The possible existence of an unknowable contradiction to the truth of a statement acts to support the idea of fallibility. And must unicorns exist because I believe that they do ? The existence or non-existence is not contingent on anything, especially the belief of one person. Your question should be phrased as: Must unicorns be a physical creature because of my belief in such? The answer might be yes is there is some means by which your belief has the causal power to generate a physical being. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King I have no problem with that, although I do think that there are some eternal truths external to those minds. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end, all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/5/2012 1:17 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King I have no problem with that, although I do think that there are some eternal truths external to those minds. Dear Roger, OK, but what allows those 'external truths to be knowable? Maybe they are unknowable and if so what difference does their existence make? Think about what my claim below implies as we take the number of minds to infinity. Does the truth value increase to certainty of an arbitrary statement or not? Is it possible for an infinite number of minds to agree on the truth value of more than one sentence? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 *Subject:* Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on _many minds_ in agreement. -- -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/5/2012 1:19 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end, all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote. Dear Roger, Are you familiar with Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem and the voting paradox ? http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/02/12/game-theory-tuesdays-someone-is-going-to-be-unhappy-an-illustration-of-the-voting-paradox/ The executive summary is that whenever there are at least 2 people and at least 3 options, it's impossible to aggregate individual preferences without violating some desired conditions, like Pareto efficiency. You either have to accept that society will not act rationally like an individual would, or you have to accept that society's preferences will exactly mimic one person's preferences. In a sense, that makes the individual a dictator. I suspect that this impossibility might explain why people are so easily seduced by arguments like Einstein's quip: The moon still exists if I am not looking at it! We always over-value our own individual contribution to the definiteness of properties that we observe in the physical universe. It also might have something to do with theproblem of Free Will http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ and the absurd implications of the Quantum Suicide argument http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King Hmmm. Spacetime is xyzt and so extended, 1p is inextended and so not part of that. Thus, contrary to you and Berkeley, 1p and the physical universe do not need each other. xyzt does fine on its own. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:35:50 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 9:18 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Yes, Aristotle's substances and their properties do not change with time. But Leibniz's do very rapidly. And they are individual to each substance, meaning to each monad (from his aspect). The actual properties are collective data of the universe. Hi Roger, I do not assume a single physical universe that is independent of entities with 1p. I call this idea the Fish bowl model. I see the physical universe as a dream that is the same for many 1p, a literal mass delusion! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King Simple. All truths can probably only be known by the One who it seems generated them (not sure). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 13:43:57 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/5/2012 1:17 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King I have no problem with that, although I do think that there are some eternal truths external to those minds. Dear Roger, OK, but what allows those 'external truths to be knowable? Maybe they are unknowable and if so what difference does their existence make? Think about what my claim below implies as we take the number of minds to infinity. Does the truth value increase to certainty of an arbitrary statement or not? Is it possible for an infinite number of minds to agree on the truth value of more than one sentence? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King Thanks for the heads up. We ask that question every four years in the USA-- namely should the popular vote or should the votes from the individual states (the electoral vote) decide who becomes president ? In the first Bush election, Gore won the popular vote but Bush at the last moment narrowly squeezed out the electoral vote and so won at least officially. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 13:51:48 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/5/2012 1:19 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end, all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote. Dear Roger, Are you familiar with Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem and the voting paradox ? http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/02/12/game-theory-tuesdays-someone-is-going-to-be-unhappy-an-illustration-of-the-voting-paradox/ The executive summary is that whenever there are at least 2 people and at least 3 options, it? impossible to aggregate individual preferences without violating some desired conditions, like Pareto efficiency. You either have to accept that society will not act rationally like an individual would, or you have to accept that society? preferences will exactly mimic one person? preferences. In a sense, that makes the individual a dictator. I suspect that this impossibility might explain why people are so easily seduced by arguments like Einstein's quip: The moon still exists if I am not looking at it! We always over-value our own individual contribution to the definiteness of properties that we observe in the physical universe. It also might have something to do with the problem of Free Will and the absurd implications of the Quantum Suicide argument. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/5/2012 12:51 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 1:19 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end, all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote. Dear Roger, Are you familiar with Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem and the voting paradox ? http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/02/12/game-theory-tuesdays-someone-is-going-to-be-unhappy-an-illustration-of-the-voting-paradox/ The executive summary is that whenever there are at least 2 people and at least 3 options, it's impossible to aggregate individual preferences without violating some desired conditions, like Pareto efficiency. You either have to accept that society will not act rationally like an individual would, or you have to accept that society's preferences will exactly mimic one person's preferences. In a sense, that makes the individual a dictator. Which is why science is successful in reaching agreements. It seeks to persuade people by evidence instead of just aggregating opinions. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King All that we can know of reality is in the experience of now. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:26:12 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: ?? After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology. Dear Bruno, ?? Please elaborate on what this independence implies that has to do with the definiteness of properties. but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have done with it. ?? Any elaboration or link on this? The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean.? Bruno ?? Please understand that I am still developing my thesis, it is not yet born. It is like a jig-saw puzzle with most of the Big Picture on the box missing... ?? Even today I realized a new piece of the picture, but I don't know how to explain it... It has to do with the way that the duality permutes under exponentiation in Pratt's theory in a way that might be a better way to connect it with comp. ?? The canonical transformation of the duality, in Pratt's theory, is an exact or bijective chain of transformations ... - body - mind - body - mind - ... This makes the isomorphism between the Stone spaces and Boolean algebras into a bijective map equivalent to an automorphism. If we consider the transformation for the case there it is almost but not quite bijective, then we get orbits that tend to be near the automorphism, like the orbits of a strange attractor and not exactly periodic in space/time. This can be taken to something like an ergodic map where the orbits of the transformation are never periodic and every body and mind in the chain is different. ? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/4/2012 7:40 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King All that we can know of reality is in the experience of now. Hi Roger, Yes, in our mutual consistency and individually, but we have to start with a 'now' at the 1p for each observer. Every observer perceived itself at the center of its own universe. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:26:12 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: ?? After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology. Dear Bruno, ?? Please elaborate on what this independence implies that has to do with the definiteness of properties. but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have done with it. ?? Any elaboration or link on this? The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean.? Bruno ?? Please understand that I am still developing my thesis, it is not yet born. It is like a jig-saw puzzle with most of the Big Picture on the box missing... ?? Even today I realized a new piece of the picture, but I don't know how to explain it... It has to do with the way that the duality permutes under exponentiation in Pratt's theory in a way that might be a better way to connect it with comp. ?? The canonical transformation of the duality, in Pratt's theory, is an exact or bijective chain of transformations ... - body - mind - body - mind - ... This makes the isomorphism between the Stone spaces and Boolean algebras into a bijective map equivalent to an automorphism. If we consider the transformation for the case there it is almost but not quite bijective, then we get orbits that tend to be near the automorphism, like the orbits of a strange attractor and not exactly periodic in space/time. This can be taken to something like an ergodic map where the orbits of the transformation are never periodic and every body and mind in the chain is different. ? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 02 Nov 2012, at 20:48, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, Why do you consider magic as a potential answer to your question? After thinking about your question while I was waiting to pick up my daughter from school, it occurred to me that we see in the Big Bang model and in almost all cosmogenesis myths before it, an attempt to answer your question. Do you believe that properties are innate in objects? The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. If so, how do you propose the dependency on measurement, to 'make definite' the properties of objects that we see in quantum theory, works? QM is not part of the theory. My pathetic claim is that properties emerge from a 'subtractive process' (hat tip to Craig) between observers and that the One (totality of what exists) has all possible properties simultaneously (hat tip to Russell Standish). ? I have never understood what aspects of QM theory are derivable from COMP. Then study UDA. You must understand that the *whole* of physics is derivable, not from comp, but from elemntary arithmetic only. This is what is proved from comp. Ask question if you have a problem with any step. Do you have any result that show the general non-commutativity between observables of QM, Yes. That is testable in the Z1* comp quantum logic. It has not yet been completely justified, as the statement involve too many nesting of modal operator to be currently tractable. or do you just show that the linear algebraic structure of observables (as we see in Hilbert spaces) can be derived from 1p indeterminacy? Both. The linear properties and the general non-commutativity properties of operators (representing physical observables) are not the same thing... Of course. But the whole physics is given by the first order extension of the Z and X logic. This is necessary if we assume comp and the classical theory of knowledge (S4). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Dear Bruno, How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me, it never has as it does not allow for any explanation of apprehension of properties in my consideration... The only explanation of properties that makes sense to me is that of Leibniz: Properties are given by relations. We might think of objects as bundles of properties but this is problematic as it implies that properties are objects themselves. I think of properties similar to what Leibniz did: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's/monads/---which is the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an object/has to/possess and those that it possesses/throughout its existence/coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have been a different entity. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a different perspective. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce...And he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways...the result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is...a substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective emphasized. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. The difference in my thinking to that of Leibniz is that a monad is never at place p at time t (location is defined solely interns of mutuality of perspectives) and monads are only substances in that they are eternal. I find it best to drop the idea of substance altogether as it can be completely defined in terms of invariances. After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Hi, This paper might be interesting to any one that would like to see a nice discussion of who it is that we come to understand numbers: http://web.media.mit.edu/~stefanm/society/som_final.html http://web.media.mit.edu/%7Estefanm/society/som_final.html -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Dear Bruno, How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me, it never has as it does not allow for any explanation of apprehension of properties in my consideration... The only explanation of properties that makes sense to me is that of Leibniz: Properties are given by relations. We might think of objects as bundles of properties but this is problematic as it implies that properties are objects themselves. I think of properties similar to what Leibniz did: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's monads—which is the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its existence coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have been a different entity. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a different perspective. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce…And he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways…the result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is…a substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective emphasized. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. The difference in my thinking to that of Leibniz is that a monad is never at place p at time t (location is defined solely interns of mutuality of perspectives) and monads are only substances in that they are eternal. I find it best to drop the idea of substance altogether as it can be completely defined in terms of invariances. After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology. but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have done with it. The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 07:17:58 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Dear Bruno, How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me, it never has as it does not allow for any explanation of apprehension of properties in my consideration... The only explanation of properties that makes sense to me is that of Leibniz: Properties are given by relations. We might think of objects as bundles of properties but this is problematic as it implies that properties are objects themselves. I think of properties similar to what Leibniz did: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's monads?hich is the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its existence coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have been a different entity. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a different perspective. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce?nd he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways?he result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is? substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective emphasized. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. The difference in my thinking to that of Leibniz is that a monad is never at place p at time t (location is defined solely interns of mutuality of perspectives) and monads are only substances in that they are eternal. I find it best to drop the idea of substance altogether as it can be completely defined in terms of invariances. After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King Those are psychological versions of numbers etc,. The innate properties are arithmetical. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 07:20:37 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Hi, This paper might be interesting to any one that would like to see a nice discussion of who it is that we come to understand numbers: http://web.media.mit.edu/~stefanm/society/som_final.html -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen, ' Yes, Aristotle's substances and their properties do not change with time. But Leibniz's do very rapidly. And they are individual to each substance, meaning to each monad (from his aspect). The actual properties are collective data of the universe. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 08:22:27 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Dear Bruno, How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me, it never has as it does not allow for any explanation of apprehension of properties in my consideration... The only explanation of properties that makes sense to me is that of Leibniz: Properties are given by relations. We might think of objects as bundles of properties but this is problematic as it implies that properties are objects themselves. I think of properties similar to what Leibniz did: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's monads?hich is the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its existence coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have been a different entity. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a different perspective. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce?nd he considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways?he result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is? substance which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective emphasized. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid. The difference in my thinking to that of Leibniz is that a monad is never at place p at time t (location is defined solely interns of mutuality of perspectives) and monads are only substances in that they are eternal. I find it best to drop the idea of substance altogether as it can be completely defined in terms of invariances. After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology. but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have done with it. The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on _many minds_ in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/3/2012 9:18 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Yes, Aristotle's substances and their properties do not change with time. But Leibniz's do very rapidly. And they are individual to each substance, meaning to each monad (from his aspect). The actual properties are collective data of the universe. Hi Roger, I do not assume a single physical universe that is independent of entities with 1p. I call this idea the Fish bowl model. I see the physical universe as a dream that is the same for many 1p, a literal mass delusion! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, Why do you consider magic as a potential answer to your question? After thinking about your question while I was waiting to pick up my daughter from school, it occurred to me that we see in the Big Bang model and in almost all cosmogenesis myths https://www.google.com/#hl=ensugexp=les%3Bgs_nf=3tok=1XoTsmBbCpme0mnC57FQ9Qcp=18gs_id=3xhr=tq=cosmogenesis+mythspf=poutput=searchsclient=psy-aboq=cosmogenesis+mythsgs_l=pbx=1bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.fp=41b2cca49596839ebpcl=37189454biw=1527bih=812 before it, an attempt to answer your question. Do you believe that properties are innate in objects? If so, how do you propose the dependency on measurement, to 'make definite' the properties of objects that we see in quantum theory, works? My pathetic claim is that properties emerge from a 'subtractive process' (hat tip to Craig) between observers and that the One (totality of what exists) has all possible properties simultaneously (hat tip to Russell Standish). I have never understood what aspects of QM theory are derivable from COMP. Do you have any result that show the general non-commutativity between observables of QM, or do you just show that the linear algebraic structure of observables (as we see in Hilbert spaces) can be derived from 1p indeterminacy? The linear properties and the general non-commutativity properties of operators (representing physical observables) are not the same thing... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:39, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King H. I guess I should have know this, but if there are unproveable statements, couldn't that also mean that the axioms needed to prove them have simply been overlooked in inventorying (or constructing) the a priori ? If so, then couldn't these missing axioms be suggested by simply asking what additional axioms are needed to prove the supposedly unproveable propositions? You can add the new statement, but then you get a transformed machine, and it will have new unprovable statement, or become inconsistent. Tkae the machine/theory having the beliefs:axioms: 1) 2) Suppose the machine is consistent. Then the following below is a new consistent machine, much richer in probability abilities: 1) 2) 3) 1) + 2) is consistent. But the one below: 1) 2) 3) 1) + 2) + 3) is consistent. which can be defined (the circularity can be eliminated by use of some trick) will be inconsistent, as no machine can ever prove consistently his own consistency. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/24/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 13:28:00 Subject: Re: Emergence Hi Richard, You mean provable statements not truths per se... I guess. OK, I haven't given that trope much thought I try to keep Godel's theorems reserved for special occasions. It has my experience that they can be very easily misapplied. On 8/23/2012 1:24 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, Strong emergence follows from Godel's incompleteness because in any consistent system there are truths that cannot be derived from the axioms of the system. That is what is meant by incompleteness. Sounds like what you just said. No? Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:20 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Ah! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_emergence Strong emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is irreducible to its individual constituents. OK, but irreducibility would have almost the same meaning as implying the non-existence of relations between the constituents and the emergent. It makes a mathematical description of the pair impossible... I don't think that I agree that it is derivable from Godel Incompleteness; I will be agnostic on this for now. Could you explain how it might? On 8/23/2012 1:10 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is said that strong emergence comes from Godel incompleteness. Weak emergence is like your grains of sand. On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Pratt's theory does not address this. Could emergence be the result of inter-communications between monads and not an objective process at all? It is useful to think about how to solve the Sorites paradox to see what I mean here. A heap is said to emerge from a collection of grains, but is there a number or discrete or smooth process that generates the heap? No! The heap is just an abstract category that we assign. It is a name. On 8/23/2012 9:44 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence
Hi Stephen P. King H. I guess I should have know this, but if there are unproveable statements, couldn't that also mean that the axioms needed to prove them have simply been overlooked in inventorying (or constructing) the a priori ? If so, then couldn't these missing axioms be suggested by simply asking what additional axioms are needed to prove the supposedly unproveable propositions? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/24/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 13:28:00 Subject: Re: Emergence Hi Richard, You mean provable statements not truths per se... I guess. OK, I haven't given that trope much thought I try to keep Godel's theorems reserved for special occasions. It has my experience that they can be very easily misapplied. On 8/23/2012 1:24 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, Strong emergence follows from Godel's incompleteness because in any consistent system there are truths that cannot be derived from the axioms of the system. That is what is meant by incompleteness. Sounds like what you just said. No? Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:20 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Ah! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_emergence Strong emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is irreducible to its individual constituents. OK, but irreducibility would have almost the same meaning as implying the non-existence of relations between the constituents and the emergent. It makes a mathematical description of the pair impossible... I don't think that I agree that it is derivable from Godel Incompleteness; I will be agnostic on this for now. Could you explain how it might? On 8/23/2012 1:10 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is said that strong emergence comes from Godel incompleteness. Weak emergence is like your grains of sand. On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Pratt's theory does not address this. Could emergence be the result of inter-communications between monads and not an objective process at all? It is useful to think about how to solve the Sorites paradox to see what I mean here. A heap is said to emerge from a collection of grains, but is there a number or discrete or smooth process that generates the heap? No! The heap is just an abstract category that we assign. It is a name. On 8/23/2012 9:44 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence
Hi Roger, The point is that there exist (provably!) statements that are infinite and thus would require proofs that can effectively inspect their infinite extent. We could argue that induction allows us to shorten the length to a finite version but this does not cover all. For instance, consider a proposed theorem that states that there exists a certain sequence of digits in the n-ary expansion of pi. How does one consider the proof of such a theorem? Constructability (by fiite means) is the key to our notions of understanding, etc. and have lead some people to reject all math that does not admit constructable proofs. This is a HUGE problem in mathematics and by extension philosophy. On 8/24/2012 6:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King H. I guess I should have know this, but if there are unproveable statements, couldn't that also mean that the axioms needed to prove them have simply been overlooked in inventorying (or constructing) the a priori ? If so, then couldn't these missing axioms be suggested by simply asking what additional axioms are needed to prove the supposedly unproveable propositions? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 8/24/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-23, 13:28:00 *Subject:* Re: Emergence Hi Richard, You mean provable statements not truths per se... I guess. OK, I haven't given that trope much thought I try to keep Godel's theorems reserved for special occasions. It has my experience that they can be very easily misapplied. On 8/23/2012 1:24 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, Strong emergence follows from Godel's incompleteness because in any consistent system there are truths that cannot be derived from the axioms of the system. That is what is meant by incompleteness. Sounds like what you just said. No? Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:20 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Ah! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_emergence Strong emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is irreducible to its individual constituents. OK, but irreducibility would have almost the same meaning as implying the non-existence of relations between the constituents and the emergent. It makes a mathematical description of the pair impossible... I don't think that I agree that it is derivable from Godel Incompleteness; I will be agnostic on this for now. Could you explain how it might? On 8/23/2012 1:10 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is said that strong emergence comes from Godel incompleteness. Weak emergence is like your grains of sand. On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Pratt's theory does not address this. Could emergence be the result of inter-communications between monads and not an objective process at all? It is useful to think about how to solve the Sorites paradox to see what I mean here. A heap is said to emerge from a collection of grains, but is there a number or discrete or smooth process that generates the heap? No! The heap is just an abstract category that we assign. It is a name. On 8/23/2012 9:44 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence
Hi Richard, Pratt's theory does not address this. Could emergence be the result of inter-communications between monads and not an objective process at all? It is useful to think about how to solve the Sorites paradox to see what I mean here. A heap is said to emerge from a collection of grains, but is there a number or discrete or smooth process that generates the heap? No! The heap is just an abstract category that we assign. It is a name. On 8/23/2012 9:44 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence
Hi Stephen P. King Complexity seems to be the threshold of a magical transformation. The more commonsense solution or explanation is to invoke Leibniz-like downward causation. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/23/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 12:48:51 Subject: Re: Emergence Hi Richard, Pratt's theory does not address this. Could emergence be the result of inter-communications between monads and not an objective process at all? It is useful to think about how to solve the Sorites paradox to see what I mean here. A heap is said to emerge from a collection of grains, but is there a number or discrete or smooth process that generates the heap? No! The heap is just an abstract category that we assign. It is a name. On 8/23/2012 9:44 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence
It is said that strong emergence comes from Godel incompleteness. Weak emergence is like your grains of sand. On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Hi Richard, Pratt's theory does not address this. Could emergence be the result of inter-communications between monads and not an objective process at all? It is useful to think about how to solve the Sorites paradox to see what I mean here. A heap is said to emerge from a collection of grains, but is there a number or discrete or smooth process that generates the heap? No! The heap is just an abstract category that we assign. It is a name. On 8/23/2012 9:44 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence
Hi Richard, Ah! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_emergence Strong emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is irreducible to its individual constituents. OK, but irreducibility would have almost the same meaning as implying the non-existence of relations between the constituents and the emergent. It makes a mathematical description of the pair impossible... I don't think that I agree that it is derivable from Godel Incompleteness; I will be agnostic on this for now. Could you explain how it might? On 8/23/2012 1:10 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is said that strong emergence comes from Godel incompleteness. Weak emergence is like your grains of sand. On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Pratt's theory does not address this. Could emergence be the result of inter-communications between monads and not an objective process at all? It is useful to think about how to solve the Sorites paradox to see what I mean here. A heap is said to emerge from a collection of grains, but is there a number or discrete or smooth process that generates the heap? No! The heap is just an abstract category that we assign. It is a name. On 8/23/2012 9:44 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence
Stephan, Strong emergence follows from Godel's incompleteness because in any consistent system there are truths that cannot be derived from the axioms of the system. That is what is meant by incompleteness. Sounds like what you just said. No? Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:20 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Hi Richard, Ah! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_emergence Strong emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is irreducible to its individual constituents. OK, but irreducibility would have almost the same meaning as implying the non-existence of relations between the constituents and the emergent. It makes a mathematical description of the pair impossible... I don't think that I agree that it is derivable from Godel Incompleteness; I will be agnostic on this for now. Could you explain how it might? On 8/23/2012 1:10 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is said that strong emergence comes from Godel incompleteness. Weak emergence is like your grains of sand. On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Hi Richard, Pratt's theory does not address this. Could emergence be the result of inter-communications between monads and not an objective process at all? It is useful to think about how to solve the Sorites paradox to see what I mean here. A heap is said to emerge from a collection of grains, but is there a number or discrete or smooth process that generates the heap? No! The heap is just an abstract category that we assign. It is a name. On 8/23/2012 9:44 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence
Hi Richard, You mean provable statements not truths per se... I guess. OK, I haven't given that trope much thought I try to keep Godel's theorems reserved for special occasions. It has my experience that they can be very easily misapplied. On 8/23/2012 1:24 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, Strong emergence follows from Godel's incompleteness because in any consistent system there are truths that cannot be derived from the axioms of the system. That is what is meant by incompleteness. Sounds like what you just said. No? Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:20 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Ah! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_emergence Strong emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is irreducible to its individual constituents. OK, but irreducibility would have almost the same meaning as implying the non-existence of relations between the constituents and the emergent. It makes a mathematical description of the pair impossible... I don't think that I agree that it is derivable from Godel Incompleteness; I will be agnostic on this for now. Could you explain how it might? On 8/23/2012 1:10 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is said that strong emergence comes from Godel incompleteness. Weak emergence is like your grains of sand. On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Pratt's theory does not address this. Could emergence be the result of inter-communications between monads and not an objective process at all? It is useful to think about how to solve the Sorites paradox to see what I mean here. A heap is said to emerge from a collection of grains, but is there a number or discrete or smooth process that generates the heap? No! The heap is just an abstract category that we assign. It is a name. On 8/23/2012 9:44 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: emergence (or is that re-emergence)
Thank you, Eric for your considerate reply, however more comprehensive (branching into math) than I can absorbe all of it. Please see my remarks interjected as lines between John M - Original Message - From: Eric Hawthorne [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 2:42 AM Subject: Re: emergence (or is that re-emergence) Let me first apologize for not yet reading the mentioned references on the subject, John Mikes wrote: As long as we cannot qualify the steps in a 'process' leading to the emerged new, we call it emergence, later we call it process. Just look back into the cultural past, how many emergence-mystiques (miracles included) changed into regular quotidien processes, simply by developing more information about them. I did not say: the information. Some. I don't think this is correct. A fundamental concept when talking about emergence ought to be the pattern, or more precisely, the interesting, coherent, or perhaps useful pattern; useful perhaps in the sense of being a good building block for some other pattern. Process is a subset of pattern, in the sense in which I'm using pattern. Also, system is a subset of pattern. ** I also think in second thought that my statement is NOT correct. I mixed the (misused name) complexity, indeed a set of all descriptions with the model we form within a topic (a defined subset). Once you mention a 'pattern', it is a model. A cut-off view within the topical interest of the observer. In the 'emergence' as I formulated it, the effect of the total is invoked, influences from broader sets than the model itself. I find mathematical examples off (my) base, since math is 'describing' the model and so it is the map of the territory - where the territory itself is also only a model of our viewed (selected) part in question. ** Q: How do you know when you have completely described a pattern? Two examples, or analogies, for what I mean by this question: e.g. 1 I used to wonder whether I had completely proved something in math, and would go into circles trying to figure out how to know when something was sufficiently proved or needed more reductionism ... ** You said it in the last three words. I try to generalize (which is, of course, beyond my capabilites, but so be it: I don't cut my inqueries to the conventional old reductionistic knowledge in searching for new views). Your completely described pattern is still an incomplete model. [let me skip your example #1, the A to it, shows the model indeed] ** e.g. 2 Is the essence of human life in the domain of DNA chemistry, or in the domain of sociobiology, psychology, cultural anthropology? Are we likely to have a future DNA based theory of psychology or culture? Definitely not. Cellular processes and psychology and culture are related, but not in any essential manner. ** I don't know what is life, especially human life? There is a 'pattern' in processes of changes in parts of the complexity which - at a certain level - may be called 'life', not essentially different from other types of change. How good old reductionist science boxed in the models formulated under this name are good for the developmental sequence in the inquiry, but do not contribute much to my search of fundamental generalization. The organizations are interconnected and interinfluenced, which makes the difference between a machine and a natural system (words borrowed from Robert Rosen's vocabulary). Cellular processes IMO are definitly model based cut-offs. *** A: Let's define a complete description of a pattern as a description which describes the essential properties of the pattern. The essential properties of the pattern are those which, taken together, are sufficient to yield the defining interestingness, coherence, or usefulness of the pattern. **QED** Note that any other properties (of the medium in which the pattern lives) are accidental properties of the incarnation of the pattern. Note also that the more detailed mechanisms or sub-patterns which may have generated each particular essential property of the main pattern are irrelevant to the creation of a minimal complete description of the main pattern being described. As long as the property of the main pattern has whatever nature it has to have as far as the pattern is concerned, it simply doesn't matter how the property got that way, or what other humps on its back the property also has in the particular incarnation. And that level-independence or spurious-detail independence or simply abstractness of useful patterns is one of the reasons why it makes sense to talk about emergence. e.g.of level-independence of a pattern. 1. Game of Pong 2a. Visual Basic 2b. Pascal program 2c. Ping-pong table, program on PCon a Mac ball, bats, players 3a. x86 ML
Re: emergence (or is that re-emergence)
Let me first apologize for not yet reading the mentioned references on the subject, John Mikes wrote: As long as we cannot qualify the steps in a 'process' leading to the emerged new, we call it emergence, later we call it process. Just look back into the cultural past, how many emergence-mystiques (miracles included) changed into regular quotidien processes, simply by developing more information about them. I did not say: the information. Some. I don't think this is correct. A fundamental concept when talking about emergence ought to be the pattern, or more precisely, the interesting, coherent, or perhaps useful pattern; useful perhaps in the sense of being a good building block for some other pattern. Process is a subset of pattern, in the sense in which I'm using pattern. Also, system is a subset of pattern. Q: How do you know when you have completely described a pattern? Two examples, or analogies, for what I mean by this question: e.g. 1 I used to wonder whether I had completely proved something in math, and would go into circles trying to figure out how to know when something was sufficiently proved or needed more reductionism i.e. The old Wait a minute: How do we know that 1 + 1 = 2? problem. The gifted mathematicians teaching me seemed to have no trouble knowing when they were finished proving something. It was intuitively obvious -- load of cods wallop of course. And I still wonder to this day if they were simply way smarter than me or prisoners of an incredibly limited, rote-learned math worldview. The point is, every theory; every description of states-of-affairs and processes or systems (patterns) using concepts and relationships, has a limited domain-of-discourse, and mixing descriptions of patterns in different domains is unnecessary and obfuscates the essentials of the pattern under analysis. e.g. 2 Is the essence of human life in the domain of DNA chemistry, or in the domain of sociobiology, psychology, cultural anthropology? Are we likely to have a future DNA based theory of psychology or culture? Definitely not. Cellular processes and psychology and culture are related, but not in any essential manner. A: Let's define a complete description of a pattern as a description which describes the essential properties of the pattern. The essential properties of the pattern are those which, taken together, are sufficient to yield the defining interestingness, coherence, or usefulness of the pattern. Note that any other properties (of the medium in which the pattern lives) are accidental properties of the incarnation of the pattern. Note also that the more detailed mechanisms or sub-patterns which may have generated each particular essential property of the main pattern are irrelevant to the creation of a minimal complete description of the main pattern being described. As long as the property of the main pattern has whatever nature it has to have as far as the pattern is concerned, it simply doesn't matter how the property got that way, or what other humps on its back the property also has in the particular incarnation. And that level-independence or spurious-detail independence or simply abstractness of useful patterns is one of the reasons why it makes sense to talk about emergence. e.g.of level-independence of a pattern. 1. Game of Pong 2a. Visual Basic 2b. Pascal program 2c. Ping-pong table, program on PCon a Mac ball, bats, players 3a. x86 ML program 3b. PowerPC ML program3c. Newtonian physics of everyday objects 4a. voltage patterns in 4b. voltage patterns in silicon NAND gates Gallium Arsenide NOR gates (you get the idea) Key: - 1. The main pattern being described 2, 3, 4. Lower-level i.e. implementation-level or building-block-level patterns whose own internal details are irrelevant to the emergence of the main pattern, which emerges essentially identical from all three of very different lower level building-block patterns. So in summary, an emergent pattern is described as emergent because it emerges, somehow, anyhow, doesn't matter how, as an abstract, useful, independently describable pattern (process, system, state-of-affairs). A theory of the pattern's essential form or behaviour need make no mention of the properties of the substrate in which the pattern formed, except to confirm that, in some way, some collection of the substrate properties could have generated or accidentally manifested each pattern-essential property. A theory of form and function of the pattern can be perfectly adequate, complete, and predictive (in the pattern-level-appropriate domain of discourse), without making any reference to the substrate properties. This is not to say that any substrate can generate any pattern. There are constraints, but they are of many-to-many
Re: emergence
Russell, thanks for your considerate reply. I 'owe one' to 'vznuri' (whatever name that may be) for the URL of your paper. I glanced at it only, because it is on a different 'basis' from my thinking. I try to explain below. Try, because the complexity thinking I seek needs lots of enlightenment and is mostly a criticism of the conventionality, with very little (so far) to go on with. Basically: I don't think in terms of a complex system and of the calculable definitions (Kolmogoroff, Shanon, Chaitin, Santa Fe, and - R. StandishG,) rather a conceptual explanatory narrative (not even a theory) for the 'complementarities' (paradoxes) of the 'science/dilemma' we got into by overstepping the thinking barriers of math-based belief systems (btw. this list started exactly on such dissatisfaction some years ago, before too much conventional physics knowledge came into consideration on it). Quoting from your paper: Is complexity totally subjective? As far as our mind-formulated models are concerned: yes. However there are only insufficient models, the 'total model' would be the thing itself, nit a model. The 'complexity' (I emphasise: wrong word) is called by some students endogenous impredicative pointing more closely to the unmodellable diversification of the concept. Since this line would lead into a quagmire and I want to concentrate on emergence, I jump into it. Your definition (among another 1000 words): emergence (e-) is the concept of some new phenomenon arising in a system that wasn't in the specification of that system's specification to start with... Here we go: NEW, pointing to our (so far) ignorance. Which rests my case for my fist statement about human ignorance. Then you follow up with what you call my description of (e-), a lengthy mathematical-like part on macro vs micro language (description), irrelevant for me, since a 'description' secures an insufficient model. I appreciate your statement of the 'macrodesciption' as a good theory. As you conclude - and I agree: ...(the (e-) system) would not be an observed phenomenon. The 'observed' would be our model of the natural system's so far discovered part - while (e-) arises mostly from beyond that knowledge-segment (why we call it an (e-), of course) Ronald et al. focus on the element of surprise as a test of the (e-)... Another 'resting place' for my statement about 'ignorance' - we are not surprised about things we know. It would be predicted, expected. I do not go into your evidences by entropy, a mathematical ingenuity for making sense of things not understandable - at the informational - epistemic level of thinking 200+ years ago and still carried on by more than a dozen new and improved theories - a basic obsession of conventional physicists. I know this is anathema, but I am not religious. I would like to know why you find (e-) applicable for known circumstances. I think it is because of the different views I explained above. Thank you for your position on the math-applicability. One short rremark though: Maybe I call (e-) less of a product of a modeling process, rather a view within our modeling-results. Respectfully John Mikes - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, November 24, 2002 7:11 PM Subject: Re: emergence John, I can't remember whether you read my paper On Complexity and Emergence in Complexity International a couple of years ago. Basically, I think you are well on the mark, except I disagree with you on the issue that once a mechanism is known, the process is no longer emergent. I think it still is emergent, and explain why in that paper. As to mathematics predicting emergent phenomena, I believe that the answer is categorically no. Emergent phenomena is a result of a modelling process - eg what a brain does, not an analytic process. Mathematics can be used to describe the emergent phenomenon after it is discovered, but I don't think the discovery process can really be called mathematics. Cheers [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The correspondent with that mystical name touched an interesting problem (earlier appearing in Hale's and Tim's posts): emergence. Colin Hales: Our main gripe is the issue of emergent behaviour and the mathematical treatment thereof? Yes? (Tim's post see below). I have an indecent opinion of this concept: it is human ignorance. Let me explain. As long as we cannot qualify the steps in a 'process' leading to the emerged new, we call it emergence, later we call it process. Just look back into the cultural past, how many emergence-mystiques (miracles included) changed into regular quotidien processes, simply by developing more information about them. I did not say: the information. Some. The world as we know about it, consists of models which the mind (who's-ever or what's-ever) was capable to construct at a given level
