On Wednesday, April 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or physics
than mathematics,
I call that theology, and this can be justified
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or
physics than mathematics,
I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's notion of
theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates.
Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons. Nematodes
should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion of which would
involve damaging the 1000 neurons and there was a brain prothesis that
would simulate a their function I should say yes doctor. Since modelling
1000
On 22 Apr 2015, at 09:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or
physics than mathematics,
I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's
notion of theology,
On 22 Apr 2015, at 09:26, Dennis Ochei wrote:
Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons.
Nematodes should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion
of which would involve damaging the 1000 neurons and there was a
brain prothesis that would simulate a their
.
I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive teleportation
scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually terminates the original
person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest continuer so there is no
continuing person -- the original is cut. If the original is not cut
On 21 April 2015 at 09:25, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that
claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original
It is a possible theory. See D Parfit, 'Reasons and
on -- does not duplicate the person -- the copies,
being identical in all respects, are one person.
I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive
teleportation
scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually terminates the original
person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest
On 21 April 2015 at 14:15, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
theory coupled with computationalism predicts the
is false (which is out of topic).
In step 3 you have a tie for closest continuer so there is no
continuing person -- the original is cut. If the original is not cut
(as in step 5), then that is the continuing person, and the
duplicate is a new person. Time delays as in steps 2 and 4 do
saying that a case could be made that all the destructive
teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually
terminates the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest
continuer so there is no continuing person -- the original is cut.
If the original is not cut (as in step
On 20 April 2015 at 21:44, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity
I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a concrete example
with a train moving at relativistic speeds through a tunnel. The train
lorentz contracts such that it is shorter than the tunnel. To an observer
outside the
On 4/20/2015 3:19 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest
continuer or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more
psychologically like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher
fraction of the molecules
No one cares who inherits the farm. Subjective expectation is the crux of
personal identity. You can't tell me that whether i wake up in Moscow
depends on whether or not a reconstruction event happened at Helsinki
faster than signals can travel between the two.
On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Oh i see the issue. I didn't realize you'd assume the scanner is
immobile. Immobilizing it relative to everything in the universe is
uhhh... rather difficult.
The scanning event is taken as a single point in space-time. Mobility is
irrelevant. If you create duplicates,
I have to say that the point under discussion SHOULD be the nature of
subjective experience, surely? That is, why do we feel as though we have
continuity? (And does the answer to that preclude duplicators etc?)
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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
sigh... Parfit does away with personal identity, replacing it with
psychological connectedness relation R. Past and future selves are not
identical to you, but are new persons that are like you to a high degree.
Your relationship to your past and future selves are much like your
relationship to
Dennis Ochei wrote:
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity
I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a concrete
example with a train moving at relativistic speeds through a tunnel. The
train lorentz contracts such that it is shorter than the tunnel. To an
Oh i see the issue. I didn't realize you'd assume the scanner is immobile.
Immobilizing it relative to everything in the universe is uhhh... rather
difficult.
On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
the person -- the copies,
being identical in all respects, are one person.
I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive
teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually terminates
the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest continuer so
Dennis Ochei wrote:
No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest
continuer or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more
psychologically like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher
fraction of the molecules I was made of when I was 5.
Or suppose I
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!
That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says that
teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a teleportation to
the same location. Or perhaps you missed the part were it
Bruce Kellett wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!
That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says
that teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a
teleportation to the same location. Or perhaps you missed the
new persons -- the cut actually
terminates the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest
continuer so there is no continuing person -- the original is cut.
If the original is not cut (as in step 5), then that is the
continuing person, and the duplicate is a new person. Time
scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually
terminates the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest
continuer so there is no continuing person -- the original is cut. If
the original is not cut (as in step 5), then that is the continuing
person, and the duplicate is a new person
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that
claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original
It is a possible theory. See D Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons' (Oxford, 1984).
and 2) Ordinary survival does not create a new
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/20/2015 3:19 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.
The information from the scan could be transmitted to spacelike separate
reconstruction
Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!
That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says that
teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a teleportation to the
same location. Or perhaps you missed the part were it reconstitutes me at
t+epsilon and
Right, mobility is irrelevant. I mispoke.
On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Oh i see the issue. I didn't realize you'd assume the scanner is
immobile. Immobilizing it relative to everything in the universe is uhhh...
rather
Russell Standish wrote:
There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
theory coupled with computationalism predicts the absence of any
discontinuities of experience, such as what I experience evry night
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad
Closest continuer theory is itself a redefinition of the lay conception and is
frankly absurd. Semiconservative replication doesn't kill me. And the lay
understanding considers teletransportation as equivalent to death, contra
closest continuer theory.
--
You received this message because you
Closest continuer theory is itself a redefinition of the lay conception and is
frankly absurd. Semiconservative replication doesn't kill me. And the lay
understanding considers teletransportation as equivalent to death, contra
closest continuer theory.
Combustion is the everyday concept and
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining
combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it isn't even
coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining combustion without
reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday notion because it is a
convenient fiction.
I don't think
to 100% accurate,
to start off at least. Identity over time is the real issue.
-Original Message-
From: Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Mon, Apr 20, 2015 5:11 am
Subject: Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?
Closest continuer
I think his problem is that you are using an impoverished definition of
personal identity, the same way an incompatibilist would be annoyed at the
compatibilist redefinition of free will. I have to admit that as an
incompatibilist i am annoyed by this move, but in your case i am not bothered
No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest continuer
or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more psychologically
like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher fraction of the molecules I
was made of when I was 5.
Or suppose I get into a matter
On 20 Apr 2015, at 13:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
because it
On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because
it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for
explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use
the everyday notion
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it isn't even
coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining combustion without
reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday notion because it is a
convenient fiction.
--
You received this message because you
, despite its non-definability, facilitates
the train of reasoning in humans; but we justifiably might have used
digital machines instead.
Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant by step
3. Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond the contents
, facilitates
the train of reasoning in humans; but we justifiably might have
used
digital machines instead.
Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant by
step 3. Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond
the contents of memories. Whether one really
non-definability, facilitates
the train of reasoning in humans; but we justifiably might have used
digital machines instead.
Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant by
step 3. Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond the
contents of memories
by access to basic
memories. Consciousness, despite its non-definability,
facilitates
the train of reasoning in humans; but we justifiably might have
used
digital machines instead.
Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant
by step 3. Bruno makes no attempt to define
On Wed, Apr 15, 2015 at 10:23 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
We are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no
longer have their ordinary, everyday meaning.
Yes. According to Bruno the words atheist and Christian mean almost the
same thing with atheism
there is no problem with what is meant by
step 3.
Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond the contents
of
memories. Whether one really survives being teleported, or falling
asleep and
waking up the next day, isn't relevant. Moscow man is just the guy who
in humans; but we justifiably might have used
digital machines instead.
Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant by step
3. Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond the
contents of memories. Whether one really survives being teleported, or
falling asleep
have used digital machines
instead.
Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant by step 3.
Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond the contents of
memories. Whether one really survives being teleported, or falling asleep
and waking up the next day, isn't
On Saturday, March 22, 2014 8:35:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Mar 2014, at 16:25, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
On Thursday, March 20, 2014 6:26:53 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Mar 2014, at 21:21, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM
On 25 Mar 2014, at 07:45, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Saturday, March 22, 2014 8:35:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Mar 2014, at 16:25, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
How many different methodologies are used in the course of
producing all those definitions?
If science is
On Thursday, March 20, 2014 6:26:53 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Mar 2014, at 21:21, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC,
On Thursday, March 20, 2014 1:38:07 AM UTC, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 03:53:02PM -0700, ghi...@gmail.com
javascript:wrote:
Then - the notion of Computation being intrinsically conscious - a
basic
assaumption that I'[d call a major recurrent theme of
On 19 Mar 2014, at 21:21, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
I am
On 19 Mar 2014, at 23:53, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
I still remember back maybe in the 1990's, having to keep a sick
bucket nearby, for every tirme some daft comp scientist wheeled
himself out to say consciousness was purely about processing speed.
Remember that one? That was pretty big in
On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that
has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
I am not sure if I have any clue where we
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 8:21:58 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03,
On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 03:53:02PM -0700, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
Then - the notion of Computation being intrinsically conscious - a basic
assaumption that I'[d call a major recurrent theme of computionralism over
a pretty long period. A lot o.f your friends have said they buy it.
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 7:24:10 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Mar 2014, at 13:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't feel so much cloaked in the Popperian
On 15 Mar 2014, at 13:22, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:39:21 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Mar 2014, at 21:40, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
I've asked questions about method. You have not answered them. You
say you have been trying to understand me. I believe
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 7:24:10 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Mar 2014, at 13:22, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:39:21 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Mar 2014, at 21:40, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
I've asked questions about method. You have
On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 7:24:10 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Mar 2014, at 13:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't feel so much cloaked in the Popperian view. It has been been
refuted by John Case, notably (showing that Popper was
On 14 Mar 2014, at 21:40, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, March 14, 2014 8:26:47 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, March 14, 2014 5:21:05 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
On
On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:39:21 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Mar 2014, at 21:40, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
On Friday, March 14, 2014 8:26:47 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, March 14, 2014 5:21:05 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18,
On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net javascript:wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:
On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote:
On
On Friday, March 14, 2014 5:21:05 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/7/2014 8:26
On Friday, March 14, 2014 8:26:47 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, March 14, 2014 5:21:05 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On
:29 -0700
From: gabebod...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. Me too. But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and
consciousness seems more to be an immaterial
On 12 Mar 2014, at 20:31, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. Me too. But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and
consciousness seems more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge
than something made of particles, so, if
On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. Me too. But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and
consciousness seems more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than
something made of particles, so, if interested in the mind body problem,
the
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:OK. Me too.
But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and consciousness seems
more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than something made of particles,
so, if interested in the mind
On 10 Mar 2014, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 March 2014 17:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
or to bet on normal higher level of simulation, like with Böstrom
Could you elaborate?
Imagine you embed yourself in a virtual environment hereby. We
might easily fake a reality
On 10 Mar 2014, at 22:01, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
On Monday, March 10, 2014 2:08:14 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
That relativism argues against comp, and even implicitly against
Church thesis. But my point is not that comp is true, just that with
comp, the theory QM + comp is redundant,
On 10 Mar 2014, at 08:14, LizR wrote:
I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because
the brain (and body) are classical, which almost begs the question
of course, but it means that whatever causes macro-objects to
generally behave classically also applies to the brain.
On 3/9/2014 8:14 PM, LizR wrote:
On 10 March 2014 15:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Decoherence is what I described above. It's tracing over the environment
variables,
having selected what counts as environment and what as instrument/observer,
I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the
brain (and body) are classical, which almost begs the question of course,
but it means that whatever causes macro-objects to generally behave
classically also applies to the brain. (And the senses - if the eyes are
classical,
On 09 Mar 2014, at 00:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/8/2014 3:41 PM, LizR wrote:
On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in
arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.).
I can't hardly
On 09 Mar 2014, at 19:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:
On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb
On Saturday, March 8, 2014 2:37:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A couple other accounts of how things might be that I take seriously are
(1) physicalism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might only be
true when physically realized,
No problem, and indeed this would make comp
It's this one http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0312059v4.pdf which I think is his doctoral
thesis. He later expanded it into a book.
Brent
On 3/10/2014 12:14 AM, LizR wrote:
I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the brain (and body)
are classical, which almost begs
with Böstrom, or
abandon comp, that is abandon Church thesis, or yes doctor.
Bruno
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06
: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM
On 10 March 2014 17:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
or to bet on normal higher level of simulation, like with Böstrom
Could you elaborate?
David
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On 3/10/2014 8:16 AM, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
The axiomatic of natural numbers is far more simple than anything else. You
can
always propose a much more complex theory to falsify a simple set of axioms.
I don't know that the other cases I've mentioned are more complex. Physicalism
On 10 Mar 2014, at 16:16, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
On Saturday, March 8, 2014 2:37:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A couple other accounts of how things might be that I take
seriously are (1) physicalism in the sense that arithmetical
propositions might only be true when physically
On Monday, March 10, 2014 2:08:14 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
That relativism argues against comp, and even implicitly against Church
thesis. But my point is not that comp is true, just that with comp, the
theory QM + comp is redundant, and we have to justify QM (at the least its
Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to read
it?
On 11 March 2014 05:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
It's this one http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0312059v4.pdf which I think
is his doctoral thesis. He later expanded it into a book.
Brent
On
Actually I assume it's this...
http://www.amazon.com/Decoherence-Quantum---Classical-Transition-Collection/dp/3642071422/ref=sr_1_2?s=booksie=UTF8qid=1394489389sr=1-2keywords=Maximilian+Schlosshauer
Well I will start with the paper. It maye be beyond my brain (no fluffy
kittens).
On 11 March
On 3/10/2014 2:35 PM, LizR wrote:
Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to read it?
Decoherence and The Quantum-to-Classical Transition Springer
Brent
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Ta.
On 11 March 2014 14:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/10/2014 2:35 PM, LizR wrote:
Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to
read it?
Decoherence and The Quantum-to-Classical Transition Springer
Brent
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You received this message because
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:
On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is,
On 08 Mar 2014, at 20:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in
arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.).
I can't hardly imagine something less random than that.
But we don't know that it exists.
?
I just said:
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:
On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb
difficulties
but it can only do that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your
theories are scientifically irrelevant.
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/9
.
--
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14
.
--
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3
On 10 March 2014 14:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/9/2014 5:36 PM, LizR wrote:
Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism that
causes the collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being gravitational) and
therefore predicts that at some point that
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