On Tue, Apr 5, 2011 at 9:43 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
>
>
> On Apr 2, 12:08 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince
>>
>> wrote:
>> > Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the
>> > viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some
On Apr 2, 12:08 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince
>
> wrote:
> > Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the
> > viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual
> > branches to accomodate his survival. I've
On Apr 2, 7:51 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 02 Apr 2011, at 13:52, Nick Prince wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> Hi Nick,
>
> >> On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote:
>
> Bruno wrote
> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very o
On Mon, Apr 04, 2011 at 02:25:04PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
>
> Hi Russell
>
> Hi Russell
>
> Sorry I'm not making it clear what I meant – but I think I may have
> got a handle on it now. I was thinking about Bruno’s thought
> experiment. Suppose I am encoded in Brussels, my original is destr
On Apr 4, 7:16 pm, "Stephen Paul King" wrote:
> -Original Message-
> From: Nick Prince
> Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 1:55 PM
> To: Everything List
> Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
>
> Yes Sheldrakes ideas are just the kind of thing I was thinking of. I
>
On Apr 2, 11:42 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 02, 2011 at 05:12:28AM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
>
> > Hi Russell
> > I have considered also the possibility that the NCDSC may not
> > necessarilly operate simultaneously - this would imply temporary 3rd
> > person culde sacs! Just as i
-Original Message-
From: Nick Prince
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 1:55 PM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
Yes Sheldrakes ideas are just the kind of thing I was thinking of. I
think that he looked at my paper and used a reference to, I think?
alligned himself with
On Apr 2, 11:21 pm, stephenk wrote:
> Hi Nick,
>
> On Apr 2, 7:22 am, Nick Prince wrote:
>
> > Yes agreed. Also if timelike entanglements occurred there would be
> > less worry about conflict with relativity than there was originally
> > with spacelike effects. However if I understand decoher
On Sun, Apr 3, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
> When you say temporary cul-de-sacs, do you mean after which there is
> some kind of amnesia, and then you follow a non cul-de-sac history? If
> these really existed, then I would say the NCDS conjecture is refuted,
> and QTI, stricto-sensu
On Sun, Apr 3, 2011 at 7:36 AM, meekerdb wrote:
> But then why is your demise relevant? Presumably because if you did not die
> then the most consistent extension would be that your consciousness remain
> associated with your body - but as your body/brain deteriorates the most
> consistent exten
On Sat, Apr 02, 2011 at 05:12:28AM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
>
> Hi Russell
> I have considered also the possibility that the NCDSC may not
> necessarilly operate simultaneously - this would imply temporary 3rd
> person culde sacs! Just as in Bruno's teleportation experiment, there
> is no reason
Hi Nick,
On Apr 2, 7:22 am, Nick Prince wrote:
> Yes agreed. Also if timelike entanglements occurred there would be
> less worry about conflict with relativity than there was originally
> with spacelike effects. However if I understand decoherence
> correctly, information from the system pass
On 4/2/2011 6:08 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the
viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual
branches to accomodate his survival. I've read some o
On 02 Apr 2011, at 13:52, Nick Prince wrote:
On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Nick,
On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote:
Bruno wrote
With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to
being a
baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
con
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 6:38 PM, Nick Prince
wrote:
>
>
> On Apr 1, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > wrote:
> > > Stathis wrote
> >
> > >> That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since
> > >> from t
nfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate -
> > which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out
> > to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach.
>
> > So is QTI false?
>
> > Russell does put forward a possible solution
On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Nick,
>
> On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote:
>
> >> Bruno wrote
> >> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
> >> baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
> >> continuous way, by little backt
Yes agreed. Also if timelike entanglements occurred there would be
less worry about conflict with relativity than there was originally
with spacelike effects. However if I understand decoherence
correctly, information from the system passes into the environment so
it is there somehow but very dis
On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
> Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the
> viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual
> branches to accomodate his survival. I've read some of your posts
> before about personal identity and
On Apr 1, 7:38 pm, Nick Prince wrote:
> On Apr 1, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> > On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince
>
> > wrote:
> > > Stathis wrote
>
> > >> That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since
> > >> from the third person perspective rar
On Apr 1, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince
>
>
>
>
>
> wrote:
> > Stathis wrote
>
> >> That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since
> >> from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a
> >> great age hap
On 01 Apr 2011, at 00:58, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday
argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from
our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot
On 01 Apr 2011, at 02:10, meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 03/31/11, Nick Prince wrote:>Bruno
wrote
> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to
being a
> baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
> continuous way, by little backtracking. We always su
Hi Nick,
On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote:
Bruno wrote
With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most
normal world compatible with
On 01 Apr 2011, at 01:51, Johnathan Corgan wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
Or something like that. Quantum logic (and also its arithmetical
form) has
many notion of implication. The one above is the closer to the
Sazaki Hook
which Hardegree used to show that
Nick,
the rewinding of the aging process is tricky. Now I am diverting from my
lately absorbed worldview of an unlimited complexity of everything of which
we (humans) can acknowledge only a part and build from that our
'mini-solipsism' (after Colin H) - matching in *part* with many humans, by
whic
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 10:20:58PM -0500, meekerdb wrote:
>
> Couldn't the person have been born at different times too? QM
> Hamiltonians are time symmetric. If you try to infer the past you
> also have unitary evolution - just in the other direction. So I'm
> wondering where the arrow of time
On 3/31/2011 10:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:52:25PM -0500, meekerdb wrote:
Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to
being a baby than an adult.
Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not
the past:?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:52:25PM -0500, meekerdb wrote:
> >Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to
> >being a baby than an adult.
> Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not
> the past:?
>
> Brent
In QM, the state evolves unitarily, which
On 3/31/2011 5:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday
argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from
our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday
> argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from
> our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be applied in this
> setting, as we have alread
On Mar 31, 8:10 pm, meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
>
>
> On 03/31/11,Nick Princewrote:>Bruno wrote
> > With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
> > baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
> > continuous way, by little backtracking. We always surv
On 03/31/11, Nick Prince wrote:>Bruno wrote> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a > baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more > continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most > normal world compatible with our states.
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Or something like that. Quantum logic (and also its arithmetical form) has
> many notion of implication. The one above is the closer to the Sazaki Hook
> which Hardegree used to show that orthomodularity in quantum ortholattice is
> related
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
> Stathis wrote
>
>
>> That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since
>> from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a
>> great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person
>> perspective you wil
Stathis wrote
> That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since
> from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a
> great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person
> perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the
> most pr
>Bruno wrote
> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
> baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
> continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most
> normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are
>
On Mar 31, 1:43 am, Russell Standish wrote:
> The observation that other people never seem to live beyond a certain
> age is not evidence against the NCDSC. Only logical
> impossibility can count. Even physical impossibility is insufficient,
> because there is always the possibility of mind upl
On 31 Mar 2011, at 15:35, Stephen Paul King wrote:
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 8:52 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 8:52 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
In Russell’s book there is a
have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns
out
to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach.
So is QTI false?
Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests
the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the
conscious
mind becomes so
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 11:43 AM, Russell Standish
wrote:
> This is a variant of an argument that David Parfit uses in his book
> "Reasons and Persons", where he considers a continuum from his mind
> to that of Napoleon. (Don't flame me if I get the details wrong - the
> essence is what is import
te for clarifying the issue - turns out
> to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach.
>
> So is QTI false?
>
> Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests
> the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious
> mind b
a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns
out
to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach.
So is QTI false?
Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests
the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the
conscious
mind becomes so similar to
confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach.
So is QTI false?
Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests
the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious
mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby
that perhaps “a diminishing
a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out
> to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach.
>
> So is QTI false?
>
> Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests
> the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious
&
.
So is QTI false?
Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests
the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious
mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby
that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an
appropriate
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