Re: Prime numbers

2013-05-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

John,

On 26 May 2013, at 00:54, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno and others:
did you read

http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/do_the_math/2013/05/yitang_zhang_twin_primes_conjecture_a_huge_discovery_about_prime_numbers.single.html

the information about prof. Zhang's discovery (U of New Hampshire)?
It is still in the conjecture of mathematical proof and 'truth' with  
a position of "primes are greater
than 1" -  with the interesting conclusion that 'primes' are the  
ATOMS of the number world.

Any thoughts?


Primes (1 is usually not considered as a prime number) are atoms of  
the numbers when conceived multiplicatively, because all numbers can  
be described uniquely as a product of primes. That is the existence  
and unicity of decomposition of numbers into prime factors (without  
taking the order of the multiplication into account). This is the so  
called fundamental theorem of arithmetic. It is easy to prove the  
existence of the decomposition into primes, but less easy to prove the  
uniqueness.


For the twin conjecture, (it exists an infinity of pair of primes p  
and q with p - q = 2) it looks like an important step has been proved,  
(the case with p - q just bounded) but we are still far from proving  
the twin one. Most mathematician believe that the twin conjecture is  
true (like most believe that the Riemann conjecture is true). If they  
were false, the distribution of primes would not be "statistically  
random", and that would mean something very special is at play, a bit  
like a number conspiracy!  Why not, of course. We just don't know, but  
a non random behavior of the primes is a bit like the UFO of number  
theory. Well, except that for the UFO, there are (at least) some  
evidences (from time to time, most are eventually explained in  
general), but there is no evidence at all that the primes behave non- 
randomly (in the statistical sense, not in Chaitin-Kolmogorov sense as  
we can generate mechanically the distribution of primes).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Prime numbers

2013-05-25 Thread meekerdb

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23595-weinsteins-theory-of-everything-is-probably-nothing.html

Brent


On 5/25/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno and others:
did you read

http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/do_the_math/2013/05/yitang_zhang_twin_primes_conjecture_a_huge_discovery_about_prime_numbers.single.html

the information about prof. Zhang's discovery (U of New Hampshire)?
It is still in the conjecture of mathematical proof and 'truth' with a position of 
"primes are greater

than 1" -  with the interesting conclusion that 'primes' are the ATOMS of the 
number world.
Any thoughts?
JM
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Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can bemonads. Cool.

2012-12-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 08 Dec 2012, at 14:23, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

By "universal numbers" are you referring to the numbers
as seen by Pythagoras ? I'm a little hesistant to get
into that stuff or anything esoteric since becoming a Christian.


Good!

No, by universal numbers I mean a code for a universal Turing machine  
(what a physical computers approximate very well).


Enumerate all the programs in some fixed universal programming  
language: p_0, p_1, p_2, p_3, ...
Call phi_i the corresponding partial computable function. u is said to  
be a universal number if phi_u() = phi_x(y). u is the computer, x  
is the program, and y is the data.  is a bijection from NXN to N,  
so as to keep the phi_i having all one input/variable.


Nothing esoteric here, it is computer science.

Bruno




There is a short video of these at

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7AyNFpJ6DA


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-08, 05:09:15
Subject: Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers  
can bemonads. Cool.


On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:57, Roger Clough wrote:

>
>
> Here's an additional observation-- Only the prime numbers can be
> monads,
> because all other integers can not be subdivided and still remain
> integers.






Hmm... numbers are monad when seen as index of a partial computable
function. the monad are the program, which you can see as a number
relative to a universal number. Keep in mind I use comp (renamed CTM
for Computationalist theory of Mind).

Bruno



>
> Cool.
>
>
>
> - Have received the following content -
> Sender: Roger Clough
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-07, 08:33:37
> Subject: Fw: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads
>
>
>
> Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers,
> whatever they be.
>
>
> - Have received the following content -
> Sender: Roger Clough
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36
> Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads
>
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
>
> 1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the
> Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's
> 1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God.
>
> 2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I
> thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances.
>
> But natural numbers are different because
> even though they are only mental substances, they're still
> substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided.
> So they are of one part each.
>
> Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no
> physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that.
>
> That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p.
>
> WHOOPEE !
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/7/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46
> Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling
> the mind
>
>
>
>
> On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon
> itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive
> theory has done.
>
>
> On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the
> diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is
> enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the "numbers
> see themselves".
>
>
> But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the
> incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp
> & p definition. It is a bit technical.
>
>
> Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower,
> and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> We can replace [1p] by its actions -
> those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject:  
object).

> You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.
>
>
> That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is
> the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by
> machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and
> indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or
> interprant) as a necessary and natural

Re: Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can bemonads. Cool.

2012-12-08 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Bruno Marchal 

By "universal numbers" are you referring to the numbers
as seen by Pythagoras ? I'm a little hesistant to get
into that stuff or anything esoteric since becoming a Christian.

There is a short video of these at

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7AyNFpJ6DA


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/8/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-08, 05:09:15
Subject: Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can 
bemonads. Cool.


On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:57, Roger Clough wrote:

>
>
> Here's an additional observation-- Only the prime numbers can be 
> monads,
> because all other integers can not be subdivided and still remain 
> integers.






Hmm... numbers are monad when seen as index of a partial computable 
function. the monad are the program, which you can see as a number 
relative to a universal number. Keep in mind I use comp (renamed CTM 
for Computationalist theory of Mind).

Bruno



>
> Cool.
>
>
>
> - Have received the following content -
> Sender: Roger Clough
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-07, 08:33:37
> Subject: Fw: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads
>
>
>
> Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers, 
> whatever they be.
>
>
> - Have received the following content -
> Sender: Roger Clough
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36
> Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads
>
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
>
> 1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the
> Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's
> 1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God.
>
> 2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I
> thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances.
>
> But natural numbers are different because
> even though they are only mental substances, they're still
> substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided.
> So they are of one part each.
>
> Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no
> physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that.
>
> That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p.
>
> WHOOPEE !
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/7/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46
> Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling 
> the mind
>
>
>
>
> On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon
> itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive
> theory has done.
>
>
> On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the 
> diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is 
> enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the "numbers 
> see themselves".
>
>
> But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the 
> incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp 
> & p definition. It is a bit technical.
>
>
> Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, 
> and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> We can replace [1p] by its actions -
> those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object).
> You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.
>
>
> That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is 
> the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by 
> machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and 
> indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or
> interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations.
> Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find
> again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument
> for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive
> theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize
> cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work
> when living breathing humans are concerned.
>
>
> I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage 
> of comp. You have computer science.
>
>
>
>
&

Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can be monads. Cool.

2012-12-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:57, Roger Clough wrote:




Here's an additional observation-- Only the prime numbers can be  
monads,
because all other integers can not be subdivided and still remain  
integers.







Hmm... numbers are monad when seen as index of a partial computable  
function. the monad are the program, which you can see as a number  
relative to a universal number. Keep in mind I use comp (renamed CTM  
for Computationalist theory of Mind).


Bruno





Cool.



- Have received the following content -
Sender: Roger Clough
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-07, 08:33:37
Subject: Fw: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads



Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers,  
whatever they be.



- Have received the following content -
Sender: Roger Clough
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36
Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads


Hi Bruno Marchal


1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the
Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's
1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God.

2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I
thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances.

But natural numbers are different because
even though they are only mental substances, they're still
substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided.
So they are of one part each.

Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no
physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that.

That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p.

WHOOPEE !

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/7/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46
Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling  
the mind





On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon
itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive
theory has done.


On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the  
diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is  
enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the "numbers  
see themselves".



But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the  
incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp  
& p definition. It is a bit technical.



Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower,  
and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter.









 We can replace [1p] by its actions -
those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object).
You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.


That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is  
the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by  
machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and  
indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level.








That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or
interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations.
Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find
again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument
for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive
theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize
cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work
when living breathing humans are concerned.


I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage  
of comp. You have computer science.






IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent
computer calculations from emulating the mind.


The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person  
points of view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the  
meaning of the comp hope, or the comp fear.



Bruno








[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12
Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth




On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual  
machines knows already that, and can justified that If there are  
machine (and from outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p- 
truth is not codable. The 1p truth are more related to the relation  
between belief and reality (not necessarily physical reality, except  
for observation and sensation).



Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.
Most truth about machine, including some that they can kno

An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can be monads. Cool.

2012-12-07 Thread Roger Clough


Here's an additional observation-- Only the prime numbers can be monads,
because all other integers can not be subdivided and still remain integers. 

Cool.



- Have received the following content -  
Sender: Roger Clough  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-07, 08:33:37 
Subject: Fw: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads 



Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers, whatever they 
be.  


- Have received the following content -  
Sender: Roger Clough  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36  
Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads  


Hi Bruno Marchal  


1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the  
Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's  
1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God.  

2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I  
thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances.  

But natural numbers are different because  
even though they are only mental substances, they're still  
substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided.  
So they are of one part each.  

Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no  
physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that.  

That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p.  

WHOOPEE !  

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]  
12/7/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46  
Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind  




On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote:  


Hi Bruno Marchal  

Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon  
itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive  
theory has done.  


On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the the 
self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to understand that 
physics emerge from the way the "numbers see themselves".  


But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the incompleteness 
phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp & p definition. It is a 
bit technical.  


Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and it 
plays the key role for consciousness and matter.  








  We can replace [1p] by its actions -  
those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object).  
You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.  


That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the 1p, that 
we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I describe the 3p 
and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their necessary statistical 
relation at some level.  







That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or  
interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations.  
Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find  
again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument  
for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive  
theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize  
cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work  
when living breathing humans are concerned.  


I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of comp. 
You have computer science.  





IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent  
computer calculations from emulating the mind.  


The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person points of 
view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the meaning of the comp 
hope, or the comp fear.  


Bruno  








[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]  
12/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12  
Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth  




On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote:  


On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:  
The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual machines 
knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from 
outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p-truth is not codable. The 1p 
truth are more related to the relation between belief and reality (not 
necessarily physical reality, except for observation and sensation).  


Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.  
Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not codable.  
Many things true about us is not codable either.  

Let me see if I understand that. I think you are saying that p, i.e. that "p" 
describes a fact about the world, a meta-le

Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-28 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 Sep 2012, at 18:46, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/27/2012 1:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/25/2012 9:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:









So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction  
it doesn't exist, e.g. the largest prime number. But then of  
course the proof of contradiction is relative to the axioms and  
rules of inference.


Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model we  
operate under.  This is needed just to communicate or to think.


The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is the  
existence proof.  You can't even define an object without using  
some agreed upon theory.


Sure you can.  You point and say, "That!"  That's how you learned  
the meaning of words, by abstracting from a lot of instances of  
your mother pointing and saying, "That."


But this uses implicit theories selected by evolution. A brain *is*  
essentially a theory of the "local universe" already.


At least that's your theory.  :-)


Hmm... If by brain you mean the material object, then a brain is not a  
theory, but the 3-I, the body description at the right comp- 
substitution level, is the theory. It is a word (finite object)  
interpreted by a universal system (physical forces, QM, bosons and  
fermions).
The *material* brain, unfortunately perhaps, is not a word, it is an  
infinity of words interpreted by an infinity of "competing" universal  
numbers.


We have to explain, with comp, why little numbers seems to win,  
because we can't prevent all the numbers to add their grains of salt,  
hopefully not their buggy grains of sand generating noise and/or white  
rabbits.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-27 Thread meekerdb

On 9/27/2012 1:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/25/2012 9:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb  wrote:








So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction it doesn't exist, 
e.g. the largest prime number. But then of course the proof of contradiction is 
relative to the axioms and rules of inference.


Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model we operate under.  This 
is needed just to communicate or to think.


The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is the existence proof.  
You can't even define an object without using some agreed upon theory.


Sure you can.  You point and say, "That!"  That's how you learned the meaning of words, 
by abstracting from a lot of instances of your mother pointing and saying, "That."


But this uses implicit theories selected by evolution. A brain *is* essentially a theory 
of the "local universe" already.


At least that's your theory.  :-)

Brent

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/25/2012 9:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb  wrote:








So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction it  
doesn't exist, e.g. the largest prime number. But then of course  
the proof of contradiction is relative to the axioms and rules of  
inference.


Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model we  
operate under.  This is needed just to communicate or to think.


The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is the  
existence proof.  You can't even define an object without using  
some agreed upon theory.


Sure you can.  You point and say, "That!"  That's how you learned  
the meaning of words, by abstracting from a lot of instances of your  
mother pointing and saying, "That."


But this uses implicit theories selected by evolution. A brain *is*  
essentially a theory of the "local universe" already.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-26 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 5:01 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 9/26/2012 2:53 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 2:33 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>> On 9/26/2012 12:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sep 26, 2012, at 12:29 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 9/25/2012 9:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

>
>
> On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>  On 9/25/2012 8:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:27 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 9/25/2012 4:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

> Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self-contradictory
>

 Propositions can be self contradictory, but how can existence of
 something be self-contradictory?

 Brent

>>>
>>> Brent, it was roger, not I, who wrote the above.  But in any case I
>>> interpreted his statement to mean if some theoretical object is found to
>>> have contradictory properties, then it does not exist.
>>>
>>
>> Sorry.
>>
>>
> No worries.
>
>  So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction it
>> doesn't exist, e.g. the largest prime number. But then of course the 
>> proof
>> of contradiction is relative to the axioms and rules of inference.
>>
>
> Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model we
> operate under.  This is needed just to communicate or to think.
>
> The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is the
> existence proof.  You can't even define an object without using some 
> agreed
> upon theory.
>

 Sure you can.  You point and say, "That!"  That's how you learned the
 meaning of words, by abstracting from a lot of instances of your mother
 pointing and saying, "That."

 Brent

>>>
>>>
>>> There is still an implicitly assumed model that the two people are
>>> operating under (if they agree on what is meant by the chair they see).
>>>
>>> Or they may use different models and define the chair differently.  For
>>> example, a solipist believes the chair is only his idea, a physicalist
>>> thinks it is a collection of primitive matter, a computationalist a dream
>>> of numbers.
>>>
>>> Then while they might all agree on the existence of something, that
>>> thing is different for each person because they are defining it under
>>> different models.
>>>
>>
>>  But if they are different then what sense does it make to say there is a
>> contradiction in *the* model and hence something doesn't exist.
>
>
>  It means a certain object (which is defined in a model) does not exist
> in that model.  A model in one object is not the same as another object in
> a different model, even if they might have the same name, symbol,
> or appearance.  "2 in a finite field", is a different thing from "2 in the
> natural numbers".  The "chair in the solipist model" is different from the
> "chair in the materialist model".  A chair made out of primitively real
> matter is non-existent in the solipist model.
>
> I don't see how you can escape having to work within a model when you make
> assertions, like X exists, or Y does not exist.
>
>
> I don't try to escape that.
>
>
>  What is X or Y outside of the model from which they are defined and
> exist within?
>
>
> The whole point of having a model is that X and Y refer to something
> outside the model.  The model is a model *of* reality, not reality itself.
> So when you prove "X and ~X" in the model you may have proved X doesn't
> exist or you may have shown your model doesn't correspond to reality.
>
>
Okay.  I think we are in agreement then.

The main idea is to make a model of reality and test it by seeing how well
the model's predictions for observations match our observations.

Jason

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-26 Thread meekerdb

On 9/26/2012 2:53 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 2:33 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 9/26/2012 12:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 26, 2012, at 12:29 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 9/25/2012 9:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 9/25/2012 8:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:27 PM, meekerdb 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 9/25/2012 4:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is
self-contradictory


Propositions can be self contradictory, but how can
existence of something be self-contradictory?

Brent


Brent, it was roger, not I, who wrote the above.  But 
in any
case I interpreted his statement to mean if some 
theoretical
object is found to have contradictory properties, then 
it does
not exist.


Sorry.


No worries.

So you mean if some mathematical object implies a 
contradiction it
doesn't exist, e.g. the largest prime number. But then of 
course the
proof of contradiction is relative to the axioms and rules 
of inference.


Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model 
we
operate under.  This is needed just to communicate or to think.

The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is 
the
existence proof.  You can't even define an object without using 
some
agreed upon theory.


Sure you can.  You point and say, "That!"  That's how you learned 
the
meaning of words, by abstracting from a lot of instances of your 
mother
pointing and saying, "That."

Brent



There is still an implicitly assumed model that the two people are 
operating
under (if they agree on what is meant by the chair they see).

Or they may use different models and define the chair differently.  For 
example,
a solipist believes the chair is only his idea, a physicalist thinks it 
is a
collection of primitive matter, a computationalist a dream of numbers.

Then while they might all agree on the existence of something, that 
thing is
different for each person because they are defining it under different 
models.


But if they are different then what sense does it make to say there is a
contradiction in *the* model and hence something doesn't exist.


It means a certain object (which is defined in a model) does not exist in that model.  A 
model in one object is not the same as another object in a different model, even if they 
might have the same name, symbol, or appearance.  "2 in a finite field", is a different 
thing from "2 in the natural numbers".  The "chair in the solipist model" is different 
from the "chair in the materialist model".  A chair made out of primitively real matter 
is non-existent in the solipist model.
I don't see how you can escape having to work within a model when you make assertions, 
like X exists, or Y does not exist.


I don't try to escape that.


What is X or Y outside of the model from which they are defined and exist 
within?


The whole point of having a model is that X and Y refer to something outside the model.  
The model is a model *of* reality, not reality itself.  So when you prove "X and ~X" in 
the model you may have proved X doesn't exist or you may have shown your model doesn't 
correspond to reality.


Brent




Jason

 That's why it makes no sense to talk about a contradiction disproving the 
existence
of something you can define ostensively.  It is only in the Platonia of 
statements
that you can derive contradictions from axioms and rules of inference.  If 
you can
point to the thing whose non-existence is proven, then it just means you've 
made an
error in translating between reality and Platonia.

Brent


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T

Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-26 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 2:33 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> On 9/26/2012 12:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sep 26, 2012, at 12:29 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>  On 9/25/2012 9:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>


 On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

  On 9/25/2012 8:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:27 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>  On 9/25/2012 4:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
 Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self-contradictory

>>>
>>> Propositions can be self contradictory, but how can existence of
>>> something be self-contradictory?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> Brent, it was roger, not I, who wrote the above.  But in any case I
>> interpreted his statement to mean if some theoretical object is found to
>> have contradictory properties, then it does not exist.
>>
>
> Sorry.
>
>
 No worries.

  So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction it
> doesn't exist, e.g. the largest prime number. But then of course the proof
> of contradiction is relative to the axioms and rules of inference.
>

 Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model we
 operate under.  This is needed just to communicate or to think.

 The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is the
 existence proof.  You can't even define an object without using some agreed
 upon theory.

>>>
>>> Sure you can.  You point and say, "That!"  That's how you learned the
>>> meaning of words, by abstracting from a lot of instances of your mother
>>> pointing and saying, "That."
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> There is still an implicitly assumed model that the two people are
>> operating under (if they agree on what is meant by the chair they see).
>>
>> Or they may use different models and define the chair differently.  For
>> example, a solipist believes the chair is only his idea, a physicalist
>> thinks it is a collection of primitive matter, a computationalist a dream
>> of numbers.
>>
>> Then while they might all agree on the existence of something, that thing
>> is different for each person because they are defining it under different
>> models.
>>
>
> But if they are different then what sense does it make to say there is a
> contradiction in *the* model and hence something doesn't exist.


It means a certain object (which is defined in a model) does not exist in
that model.  A model in one object is not the same as another object in a
different model, even if they might have the same name, symbol,
or appearance.  "2 in a finite field", is a different thing from "2 in the
natural numbers".  The "chair in the solipist model" is different from the
"chair in the materialist model".  A chair made out of primitively real
matter is non-existent in the solipist model.

I don't see how you can escape having to work within a model when you make
assertions, like X exists, or Y does not exist.  What is X or Y outside of
the model from which they are defined and exist within?

Jason

 That's why it makes no sense to talk about a contradiction disproving the
> existence of something you can define ostensively.  It is only in the
> Platonia of statements that you can derive contradictions from axioms and
> rules of inference.  If you can point to the thing whose non-existence is
> proven, then it just means you've made an error in translating between
> reality and Platonia.
>
> Brent
>
>
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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-26 Thread meekerdb

On 9/26/2012 12:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 26, 2012, at 12:29 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 9:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 8:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:27 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 4:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self-contradictory


Propositions can be self contradictory, but how can existence of something be 
self-contradictory?


Brent


Brent, it was roger, not I, who wrote the above.  But in any case I interpreted his 
statement to mean if some theoretical object is found to have contradictory 
properties, then it does not exist.


Sorry.



No worries.

So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction it doesn't exist, 
e.g. the largest prime number. But then of course the proof of contradiction is 
relative to the axioms and rules of inference.


Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model we operate under.  This 
is needed just to communicate or to think.


The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is the existence proof.  
You can't even define an object without using some agreed upon theory.


Sure you can.  You point and say, "That!"  That's how you learned the meaning of words, 
by abstracting from a lot of instances of your mother pointing and saying, "That."


Brent



There is still an implicitly assumed model that the two people are operating under (if 
they agree on what is meant by the chair they see).


Or they may use different models and define the chair differently.  For example, a 
solipist believes the chair is only his idea, a physicalist thinks it is a collection of 
primitive matter, a computationalist a dream of numbers.


Then while they might all agree on the existence of something, that thing is different 
for each person because they are defining it under different models.


But if they are different then what sense does it make to say there is a contradiction in 
*the* model and hence something doesn't exist.  That's why it makes no sense to talk about 
a contradiction disproving the existence of something you can define ostensively.  It is 
only in the Platonia of statements that you can derive contradictions from axioms and 
rules of inference.  If you can point to the thing whose non-existence is proven, then it 
just means you've made an error in translating between reality and Platonia.


Brent

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-26 Thread Jason Resch



On Sep 26, 2012, at 12:29 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 9:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 8:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:27 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:



On 9/25/2012 4:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self- 
contradictory


Propositions can be self contradictory, but how can existence of  
something be self-contradictory?


Brent


Brent, it was roger, not I, who wrote the above.  But in any case  
I interpreted his statement to mean if some theoretical object is  
found to have contradictory properties, then it does not exist.


Sorry.



No worries.

So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction it  
doesn't exist, e.g. the largest prime number. But then of course  
the proof of contradiction is relative to the axioms and rules of  
inference.


Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model we  
operate under.  This is needed just to communicate or to think.


The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is the  
existence proof.  You can't even define an object without using  
some agreed upon theory.


Sure you can.  You point and say, "That!"  That's how you learned  
the meaning of words, by abstracting from a lot of instances of your  
mother pointing and saying, "That."


Brent



There is still an implicitly assumed model that the two people are  
operating under (if they agree on what is meant by the chair they see).


Or they may use different models and define the chair differently.   
For example, a solipist believes the chair is only his idea, a  
physicalist thinks it is a collection of primitive matter, a  
computationalist a dream of numbers.


Then while they might all agree on the existence of something, that  
thing is different for each person because they are defining it under  
different models.


Jason




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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-26 Thread meekerdb

On 9/25/2012 9:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 8:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:27 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 4:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self-contradictory


Propositions can be self contradictory, but how can existence of something be 
self-contradictory?


Brent


Brent, it was roger, not I, who wrote the above.  But in any case I interpreted his 
statement to mean if some theoretical object is found to have contradictory 
properties, then it does not exist.


Sorry.



No worries.

So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction it doesn't exist, e.g. 
the largest prime number. But then of course the proof of contradiction is relative to 
the axioms and rules of inference.


Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model we operate under.  This 
is needed just to communicate or to think.


The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is the existence proof.  You 
can't even define an object without using some agreed upon theory.


Sure you can.  You point and say, "That!"  That's how you learned the meaning of words, by 
abstracting from a lot of instances of your mother pointing and saying, "That."


Brent

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-25 Thread Jason Resch



On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 8:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:27 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 4:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self-contradictory


Propositions can be self contradictory, but how can existence of  
something be self-contradictory?


Brent


Brent, it was roger, not I, who wrote the above.  But in any case I  
interpreted his statement to mean if some theoretical object is  
found to have contradictory properties, then it does not exist.


Sorry.



No worries.

So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction it  
doesn't exist, e.g. the largest prime number. But then of course the  
proof of contradiction is relative to the axioms and rules of  
inference.


Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model we  
operate under.  This is needed just to communicate or to think.


The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is the  
existence proof.  You can't even define an object without using some  
agreed upon theory.


Jason





Brent

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-25 Thread meekerdb

On 9/25/2012 8:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:27 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 4:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

  Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self-contradictory


Propositions can be self contradictory, but how can existence of something be 
self-contradictory?


Brent


Brent, it was roger, not I, who wrote the above.  But in any case I interpreted his 
statement to mean if some theoretical object is found to have contradictory properties, 
then it does not exist.


Sorry.

So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction it doesn't exist, e.g. the 
largest prime number. But then of course the proof of contradiction is relative to the 
axioms and rules of inference.


Brent

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-25 Thread Jason Resch



On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:27 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/25/2012 4:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

  Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self-contradictory


Propositions can be self contradictory, but how can existence of  
something be self-contradictory?


Brent


Brent, it was roger, not I, who wrote the above.  But in any case I  
interpreted his statement to mean if some theoretical object is found  
to have contradictory properties, then it does not exist.


Jason





then we should consider them as "possible". Just because I cannot  
experience or imagine something is not a proof of impossibility.


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-25 Thread meekerdb

On 9/25/2012 4:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
   Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self-contradictory 


Propositions can be self contradictory, but how can existence of something be 
self-contradictory?


Brent

then we should consider them as "possible". Just because I cannot experience or imagine 
something is not a proof of impossibility.


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-25 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/25/2012 7:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 5:37 PM, Stephen P. King 
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:


On 9/25/2012 10:24 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 7:35 AM, Roger Clough
mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>> wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Yes, I think that the structures and
attributes of matter are provided
by a creator (the All, the supreme
monad, or God). Plato used the analogy
of geometrical shapes for his structures.


But if you believe in "the All" do you also believe there are
other types of matter, other universes, other planets with
intelligent beings, etc?

Jason


Hi Jason,

   Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is
self-contradictory then we should consider them as "possible".
Just because I cannot experience or imagine something is not a
proof of impossibility.



Roger,

I agree with you here.  But then this seems to contradict the notion 
that *this* world is the best of all possible worlds, unless by "this 
world" you mean the All.  After all Leibniz said "Everything that is 
possible demands to exist."


Jason


Hi Jason,

Well said! I think that Leibniz' idea that "*this* world is the 
best of all possible worlds" has a stipulation that was not stated! It 
only seems to make sense that Leibniz was defining  "this world" as the 
world that "we" observe *and* communicate about with each other. It is 
the best possible by necessity as it is impossible for us to experience 
any other lesser version. We have  least action rules in physics that 
are nice demonstration of this...


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-25 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 5:37 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

>  On 9/25/2012 10:24 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 7:35 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:
>
>> Hi Stephen P. King
>>
>> Yes, I think that the structures and
>> attributes of matter are provided
>> by a creator (the All, the supreme
>> monad, or God). Plato used the analogy
>> of geometrical shapes for his structures.
>>
>>
> But if you believe in "the All" do you also believe there are other types
> of matter, other universes, other planets with intelligent beings, etc?
>
> Jason
>
>  Hi Jason,
>
>Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self-contradictory then
> we should consider them as "possible". Just because I cannot experience or
> imagine something is not a proof of impossibility.
>
>
>
Roger,

I agree with you here.  But then this seems to contradict the notion that
*this* world is the best of all possible worlds, unless by "this world" you
mean the All.  After all Leibniz said "Everything that is possible demands
to exist."

Jason

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-25 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/25/2012 10:24 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 7:35 AM, Roger Clough > wrote:


Hi Stephen P. King

Yes, I think that the structures and
attributes of matter are provided
by a creator (the All, the supreme
monad, or God). Plato used the analogy
of geometrical shapes for his structures.


But if you believe in "the All" do you also believe there are other 
types of matter, other universes, other planets with intelligent 
beings, etc?


Jason


Hi Jason,

   Yes. If we cannot prove that their existence is self-contradictory 
then we should consider them as "possible". Just because I cannot 
experience or imagine something is not a proof of impossibility.


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Stephen

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Re: Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-25 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 7:35 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:

> Hi Stephen P. King
>
> Yes, I think that the structures and
> attributes of matter are provided
> by a creator (the All, the supreme
> monad, or God). Plato used the analogy
> of geometrical shapes for his structures.
>
>
But if you believe in "the All" do you also believe there are other types
of matter, other universes, other planets with intelligent beings, etc?

Jason

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Re: Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-25 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Stephen P. King 

Yes, I think that the structures and
attributes of matter are provided
by a creator (the All, the supreme
monad, or God). Plato used the analogy
of geometrical shapes for his structures.

 
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/25/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-24, 10:42:12 
Subject: Re: Prime Numbers 


On 9/24/2012 9:46 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> God's ideas is fine. The numbers and arithmetic etc. can inhere in 
> some mind. The numbers are (idealistically) real, as I think 
> all arithmetic must be. For it is true whether known or 
> not. At least as you stay with common numbers and arithmetic. 
> Pretty sure. 
Hi Roger, 

 One question I have to pose: How do the properties of entities  
become discriminated from each other and collected together? Are the  
properties on a object inherent or is there some other active system of  
property attribution in Nature? Does God play a role in this? 

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-24 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/24/2012 9:46 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

God's ideas is fine. The numbers and arithmetic etc. can inhere in
some mind.  The numbers are (idealistically) real, as I think
all arithmetic must be.  For it is true whether known or
not. At least as you stay with common numbers and arithmetic.
Pretty sure.

Hi Roger,

One question I have to pose: How do the properties of entities 
become discriminated from each other and collected together? Are the 
properties on a object inherent or is there some other active system of 
property attribution in Nature? Does God play a role in this?


--
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Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-24 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Bruno Marchal  

God's ideas is fine. The numbers and arithmetic etc. can inhere in 
some mind.  The numbers are (idealistically) real, as I think 
all arithmetic must be.  For it is true whether known or 
not. At least as you stay with common numbers and arithmetic.
Pretty sure.  


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/24/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-24, 09:12:29 
Subject: Re: Prime Numbers 


On 24 Sep 2012, at 12:39, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> Numbers are not in spacetime, that is, are not at location r at time  
> t. 
> So they are ideas, 

God's ideas? Then I am OK. The comp God is arithmetical truth, so this  
works. 



> they are not physical. 

OK. 


> To be physical you 
> have to have a specific location at a specific time. 

I am OK with this, but note that it makes the Universe into a non  
physical object. The Universe cannot belong to a location r at time t,  
as it is the gauge making such position and time consistent in the  
picture. 



> This is not 
> my view, it is that of Descartes. 
> 
> The same with arithmetic. Numbers and arithmetic statements are not  
> at (r,t). 

OK. 

> 
> Which is not to say that they are not real, if by real I mean true 
> or as is without an observer. Like in a textbook. 

OK. So you can understand how comp is interesting, as it explains  
(partially but more than any other theory) how the physical beliefs  
appears and why they come in two sort of shapes (quanta and qualia),  
and this without assuming anything more than elementary arithmetic and  
the invariance of consciousness for some digital transformations. 
Then the "big picture" happens to be closer to the neoplatonists one  
than the aristotelian one, which I think you should appreciate. 

Bruno 


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-24 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 24 Sep 2012, at 12:39, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Numbers are not in spacetime, that is, are not at location r at time  
t.

So they are ideas,


God's ideas? Then I am OK. The comp God is arithmetical truth, so this  
works.





they are not physical.


OK.



To be physical you
have to have a specific location at a specific time.


I am OK with this, but note that it makes the Universe into a non  
physical object. The Universe cannot belong to a location r at time t,  
as it is the gauge making such position and time consistent in the  
picture.





This is not
my view, it is that of Descartes.

The same with arithmetic. Numbers and arithmetic statements are not  
at (r,t).


OK.



Which is not to say that they are not real, if by real I mean true
or as is without an observer. Like in a textbook.


OK. So you can understand how comp is interesting, as it explains  
(partially but more than any other theory) how the physical beliefs  
appears and why they come in two sort of shapes (quanta and qualia),  
and this without assuming anything more than elementary arithmetic and  
the invariance of consciousness for some digital transformations.
Then the "big picture" happens to be closer to the neoplatonists one  
than the aristotelian one, which I think you should appreciate.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-24 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Stephen P. King  

That's what Peirce gave as a pragmatic definition of truth, 
something that we would all agree to, given time enough. 

But fiction can be true (as "true fiction", a narrative woven about
actual events)  or not be true.  Arithmetic isn't, it's either
always true or always false.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/24/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-22, 16:10:38 
Subject: Re: Prime Numbers 


On 9/22/2012 7:32 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> How could mathematics be fiction ? 
> If so, then we could simply say that 2+2=5 because it's saturday. 
How could we have a world we many minds can, on rare occasions, come to  
complete agreement if that where the case? Perhaps it is true that 2+2=4  
because we all agree, at some level, that it is true. (I am not just  
considering humans here with the word "we"!) 

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Stephen 

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html 


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Re: Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-24 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Bruno Marchal  

I believe that there are at least three attributes of numbers:

1) Are they true or false as in a numerical equation ? Does 2+ 2 = 4 ? True.

2) Do they physically exist or do they mentally inhere ?  They inhere. You 
can't touch them.

3) Are they real or not ?  Numbers are always real (in the philosophical sense).


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/24/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-23, 03:42:03 
Subject: Re: Prime Numbers 


On 22 Sep 2012, at 22:10, Stephen P. King wrote: 

> On 9/22/2012 7:32 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
>> How could mathematics be fiction ? 
>> If so, then we could simply say that 2+2=5 because it's saturday. 
> How could we have a world we many minds can, on rare occasions, come  
> to complete agreement if that where the case? Perhaps it is true  
> that 2+2=4 because we all agree, at some level, that it is true. (I  
> am not just considering humans here with the word "we"!) 

How will you define "we" without accepting "2+2=4", given that IF we  
assume comp, "we" are defined by (L?ian) universal number and their  
relations with other universal numbers? 

Why do you keep an idealist conception of numbers, which contradicts  
your references to papers which use, as most texts in science, the  
independence and primitivity of elementary arithmetic? 

Or you remark was ironic? 

Bruno 


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-24 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Bruno Marchal  

Numbers are not in spacetime, that is, are not at location r at time t.
So they are ideas, they are not physical. To be physical you
have to have a specific location at a specific time. This is not
my view, it is that of Descartes.

The same with arithmetic. Numbers and arithmetic statements are not at (r,t).

Which is not to say that they are not real, if by real I mean true
or as is without an observer. Like in a textbook.




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/24/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-23, 03:42:03 
Subject: Re: Prime Numbers 


On 22 Sep 2012, at 22:10, Stephen P. King wrote: 

> On 9/22/2012 7:32 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
>> How could mathematics be fiction ? 
>> If so, then we could simply say that 2+2=5 because it's saturday. 
> How could we have a world we many minds can, on rare occasions, come  
> to complete agreement if that where the case? Perhaps it is true  
> that 2+2=4 because we all agree, at some level, that it is true. (I  
> am not just considering humans here with the word "we"!) 

How will you define "we" without accepting "2+2=4", given that IF we  
assume comp, "we" are defined by (L?ian) universal number and their  
relations with other universal numbers? 

Why do you keep an idealist conception of numbers, which contradicts  
your references to papers which use, as most texts in science, the  
independence and primitivity of elementary arithmetic? 

Or you remark was ironic? 

Bruno 


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-23 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/23/2012 3:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Sep 2012, at 22:10, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/22/2012 7:32 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

How could mathematics be fiction ?
If so, then we could simply say that 2+2=5 because it's saturday.
How could we have a world we many minds can, on rare occasions, come 
to complete agreement if that where the case? Perhaps it is true that 
2+2=4 because we all agree, at some level, that it is true. (I am not 
just considering humans here with the word "we"!)


How will you define "we" without accepting "2+2=4", given that IF we 
assume comp, "we" are defined by (Löbian) universal number and their 
relations with other universal numbers?


Why do you keep an idealist conception of numbers, which contradicts 
your references to papers which use, as most texts in science, the 
independence and primitivity of elementary arithmetic?


Or you remark was ironic?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



The continued confusion of the symbols and what they represent makes 
this entire conversation an exercise in futility.


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Stephen

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Sep 2012, at 22:10, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/22/2012 7:32 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

How could mathematics be fiction ?
If so, then we could simply say that 2+2=5 because it's saturday.
How could we have a world we many minds can, on rare occasions, come  
to complete agreement if that where the case? Perhaps it is true  
that 2+2=4 because we all agree, at some level, that it is true. (I  
am not just considering humans here with the word "we"!)


How will you define "we" without accepting "2+2=4", given that IF we  
assume comp, "we" are defined by (Löbian) universal number and their  
relations with other universal numbers?


Why do you keep an idealist conception of numbers, which contradicts  
your references to papers which use, as most texts in science, the  
independence and primitivity of elementary arithmetic?


Or you remark was ironic?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-22 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/22/2012 7:32 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

How could mathematics be fiction ?
If so, then we could simply say that 2+2=5 because it's saturday.
How could we have a world we many minds can, on rare occasions, come to 
complete agreement if that where the case? Perhaps it is true that 2+2=4 
because we all agree, at some level, that it is true. (I am not just 
considering humans here with the word "we"!)


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 21 Sep 2012, at 19:17, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/21/2012 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Sep 2012, at 20:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2012 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Sep 2012, at 18:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2012 2:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A modal logic of probability is given by the behavior of the  
"probability one". In Kripke terms, P(x) = 1 in world alpha  
means that x is realized in all worlds accessible from alpha,  
and (key point) that we are not in a cul-de-sac world.


What does 'accessible' mean?



In modal logic semantic, it is a technical world for any element  
in set + a binary relation on it.


A mapping of the set onto itself?


?

A relation is not a map. A world can access more than one world.
For example {a, b} with the relation {(a, a), (a, b)}, or aRa, aRb.







When applied to probability, the idea is to interpret the worlds  
by the realization of some random experience, like throwing a  
coin would lead to two worlds accessible, one with head, the  
other with tail. In that modal (tail or head) is a certainty as  
(tail or head) is realized everywhere in the accessible worlds.


Then accessible means nomologically possible.


Accessible means only that some binary relation exists on a set.  
But in some concrete model of a multi-world or multi-situation  
context, nomological possibility is not excluded.


Then I don't understand what other kinds of possibility are  
allowed?  I don't see how logical possibility could be considered an  
accessibility relation (at least not an interesting one) because it  
would allow Rxy where y was anything except not-x.







But in the worlds of the UD there is no nomological constraint, so  
there's no probability measure?


I am not sure why there is no nomological constraints in the UD.  
UD* is a highly structured entity. You might elaborate on this.


A nomological constraint is one of physics.


Why? Define perhaps "nomological".



But physics is derivative from part of the UD.  The UD is structured  
only by arithmetic.


Why would this be not enough, given that physics will supervene on  
arithmetical relations (computations)?


Bruno







Generally speaking a different world is defined as not  
accessible.  If you can go there, it's part of your same world.


Yes. OK. Sorry. Logician used the term world in a technical  
sense, and the worlds can be anything, depending of which modal  
logic is used, for what purpose, etc. Kripke semantic main used  
is in showing the independence of formula in different systems.


Bruno





Brent


This gives KD modal logics, with K:  = [](p -> q)->([]p ->  
[]q), and D:  []p -> <>p. Of course with "[]" for Gödel's  
beweisbar we don't have that D is a theorem, so we ensure the D  
property by defining a new box, Bp = []p & <>t.


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Re: Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-22 Thread Roger Clough
Hi meekerdb 

Mathematical objects such as proofs ansd new theorems are found by intuition.
Penrose suggests that intuition is a peep into Platonia.
So these come from Platonia.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/22/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content - 
From: meekerdb 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-21, 13:30:03
Subject: Re: Prime Numbers


On 9/21/2012 5:40 AM, Rex Allen wrote: 
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 11:50 PM, Terren Suydam  wrote:

On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 10:19 PM, Rex Allen  wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>>
>> Rex,
>>
>> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
>> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?
>
>
> I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with all
> that implies for the Mandelbrot set.


I'm curious about what a plausible "fictionalist" account of the
Mandelbrot set could be. Is fictionalism the same as constructivism,
or the idea that knowledge doesn't exist outside of a mind?



I lean towards a strong form of fictionalism - which says that there are few 
important differences between mathematics and literary fiction.


So - I could give a detailed answer - but I think I'd rather give a sketchy 
answer at this point.


I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so many 
details of the story are known up front that the plot can only progress in very 
specific ways if it is to remain consistent and believable to the "reader".


Mathematics is a kind of world building.  In the imaginative sense.






> But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:
>
> Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects and
> otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?
>
> How is it that we are able to reliably know things about Platonia?


I think just doing logic and math - starting from axioms and proving
things from them - is interacting with the Platonic realm.


But how is it that we humans do that?  This is my main question.  What exactly 
are we doing when we start from axioms and prove things from them?  Where does 
this ability come from?  What does it consist of?






> I would have thought that quarks and electrons from which we appear to be
> constituted would be indifferent to truth.
>
> Which would fit with the fact that I seem to make a lot of mistakes.
>
> But you think otherwise?


I didn't understand the above... what do quarks and electrons have to
do with arithmetical platonism?



Are we not composed from quarks and electrons?  If so - then how do "mere" 
collections of quarks and electrons connect with platonic truths?


By chance?  Are we just fortunate that the initial conditions and causal laws 
of the universe are such that our quarks and electrons take forms that mirror 
Platonic Truths?




>>
>> How can you make
>> sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view that you
>> are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
>> platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
>> discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
>> z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.
>
> I will agree with you that all intelligences that start from the same
> premises as you, and follow the same rules as inference as you, will also
> draw the same conclusions about the Mandelbrot set as you do.
>
> However - I do not agree with you that this amenable group exhausts the set
> of all *possible* intelligences.


I only meant that all possible intelligences that start from a
mathematics that includes addition, multiplication, and complex
numbers will find that if they iterate the function z' = z^2 + c, they
will find that some orbits become periodic or settle on a point, and
some escape to infinity. If they draw a graph of which orbits don't
escape, they will draw the Mandelbrot Set. All possible intelligences
that undertake that procedure will draw the same shape... and this
seems like discovery, not creation.



It seems like a tautology to me.  If you do what I do and believe what I 
believe then you will be a lot like me...?


Is there anything to mathematics other than belief?


What are beliefs?  Why do we have the beliefs that we have?  How do we form 
beliefs - what lies behind belief?


Can *our* mathematical abilities be reduced to something that is indifferent to 
mathematical truth?






> Could there be intelligences who start from vastly difference premises, and
> use vastly different rules of inference, and draw vastly different
> conclusions?


Of course, but then what they are doing d

Re: Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-22 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Terren Suydam 

I don't see that mathematics and fiction have anything in common.

With fiction, anything can happen. 
A would of "could be", or "should be".

With mathematics you've got that nasty equals sign.
A world of "is".

Hume pointed out that there's no way to get from "is"
to "ought" or vice versa.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/22/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content - 
From: Terren Suydam 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-21, 12:29:56
Subject: Re: Prime Numbers


On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 8:40 AM, Rex Allen  wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 11:50 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>>
>> I'm curious about what a plausible "fictionalist" account of the
>> Mandelbrot set could be. Is fictionalism the same as constructivism,
>> or the idea that knowledge doesn't exist outside of a mind?
>
>
> I lean towards a strong form of fictionalism - which says that there are few
> important differences between mathematics and literary fiction.

Can you articulate any important differences between them?

> So - I could give a detailed answer - but I think I'd rather give a sketchy
> answer at this point.
>
> I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so
> many details of the story are known up front that the plot can only progress
> in very specific ways if it is to remain consistent and believable to the
> "reader".
>
> Mathematics is a kind of world building. In the imaginative sense.

I am not unsympathetic with this view, given the creativity that goes
into mathematical proofs. However, it falls apart for me when I
consider that an alien civilization is constrained to build the same
worlds if they start from the same logical axioms.

>>
>> I think just doing logic and math - starting from axioms and proving
>> things from them - is interacting with the Platonic realm.
>
>
> But how is it that we humans do that? This is my main question. What
> exactly are we doing when we start from axioms and prove things from them?
> Where does this ability come from? What does it consist of?

We're using our intelligence and creativity to search a space of
propositions (given a set of axioms) that are either provably true or
false. I would say our intelligence and creativity comes from our
animal nature, evolved as it is to make sense of the world (and each
other) and draw useful inferences that help us survive. I'm not sure
how to answer the question "what does it consist of". Are you asking
how we can act intelligently, how creativity works?

>> I didn't understand the above... what do quarks and electrons have to
>> do with arithmetical platonism?
>
> Are we not composed from quarks and electrons? If so - then how do "mere"
> collections of quarks and electrons connect with platonic truths?
>
> By chance? Are we just fortunate that the initial conditions and causal
> laws of the universe are such that our quarks and electrons take forms that
> mirror Platonic Truths?

I see. Assuming comp, we are some infinite subset of the trace of the
UD (universal dovetailer), which is a platonic entity. Quarks and
electrons are a part of the physics that emerges from that (the
numbers' dreams)... that's the reversal, where physics emerges from
computer science.

The question of how we, as "mere" collections of quarks etc. connect
back with Platonia, is answered by CT (Church-Turing Thesis). As we
are universal machines, we can emulate any computation, including the
universal dovetailer (for instance).

>> I only meant that all possible intelligences that start from a
>> mathematics that includes addition, multiplication, and complex
>> numbers will find that if they iterate the function z' = z^2 + c, they
>> will find that some orbits become periodic or settle on a point, and
>> some escape to infinity. If they draw a graph of which orbits don't
>> escape, they will draw the Mandelbrot Set. All possible intelligences
>> that undertake that procedure will draw the same shape... and this
>> seems like discovery, not creation.
>
> It seems like a tautology to me. If you do what I do and believe what I
> believe then you will be a lot like me...?
>
> Is there anything to mathematics other than belief?

The point is that you are constrained in what you can prove starting
from a given set of axioms. You are not constrained in which axioms
you start with - that's where the belief comes in since there is no
way to prove that your axioms are True, except within a more
encompassing logical framework with its own axioms.

> What are belie

Re: Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-22 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Rex Allen  

How could mathematics be fiction ?
If so, then we could simply say that 2+2=5 because it's saturday.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/22/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Rex Allen  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-21, 09:20:41 
Subject: Re: Prime Numbers 


Just to avoid confusion, this sentence: 


I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so many 
details of the story are known up front that the plot can only progress in very 
specific ways if it is to remain consistent and believable to the "reader".? 


Should probably be: 


I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so many 
details of the back-story are known up front that the plot can only progress in 
very specific ways if it is to remain consistent and believable to the 
"reader".? 






On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 8:40 AM, Rex Allen  wrote: 

On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 11:50 PM, Terren Suydam  wrote: 

On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 10:19 PM, Rex Allen  wrote: 
> 
> On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam  
> wrote: 
>> 
>> Rex, 
>> 
>> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the 
>> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein? 
> 
> 
> I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with all 
> that implies for the Mandelbrot set. 


I'm curious about what a plausible "fictionalist" account of the 
Mandelbrot set could be. Is fictionalism the same as constructivism, 
or the idea that knowledge doesn't exist outside of a mind? 



I lean towards a strong form of fictionalism - which says that there are few 
important differences between mathematics and literary fiction. 


So - I could give a detailed answer - but I think I'd rather give a sketchy 
answer at this point. 


I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so many 
details of the story are known up front that the plot can only progress in very 
specific ways if it is to remain consistent and believable to the "reader". 


Mathematics is a kind of world building. ?n the?maginative?ense. 




? 

> But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can: 
> 
> Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects and 
> otherwise interact with the Platonic realm? 
> 
> How is it that we are able to reliably know things about Platonia? 


I think just doing logic and math - starting from axioms and proving 
things from them - is interacting with the Platonic realm. 


But how is it that we humans do that? ?his is my main question. ?hat exactly 
are we doing when we start from axioms and prove things from them? ?here does 
this ability come from? ?hat does it consist of? 






> I would have thought that quarks and electrons from which we appear to be 
> constituted would be indifferent to truth. 
> 
> Which would fit with the fact that I seem to make a lot of mistakes. 
> 
> But you think otherwise? 


I didn't understand the above... what do quarks and electrons have to 
do with arithmetical platonism? 



Are we not composed from quarks and electrons? ?f so - then how do "mere" 
collections of quarks and electrons connect with platonic truths? 


By chance? ?re we just fortunate that the initial conditions and causal laws of 
the universe are such that our quarks and electrons take forms that mirror 
Platonic Truths? 


? 

>> 
>> How can you make 
>> sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view that you 
>> are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical 
>> platonism? ?t seems obvious that all possible intelligences would 
>> discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on 
>> z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument. 
> 
> I will agree with you that all intelligences that start from the same 
> premises as you, and follow the same rules as inference as you, will also 
> draw the same conclusions about the Mandelbrot set as you do. 
> 
> However - I do not agree with you that this amenable group exhausts the set 
> of all *possible* intelligences. 


I only meant that all possible intelligences that start from a 
mathematics that includes addition, multiplication, and complex 
numbers will find that if they iterate the function z' = z^2 + c, they 
will find that some orbits become periodic or settle on a point, and 
some escape to infinity. If they draw a graph of which orbits don't 
escape, they will draw the Mandelbrot Set. All possible intelligences 
that undertake that procedure will draw the same shape... and this 
seems like discovery, not creation. 



It seems like a taut

Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread meekerdb

On 9/21/2012 12:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 1:55 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 9/21/2012 8:59 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 21, 2012, at 8:13 AM, Rex Allen mailto:rexallen31...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:27 AM, Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Sep 18, 2012, at 9:19 PM, Rex Allen mailto:rexallen31...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam mailto:terren.suy...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Rex,

Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein? 



I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with 
all
that implies for the Mandelbrot set.

But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:

Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects 
and
otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?


We study and create theories about objects in the mathematical realm 
just as
we study and create theories about objects in the physical realm.


So in the physical realm, we start from our senses - what we see, hear, 
feel, etc.

From this, we infer the existence of electrons and wavefunctions and 
strings and
whatnot.  Or some of us do.  Others take a more instrumental view of 
scientific
theories.


Right, and we have similarly inferred the existence of primes, fractals,
non-computable functions, etc.


We invented counting, addition, etc and found it implied true propositions 
about
primes, fractals, etc.  To say they exist in the same way tables and chairs 
exist is
going much further.


All of our scientific theories are inventions too.  We can only hope they bear 
some resemblance to reality.








So you're saying that "thought" is another kind of sense?


Thought is needed for inference and building theories, equally in the 
physical
sciences and math.


And that what occurs to us in thought can also be used as a basis to infer 
the
existence of objects which help "explain" those thoughts?


Right, like you might think up genesis and dualism, or big bang and 
materialism, or
platonic truth and computationalism.  These are ontological theories for 
what
exists, and why we are here experiencing it.

If you say math is fiction and only exists only as a story in our brains, 
then
obviously you can't use platonic truth and computationalism as one if your 
theories
of existence.

I think the fact that mathematics can serve as a theory for our existence 
shows
absolutely that mathematical theories and physical theories are on equal 
footing.
 We can gather evidence for them and build cases for them, find out we were 
wrong
about them, and so on.  Why do we believe in quarks, electrons, strings, 
etc.?
 Because they can explain our observations.  Why do I believe in the 
platonic
realm?  For the same reasons.



But we believe that electrons interact causally with us because we are made 
from
similar stuff - and by doing so make themselves known to us...right?

How do Platonic objects interact causally with us?  Via a Platonic Field?  
PFT -
Platonic Field Theory?



How did the warping of space and time cause Einsteins brain to figure out 
relativity?

I think you are looking at it in the wrong way. Our brains seek good 
explanations.
 They sometimes find one.  That's all that is going on.

Now you say our explainations when it comes to mathematics are fiction, but 
if that
is so, why not say the same of the physical theories?  Why not say the big 
bang is
fiction, or matter is fiction?


They are stories which we intend to have referents independent of the 
stories
(theories).


I don't see how this is any different from our mathematical theories though.


It is different.  It's confusing because arithmetic (to take an example) is both a theory 
about discrete objects, 1apple + 1apple = 2apples, which requires a correct interpretation 
like any theory of physics,  1raindrop + 1raindrop = 1raindrop, but it's also a closed 
story without any external referents, s(0)+s(0)=s(s(0)).  This is what makes mathematics 
(and logic and language) useful; you can abstract from the physical world to the Platonia 
story, manipulate it by some rules, and if you did it right interpret the result back in 
the physical world.  But that doesn't mean language and logic and mathematics exist in the 
same sense.


Brent

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread Jason Resch
On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 1:55 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 9/21/2012 8:59 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sep 21, 2012, at 8:13 AM, Rex Allen  wrote:
>
>  On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>>  On Sep 18, 2012, at 9:19 PM, Rex Allen  wrote:
>>
>>  On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Rex,
>>>
>>> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
>>> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?
>>
>>
>>  I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with
>> all that implies for the Mandelbrot set.
>>
>>  But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:
>>
>>  Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects
>> and otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?
>>
>>
>>  We study and create theories about objects in the mathematical realm
>> just as we study and create theories about objects in the physical realm.
>>
>
>  So in the physical realm, we start from our senses - what we see, hear,
> feel, etc.
>
>  From this, we infer the existence of electrons and wavefunctions and
> strings and whatnot.  Or some of us do.  Others take a more instrumental
> view of scientific theories.
>
>
>  Right, and we have similarly inferred the existence of primes, fractals,
> non-computable functions, etc.
>
>
> We invented counting, addition, etc and found it implied true propositions
> about primes, fractals, etc.  To say they exist in the same way tables and
> chairs exist is going much further.
>

All of our scientific theories are inventions too.  We can only hope they
bear some resemblance to reality.


>
>
>
>
>  So you're saying that "thought" is another kind of sense?
>
>
>  Thought is needed for inference and building theories, equally in the
> physical sciences and math.
>
>   And that what occurs to us in thought can also be used as a basis to
> infer the existence of objects which help "explain" those thoughts?
>
>
>  Right, like you might think up genesis and dualism, or big bang and
> materialism, or platonic truth and computationalism.  These are ontological
> theories for what exists, and why we are here experiencing it.
>
>  If you say math is fiction and only exists only as a story in our
> brains, then obviously you can't use platonic truth and computationalism as
> one if your theories of existence.
>
>  I think the fact that mathematics can serve as a theory for our
> existence shows absolutely that mathematical theories and physical theories
> are on equal footing.  We can gather evidence for them and build cases for
> them, find out we were wrong about them, and so on.  Why do we believe in
> quarks, electrons, strings, etc.?  Because they can explain our
> observations.  Why do I believe in the platonic realm?  For the same
> reasons.
>
>
>  But we believe that electrons interact causally with us because we are
> made from similar stuff - and by doing so make themselves known to
> us...right?
>
>  How do Platonic objects interact causally with us?  Via a Platonic
> Field?  PFT - Platonic Field Theory?
>
>
>  How did the warping of space and time cause Einsteins brain to figure
> out relativity?
>
>  I think you are looking at it in the wrong way.  Our brains seek good
> explanations.  They sometimes find one.  That's all that is going on.
>
>  Now you say our explainations when it comes to mathematics are fiction,
> but if that is so, why not say the same of the physical theories?  Why not
> say the big bang is fiction, or matter is fiction?
>
>
> They are stories which we intend to have referents independent of the
> stories (theories).
>
>
I don't see how this is any different from our mathematical theories though.

Jason

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread Rex Allen
Just to avoid confusion, this sentence:

*I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so
many details of the story are known up front that the plot can only
progress in very specific ways if it is to remain consistent and believable
to the "reader".*


Should probably be:

*I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so
many details of the back-story are known up front that the plot can only
progress in very specific ways if it is to remain consistent and believable
to the "reader". *




On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 8:40 AM, Rex Allen  wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 11:50 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 10:19 PM, Rex Allen 
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam > >
>> > wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Rex,
>> >>
>> >> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
>> >> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?
>> >
>> >
>> > I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with
>> all
>> > that implies for the Mandelbrot set.
>>
>> I'm curious about what a plausible "fictionalist" account of the
>> Mandelbrot set could be. Is fictionalism the same as constructivism,
>> or the idea that knowledge doesn't exist outside of a mind?
>>
>
> I lean towards a strong form of fictionalism - which says that there are
> few important differences between mathematics and literary fiction.
>
> So - I could give a detailed answer - but I think I'd rather give a
> sketchy answer at this point.
>
> I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so
> many details of the story are known up front that the plot can only
> progress in very specific ways if it is to remain consistent and believable
> to the "reader".
>
> Mathematics is a kind of world building.  In the imaginative sense.
>
>
>
>
>>
>> > But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:
>> >
>> > Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects
>> and
>> > otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?
>> >
>> > How is it that we are able to reliably know things about Platonia?
>>
>> I think just doing logic and math - starting from axioms and proving
>> things from them - is interacting with the Platonic realm.
>
>
> But how is it that we humans do that?  This is my main question.  What
> exactly are we doing when we start from axioms and prove things from them?
>  Where does this ability come from?  What does it consist of?
>
>
>
> > I would have thought that quarks and electrons from which we appear to be
>> > constituted would be indifferent to truth.
>> >
>> > Which would fit with the fact that I seem to make a lot of mistakes.
>> >
>> > But you think otherwise?
>>
>> I didn't understand the above... what do quarks and electrons have to
>> do with arithmetical platonism?
>>
>
> Are we not composed from quarks and electrons?  If so - then how do "mere"
> collections of quarks and electrons connect with platonic truths?
>
> By chance?  Are we just fortunate that the initial conditions and causal
> laws of the universe are such that our quarks and electrons take forms that
> mirror Platonic Truths?
>
>
>
>>
>> >>
>> >> How can you make
>> >> sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view that you
>> >> are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
>> >> platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
>> >> discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
>> >> z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.
>> >
>> > I will agree with you that all intelligences that start from the same
>> > premises as you, and follow the same rules as inference as you, will
>> also
>> > draw the same conclusions about the Mandelbrot set as you do.
>> >
>> > However - I do not agree with you that this amenable group exhausts the
>> set
>> > of all *possible* intelligences.
>>
>> I only meant that all possible intelligences that start from a
>> mathematics that includes addition, multiplication, and complex
>> numbers will find that if they iterate the function z' = z^2 + c, they
>> will find that some orbits become periodic or settle on a point, and
>> some escape to infinity. If they draw a graph of which orbits don't
>> escape, they will draw the Mandelbrot Set. All possible intelligences
>> that undertake that procedure will draw the same shape... and this
>> seems like discovery, not creation.
>>
>
> It seems like a tautology to me.  If you do what I do and believe what I
> believe then you will be a lot like me...?
>
> Is there anything to mathematics other than belief?
>
> What are beliefs?  Why do we have the beliefs that we have?  How do we
> form beliefs - what lies behind belief?
>
> Can *our* mathematical abilities be reduced to something that is
> indifferent to mathematical truth?
>
>
>
>
>>
>> > Could there be intelligences who start from vastly difference premises,
>> and
>> > use vastly d

Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread meekerdb

On 9/21/2012 8:59 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sep 21, 2012, at 8:13 AM, Rex Allen > wrote:


On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:27 AM, Jason Resch > wrote:


On Sep 18, 2012, at 9:19 PM, Rex Allen mailto:rexallen31...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam mailto:terren.suy...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Rex,

Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein? 



I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with all 
that
implies for the Mandelbrot set.

But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:

Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects and
otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?


We study and create theories about objects in the mathematical realm just 
as we
study and create theories about objects in the physical realm.


So in the physical realm, we start from our senses - what we see, hear, feel, 
etc.

From this, we infer the existence of electrons and wavefunctions and strings and 
whatnot.  Or some of us do.  Others take a more instrumental view of scientific theories.


Right, and we have similarly inferred the existence of primes, fractals, non-computable 
functions, etc.


We invented counting, addition, etc and found it implied true propositions about primes, 
fractals, etc.  To say they exist in the same way tables and chairs exist is going much 
further.






So you're saying that "thought" is another kind of sense?


Thought is needed for inference and building theories, equally in the physical sciences 
and math.


And that what occurs to us in thought can also be used as a basis to infer the 
existence of objects which help "explain" those thoughts?


Right, like you might think up genesis and dualism, or big bang and materialism, or 
platonic truth and computationalism.  These are ontological theories for what exists, 
and why we are here experiencing it.


If you say math is fiction and only exists only as a story in our brains, then obviously 
you can't use platonic truth and computationalism as one if your theories of existence.


I think the fact that mathematics can serve as a theory for our existence shows 
absolutely that mathematical theories and physical theories are on equal footing.  We 
can gather evidence for them and build cases for them, find out we were wrong about 
them, and so on.  Why do we believe in quarks, electrons, strings, etc.?  Because they 
can explain our observations.  Why do I believe in the platonic realm?  For the same 
reasons.




But we believe that electrons interact causally with us because we are made from 
similar stuff - and by doing so make themselves known to us...right?


How do Platonic objects interact causally with us?  Via a Platonic Field?  PFT - 
Platonic Field Theory?




How did the warping of space and time cause Einsteins brain to figure out 
relativity?

I think you are looking at it in the wrong way. Our brains seek good explanations.  They 
sometimes find one.  That's all that is going on.


Now you say our explainations when it comes to mathematics are fiction, but if that is 
so, why not say the same of the physical theories?  Why not say the big bang is fiction, 
or matter is fiction?


They are stories which we intend to have referents independent of the stories 
(theories).

Brent

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread meekerdb

On 9/21/2012 5:40 AM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 11:50 PM, Terren Suydam > wrote:


On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 10:19 PM, Rex Allen mailto:rexallen31...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam mailto:terren.suy...@gmail.com>>
> wrote:
>>
>> Rex,
>>
>> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
>> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?
>
>
> I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with all
> that implies for the Mandelbrot set.

I'm curious about what a plausible "fictionalist" account of the
Mandelbrot set could be. Is fictionalism the same as constructivism,
or the idea that knowledge doesn't exist outside of a mind?


I lean towards a strong form of fictionalism - which says that there are few important 
differences between mathematics and literary fiction.


So - I could give a detailed answer - but I think I'd rather give a sketchy answer at 
this point.


I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so many details 
of the story are known up front that the plot can only progress in very specific ways if 
it is to remain consistent and believable to the "reader".


Mathematics is a kind of world building.  In the imaginative sense.



> But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:
>
> Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects and
> otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?
>
> How is it that we are able to reliably know things about Platonia?

I think just doing logic and math - starting from axioms and proving
things from them - is interacting with the Platonic realm.


But how is it that we humans do that?  This is my main question.  What exactly are we 
doing when we start from axioms and prove things from them?  Where does this ability 
come from?  What does it consist of?




> I would have thought that quarks and electrons from which we appear to be
> constituted would be indifferent to truth.
>
> Which would fit with the fact that I seem to make a lot of mistakes.
>
> But you think otherwise?

I didn't understand the above... what do quarks and electrons have to
do with arithmetical platonism?


Are we not composed from quarks and electrons?  If so - then how do "mere" collections 
of quarks and electrons connect with platonic truths?


By chance?  Are we just fortunate that the initial conditions and causal laws of the 
universe are such that our quarks and electrons take forms that mirror Platonic Truths?



>>
>> How can you make
>> sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view that you
>> are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
>> platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
>> discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
>> z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.
>
> I will agree with you that all intelligences that start from the same
> premises as you, and follow the same rules as inference as you, will also
> draw the same conclusions about the Mandelbrot set as you do.
>
> However - I do not agree with you that this amenable group exhausts the 
set
> of all *possible* intelligences.

I only meant that all possible intelligences that start from a
mathematics that includes addition, multiplication, and complex
numbers will find that if they iterate the function z' = z^2 + c, they
will find that some orbits become periodic or settle on a point, and
some escape to infinity. If they draw a graph of which orbits don't
escape, they will draw the Mandelbrot Set. All possible intelligences
that undertake that procedure will draw the same shape... and this
seems like discovery, not creation.


It seems like a tautology to me.  If you do what I do and believe what I believe then 
you will be a lot like me...?


Is there anything to mathematics other than belief?

What are beliefs?  Why do we have the beliefs that we have?  How do we form beliefs - 
what lies behind belief?


Can *our* mathematical abilities be reduced to something that is indifferent to 
mathematical truth?




> Could there be intelligences who start from vastly difference premises, 
and
> use vastly different rules of inference, and draw vastly different
> conclusions?

Of course, but then what they are doing doesn't relate to the Mandelbrot 
Set.


However - they might *believe* their creations to be just as significant and universal 
as you consider the Mandelbrot Set to be - mightened they?


What would make them wrong in their belief but you right in yours?



>
> What are the limits of belief, do you think?  Is there any belief that is 
so
> preposterous that even the maddest o

Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread meekerdb

On 9/21/2012 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Sep 2012, at 20:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2012 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Sep 2012, at 18:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2012 2:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A modal logic of probability is given by the behavior of the "probability one". In 
Kripke terms, P(x) = 1 in world alpha means that x is realized in all worlds 
accessible from alpha, and (key point) that we are not in a cul-de-sac world.


What does 'accessible' mean?



In modal logic semantic, it is a technical world for any element in set + a binary 
relation on it.


A mapping of the set onto itself?



When applied to probability, the idea is to interpret the worlds by the realization of 
some random experience, like throwing a coin would lead to two worlds accessible, one 
with head, the other with tail. In that modal (tail or head) is a certainty as (tail 
or head) is realized everywhere in the accessible worlds.


Then accessible means nomologically possible.


Accessible means only that some binary relation exists on a set. But in some concrete 
model of a multi-world or multi-situation context, nomological possibility is not excluded.


Then I don't understand what other kinds of possibility are allowed?  I don't see how 
logical possibility could be considered an accessibility relation (at least not an 
interesting one) because it would allow Rxy where y was anything except not-x.







But in the worlds of the UD there is no nomological constraint, so there's no 
probability measure?


I am not sure why there is no nomological constraints in the UD. UD* is a highly 
structured entity. You might elaborate on this.


A nomological constraint is one of physics.  But physics is derivative from part of the 
UD.  The UD is structured only by arithmetic.


Brent



Bruno





Generally speaking a different world is defined as not accessible.  If you can go 
there, it's part of your same world.


Yes. OK. Sorry. Logician used the term world in a technical sense, and the worlds can 
be anything, depending of which modal logic is used, for what purpose, etc. Kripke 
semantic main used is in showing the independence of formula in different systems.


Bruno





Brent


This gives KD modal logics, with K:  = [](p -> q)->([]p -> []q), and D:  []p -> <>p. 
Of course with "[]" for Gödel's beweisbar we don't have that D is a theorem, so we 
ensure the D property by defining a new box, Bp = []p & <>t.


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread Terren Suydam
On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 8:40 AM, Rex Allen  wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 11:50 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>>
>> I'm curious about what a plausible "fictionalist" account of the
>> Mandelbrot set could be. Is fictionalism the same as constructivism,
>> or the idea that knowledge doesn't exist outside of a mind?
>
>
> I lean towards a strong form of fictionalism - which says that there are few
> important differences between mathematics and literary fiction.

Can you articulate any important differences between them?

> So - I could give a detailed answer - but I think I'd rather give a sketchy
> answer at this point.
>
> I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so
> many details of the story are known up front that the plot can only progress
> in very specific ways if it is to remain consistent and believable to the
> "reader".
>
> Mathematics is a kind of world building.  In the imaginative sense.

I am not unsympathetic with this view, given the creativity that goes
into mathematical proofs. However, it falls apart for me when I
consider that an alien civilization is constrained to build the same
worlds if they start from the same logical axioms.

>>
>> I think just doing logic and math - starting from axioms and proving
>> things from them - is interacting with the Platonic realm.
>
>
> But how is it that we humans do that?  This is my main question.  What
> exactly are we doing when we start from axioms and prove things from them?
> Where does this ability come from?  What does it consist of?

We're using our intelligence and creativity to search a space of
propositions (given a set of axioms) that are either provably true or
false. I would say our intelligence and creativity comes from our
animal nature, evolved as it is to make sense of the world (and each
other) and draw useful inferences that help us survive. I'm not sure
how to answer the question "what does it consist of". Are you asking
how we can act intelligently, how creativity works?

>> I didn't understand the above... what do quarks and electrons have to
>> do with arithmetical platonism?
>
> Are we not composed from quarks and electrons?  If so - then how do "mere"
> collections of quarks and electrons connect with platonic truths?
>
> By chance?  Are we just fortunate that the initial conditions and causal
> laws of the universe are such that our quarks and electrons take forms that
> mirror Platonic Truths?

I see. Assuming comp, we are some infinite subset of the trace of the
UD (universal dovetailer), which is a platonic entity. Quarks and
electrons are a part of the physics that emerges from that (the
numbers' dreams)... that's the reversal, where physics emerges from
computer science.

The question of how we, as "mere" collections of quarks etc. connect
back with Platonia, is answered by CT (Church-Turing Thesis). As we
are universal machines, we can emulate any computation, including the
universal dovetailer (for instance).

>> I only meant that all possible intelligences that start from a
>> mathematics that includes addition, multiplication, and complex
>> numbers will find that if they iterate the function z' = z^2 + c, they
>> will find that some orbits become periodic or settle on a point, and
>> some escape to infinity. If they draw a graph of which orbits don't
>> escape, they will draw the Mandelbrot Set. All possible intelligences
>> that undertake that procedure will draw the same shape... and this
>> seems like discovery, not creation.
>
> It seems like a tautology to me.  If you do what I do and believe what I
> believe then you will be a lot like me...?
>
> Is there anything to mathematics other than belief?

The point is that you are constrained in what you can prove starting
from a given set of axioms. You are not constrained in which axioms
you start with - that's where the belief comes in since there is no
way to prove that your axioms are True, except within a more
encompassing logical framework with its own axioms.

> What are beliefs?  Why do we have the beliefs that we have?  How do we form
> beliefs - what lies behind belief?

Beliefs in the everyday sense are inferences about our experience that
we hold to be true. They help us navigate the world as we experience
it, and make sense of it. Mostly our beliefs are formed by suggestion
from our parents and peers when we are young, and as we learn and grow
we complicate our worldview with new beliefs. There isn't much behind
belief except habituation. Certainly most of us hold onto some beliefs
that are contradicted by facts (particularly the beliefs we hold of
ourselves).

> Can *our* mathematical abilities be reduced to something that is indifferent
> to mathematical truth?

I think if you were doing math in a way that was indifferent to
mathematical truth, you wouldn't be very good at math.

>> Of course, but then what they are doing doesn't relate to the Mandelbrot
>> Set.
>
>
> However - they might *believe* their creations 

Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread Jason Resch



On Sep 21, 2012, at 8:13 AM, Rex Allen  wrote:

On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:27 AM, Jason Resch   
wrote:
On Sep 18, 2012, at 9:19 PM, Rex Allen   
wrote:
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam > wrote:

Rex,

Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?

I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics,  
with all that implies for the Mandelbrot set.


But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:

Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical  
objects and otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?


We study and create theories about objects in the mathematical realm  
just as we study and create theories about objects in the physical  
realm.


So in the physical realm, we start from our senses - what we see,  
hear, feel, etc.


From this, we infer the existence of electrons and wavefunctions and  
strings and whatnot.  Or some of us do.  Others take a more  
instrumental view of scientific theories.


Right, and we have similarly inferred the existence of primes,  
fractals, non-computable functions, etc.




So you're saying that "thought" is another kind of sense?


Thought is needed for inference and building theories, equally in the  
physical sciences and math.


And that what occurs to us in thought can also be used as a basis to  
infer the existence of objects which help "explain" those thoughts?


Right, like you might think up genesis and dualism, or big bang and  
materialism, or platonic truth and computationalism.  These are  
ontological theories for what exists, and why we are here experiencing  
it.


If you say math is fiction and only exists only as a story in our  
brains, then obviously you can't use platonic truth and  
computationalism as one if your theories of existence.


I think the fact that mathematics can serve as a theory for our  
existence shows absolutely that mathematical theories and physical  
theories are on equal footing.  We can gather evidence for them and  
build cases for them, find out we were wrong about them, and so on.   
Why do we believe in quarks, electrons, strings, etc.?  Because they  
can explain our observations.  Why do I believe in the platonic  
realm?  For the same reasons.




But we believe that electrons interact causally with us because we  
are made from similar stuff - and by doing so make themselves known  
to us...right?


How do Platonic objects interact causally with us?  Via a Platonic  
Field?  PFT - Platonic Field Theory?




How did the warping of space and time cause Einsteins brain to figure  
out relativity?


I think you are looking at it in the wrong way.  Our brains seek good  
explanations.  They sometimes find one.  That's all that is going on.


Now you say our explainations when it comes to mathematics are  
fiction, but if that is so, why not say the same of the physical  
theories?  Why not say the big bang is fiction, or matter is fiction?   
I think this leads to declaring everything but one's current thought  
is fiction, which does not seem very useful.





It's not much different from how we develop theories about other  
things we cannot interact with: the early universe, the cores of  
stars, the insides of black holes, etc.


We test these theories by following their implications and seeing if  
they lead to contridictions with other, more  established, facts.


Just as with physical theories, we ocasionally find that we need to  
throw out the old set of theories (or axioms) for a new set which  
has greater explanatory power.



So you think our current mathematical theories are not "true" in any  
metaphysical sense - but rather are approximations of what exists in  
Platonia?


They may or may not be true, but they are certainly incomplete.  Just  
like our physical theories may or not be true descriptions of the  
universe, and are certainly incomplete.




Is there an equivalent of the idea of "domains of validity" that  
holds in some circles in physics?




I don't know what this concept means well enough to say.


I'm not sure any of this counts as being evidence in favor of  
Platonism...




How is it that we are able to reliably know things about Platonia?


The very idea of knowing implies a differentiation between true and  
false.


Nearly any intelligent civilization that notices a partition between  
true and false will eventyally get here.



True in what sense?  A coherentist conception of truth?  A  
correspondence conception of truth?




In the sense of the notion that a proposition is either true or false.


How do we know truth?  Do we have an innate "truth sense"?


How do we know anything?  Do we know anything?




Does the ability to know truth require free will?



Comparabalist or incompatibalist?


For instance:

If we say a statement is true because it is true,


What we say or think has no effect on platonic truth.

that is different than saying it is true

Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread Rex Allen
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:27 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sep 18, 2012, at 9:19 PM, Rex Allen  wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam < 
> terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Rex,
>>
>> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
>> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?
>
>
> I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with all
> that implies for the Mandelbrot set.
>
> But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:
>
> Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects and
> otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?
>
>
> We study and create theories about objects in the mathematical realm just
> as we study and create theories about objects in the physical realm.
>

So in the physical realm, we start from our senses - what we see, hear,
feel, etc.

>From this, we infer the existence of electrons and wavefunctions and
strings and whatnot.  Or some of us do.  Others take a more instrumental
view of scientific theories.

So you're saying that "thought" is another kind of sense?  And that what
occurs to us in thought can also be used as a basis to infer the existence
of objects which help "explain" those thoughts?

But we believe that electrons interact causally with us because we are made
from similar stuff - and by doing so make themselves known to us...right?

How do Platonic objects interact causally with us?  Via a Platonic Field?
 PFT - Platonic Field Theory?


It's not much different from how we develop theories about other things we
> cannot interact with: the early universe, the cores of stars, the insides
> of black holes, etc.
>
> We test these theories by following their implications and seeing if they
> lead to contridictions with other, more  established, facts.
>

> Just as with physical theories, we ocasionally find that we need to throw
> out the old set of theories (or axioms) for a new set which has greater
> explanatory power.
>


So you think our current mathematical theories are not "true" in any
metaphysical sense - but rather are approximations of what exists in
Platonia?

Is there an equivalent of the idea of "domains of validity" that holds in
some circles in physics?

I'm not sure any of this counts as being evidence in favor of Platonism...


How is it that we are able to reliably know things about Platonia?
>
>
> The very idea of knowing implies a differentiation between true and false.
>

> Nearly any intelligent civilization that notices a partition between true
> and false will eventyally get here.
>
>
True in what sense?  A coherentist conception of truth?  A correspondence
conception of truth?

How do we know truth?  Do we have an innate "truth sense"?

Does the ability to know truth require free will?

For instance:

If we say a statement is true because it is true, that is different than
saying it is true because our neurons fired in a way that determined our
response. If all our decisions were predetermined from the moment of the
big bang then rational discussion is meaningless. Whether or not anyone
agrees with you has nothing to do with the truth of your claim. Their
beliefs were "hardwired" from the beginning of time.

It follows then that your own beliefs are not based on their truth value.
You believe what you believe because your neurons have determined that you
will believe in this rather than that.

SO - what is this "truth" stuff, really?



>
>
> I would have thought that quarks and electrons from which we appear to be
> constituted would be indifferent to truth.
>
>
> The unreasonable effectiveness of math in the physical sciences is yet
> further support if Platonism.  If this, and seemingly infinite  physical
> universes exist, and they are mathematical structures, why can't others
> exist?
>



>
> Which would fit with the fact that I seem to make a lot of mistakes.
>
> But you think otherwise?
>
>
> We are imperfect beings.
>

What is the source of imperfection?  Where does it come from?  What
explains it?

Objectively, intrinsically, absolutely imperfect?

Have you heard the term "Works as coded", with respect to software
development?

So I can write a program that has a bug in it - and the computer will run
it perfectly.  The computer will do exactly what I told it to do.

The program works as coded.  When running my program, the computer is
perfectly imperfect.

I am the source of its imperfection.

However, in a functionalist theory of mind - I am actually just executing
my own "program" right?  Given the initial conditions of the universe and
the causal laws that govern it - I could not do other than I did when I
wrote that buggy code.

I also "work as coded".  I also am "perfectly imperfect".  And since in
this view I am not the source of my own imperfection - the universe's
initial conditions and causal laws must be that source.

But what explains that imperfection?

But - maybe there really is no such thing as imperfection?  It's all just
mad

Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread Rex Allen
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 11:50 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 10:19 PM, Rex Allen 
> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam 
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> Rex,
> >>
> >> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
> >> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?
> >
> >
> > I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with
> all
> > that implies for the Mandelbrot set.
>
> I'm curious about what a plausible "fictionalist" account of the
> Mandelbrot set could be. Is fictionalism the same as constructivism,
> or the idea that knowledge doesn't exist outside of a mind?
>

I lean towards a strong form of fictionalism - which says that there are
few important differences between mathematics and literary fiction.

So - I could give a detailed answer - but I think I'd rather give a sketchy
answer at this point.

I would say that mathematics is just very tightly plotted fiction where so
many details of the story are known up front that the plot can only
progress in very specific ways if it is to remain consistent and believable
to the "reader".

Mathematics is a kind of world building.  In the imaginative sense.




>
> > But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:
> >
> > Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects and
> > otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?
> >
> > How is it that we are able to reliably know things about Platonia?
>
> I think just doing logic and math - starting from axioms and proving
> things from them - is interacting with the Platonic realm.


But how is it that we humans do that?  This is my main question.  What
exactly are we doing when we start from axioms and prove things from them?
 Where does this ability come from?  What does it consist of?



> I would have thought that quarks and electrons from which we appear to be
> > constituted would be indifferent to truth.
> >
> > Which would fit with the fact that I seem to make a lot of mistakes.
> >
> > But you think otherwise?
>
> I didn't understand the above... what do quarks and electrons have to
> do with arithmetical platonism?
>

Are we not composed from quarks and electrons?  If so - then how do "mere"
collections of quarks and electrons connect with platonic truths?

By chance?  Are we just fortunate that the initial conditions and causal
laws of the universe are such that our quarks and electrons take forms that
mirror Platonic Truths?



>
> >>
> >> How can you make
> >> sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view that you
> >> are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
> >> platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
> >> discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
> >> z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.
> >
> > I will agree with you that all intelligences that start from the same
> > premises as you, and follow the same rules as inference as you, will also
> > draw the same conclusions about the Mandelbrot set as you do.
> >
> > However - I do not agree with you that this amenable group exhausts the
> set
> > of all *possible* intelligences.
>
> I only meant that all possible intelligences that start from a
> mathematics that includes addition, multiplication, and complex
> numbers will find that if they iterate the function z' = z^2 + c, they
> will find that some orbits become periodic or settle on a point, and
> some escape to infinity. If they draw a graph of which orbits don't
> escape, they will draw the Mandelbrot Set. All possible intelligences
> that undertake that procedure will draw the same shape... and this
> seems like discovery, not creation.
>

It seems like a tautology to me.  If you do what I do and believe what I
believe then you will be a lot like me...?

Is there anything to mathematics other than belief?

What are beliefs?  Why do we have the beliefs that we have?  How do we form
beliefs - what lies behind belief?

Can *our* mathematical abilities be reduced to something that is
indifferent to mathematical truth?




>
> > Could there be intelligences who start from vastly difference premises,
> and
> > use vastly different rules of inference, and draw vastly different
> > conclusions?
>
> Of course, but then what they are doing doesn't relate to the Mandelbrot
> Set.
>

However - they might *believe* their creations to be just as significant
and universal as you consider the Mandelbrot Set to be - mightened they?

What would make them wrong in their belief but you right in yours?



>
> > What are the limits of belief, do you think?  Is there any belief that
> is so
> > preposterous that even the maddest of the mad could not believe such a
> > thing?
>
> I don't think so... based on my understanding of how mad "maddest of
> the mad" can get.
>
> > And if there is no such belief - then is it conceivable that quarks and
> > electrons could configure themselves in 

Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-21 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Sep 2012, at 20:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2012 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Sep 2012, at 18:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2012 2:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A modal logic of probability is given by the behavior of the  
"probability one". In Kripke terms, P(x) = 1 in world alpha means  
that x is realized in all worlds accessible from alpha, and (key  
point) that we are not in a cul-de-sac world.


What does 'accessible' mean?



In modal logic semantic, it is a technical world for any element in  
set + a binary relation on it.


When applied to probability, the idea is to interpret the worlds by  
the realization of some random experience, like throwing a coin  
would lead to two worlds accessible, one with head, the other with  
tail. In that modal (tail or head) is a certainty as (tail or head)  
is realized everywhere in the accessible worlds.


Then accessible means nomologically possible.


Accessible means only that some binary relation exists on a set. But  
in some concrete model of a multi-world or multi-situation context,  
nomological possibility is not excluded.





But in the worlds of the UD there is no nomological constraint, so  
there's no probability measure?


I am not sure why there is no nomological constraints in the UD. UD*  
is a highly structured entity. You might elaborate on this.


Bruno





Generally speaking a different world is defined as not  
accessible.  If you can go there, it's part of your same world.


Yes. OK. Sorry. Logician used the term world in a technical sense,  
and the worlds can be anything, depending of which modal logic is  
used, for what purpose, etc. Kripke semantic main used is in  
showing the independence of formula in different systems.


Bruno





Brent


This gives KD modal logics, with K:  = [](p -> q)->([]p -> []q),  
and D:  []p -> <>p. Of course with "[]" for Gödel's beweisbar we  
don't have that D is a theorem, so we ensure the D property by  
defining a new box, Bp = []p & <>t.


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-20 Thread meekerdb

On 9/20/2012 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Sep 2012, at 18:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2012 2:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A modal logic of probability is given by the behavior of the "probability one". In 
Kripke terms, P(x) = 1 in world alpha means that x is realized in all worlds 
accessible from alpha, and (key point) that we are not in a cul-de-sac world.


What does 'accessible' mean?



In modal logic semantic, it is a technical world for any element in set + a binary 
relation on it.


When applied to probability, the idea is to interpret the worlds by the realization of 
some random experience, like throwing a coin would lead to two worlds accessible, one 
with head, the other with tail. In that modal (tail or head) is a certainty as (tail or 
head) is realized everywhere in the accessible worlds.


Then accessible means nomologically possible.  But in the worlds of the UD there is no 
nomological constraint, so there's no probability measure?


Brent





Generally speaking a different world is defined as not accessible.  If you can go 
there, it's part of your same world.


Yes. OK. Sorry. Logician used the term world in a technical sense, and the worlds can be 
anything, depending of which modal logic is used, for what purpose, etc. Kripke semantic 
main used is in showing the independence of formula in different systems.


Bruno





Brent


This gives KD modal logics, with K:  = [](p -> q)->([]p -> []q), and D:  []p -> <>p. 
Of course with "[]" for Gödel's beweisbar we don't have that D is a theorem, so we 
ensure the D property by defining a new box, Bp = []p & <>t.


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Sep 2012, at 18:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2012 2:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A modal logic of probability is given by the behavior of the  
"probability one". In Kripke terms, P(x) = 1 in world alpha means  
that x is realized in all worlds accessible from alpha, and (key  
point) that we are not in a cul-de-sac world.


What does 'accessible' mean?



In modal logic semantic, it is a technical world for any element in  
set + a binary relation on it.


When applied to probability, the idea is to interpret the worlds by  
the realization of some random experience, like throwing a coin would  
lead to two worlds accessible, one with head, the other with tail. In  
that modal (tail or head) is a certainty as (tail or head) is realized  
everywhere in the accessible worlds.




Generally speaking a different world is defined as not accessible.   
If you can go there, it's part of your same world.


Yes. OK. Sorry. Logician used the term world in a technical sense, and  
the worlds can be anything, depending of which modal logic is used,  
for what purpose, etc. Kripke semantic main used is in showing the  
independence of formula in different systems.


Bruno





Brent


This gives KD modal logics, with K:  = [](p -> q)->([]p -> []q),  
and D:  []p -> <>p. Of course with "[]" for Gödel's beweisbar we  
don't have that D is a theorem, so we ensure the D property by  
defining a new box, Bp = []p & <>t.


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-20 Thread meekerdb

On 9/20/2012 2:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A modal logic of probability is given by the behavior of the "probability one". In 
Kripke terms, P(x) = 1 in world alpha means that x is realized in all worlds accessible 
from alpha, and (key point) that we are not in a cul-de-sac world. 


What does 'accessible' mean?  Generally speaking a different world is defined as not 
accessible.  If you can go there, it's part of your same world.


Brent


This gives KD modal logics, with K:  = [](p -> q)->([]p -> []q), and D:  []p -> <>p. Of 
course with "[]" for Gödel's beweisbar we don't have that D is a theorem, so we ensure 
the D property by defining a new box, Bp = []p & <>t. 


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Sep 2012, at 21:51, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/19/2012 2:39 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Dear Bruno,

  Your remarks raise an interesting question: Could it be that  
both the object and the means to generate (or perceive) it are of  
equal importance ontologically?


Yes. It comes from the embedding of the subject in the objects,  
that any monist theory has to do somehow.


In computer science, the "universal" (in the sense of Turing)  
association i -> phi_i, transforms N into an applicative algebra.  
The numbers are both perceivers and perceived  according of their  
place x and y in the relation of phi_x(y).


You can define the applicative operation by x # y = phi_x(y). The  
combinators are not far away from this, and provides intensional  
and extensional models.


I remind you that phi_i represent the ith computable function in  
some effective universal enumeration of the partial computable  
functions. You can take LISP, or c++ to fix the things.


Bruno

Dear Bruno,

   You are highlighting of the key property of a number, that it can  
both represent itself and some other number.


It is a key property of anything finite, not just number. Lists and  
strings do this even more easily and naturally.




My question becomes, how does one track the difference between these  
representations?


By quotations, like when using Gödel number, or quoted list in LISP.  
Those are computable operations.





You speak of measures, but I have never seen how relative measures  
are discussed or defined in modal logic.


?

A modal logic of probability is given by the behavior of the  
"probability one". In Kripke terms, P(x) = 1 in world alpha means that  
x is realized in all worlds accessible from alpha, and (key point)  
that we are not in a cul-de-sac world. This gives KD modal logics,  
with K:  = [](p -> q)->([]p -> []q), and D:  []p -> <>p. Of course  
with "[]" for Gödel's beweisbar we don't have that D is a theorem, so  
we ensure the D property by defining a new box, Bp = []p & <>t.






It seems to me that if we have the possibility of a Godel numbering  
scheme on the integers, then we lose the ability to define a global  
index set on subsets of those integers


?


unless we can somehow call upon something that is not a number and  
thus not directly representable by a number..


?
Not clear. We appeal to something non representable by adding the "&  
p" in the definition of the modal box, but this is for the qualia and  
first person notion. The Dt (and variant like DDt, DDBDt, etc.) should  
give the first person plural, normally. many possibility remains, as  
the quantum p -> []<>p appears in the three main "material variants"  
of: S4Grz1, Z1*, and X1*, for p arithmetic sigma_1 proposition (the  
arithmetical UD).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-19 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/19/2012 2:39 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Dear Bruno,

   Your remarks raise an interesting question: Could it be that both 
the object and the means to generate (or perceive) it are of equal 
importance ontologically?


Yes. It comes from the embedding of the subject in the objects, that 
any monist theory has to do somehow.


In computer science, the "universal" (in the sense of Turing) 
association i -> phi_i, transforms N into an applicative algebra. The 
numbers are both perceivers and perceived  according of their place x 
and y in the relation of phi_x(y).


You can define the applicative operation by x # y = phi_x(y). The 
combinators are not far away from this, and provides intensional and 
extensional models.


I remind you that phi_i represent the ith computable function in some 
effective universal enumeration of the partial computable functions. 
You can take LISP, or c++ to fix the things.


Bruno

Dear Bruno,

You are highlighting of the key property of a number, that it can 
both represent itself and some other number. My question becomes, how 
does one track the difference between these representations? You speak 
of measures, but I have never seen how relative measures are discussed 
or defined in modal logic. It seems to me that if we have the 
possibility of a Godel numbering scheme on the integers, then we lose 
the ability to define a global index set on subsets of those integers 
unless we can somehow call upon something that is not a number and thus 
not directly representable by a number..



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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Sep 2012, at 17:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/19/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Sep 2012, at 18:02, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/18/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Sep 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:


But did anybody think z' = z^2 + c was interesting before that?



Yes. This was known by people like Fatou and Julia, in the early  
1900.


I knew they considered what are now called fractal sets, but not  
that particular one.


I think Julia worked on the "Mandelbrot's Julia sets", notably. The  
Mandelbrot set is a classifier of the Julia sets. You can define  
the Mandelbrot set by the the set of z such that z belongs to its  
Julia J(z).


The point is that in math and physics such object are hard to miss,  
even if you need a computer to figure out what they looks like.






Iterating analytical complex functions leads to the Mandelbrot  
fractal sets, or similar.


The computer has made those objects famous, but the  
mathematicians know them both from logic (counterexamples to  
theorem in analysis, like finding a continuous function nowhere  
derivable), or from dynamic system and iteration.


If you iterate the trigonometric cosec function on the Gauss  
plane C, you can't miss the Mandelbrot set.


But this iteration is a tedious and impractical *construction*  
which in practice depends on computers.


In practice, yes. But if I remember well, the point is that the M  
sets and alike are discovered, not fictitious human's construction.  
To see them, we need a computer, but to see a circle you need a  
compass, or a very massive object, like the sun or the moon, ...







In nature too as the following video does not illustrate too much  
seriously :)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGxbhdr3w2I


In such beautiful imagery it is generally overlooked that it is  
not the Mandelbrot set you are looking at, but rather regions  
colored according how close they are to the set (which cannot be  
seen at all).


Hmm, the inside mandelbrot set has dimension 2, as you can  
extrapolate from the big spot, and then the filament ar made of  
little mandelbrot set. So you can always see something. You are  
correct, for the filaments: usually we can see them, as the little  
Mandelbrot sets are too small. The coloring only makes them less  
thin and more easily observable, but you would see the same basic  
shape with a pure black and white picture. for example, everywhere  
on the main (straight) antenna, there is a little mandelbrot set,  
so even black and white resolution will make a thin line (with  
always too big pixels, of course). Of course, the line can become  
thinner and thinner, so with deeper zoom, you will have "to darken  
the picture", and then light it up, etc. Of course this is true  
also for a circle, or a straight line, which are too thin to be  
seen, too, but we don't worry to draw them with chalks or pens,  
which approximates them quite well.


You can see that phenomenon here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXzgrtntRTY


Bruno




Dear Bruno,

   Your remarks raise an interesting question: Could it be that both  
the object and the means to generate (or perceive) it are of equal  
importance ontologically?


Yes. It comes from the embedding of the subject in the objects, that  
any monist theory has to do somehow.


In computer science, the "universal" (in the sense of Turing)  
association i -> phi_i, transforms N into an applicative algebra. The  
numbers are both perceivers and perceived  according of their place x  
and y in the relation of phi_x(y).


You can define the applicative operation by x # y = phi_x(y). The  
combinators are not far away from this, and provides intensional and  
extensional models.


I remind you that phi_i represent the ith computable function in some  
effective universal enumeration of the partial computable functions.  
You can take LISP, or c++ to fix the things.


Bruno




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Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-19 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/19/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Sep 2012, at 18:02, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/18/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Sep 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:


But did anybody think z' = z^2 + c was interesting before that?



Yes. This was known by people like Fatou and Julia, in the early 1900.


I knew they considered what are now called fractal sets, but not that 
particular one.


I think Julia worked on the "Mandelbrot's Julia sets", notably. The 
Mandelbrot set is a classifier of the Julia sets. You can define the 
Mandelbrot set by the the set of z such that z belongs to its Julia J(z).


The point is that in math and physics such object are hard to miss, 
even if you need a computer to figure out what they looks like.






Iterating analytical complex functions leads to the Mandelbrot 
fractal sets, or similar.


The computer has made those objects famous, but the mathematicians 
know them both from logic (counterexamples to theorem in analysis, 
like finding a continuous function nowhere derivable), or from 
dynamic system and iteration.


If you iterate the trigonometric cosec function on the Gauss plane 
C, you can't miss the Mandelbrot set.


But this iteration is a tedious and impractical *construction* which 
in practice depends on computers.


In practice, yes. But if I remember well, the point is that the M sets 
and alike are discovered, not fictitious human's construction. To see 
them, we need a computer, but to see a circle you need a compass, or a 
very massive object, like the sun or the moon, ...







In nature too as the following video does not illustrate too much 
seriously :)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGxbhdr3w2I


In such beautiful imagery it is generally overlooked that it is not 
the Mandelbrot set you are looking at, but rather regions colored 
according how close they are to the set (which cannot be seen at all).


Hmm, the inside mandelbrot set has dimension 2, as you can extrapolate 
from the big spot, and then the filament ar made of little mandelbrot 
set. So you can always see something. You are correct, for the 
filaments: usually we can see them, as the little Mandelbrot sets are 
too small. The coloring only makes them less thin and more easily 
observable, but you would see the same basic shape with a pure black 
and white picture. for example, everywhere on the main (straight) 
antenna, there is a little mandelbrot set, so even black and white 
resolution will make a thin line (with always too big pixels, of 
course). Of course, the line can become thinner and thinner, so with 
deeper zoom, you will have "to darken the picture", and then light it 
up, etc. Of course this is true also for a circle, or a straight line, 
which are too thin to be seen, too, but we don't worry to draw them 
with chalks or pens, which approximates them quite well.


You can see that phenomenon here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXzgrtntRTY


Bruno




Dear Bruno,

Your remarks raise an interesting question: Could it be that both 
the object and the means to generate (or perceive) it are of equal 
importance ontologically?


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 Sep 2012, at 18:02, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/18/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Sep 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:


But did anybody think z' = z^2 + c was interesting before that?



Yes. This was known by people like Fatou and Julia, in the early  
1900.


I knew they considered what are now called fractal sets, but not  
that particular one.


I think Julia worked on the "Mandelbrot's Julia sets", notably. The  
Mandelbrot set is a classifier of the Julia sets. You can define the  
Mandelbrot set by the the set of z such that z belongs to its Julia  
J(z).


The point is that in math and physics such object are hard to miss,  
even if you need a computer to figure out what they looks like.






Iterating analytical complex functions leads to the Mandelbrot  
fractal sets, or similar.


The computer has made those objects famous, but the mathematicians  
know them both from logic (counterexamples to theorem in analysis,  
like finding a continuous function nowhere derivable), or from  
dynamic system and iteration.


If you iterate the trigonometric cosec function on the Gauss plane  
C, you can't miss the Mandelbrot set.


But this iteration is a tedious and impractical *construction* which  
in practice depends on computers.


In practice, yes. But if I remember well, the point is that the M sets  
and alike are discovered, not fictitious human's construction. To see  
them, we need a computer, but to see a circle you need a compass, or a  
very massive object, like the sun or the moon, ...







In nature too as the following video does not illustrate too much  
seriously :)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGxbhdr3w2I


In such beautiful imagery it is generally overlooked that it is not  
the Mandelbrot set you are looking at, but rather regions colored  
according how close they are to the set (which cannot be seen at all).


Hmm, the inside mandelbrot set has dimension 2, as you can extrapolate  
from the big spot, and then the filament ar made of little mandelbrot  
set. So you can always see something. You are correct, for the  
filaments: usually we can see them, as the little Mandelbrot sets are  
too small. The coloring only makes them less thin and more easily  
observable, but you would see the same basic shape with a pure black  
and white picture. for example, everywhere on the main (straight)  
antenna, there is a little mandelbrot set, so even black and white  
resolution will make a thin line (with always too big pixels, of  
course). Of course, the line can become thinner and thinner, so with  
deeper zoom, you will have "to darken the picture", and then light it  
up, etc. Of course this is true also for a circle, or a straight line,  
which are too thin to be seen, too, but we don't worry to draw them  
with chalks or pens, which approximates them quite well.


You can see that phenomenon here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXzgrtntRTY


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-18 Thread meekerdb

On 9/18/2012 9:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
The unreasonable effectiveness of math in the physical sciences is yet further support 
if Platonism.


I don't see that this follows.  If we invent language, including mathematics, to describe 
our theories of the world that explains their effectiveness.  But it doesn't imply that 
every description refers.  The mathematics of Maxwell's equations was (and is) very 
effective, but we now believe they only approximately describe what exists.


Brent

If this, and seemingly infinite  physical universes exist, and they are mathematical 
structures, why can't others exist? 


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-18 Thread Jason Resch



On Sep 18, 2012, at 9:19 PM, Rex Allen  wrote:



On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam > wrote:

Rex,

Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?

I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics,  
with all that implies for the Mandelbrot set.


But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:

Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical  
objects and otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?


We study and create theories about objects in the mathematical realm  
just as we study and create theories about objects in the physical  
realm.


It's not much different from how we develop theories about other  
things we cannot interact with: the early universe, the cores of  
stars, the insides of black holes, etc.


We test these theories by following their implications and seeing if  
they lead to contridictions with other, more  established, facts.


Just as with physical theories, we ocasionally find that we need to  
throw out the old set of theories (or axioms) for a new set which has  
greater explanatory power.





How is it that we are able to reliably know things about Platonia?


The very idea of knowing implies a differentiation between true and  
false.


This leads quite directly to boolean algebra.  Boolean algebra leads  
to concepts of numbers.  (e.g., even numbers of not operators cancel  
out, so counting them becomes an issue). Once you get counting and  
numbers, you get the uncapturable infinite truths concerning them, and  
infinite hierarchies if ever more powerful consistent theories.


Nearly any intelligent civilization that notices a partition between  
true and false will eventyally get here.





I would have thought that quarks and electrons from which we appear  
to be constituted would be indifferent to truth.




The unreasonable effectiveness of math in the physical sciences is yet  
further support if Platonism.  If this, and seemingly infinite   
physical universes exist, and they are mathematical structures, why  
can't others exist?



Which would fit with the fact that I seem to make a lot of mistakes.

But you think otherwise?


We are imperfect beings.

Jason




How can you make
sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view that you
are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.


I will agree with you that all intelligences that start from the  
same premises as you, and follow the same rules as inference as you,  
will also draw the same conclusions about the Mandelbrot set as you  
do.


However - I do not agree with you that this amenable group exhausts  
the set of all *possible* intelligences.


Could there be intelligences who start from vastly difference  
premises, and use vastly different rules of inference, and draw  
vastly different conclusions?


If not - what makes them impossible intelligences?

=*=

What are the limits of belief, do you think?  Is there any belief  
that is so preposterous that even the maddest of the mad could not  
believe such a thing?


And if there is no such belief - then is it conceivable that quarks  
and electrons could configure themselves in such a way as to *cause*  
a being who holds such beliefs to come into existence?


And if this is beyond the capacity of quarks and electrons, does it  
seem possible that there might be some other form of matter with  
more exotic properties that might be up to the task?


And if not - why not?

Rex

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-18 Thread Terren Suydam
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 10:19 PM, Rex Allen  wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>>
>> Rex,
>>
>> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
>> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?
>
>
> I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with all
> that implies for the Mandelbrot set.

I'm curious about what a plausible "fictionalist" account of the
Mandelbrot set could be. Is fictionalism the same as constructivism,
or the idea that knowledge doesn't exist outside of a mind?

> But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:
>
> Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects and
> otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?
>
> How is it that we are able to reliably know things about Platonia?

I think just doing logic and math - starting from axioms and proving
things from them - is interacting with the Platonic realm. It is
reliable because such proofs are necessarily valid no matter what sort
of computational agent is computing them. Bruno really takes it to the
next level though when he talks of "interviewing ideally correct
machines" and treating them as entities (strictly platonic, of course)
that can talk about what they can prove (believe).

> I would have thought that quarks and electrons from which we appear to be
> constituted would be indifferent to truth.
>
> Which would fit with the fact that I seem to make a lot of mistakes.
>
> But you think otherwise?

I didn't understand the above... what do quarks and electrons have to
do with arithmetical platonism?

>>
>> How can you make
>> sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view that you
>> are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
>> platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
>> discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
>> z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.
>
>
>
> I will agree with you that all intelligences that start from the same
> premises as you, and follow the same rules as inference as you, will also
> draw the same conclusions about the Mandelbrot set as you do.
>
> However - I do not agree with you that this amenable group exhausts the set
> of all *possible* intelligences.

I only meant that all possible intelligences that start from a
mathematics that includes addition, multiplication, and complex
numbers will find that if they iterate the function z' = z^2 + c, they
will find that some orbits become periodic or settle on a point, and
some escape to infinity. If they draw a graph of which orbits don't
escape, they will draw the Mandelbrot Set. All possible intelligences
that undertake that procedure will draw the same shape... and this
seems like discovery, not creation.

> Could there be intelligences who start from vastly difference premises, and
> use vastly different rules of inference, and draw vastly different
> conclusions?

Of course, but then what they are doing doesn't relate to the Mandelbrot Set.

> If not - what makes them impossible intelligences?
>
> =*=
>
> What are the limits of belief, do you think?  Is there any belief that is so
> preposterous that even the maddest of the mad could not believe such a
> thing?

I don't think so... based on my understanding of how mad "maddest of
the mad" can get.

> And if there is no such belief - then is it conceivable that quarks and
> electrons could configure themselves in such a way as to *cause* a being who
> holds such beliefs to come into existence?

I'm guessing you meant to say "and if there is such a belief...".  I'm
having a tough time understanding where you're going with this... it
seems like an interesting line of questions, but I have no idea how it
relates to what we were discussing.

Terren

> And if this is beyond the capacity of quarks and electrons, does it seem
> possible that there might be some other form of matter with more exotic
> properties that might be up to the task?
>
> And if not - why not?
>
> Rex
>
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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-18 Thread Rex Allen
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

> Rex,
>
> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?


I find fictionalism to be the most plausible view of mathematics, with all
that implies for the Mandelbrot set.

But ;et me turn the question around on you, if I can:

Do you have an explanation for how we "discover" mathematical objects and
otherwise interact with the Platonic realm?

How is it that we are able to reliably know things about Platonia?

I would have thought that quarks and electrons from which we appear to be
constituted would be indifferent to truth.

Which would fit with the fact that I seem to make a lot of mistakes.

But you think otherwise?



> How can you make
> sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view that you
> are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
> platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
> discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
> z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.
>


I will agree with you that all intelligences that start from the same
premises as you, and follow the same rules as inference as you, will also
draw the same conclusions about the Mandelbrot set as you do.

However - I do not agree with you that this amenable group exhausts the set
of all *possible* intelligences.

Could there be intelligences who start from vastly difference premises, and
use vastly different rules of inference, and draw vastly different
conclusions?

If not - what makes them impossible intelligences?

=*=

What are the limits of belief, do you think?  Is there any belief that is
so preposterous that even the maddest of the mad could not believe such a
thing?

And if there is no such belief - then is it conceivable that quarks and
electrons could configure themselves in such a way as to *cause* a being
who holds such beliefs to come into existence?

And if this is beyond the capacity of quarks and electrons, does it seem
possible that there might be some other form of matter with more exotic
properties that might be up to the task?

And if not - why not?

Rex

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-18 Thread meekerdb

On 9/18/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Sep 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:


But did anybody think z' = z^2 + c was interesting before that?



Yes. This was known by people like Fatou and Julia, in the early 1900. 


I knew they considered what are now called fractal sets, but not that 
particular one.


Iterating analytical complex functions leads to the Mandelbrot fractal sets, or 
similar.

The computer has made those objects famous, but the mathematicians know them both from 
logic (counterexamples to theorem in analysis, like finding a continuous function 
nowhere derivable), or from dynamic system and iteration.


If you iterate the trigonometric cosec function on the Gauss plane C, you can't miss the 
Mandelbrot set.


But this iteration is a tedious and impractical *construction* which in practice depends 
on computers.




In nature too as the following video does not illustrate too much seriously :)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGxbhdr3w2I


In such beautiful imagery it is generally overlooked that it is not the Mandelbrot set you 
are looking at, but rather regions colored according how close they are to the set (which 
cannot be seen at all).


Brent

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Sep 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:


But did anybody think z' = z^2 + c was interesting before that?



Yes. This was known by people like Fatou and Julia, in the early 1900.  
Iterating analytical complex functions leads to the Mandelbrot fractal  
sets, or similar.


The computer has made those objects famous, but the mathematicians  
know them both from logic (counterexamples to theorem in analysis,  
like finding a continuous function nowhere derivable), or from dynamic  
system and iteration.


If you iterate the trigonometric cosec function on the Gauss plane C,  
you can't miss the Mandelbrot set.


In nature too as the following video does not illustrate too much  
seriously :)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGxbhdr3w2I

Bruno



Bretn

On 9/17/2012 1:17 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

I would say computers were the tool that allowed us to see it, like a
microscope allowed us to see bacteria, and a telescope stars.

On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 9/17/2012 10:36 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

Rex,

Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?  How can you  
make

sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view


How can you make sense of it otherwise.  The Mandelbrot set is only
interesting because it became possible to construct it by use of  
computers.


Brent


that you
are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated  
on

z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.

Terren


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-17 Thread Terren Suydam
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:52 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 9/17/2012 2:45 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>> Benoit Mandelbrot did.
>
>
> I wasn't aware of that.  Did he have a proof of the fractal nature of the
> set before he calculated it?
>
> Brent

I don't know. I doubt it, I'm not even sure he had even coined the
term 'fractal' yet. I would be willing to bet though that what made
plotting z' = z^2 + c interesting to him was the same basic curiosity
that led astronomers to point Hubble at an empty patch of space
(despite the considerable cost of doing so): is there anything there
to be discovered?

Terren

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-17 Thread meekerdb

On 9/17/2012 2:45 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

Benoit Mandelbrot did.


I wasn't aware of that.  Did he have a proof of the fractal nature of the set before he 
calculated it?


Brent


But what does "interesting" have to do with it?
  Did anyone think that empty patch of sky was interesting before
Hubble turned it into one of the most amazing photos ever taken?


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-17 Thread Terren Suydam
Benoit Mandelbrot did. But what does "interesting" have to do with it?
 Did anyone think that empty patch of sky was interesting before
Hubble turned it into one of the most amazing photos ever taken?

On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 4:25 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> But did anybody think z' = z^2 + c was interesting before that?
>
> Bretn
>
>
> On 9/17/2012 1:17 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>> I would say computers were the tool that allowed us to see it, like a
>> microscope allowed us to see bacteria, and a telescope stars.
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
>>> On 9/17/2012 10:36 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>
>>> Rex,
>>>
>>> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
>>> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?  How can you make
>>> sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view
>>>
>>>
>>> How can you make sense of it otherwise.  The Mandelbrot set is only
>>> interesting because it became possible to construct it by use of
>>> computers.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>> that you
>>> are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
>>> platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
>>> discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
>>> z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.
>>>
>>> Terren
>>>
>>>
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>
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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-17 Thread meekerdb

But did anybody think z' = z^2 + c was interesting before that?

Bretn

On 9/17/2012 1:17 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

I would say computers were the tool that allowed us to see it, like a
microscope allowed us to see bacteria, and a telescope stars.

On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

On 9/17/2012 10:36 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

Rex,

Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?  How can you make
sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view


How can you make sense of it otherwise.  The Mandelbrot set is only
interesting because it became possible to construct it by use of computers.

Brent


that you
are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.

Terren


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-17 Thread Terren Suydam
I would say computers were the tool that allowed us to see it, like a
microscope allowed us to see bacteria, and a telescope stars.

On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 9/17/2012 10:36 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> Rex,
>
> Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
> Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?  How can you make
> sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view
>
>
> How can you make sense of it otherwise.  The Mandelbrot set is only
> interesting because it became possible to construct it by use of computers.
>
> Brent
>
>
> that you
> are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
> platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
> discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
> z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.
>
> Terren
>
>
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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-17 Thread meekerdb

On 9/17/2012 10:36 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

Rex,

Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?  How can you make
sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view


How can you make sense of it otherwise.  The Mandelbrot set is only interesting because it 
became possible to construct it by use of computers.


Brent


that you
are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
z' = z^2  + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.

Terren


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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-17 Thread Terren Suydam
Rex,

Do you have a non-platonist explanation for the "discovery" of the
Mandelbrot set and the infinite complexity therein?  How can you make
sense of that in terms of the constructivist point of view that you
are (I think) compelled to take if you argue against arithmetical
platonism?  It seems obvious that all possible intelligences would
discover the same forms of the Mandelbrot so long as they iterated on
z' = z^2 + c, but maybe I am missing the point of your argument.

Terren

On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Rex Allen  wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 2:05 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>
>> I think an easier way to intuit prime numbers that can't be represented as
>> rectangles, only a 1-wide "lines".
>>
>> While the concept of primes is straight forward, there is an unending set
>> of not-so-obvious facts that we continue to discover about the Primes.
>>
>
> Right.  My proposal is that this entire infinite edifice is built on top of
> our innate sense of "more", "less", and "equal".
>
> Which I am tentatively advancing as the basis of an argument against
> Platonism.
>
> Rex
>
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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-17 Thread Rex Allen
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 2:05 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

>
> I think an easier way to intuit prime numbers that can't be represented as
> rectangles, only a 1-wide "lines".
>
> While the concept of primes is straight forward, there is an unending set
> of not-so-obvious facts that we continue to discover about the Primes.
>
>
Right.  My proposal is that this entire infinite edifice is built on top of
our innate sense of "more", "less", and "equal".

Which I am tentatively advancing as the basis of an argument against
Platonism.

Rex

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-16 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 12:27 AM, Rex Allen  wrote:

>
> On Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 6:10 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>> HI Rex,
>>
>> Nice post! Could you riff a bit on what the number PHI tells us about
>> this characteristic. How is it that it seems that our perceptions of the
>> world find anything that is close to a PHI valued relationship to be
>> "beautiful"?
>>
>>
>
> Thanks Stephen!
>
> Actually my initial example of "numeracy" isn't quite right, but it's not
> important to the rest of the argument.
>
> My main point is that you can get to the concept of "prime numbers" just
> using relative magnitudes that we have an innate sense of.
>
>
I think an easier way to intuit prime numbers that can't be represented as
rectangles, only a 1-wide "lines".

While the concept of primes is straight forward, there is an unending set
of not-so-obvious facts that we continue to discover about the Primes.  For
example:

The average distance between primes of size N is approximately the natural
log of N, yet we know of no way to predict where the next prime will
exactly be. ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_gap )

Between N and 2N, there will always be at least one prime. (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand's_postulate )

There is a one-to-one correspondence, and method to get one from the other,
between perfect numbers and primes of the form ((2^p) - 1) (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_number#Even_perfect_numbers )

For any prime p, and any integer i where 0 < i < p, i^p divided by p has a
remainder of i.  This almost never works for composite numbers.  (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fermat's_little_theorem )  the exception for
composite numbers where this does hold are known as Carmichael numbers (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carmichael_number ) but they are rare.

And there are an infinite number of other such patterns waiting to be
discovered.

Jason

As for the significance of PHI - well - I guess there's probably some
> plausible sounding evolutionary story that could be told about that.
>
> Though how satisfying or useful an explanation like that is just depends
> on what you're after and what your interests are.
>
> An explanation that might be useful in one context might be useless in
> some other context.
>
> Explanations are observer dependent.
>
> Probably.
>
> Rex
>
>
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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-16 Thread Rex Allen
On Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 6:10 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
> HI Rex,
>
> Nice post! Could you riff a bit on what the number PHI tells us about
> this characteristic. How is it that it seems that our perceptions of the
> world find anything that is close to a PHI valued relationship to be
> "beautiful"?
>
>

Thanks Stephen!

Actually my initial example of "numeracy" isn't quite right, but it's not
important to the rest of the argument.

My main point is that you can get to the concept of "prime numbers" just
using relative magnitudes that we have an innate sense of.

As for the significance of PHI - well - I guess there's probably some
plausible sounding evolutionary story that could be told about that.

Though how satisfying or useful an explanation like that is just depends on
what you're after and what your interests are.

An explanation that might be useful in one context might be useless in some
other context.

Explanations are observer dependent.

Probably.

Rex

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Re: Prime Numbers

2012-09-16 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/16/2012 3:43 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

It seems to me that numbers are based on our ability to judge relative
magnitudes:

"Which is bigger, which is closer, which is heavier, etc."

Many animals have this ability - called numeracy.  Humans differ only
in the degree to which it is developed, and in our ability to build
higher level abstractions on top of this fundamental skill.

SO - prime numbers, I think, emerge from a peculiar characteristic of
our ability to judge relative magnitudes, and the way this feeds into
the abstractions we build on top of that ability.

=*=

Let’s say you take a board and divide it into 3 sections of equal
length (say, by drawing a line on it at the section boundaries).

Having done so – is there a way that you could have divided the board
into fewer sections of equal length so that every endpoint of a long
section can be matched to the end of a shorter section?

In other words – take two boards of equal length.  Divide one into 3
sections.  Divide the other into two sections.  The dividing point of
the two-section-board will fall right into the middle of the middle
section of the three-section-board.  There is no way to divide the
second board into fewer sections so that all of its dividing points
are matched against a dividing point on the longer board.

Because of this – three is a prime.  (Notice that I do not say:  “this
is because 3 is prime” – instead I reverse the causal arrow).

=*=

Let’s take two boards and divide the first one into 10 equally sized sections.

Now – there are two ways that we can divide the second board into a
smaller number of equally sized sections so that the end-points of
every section on this second board are matched to a sectional dividing
point on the first board (though the opposite will not be true):

We can divide the second board into either 2 sections (in which case
the dividing point will align with the end of the 5th section on the
first board),

OR

We can divide the second board into 5 sections – each of which is the
same size as two sections on the first board.

Because of this, the number 10 is not prime.

=*=

The entire field of Number Theory grows out of this peculiar
characteristic of how we judge relative magnitudes.

Do you think?


HI Rex,

Nice post! Could you riff a bit on what the number PHI tells us 
about this characteristic. How is it that it seems that our perceptions 
of the world find anything that is close to a PHI valued relationship to 
be "beautiful"?


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Prime Numbers

2012-09-16 Thread Rex Allen
It seems to me that numbers are based on our ability to judge relative
magnitudes:

"Which is bigger, which is closer, which is heavier, etc."

Many animals have this ability - called numeracy.  Humans differ only
in the degree to which it is developed, and in our ability to build
higher level abstractions on top of this fundamental skill.

SO - prime numbers, I think, emerge from a peculiar characteristic of
our ability to judge relative magnitudes, and the way this feeds into
the abstractions we build on top of that ability.

=*=

Let’s say you take a board and divide it into 3 sections of equal
length (say, by drawing a line on it at the section boundaries).

Having done so – is there a way that you could have divided the board
into fewer sections of equal length so that every endpoint of a long
section can be matched to the end of a shorter section?

In other words – take two boards of equal length.  Divide one into 3
sections.  Divide the other into two sections.  The dividing point of
the two-section-board will fall right into the middle of the middle
section of the three-section-board.  There is no way to divide the
second board into fewer sections so that all of its dividing points
are matched against a dividing point on the longer board.

Because of this – three is a prime.  (Notice that I do not say:  “this
is because 3 is prime” – instead I reverse the causal arrow).

=*=

Let’s take two boards and divide the first one into 10 equally sized sections.

Now – there are two ways that we can divide the second board into a
smaller number of equally sized sections so that the end-points of
every section on this second board are matched to a sectional dividing
point on the first board (though the opposite will not be true):

We can divide the second board into either 2 sections (in which case
the dividing point will align with the end of the 5th section on the
first board),

OR

We can divide the second board into 5 sections – each of which is the
same size as two sections on the first board.

Because of this, the number 10 is not prime.

=*=

The entire field of Number Theory grows out of this peculiar
characteristic of how we judge relative magnitudes.

Do you think?

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Re: prime numbers etc

2012-09-07 Thread John Mikes
Touche.
But I don't believe (in?) it - I am agnostic. Nonbeliever.
(SONG: I lost my turf in San Francisco)
J

On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 10:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>  On Fri, Sep 7, 2012 at 8:07 AM, John Mikes  wrote:
> > Stathis wrote (to Craig):
> >
> > "But you believe that the neurochemicals do things contrary to what
> > chemists would predict, for example an ion channel opening or closing
> > without any cause such as a change in transmembrane potential or
> > ligand concentration. We've talked about this before and it just isn't
> > consistent with any scientific evidence. You interpret the existence
> > "spontaneous neural activity" as meaning that something magical like
> > this happens, but it doesn't mean that at all."
> >
> > Stathis, you know ... whatever we state as 'knowledge about mind etc.'
> is an
> > explanation for the little we think we learned - with lots we have no
> idea
> > about.
> > Like: chemicals ... potentials ... scientific evidence ... even cause
> > (meaning the
> > part we alredy know about) and mauch much more.
> > It is your turf, you must know about more we don't know only think we do.
>
> It's your turf too - you're a chemist.
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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Re: prime numbers etc

2012-09-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Fri, Sep 7, 2012 at 8:07 AM, John Mikes  wrote:
> Stathis wrote (to Craig):
>
> "But you believe that the neurochemicals do things contrary to what
> chemists would predict, for example an ion channel opening or closing
> without any cause such as a change in transmembrane potential or
> ligand concentration. We've talked about this before and it just isn't
> consistent with any scientific evidence. You interpret the existence
> "spontaneous neural activity" as meaning that something magical like
> this happens, but it doesn't mean that at all."
>
> Stathis, you know ... whatever we state as 'knowledge about mind etc.' is an
> explanation for the little we think we learned - with lots we have no idea
> about.
> Like: chemicals ... potentials ... scientific evidence ... even cause
> (meaning the
> part we alredy know about) and mauch much more.
> It is your turf, you must know about more we don't know only think we do.

It's your turf too - you're a chemist.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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prime numbers etc

2012-09-06 Thread John Mikes
Stathis wrote (to Craig):

*"But you believe that the neurochemicals do things contrary to what
chemists would predict, for example an ion channel opening or closing
without any cause such as a change in transmembrane potential or
ligand concentration. We've talked about this before and it just isn't
consistent with any scientific evidence. You interpret the existence
"spontaneous neural activity" as meaning that something magical like
this happens, but it doesn't mean that at all."*

Stathis, you *know *... whatever we state as 'knowledge about mind etc.' is
an
explanation for the little we think we learned - with lots we have no idea
about.
Like: chemicals ... potentials ... scientific evidence ... even cause
(meaning the
part we alredy know about) and mauch much more.
It is your turf, you must know about more we don't know only think we do.

John M

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Re: Could we have invented the prime numbers ?

2012-09-06 Thread Stephen P. King

Dear Roger,

Could the mere possibility of being a number (without the 
specificity of which one) be considered to be "there from the beginning"?


On 9/6/2012 7:47 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stathis Papaioannou
If the prime numbers were there from the beginning, before man,
then  I think they were mind-created (platonic) not brain-created 
(human creations).

Are the prime numbers an invention by man or one of man's discoveries ?
I believe that the prime numbers are not a human invention,
they were there from the beginning. Humans can discover
them by brute calculation, but there is a pattern to them
(except for 1, 3 and 5, spaced  6 apart, plus or minus one)
Thus 2 3 5 7 11 13 17 19 23 29 31 37 41 43 47 53 59 61 67 71 etc.
for n>5, they can be placed +-1 on a grid with a spacing of 6
That spacing seems to me at least to be a priori, out of man's control.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>
9/6/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."

- Receiving the following content -
*From:* Stathis Papaioannou <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>
*Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
*Time:* 2012-09-06, 01:24:31
*Subject:* Re: Sane2004 Step One

On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 2:34 PM, Craig Weinberg
mailto:%20whatsons...@gmail.com>> wrote:

>> But you couldn't realise you felt different if the part of your
brain
>> responsible for realising were receiving exactly the same
inputs from
>> the rest of the brain. So you could feel different, or feel
nothing,
>> but maintain the delusional belief that nothing had changed.
>>
>>
>
> That's begging the question. You are assuming that the brain is
a machine
> which produces consciousness. I think that the brain is the three
> dimensional shadow of many levels of experience and it produces
nothing but
> neurochemistry and alterations in our ability to access an
individual set of
> human experiences. The brain does not produce consciousness, it
defines the
> form of many conscious relations.

But you believe that the neurochemicals do things contrary to what
chemists would predict, for example an ion channel opening or closing
without any cause such as a change in transmembrane potential or
ligand concentration. We've talked about this before and it just isn't
consistent with any scientific evidence. You interpret the existence
"spontaneous neural activity" as meaning that something magical like
this happens, but it doesn't mean that at all.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou




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Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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Could we have invented the prime numbers ? Ie, are they platonic or man-created ?

2012-09-06 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Stathis Papaioannou

If the prime numbers were there from the beginning, before man,
then  I think they were mind-created (platonic) not brain-created (human 
creations).

Are the prime numbers an invention by man or one of man's discoveries ? 

I believe that the prime numbers are not a human invention,
they were there from the beginning. Humans can discover
them by brute calculation, but there is a pattern to them
(except for 1, 3 and 5, spaced  6 apart, plus or minus one)

Thus 2 3 5 7 11 13 17 19 23 29 31 37 41 43 47 53 59 61 67 71 etc.


for n>5, they can be placed +-1 on a grid with a spacing of 6

That spacing seems to me at least to be a priori, out of man's control.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/6/2012 
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function."
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stathis Papaioannou 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-06, 01:24:31
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One


On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 2:34 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> But you couldn't realise you felt different if the part of your brain
>> responsible for realising were receiving exactly the same inputs from
>> the rest of the brain. So you could feel different, or feel nothing,
>> but maintain the delusional belief that nothing had changed.
>>
>>
>
> That's begging the question. You are assuming that the brain is a machine
> which produces consciousness. I think that the brain is the three
> dimensional shadow of many levels of experience and it produces nothing but
> neurochemistry and alterations in our ability to access an individual set of
> human experiences. The brain does not produce consciousness, it defines the
> form of many conscious relations.

But you believe that the neurochemicals do things contrary to what
chemists would predict, for example an ion channel opening or closing
without any cause such as a change in transmembrane potential or
ligand concentration. We've talked about this before and it just isn't
consistent with any scientific evidence. You interpret the existence
"spontaneous neural activity" as meaning that something magical like
this happens, but it doesn't mean that at all.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-11 Thread John M


--- Stathis Papaioannou
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

among others:
*
"> I understood Tom's phrase "atomic parts" as meaning
> "component parts" rather 
> than literally what scientists call "atoms"<

fine, I used Tom's word. It went to a nice extreme. 
*
Then about 'rules':
> It was deliberately left vague: the "rules" are not
> necessarily the rules of 
> present day science, but the rules of any possible
> future science, or, as 
> you suggest, the rules known by an omniscient
being.<

Are you still talking about 'rules' reduced (!) to the
limited model view they pertain to (=reductionistic)
or do you imply the untellable 'rules' of the
tota;ity? In that case I don't know how to valuate any
'rules'. The 'omniscient being' would 'know' that
detailed rules are off. In everything interefficient
to everything incl. those 'trends' we consider parts
within the model, (a definitely reductionist view)
forming continually in the ceaseless change of the
wholeness. It's above me! 
*
And warm thanks for your consent:
> Yes, this is just what I meant: the truly random is
> beyond *any* rules, 
> including ones not yet discovered. Otherwise, it
> would not be truly random.<
(I find 'untruly random' similar to 'just a bit
pregnant'). 
*

from the truncated message:

> John M writes:
> 
> > > Tom Caylor writes:
> > >
> > > >1) The reductionist definition that something
> is determined by the
> > > >sum of atomic parts and rules.
> > >
> > > So how about this: EITHER something is
> determined by
> > > the sum of atomic parts
> > > and rules OR it is truly random.
> >
> >"Sum of atomic parts"? I am not sure about the
> figment
> >  based on primitive observations and on then
> >applicable explanatory calculative conclusions
> within
> >the narrow model of the ancient scientist's views,
> >called "atom".
skip
> 
> >Same with chaos: we just did not (yet?) learn that
> >kind of processes in the wide world existence that
> >would result in our "chaos"- called process. (Like
> >random.)
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean here. In principle, a
> chaotic process could 
> follow very simple and well-understood rules. The
> difficulty is that a 
> future state of a chaotic system may be so
> sensitively dependent on initial 
> conditions that it is impossible to measure these
> conditions to the 
> requisite level of accuracy. The limitation is
> practical, not theoretical.

And how do you think to evaluate ALL initial
conditions in a wide world where everything is
interconnected and intereffective? Practically (not
theoretically  you cannot, so chaotic comes in in
practice. Please, do not mix up the 'concept' with the
limited science of the physical chaologists who
restricted their conclusions to handpicked cases where
(their) explanations may apply. Gleick's excellent
journalism impressed even the most 'scientific' minds.
He made the untellable clearly statable. His stupid
butterfly still haunts the minds.

> >
> >Make yourself a god that could figure it all out.
> 
> But the point is that it is *impossible* even in
> theory - even for an 
> omniscient being - to figure it out. If I undergo
> destructive teleportation 
> and two exact copies emerge in two separate
> locations, A and B, can I expect 
> to find myself at A or at B?

Let me refrain from remarking on that stupid
teleportation hoax in honor for the esteemed
listmembers. Your question rewords into: Is the cat
dead or alive? Physics is a nice limited model
formulated over the past ~10 millennia, to explain in
its own rite whatever was thought to be observed. Then
QM made it into a linear way of thinking accepting
some of the paradoxes arising within the model
'physics'. I for one do not find QM more wholistic
than St. Physix herself, in the contrary. It extends
into limited models even the 'concepts' left uncut in
physics (eg. particles galore).

The Cavalcanti problem is part of the 'game'. Part of
the term 'thought experiment' as I wrote yesterday to
Bruno. Star Trek or Harry Potter.
I am an old man, do not have time for such fantasy -
games. I hope to find something more reasonable. 

Thanks, Stathis,
John M

> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> 
=== message truncated ===


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Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

John M writes:

> > Tom Caylor writes:
> >
> > >1) The reductionist definition that something is
> > determined by the
> > >sum of atomic parts and rules.
> >
> > So how about this: EITHER something is determined by
> > the sum of atomic parts
> > and rules OR it is truly random.
>
>"Sum of atomic parts"? I am not sure about the figment
>  based on primitive observations and on then
>applicable explanatory calculative conclusions within
>the narrow model of the ancient scientist's views,
>called "atom".
>
>Then again the phrase restricts its validity to THAT
>(figmentious) bunch of allaged atoms, period. Nothing
>exists as a cut-off singularity without intereffects.

I understood Tom's phrase "atomic parts" as meaning "component parts" rather 
than literally what scientists call "atoms".

>"RULES" to the rescue! how far are you willing to
>accept the rules? Do they involve the ambience, all
>the way to the 'end' of the existing world with ALL
>its intereffectiveness? In that case a different
>wording would be more appropriate...(Not the closed
>model)
>
>The bigger thing is your "OR" (in caps, meaning that
>it is exclusive). You prescribe only TWO alternatives.
>
>That would be right if we are onmiscient and exclude
>any other ways of that interactive endless world -
>allowed to be followed.

It was deliberately left vague: the "rules" are not necessarily the rules of 
present day science, but the rules of any possible future science, or, as 
you suggest, the rules known by an omniscient being.

>Truly random IMO means that we truly believe in our
>ignorance to detect some (so far undiscovered?)
>'order' with 'rules' leading to those 'truly random'
>results.

Yes, this is just what I meant: the truly random is beyond *any* rules, 
including ones not yet discovered. Otherwise, it would not be truly random.

>Same with chaos: we just did not (yet?) learn that
>kind of processes in the wide world existence that
>would result in our "chaos"- called process. (Like
>random.)

I'm not sure what you mean here. In principle, a chaotic process could 
follow very simple and well-understood rules. The difficulty is that a 
future state of a chaotic system may be so sensitively dependent on initial 
conditions that it is impossible to measure these conditions to the 
requisite level of accuracy. The limitation is practical, not theoretical.

>Your following words underline this position:
> >
> > There are two mechanisms which make events seem
> > random in ordinary life. One
> > is the difficulty of actually making the required
> > measurements, finding the
> > appropriate rules and then doing the calculations.
>
>Amen (difficulty?)
> >
> > Classical chaos may make
> > this practically impossible, but we still understand
> > that the event (such as
> > a coin toss) is fundamentally deterministic, and the
> > randomness is only apparent.
>
>Amen again ("we don't know".)
> >
> > The other mechanism is quantum randomness, for
> > example in the case of
> > radioctive decay. In a single world interpretation
> > of QM this is, as far as
> > I am aware, true randomness. In a no-collapse/ many
> > worlds interpretation
> > there is no true randomness because all outcomes
> > occur deterministically
> > according to the SWE. However, there is apparent
> > randomness due to what
> > Bruno calls the first person indeterminacy: the
> > observer does not know which
> > world he will end up in from a first person
> > viewpoint, even though he knows
> > that from a third person viewpoint he will end up in
> > all of them.
>
>Sorry to agree both with QM and the new version of the
>classical MWI. The former is a 2nd tier (linear?
>-after Alwyn Scott) version of the "model" 'physical
>views', the latter is beyond the level I like to
>speculate on.
> >
> > I find the randomness resulting from first person
> > indeterminacy in the MWI
> > difficult to get my mind around. In the case of the
> > chaotic coin toss one
> > can imagine God being able to do the calculations
> > and predict the outcome,
> > but even God would not be able to tell me which
> > world I will find myself in
> > when a quantum event induces splitting. And yet, I
> > am stuck thinking of
> > quantum events in the MWI as fundamentally
> > non-random.
>
>Make yourself a god that could figure it all out.

But the point is that it is *impossible* even in theory - even for an 
omniscient being - to figure it out. If I undergo destructive teleportation 
and two exact copies emerge in two separate locations, A and B, can I expect 
to find myself at A or at B? From the symmetry of the situation, I *must* 
have a 1/2 chance of finding myself at one or other location 
post-teleportation, and not even God can change this without changing the 
initial experimental setup.

Eric Cavalcanti, some time back, objected to the above using the example of 
a computer game: if a player is "jacked in" as the first person character 
who undergoes teleportation to A and B, the game designer 

Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 06-avr.-06, à 10:04, Dominic Tarr a écrit :

> Bruno wrote
>> ...
>> Karl Popper did make an attempt to explain
>> free-will in term of "self-diagonalization" indeed. The basic and
>> simple idea is that IF I can totally predict myself, then I have the
>> opportunity to refute such a prediction. This is why in a trial your
>> lawyer cannot invoke determinacy (like my client has made a murder, 
>> but
>> really he was just obeying to the physical laws), because if such a
>> determination can make sense then the "client" could have use in some
>> responsible way to escape its murderer fate still without violating 
>> the
>> physical laws. I don't pretend there is any rigor here.
>> "Free from what?": Free from what you can determine. The one who can
>> determine that heavy bodies fall, will soon or later be able to fly.
>
> I was just about to make a post to this effect, and then when i read
> down to the end i found it.
>
> but so how could primes be said to have free will? primes are complex
> in the sense that they can not be predicted except by performing the
> calculation they literally represent faster than some algorithm which
> you are trying to beat.
>
> likewise, one could surely calculate the outcome of a coin flip with a
> sufficiently large and accurate number of measurements and fast
> calculations, or even a human being, if you could accurately model
> them and a sufficient amount of their local environment. there is no
> shortcut to computing these things, you just have do all the hard work
> quickly to make a prediction, so they are all complex, if not free.
>
> however, as a person's local environment might plausibly contain a
> computer which modeled their local environment and predicted their
> behaviour. so the model would actually have to model itself, now
> having to recalculate what the subject will do after every calculation
> would take so long the subject would have already done something and
> the model wouldn't be making a prediction any more!
>
> this looks like a different order of magnitude of unpredictability to
> what primes and coins have, because of the potential self-referential
> step.
>
> perhaps the key is that primes and coins do not have a will, thus
> remain indifferent to being predicted. so you might say they are
> "free", but you could not say they had "freewill".


I did not intent to be so precise, and my "attribution" of free will to 
primes was, well, admittedly a little bit poetical. My point is this 
common point between the primes and human (as conceived by 
determinist):   they are simultaneously determinate and free (cf 
Zagier's quote). Of course primes does not have "will", at least as we 
conceive them today.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

Brent Meeker wrote:

> Unfortunately there is no way to distinguish "true randomness" from 
> just
> "unpredictable" randomness.  So there are theories of QM in which the 
> randomness
> is just unpredictable, like Bohm's - and here's a recent paper on that 
> theme you
> may find interesting:
>
> quant-ph/0604008
>
> From: Gerard Hooft 't [view email]
> Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2006 18:17:08 GMT   (23kb)
>
> The mathematical basis for deterministic quantum mechanics
> Authors: Gerard 't Hooft
> Comments: 15 pages, 3 figures
> Report-no: ITP-UU-06/14, SPIN-06/12
>
>  If there exists a classical, i.e. deterministic theory underlying 
> quantum
> mechanics, an explanation must be found of the fact that the 
> Hamiltonian, which
> is defined to be the operator that generates evolution in time, is 
> bounded from
> below. The mechanism that can produce exactly such a constraint is 
> identified in
> this paper. It is the fact that not all classical data are registered 
> in the
> quantum description. Large sets of values of these data are assumed to 
> be
> indistinguishable, forming equivalence classes. It is argued that this 
> should be
> attributed to information loss, such as what one might suspect to 
> happen during
> the formation and annihilation of virtual black holes.
>  The nature of the equivalence classes is further elucidated, as 
> it follows
> from the positivity of the Hamiltonian. Our world is assumed to 
> consist of a
> very large number of subsystems that may be regarded as approximately
> independent, or weakly interacting with one another. As long as two 
> (or more)
> sectors of our world are treated as being independent, they all must 
> be demanded
> to be restricted to positive energy states only. What follows from 
> these
> considerations is a unique definition of energy in the quantum system 
> in terms
> of the periodicity of the limit cycles of the deterministic model.


Saibal Mitra has often referd us to 't Hooft argument in favor of a 
deterministic QM.
I still don't understand how he manages EPR-BELL like phenomena.

Now in the zeta-primes sort of TOE, I can guess a purely arithmetical 
argument in favor of a TOE with a single universe. The primes would 
could both the Universal (chaotic) Wave Function and a selection 
function. The primes are that perverse! We could get a comp theory with 
only one universe! I doubt it to be sure, but who really knows. In that 
case, from UDA you could infer that there would be only one person, 
living different lifes. Reintroducing a deterministic bottom could have 
very strange consequences too.


> It's also unclear as to what "probability" means in the MWI.  Omnes' 
> points out
> that "probability" means some things happen and some don't.


I do think the MWI indeterminacy are "just" first person plural 
indeterminacy. Then probabilities can be justified in the manner of 
Hartle and or Graham, or with the use of Gleason theorem. See also the 
paper by Deutsch on the structure of the multiverse.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-06 Thread Dominic Tarr

> > however, as a person's local environment might plausibly contain a
> > computer which modeled their local environment and predicted their
> > behaviour. so the model would actually have to model itself,
>
> Why assume the computer is part of the person's environment?

because it might be.

> >now
> > having to recalculate what the subject will do after every calculation
>
> Why assume the calculation is communicated to the person?

because if it was then it would invalidate the prediction.

presenting the prediction to an agent to resented being predicted
would invalidate the prediction and thus demonstrate the freewill of
the agent.

playing poker i would be rewarded for predicting your behaviour,
folding when you have the nutts and calling when you bluff, but my
success negatively reinforces your predictability.

> Actually, in some circumstances you can predict what a person will do.  Does
> that somehow prevent them from doing it or deny them "freewill" (whatever that
> is).  See the Grey Walter experiment for an interesting example.

yes, if knowledge of that prediction can not alter that person's
behaviour,  then they do not have freewill about that thing. like
breathing, or eating, i can choose what i eat but not that i eat. the
will is free but not arbitary.

okay, so if they can be predicted in secret, and the prediction
confirmed after the fact -> then they are deterministic
okay, so if they can be predicted in secret, but the prediction cannot
be confirmed after the fact if the subject has knowledge of it -> then
have freewill.

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Re: SV: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-06 Thread John M

This "density - idea is the first one that brings me a
bit "less far" from the big (infinite?) number idea.
It is still not reaching to the problem, how number
qualia can turn into other meaning qualia - without
outside (other) input.

Thanks Lennart

John M


--- Lennart Nilsson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> 
> Nick Boström have been trying to calculate the
> probability that
> we live in a computer simulation. His answer to how
> you go about
> this (below) if we live in an infinite universe with
> infinite simulations
> seems to fit how one could do probabilities in a
> multiverse with an
> infinite number of universes as well.
> 
> Lennart Nilsson
> 
> 
> "To deal with these infinite cases, we need to do
> something like thinking in
> terms of densities rather than total populations. A
> suitable density-measure
> can be finite even if the total population is
> infinite. It is important to
> note that we to use some kind of density-measure of
> observation types quite
> independently of the simulation argument. In a “Big
> World” cosmology, all
> possible human observations are in fact made by
> somebody somewhere. (Our
> world is may well be a big world, so this is not a
> farfetched possibility.).
> To be able to derive any observational consequences
> from our scientific
> theories in a Big World, we need to be able to say
> that certain types of
> observations are more typical than others. (See my
> paper “Self-Locating
> Belief in Big Worlds” for more details on this.)
> 
> The most straightforward way of making this notion
> precise in an infinite
> universe is via the idea of limit density. Start by
> picking an arbitrary
> spacetime point. Then consider a hypersphere
> centered on that point with
> radius R. Let f(A) be the fraction of all
> observations that are of kind A
> that takes place within this hypersphere. Then
> expand the sphere. Let the
> typicality of type-A observations be the limit of
> f(A) as R--->infinity."
> 
> 
> 
> -Ursprungligt meddelande-
> Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Brent
> Meeker
> Skickat: den 6 april 2006 18:21
> Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Ämne: Re: Do prime numbers have free will?
> 
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Tom Caylor writes:
> > 
> > 
> >>1) The reductionist definition that something is
> determined by the
> >>sum of atomic parts and rules.
> > 
> > 
> > So how about this: EITHER something is determined
> by the sum of atomic
> parts 
> > and rules OR it is truly random.
> > 
> > There are two mechanisms which make events seem
> random in ordinary life.
> One 
> > is the difficulty of actually making the required
> measurements, finding
> the 
> > appropriate rules and then doing the calculations.
> Classical chaos may
> make 
> > this practically impossible, but we still
> understand that the event (such
> as 
> > a coin toss) is fundamentally deterministic, and
> the randomness is only 
> > apparent.
> > 
> > The other mechanism is quantum randomness, for
> example in the case of 
> > radioctive decay. In a single world interpretation
> of QM this is, as far
> as 
> > I am aware, true randomness. 
> 
> Unfortunately there is no way to distinguish "true
> randomness" from just 
> "unpredictable" randomness.  So there are theories
> of QM in which the
> randomness 
> is just unpredictable, like Bohm's - and here's a
> recent paper on that theme
> you 
> may find interesting:
> 
> quant-ph/0604008
> 
> From: Gerard Hooft 't [view email]
> Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2006 18:17:08 GMT   (23kb)
> 
> The mathematical basis for deterministic quantum
> mechanics
> Authors: Gerard 't Hooft
> Comments: 15 pages, 3 figures
> Report-no: ITP-UU-06/14, SPIN-06/12
> 
>  If there exists a classical, i.e. deterministic
> theory underlying
> quantum 
> mechanics, an explanation must be found of the fact
> that the Hamiltonian,
> which 
> is defined to be the operator that generates
> evolution in time, is bounded
> from 
> below. The mechanism that can produce exactly such a
> constraint is
> identified in 
> this paper. It is the fact that not all classical
> data are registered in the
> 
> quantum description. Large sets of values of these
> data are assumed to be 
> indistinguishable, forming equivalence classes. It
> is argued that this
> should be 
> attributed to information loss, such as what one
> might suspect to happen
> during 
> the forma

SV: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-06 Thread Lennart Nilsson

Nick Boström have been trying to calculate the probability that
we live in a computer simulation. His answer to how you go about
this (below) if we live in an infinite universe with infinite simulations
seems to fit how one could do probabilities in a multiverse with an
infinite number of universes as well.

Lennart Nilsson


"To deal with these infinite cases, we need to do something like thinking in
terms of densities rather than total populations. A suitable density-measure
can be finite even if the total population is infinite. It is important to
note that we to use some kind of density-measure of observation types quite
independently of the simulation argument. In a “Big World” cosmology, all
possible human observations are in fact made by somebody somewhere. (Our
world is may well be a big world, so this is not a farfetched possibility.).
To be able to derive any observational consequences from our scientific
theories in a Big World, we need to be able to say that certain types of
observations are more typical than others. (See my paper “Self-Locating
Belief in Big Worlds” for more details on this.)

The most straightforward way of making this notion precise in an infinite
universe is via the idea of limit density. Start by picking an arbitrary
spacetime point. Then consider a hypersphere centered on that point with
radius R. Let f(A) be the fraction of all observations that are of kind A
that takes place within this hypersphere. Then expand the sphere. Let the
typicality of type-A observations be the limit of f(A) as R--->infinity."



-Ursprungligt meddelande-
Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Brent Meeker
Skickat: den 6 april 2006 18:21
Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Ämne: Re: Do prime numbers have free will?


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Tom Caylor writes:
> 
> 
>>1) The reductionist definition that something is determined by the
>>sum of atomic parts and rules.
> 
> 
> So how about this: EITHER something is determined by the sum of atomic
parts 
> and rules OR it is truly random.
> 
> There are two mechanisms which make events seem random in ordinary life.
One 
> is the difficulty of actually making the required measurements, finding
the 
> appropriate rules and then doing the calculations. Classical chaos may
make 
> this practically impossible, but we still understand that the event (such
as 
> a coin toss) is fundamentally deterministic, and the randomness is only 
> apparent.
> 
> The other mechanism is quantum randomness, for example in the case of 
> radioctive decay. In a single world interpretation of QM this is, as far
as 
> I am aware, true randomness. 

Unfortunately there is no way to distinguish "true randomness" from just 
"unpredictable" randomness.  So there are theories of QM in which the
randomness 
is just unpredictable, like Bohm's - and here's a recent paper on that theme
you 
may find interesting:

quant-ph/0604008

From: Gerard Hooft 't [view email]
Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2006 18:17:08 GMT   (23kb)

The mathematical basis for deterministic quantum mechanics
Authors: Gerard 't Hooft
Comments: 15 pages, 3 figures
Report-no: ITP-UU-06/14, SPIN-06/12

 If there exists a classical, i.e. deterministic theory underlying
quantum 
mechanics, an explanation must be found of the fact that the Hamiltonian,
which 
is defined to be the operator that generates evolution in time, is bounded
from 
below. The mechanism that can produce exactly such a constraint is
identified in 
this paper. It is the fact that not all classical data are registered in the

quantum description. Large sets of values of these data are assumed to be 
indistinguishable, forming equivalence classes. It is argued that this
should be 
attributed to information loss, such as what one might suspect to happen
during 
the formation and annihilation of virtual black holes.
 The nature of the equivalence classes is further elucidated, as it
follows 
from the positivity of the Hamiltonian. Our world is assumed to consist of a

very large number of subsystems that may be regarded as approximately 
independent, or weakly interacting with one another. As long as two (or
more) 
sectors of our world are treated as being independent, they all must be
demanded 
to be restricted to positive energy states only. What follows from these 
considerations is a unique definition of energy in the quantum system in
terms 
of the periodicity of the limit cycles of the deterministic model.


>In a no-collapse/ many worlds interpretation 
> there is no true randomness because all outcomes occur deterministically 
> according to the SWE. However, there is apparent randomness due to what 
> Bruno calls the first person indeterminacy: the observer does not know
which 
> world he will end up in from a first person viewpoint, even though he
knows 
> that fro

Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-06 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Tom Caylor writes:
> 
> 
>>1) The reductionist definition that something is determined by the
>>sum of atomic parts and rules.
> 
> 
> So how about this: EITHER something is determined by the sum of atomic parts 
> and rules OR it is truly random.
> 
> There are two mechanisms which make events seem random in ordinary life. One 
> is the difficulty of actually making the required measurements, finding the 
> appropriate rules and then doing the calculations. Classical chaos may make 
> this practically impossible, but we still understand that the event (such as 
> a coin toss) is fundamentally deterministic, and the randomness is only 
> apparent.
> 
> The other mechanism is quantum randomness, for example in the case of 
> radioctive decay. In a single world interpretation of QM this is, as far as 
> I am aware, true randomness. 

Unfortunately there is no way to distinguish "true randomness" from just 
"unpredictable" randomness.  So there are theories of QM in which the 
randomness 
is just unpredictable, like Bohm's - and here's a recent paper on that theme 
you 
may find interesting:

quant-ph/0604008

From: Gerard Hooft 't [view email]
Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2006 18:17:08 GMT   (23kb)

The mathematical basis for deterministic quantum mechanics
Authors: Gerard 't Hooft
Comments: 15 pages, 3 figures
Report-no: ITP-UU-06/14, SPIN-06/12

 If there exists a classical, i.e. deterministic theory underlying quantum 
mechanics, an explanation must be found of the fact that the Hamiltonian, which 
is defined to be the operator that generates evolution in time, is bounded from 
below. The mechanism that can produce exactly such a constraint is identified 
in 
this paper. It is the fact that not all classical data are registered in the 
quantum description. Large sets of values of these data are assumed to be 
indistinguishable, forming equivalence classes. It is argued that this should 
be 
attributed to information loss, such as what one might suspect to happen during 
the formation and annihilation of virtual black holes.
 The nature of the equivalence classes is further elucidated, as it follows 
from the positivity of the Hamiltonian. Our world is assumed to consist of a 
very large number of subsystems that may be regarded as approximately 
independent, or weakly interacting with one another. As long as two (or more) 
sectors of our world are treated as being independent, they all must be 
demanded 
to be restricted to positive energy states only. What follows from these 
considerations is a unique definition of energy in the quantum system in terms 
of the periodicity of the limit cycles of the deterministic model.


>In a no-collapse/ many worlds interpretation 
> there is no true randomness because all outcomes occur deterministically 
> according to the SWE. However, there is apparent randomness due to what 
> Bruno calls the first person indeterminacy: the observer does not know which 
> world he will end up in from a first person viewpoint, even though he knows 
> that from a third person viewpoint he will end up in all of them.
> 
> I find the randomness resulting from first person indeterminacy in the MWI 
> difficult to get my mind around. In the case of the chaotic coin toss one 
> can imagine God being able to do the calculations and predict the outcome, 
> but even God would not be able to tell me which world I will find myself in 
> when a quantum event induces splitting. And yet, I am stuck thinking of 
> quantum events in the MWI as fundamentally non-random.

It's also unclear as to what "probability" means in the MWI.  Omnes' points out 
that "probability" means some things happen and some don't.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-06 Thread Brent Meeker

Dominic Tarr wrote:
>>...Karl Popper did make an attempt to explain
>>free-will in term of "self-diagonalization" indeed. The basic and
>>simple idea is that IF I can totally predict myself, then I have the
>>opportunity to refute such a prediction. This is why in a trial your
>>lawyer cannot invoke determinacy (like my client has made a murder, but
>>really he was just obeying to the physical laws), because if such a
>>determination can make sense then the "client" could have use in some
>>responsible way to escape its murderer fate still without violating the
>>physical laws. I don't pretend there is any rigor here.
>>"Free from what?": Free from what you can determine. The one who can
>>determine that heavy bodies fall, will soon or later be able to fly.
> 
> 
> I was just about to make a post to this effect, and then when i read
> down to the end i found it.
> 
> but so how could primes be said to have free will? primes are complex
> in the sense that they can not be predicted except by performing the
> calculation they literally represent faster than some algorithm which
> you are trying to beat.
> 
> likewise, one could surely calculate the outcome of a coin flip with a
> sufficiently large and accurate number of measurements and fast
> calculations, or even a human being, 

The statistician Persis Diaconis can flip a coin and predict the outcome of 
each 
  flip (as can many magicians).

>if you could accurately model
> them and a sufficient amount of their local environment. there is no
> shortcut to computing these things, you just have do all the hard work
> quickly to make a prediction, so they are all complex, if not free.
> 
> however, as a person's local environment might plausibly contain a
> computer which modeled their local environment and predicted their
> behaviour. so the model would actually have to model itself, 

Why assume the computer is part of the person's environment?

>now
> having to recalculate what the subject will do after every calculation

Why assume the calculation is communicated to the person?

> would take so long the subject would have already done something and
> the model wouldn't be making a prediction any more!
> 
> this looks like a different order of magnitude of unpredictability to
> what primes and coins have, because of the potential self-referential
> step.
> 
> perhaps the key is that primes and coins do not have a will, thus
> remain indifferent to being predicted. so you might say they are
> "free", but you could not say they had "freewill".

Actually, in some circumstances you can predict what a person will do.  Does 
that somehow prevent them from doing it or deny them "freewill" (whatever that 
is).  See the Grey Walter experiment for an interesting example.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-06 Thread John M

Stathis:
please see my interjected remarks/questions
John

--- Stathis Papaioannou
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> 
> Tom Caylor writes:
> 
> >1) The reductionist definition that something is
> determined by the
> >sum of atomic parts and rules.
> 
> So how about this: EITHER something is determined by
> the sum of atomic parts 
> and rules OR it is truly random.

"Sum of atomic parts"? I am not sure about the figment
 based on primitive observations and on then
applicable explanatory calculative conclusions within
the narrow model of the ancient scientist's views,
called "atom".

Then again the phrase restricts its validity to THAT
(figmentious) bunch of allaged atoms, period. Nothing
exists as a cut-off singularity without intereffects.
 
"RULES" to the rescue! how far are you willing to
accept the rules? Do they involve the ambience, all
the way to the 'end' of the existing world with ALL
its intereffectiveness? In that case a different
wording would be more appropriate...(Not the closed
model)

The bigger thing is your "OR" (in caps, meaning that
it is exclusive). You prescribe only TWO alternatives.

That would be right if we are onmiscient and exclude 
any other ways of that interactive endless world -
allowed to be followed.
 
Truly random IMO means that we truly believe in our
ignorance to detect some (so far undiscovered?)
'order' with 'rules' leading to those 'truly random'
results. 

Same with chaos: we just did not (yet?) learn that
kind of processes in the wide world existence that
would result in our "chaos"- called process. (Like
random.)
Your following words underline this position:
> 
> There are two mechanisms which make events seem
> random in ordinary life. One 
> is the difficulty of actually making the required
> measurements, finding the 
> appropriate rules and then doing the calculations.

Amen (difficulty?)
>
> Classical chaos may make 
> this practically impossible, but we still understand
> that the event (such as 
> a coin toss) is fundamentally deterministic, and the
> randomness is only apparent.

Amen again ("we don't know".)
> 
> The other mechanism is quantum randomness, for
> example in the case of 
> radioctive decay. In a single world interpretation
> of QM this is, as far as 
> I am aware, true randomness. In a no-collapse/ many
> worlds interpretation 
> there is no true randomness because all outcomes
> occur deterministically 
> according to the SWE. However, there is apparent
> randomness due to what 
> Bruno calls the first person indeterminacy: the
> observer does not know which 
> world he will end up in from a first person
> viewpoint, even though he knows 
> that from a third person viewpoint he will end up in
> all of them.

Sorry to agree both with QM and the new version of the
classical MWI. The former is a 2nd tier (linear?
-after Alwyn Scott) version of the "model" 'physical
views', the latter is beyond the level I like to
speculate on. 
> 
> I find the randomness resulting from first person
> indeterminacy in the MWI 
> difficult to get my mind around. In the case of the
> chaotic coin toss one 
> can imagine God being able to do the calculations
> and predict the outcome, 
> but even God would not be able to tell me which
> world I will find myself in 
> when a quantum event induces splitting. And yet, I
> am stuck thinking of 
> quantum events in the MWI as fundamentally
> non-random.

Make yourself a god that could figure it all out.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
John M

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Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Tom Caylor writes:

>1) The reductionist definition that something is determined by the
>sum of atomic parts and rules.

So how about this: EITHER something is determined by the sum of atomic parts 
and rules OR it is truly random.

There are two mechanisms which make events seem random in ordinary life. One 
is the difficulty of actually making the required measurements, finding the 
appropriate rules and then doing the calculations. Classical chaos may make 
this practically impossible, but we still understand that the event (such as 
a coin toss) is fundamentally deterministic, and the randomness is only 
apparent.

The other mechanism is quantum randomness, for example in the case of 
radioctive decay. In a single world interpretation of QM this is, as far as 
I am aware, true randomness. In a no-collapse/ many worlds interpretation 
there is no true randomness because all outcomes occur deterministically 
according to the SWE. However, there is apparent randomness due to what 
Bruno calls the first person indeterminacy: the observer does not know which 
world he will end up in from a first person viewpoint, even though he knows 
that from a third person viewpoint he will end up in all of them.

I find the randomness resulting from first person indeterminacy in the MWI 
difficult to get my mind around. In the case of the chaotic coin toss one 
can imagine God being able to do the calculations and predict the outcome, 
but even God would not be able to tell me which world I will find myself in 
when a quantum event induces splitting. And yet, I am stuck thinking of 
quantum events in the MWI as fundamentally non-random.

Stathis Papaioannou

_
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Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-06 Thread Dominic Tarr

> ...Karl Popper did make an attempt to explain
> free-will in term of "self-diagonalization" indeed. The basic and
> simple idea is that IF I can totally predict myself, then I have the
> opportunity to refute such a prediction. This is why in a trial your
> lawyer cannot invoke determinacy (like my client has made a murder, but
> really he was just obeying to the physical laws), because if such a
> determination can make sense then the "client" could have use in some
> responsible way to escape its murderer fate still without violating the
> physical laws. I don't pretend there is any rigor here.
> "Free from what?": Free from what you can determine. The one who can
> determine that heavy bodies fall, will soon or later be able to fly.

I was just about to make a post to this effect, and then when i read
down to the end i found it.

but so how could primes be said to have free will? primes are complex
in the sense that they can not be predicted except by performing the
calculation they literally represent faster than some algorithm which
you are trying to beat.

likewise, one could surely calculate the outcome of a coin flip with a
sufficiently large and accurate number of measurements and fast
calculations, or even a human being, if you could accurately model
them and a sufficient amount of their local environment. there is no
shortcut to computing these things, you just have do all the hard work
quickly to make a prediction, so they are all complex, if not free.

however, as a person's local environment might plausibly contain a
computer which modeled their local environment and predicted their
behaviour. so the model would actually have to model itself, now
having to recalculate what the subject will do after every calculation
would take so long the subject would have already done something and
the model wouldn't be making a prediction any more!

this looks like a different order of magnitude of unpredictability to
what primes and coins have, because of the potential self-referential
step.

perhaps the key is that primes and coins do not have a will, thus
remain indifferent to being predicted. so you might say they are
"free", but you could not say they had "freewill".

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Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-04 Thread John M

Tom, - ha ha,
I would have asked the same stupid question, because a
"poisitve" integer is just so the product of -1 and
the NEGATIVE of the integer plus the (positive)
integer itself and 1. You did not want that either. 
I think a better restriction is in order, but let me
stop here. I don't want to start math 101.
Sorry for having been facetious.

John



--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

> 
> John,
> 
> As I was typing that post, I thought about the fact
> that I was leaving 
> out the word "positive" but I left it out anyway.  I
> should have typed 
> "a prime is a positive integer having no factors
> other than 1 and 
> itself."
> 
> While I'm at it, I wanted to correct something else
> in the same post.  
> Instead of
> 
> 1) The reductionist definition that something can be
> predicted by the
> sum of atomic parts and rules.
> 
> I think I should have said
> 
> 1) The reductionist definition that something is
> determined by the
> sum of atomic parts and rules.
> 
> Saying "is determined by" is theoretical and so
> covers the cases like 
> with a coin when limitations and uncertainties
> prohibit actual 
> prediction.  I guess this is a difference between
> the primes and 
> tossing a coin.  But perhaps it's only a difference
> of degree, because 
> when you add and multiply there is always the chance
> that you will make 
> an error.  But then you can repeat the computation,
> whereas you can't 
> repeat the *same* coin toss.  How does this relate
> to free will?  I 
> probably don't want to talk about that too much. 
> There's *probably* a 
> *deterministic* reason for that too.  ;)
> 
> Tom
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 11:57:21 -0700 (PDT)
> Subject: Re: Do prime numbers have free will?
> 
> 
> Tom,
> 
> I did not shoot my mouth about free will, because of
> my esteem for Bruno. Now, however, your definition
> of
> the primes tickled my mathematical ignorance and I
> ask
> you:
> IF - as you wrote,
> ">a prime is an integer having no factors other than
> >1 and itself. <
> (I heard that somewhere already)
> My question: is a 'number' the same as its negative,
> eg. is 2 = -2? because if not, then a prime number
> "p" is both equal to p.1 and 1.p, (so far so good,)
> but it is also p = -1.-p   --
> factors different from the prime itself and 1.
> (And please spare me of the [..] absolut values)
> 
> What say you?
> 
> John
> 
> 
> 
> --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> 
> >
> > Bruno,
> >
> > To help us understand this:  How is this different
> > from saying the toss
> > of a coin is both unpredictable and yet determined
> > by laws?
> >
> > Another thought is that there are the two extremes
> > of the meaning of
> > "law":
> >
> > 1) The reductionist definition that something can
> be
> > predicted by the
> > sum of atomic parts and rules.
> > With the primes it is the integers and addition
> and
> > multiplication.
> > With a coin supposedly it is "atoms" and the laws
> of
> > physics.
> > 2) The statistical definition that something
> follows
> > a certain
> > distribution over many trials.
> > With the primes it would be the prime number
> theorem
> > or more precise
> > bounds on the distribution of the primes.  With a
> > coin it would be the
> > binomial distribution.
> >
> > This brought up another thought.  The definition
> of
> > the primes is a
> > negative definition, an integer having no factors
> > other than 1 and
> > itself.  Of course this is what makes it difficult
> > to determine if a
> > large number is prime.  But is there something
> about
> > a negative
> > definition that sets us up for... what... not
> being
> > able to understand
> > something?  This also reminds me of the
> > diagonalization process,
> > defining something by saying it is not something
> > else, like Chaitin
> > does with his Omega, and of course Cantor with the
> > reals (resulting in
> > the mystery of the continuum hypothesis).  Another
> > famous negative
> > definition is that of infinity, which causes so
> many
> > weirdnesses in
> > divergent series, and talking about the
> multiverse,
> > etc.
> >
> > Perhaps free will is such a mytery because it can
> be
> > defined only
> > negative

Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-04 Thread daddycaylor

John,

As I was typing that post, I thought about the fact that I was leaving 
out the word "positive" but I left it out anyway.  I should have typed 
"a prime is a positive integer having no factors other than 1 and 
itself."

While I'm at it, I wanted to correct something else in the same post.  
Instead of

1) The reductionist definition that something can be predicted by the
sum of atomic parts and rules.

I think I should have said

1) The reductionist definition that something is determined by the
sum of atomic parts and rules.

Saying "is determined by" is theoretical and so covers the cases like 
with a coin when limitations and uncertainties prohibit actual 
prediction.  I guess this is a difference between the primes and 
tossing a coin.  But perhaps it's only a difference of degree, because 
when you add and multiply there is always the chance that you will make 
an error.  But then you can repeat the computation, whereas you can't 
repeat the *same* coin toss.  How does this relate to free will?  I 
probably don't want to talk about that too much.  There's *probably* a 
*deterministic* reason for that too.  ;)

Tom

-Original Message-
From: John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 11:57:21 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Re: Do prime numbers have free will?


Tom,

I did not shoot my mouth about free will, because of
my esteem for Bruno. Now, however, your definition of
the primes tickled my mathematical ignorance and I ask
you:
IF - as you wrote,
">a prime is an integer having no factors other than
>1 and itself. <
(I heard that somewhere already)
My question: is a 'number' the same as its negative,
eg. is 2 = -2? because if not, then a prime number
"p" is both equal to p.1 and 1.p, (so far so good,)
but it is also p = -1.-p   --
factors different from the prime itself and 1.
(And please spare me of the [..] absolut values)

What say you?

John



--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

>
> Bruno,
>
> To help us understand this:  How is this different
> from saying the toss
> of a coin is both unpredictable and yet determined
> by laws?
>
> Another thought is that there are the two extremes
> of the meaning of
> "law":
>
> 1) The reductionist definition that something can be
> predicted by the
> sum of atomic parts and rules.
> With the primes it is the integers and addition and
> multiplication.
> With a coin supposedly it is "atoms" and the laws of
> physics.
> 2) The statistical definition that something follows
> a certain
> distribution over many trials.
> With the primes it would be the prime number theorem
> or more precise
> bounds on the distribution of the primes.  With a
> coin it would be the
> binomial distribution.
>
> This brought up another thought.  The definition of
> the primes is a
> negative definition, an integer having no factors
> other than 1 and
> itself.  Of course this is what makes it difficult
> to determine if a
> large number is prime.  But is there something about
> a negative
> definition that sets us up for... what... not being
> able to understand
> something?  This also reminds me of the
> diagonalization process,
> defining something by saying it is not something
> else, like Chaitin
> does with his Omega, and of course Cantor with the
> reals (resulting in
> the mystery of the continuum hypothesis).  Another
> famous negative
> definition is that of infinity, which causes so many
> weirdnesses in
> divergent series, and talking about the multiverse,
> etc.
>
> Perhaps free will is such a mytery because it can be
> defined only
> negatively.  Free from what?
>
> Tom
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: FoR <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 17:42:03 +0200
> Subject: Do prime numbers have free will?
>
> Hi,
>
> I love so much this citation (often quoted) of D.
> Zagier, which seems
> to me to describe so well what is peculiar with ...
> humans, which
> behaviors are simultaneously completely determinated
> by numbers/math or
> waves/physics and at the same time are so much rich
> and unpredictible.
> I find instructive to see that primes already
> behaves like that 
>
>
> "There are two facts about the distribution of prime
> numbers of which I
> hope to convince you so overwhelmingly that they
> will be permanently
> engraved in your hearts. The first is that, despite
> their simple
> definition and role as the building blocks of the
> natural numbers, the
> prime numbers...grow like weeds among the natural
> numbers, seeming to
> obey

Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-04 Thread John M


Tom,

I did not shoot my mouth about free will, because of
my esteem for Bruno. Now, however, your definition of
the primes tickled my mathematical ignorance and I ask
you:
IF - as you wrote,
">a prime is an integer having no factors other than 
>1 and itself. <
(I heard that somewhere already) 
My question: is a 'number' the same as its negative,
eg. is 2 = -2? because if not, then a prime number 
"p" is both equal to p.1 and 1.p, (so far so good,) 
but it is also p = -1.-p   --  
factors different from the prime itself and 1. 
(And please spare me of the [..] absolut values)

What say you?

John



--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

> 
> Bruno,
> 
> To help us understand this:  How is this different
> from saying the toss 
> of a coin is both unpredictable and yet determined
> by laws?
> 
> Another thought is that there are the two extremes
> of the meaning of 
> "law":
> 
> 1) The reductionist definition that something can be
> predicted by the 
> sum of atomic parts and rules.
> With the primes it is the integers and addition and
> multiplication.  
> With a coin supposedly it is "atoms" and the laws of
> physics.
> 2) The statistical definition that something follows
> a certain 
> distribution over many trials.
> With the primes it would be the prime number theorem
> or more precise 
> bounds on the distribution of the primes.  With a
> coin it would be the 
> binomial distribution.
> 
> This brought up another thought.  The definition of
> the primes is a 
> negative definition, an integer having no factors
> other than 1 and 
> itself.  Of course this is what makes it difficult
> to determine if a 
> large number is prime.  But is there something about
> a negative 
> definition that sets us up for... what... not being
> able to understand 
> something?  This also reminds me of the
> diagonalization process, 
> defining something by saying it is not something
> else, like Chaitin 
> does with his Omega, and of course Cantor with the
> reals (resulting in 
> the mystery of the continuum hypothesis).  Another
> famous negative 
> definition is that of infinity, which causes so many
> weirdnesses in 
> divergent series, and talking about the multiverse,
> etc.
> 
> Perhaps free will is such a mytery because it can be
> defined only 
> negatively.  Free from what?
> 
> Tom
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: FoR <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 17:42:03 +0200
> Subject: Do prime numbers have free will?
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I love so much this citation (often quoted) of D.
> Zagier, which seems
> to me to describe so well what is peculiar with ...
> humans, which
> behaviors are simultaneously completely determinated
> by numbers/math or
> waves/physics and at the same time are so much rich
> and unpredictible.
> I find instructive to see that primes already
> behaves like that 
> 
> 
> "There are two facts about the distribution of prime
> numbers of which I
> hope to convince you so overwhelmingly that they
> will be permanently
> engraved in your hearts. The first is that, despite
> their simple
> definition and role as the building blocks of the
> natural numbers, the
> prime numbers...grow like weeds among the natural
> numbers, seeming to
> obey no other law than that of chance, and nobody
> can predict where the
> next one will sprout. The second fact is even more
> astonishing, for it
> states just the opposite: that the prime numbers
> exhibit stunning
> regularity, that there are laws governing their
> behaviour, and that
> they obey these laws with almost military
> precision."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
>
> 
> 


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Re: Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-04 Thread daddycaylor

Bruno,

To help us understand this:  How is this different from saying the toss 
of a coin is both unpredictable and yet determined by laws?

Another thought is that there are the two extremes of the meaning of 
"law":

1) The reductionist definition that something can be predicted by the 
sum of atomic parts and rules.
With the primes it is the integers and addition and multiplication.  
With a coin supposedly it is "atoms" and the laws of physics.
2) The statistical definition that something follows a certain 
distribution over many trials.
With the primes it would be the prime number theorem or more precise 
bounds on the distribution of the primes.  With a coin it would be the 
binomial distribution.

This brought up another thought.  The definition of the primes is a 
negative definition, an integer having no factors other than 1 and 
itself.  Of course this is what makes it difficult to determine if a 
large number is prime.  But is there something about a negative 
definition that sets us up for... what... not being able to understand 
something?  This also reminds me of the diagonalization process, 
defining something by saying it is not something else, like Chaitin 
does with his Omega, and of course Cantor with the reals (resulting in 
the mystery of the continuum hypothesis).  Another famous negative 
definition is that of infinity, which causes so many weirdnesses in 
divergent series, and talking about the multiverse, etc.

Perhaps free will is such a mytery because it can be defined only 
negatively.  Free from what?

Tom

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: FoR <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 17:42:03 +0200
Subject: Do prime numbers have free will?

Hi,

I love so much this citation (often quoted) of D. Zagier, which seems
to me to describe so well what is peculiar with ... humans, which
behaviors are simultaneously completely determinated by numbers/math or
waves/physics and at the same time are so much rich and unpredictible.
I find instructive to see that primes already behaves like that 


"There are two facts about the distribution of prime numbers of which I
hope to convince you so overwhelmingly that they will be permanently
engraved in your hearts. The first is that, despite their simple
definition and role as the building blocks of the natural numbers, the
prime numbers...grow like weeds among the natural numbers, seeming to
obey no other law than that of chance, and nobody can predict where the
next one will sprout. The second fact is even more astonishing, for it
states just the opposite: that the prime numbers exhibit stunning
regularity, that there are laws governing their behaviour, and that
they obey these laws with almost military precision."




Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Do prime numbers have free will?

2006-04-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi,

I love so much this citation (often quoted) of D. Zagier, which seems to me to describe so well what is peculiar with ... humans, which behaviors are simultaneously completely determinated by numbers/math or waves/physics and at the same time are so much rich and unpredictible. I find instructive to see that primes already behaves like that 


"There are two facts about the distribution of prime numbers of which I hope to convince you so overwhelmingly that they will be permanently engraved in your hearts. The first is that, despite their simple definition and role as the building blocks of the natural numbers, the prime numbers...grow like weeds among the natural numbers, seeming to obey no other law than that of chance, and nobody can predict where the next one will sprout. The second fact is even more astonishing, for it states just the opposite: that the prime numbers exhibit stunning regularity, that there are laws governing their behaviour, and that they obey these laws with almost military precision."




Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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